Opposition Brief — Tynisa Williams, Petitioner v. City of Cleveland, Ohio

Supreme Court briefApr 9, 2019

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No. 18-1172

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In The

Supreme Court of the United States

-----------------------------------------------------------------TYNISA WILLIAMS,

Petitioner,

CITY OF CLEVELAND, OHIO,

Respondent.

-----------------------------------------------------------------On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari

To The United States Court Of Appeals

For The Sixth Circuit

-----------------------------------------------------------------BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

-----------------------------------------------------------------THOMAS J. KAISER

Chief Trial Counsel

CITY OF CLEVELAND

LAW DEPARTMENT

601 Lakeside Avenue, Room 106

Cleveland, Ohio 44114

(216) 664-2800

STEPHEN W. FUNK

Counsel of Record

ROETZEL & ANDRESS, LPA

222 S. Main Street, Suite 400

Akron, Ohio 44308

(330) 376-2700

sfunk@ralaw.com

Attorneys for Respondent

City of Cleveland, Ohio

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COCKLE LEGAL BRIEFS (800) 225-6964

WWW.COCKLELEGALBRIEFS.COM

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the Sixth Circuit properly applied existing Supreme Court precedent in deciding that the City

of Cleveland, Ohio was entitled to summary judgment

in its favor on a Fourth Amendment challenge to intake procedures for detainees at a municipal jail facility based upon the particularized facts and evidence

presented in this case.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTION PRESENTED...................................

TABLE OF CONTENTS ......................................

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................

iii

STATEMENT OF THE CASE..............................

REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION ......

THE SIXTH CIRCUIT PROPERLY APPLIED EXISTING SUPREME COURT

PRECEDENT IN DETERMINING THAT

CLEVELAND WAS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN ITS FAVOR .........

THE SIXTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION DOES

NOT CREATE AN INTER-CIRCUIT CONFLICT ........................................................

CONCLUSION.....................................................

II.

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

CASES

Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60

L.Ed.2d 447 (1979) ............................................ 4, 5, 8

Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of Cty. of

Burlington, 566 U.S. 318, 131 S.Ct. 1816, 179

L.Ed.2d 772 (2011) ........................................ 4, 5, 6, 8

Harris v. Miller, 818 F.3d 49 (2d Cir. 2016) .................7

Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 103 S.Ct. 864, 74

L.Ed.2d 675 (1983) ....................................................4

Mays v. Springborn, 575 F.3d 643 (7th Cir.

2008) ....................................................................... 7

McCreary v. Richardson, 738 F.3d 651 (5th Cir.

2013) ..........................................................................7

Story v. Foote, 782 F.3d 968 (8th Cir. 2015)..................7

Sumpter v. Wayne County, 868 F.3d 473 (6th Cir.

2017) ..........................................................................7

Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96

L.Ed.2d 64 (1987) .............................................. 5, 6, 8

Williams v. City of Cleveland, 907 F.3d 924 (6th

Cir. 2018) ......................................................... passim

RULES

Rules of the Supreme Court, Rule 10 .................. 3, 6, 7

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This case arises from a 2009 complaint that alleged a Fourth Amendment challenge to the intake

procedures at the City of Cleveland’s House of Corrections (“HOC”). In her Complaint, Petitioner Tynisa

Williams (“Williams”) alleges that she was subjected to

a group strip search and compulsory delousing when

she was admitted to the HOC on October 30, 2009. A

summary of the material facts relating to the HOC’s

intake procedures are described more fully in the Sixth

Circuit’s decision and will not be repeated herein. See

Williams v. City of Cleveland, 907 F.3d 924, 931 (6th

Cir. 2018) (copy attached to Petition, App. 8-10).

In her Statement of the Case, Williams largely ignores the undisputed evidence that was filed by City of

Cleveland about the HOC’s intake procedures. As the

Sixth Circuit observed, the undisputed evidence in the

record establishes that HOC’s intake procedures

merely involved a quick “visual observation” of incoming detainees for contraband or injury, and did not involve a visual body cavity search. (App. 9). Moreover,

the challenged delousing procedure (which was discontinued in April 2010) merely involved the spraying of

a light mist from a distance of 3-4 feet that did not hit

any detainees with any kind of force. (App. 9, 23). Thus,

as the Sixth Circuit described, the pre-2010 delousing

procedure was a “brief, painless and necessary” procedure that “was instituted for health and safety reasons” in order “to prevent lice, crabs, bugs, [and] insects

from coming” into the facility. Id.

The Petitioner’s Statement of the Case also ignores the evidence submitted by the City to explain

the reasons for the HOC’s intake procedures. While the

HOC often performed the clothing exchange process

with groups of 2 or 3 incoming detainees at a time, the

City’s witnesses explained that this practice did not occur in all cases, but depended on the total number of

detainees arriving at the facility at any given time.

(App. 21). In so doing, the Sixth Circuit found that the

City’s witnesses provided legitimate health and safety

reasons for why they needed to speed up the intake

process during high-volume hours. Id. Moreover, it

found that Williams “has not provided evidence questioning the legitimacy of the City’s proffered justification.” Id. Accordingly, based upon a proper application

of the constitutional standard established by this

Court, the Sixth Circuit concluded that Cleveland was

entitled to summary judgment in its favor. (App. 1722).

Similarly, with respect to the pre-2010 delousing

procedures, the Sixth Circuit found that the City’s witnesses provided substantial justifications that were

“reasonably related to the cleanliness and habitability

of the HOC.” (App. 24). Moreover, the Sixth Circuit

found that the City’s witnesses provided “good reasons” for why they did not allow detainees to self-apply

the solution because “they could not trust the inmates

to follow instructions and any failure to comply would

potentially lead to community infestations.” (App. 2324). Thus, based upon the particularized facts and evidence presented, the Sixth Circuit determined that the

City also was entitled to summary judgment on the delousing claim. Id.

------------------------------------------------------------------

REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION

Petitioner has not presented compelling reasons to

grant a petition for writ of certiorari under S. Ct. R. 10.

The Sixth Circuit’s decision does not conflict with a decision of this Court or any court of appeals nor does it

raise an important federal question that has not been

settled by this Court. Rather, the Opinion merely follows existing Supreme Court precedent to conclude

that the City of Cleveland was entitled to summary

judgment in its favor based upon the particular facts

and evidence presented in this case. Accordingly, given

that the Sixth Circuit’s opinion properly states for the

applicable rule of law, the Petition does not present the

type of legal issue that might warrant Supreme Court

review. See S. Ct. R. 10 (“a petition for writ of certiorari

is rarely granted when the asserted error consists of

. . . the misapplication of a properly stated rule of

law”).

THE SIXTH CIRCUIT PROPERLY APPLIED

EXISTING SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT

IN DETERMINING THAT CLEVELAND WAS

ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN

ITS FAVOR.

The sole claim alleged by Williams in this case is

based upon the allegation that the HOC’s pre-2010

intake procedures violated the Fourth Amendment of

the United States Constitution. In discussing the “reasonableness” test that governs this type of Fourth

Amendment claim, this Court has held that the applicable constitutional standard “is not capable of precise

definition or mechanical application.” Bell v. Wolfish,

441 U.S. 520, 559, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979).

Rather, it depends on particular facts and circumstances relating to the search at issue, including “the

scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in which

it is conducted, the justification for initiating it, and

the place in which it is conducted.” Id.

In this regard, it is well established that state and

local governments have a strong and legitimate interest in “the effective management of the detention facility.” Bell, 441 U.S. at 540. The Supreme Court therefore

has repeatedly emphasized that “prison officials have

broad administrative and discretionary authority over

the institutions they manage and that lawfully incarcerated persons retain only a narrow range of protected liberty interests.” Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460,

467, 103 S.Ct. 864, 74 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983). As the Court

explained in Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of

Cty. of Burlington, 566 U.S. 318, 131 S.Ct. 1816, 179

L.Ed.2d 772 (2011), “[m]aintaining safety and order at

these institutions requires the expertise of correctional

officials, who must have substantial discretion to devise reasonable solutions to the problems they face.”

Id. at 326. Thus, the Supreme Court has repeatedly

“confirmed the importance of deference to correctional

officials and explained that a regulation impinging on

an inmate’s constitutional rights must be upheld ‘if it

is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.’ ” Id. (citing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 79, 107

S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987)).

This highly deferential standard of review does

not allow the judiciary to second-guess the management decisions of prison officials or “ignore the realities of prison operations.” Florence, 566 U.S. at 328.

Rather, as the Court stated in Florence, “[t]he task of

determining whether a policy is reasonably related to

legitimate security interests is ‘peculiarly within the

province and professional expertise of correctional officials,’ ” and “in the absence of substantial evidence in

the record to indicate that the officials have exaggerated their response to these considerations courts

should ordinarily defer to their expert judgment in

such matters.” Id. at 328 (citations omitted) (emphasis

added).

Here, the Sixth Circuit properly applied this existing precedent by analyzing the merits of the Fourth

Amendment claim based upon the individualized facts

and circumstances surrounding the alleged search,

and then balancing the alleged intrusion against the

City’s proffered justifications for its intake procedures.

In so doing, the Sixth Circuit properly followed this

Court’s opinions in Florence and Bell to conclude that

it must afford “significant deference” to the City’s reasons for its intake procedures, and properly cited this

Court’s opinion in Turner in stating that the HOC’s intake procedures should be upheld if they are “reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” (App.

18-19) (quoting Florence, 566 U.S. at 322-323, Bell, 441

U.S. at 547, and Turner, 452 U.S. at 89).

In her Petition, Williams does not argue that the

Sixth Circuit did not accurately set forth the rule of

law that governs Fourth Amendment claims in the

prison context. While she argues that the Sixth Circuit

“ignored” certain evidence in the record, this argument

misconstrues the evidence in the record and does not

present the type of legal issue that might warrant Supreme Court review. See S. Ct. R. 10 (“a petition for

writ of certiorari is rarely granted when the asserted

error consists of . . . the misapplication of a properly

stated rule of law”). Moreover, it fails to afford the type

of deference that must be afforded to jail officials, as

Supreme Court precedent requires. Accordingly, the

Court should deny the Petition because it improperly

asks this Court to engage in a highly fact-based and

particularized inquiry into the specific evidence presented in this case in order to determine whether the

Sixth Circuit misapplied a properly stated rule of law.

Id.

II.

THE SIXTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION DOES

NOT CREATE AN INTER-CIRCUIT CONFLICT.

In her Petition, Williams also argues that there is

an alleged “conflict” between the circuit and district

courts that have considered similar Fourth Amendment claims relating to allegations of group strip

searches in the prison context. (Petition, pg. 12). This

is not true. Most of the cases cited by Williams are consistent with the Sixth Circuit decision because they

also followed existing Supreme Court precedent to affirm the grant of summary judgment or dismissal of a

Fourth Amendment strip search claim based upon the

particularized facts alleged or shown in each case. See,

e.g., Sumpter v. Wayne County, 868 F.3d 473 (6th Cir.

2017) (upholding county jail’s decision to conduct

group strip search based upon the specific evidence

presented in that case); Story v. Foote, 782 F.3d 968,

973 (8th Cir. 2015) (following Supreme Court precedent

to affirm grant of motion to dismiss because “Story has

not alleged sufficient facts to support a plausible claim”

against a corrections officer); McCreary v. Richardson,

738 F.3d 651, 656-660 (5th Cir. 2013) (affirming summary judgment on alleged Fourth Amendment strip

search claim based upon the specific evidence presented in that case).

Moreover, in the cases where the appellate courts

ruled in the plaintiff ’s favor, the courts did not adopt

or apply a different rule of law. Rather, they also followed existing Supreme Court precedent to conclude,

based upon the particularized evidence presented in

each case, that there were genuine issues of fact that

denying summary judgment. See Harris v. Miller, 818

F.3d 49, 62 (2d Cir. 2016); Mays v. Springborn, 575 F.3d

643, 649 (7th Cir. 2008). Indeed, in this case, the Sixth

Circuit did not establish any new rule of law that

would conflict with existing Supreme Court precedent.

Thus, there is no need for this Court “to clarify” the

relevant constitutional standard because it already

established the applicable rule of law in Florence,

Turner, Bell, and the other Supreme Court decisions

that were cited and followed in the Sixth Circuit’s decision. Accordingly, the Court should conclude that the

Petition does not present compelling reasons to justify

Supreme Court review.

------------------------------------------------------------------

CONCLUSION

Petitioner has not established any compelling reason to grant the Petition. The Sixth Circuit’s decision

does not create a circuit conflict nor raise an important

question of federal law. Rather, it merely applies existing Supreme Court precedent to the particularized

facts and evidence presented in this case. Accordingly,

Respondent respectfully requests that the Court deny

the Petition.

Respectfully submitted,

THOMAS J. KAISER