Reply Brief — The Little Sisters of the Poor Jeanne Jugan Residence, Petitioner v. California, et al.
Supreme Court briefMay 29, 2019
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No. 18-1192
In the Supreme Court of the United States
__________
THE LITTLE SISTERS OF THE POOR JEANNE
JUGAN RESIDENCE;
Petitioner,
v.
THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, ET AL.,
__________
Respondents.
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
__________
REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONERS
__________
MARK L. RIENZI
Counsel of Record
ERIC C. RASSBACH
LORI H. WINDHAM
DIANA M. VERM
CHRIS PAGLIARELLA
THE BECKET FUND FOR
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY
1200 New Hampshire
Ave. NW, Suite 700
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 955-0095
mrienzi@becketlaw.org
Counsel for Petitioner
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ....................................... ii
REPLY BRIEF ............................................................ 1
CONCLUSION ........................................................... 9
ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
Cases
California v. Health & Human Servs.,
351 F. Supp. 3d 1267
(N.D. Cal. 2019) ...................................................... 5
Geneva Coll. v. Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of
Health & Human Servs.,
778 F.3d 422 (3d Cir. 2015).................................... 4
Pennsylvania v. Trump,
281 F. Supp. 3d 553 (E.D. Pa. 2017)...................... 3
Pennsylvania v. Trump,
351 F. Supp. 3d 791 (E.D. Pa. 2019).............. 4, 5, 7
United States v. Mendoza,
464 U.S. 154 (1984) ................................................ 4
Wheaton Coll. v. Azar,
No. 1:13-cv-08910 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 22,
2018), Dkt. No. 119 ................................................ 4
Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016) .................... 4
Statutes
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb ...................................................... 3
Other Authorities
76 Fed. Reg. 46,621 (Aug. 3, 2011) ............................. 6
iii
80 Fed. Reg. 41,318 (July 14, 2015) ............................ 6
81 Fed. Reg. 91,494 (Dec. 16, 2016) ............................ 7
82 Fed. Reg. 47,792 (Oct. 13, 2017) ........................ 2, 3
83 Fed. Reg. 57,536 (Nov. 15, 2018)............................ 2
Army Command Policy, Accommodating
religious practices, Army Reg. 600-20
(Nov. 6, 2014).......................................................... 7
U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO13-21, Federal Rulemaking: Agencies
Could Take Additional Steps to Respond to Public Comments
(Dec. 2012) .............................................................. 7
REPLY BRIEF
The petition offers an opportunity for this Court to
resolve the contraceptive mandate litigation once and
for all. As this Court has recognized with several prior
emergency orders and grants of certiorari, this litigation raises questions of national importance and already has received an extraordinary level of lower
court attention.
The State Respondents do not contest the national
importance of the issue presented, nor the need for it
to be eventually settled by this Court; and they agree
that the appeal is not moot. BIO 10-11. Their only argument for denying certiorari is that—even after
seven years of litigation—still further development in
the lower courts is warranted.
The States have it backwards. At this point, further percolation (a) is unnecessary, (b) is not actually
happening (because courts are just deferring to the
same cases upon which this Court’s Zubik certiorari
grant was based in 2015), and (c) is actually harmful
to the development of the law, as this politically sensitive litigation upsets normal decision-making in other
important areas of the law. The questions presented
stopped percolating long ago and are festering instead.
Further litigation is therefore both unnecessary and
unhelpful. The petition presents a clean, narrow vehicle for addressing the heart of the contraceptive mandate litigation. Future petitions will not be so narrow.
1. The States downplay the RFRA question by suggesting that it might be avoided if this particular case
is resolved on other grounds. BIO 13-14. But even a
ruling in the States’ favor on the alternate questions
they propose will not avoid the RFRA question. The
2
States’ requested remedy in this case is the restoration
of the mandate and the regulatory mechanism for
compliance (which the States call the “accommodation”) as they existed before the Fourth IFR, i.e., the
regulatory system in place at the time of this Court’s
decision in Zubik. Excerpts of Record at 59, California
v. Azar, Nos. 19-15072, 19-15118, and 19-15150 (9th
Cir. Feb. 25, 2019), Dkt. 21-1. Judicial reinstatement
of that system will only spawn further litigation over
the legality of the old, pre-Zubik system—the very reason this Court granted certiorari in Zubik.
The RFRA issue is also a central part of the government’s rationale both for forgoing notice and comment, 82 Fed. Reg. 47,792, 47,793 (Oct. 13, 2017), and
for the substance of the Final Rule at issue, 83 Fed.
Reg. 57,536, 57,542-51 (Nov. 15, 2018). Accordingly,
even judicial determinations on APA grounds will
need to reckon with the invalidity of the prior system
under RFRA. The States’ proposed alternate paths all
lead back to RFRA.
Conversely, while the States’ allegedly alternative
grounds cannot foreclose a RFRA determination, a
RFRA determination now would save courts the work
of resolving those other grounds. First, a finding that
the regulatory mechanism for compliance violated
RFRA would resolve the States’ alternate question of
whether the agencies had good cause to postpone notice and comment. BIO 14. That is because violation of
a federal civil rights law is surely a good reason to
briefly delay what would have been the seventh comment period on this issue, and because—even if good
cause was lacking—the agencies have conducted notice and comment before issuing a final rule.
3
Second, that such an ongoing violation of civil
rights constituted good cause to postpone notice and
comment would also resolve (or obviate the need for
resolving) the States’ alternate question of the agencies’ substantive authority to issue the IFR in the first
place. BIO 13. Federal agencies of course have authority to obey federal law. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2 (“the term
‘government’ includes a branch, department, agency”).
The same logic applies to the States’ third proposed
question of whether the IFR was arbitrary and capricious, BIO 13-14; if the agencies needed to cure an ongoing RFRA violation, that cure could not be arbitrary
or capricious, and with good cause, there would be no
procedural violations that could taint the Final Rule.
If the agencies correctly identify a RFRA violation, the
agencies’ substantive authority to comply with federal
law cannot possibly turn on how well they explain
their change of view from that prior administration. 1
For the same reasons, a resolution of the RFRA question would also resolve any plausible argument
against the Final Rule, thus likely resolving that litigation as well. See Pennsylvania v. Trump, 281 F.
Supp. 3d 553, 578 (E.D. Pa. 2017) (“any exception to
the ACA required by RFRA is permissible.”).
2. The States fail to offer any reasons that further
percolation in the lower courts would aid in a resolution of the RFRA question, particularly when the
lower courts are now simply repeating the analysis of
the “several courts of appeals” that addressed the
question of RFRA’s application to the regulatory
1 The agencies did, in any case, devote almost 8,000 words to that
explanation. 82 Fed. Reg. at 47,799-807.
4
mechanism pre-Zubik. United States v. Mendoza, 464
U.S. 154, 160 (1984); see Pet. 27 (citing App. 124a125a); see also Pennsylvania v. Trump, 351 F. Supp.
3d 791, 825 (E.D. Pa. 2019) (noting that the Third Circuit has “reaffirmed and reapplied the reasoning” of
its vacated decision in Geneva Coll. v. Sec’y U.S. Dep’t
of Health & Human Servs., 778 F.3d 422, 442 (3d Cir.
2015), vacated and remanded sub nom. Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016)). Additional cut-and-paste
analysis will do nothing to sharpen the issues.
The States suggest that the agencies’ concessions
in Zubik warrant further consideration in the lower
courts. BIO 13. But concessions made in this Court itself surely do not require development in the lower
courts. This Court is perfectly capable of judging the
import of arguments made in front of it and why, after
those concessions, the federal government was required (or at the very least permitted) to stop asserting its affirmative defense of strict scrutiny. And many
lower courts since Zubik have had an opportunity to
consider those developments. See e.g., App. 95a; Order
granting permanent injunction, Wheaton Coll. v. Azar,
No. 1:13-cv-08910 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 22, 2018), Dkt. No.
119 (“After considering the parties’ briefs submitted
on the motion for a permanent injunction, including
Defendants’ concessions on the merits of Wheaton’s
claims, the Court agrees that Wheaton is entitled to a
permanent injunction.”).
The States claim there is a need for percolation
about “the applicability of RFRA in [the] context” of
the Final Rule. BIO 13. But the RFRA question is not
how RFRA applies to the Final Rule, but whether the
5
pre-Zubik regime violated RFRA and thus required
the federal government to change the rules. 2
Indeed, rather than allowing further percolation of
the law following Zubik, the result of the injunctions
in this and related lawsuits is to stymie the federal
government’s attempt to follow the Court’s Zubik order. BIO 4. The States have argued successfully in the
district court below, as have the plaintiff states in the
parallel Third Circuit case, that the agencies have no
authority at all to implement a regulatory response to
Zubik. See California v. Health & Human Servs., 351
F. Supp. 3d 1267, 1285 (N.D. Cal. 2019); Pennsylvania
v. Trump, 351 F. Supp. 3d at 827 (“Because neither
the ACA nor RFRA confer authority on the Agencies
to promulgate the Religious Exemption, the rule is invalid.”); see also Oral Argument at 52:00-53:00, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Trump, No. 17-3752 (3d
Cir. May 21, 2019), available at https://bit.ly/2JGf19H
(“[T]he ACA as is written does not authorize the agencies to promulgate exemptions to the mandate * * * .
Perhaps what they should have done was gone to Congress * * * .”). As the States see it, neither the ACA nor
RFRA give the agencies authority to respond to this
Court’s Zubik order with anything other than obstinate refusal to adopt a new approach. The States thus
question the fundamental premise of the Zubik order,
which was that a deal ought to be possible.
2 Percolation may have one other virtue from the States’ point of
view: it allows them to play for time. But that is not an interest
the Court should honor.
6
To support this claim, the States have been forced
to advance severely constrained views of the Affordable Care Act, RFRA, and the APA. First, the States
argue that the Affordable Care Act required only a
strict contraceptive mandate, because the agencies
can only determine “the types of preventive services
that shall be included—not who must” provide them.
States’ Br. at 18, California v. Azar, Nos. 19-15072, 1915118, and 19-15150 (9th Cir. Apr. 15, 2019), Dkt. 72
(first emphasis added). That interpretation is irreconcilable with the task this Court set the agencies in Zubik, and conflicts with the interpretations of both administrations to implement the ACA. The Obama Administration’s interpretation of the statue was that it
was allowed to ease the burden of the mandate on
what it deemed “religious employers,” 76 Fed. Reg.
46,621, 46,623 (Aug. 3, 2011), and to “accommodat[e]”
other religious objectors by purporting to adjust “who”
would cover the contraceptives, 80 Fed. Reg. 41,318,
41,344 (July 14, 2015).
Second, the States also argue that RFRA does not
allow an agency to withdraw a burden it has imposed
except as ordered by a court with regard to specific religious objectors. See States’ Br. at 59, California v.
Azar, Nos. 19-15072, 19-15118, and 19-15150 (9th Cir.
Apr. 15, 2019), Dkt. 72 (“There is no statutory basis
for the notion that RFRA permits agencies to impose
broad, categorical exemptions to federal statutes.”).
They thus reject the notion that federal agencies can
fulfill their RFRA obligations unless and until the
agencies lose a lawsuit. And the States now argue that
if an agency erroneously proceeds by IFR, that error
invalidates both the IFR and also any subsequent final rule issued after notice and comment. See Mot. for
7
Summ. J. at 56-58, California v. Azar, No. 17-5783
(N.D. Cal. Apr. 30, 2019), Dkt. 311; see also Pennsylvania v. Trump, 351 F. Supp. 3d at 816 (“the procedural defect that characterized the IFRs fatally
tainted the issuance of the Final Rules”).
If successful, these arguments will prevent the
agencies from following this Court’s order in Zubik
and will circumscribe the agencies’ flexibility in other
areas of the law. For example, much of the federal government operates on the presumption that agencies
are obligated (and, of course, authorized) to lift burdens that would be illegal under RFRA. See Army
Command Policy, Accommodating religious practices,
Army Reg. 600-20 ch. 5-6 (Nov. 6, 2014) (prescribing
religious accommodations under RFRA); 81 Fed. Reg.
91,494, 91,537 (Dec. 16, 2016) (citing RFRA to accommodate Native American eagle taking).
Likewise, adopting the States’ rule that a procedurally invalid IFR taints all subsequent rulemaking
would remove any incentive for agencies to request
post-promulgation comment for even valid IFRs. See
U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-13-21, Federal
Rulemaking: Agencies Could Take Additional Steps to
Respond to Public Comments 3 n.6, 8, 24 (Dec. 2012),
http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/651052.pdf
(noting
agencies commonly request comments on major rules
issued without notice and comment post-publication).
Furthermore, the States have requested a nationwide
injunction against the Final Rules, further stunting
8
the agencies and preventing religious objectors from
obtaining long-awaited regulatory relief. 3
The longer this case and parallel cases wind
through the lower courts, the more the States and others will continue to make results-oriented arguments
(in this case and in parallel cases) that could both prevent agency action and warp the development of the
law.
Continued percolation of these strained views of
the ACA, APA, and RFRA will hurt, not help, the development of the law. Prompt resolution of the central
RFRA question would therefore be beneficial even beyond the parties to this dispute.
This petition offers a narrow, clean vehicle in
which to resolve the long-pending dispute over
whether RFRA requires religious exemptions from the
contraceptive mandate. Neither the parties nor the
courts will benefit from continued lower-court litigation.
3 In the appeal of the preliminary injunction of the Final Rules in
this case, the Ninth Circuit has requested briefing on whether
the case is moot due to the nationwide preliminary injunction in
the parallel case in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, currently on appeal in the Third Circuit. Order, California v. Azar,
Nos. 19-15072, 19-15118, and 19-15150 (9th Cir. Apr. 29, 2019),
Dkt. 131. A mootness determination in the Ninth Circuit could
significantly curtail further percolation of this issue.
9
CONCLUSION
This Court should grant the petition.
Respectfully submitted.
MARK L. RIENZI
Counsel of Record
ERIC C. RASSBACH
LORI H. WINDHAM
DIANA M. VERM
CHRIS PAGLIARELLA
THE BECKET FUND FOR
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY
1200 New Hampshire
Ave. NW, Suite 700
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 955-0095
mrienzi@becketlaw.org
MAY 2019
Counsel for Petitioner
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