Reply Brief — The Little Sisters of the Poor Jeanne Jugan Residence, Petitioner v. California, et al.

Supreme Court briefMay 29, 2019

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No. 18-1192

In the Supreme Court of the United States

__________

THE LITTLE SISTERS OF THE POOR JEANNE

JUGAN RESIDENCE;

Petitioner,

v.

THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, ET AL.,

__________

Respondents.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED

STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

__________

REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONERS

__________

MARK L. RIENZI

Counsel of Record

ERIC C. RASSBACH

LORI H. WINDHAM

DIANA M. VERM

CHRIS PAGLIARELLA

THE BECKET FUND FOR

RELIGIOUS LIBERTY

1200 New Hampshire

Ave. NW, Suite 700

Washington, D.C. 20036

(202) 955-0095

mrienzi@becketlaw.org

Counsel for Petitioner

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ....................................... ii

REPLY BRIEF ............................................................ 1

CONCLUSION ........................................................... 9

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

Cases

California v. Health & Human Servs.,

351 F. Supp. 3d 1267

(N.D. Cal. 2019) ...................................................... 5

Geneva Coll. v. Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of

Health & Human Servs.,

778 F.3d 422 (3d Cir. 2015).................................... 4

Pennsylvania v. Trump,

281 F. Supp. 3d 553 (E.D. Pa. 2017)...................... 3

Pennsylvania v. Trump,

351 F. Supp. 3d 791 (E.D. Pa. 2019).............. 4, 5, 7

United States v. Mendoza,

464 U.S. 154 (1984) ................................................ 4

Wheaton Coll. v. Azar,

No. 1:13-cv-08910 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 22,

2018), Dkt. No. 119 ................................................ 4

Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016) .................... 4

Statutes

42 U.S.C. § 2000bb ...................................................... 3

Other Authorities

76 Fed. Reg. 46,621 (Aug. 3, 2011) ............................. 6

iii

80 Fed. Reg. 41,318 (July 14, 2015) ............................ 6

81 Fed. Reg. 91,494 (Dec. 16, 2016) ............................ 7

82 Fed. Reg. 47,792 (Oct. 13, 2017) ........................ 2, 3

83 Fed. Reg. 57,536 (Nov. 15, 2018)............................ 2

Army Command Policy, Accommodating

religious practices, Army Reg. 600-20

(Nov. 6, 2014).......................................................... 7

U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO13-21, Federal Rulemaking: Agencies

Could Take Additional Steps to Respond to Public Comments

(Dec. 2012) .............................................................. 7

REPLY BRIEF

The petition offers an opportunity for this Court to

resolve the contraceptive mandate litigation once and

for all. As this Court has recognized with several prior

emergency orders and grants of certiorari, this litigation raises questions of national importance and already has received an extraordinary level of lower

court attention.

The State Respondents do not contest the national

importance of the issue presented, nor the need for it

to be eventually settled by this Court; and they agree

that the appeal is not moot. BIO 10-11. Their only argument for denying certiorari is that—even after

seven years of litigation—still further development in

the lower courts is warranted.

The States have it backwards. At this point, further percolation (a) is unnecessary, (b) is not actually

happening (because courts are just deferring to the

same cases upon which this Court’s Zubik certiorari

grant was based in 2015), and (c) is actually harmful

to the development of the law, as this politically sensitive litigation upsets normal decision-making in other

important areas of the law. The questions presented

stopped percolating long ago and are festering instead.

Further litigation is therefore both unnecessary and

unhelpful. The petition presents a clean, narrow vehicle for addressing the heart of the contraceptive mandate litigation. Future petitions will not be so narrow.

1. The States downplay the RFRA question by suggesting that it might be avoided if this particular case

is resolved on other grounds. BIO 13-14. But even a

ruling in the States’ favor on the alternate questions

they propose will not avoid the RFRA question. The

2

States’ requested remedy in this case is the restoration

of the mandate and the regulatory mechanism for

compliance (which the States call the “accommodation”) as they existed before the Fourth IFR, i.e., the

regulatory system in place at the time of this Court’s

decision in Zubik. Excerpts of Record at 59, California

v. Azar, Nos. 19-15072, 19-15118, and 19-15150 (9th

Cir. Feb. 25, 2019), Dkt. 21-1. Judicial reinstatement

of that system will only spawn further litigation over

the legality of the old, pre-Zubik system—the very reason this Court granted certiorari in Zubik.

The RFRA issue is also a central part of the government’s rationale both for forgoing notice and comment, 82 Fed. Reg. 47,792, 47,793 (Oct. 13, 2017), and

for the substance of the Final Rule at issue, 83 Fed.

Reg. 57,536, 57,542-51 (Nov. 15, 2018). Accordingly,

even judicial determinations on APA grounds will

need to reckon with the invalidity of the prior system

under RFRA. The States’ proposed alternate paths all

lead back to RFRA.

Conversely, while the States’ allegedly alternative

grounds cannot foreclose a RFRA determination, a

RFRA determination now would save courts the work

of resolving those other grounds. First, a finding that

the regulatory mechanism for compliance violated

RFRA would resolve the States’ alternate question of

whether the agencies had good cause to postpone notice and comment. BIO 14. That is because violation of

a federal civil rights law is surely a good reason to

briefly delay what would have been the seventh comment period on this issue, and because—even if good

cause was lacking—the agencies have conducted notice and comment before issuing a final rule.

3

Second, that such an ongoing violation of civil

rights constituted good cause to postpone notice and

comment would also resolve (or obviate the need for

resolving) the States’ alternate question of the agencies’ substantive authority to issue the IFR in the first

place. BIO 13. Federal agencies of course have authority to obey federal law. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2 (“the term

‘government’ includes a branch, department, agency”).

The same logic applies to the States’ third proposed

question of whether the IFR was arbitrary and capricious, BIO 13-14; if the agencies needed to cure an ongoing RFRA violation, that cure could not be arbitrary

or capricious, and with good cause, there would be no

procedural violations that could taint the Final Rule.

If the agencies correctly identify a RFRA violation, the

agencies’ substantive authority to comply with federal

law cannot possibly turn on how well they explain

their change of view from that prior administration. 1

For the same reasons, a resolution of the RFRA question would also resolve any plausible argument

against the Final Rule, thus likely resolving that litigation as well. See Pennsylvania v. Trump, 281 F.

Supp. 3d 553, 578 (E.D. Pa. 2017) (“any exception to

the ACA required by RFRA is permissible.”).

2. The States fail to offer any reasons that further

percolation in the lower courts would aid in a resolution of the RFRA question, particularly when the

lower courts are now simply repeating the analysis of

the “several courts of appeals” that addressed the

question of RFRA’s application to the regulatory

1 The agencies did, in any case, devote almost 8,000 words to that

explanation. 82 Fed. Reg. at 47,799-807.

4

mechanism pre-Zubik. United States v. Mendoza, 464

U.S. 154, 160 (1984); see Pet. 27 (citing App. 124a125a); see also Pennsylvania v. Trump, 351 F. Supp.

3d 791, 825 (E.D. Pa. 2019) (noting that the Third Circuit has “reaffirmed and reapplied the reasoning” of

its vacated decision in Geneva Coll. v. Sec’y U.S. Dep’t

of Health & Human Servs., 778 F.3d 422, 442 (3d Cir.

2015), vacated and remanded sub nom. Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016)). Additional cut-and-paste

analysis will do nothing to sharpen the issues.

The States suggest that the agencies’ concessions

in Zubik warrant further consideration in the lower

courts. BIO 13. But concessions made in this Court itself surely do not require development in the lower

courts. This Court is perfectly capable of judging the

import of arguments made in front of it and why, after

those concessions, the federal government was required (or at the very least permitted) to stop asserting its affirmative defense of strict scrutiny. And many

lower courts since Zubik have had an opportunity to

consider those developments. See e.g., App. 95a; Order

granting permanent injunction, Wheaton Coll. v. Azar,

No. 1:13-cv-08910 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 22, 2018), Dkt. No.

119 (“After considering the parties’ briefs submitted

on the motion for a permanent injunction, including

Defendants’ concessions on the merits of Wheaton’s

claims, the Court agrees that Wheaton is entitled to a

permanent injunction.”).

The States claim there is a need for percolation

about “the applicability of RFRA in [the] context” of

the Final Rule. BIO 13. But the RFRA question is not

how RFRA applies to the Final Rule, but whether the

5

pre-Zubik regime violated RFRA and thus required

the federal government to change the rules. 2

Indeed, rather than allowing further percolation of

the law following Zubik, the result of the injunctions

in this and related lawsuits is to stymie the federal

government’s attempt to follow the Court’s Zubik order. BIO 4. The States have argued successfully in the

district court below, as have the plaintiff states in the

parallel Third Circuit case, that the agencies have no

authority at all to implement a regulatory response to

Zubik. See California v. Health & Human Servs., 351

F. Supp. 3d 1267, 1285 (N.D. Cal. 2019); Pennsylvania

v. Trump, 351 F. Supp. 3d at 827 (“Because neither

the ACA nor RFRA confer authority on the Agencies

to promulgate the Religious Exemption, the rule is invalid.”); see also Oral Argument at 52:00-53:00, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Trump, No. 17-3752 (3d

Cir. May 21, 2019), available at https://bit.ly/2JGf19H

(“[T]he ACA as is written does not authorize the agencies to promulgate exemptions to the mandate * * * .

Perhaps what they should have done was gone to Congress * * * .”). As the States see it, neither the ACA nor

RFRA give the agencies authority to respond to this

Court’s Zubik order with anything other than obstinate refusal to adopt a new approach. The States thus

question the fundamental premise of the Zubik order,

which was that a deal ought to be possible.

2 Percolation may have one other virtue from the States’ point of

view: it allows them to play for time. But that is not an interest

the Court should honor.

6

To support this claim, the States have been forced

to advance severely constrained views of the Affordable Care Act, RFRA, and the APA. First, the States

argue that the Affordable Care Act required only a

strict contraceptive mandate, because the agencies

can only determine “the types of preventive services

that shall be included—not who must” provide them.

States’ Br. at 18, California v. Azar, Nos. 19-15072, 1915118, and 19-15150 (9th Cir. Apr. 15, 2019), Dkt. 72

(first emphasis added). That interpretation is irreconcilable with the task this Court set the agencies in Zubik, and conflicts with the interpretations of both administrations to implement the ACA. The Obama Administration’s interpretation of the statue was that it

was allowed to ease the burden of the mandate on

what it deemed “religious employers,” 76 Fed. Reg.

46,621, 46,623 (Aug. 3, 2011), and to “accommodat[e]”

other religious objectors by purporting to adjust “who”

would cover the contraceptives, 80 Fed. Reg. 41,318,

41,344 (July 14, 2015).

Second, the States also argue that RFRA does not

allow an agency to withdraw a burden it has imposed

except as ordered by a court with regard to specific religious objectors. See States’ Br. at 59, California v.

Azar, Nos. 19-15072, 19-15118, and 19-15150 (9th Cir.

Apr. 15, 2019), Dkt. 72 (“There is no statutory basis

for the notion that RFRA permits agencies to impose

broad, categorical exemptions to federal statutes.”).

They thus reject the notion that federal agencies can

fulfill their RFRA obligations unless and until the

agencies lose a lawsuit. And the States now argue that

if an agency erroneously proceeds by IFR, that error

invalidates both the IFR and also any subsequent final rule issued after notice and comment. See Mot. for

7

Summ. J. at 56-58, California v. Azar, No. 17-5783

(N.D. Cal. Apr. 30, 2019), Dkt. 311; see also Pennsylvania v. Trump, 351 F. Supp. 3d at 816 (“the procedural defect that characterized the IFRs fatally

tainted the issuance of the Final Rules”).

If successful, these arguments will prevent the

agencies from following this Court’s order in Zubik

and will circumscribe the agencies’ flexibility in other

areas of the law. For example, much of the federal government operates on the presumption that agencies

are obligated (and, of course, authorized) to lift burdens that would be illegal under RFRA. See Army

Command Policy, Accommodating religious practices,

Army Reg. 600-20 ch. 5-6 (Nov. 6, 2014) (prescribing

religious accommodations under RFRA); 81 Fed. Reg.

91,494, 91,537 (Dec. 16, 2016) (citing RFRA to accommodate Native American eagle taking).

Likewise, adopting the States’ rule that a procedurally invalid IFR taints all subsequent rulemaking

would remove any incentive for agencies to request

post-promulgation comment for even valid IFRs. See

U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-13-21, Federal

Rulemaking: Agencies Could Take Additional Steps to

Respond to Public Comments 3 n.6, 8, 24 (Dec. 2012),

http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/651052.pdf

(noting

agencies commonly request comments on major rules

issued without notice and comment post-publication).

Furthermore, the States have requested a nationwide

injunction against the Final Rules, further stunting

8

the agencies and preventing religious objectors from

obtaining long-awaited regulatory relief. 3

The longer this case and parallel cases wind

through the lower courts, the more the States and others will continue to make results-oriented arguments

(in this case and in parallel cases) that could both prevent agency action and warp the development of the

law.

Continued percolation of these strained views of

the ACA, APA, and RFRA will hurt, not help, the development of the law. Prompt resolution of the central

RFRA question would therefore be beneficial even beyond the parties to this dispute.

This petition offers a narrow, clean vehicle in

which to resolve the long-pending dispute over

whether RFRA requires religious exemptions from the

contraceptive mandate. Neither the parties nor the

courts will benefit from continued lower-court litigation.

3 In the appeal of the preliminary injunction of the Final Rules in

this case, the Ninth Circuit has requested briefing on whether

the case is moot due to the nationwide preliminary injunction in

the parallel case in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, currently on appeal in the Third Circuit. Order, California v. Azar,

Nos. 19-15072, 19-15118, and 19-15150 (9th Cir. Apr. 29, 2019),

Dkt. 131. A mootness determination in the Ninth Circuit could

significantly curtail further percolation of this issue.

9

CONCLUSION

This Court should grant the petition.

Respectfully submitted.

MARK L. RIENZI

Counsel of Record

ERIC C. RASSBACH

LORI H. WINDHAM

DIANA M. VERM

CHRIS PAGLIARELLA

THE BECKET FUND FOR

RELIGIOUS LIBERTY

1200 New Hampshire

Ave. NW, Suite 700

Washington, D.C. 20036

(202) 955-0095

mrienzi@becketlaw.org

MAY 2019

Counsel for Petitioner

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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