Opposition Brief — Jarrod Taylor, Petitioner v. Jefferson S. Dunn, Commissioner, Alabama Department of Corrections
Supreme Court briefMar 26, 2019
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No. 18-1158
CAPITAL CASE
In the
Supreme Court of the United States
──────────────────────────
JARROD TAYLOR,
Petitioner,
v.
JEFFERSON S. DUNN, COMMISSIONER,
ALABAMA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
Respondent.
──────────────────────────
On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
──────────────────────────
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO CERTIORARI
──────────────────────────
STEVE MARSHALL
Alabama Attorney General
Lauren A. Simpson*
Assistant Attorney General
OFFICE OF ALA. ATT’Y GEN.
501 Washington Avenue
Montgomery, AL 36104
(334) 242-7300
lsimpson@ago.state.al.us
*Counsel of Record
March 26, 2019
Counsel for State of Alabama
i
CAPITAL CASE
QUESTION PRESENTED
(Restated)
By no later than October 1998, before state trial
court proceedings had concluded, Jarrod Taylor knew
the key facts that would form the basis for the claim
he is pressing here. Even so, he waited more than a
decade to raise that claim, and only after his state
postconviction proceedings had been sent back to the
circuit court on limited remand. The state courts thus
refused to consider the claim, and the federal district
court then dismissed Taylor’s claim as procedurally
defaulted and unexhausted. The question presented is
whether the Eleventh Circuit erred in denying
Taylor’s motion for certificate of appealability.
ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Question Presented ................................................... i
Table of Authorities.................................................iii
Introduction .............................................................. 1
Statement of the Case .............................................. 3
A. The murder of Sherry Gaston, Bruce
Gaston, and Steve Dyas ................................ 3
B. The trial ......................................................... 4
C. Post-trial and direct appeal........................... 7
D. State postconviction proceedings .................. 8
E. Federal habeas proceedings ........................ 11
Reasons the Petition Should be Denied ................ 12
I. Taylor’s petition is due to be denied because
the district court’s procedural ruling was
correct ................................................................ 12
A. The state-court procedural background...... 12
B. The district court correctly deemed the
claim procedurally defaulted....................... 21
C. Taylor’s contentions do not excuse his
default .......................................................... 25
II. Taylor’s petition is due to be denied because
the Eleventh Circuit did not apply an
incorrect standard............................................. 29
Conclusion .............................................................. 33
iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Anderson v. State,
796 So. 2d 1151 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000) ..............28
Barefoot v. Estelle,
463 U.S. 880 (1983)..............................................31
Benjamin v. Fischer,
248 F. Supp. 2d 251 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)...................26
Coleman v. Thompson,
501 U.S. 722 (1991)........................................22–23
Cullen v. Pinholster,
563 U.S. 170 (2011)..............................................22
Davila v. Davis,
137 S. Ct. 2058 (2017)..........................................22
Ellis v. State,
705 So. 2d 843 (Ala. Crim. App. 1996) ..........21, 28
Ex parte Apicella,
87 So. 3d 1150 (Ala. 2011) .......................20–21, 27
Ex parte DuBose Const. Co., LLC,
92 So. 3d 49 (Ala. 2012) .......................................29
Ex parte Johnson,
507 So. 2d 1351 (Ala. 1986) .................................26
Ex parte Rhone,
900 So. 2d 455 (Ala. 2004) .......................19–21, 27
Ex parte Taylor,
808 So. 2d 1215 (Ala. 2001) ...................................8
iv
Ex parte Taylor,
157 So. 3d 122 (Ala. 2008) .....................................9
Ex parte Taylor,
No. 1130313 (Ala. Apr. 25, 2014) ........................11
Harrington v. Richter,
562 U.S. 86 (2011)................................................21
Harris v. Alabama,
513 U.S. 504 (1995)................................................7
Hurst v. Florida,
136 S. Ct. 616 (2016)............................................11
Hyde v. State,
894 So. 2d 808 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004) ..........28–29
Lee v. Kemna,
534 U.S. 362 (2002)..............................................29
Lynch v. State,
587 So. 2d 306 (Ala. 1991) ...................................28
Medellin v. Dretke,
544 U.S. 660 (2005)..............................................21
Miller-El v. Cockrell,
537 U.S. 322 (2003)..............................................31
Moore v. State,
871 So. 2d 106 (Ala. Crim. App. 2003) ................29
Murray v. Carrier,
477 U.S. 478 (1986)..............................................22
O’Sullivan v. Boerckel,
526 U.S. 838 (1999)..............................................22
Paz v. United States,
462 F.2d 740 (5th Cir. 1972)................................25
v
Schlup v. Delo,
513 U.S. 298 (1995)..............................................23
Slack v. McDaniel,
529 U.S. 473 (2000)..............................................31
Taylor v. Alabama,
534 U.S. 1086 (2002)..............................................8
Taylor v. State,
808 So. 2d 1148
(Ala. Crim. App. 2000) .................................4, 8, 18
Taylor v. State,
978 So. 2d 76 (Ala. Crim. App. 2006) ....................9
Taylor v. State,
157 So. 3d 131 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010) ..................9
Taylor v. State,
CR-05-0066 (Ala. Crim. App. Apr. 26, 2013).......11
United States v. Dressler,
112 F.2d 972 (7th Cir. 1940)................................25
United States v. Perkins,
748 F.2d 1519 (11th Cir. 1984)............................25
Wainwright v. Sykes,
433 U.S. 72 (1977)..........................................22–23
Walker v. Martin,
562 U.S. 307 (2011)..............................................23
Ward v. State,
228 So. 3d 490 (Ala. Crim. App. 2017) ................28
vi
Statutes and Rules
28 U.S.C. § 2254 ........................................................21
ALA. CODE § 13A-5-40 (1975) ......................................4
ALA. R. APP. P. 45A....................................................16
ALA. R. CRIM P. 32.7 ..................................................19
1
INTRODUCTION
This is a case about procedural default.
When Jarrod Taylor was arrested for a triple
robbery-murder in 1997, police seized from his motel
room a blue duffel bag containing Taylor’s papers. The
bag, in substantially the same condition in which it
was seized, was introduced at trial as State’s Exhibit
58 without objection. Around the time of judicial
sentencing in August 1998, one of the former jurors
allegedly went on a talk radio show and discussed
reading some of the papers in the bag that made
reference to Taylor’s criminal history, but neither that
juror nor any other juror was ever asked to testify as
to what was seen.
Despite presumably knowing what was contained
in his own duffel bag—and claiming in October 1998
that a juror had publicly stated that the jury had
considered documents from the bag addressing
Taylor’s criminal history—Taylor’s only protest on
direct appeal was that the paperwork in the bag
concerning his missed child support payments was
improperly admitted. Not until 2011, during state
postconviction proceedings, did Taylor claim that the
State had improperly provided the jury with evidence
of his criminal history. This claim was raised in his
second amended petition—a petition disallowed
because the case was then back in the circuit court on
limited remand from the Alabama Court of Criminal
Appeals.
As Taylor never properly presented this claim to
the state circuit court, he failed to exhaust it for
habeas purposes. The federal district court correctly
2
found that the claim was procedurally defaulted,
noting that the factual basis of the claim was
“reasonably available” to defense counsel in 1998. The
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals concurred,
explaining that Taylor had not shown that reasonable
jurists could disagree as to whether the district court’s
ruling was correct because Taylor could not show
cause to excuse his procedural default. That court
made a further commonsense point: “The factual basis
for this claim was available to [Taylor] the moment
the bag was offered into evidence. It was his bag with
his documents.”1
Taylor now contends that the Eleventh Circuit
applied an incorrect standard of review in denying his
motion for certificate of appealability (COA) and that
the court should have granted a COA as to his claim
of prosecutorial misconduct concerning the duffel bag.
This claim is not cert-worthy. Even disregarding the
Eleventh Circuit opinion, Taylor knew about the basis
for this claim no later than August 1998—indeed, he
referenced the alleged juror interview in his motion
for new trial. That he waited thirteen years to raise
the claim on state postconviction review, and that he
only attempted to do so during a limited remand,
when the circuit court was unauthorized to accept
amendments to his petition, shows that there is no
cause to excuse his procedural default. The federal
courts’ rulings as to this claim were appropriate, and
this Court should deny review.
1. App’x A at 3a.
3
STATEMENT OF THE CASE2
A. The murder of Sherry Gaston, Bruce
Gaston, and Steve Dyas
On the morning of December 12, 1997, Jarrod
Taylor and his accomplice, Kenyatta McMillan, took a
.380 caliber pistol from the home of one of Taylor’s
friends, then bought a BB gun at Walmart. McMillan
testified that Taylor carried the pistol, while she
carried the BB gun.
The two proceeded to Steve Dyas Motors, a used
car dealership in Mobile, Alabama, intending to rob it.
Taylor negotiated the purchase of a Ford Mustang
with Sherry Gaston, a salesperson, and told her that
his father-in-law would give him the purchase money
as an early Christmas present. During the day, Taylor
and McMillan test-drove the car, filled out the
paperwork, and waited for Taylor’s non-existent
father-in-law to bring the $13,700 needed for
purchase. The pair came and went from the
dealership several times, even once asking Sherry for
a bill of sale to take to the father-in-law.
Late in the day, the employees began to leave the
dealership in preparation for the company Christmas
party. Taylor and McMillan returned around dusk to
find only Sherry, her husband, Bruce Gaston, and
Steve Dyas, the owner, remaining. Taylor
immediately shot Bruce in the chest; Sherry locked
herself in the bathroom, while Dyas attempted to
escape through a back window. McMillan brought
2. Record citations are to the habeas record below in Taylor v.
Dunn, 1:15-cv-00439-WS-N (S.D. Ala.).
4
Dyas back, and the two demanded to know where the
safe was. On his knees, Dyas begged for his life, tried
to convince them that he did not keep money in the
office, and offered them any car on the lot and his
wallet. Taylor shot Dyas in the head, then ordered
Sherry to come out of the bathroom. Like Dyas, Sherry
begged to be spared, explaining that she had two
children. Again, as with Dyas, Taylor shot her in the
head.
With three victims on the ground, Taylor and
McMillan took Sherry’s purse, the men’s wallets, and
the paperwork Sherry had prepared for the sale of the
Mustang, leaving copies on her desk to make it appear
that Taylor had bought the car. As they prepared to
leave, Taylor noticed Bruce move, and so he shot him
in the head. Taylor and McMillan then drove their
stolen Mustang to Selma, where they were caught the
next morning.3
B. The trial
Taylor was indicted on four counts of capital
murder in April 1998: one count of robbery-murder for
each of the deaths of Sherry Gaston, Bruce Gaston,
and Steve Dyas, and one count of murder of two or
more persons pursuant to one scheme or course of
conduct.4 Trial began in Mobile County on August 3,
1998.5 Of note to the matter at bar, during the guilt
3. Taylor v. State, 808 So. 2d 1148, 1160–61 (Ala. Crim. App.
2000) (Vol. 53, Tab #R-114).
4. Vol. 1 at C. 9–11; see ALA. CODE §§ 13A-5-40(a)(2), (a)(10)
(1975).
5. Vol. 2, Tab #R-8, at TR. 74.
5
phase of the trial, the State introduced Exhibit 58, a
blue duffel bag retrieved from Taylor’s motel room,
which was in substantially the same condition at trial
as it had been when it was seized.6 While the State did
not itemize the contents of the bag at trial,7 it did
mention certain documents inside the bag during its
closing argument:
How would Jarrod Taylor know the workings of
a car lot? Well, one of the pieces of evidence in
this case, state’s number 58, a blue bag. This
bag was seized from the motel room, if you
recall, up in Selma. In this bag is some business
cards. The name J. Taylor on there, Treadwell
Honda. You will see this when you get back to
the jury room. Mr. Taylor not only from these
cards but from some records inside this bag
here worked at a car dealership at one point.
[. . .]
Well, there was something else interesting
in that blue bag. There was some other
paperwork in there. Paperwork in the name of
Jarrod Taylor which shows he was in arrears in
his child support over $9,000.00—excuse me,
over $19,000.00 in arrears in his child support.
This is a man who is carrying his life in this bag
here, his previous work, how much child
support he owed. Ask yourselves, did this man
6. Vol. 7, Tab #R-15, at TR. 1054.
7. During the postconviction evidentiary hearing, the bag was
described as “full of paper,” “at least fifty” pages. Vol. 47, Tab
#R-103, at TR. 70.
6
have $13,700.00 in cash to pay for a car that
night?8
According to
inadmissible:
Taylor,
the
bag’s contents were
Taylor posits that the duffel bag contained
prejudicial, inadmissible information about his
criminal history, including (i) a document
showing that Taylor had been charged with
misprision of a felony in the U.S. District Court
for the Western District of Louisiana in
November 1993; (ii) that the same federal court
ordered Taylor arrested in March 1994 for a
hearing on the Government’s motion for
revocation of his supervised release on that
charge; (iii) that a warrant of arrest was in fact
issued for Taylor in March 1994; (iv) that the
misprision case was set for trial in September
1994; (v) that the U.S. Probation Office
discharged Taylor from supervision on
September 30, 1997, for a sentence that had
expired one day earlier. According to Taylor,
the duffel bag also contained various other
prejudicial items, such as documents showing
Taylor’s overdue loan payments and medical
bills, as well as the suspension of his driver’s
license.9
8. Vol. 8, Tab #R-19, at TR. 1398–99.
9. App’x C at 147a (internal citations omitted).
7
After five days of testimony, the jury found Taylor
guilty as charged on all counts.10
Following the penalty-phase presentation, the jury
recommended 7–5 that Taylor be sentenced to life
without parole.11 At the time of Taylor’s trial, the
jury’s verdict as to penalty was advisory and not
binding on the trial court, a scheme this Court upheld
in Court in Harris v. Alabama.12 The trial court held
a sentencing hearing on August 25, 1998, heard
additional
testimony,
overrode
the
jury’s
recommendation, and sentenced Taylor to death.13
C. Post-trial and direct appeal
Allegedly, a juror went on a local radio talk show
in August 1998 and stated that the jury was made
aware of Taylor’s prior criminal record through
evidence or personal effects belonging to Taylor.14
Counsel filed a motion for new trial based in part on
this ground.15 While the trial court suggested bringing
the juror in for questioning,16 Taylor failed to do so.
Indeed, there is no indication in the record that
Taylor’s trial, direct appeal, or state postconviction
counsel contacted any juror to identify what evidence
10. Vol. 9, Tab #R-25, at TR. 1522; see Vol. 1 at C. 12–15 (verdict
forms).
11. Vol. 9–10, Tab #R-36, at TR. 1599–1601; see Vol. 1 at C. 16–
19 (verdict forms).
12. 513 U.S. 504 (1995).
13. Vol. 10, Tab #R-38, at TR. 1636–38; see Vol. 53, Tab #R-113
(sentencing order).
14. See Vol. 1 at C. 178.
15. Vol. 1 at C. 177–79.
16. Vol. 10, Tab #R-39, at TR. 1647.
8
concerning Taylor’s criminal history was seen during
deliberations.17
On direct appeal, the Alabama Court of Criminal
Appeals affirmed Taylor’s convictions and sentence,18
as did the Alabama Supreme Court,19 and this Court
denied certiorari in 2002.20
D. State postconviction proceedings
The state postconviction proceedings in Taylor’s
case lasted for twelve years. The following is a brief
synopsis.
Taylor filed a petition for postconviction relief
pursuant to Rule 32 of the Alabama Rules of Criminal
Procedure in July 200221 and a corrected first
amended petition on May 2, 2003.22 This was his last
permitted amendment. The State moved to dismiss
most of the claims in the corrected first amended
petition and to prohibit further amendments,23 and
the circuit court granted these motions in October
2003.24 In August 2004, the circuit court issued a final
order summarily dismissing the petition.25
17. App’x C at 149a.
18. Taylor v. State, 808 So. 2d 1148 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000).
19. Ex parte Taylor, 808 So. 2d 1215 (Ala. 2001).
20. Taylor v. Alabama, 534 U.S. 1086 (2002) (mem.).
21. Vol. 18 at C. 16–124.
22. Vol. 22, Tab #R-56.
23. Vol. 25, Tabs #R-61, R-64, R-65, R-70, R-71.
24. Vol. 53, Tabs #R-117, R-118, R-119, R-120, R-121.
25. Vol. 53, Tab #R-122.
9
Taylor filed notice of appeal in September 2005.26
As his counsel had not been admitted pro hac vice at
that time, the Court of Criminal Appeals dismissed
the case, explaining that the notice of appeal was a
legal nullity.27 The Alabama Supreme Court
reversed.28
On remand in the Court of Criminal Appeals,
Taylor filed a brief in May 2008 in which he argued
that the circuit court’s final dismissal order was
erroneous because the State had never moved to
dismiss certain claims.29 In October 2010, the Court of
Criminal Appeals held that the circuit court’s
adoption of the State’s proposed orders was not
improper but ordered a limited remand to resolve the
claims that the State had not moved to dismiss.30
Back in the circuit court, Taylor moved for leave to
file a second amended petition in September 2011.31
Therein, he raised for the first time a claim that the
State “knowingly and improperly” introduced the
documents in his duffel bag, that the documents were
prejudicial, and that the State had failed to disclose
that the jury had reviewed the documents.32 The State
moved to strike the proposed second amended
petition, explaining that due to the remand directive,
26. See Vol. 53, Tab #R-124.
27. Taylor v. State, 978 So. 2d 76 (Ala. Crim. App. 2006).
28. Ex parte Taylor, 157 So. 3d 122 (Ala. 2008).
29. Vol. 31, Tab #R-90.
30. Taylor v. State, 157 So. 3d 131 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010).
31. Vol. 34, Tab #R-93.
32. Vol. 35, Tab #R-93, at C. 432–37; see Vol. 34, Tab #R-93, at
365–71 (counsel ineffective for failing to review and object to
contents of bag and wallet).
10
the circuit court did not have jurisdiction to consider
either Taylor’s new claims or his previously dismissed
claims.33 The circuit court agreed with the State,34 as
did the Court of Criminal Appeals when Taylor
petitioned for mandamus.35 After an evidentiary
hearing in January 201236—and still on limited
remand—Taylor filed a motion for leave to file a
revised second amended petition, which contained the
allegations made in the prohibited second amended
petition as well as new material.37 The motion was
denied,38 and the circuit court dismissed Taylor’s
petition in May.39
Once again in the Court of Criminal Appeals,
Taylor moved for a second remand to the circuit court
to force that court to consider the claims raised in his
prohibited second amended and revised second
amended petitions.40 The Court of Criminal Appeals
denied the motion,41 then affirmed the circuit court in
33. Vol. 55, Tab #R-137.
34. Vol. 53, Tab #R-129.
35. Vol. 53, Tab #R-130.
36. Vols. 47–48, Tab #R-103.
37. Vol. 46, Tab #R-101.
38. This order does not appear in the habeas record. Order,
Taylor v. State, 02-CC-1998-1328.60 (Mobile Cty. Cir. Ct.
May 23, 2012).
39. Vol. 53, Tab #R-131.
40. Vol. 49, Tab #R-104.
41. Vol. 53, Tab #R-132; see Vol. 53, Tab #R-133 (corrected order).
11
April 2013.42 The Alabama Supreme Court denied
certiorari the following April.43
E. Federal habeas proceedings
Taylor turned to the federal courts for relief, filing
a habeas petition in the Southern District of Alabama
in September 2014.44 After briefing, including
supplemental briefing on the effect of Hurst v.
Florida45 on Taylor’s case, the district court denied the
petition and a COA in January 2018.46 Taylor’s motion
to alter or amend the judgment was denied.47
Taylor then petitioned the Eleventh Circuit Court
of Appeals for a COA. In October 2018, the court
denied the petition in an order signed by the
Honorable Gerald Tjoflat.48 Taylor moved for panel
reconsideration; that motion was denied in January
2019 in an order signed by a three-judge panel.49
The present petition for writ of certiorari followed.
42. Taylor v. State, CR-05-0066 (Ala. Crim. App. Apr. 26, 2013)
(Vol. 53, Tab #R-134).
43. Ex parte Taylor, No. 1130313 (Ala. Apr. 25, 2014) (Vol. 53,
Tab #R-135).
44. Petition, Taylor v. Dunn, 1:14-cv-00439-WS-N (S.D. Ala.
Sept. 22, 2014), Doc. 5.
45. 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016).
46. App’x C at 52a–297a.
47. App’x B at 15a–51a.
48. App’x A at 1a–14a.
49. App’x D at 298a–99a.
12
REASONS THE PETITION SHOULD BE
DENIED
No issue in Taylor’s petition is worthy of certiorari.
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals correctly
denied a COA because Taylor’s procedural default was
inexcusable, and Taylor cannot show that the district
court erred as to its procedural ruling. His contentions
that the Eleventh Circuit applied an incorrect
standard of review and that reasonable jurists could
disagree with the district court are simply not
meritorious. For the reasons that follow, Taylor’s
petition is not cert-worthy.
I. Taylor’s petition is due to be denied because
the district court’s procedural ruling was
correct.
The question at the heart of this matter is whether
reasonable jurists could disagree with the district
court’s procedural ruling that Taylor’s claim
concerning the duffel bag was inexcusably defaulted.
The answer to that question is no.
A. The state-court procedural background
As set forth above, the State seized Taylor’s duffel
bag from his motel room when he was arrested the day
after the triple robbery-murder. That bag was
introduced at trial in substantially the same condition
as when it was seized.50 There is no question that the
bag was Taylor’s. As the Eleventh Circuit aptly noted,
the bag contained Taylor’s “own stuff,” and he had
50. Vol. 7, Tab #R-15, at TR. 1054.
13
knowledge of what was being introduced.51 The
defense did not object to the introduction of the bag.52
In August 1998, the defense filed a motion for new
trial, claiming, in relevant part:
On a talk show on Thursday and Friday,
August the 13th and 14th a juror was on the air
and testified, among other things, that the jury
was made aware of the prior criminal record of
Jarrod Taylor through evidence and/or
personal effects purportedly belonging to the
defendant Taylor. Based on information and
belief, in counsels’ review of all evidence, there
was no indication, in any of the clothes,
personal items, or documents that Jarrod
Taylor had a prior criminal record. But if said
evidence did exist, it was illegal and
improper.53
The trial court was willing to hear testimony from this
juror:
THE COURT:
It said something in here in
either the motion or the
amended motion about an
interview
with
a
juror.
[Counsel], when did that take
place?
[COUNSEL]:
Judge, it was not an interview.
It was something I found out
about Friday morning. That
51. App’x A at 2a.
52. Vol. 7, Tab #R-15, at TR. 1055.
53. Vol. 1 at C. 177–79.
14
was—I don’t remember who
told [co-counsel], but they had
heard a radio program on I
think the same talk show
Thursday morning and Friday
morning following the verdict.
THE COURT:
Uh-huh.
[COUNSEL]:
And—I am sorry. It was
following, I believe, the
sentencing. So that would have
been somewhere around the
27th [or] 28th of August that
this woman was on the radio
and I think [co-counsel] has
her name. That she was
discussing the fact that they
had seen evidence during the
guilt phase that Jarrod Taylor
had a prior conviction and I
don’t know what that might
have been because I recall
looking at all the evidence and
I don’t recall seeing anything
like that.
THE COURT:
Uh-huh. I suppose for the sake
of getting as good a record as
we can we ought to try to get
the lady here, if she can be
brought here.54
54. Vol. 10, Tab #R-39, at TR. 1647–48.
15
But Taylor failed to bring the juror to the subsequent
hearing:
THE COURT:
There was something about a
juror?
[COUNSEL]:
Yes, Your Honor, with regard
to—
THE COURT:
Is that person here?
[COUNSEL]:
No, is not and will not be. I
have looked at my notes and
looked at the law with regard
to that issue and I don’t believe
that the witness’ testimony,
even if it were exactly as it is
characterized,
would
be
admissible.
THE COURT:
All right.55
The record does not indicate that the juror was ever
identified or that trial, direct appeal, or state
postconviction counsel spoke with the juror about
what evidence was seen during deliberations.56
Despite presumably knowing the contents of his
own duffel bag, and indisputably knowing that a juror
had stated that the jury had considered documents
from the bag addressing Taylor’s criminal history,
Taylor raised only a limited claim concerning the bag
on direct appeal. The Court of Criminal Appeals
addressed the merits of this claim:
55. Vol. 10, Tab #R-40, at TR. 1685–86.
56. App’x C at 149a.
16
Taylor argues that the trial court erred in
admitting into evidence a document found in
Taylor’s possession at the time of his arrest that
indicated he was $19,000 in arrears in child
support payments. Taylor also argues that the
trial court erred in allowing the prosecutor to
refer to this document during his closing
argument and that the trial court erred in not
sua sponte giving the jury a limiting instruction
concerning the document. Because there was
never any objection at trial to the admissibility
of the document and the argument of counsel
concerning the document, and there was not a
request by Taylor for a limiting instruction or
an objection to the lack of such an instruction,
we review this claim of error for plain error
only. Rule 45A, ALA. R. APP. P.
The record reflects that, during the State’s
case, the prosecutor introduced into evidence a
blue bag found in Taylor’s motel room after he
was arrested in Selma. The blue bag,
apparently with unidentified contents inside it,
was admitted into evidence without objection.
During the prosecutor’s closing argument, the
following argument was made:
“How would Jarrod Taylor know the
workings of a car lot? Well, one of the
pieces of evidence in this case [is] State’s
number 58, a blue bag. This bag was
seized from the motel room, if you recall,
up in Selma. In this bag is some business
cards. The name ‘J. Taylor’ on there;
‘Treadwell Honda.’ You will see this
17
when you get back to the jury room. Mr.
Taylor, not only from these cards but
from some records inside this bag here,
worked at a car dealership at one point.
“That is very important, because
having worked at a car dealership, don’t
you think this man knew when he fled
from that scene that night which
paperwork he thought he needed, if he
had to answer questions to the police?
Don’t you think he knew what he might
need?
“....
“Speaking of cash, $13,700, which he
told the officers that he had—He told
these folks, ‘I had $13,700 cash that I
had saved up.’ Well, there was
something else interesting in that blue
bag. There was some other paperwork in
there. Paperwork in the name of Jarrod
Taylor which shows he was in arrears in
his child support over $9000—excuse
me, over $19,000 in arrears in his child
support. This is a man who is carrying
his life in this bag here; his previous
work; how much child support he owed.
Ask yourselves, did this man have
$13,700 in cash to pay for a car that
night?”
On appeal, Taylor argues that the
paperwork showing that he was in arrears in
child support payments was improper evidence
18
of collateral conduct and that it was improperly
admitted for the sole purpose of prejudicing Mr.
Taylor and influencing the jury to convict him
solely because he had a bad character. He also
argues that the trial court improperly allowed
the prosecutor to refer to the document in
closing argument.
[. . .]
Taylor also argues that the trial court erred
in not sua sponte giving a limiting instruction
on the proper use of evidence of collateral bad
acts. Again, we review this issue for plain error
only.57
The court found no plain error, explaining that the
child support document was used to show motive for
the robbery, as Taylor did not have the money to
purchase the Mustang he stole, and that there was no
error in failing to give an unrequested limiting
instruction.58
On state postconviction review, Taylor argued that
his counsel were ineffective for failing to object to the
State’s reference to the duffel bag and the child
support document,59 but it was not until he attempted
to file a second amended petition in September 2011,
when the matter was on limited remand to the circuit
court, did he allege that the State knowingly admitted
prejudicial materials concerning his prior bad acts.60
57. Taylor, 808 So. 2d at 1164–66 (internal citation omitted).
58. Id. at 1166–67.
59. Vol. 22, Tab #R-56, at C. 905; Vol. 27, Tab #R-76, at 53, 68;
Vol. 31, Tab #R-90, at 53, 69.
60. Vol. 35, Tab #R-93, at C. 432–37.
19
In that petition, Taylor claimed that he could not have
known of the contested documents’ existence at trial
and that he only learned of them in post-trial
interviews with jurors, despite the fact that the
documents were supposedly contained within a trial
exhibit admitted without objection, his own duffel
bag, and by Taylor’s own account in October 1998, a
juror had declared on the radio that such documents
were in the bag.61
Alabama law directs that “[a]mendments to
[postconviction] pleadings may be permitted at any
stage of the proceedings prior to the entry of
judgment” and that “[l]eave to amend shall be freely
granted.”62 This does not mean that a petitioner has
unfettered discretion to file an amendment at any
time, however, such as in Taylor’s case, where the
circuit court had no discretion to permit an
amendment due to the scope of the remand. The
circuit court correctly disallowed Taylor’s second
amended petition, explaining:
Here, the Court of Criminal Appeals has
instructed this Court on remand only to resolve
the specific claims which the parties agreed
were still pending before its summary
dismissal of Taylor’s first amended corrected
petition, with Taylor being “entitled to the
61. Id. at C. 436.
62. ALA. R. CRIM P. 32.7(b), (d); see Ex parte Rhone, 900 So. 2d
455, 458 (Ala. 2004) (“[I]t is clear that only grounds such as
actual prejudice or undue delay will support a trial court’s
refusal to allow, or to consider, an amendment to a Rule 32
petition.”).
20
opportunity to prove the allegations in those
claims and to establish that he is entitled to
relief.” The Court detects no instruction which
would allow it to permit amendments to
Taylor’s petition on remand, either to
supplement those specific claims or to add new
ones.63
The Court of Criminal Appeals denied Taylor’s
subsequent petition for mandamus, holding that the
circuit court was correct to disallow the amendment.
While Taylor claimed that his posture was like that of
the petitioner in Ex parte Apicella,64 who was
improperly prohibited from filing an amended petition
after the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the
circuit court’s summary dismissal of his petition, the
Court of Criminal Appeals explained why the cases
were distinguishable:
Taylor argues that according to the Alabama
Supreme Court’s opinion in Ex parte Apicella,
87 So. 3d 1150 (Ala. 2011), because his case was
reversed and remanded, “no final judgment was
in effect, and Ex parte Rhone, 900 So. 2d 455
(Ala. 2004), must govern the consideration of
that amended petition.” 87 So. 3d at 1154–55.
This Court did not reverse and remand the case
for further proceedings as was the case in
Apicella. We limited the scope of the circuit’s
court remand to specific claims of ineffective
assistance and we affirmed the other claims
raised by Taylor on appeal. This case is not
63. Vol. 53, Tab #R-129, at C. 694 (internal citation omitted).
64. 87 So. 3d 1150 (Ala. 2011).
21
governed by the Supreme Court’s decision in
Apicella.
As we have stated: “On remand, the issues
decided by an appellate court become the law of
the case, and the trial court’s duty is to comply
with the directions given by the reviewing
court.” Ellis v. State, 705 So. 2d 843, 847 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1996). If [the circuit court] allowed
Taylor to amend his Rule 32 petition he would
be acting beyond the scope of our remand
directions. The circuit court’s ruling was
consistent with this Court’s instructions in our
October 1, 2010, opinion.65
Pursuing certiorari in the Alabama Supreme
Court, Taylor argued that the Court of Criminal
Appeals’ decision prohibiting him from amending his
petition was improper, based on Ex parte Apicella and
Ex parte Rhone.66 That court declined to grant
certiorari.67
B. The district court correctly deemed the
claim procedurally defaulted.
As the United States Code and this Court have
made clear, with limited exception, habeas relief
cannot be granted on a claim that has not been
exhausted in state court.68 A claim is not exhausted
65. Vol. 53, Tab #R-130, at 2 (cleaned up).
66. Vol. 52, Tab #R-112, at 36–54.
67. Vol. 53, Tab #R-135.
68. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1); e.g., Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170,
208 (2011); Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011);
Medellin v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660, 666 (2005).
22
unless the petitioner has “invoke[ed] one complete
round of the State’s established appellate review
process.”69 This requirement “is designed to avoid the
unseemly result of a federal court upsetting a state
court conviction without first according the state
courts an opportunity to . . . correct a constitutional
violation.”70 Moreover, “a federal court may not review
federal claims that were procedurally defaulted in
state court—that is, claims that the state court denied
based on an adequate and independent state
procedural rule.”71 A petitioner can, however,
circumvent this bar if he meets certain criteria:
A state prisoner may overcome the prohibition
on reviewing procedurally defaulted claims if
he can show “cause” to excuse his failure to
comply with the state procedural rule and
“actual prejudice resulting from the alleged
constitutional violation.” Wainwright v. Sykes,
433 U.S. 72, 84 (1977); Coleman v. Thompson,
501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991). To establish “cause[,]”
the prisoner must “show that some objective
factor external to the defense impeded counsel’s
efforts to comply with the State’s procedural
rule.” Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488
(1986). A factor is external to the defense if it
“cannot fairly be attributed to” the prisoner.
Coleman, supra, at 753.72
In other words:
69. O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999).
70. Davila v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 2058, 2064 (2017) (cleaned up).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 2064–65 (citations edited).
23
[A]bsent showings of “cause” and “prejudice,”
see Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 84–85
(1977), federal habeas relief will be unavailable
when (1) “a state court [has] declined to address
a prisoner’s federal claims because the prisoner
had failed to meet a state procedural
requirement,” and (2) “the state judgment rests
on independent and adequate state procedural
grounds.” Coleman, 501 U.S. at 729–730.73
Here, when Taylor initiated federal habeas
proceedings, the district court was presented with a
clear-cut case of an unexhausted claim and no
showing of cause and prejudice to excuse the
procedural default. The court rejected his claim,
explaining that Taylor could not establish cause to
overcome the procedural default because the facts
were reasonably available to him in 1998:
In particular, in his Amended Motion for New
Trial filed in October 1998, Taylor moved for
relief on the grounds that on August 13 and 14,
1998, a juror had stated “on the air” that “the
jury was made aware of the prior criminal
record of Jarrod Taylor through evidence
and/or personal effects purportedly belonging
to the defendant Taylor.” At a hearing on
October 5, 1998, Taylor’s counsel explained to
Judge Johnstone that a female juror (whose
identity was known to them) had appeared on
a radio talk show airing on the Thursday and
73. Walker v. Martin, 562 U.S. 307, 316 (2011) (citations edited).
A second exception, not at issue here, is that default may be
excused if the petitioner makes a showing of actual
innocence. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995).
24
Friday after the August 1998 sentencing
hearing, and that the juror “was discussing the
fact that they had seen evidence during the
guilt phase that Jarrod Taylor had a prior
conviction and I don’t know what that might
have been.” In response, Judge Johnstone
commented that “for the sake of getting as good
a record as we can we ought to try to get the
lady here, if she can be brought here.” Yet
defendants did not bring the juror in to testify
at the hearing on the motion for new trial. Nor
is there any indication that defense counsel
(including trial counsel, direct appeal counsel,
or state post-conviction counsel) attempted to
contact that juror (or any other juror) to
identify what evidence of Taylor’s criminal
history
the
jury
had
seen
in
its
deliberations. . . .
[. . .]
The point is straightforward. Taylor’s
counsel have known—or have had good reason
to believe—since no later than October 1998
that the jury had seen something they should
not have seen relating to Taylor’s criminal
history. Had Taylor performed reasonable
follow-up between then and 2005, he would
have learned about the contents of the duffel
bag in advance of the final judgment entered by
Judge Thomas in the Rule 32 proceedings, and
therefore could have pleaded Claim II.C in the
state post-conviction proceedings in a timely
manner that complied with the state
procedural rule. Yet Taylor has made no
25
showing that he ever conducted such inquiries
in a reasonably diligent manner. Because the
Court finds that the factual basis for Claim II.C
was reasonably available to Taylor many years
before he actually attempted to raise the claim,
such that he readily could have avoided the
state procedural bar, he has not shown cause to
overcome the procedural default. Accordingly,
Claim II.C will not be considered on federal
habeas review.74
C. Taylor’s contentions do not excuse his
default.
Taylor now asks this Court to overlook his own
procedural failings, contending that reasonable
jurists could debate whether the State’s alleged
misconduct violated his constitutional rights and
whether the claim was procedurally defaulted.75
Neither contention is meritorious or cert-worthy.
First, while Taylor cites various authorities to
support his claim that he is entitled to a new trial due
to the State’s alleged misconduct,76 these cases are
distinguishable on both procedural and factual
grounds. Paz v. United States,77 United States v.
Perkins,78 and United States v. Dressler79 were
appeals from federal convictions, not federal review of
74. App’x C at 148a–150a (footnote and citations omitted).
75. Pet. 21–38.
76. Pet. 23–27.
77. 462 F.2d 740 (5th Cir. 1972).
78. 748 F.2d 1519 (11th Cir. 1984).
79. 112 F.2d 972 (7th Cir. 1940).
26
state convictions, while Ex parte Johnson80 was on
direct appeal to the Alabama Supreme Court.
Benjamin v. Fischer,81 a habeas decision arising from
a district court in the Second Circuit, is
distinguishable because Benjamin, unlike Taylor,
exhausted his claims in state court. Most important,
none of the authorities upon which Taylor relies
excuses a petitioner’s failure to exhaust his claims,
particularly not, as here, where the petitioner had
notice of the factual basis of his claim at the time of
trial, or at the very latest, in time for direct appeal.
Second, Taylor’s claim that the procedural bar is
reasonably debatable is unsupported. Again, this is a
case in which the object at issue—Taylor’s own duffel
bag, stuffed with his own papers—was before the
petitioner at the time of trial. Knowledge of the
contents of his own bag may reasonably be imputed to
Taylor. And even if he had forgotten, the district court
found that Taylor was on notice that the jury might
have seen something concerning his criminal history
as of August 1998. Indeed, Taylor sought a new trial
in October 1998 based on a juror’s purported
statement that the jury had seen evidence of Taylor’s
prior conviction. Yet Taylor waited thirteen years
before raising this claim in a procedurally improper
petition. For that reason, Taylor’s claim that the state
procedural bar was manifestly unfair is likewise
mistaken.
Third, while Taylor alleges that the state’s
procedural rule was improperly applied to bar his
80. 507 So. 2d 1351 (Ala. 1986).
81. 248 F. Supp. 2d 251 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
27
second amended petition, he is mistaken. As discussed
above, while Ex parte Apicella and Ex parte Rhone
generally stand for the proposition that leave to
amend should be freely granted in state
postconviction proceedings, that grant is not absolute,
and it certainly does not apply when a case is on
limited remand from an appellate court. Here, the
case was remanded to the circuit court for a limited
purpose:
The State concedes in its brief to this Court that
it had not moved to dismiss all the claims
Taylor had raised in his petition and that the
circuit court’s partial-dismissal orders had not
previously disposed of all claims. The State also
concedes that Claims IV.B.10 and V.C. of the
petition initially had been improperly
summarily dismissed based on Rule 32.2(c)
grounds and that the circuit court had
reinstated them. Therefore, the State argues in
its brief on appeal that this Court should order
a limited remand for an evidentiary hearing on
those claims that have not been dismissed. The
parties’ having agreed that the foregoing claims
remained pending after the circuit court
entered the orders of partial dismissal, the
circuit court erred in entering its August 1,
2005, final order summarily dismissing the
petition in its entirety; we therefore remand the
cause to the trial court for resolution of the
pending claims.82
82. Vol. 53, Tab #R-128, at *4 (footnote omitted, emphasis
added).
28
In refusing to exceed the scope of the limited
remand and permit Taylor to file a second amended
petition with new claims, the circuit court relied upon
state precedent, particularly Hyde v. State.83 In that
case, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that a circuit
court’s order on remand, which had allowed the
defendant
to
supplement
and amend his
postconviction petition, was void for lack of
jurisdiction because the circuit court was limited to
the scope of the remand order.84 Hyde remains an
accurate statement of the law in Alabama.85 As the
Alabama Supreme Court has explained:
“In Lynch v. State, 587 So. 2d 306, 307 (Ala.
1991), the Supreme Court of Alabama held that
a lower court acts beyond its authority if it
takes any action on remand that differs from
the explicit instructions of the higher appellate
court. In Anderson v. State, 796 So. 2d 1151
(Ala. Crim. App. 2000), the Alabama Court of
Criminal Appeals interpreted Lynch as holding
that ‘any act by a trial court beyond the scope
of an appellate court’s remand order is void for
lack of jurisdiction.’ 796 So. 2d at 1156 (citing
Ellis v. State, 705 So. 2d 843, 847 (Ala. Crim.
App. 1996) (stating that on remand, ‘the trial
83. 894 So. 2d 808 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004).
84. Id. at 810.
85. See, e.g., Ward v. State, 228 So. 3d 490, 494 n.2 (Ala. Crim.
App. 2017) (“In Ward V, the Supreme Court limited the
remand proceedings to the issue of equitable tolling. Thus,
the circuit court correctly prohibited any amendment to
Ward’s petition that addressed issues that were outside the
scope of the Supreme Court’s remand instructions.”).
29
court had no jurisdiction to modify the original
or base sentence imposed or to take any action
beyond the express mandate of this court’)); see
also Hyde v. State, 894 So. 2d 808 (Ala. Crim.
App. 2004), and Moore v. State, 871 So. 2d 106
(Ala. Crim. App. 2003) (accord).”86
Taylor’s claim that the state procedural rule was not
adequate and independent because it is not “firmly
established and regularly followed”87 is simply wrong.
Simply put, this is a case in which Taylor blames
everyone but himself for his failure to raise a claim
about a piece of evidence with an alleged problem
known to him no later than the time of sentencing.
Reasonable jurists would not debate the district
court’s decision to deem this claim procedurally
defaulted, and the Eleventh Circuit correctly denied a
COA.
II. Taylor’s petition is due to be denied because
the Eleventh Circuit did not apply an
incorrect standard.
Taylor alleges that this Court should grant
certiorari because the Eleventh Circuit applied an
incorrect standard of review to his motion for COA as
to his duffel bag claim.88 This contention is meritless.
86. Ex parte DuBose Const. Co., LLC, 92 So. 3d 49, 55 (Ala. 2012)
(quoting lower court’s answer to petitioner’s mandamus
petition).
87. Lee v. Kemna, 534 U.S. 362, 376 (2002).
88. Pet. 16–20.
30
In denying the motion as to the duffel bag claim,
Judge Tjoflat wrote:
In Claim One, Petitioner argues that his
constitutional rights to due process, a fair trial,
and an impartial jury were violated when “the
State knowingly secreted to the jury evidence of
[his] prior criminal history.” After Petitioner
was arrested, he allowed police to search the
hotel room where he was staying. During the
search, police seized a duffel bag that contained
several documents, and some of these
documents were related to Petitioner’s criminal
history. At trial—without objection—the State
introduced the full bag. Now, Petitioner claims
his due process right to a fair trial was violated
because the State “secreted” his own stuff into
evidence. Of course, Petitioner knew what
documents were in the bag, and he knew the
bag was admitted into evidence in the same
condition as when the police seized it. There
was no secret, and Petitioner has not shown
that reasonable jurists would debate whether
Claim One states a valid due process claim.1
[FN 1: The District Court found that this claim
was procedurally defaulted. Petitioner has not
shown reasonable jurists would debate whether
the District Court’s procedural ruling was
correct because he cannot show cause to excuse
the procedural default. The factual basis for
this claim was available to Petitioner the
31
moment the bag was offered into evidence. It
was his bag with his documents.]89
A three-judge panel denied reconsideration without
further analysis.90
As this Court has explained, in determining
whether a COA should issue, the reviewing court
must “look to the District Court’s application of
AEDPA to petitioner’s constitutional claims and ask
whether that resolution was debatable amongst
jurists of reason.”91 While “a COA does not require a
showing that the appeal will succeed,”92 “issuance of a
COA must not be pro forma or a matter of course.”93
Rather, “[a] prisoner seeking a COA must prove
something more than the absence of frivolity or the
existence of mere good faith on his or her part.”94 The
showing required for a COA is “straightforward: The
petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists
would find the district court’s assessment of the
constitutional claims debatable or wrong.”95
Here, the Eleventh Circuit correctly found that
Taylor failed to make this threshold showing for a
COA, as reasonable jurists would not debate the
merits of the district court’s ruling as to the
procedural default of the duffel bag claim. In so doing,
the Eleventh Circuit reiterated the primary factual
89. App’x A at 2a–3a.
90. App’x D at 298a.
91. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003).
92. Id. at 337 (citing Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (2000)).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 338 (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893
(1983)) (cleaned up).
95. Slack, 529 U.S. at 484.
32
points brought up by the courts below: the duffel bag
was Taylor’s, it was introduced without objection, and
Taylor had notice of the factual basis of his claim long
before September 2011, when he attempted to file a
second amended postconviction petition. If the court
erred at all in its order, it was in going beyond the
district court’s holding that Taylor knew of the alleged
problem by the motion for new trial in August 1998 to
find that Taylor should have known as soon as the bag
was introduced at trial earlier that month—after all,
it was “his own stuff.” If this commonsense statement
constitutes error, such error is not cert-worthy, as the
court also correctly noted that Taylor failed to show
that the district court’s procedural ruling was
debatable.
***
Jarrod Taylor shot three innocent people in the
head—including the parents of young children, two
weeks before Christmas—in order to steal a Mustang
and a few wallets. What papers, if any, were
improperly seen by jurors and which jurors saw these
papers was never established in the state courts. Nor
has Taylor ever shown a scintilla of evidence that the
papers in his duffel bag caused the jury to convict him
of a crime he did not commit or improperly sentence
him. Instead, Taylor simply failed to raise a claim
until it was too late to present and exhaust it in the
state courts, then blamed everyone but himself for the
default. The lower courts correctly denied this claim
and denied a COA, and this Court should deny
certiorari.
33
CONCLUSION
This Court should deny certiorari.
Respectfully submitted,
Steve Marshall
Alabama Attorney General
Lauren A. Simpson
Alabama Assistant Attorney
General
*Counsel of Record for
Respondent
OFFICE OF ALA. ATT’Y
GENERAL
501 Washington Avenue
Montgomery, AL 36104
(334) 242-7300
lsimpson@ago.state.al.us
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.