Amicus Curiae Brief — Kendra Espinoza, et al., Petitioners v. Montana Department of Revenue, et al.
Supreme Court briefSep 18, 2019
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NO. 18-1195
In the
Supreme Court of the United States
________________
KENDRA ESPINOZA, JERI ELLEN ANDERSON, and
JAMIE SCHAEFER,
v.
Petitioners,
MONTANA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, and GENE
WALBORN, in his official capacity as DIRECTOR OF
THE MONTANA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE,
Respondents.
________________
On Writ of Certiorari to the
Montana Supreme Court
________________
BRIEF FOR AMICI CURIAE
CENTER FOR EDUCATION REFORM,
ET AL., IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS
(ADDITIONAL AMICI LISTED
ON INSIDE COVER)
________________
PAUL D. CLEMENT
Counsel of Record
GEORGE W. HICKS, JR.
ERIN M. HAWLEY
KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP
1301 Pennsylvania Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20004
(202) 389-5000
paul.clement@kirkland.com
September 18, 2019
ADDITIONAL AMICI CURIAE
Learn4Life
Power2Parents
Cristo Rey Network
Families Empowered
Foundation for Excellence in Education
Project 21
Jack Kemp Foundation
Parents for Educational Freedom in
North Carolina
Catholic Education Partners
Catholic Charities DC
American Legislative Exchange Council
Excellence Schools PA
Chris Stewart
Sharif El-Mekki
Dr. Howard Fuller
ii
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
Amici are not-for-profit organizations and three
individuals. No amicus has a parent or subsidiary
organization, none is an issuer of stock, and no
publicly held corporation owns 10% or more of the
stock of any amicus.
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT ............ ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ....................................... v
STATEMENT OF INTEREST ................................... 1
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT .................................... 5
ARGUMENT ............................................................... 7
I.
Prohibiting Parents From Using Generally
Available Funds To Direct Their Children’s
Education Because A School Is Religiously
Affiliated Inflicts Direct And Significant
Injuries ................................................................. 7
A. Parents
Have
a
Constitutionally
Protected Liberty Interest to Pursue the
Best Educational Opportunity for Their
Children, Which Is Promoted By
Programs
Expanding
Educational
Options .......................................................... 7
B. Empowering Parents to Exercise Their
Constitutional Right to Direct Their
Children’s Education Results in Better
Schools
and
Better
Educational
Outcomes,
As
Numerous
Studies
Concerning
Brain
Science
And
Individual Learning Reinforce ................... 10
C. Denying Parents Their School of Choice
Because of its Religious Nature Injures
Parents and Children by Violating
Bedrock Constitutional Principles ............. 15
II. The State’s Interest In Avoiding Indirect
Funding Of Religiously Affiliated Institutions
Is Miniscule ....................................................... 17
iv
III. The Balance Of Interests Strongly Favors
The Constitutional Right Of Parents To
Direct
Their
Children’s
Education,
Consistent With Framing-Era Principles And
Contrary to the Principles Of The Blaine
Amendment Era ................................................ 21
CONCLUSION ......................................................... 27
v
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Agostini v. Felton,
521 U.S. 203 (1997)................................................ 18
Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri,
564 U.S. 379 (2011)................................................ 20
Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc.
v. City of Hialeah,
508 U.S. 520 (1993)................................................ 16
Employment Division v. Smith,
494 U.S. 872 (1990).................................... 16, 17, 22
Garcetti v. Ceballos,
547 U.S. 410 (2006)................................................ 20
Locke v. Davey,
540 U.S. 712 (2004)................................................ 21
Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390 (1923).............................................. 8, 9
Mitchell v. Helms,
530 U.S. 793 (2000).......................................... 18, 25
Mueller v. Allen,
463 U.S. 388 (1983).................................... 18, 19, 21
Pierce v. Society of the Sisters of the
Holy Name of Jesus and Mary,
268 U.S. 510 (1925)............................................ 8, 15
Rosenberger v. Rectors and Visitors
of the University of Virginia,
515 U.S. 819 (1995)................................................ 20
Trinity Lutheran Church of
Columbia, Inc. v. Comer,
137 S. Ct. 2012 (2017)............................................ 16
vi
Troxel v. Granville,
530 U.S. 57 (2000).................................................... 7
Washington v. Glucksberg,
521 U.S. 702 (1997)............................................ 8, 16
Wisconsin v. Yoder,
406 U.S. 205 (1972).................................... 15, 16, 17
Witters v. Washington Dept. of
Servs. for the Blind,
474 U.S. 481 (1986)................................................ 19
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,
536 U.S. 639 (2002)................................ 9, 17, 18, 19
Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist.,
509 U.S. 1 (1993).................................................... 19
Regulation
5 C.F.R. § 950.110..................................................... 20
Other Authorities
4 Cong. Rec. (1875) ................................................... 26
Alliance for Catholic Education, Research on
the Case for Catholic Schools, University of
Notre Dame, available at
https://bit.ly/2m0eDYE .......................................... 12
Ashley Berner, Education for the Common
Good, EducationNext (Nov. 30, 2017)
available at https://bit.ly/2lOYDc5 ........................ 12
Ashley Berner, The Case for Educational
Pluralism in the U.S., Manhattan Institute
(July 11, 2019), available at
https://bit.ly/33wVMWq ......................................... 23
vii
Center for Education Reform, The
Disappointing Reality of American
Education, available at:
https://bit.ly/2kM9nrz ...................................... 10, 11
Charles L. Glenn, The American Model of
State and School (2012) ......................................... 24
Common School Movement, available at
https://bit.ly/2kOEiDv............................................ 23
Corey DeAngelis and Patrick J. Wolf, The
School Choice Voucher: A “Get Out of Jail”
Card?, University of Arkansas (Mar. 8,
2016) available at https://bit.ly/2kLZR7G ............ 12
Frederick Mark Gedicks, Reconstructing the
Blaine Amendments, 2 First Amend. L.
Rev. 85 (2004) ........................................................ 23
Jessica Bakeman, According to a New
Department of Education Study, Charter
Schools Outperform Traditional Public
Shows, Center for Education Reform
(Apr. 17, 2017) available at
https://bit.ly/2kPjM5R ........................................... 13
John C. Jeffries, Jr. & James E. Ryan, A
Political History of the Establishment
Clause, 100 Mich. L. Rev. 279 (2001) ........ 23, 24, 25
Joseph P. Viteritti, Blaine’s Wake: School
Choice, The First Amendment, and State
Constitutional Law, 21 Harv. J.L. & Pub.
Pol’y 657 (1998) ...................................................... 24
Kyle Duncan, Secularism’s Laws: State
Blaine Amendments and Religious
Persecution, 72 Fordham L. Rev. 493 (2003) ........ 24
viii
Mark Edward DeForrest, An Overview and
Evaluation of State Blaine Amendments:
Origins, Scope, and First Amendment
Concerns, 26 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 551
(2003) ...................................................................... 26
Mary Jo Madda, There’s No Such Thing as
Average’: Todd Rose on Brain Science and
the Limitations of Standards, EdSurge
(Oct. 26, 2016) available at
https://bit.ly/2ePLt7y ............................................. 13
Michael B. Horn, Why Personalized Learning
is Imperative, Education Elements (Jun.
22, 2016) available at
https://bit.ly/28UgdB3 ..................................... 13, 14
Non-Sectarianism Reconsidered, 18 J.L. &
Pol. 65 (2002) ......................................................... 24
Philip C. Hamburger, Separation of Church
and State (2002) ............................................... 24, 25
Richard A. Baer, Jr., The Supreme Court’s
Discriminatory Use of the Term “Sectarian,”
6 J.L. & Pol. 449 (1990) ......................................... 25
Stephen Macedo, Diversity and Distrust:
Civic Education in a Multicultural
Democracy (2000) ................................................... 23
Steven K. Green, The Bible, the School, and
the Constitution (2012) .......................................... 25
Steven K. Green, The Blaine Amendment
Reconsidered, 36 Am. J. Legal Hist. 38
(1992) .......................................................... 24, 25, 26
ix
Tim Keller, As School Choice Programs
Grow, We Must Debunk Myths About How
Choice Works, HomeRoom (Jan. 23, 2019)
available at https://bit.ly/2kmWZ12...................... 12
Wayne J. Urban & Jennings L. Wagoner Jr.,
American Education: A History
(2nd ed. New York: McGraw-Hill 2000)................ 23
STATEMENT OF INTEREST 1
The Center for Education Reform (“CER”),
founded in 1993, is the nation’s leading authority on
advancing education opportunity and innovation in
American education. Its mission is to expand
educational opportunities that lead to improved
economic outcomes for all Americans, particularly our
youth, ensuring that the conditions are ripe for
innovation, freedom, and flexibility throughout U.S.
education.
A non-profit research and support
organization, CER creates opportunities for, and
challenges obstacles to, better education for America’s
communities by providing support and guidance to
parents and teachers, community and civic groups,
policymakers, grassroots leaders, and all other
interested citizens who are working to bring
fundamental reforms to their schools. CER’s work
enables broad and lasting quality educational
opportunities that produce high standards, enhance
accountability, and protect parents’ rights to direct
educational opportunities for their children, securing
the future prosperity of all citizens, regardless of the
circumstances into which they are born.
In CER’s experience, the factor most closely
related to positive educational outcomes is parents’
ability to select the school that their children attend.
1 Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 37.6, amici curiae state that
no counsel for any party authored this brief in whole or in part
and that no entity or person, aside from amici curiae, their
members, and their counsel, made any monetary contribution
toward the preparation or submission of this brief. Pursuant to
Supreme Court Rule 37.3, counsel of record for all parties have
consented to this filing in letters on file with the Clerk’s office.
2
Giving parents that opportunity not only frees parents
and their children from the tyranny of the zip code; it
creates better educational opportunities for all
students by leveraging the dynamics of consumer
opportunity and provider competition to infuse
accountability and quality into the educational
system. Allowing parents to educate their children as
they see fit fosters parental involvement and high
expectations, provides educational opportunity where
none existed before, and promotes the rights of
parents and the best interests of children over
bureaucratic inertia.
CER is joined here by other amici who are
similarly committed to protecting the constitutional
rights of families to direct the education of their
children. Foundation for Excellence in Education
focuses on educational opportunity, innovation, and
quality by increasing student learning, advancing
equity, and readying graduates for college and career.
Learn4Life is a charter school organization serving
over 50,000 at-risk high school students. Families
Empowered is a parent service organization, annually
connecting over 60,000 families with school options
that work for their particular children.
Project 21 is a black leadership network created
in 1992 to highlight the diversity of black opinion on
public policy, including education. Participants in
Project 21 activities are black professionals who share
the common goal of making the nation a better place
for all Americans. The Jack Kemp Foundation is a
nonprofit organization devoted to developing,
engaging, and recognizing exceptional leaders who
champion the American Idea.
The American
3
Legislative Exchange Council is the nation’s largest
non-partisan individual membership association of
state legislators.
Excellence Schools PA, Parents for Educational
Freedom in North Carolina, and Power2Parent are
statewide educational advocacy organizations.
Excellence Schools PA advocates for educational
options in Pennsylvania and was founded on the belief
that all students, regardless of race or socioeconomic
status, have the right to a high-quality education.
Parents for Educational Freedom in North Carolina
advocates for quality educational options and educates
North Carolinians about those options. Power2Parent
is a Nevada parents’ organization that informs,
organizes, and mobilizes community members to
protect parental rights.
Catholic Education Partners serves the Catholic
community by advancing public policy that empowers
families and children to enjoy the benefits of a
Catholic education. Catholic Charities DC is a
private, non-profit agency operating 59 programs
throughout the Archdiocese of Washington, serving
over 140,000 people a year. The Cristo Rey Network
partners with educators, businesses, and communities
to deliver a college- and career-preparatory education
in the Catholic tradition for students with limited
economic resources, integrating rigorous academic
curricula with four years of professional work
experience and support to and through college.
Three individual amici are leaders in the
educational policy space.
Chris Stewart is an
educational leader writer, essayist, and speaker based
in Minnesota. Stewart founded the 8 Black Hands
4
podcast, and his Citizen Ed Blog is followed by
thousands nationally. Sharif El-Mekki is a career
educator who founded the Philly’s 7th Ward blog,
which works to find educational solutions for all
students, particularly African-American children. ElMekki is a member of the 8 Black Hands podcast and
served on the Mayor’s Commission on African
American Males across two administrations. Dr.
Howard Fuller is a long-time community activist,
former Superintendent of Milwaukee Public Schools,
author, and founder of the Institute for
Transformation of Learning at Marquette University.
Amici believe that the Montana scholarship
program at issue in this case is precisely the sort of
program that enhances educational outcomes—not
just for the low-income parents and children who
utilize it, but for all students who benefit from
increased competition and accountability in
Montana’s educational system.
Affirming the
Montana Supreme Court’s decision striking down this
neutral program would do incalculable damage to the
rights of parents and children, all for the negligible
benefit of avoiding the indirect funding of religiously
affiliated institutions—an interest this Court has
repeatedly regarded as minimal. Accordingly, amici
urge this Court to reverse the decision below.
5
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This Court has long held that the liberty protected
by the Due Process Clause includes the constitutional
right of parents to direct the education and upbringing
of their children.
Research demonstrates that
empowering parents to exercise that constitutional
right by selecting the school they consider most
appropriate for their children improves educational
outcomes for all students.
The reason is
straightforward: The science of how students learn
establishes what most parents know intuitively—
namely, that learning is a highly individual process.
Because parents have the most knowledge about their
children and their particular learning styles, which
may vary substantially even among children raised in
the same household, they can best determine the
optimal pedagogical fit for their children when their
right to direct their children’s education is protected
and facilitated. Because of financial constraints or
longstanding housing patterns, however, many
parents can only realistically exercise that right with
government assistance. Denying parents the ability
to exercise that right because of the religious
affiliation of the schools they deem best-suited for
their children results in numerous direct and
significant injuries to core constitutional interests. It
infringes upon parents’ liberty interest in directing
their children’s upbringing, and it infringes upon the
fundamental First Amendment protection of free
exercise.
In stark contrast to these substantial injuries to
individual rights, the government has only a minimal
interest in avoiding indirect funding of religiously
6
affiliated entities. This Court has long distinguished
between the greater state interest in avoiding direct
funding of religious entities—although even that is
permitted in some contexts—and the far weaker state
interest in avoiding indirect funding of religious
entities. So miniscule is the state interest in ensuring
that government funds do not indirectly end up with
religiously affiliated organizations that this Court has
never found unconstitutional a government program
where religiously affiliated entities obtain state funds
only as a result of choices by private individuals. This
negligible state interest mirrors the reduced state
interest in other circumstances involving indirect
government aid, such as where the government
provides a neutral means for third parties to engage
in speech or other expression.
Weighing these competing interests, the balance
plainly favors respecting parents’ rights, particularly
in this case, where two distinct layers of private choice
dictate the destination of government funds. That
balance, furthermore, is consistent with Framing-era
principles. Minimizing the state’s ability to restrict
parental decisionmaking when it comes to education
reestablishes the traditional pluralism and limited
governmental involvement in education that prevailed
in the early Republic. The Blaine Amendment era
marked a deviation from those principles by seeking
to cement a Protestant educational homogeneity that
the Framers would not recognize and that modern-day
principles reject. To restore the Framers’ vision,
reassert parents’ constitutional liberty interest in
directing their children’s upbringing, and reaffirm the
core First Amendment interest in free exercise, this
Court should reverse the decision below.
7
ARGUMENT
I.
Prohibiting Parents From Using Generally
Available Funds To Direct Their Children’s
Education Because A School Is Religiously
Affiliated Inflicts Direct And Significant
Injuries.
The Montana Supreme Court’s decision denies
parents the opportunity to participate in a neutral,
generally available program intended to benefit the
state’s most at-risk children and to improve
educational outcomes. That result inflicts significant
and direct injuries on parents and their children.
When a state prevents parents from choosing the best
educational opportunity for their children, parents are
unable to fully exercise their well-established
constitutional right to direct the education of their
children. Their children are also directly injured by
the lack of educational opportunity. That these
injuries derive from the mere fact that a family’s
desired school has a religious affiliation only
underscores the gravity and caprice of the harm.
A. Parents
Have
a
Constitutionally
Protected Liberty Interest to Pursue the
Best Educational Opportunity for Their
Children, Which Is Promoted By
Programs
Expanding
Educational
Options.
The constitutional liberty interest of parents to
direct the education of their children is “perhaps the
oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized
by this Court.” Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65
(2000). Nearly a century ago, in Meyer v. Nebraska,
this Court held that the “liberty” protected by the Due
8
Process Clause includes the right of parents “to control
the education” of their children. 262 U.S. 390, 399-401
(1923). The Court expounded upon that principle in
Pierce v. Society of the Sisters of the Holy Names of
Jesus and Mary, a case which upheld the right of
parents to send their children to private, religiously
affiliated schools. 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925). Pierce
held that the “liberty of parents” includes the right “to
direct the upbringing and education of children under
their control.” Id. As the Court explained, “[t]he child
is not the mere creature of the State; those who
nurture him and direct his destiny have the right,
coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare
him for additional obligations.” Id. at 535. Thus, “[i]n
a long line of cases,” this Court has held that “the
‘liberty’ specially protected by the Due Process Clause
includes the right[] … to direct the education and
upbringing of one’s children.”
Washington v.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997).
For many low-income families, however, parents’
ability to “direct the education and upbringing of
[their] children” is constrained by financial restraints
and the unfortunate but real connection between the
price tag of a house and the quality of education a child
receives. Accordingly, the critical liberty interest of
pursuing the most desirable education for one’s child
is promoted by programs that expand the options for
parents to send their children to schools beyond their
zip code—whether they take the form of vouchers,
educational savings accounts, or tax credit scholarship
programs.
This Court recognized as much in Zelman v.
Simmons-Harris, a case that involved 75,000 children
9
enrolled in the Cleveland City School District—a
district that failed to meet any of the 18 state
standards for minimal acceptable performance. 536
U.S. 639 (2002). Only 1 in 10 ninth graders passed a
basic proficiency exam and more than two-thirds of
high school students either failed or dropped out. Id.
at 644. The state auditor found the school system to
be suffering a “crisis that is perhaps unprecedented in
the history of American education.” Id. Hardest hit
were children from low-income and minority families,
who were unable to move to wealthier communities
with better schools. Id.
To address Cleveland’s failing schools, Ohio
enacted a scholarship program that provided tuition
assistance for students to “attend a participating
public or private school of their parent’s choosing.” Id.
at 645. This Court upheld against an Establishment
Clause challenge Ohio’s program in part because it
allowed parents to make a better educational choice
for their child.
See id.
Facilitating parents’
opportunities to select a school that is best-suited for
their children thus enables parents to exercise their
constitutionally protected liberty interest to “control
the education” of their children. Meyer, 262 U.S. at
401; see Zelman, 268 U.S. at 534-35.
10
B. Empowering Parents to Exercise Their
Constitutional Right to Direct Their
Children’s Education Results in Better
Schools
and
Better
Educational
Outcomes,
As
Numerous
Studies
Concerning
Brain
Science
And
Individual Learning Reinforce.
Not only do parents possess a constitutional right
to direct the education of their children; facilitating
this right leads to better schools and better
educational outcomes for parents and children, as
recent studies underscore.
The unfortunate truth is that, for an increasing
number of working families in the United States,
traditional school districts are not working. The data
from a 2017 National Assessment of Educational
Progress (NAEP) study are disturbing. Only 36% of
public school 8th grade students tested at or above
proficient in reading. Center for Education Reform,
The Disappointing Reality of American Education, at
4, available at: https://bit.ly/2kM9nrz. In math, the
8th grade proficiency level was even lower at 34%. Id.
The study also found a six-year gap in reading
achievement between the nation’s poorest and
wealthiest students. Id.
The implications are serious. According to the
Department of Justice, “the link between academic
failure and delinquency, violence, and crime is welded
to reading failure.” Id. at 6. An astounding 85 percent
of juveniles who “interface with the juvenile court
system are functionally illiterate, and over 70 percent
of inmates in America’s prisons cannot read above a
fourth-grade level.” Id.
11
Further, according to the Programme for
International Student Assessment (“PISA”), the
United States has one of the largest achievement gaps
and one of the most “deeply inequitable” education
systems in the industrialized world. Id. at 8-9. The
United States is one of only five OECD countries that
does not provide government funding for privately
managed secular and sectarian schools. Id.
In 2018, an estimated 43% of American children
were growing up in low-income families. Id. at 3.
Thus, nearly half of American families do not have the
resources needed to cover basic expenses, much less
send their children to their school of choice. Id.
Providing options outside of a family’s zip code breaks
the unfortunate link between the home a family can
afford and the quality of education they can give their
children. Providing choices also helps parents tailor
their child’s school to the particular child’s learning
needs and styles.
After all, parents who are
empowered to make educational choices—whether by
government programs or their own resources—do not
necessarily make uniform decisions about their
children’s education. They may leave one child in
public school, while a second child attends private
school, or select different non-public options based on
each child’s learning styles and needs.
Research has shown that educational choice
programs “improve academic outcomes … positively
impact graduation rates, college enrollment, civic
engagement, crime rates, and improve parental and
student satisfaction.” Tim Keller, As School Choice
Programs Grow, We Must Debunk Myths About How
Choice Works, HomeRoom (Jan. 23, 2019) available at
12
https://bit.ly/2kmWZ12. It has likewise confirmed
that private schools “often narrow [the] academic
achievement gaps, create social capital, and foster
democratic behavior.” Ashley Berner, Education for
the Common Good, EducationNext (Nov. 30, 2017)
available at https://bit.ly/2lOYDc5.
And it has
demonstrated that religiously affiliated schools in
particular have a positive impact on student
achievement, attendance, and civic engagement.
Alliance for Catholic Education, Research on the Case
for Catholic Schools, University of Notre Dame,
available at https://bit.ly/2m0eDYE.
Providing options among schools also helps
students attend safer schools and avoid bullying and
gang activity. A University of Arkansas study found
that private school attendees were half as likely to
commit felonies and misdemeanors as their local
public school colleagues. Corey DeAngelis and Patrick
J. Wolf, The School Choice Voucher: A “Get Out of Jail”
Card?, University of Arkansas (Mar. 8, 2016)
available at https://bit.ly/2kLZR7G.
Similarly, studies from the University of
Arkansas show that charter schools regularly
outperform their public counterparts, even with less
funding. In 2015-2016, for example, Florida’s charter
schools had smaller racial achievement gaps and
students made greater learning gains and performed
better on state exams than their traditional public
school peers in 65 out of 77 comparisons. Jessica
Bakeman, According to a New Department of
Education Study, Charter Schools Outperform
Traditional Public Shows, Center for Education
13
Reform
(Apr.
17,
https://bit.ly/2kPjM5R.
2017)
available
at
Decades of brain science reinforce and help
explain the reality that educational outcomes are
improved when parents have the opportunity to fully
exercise their constitutional right to direct their
children’s education. Research into the science of
learning establishes what all parents know
intuitively: every child learns differently. There is
simply no one-size-fits-all model when it comes to
learning. In fact, research shows that “[e]ach child
has different learning needs at different times.”
Michael B. Horn, Why Personalized Learning is
Imperative, Education Elements (Jun. 22, 2016)
available at https://bit.ly/28UgdB3. As Todd Rose,
director of the Mind, Brain and Education program at
the Harvard Graduate School of Education, explains,
there is no such thing as an “average” brain; every
person’s brain operates differently. Mary Jo Madda,
There’s No Such Thing as Average’: Todd Rose on
Brain Science and the Limitations of Standards,
EdSurge
(Oct.
26,
2016)
available
at
https://bit.ly/2ePLt7y. A child’s individual learning
style stems from the “unique way[]” that his or her
brain “retrieve[s] information and create[s] memory.”
Id.
The scientific research into how children learn
underscores the critical importance of parent-directed
educational opportunity. Universal education in the
United States was originally modeled after factories.
See Horn, Why Personalized Learning is Imperative.
In that still-extant industrialized model, students are
batched into classrooms based upon age and taught
14
the same material at the same pace. Id. Despite the
best efforts of teachers, the standardization of the way
students are taught makes tailoring lessons to each
child in a 20 to 35 student classroom impossible. See
id. It also creates learning gaps that later return to
haunt students. Id. A school system that confines
students to one progression of learning will not
optimize learning for any student, let alone for
students with learning styles and needs that differ
from the mean.
Protecting and facilitating the right of parents to
direct the educational outcomes of children allows for
critically needed individualization of educational
options to meet the needs of individual students. It is
no surprise that parents with multiple children who
are fully empowered to choose—whether by their own
resources or government programs—do not always
choose the same educational path for each child. They
may send one to private school, one to the local public
school, and one to a specialized academy. Single-sex
education may be the right path for one child, and a
science focus the better path for a sibling. It is also no
surprise that empowering parents to make such
choices produces better educational outcomes, because
parents best understand their children’s individual
learning styles. The science behind how students
learn thus validates that when parents exercise their
constitutional right to direct their children’s education
by choosing among a range of schools, better
educational outcomes are the result.
In short, the data on the improved outcomes that
come with parent-directed education as well as
decades of brain science confirm what common sense
15
suggests.
When parents are given options for
schooling that upend the tyranny of the zip code and
facilitate the exercise of their constitutional right to
direct and control the education of their children,
educational diversity is enhanced and better
educational outcomes are achieved.
C. Denying Parents Their School of Choice
Because of its Religious Nature Injures
Parents and Children by Violating
Bedrock Constitutional Principles.
Given this Court’s repeated recognition of
parents’ constitutional right to control their children’s
education,
denying
parents
their
preferred
educational option simply because their desired school
has a religious affiliation inflicts direct and significant
injury on parents and children. As this Court has long
held, a State may not impinge on “the traditional
interest of parents with respect to the religious
upbringing of their children” so long as the parents
prepare them for additional obligations. Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972) (quoting Pierce, 268
U.S. at 535). The state’s interest in educating its
citizens must yield to the parent’s fundamental liberty
interest in reasonably controlling that education. See
id.
It is no answer to say that parents may choose to
send their children to other private schools, so long as
they are not religiously affiliated. The state may not
limit a parent’s choice of educational options to secular
ones. As this Court has recognized, “the values of
parental direction of the religious upbringing and
education of their children in their early and formative
years have a high place in our society.” Id. at 213-14.
16
Denying parents their preferred option among a wide
variety of otherwise neutrally available options
merely because it is religiously affiliated is
tantamount to denying them the ability to direct their
children’s education and send them to their school of
choice. But parents—not the government—have both
the fundamental right and the high calling to direct
the education and upbringing of their children. See
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720.
Denying parents the ability to send their children
to a desired school simply because that school is
religiously affiliated directly implicates First
Amendment concerns as well. The Free Exercise
Clause “‘protect[s] religious observers against unequal
treatment’ and subjects to the strictest scrutiny laws
that target the religious for ‘special disabilities’ based
on their ‘religious status.’” Trinity Lutheran Church of
Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2019 (2017)
(quoting Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of
Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533, 542 (1993)). Religious
discrimination is particularly pernicious when it
intersects with a fundamental liberty interest like
directing children’s education, as this Court
recognized in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S.
872 (1990).
There, as examples of “the First
Amendment bar[ring] application of a neutral,
generally applicable law to religiously motivated
action,” the Court highlighted cases that involved “the
Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with other
constitutional protections,” including “the right of
parents … to direct the education of their children.”
Id. at 872, 881 (citing Yoder and Pierce). The Court
explicitly affirmed that “when the interests of
parenthood are combined with a free exercise claim …
17
more than merely a ‘reasonable relation to some
purpose within the competency of the State’ is
required to sustain the validity of the State’s
requirement under the First Amendment.” Id. at 881
n.1 (quoting Yoder, 406 U.S. at 233).
This case likewise implicates “the interests of
parenthood … combined with a free exercise claim.”
Both interests trigger constitutional protections, and
both interests are directly and significantly infringed
when parents are denied the ability to direct their
child’s education simply because the school of their
choosing is religiously affiliated.
II. The State’s Interest In Avoiding Indirect
Funding
Of
Religiously
Affiliated
Institutions Is Miniscule.
In stark contrast to the core liberty and First
Amendment interests of parents to direct their
children’s
education
free
from
religious
discrimination, the state’s interest in preventing the
indirect funding of religiously affiliated entities is
minimal. This Court has long recognized a difference
between direct and indirect uses of government funds
and underscored the government’s attenuated interest
in the latter. For example, the Court’s decisions “have
drawn a consistent distinction between government
programs that provide aid directly to religious schools”
and programs where “government aid reaches
religious schools only as a result of the genuine and
independent choices of private individuals.” Zelman,
536 U.S. at 649. The former require an evaluation of
criteria that include whether the government “acted
with the purpose of advancing or inhibiting religion”
and whether the direct aid “has the ‘effect’ of
18
advancing or inhibiting religion.” Agostini v. Felton,
521 U.S. 203, 222-23 (1997); see also Mitchell v. Helms,
530 U.S. 793, 807-08 (2000) (plurality); id. at 836-37
(O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). 2 The
latter, however, simply “do[] not offend the
Establishment Clause,” Zelman, 536 U.S. at 663,
because there is no danger that a reasonable observer
would attribute any endorsement of religion to the
State. In such cases, any “incidental advancement of
a religious mission, or the perceived endorsement of a
religious message, is reasonably attributable to the
individual recipient, not to the government.” Id. at
652.
Accordingly, this Court has repeatedly held that
where funds flow indirectly, the government has a
substantially reduced interest in how recipients of
government aid use those funds. In Mueller v. Allen,
463 U.S. 388 (1983), for instance, the Court rejected
an Establishment Clause challenge to a Minnesota
program authorizing tax deductions for private school
tuition even though over 90% of the program’s
beneficiaries were parents of children in religious
schools. This Court held that where “public funds
become
available
only
as
a
result
of
numerous … choices of individual parents of schoolage children,” no “imprimatur of State approval” can
be deemed conferred on religion. Id. at 399; see also
Witters v. Washington Dept. of Servs. for the Blind, 474
U.S. 481 (1986); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch.
2 Even then, the Court has upheld against Establishment
Clause challenge programs providing “government aid that
directly assists the educational function of religious schools.”
Agostini, 521 U.S. at 225.
19
Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993). Indeed, because indirect
expenditures are by definition the result of the
intervening decisions of third parties, this Court has
“never found a program of true private choice to offend
the Establishment Clause.” Zelman, 536 U.S. at 653
(emphasis added).
This Court’s Establishment Clause cases speak
directly to the lack of a strong government interest in
the indirect destination of government funds. Where
a state program, “[b]y according parents freedom to
select a school of their choice … ensures that
[government aid] will be present in a sectarian school
only as a result of the private decision of individual
parents,” the State has a minimal interest in that flow
of funds. Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 10. “The historic
purposes of the [Establishment] [C]lause simply do
not encompass the sort of attenuated financial benefit,
ultimately controlled by the private choices of
individual parents, that eventually flows to parochial
schools from the neutrally available tax benefit at
issue in this case.” Mueller, 463 U.S. at 400.
The Court has recognized the distinction between
direct and indirect uses of government funds—and the
state’s greater interest in the former and attenuated
interest in the latter—in other contexts. For example,
“a State may issue a paycheck to one of its employees,
who may then donate all or part of that paycheck to a
religious institution, all without constitutional
barrier; and the State may do so even knowing that
the employee so intends to dispose of his salary.”
Witters, 474 U.S. at 486-87. The indirect use of
government funds toward religious organizations does
not implicate the government’s core interests, and
20
thus the government has a minimal interest in
policing the spending decisions of its employees. See
5 C.F.R. § 950.110 (guaranteeing the eligibility of
religious organizations to participate in the Combined
Federal Campaign).
Along similar lines, the government has a distinct
interest in regulating the content of its employees’
speech and conduct especially when they address
matters within their job description. See, e.g., Garcetti
v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418-19 (2006).
The
government “has a substantial interest in ensuring
that all of its operations are efficient and effective,”
which “may require broad authority to supervise the
conduct of public employees” that outweighs ordinary
First Amendment protections. Borough of Duryea v.
Guarnieri, 564 U.S. 379, 386 (2011). But where the
government merely provides a neutral means for third
parties to speak—by providing a public forum or
funding for the expression of views—the government’s
interest in regulating speech is substantially
diminished. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rectors and
Visitors of the University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819,
829-30 (1995). Speech by the government itself or
government
employees
implicates
important
government interests that are simply not present
when the government provides a forum for speech by
others. There is no such thing as an indirectgovernment speech doctrine because the intervening
choices of individual speakers eliminates any
plausible inference that the speech is attributable to
the government. Once speech and aid is no longer
directly attributable to the government, its interest is
truly minimal.
21
Any such governmental interest is particularly
miniscule in this case, moreover, because the aid
provided under Montana’s program is doubly indirect.
First, individuals make a donation to a nonprofit
scholarship organization, receiving a tax credit in
return. Second, the scholarship organization gives
scholarships to parents who wish to send their
children to a qualified school. The indirect aid to
religiously affiliated organizations thus occurs “only
as a result of numerous … choices” by private
individuals at two different stages. Mueller, 463 U.S.
at 399. Under such circumstances, so long as the
funds are used for the neutral end served by
Montana’s
program—expanding
educational
opportunity and enhancing educational outcomes—
the government’s interest in preventing those funds
from reaching their destination because of their
religious nature is not just minimal but invidious.
III. The Balance Of Interests Strongly Favors
The Constitutional Right Of Parents To
Direct
Their
Children’s
Education,
Consistent With Framing-Era Principles
And Contrary to the Principles Of The
Blaine Amendment Era.
In a competition between, on the one hand,
parents’ constitutional rights to direct their children’s
education free from religious constraints and, on the
other hand, the government’s interest in regulating
the indirect use of state funds, the balance plainly
favors respecting parents’ rights. See Locke v. Davey,
540 U.S. 712, 725 (2004) (comparing the “State’s
interest in not funding the pursuit of devotional
degrees” with the “relatively minor burden” on
22
individuals from “the exclusion of such funding”). As
explained, parents have a long-established and
repeatedly recognized constitutional liberty interest in
directing the education of their children, and an
equally compelling interest in freely exercising their
religious beliefs.
This Court has specifically
recognized the potency of those two interests when
“combined.” Smith, 494 U.S. at 881-82 & n.1. Denying
parents the opportunity to direct their children’s
education simply because of religion directly and
substantially infringes upon those interests. On the
other side of the ledger, the state has a minimal
interest in regulating the destination of indirect
funding, and even less so here, where two distinct
stages of private choice intervene between
government aid and the recipients of that aid.
This balance not only is borne out by case law and
common sense; it is consistent with Framing-era
principles. Minimizing the state’s ability to restrict
parental decisionmaking when it comes to education
restores the traditional pluralism and limited
governmental involvement in education that prevailed
in the early Republic. The Blaine Amendment era
marked a deviation from those principles and should
not guide sound constitutional decisionmaking.
Traditionally, parents had broad latitude to
pursue the best educational option for their children
without undue state interference. At the country’s
inception, education was generally considered a
private, family matter. As Virginia’s governor, Sir
William Berkeley, wrote in 1671, Virginians were
taking “the same course that is taken in England out
of towns; every man according to his own ability in
23
instructing his children.” Wayne J. Urban & Jennings
L. Wagoner Jr., American Education: A History 22-23
(2nd ed. New York: McGraw-Hill 2000). And while
many of the Founders recognized the critical
importance of education—another Virginia Governor,
Thomas Jefferson, proposed free public education in
1779—the new nation emerged from the eighteenth
century with a “patchwork pattern of schools,” most
established by private schoolmasters or religious
groups. Common School Movement, available at
https://bit.ly/2kOEiDv.
It was not until the 1830s that the common school
movement—i.e., public schooling—began in earnest.
At first, public schools were “educationally plural,
reflecting the local populations beliefs and values.”
Ashley Berner, The Case for Educational Pluralism in
the U.S., Manhattan Institute (July 11, 2019),
available at https://bit.ly/33wVMWq.
Gradually,
however, public schools began to reflect the thenprevailing Protestant hegemony in public life. A
general Protestant morality was widely seen as a
necessary prerequisite to the maintenance of the
American constitutional republic. See Frederick Mark
Gedicks, Reconstructing the Blaine Amendments, 2
First Amend. L. Rev. 85, 91-92 (2004). “Many people
viewed Protestantism as inseparable from the
American republican idea,” Stephen Macedo, Diversity
and Distrust: Civic Education in a Multicultural
Democracy 57 (2000), even as synonymous with
“Americanism,” John C. Jeffries, Jr. & James E. Ryan,
A Political History of the Establishment Clause, 100
Mich. L. Rev. 279, 297 (2001) (quotation marks
omitted).
24
The common schools soon served as important
tools for inculcating civic Protestant values in their
students.
Noah Feldman, Non-Sectarianism
Reconsidered, 18 J.L. & Pol. 65, 72-73 (2002). The
common schools’ curricula “evidenced a ‘panProtestant compromise,’” Kyle Duncan, Secularism’s
Laws: State Blaine Amendments and Religious
Persecution, 72 Fordham L. Rev. 493, 503 (2003)
(quoting Jeffries & Ryan, supra, at 299), the
centerpiece of which was reading from a Protestant
version of the Bible, see Joseph P. Viteritti, Blaine’s
Wake: School Choice, The First Amendment, and State
Constitutional Law, 21 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 657,
666 (1998), and reciting Protestant prayers and
hymns, Christopher C. Lund, The New Victims of the
Old Anti-Catholicism, 44 Conn. L. Rev. 1001, 1006
(2012).
The wave of Catholic immigration beginning in
the mid-nineteenth century challenged this
homogenized Protestant public education and sought
to reintroduce plurality to the system. See Philip C.
Hamburger, Separation of Church and State 201-02
(2002). Unsurprisingly, Catholics frequently declined
to simply accept the openly Protestant instruction
dominating the common schools. Protestants saw the
Catholic refusal to participate in public school
practices like Bible reading, hymn singing, and prayer
as a failure to assimilate and a rejection of core values
of American civic culture. See id. at 211; Charles L.
Glenn, The American Model of State and School 15460 (2012). Catholics established their own schools and
lobbied for a share of common school funds.
See Steven K. Green, The Blaine Amendment
Reconsidered, 36 Am. J. Legal Hist. 38, 42 (1992).
25
Although initially rebuffed, Catholics were gradually
able to gain access to funding or excise Protestant
practices from public schools in cities with large
Catholic populations. Id. at 44-47.
These efforts were met frequently with a
prejudice and nativism endemic of the broader antiCatholic brand of politics that had emerged in
response to swelling Catholic numbers. See generally
Hamburger, supra, at 201-40; see also Jeffries & Ryan,
supra, at 301. These politics reached a fevered pitch
after the Civil War. In 1875, President Grant
delivered an address denouncing the forces of
“superstition” and calling for citizens to “resolve that
not one dollar … be applied to the support of any
sectarian school[s].” Duncan, supra, at 507 (quotation
marks and emphasis omitted). The reference to
“sectarian school[s]” had an unmistakable public
meaning to Grant’s audience. It meant Catholic—the
antithesis of the “nonsectarian” Protestant public
schools of the era. See Jeffries & Ryan, supra, at 301;
Hamburger, supra, at 298-99, 307; cf. Mitchell,
530 U.S. at 828 (plurality opinion); Zelman, 536 U.S.
at 721 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Richard A. Baer, Jr.,
The Supreme Court’s Discriminatory Use of the Term
“Sectarian,” 6 J.L. & Pol. 449 (1990).
Grant also called for a constitutional amendment
forbidding funding for “sectarian” schools. Steven K.
Green, The Bible, the School, and the Constitution
192-93 (2012). Shortly thereafter, Representative
James Blaine of Maine obliged and introduced an
amendment, which read in relevant part:
[N]o money raised by taxation in any State for
the support of public schools, or derived from
26
any public fund therefor, nor any public lands
devoted thereto, shall ever be under the
control of any religious sect, nor shall any
money so raised or lands so devoted be
divided
between
religious
sects
or
denominations.
4 Cong. Rec. 205 (1875). The House approved the
amendment, but it died in the Senate as Senators
opposing it assailed its patently anti-Catholic purpose
and effect. Green, Blaine Reconsidered, supra, at 39.
Although Blaine’s Amendment failed in Congress,
advocates of such measures turned to the states.
Within a year of its defeat, fourteen states had
adopted measures forbidding public funding for
“sectarian” schools, and by the end of the nineteenth
century, thirty states had adopted such provisions.
Mark Edward DeForrest, An Overview and
Evaluation of State Blaine Amendments: Origins,
Scope, and First Amendment Concerns, 26 Harv. J.L.
& Pub. Pol’y 551, 573 (2003).
The Blaine Amendments thus marked an attempt
to crystallize a particularly odious brand of
homogeneity that the Framers would never have
recognized: a Protestant educational hegemony. They
did so through the particularly odious means of
divvying up society according to religion, barring aid
for any “sectarian” establishment (understood to mean
Catholic). And by prohibiting funding—even indirect
funding—for “sectarian” entities, they had the
particularly odious effect of constraining parents’
ability to exercise their constitutional rights to direct
the upbringing and education of their children.
27
The Blaine Amendment era was a deviation from
Founding-era principles, and it is a deviation from
present-day principles. State prohibitions on indirect
funding of religiously affiliated organizations should
not be permitted to trump the fundamental promise of
neutrality enshrined in the First Amendment or to
constrain parents’ fundamental liberty interest in
directing the education of their children. Vindicating
the rights of parents and children to be free of stateinflicted
religious
discrimination
creates
a
constitutional and educational environment that the
Framers would recognize and applaud. Accordingly,
the Court should reverse the Montana Supreme
Court’s decision.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should
reverse the decision below.
Respectfully submitted,
PAUL D. CLEMENT
Counsel of Record
GEORGE W. HICKS, JR.
ERIN M. HAWLEY
KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP
1301 Pennsylvania Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20004
(202) 389-5000
paul.clement@kirkland.com
September 18, 2019
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.