Opposition Brief — Jarrod Taylor, Petitioner v. Jefferson S. Dunn, Commissioner, Alabama Department of Corrections

Supreme Court briefMar 26, 2019

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No. 18-1158

CAPITAL CASE

In the

Supreme Court of the United States

──────────────────────────

JARROD TAYLOR,

Petitioner,

v.

JEFFERSON S. DUNN, COMMISSIONER,

ALABAMA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,

Respondent.

──────────────────────────

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United

States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

──────────────────────────

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO CERTIORARI

──────────────────────────

STEVE MARSHALL

Alabama Attorney General

Lauren A. Simpson*

Assistant Attorney General

OFFICE OF ALA. ATT’Y GEN.

501 Washington Avenue

Montgomery, AL 36104

(334) 242-7300

lsimpson@ago.state.al.us

*Counsel of Record

March 26, 2019

Counsel for State of Alabama

i

CAPITAL CASE

QUESTION PRESENTED

(Restated)

By no later than October 1998, before state trial

court proceedings had concluded, Jarrod Taylor knew

the key facts that would form the basis for the claim

he is pressing here. Even so, he waited more than a

decade to raise that claim, and only after his state

postconviction proceedings had been sent back to the

circuit court on limited remand. The state courts thus

refused to consider the claim, and the federal district

court then dismissed Taylor’s claim as procedurally

defaulted and unexhausted. The question presented is

whether the Eleventh Circuit erred in denying

Taylor’s motion for certificate of appealability.

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Question Presented ................................................... i

Table of Authorities.................................................iii

Introduction .............................................................. 1

Statement of the Case .............................................. 3

A. The murder of Sherry Gaston, Bruce

Gaston, and Steve Dyas ................................ 3

B. The trial ......................................................... 4

C. Post-trial and direct appeal........................... 7

D. State postconviction proceedings .................. 8

E. Federal habeas proceedings ........................ 11

Reasons the Petition Should be Denied ................ 12

I. Taylor’s petition is due to be denied because

the district court’s procedural ruling was

correct ................................................................ 12

A. The state-court procedural background...... 12

B. The district court correctly deemed the

claim procedurally defaulted....................... 21

C. Taylor’s contentions do not excuse his

default .......................................................... 25

II. Taylor’s petition is due to be denied because

the Eleventh Circuit did not apply an

incorrect standard............................................. 29

Conclusion .............................................................. 33

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Anderson v. State,

796 So. 2d 1151 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000) ..............28

Barefoot v. Estelle,

463 U.S. 880 (1983)..............................................31

Benjamin v. Fischer,

248 F. Supp. 2d 251 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)...................26

Coleman v. Thompson,

501 U.S. 722 (1991)........................................22–23

Cullen v. Pinholster,

563 U.S. 170 (2011)..............................................22

Davila v. Davis,

137 S. Ct. 2058 (2017)..........................................22

Ellis v. State,

705 So. 2d 843 (Ala. Crim. App. 1996) ..........21, 28

Ex parte Apicella,

87 So. 3d 1150 (Ala. 2011) .......................20–21, 27

Ex parte DuBose Const. Co., LLC,

92 So. 3d 49 (Ala. 2012) .......................................29

Ex parte Johnson,

507 So. 2d 1351 (Ala. 1986) .................................26

Ex parte Rhone,

900 So. 2d 455 (Ala. 2004) .......................19–21, 27

Ex parte Taylor,

808 So. 2d 1215 (Ala. 2001) ...................................8

iv

Ex parte Taylor,

157 So. 3d 122 (Ala. 2008) .....................................9

Ex parte Taylor,

No. 1130313 (Ala. Apr. 25, 2014) ........................11

Harrington v. Richter,

562 U.S. 86 (2011)................................................21

Harris v. Alabama,

513 U.S. 504 (1995)................................................7

Hurst v. Florida,

136 S. Ct. 616 (2016)............................................11

Hyde v. State,

894 So. 2d 808 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004) ..........28–29

Lee v. Kemna,

534 U.S. 362 (2002)..............................................29

Lynch v. State,

587 So. 2d 306 (Ala. 1991) ...................................28

Medellin v. Dretke,

544 U.S. 660 (2005)..............................................21

Miller-El v. Cockrell,

537 U.S. 322 (2003)..............................................31

Moore v. State,

871 So. 2d 106 (Ala. Crim. App. 2003) ................29

Murray v. Carrier,

477 U.S. 478 (1986)..............................................22

O’Sullivan v. Boerckel,

526 U.S. 838 (1999)..............................................22

Paz v. United States,

462 F.2d 740 (5th Cir. 1972)................................25

v

Schlup v. Delo,

513 U.S. 298 (1995)..............................................23

Slack v. McDaniel,

529 U.S. 473 (2000)..............................................31

Taylor v. Alabama,

534 U.S. 1086 (2002)..............................................8

Taylor v. State,

808 So. 2d 1148

(Ala. Crim. App. 2000) .................................4, 8, 18

Taylor v. State,

978 So. 2d 76 (Ala. Crim. App. 2006) ....................9

Taylor v. State,

157 So. 3d 131 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010) ..................9

Taylor v. State,

CR-05-0066 (Ala. Crim. App. Apr. 26, 2013).......11

United States v. Dressler,

112 F.2d 972 (7th Cir. 1940)................................25

United States v. Perkins,

748 F.2d 1519 (11th Cir. 1984)............................25

Wainwright v. Sykes,

433 U.S. 72 (1977)..........................................22–23

Walker v. Martin,

562 U.S. 307 (2011)..............................................23

Ward v. State,

228 So. 3d 490 (Ala. Crim. App. 2017) ................28

vi

Statutes and Rules

28 U.S.C. § 2254 ........................................................21

ALA. CODE § 13A-5-40 (1975) ......................................4

ALA. R. APP. P. 45A....................................................16

ALA. R. CRIM P. 32.7 ..................................................19

1

INTRODUCTION

This is a case about procedural default.

When Jarrod Taylor was arrested for a triple

robbery-murder in 1997, police seized from his motel

room a blue duffel bag containing Taylor’s papers. The

bag, in substantially the same condition in which it

was seized, was introduced at trial as State’s Exhibit

58 without objection. Around the time of judicial

sentencing in August 1998, one of the former jurors

allegedly went on a talk radio show and discussed

reading some of the papers in the bag that made

reference to Taylor’s criminal history, but neither that

juror nor any other juror was ever asked to testify as

to what was seen.

Despite presumably knowing what was contained

in his own duffel bag—and claiming in October 1998

that a juror had publicly stated that the jury had

considered documents from the bag addressing

Taylor’s criminal history—Taylor’s only protest on

direct appeal was that the paperwork in the bag

concerning his missed child support payments was

improperly admitted. Not until 2011, during state

postconviction proceedings, did Taylor claim that the

State had improperly provided the jury with evidence

of his criminal history. This claim was raised in his

second amended petition—a petition disallowed

because the case was then back in the circuit court on

limited remand from the Alabama Court of Criminal

Appeals.

As Taylor never properly presented this claim to

the state circuit court, he failed to exhaust it for

habeas purposes. The federal district court correctly

2

found that the claim was procedurally defaulted,

noting that the factual basis of the claim was

“reasonably available” to defense counsel in 1998. The

Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals concurred,

explaining that Taylor had not shown that reasonable

jurists could disagree as to whether the district court’s

ruling was correct because Taylor could not show

cause to excuse his procedural default. That court

made a further commonsense point: “The factual basis

for this claim was available to [Taylor] the moment

the bag was offered into evidence. It was his bag with

his documents.”1

Taylor now contends that the Eleventh Circuit

applied an incorrect standard of review in denying his

motion for certificate of appealability (COA) and that

the court should have granted a COA as to his claim

of prosecutorial misconduct concerning the duffel bag.

This claim is not cert-worthy. Even disregarding the

Eleventh Circuit opinion, Taylor knew about the basis

for this claim no later than August 1998—indeed, he

referenced the alleged juror interview in his motion

for new trial. That he waited thirteen years to raise

the claim on state postconviction review, and that he

only attempted to do so during a limited remand,

when the circuit court was unauthorized to accept

amendments to his petition, shows that there is no

cause to excuse his procedural default. The federal

courts’ rulings as to this claim were appropriate, and

this Court should deny review.

1. App’x A at 3a.

3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE2

A. The murder of Sherry Gaston, Bruce

Gaston, and Steve Dyas

On the morning of December 12, 1997, Jarrod

Taylor and his accomplice, Kenyatta McMillan, took a

.380 caliber pistol from the home of one of Taylor’s

friends, then bought a BB gun at Walmart. McMillan

testified that Taylor carried the pistol, while she

carried the BB gun.

The two proceeded to Steve Dyas Motors, a used

car dealership in Mobile, Alabama, intending to rob it.

Taylor negotiated the purchase of a Ford Mustang

with Sherry Gaston, a salesperson, and told her that

his father-in-law would give him the purchase money

as an early Christmas present. During the day, Taylor

and McMillan test-drove the car, filled out the

paperwork, and waited for Taylor’s non-existent

father-in-law to bring the $13,700 needed for

purchase. The pair came and went from the

dealership several times, even once asking Sherry for

a bill of sale to take to the father-in-law.

Late in the day, the employees began to leave the

dealership in preparation for the company Christmas

party. Taylor and McMillan returned around dusk to

find only Sherry, her husband, Bruce Gaston, and

Steve Dyas, the owner, remaining. Taylor

immediately shot Bruce in the chest; Sherry locked

herself in the bathroom, while Dyas attempted to

escape through a back window. McMillan brought

2. Record citations are to the habeas record below in Taylor v.

Dunn, 1:15-cv-00439-WS-N (S.D. Ala.).

4

Dyas back, and the two demanded to know where the

safe was. On his knees, Dyas begged for his life, tried

to convince them that he did not keep money in the

office, and offered them any car on the lot and his

wallet. Taylor shot Dyas in the head, then ordered

Sherry to come out of the bathroom. Like Dyas, Sherry

begged to be spared, explaining that she had two

children. Again, as with Dyas, Taylor shot her in the

head.

With three victims on the ground, Taylor and

McMillan took Sherry’s purse, the men’s wallets, and

the paperwork Sherry had prepared for the sale of the

Mustang, leaving copies on her desk to make it appear

that Taylor had bought the car. As they prepared to

leave, Taylor noticed Bruce move, and so he shot him

in the head. Taylor and McMillan then drove their

stolen Mustang to Selma, where they were caught the

next morning.3

B. The trial

Taylor was indicted on four counts of capital

murder in April 1998: one count of robbery-murder for

each of the deaths of Sherry Gaston, Bruce Gaston,

and Steve Dyas, and one count of murder of two or

more persons pursuant to one scheme or course of

conduct.4 Trial began in Mobile County on August 3,

1998.5 Of note to the matter at bar, during the guilt

3. Taylor v. State, 808 So. 2d 1148, 1160–61 (Ala. Crim. App.

2000) (Vol. 53, Tab #R-114).

4. Vol. 1 at C. 9–11; see ALA. CODE §§ 13A-5-40(a)(2), (a)(10)

(1975).

5. Vol. 2, Tab #R-8, at TR. 74.

5

phase of the trial, the State introduced Exhibit 58, a

blue duffel bag retrieved from Taylor’s motel room,

which was in substantially the same condition at trial

as it had been when it was seized.6 While the State did

not itemize the contents of the bag at trial,7 it did

mention certain documents inside the bag during its

closing argument:

How would Jarrod Taylor know the workings of

a car lot? Well, one of the pieces of evidence in

this case, state’s number 58, a blue bag. This

bag was seized from the motel room, if you

recall, up in Selma. In this bag is some business

cards. The name J. Taylor on there, Treadwell

Honda. You will see this when you get back to

the jury room. Mr. Taylor not only from these

cards but from some records inside this bag

here worked at a car dealership at one point.

[. . .]

Well, there was something else interesting

in that blue bag. There was some other

paperwork in there. Paperwork in the name of

Jarrod Taylor which shows he was in arrears in

his child support over $9,000.00—excuse me,

over $19,000.00 in arrears in his child support.

This is a man who is carrying his life in this bag

here, his previous work, how much child

support he owed. Ask yourselves, did this man

6. Vol. 7, Tab #R-15, at TR. 1054.

7. During the postconviction evidentiary hearing, the bag was

described as “full of paper,” “at least fifty” pages. Vol. 47, Tab

#R-103, at TR. 70.

6

have $13,700.00 in cash to pay for a car that

night?8

According to

inadmissible:

Taylor,

the

bag’s contents were

Taylor posits that the duffel bag contained

prejudicial, inadmissible information about his

criminal history, including (i) a document

showing that Taylor had been charged with

misprision of a felony in the U.S. District Court

for the Western District of Louisiana in

November 1993; (ii) that the same federal court

ordered Taylor arrested in March 1994 for a

hearing on the Government’s motion for

revocation of his supervised release on that

charge; (iii) that a warrant of arrest was in fact

issued for Taylor in March 1994; (iv) that the

misprision case was set for trial in September

1994; (v) that the U.S. Probation Office

discharged Taylor from supervision on

September 30, 1997, for a sentence that had

expired one day earlier. According to Taylor,

the duffel bag also contained various other

prejudicial items, such as documents showing

Taylor’s overdue loan payments and medical

bills, as well as the suspension of his driver’s

license.9

8. Vol. 8, Tab #R-19, at TR. 1398–99.

9. App’x C at 147a (internal citations omitted).

7

After five days of testimony, the jury found Taylor

guilty as charged on all counts.10

Following the penalty-phase presentation, the jury

recommended 7–5 that Taylor be sentenced to life

without parole.11 At the time of Taylor’s trial, the

jury’s verdict as to penalty was advisory and not

binding on the trial court, a scheme this Court upheld

in Court in Harris v. Alabama.12 The trial court held

a sentencing hearing on August 25, 1998, heard

additional

testimony,

overrode

the

jury’s

recommendation, and sentenced Taylor to death.13

C. Post-trial and direct appeal

Allegedly, a juror went on a local radio talk show

in August 1998 and stated that the jury was made

aware of Taylor’s prior criminal record through

evidence or personal effects belonging to Taylor.14

Counsel filed a motion for new trial based in part on

this ground.15 While the trial court suggested bringing

the juror in for questioning,16 Taylor failed to do so.

Indeed, there is no indication in the record that

Taylor’s trial, direct appeal, or state postconviction

counsel contacted any juror to identify what evidence

10. Vol. 9, Tab #R-25, at TR. 1522; see Vol. 1 at C. 12–15 (verdict

forms).

11. Vol. 9–10, Tab #R-36, at TR. 1599–1601; see Vol. 1 at C. 16–

19 (verdict forms).

12. 513 U.S. 504 (1995).

13. Vol. 10, Tab #R-38, at TR. 1636–38; see Vol. 53, Tab #R-113

(sentencing order).

14. See Vol. 1 at C. 178.

15. Vol. 1 at C. 177–79.

16. Vol. 10, Tab #R-39, at TR. 1647.

8

concerning Taylor’s criminal history was seen during

deliberations.17

On direct appeal, the Alabama Court of Criminal

Appeals affirmed Taylor’s convictions and sentence,18

as did the Alabama Supreme Court,19 and this Court

denied certiorari in 2002.20

D. State postconviction proceedings

The state postconviction proceedings in Taylor’s

case lasted for twelve years. The following is a brief

synopsis.

Taylor filed a petition for postconviction relief

pursuant to Rule 32 of the Alabama Rules of Criminal

Procedure in July 200221 and a corrected first

amended petition on May 2, 2003.22 This was his last

permitted amendment. The State moved to dismiss

most of the claims in the corrected first amended

petition and to prohibit further amendments,23 and

the circuit court granted these motions in October

2003.24 In August 2004, the circuit court issued a final

order summarily dismissing the petition.25

17. App’x C at 149a.

18. Taylor v. State, 808 So. 2d 1148 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000).

19. Ex parte Taylor, 808 So. 2d 1215 (Ala. 2001).

20. Taylor v. Alabama, 534 U.S. 1086 (2002) (mem.).

21. Vol. 18 at C. 16–124.

22. Vol. 22, Tab #R-56.

23. Vol. 25, Tabs #R-61, R-64, R-65, R-70, R-71.

24. Vol. 53, Tabs #R-117, R-118, R-119, R-120, R-121.

25. Vol. 53, Tab #R-122.

9

Taylor filed notice of appeal in September 2005.26

As his counsel had not been admitted pro hac vice at

that time, the Court of Criminal Appeals dismissed

the case, explaining that the notice of appeal was a

legal nullity.27 The Alabama Supreme Court

reversed.28

On remand in the Court of Criminal Appeals,

Taylor filed a brief in May 2008 in which he argued

that the circuit court’s final dismissal order was

erroneous because the State had never moved to

dismiss certain claims.29 In October 2010, the Court of

Criminal Appeals held that the circuit court’s

adoption of the State’s proposed orders was not

improper but ordered a limited remand to resolve the

claims that the State had not moved to dismiss.30

Back in the circuit court, Taylor moved for leave to

file a second amended petition in September 2011.31

Therein, he raised for the first time a claim that the

State “knowingly and improperly” introduced the

documents in his duffel bag, that the documents were

prejudicial, and that the State had failed to disclose

that the jury had reviewed the documents.32 The State

moved to strike the proposed second amended

petition, explaining that due to the remand directive,

26. See Vol. 53, Tab #R-124.

27. Taylor v. State, 978 So. 2d 76 (Ala. Crim. App. 2006).

28. Ex parte Taylor, 157 So. 3d 122 (Ala. 2008).

29. Vol. 31, Tab #R-90.

30. Taylor v. State, 157 So. 3d 131 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010).

31. Vol. 34, Tab #R-93.

32. Vol. 35, Tab #R-93, at C. 432–37; see Vol. 34, Tab #R-93, at

365–71 (counsel ineffective for failing to review and object to

contents of bag and wallet).

10

the circuit court did not have jurisdiction to consider

either Taylor’s new claims or his previously dismissed

claims.33 The circuit court agreed with the State,34 as

did the Court of Criminal Appeals when Taylor

petitioned for mandamus.35 After an evidentiary

hearing in January 201236—and still on limited

remand—Taylor filed a motion for leave to file a

revised second amended petition, which contained the

allegations made in the prohibited second amended

petition as well as new material.37 The motion was

denied,38 and the circuit court dismissed Taylor’s

petition in May.39

Once again in the Court of Criminal Appeals,

Taylor moved for a second remand to the circuit court

to force that court to consider the claims raised in his

prohibited second amended and revised second

amended petitions.40 The Court of Criminal Appeals

denied the motion,41 then affirmed the circuit court in

33. Vol. 55, Tab #R-137.

34. Vol. 53, Tab #R-129.

35. Vol. 53, Tab #R-130.

36. Vols. 47–48, Tab #R-103.

37. Vol. 46, Tab #R-101.

38. This order does not appear in the habeas record. Order,

Taylor v. State, 02-CC-1998-1328.60 (Mobile Cty. Cir. Ct.

May 23, 2012).

39. Vol. 53, Tab #R-131.

40. Vol. 49, Tab #R-104.

41. Vol. 53, Tab #R-132; see Vol. 53, Tab #R-133 (corrected order).

11

April 2013.42 The Alabama Supreme Court denied

certiorari the following April.43

E. Federal habeas proceedings

Taylor turned to the federal courts for relief, filing

a habeas petition in the Southern District of Alabama

in September 2014.44 After briefing, including

supplemental briefing on the effect of Hurst v.

Florida45 on Taylor’s case, the district court denied the

petition and a COA in January 2018.46 Taylor’s motion

to alter or amend the judgment was denied.47

Taylor then petitioned the Eleventh Circuit Court

of Appeals for a COA. In October 2018, the court

denied the petition in an order signed by the

Honorable Gerald Tjoflat.48 Taylor moved for panel

reconsideration; that motion was denied in January

2019 in an order signed by a three-judge panel.49

The present petition for writ of certiorari followed.

42. Taylor v. State, CR-05-0066 (Ala. Crim. App. Apr. 26, 2013)

(Vol. 53, Tab #R-134).

43. Ex parte Taylor, No. 1130313 (Ala. Apr. 25, 2014) (Vol. 53,

Tab #R-135).

44. Petition, Taylor v. Dunn, 1:14-cv-00439-WS-N (S.D. Ala.

Sept. 22, 2014), Doc. 5.

45. 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016).

46. App’x C at 52a–297a.

47. App’x B at 15a–51a.

48. App’x A at 1a–14a.

49. App’x D at 298a–99a.

12

REASONS THE PETITION SHOULD BE

DENIED

No issue in Taylor’s petition is worthy of certiorari.

The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals correctly

denied a COA because Taylor’s procedural default was

inexcusable, and Taylor cannot show that the district

court erred as to its procedural ruling. His contentions

that the Eleventh Circuit applied an incorrect

standard of review and that reasonable jurists could

disagree with the district court are simply not

meritorious. For the reasons that follow, Taylor’s

petition is not cert-worthy.

I. Taylor’s petition is due to be denied because

the district court’s procedural ruling was

correct.

The question at the heart of this matter is whether

reasonable jurists could disagree with the district

court’s procedural ruling that Taylor’s claim

concerning the duffel bag was inexcusably defaulted.

The answer to that question is no.

A. The state-court procedural background

As set forth above, the State seized Taylor’s duffel

bag from his motel room when he was arrested the day

after the triple robbery-murder. That bag was

introduced at trial in substantially the same condition

as when it was seized.50 There is no question that the

bag was Taylor’s. As the Eleventh Circuit aptly noted,

the bag contained Taylor’s “own stuff,” and he had

50. Vol. 7, Tab #R-15, at TR. 1054.

13

knowledge of what was being introduced.51 The

defense did not object to the introduction of the bag.52

In August 1998, the defense filed a motion for new

trial, claiming, in relevant part:

On a talk show on Thursday and Friday,

August the 13th and 14th a juror was on the air

and testified, among other things, that the jury

was made aware of the prior criminal record of

Jarrod Taylor through evidence and/or

personal effects purportedly belonging to the

defendant Taylor. Based on information and

belief, in counsels’ review of all evidence, there

was no indication, in any of the clothes,

personal items, or documents that Jarrod

Taylor had a prior criminal record. But if said

evidence did exist, it was illegal and

improper.53

The trial court was willing to hear testimony from this

juror:

THE COURT:

It said something in here in

either the motion or the

amended motion about an

interview

with

a

juror.

[Counsel], when did that take

place?

[COUNSEL]:

Judge, it was not an interview.

It was something I found out

about Friday morning. That

51. App’x A at 2a.

52. Vol. 7, Tab #R-15, at TR. 1055.

53. Vol. 1 at C. 177–79.

14

was—I don’t remember who

told [co-counsel], but they had

heard a radio program on I

think the same talk show

Thursday morning and Friday

morning following the verdict.

THE COURT:

Uh-huh.

[COUNSEL]:

And—I am sorry. It was

following, I believe, the

sentencing. So that would have

been somewhere around the

27th [or] 28th of August that

this woman was on the radio

and I think [co-counsel] has

her name. That she was

discussing the fact that they

had seen evidence during the

guilt phase that Jarrod Taylor

had a prior conviction and I

don’t know what that might

have been because I recall

looking at all the evidence and

I don’t recall seeing anything

like that.

THE COURT:

Uh-huh. I suppose for the sake

of getting as good a record as

we can we ought to try to get

the lady here, if she can be

brought here.54

54. Vol. 10, Tab #R-39, at TR. 1647–48.

15

But Taylor failed to bring the juror to the subsequent

hearing:

THE COURT:

There was something about a

juror?

[COUNSEL]:

Yes, Your Honor, with regard

to—

THE COURT:

Is that person here?

[COUNSEL]:

No, is not and will not be. I

have looked at my notes and

looked at the law with regard

to that issue and I don’t believe

that the witness’ testimony,

even if it were exactly as it is

characterized,

would

be

admissible.

THE COURT:

All right.55

The record does not indicate that the juror was ever

identified or that trial, direct appeal, or state

postconviction counsel spoke with the juror about

what evidence was seen during deliberations.56

Despite presumably knowing the contents of his

own duffel bag, and indisputably knowing that a juror

had stated that the jury had considered documents

from the bag addressing Taylor’s criminal history,

Taylor raised only a limited claim concerning the bag

on direct appeal. The Court of Criminal Appeals

addressed the merits of this claim:

55. Vol. 10, Tab #R-40, at TR. 1685–86.

56. App’x C at 149a.

16

Taylor argues that the trial court erred in

admitting into evidence a document found in

Taylor’s possession at the time of his arrest that

indicated he was $19,000 in arrears in child

support payments. Taylor also argues that the

trial court erred in allowing the prosecutor to

refer to this document during his closing

argument and that the trial court erred in not

sua sponte giving the jury a limiting instruction

concerning the document. Because there was

never any objection at trial to the admissibility

of the document and the argument of counsel

concerning the document, and there was not a

request by Taylor for a limiting instruction or

an objection to the lack of such an instruction,

we review this claim of error for plain error

only. Rule 45A, ALA. R. APP. P.

The record reflects that, during the State’s

case, the prosecutor introduced into evidence a

blue bag found in Taylor’s motel room after he

was arrested in Selma. The blue bag,

apparently with unidentified contents inside it,

was admitted into evidence without objection.

During the prosecutor’s closing argument, the

following argument was made:

“How would Jarrod Taylor know the

workings of a car lot? Well, one of the

pieces of evidence in this case [is] State’s

number 58, a blue bag. This bag was

seized from the motel room, if you recall,

up in Selma. In this bag is some business

cards. The name ‘J. Taylor’ on there;

‘Treadwell Honda.’ You will see this

17

when you get back to the jury room. Mr.

Taylor, not only from these cards but

from some records inside this bag here,

worked at a car dealership at one point.

“That is very important, because

having worked at a car dealership, don’t

you think this man knew when he fled

from that scene that night which

paperwork he thought he needed, if he

had to answer questions to the police?

Don’t you think he knew what he might

need?

“....

“Speaking of cash, $13,700, which he

told the officers that he had—He told

these folks, ‘I had $13,700 cash that I

had saved up.’ Well, there was

something else interesting in that blue

bag. There was some other paperwork in

there. Paperwork in the name of Jarrod

Taylor which shows he was in arrears in

his child support over $9000—excuse

me, over $19,000 in arrears in his child

support. This is a man who is carrying

his life in this bag here; his previous

work; how much child support he owed.

Ask yourselves, did this man have

$13,700 in cash to pay for a car that

night?”

On appeal, Taylor argues that the

paperwork showing that he was in arrears in

child support payments was improper evidence

18

of collateral conduct and that it was improperly

admitted for the sole purpose of prejudicing Mr.

Taylor and influencing the jury to convict him

solely because he had a bad character. He also

argues that the trial court improperly allowed

the prosecutor to refer to the document in

closing argument.

[. . .]

Taylor also argues that the trial court erred

in not sua sponte giving a limiting instruction

on the proper use of evidence of collateral bad

acts. Again, we review this issue for plain error

only.57

The court found no plain error, explaining that the

child support document was used to show motive for

the robbery, as Taylor did not have the money to

purchase the Mustang he stole, and that there was no

error in failing to give an unrequested limiting

instruction.58

On state postconviction review, Taylor argued that

his counsel were ineffective for failing to object to the

State’s reference to the duffel bag and the child

support document,59 but it was not until he attempted

to file a second amended petition in September 2011,

when the matter was on limited remand to the circuit

court, did he allege that the State knowingly admitted

prejudicial materials concerning his prior bad acts.60

57. Taylor, 808 So. 2d at 1164–66 (internal citation omitted).

58. Id. at 1166–67.

59. Vol. 22, Tab #R-56, at C. 905; Vol. 27, Tab #R-76, at 53, 68;

Vol. 31, Tab #R-90, at 53, 69.

60. Vol. 35, Tab #R-93, at C. 432–37.

19

In that petition, Taylor claimed that he could not have

known of the contested documents’ existence at trial

and that he only learned of them in post-trial

interviews with jurors, despite the fact that the

documents were supposedly contained within a trial

exhibit admitted without objection, his own duffel

bag, and by Taylor’s own account in October 1998, a

juror had declared on the radio that such documents

were in the bag.61

Alabama law directs that “[a]mendments to

[postconviction] pleadings may be permitted at any

stage of the proceedings prior to the entry of

judgment” and that “[l]eave to amend shall be freely

granted.”62 This does not mean that a petitioner has

unfettered discretion to file an amendment at any

time, however, such as in Taylor’s case, where the

circuit court had no discretion to permit an

amendment due to the scope of the remand. The

circuit court correctly disallowed Taylor’s second

amended petition, explaining:

Here, the Court of Criminal Appeals has

instructed this Court on remand only to resolve

the specific claims which the parties agreed

were still pending before its summary

dismissal of Taylor’s first amended corrected

petition, with Taylor being “entitled to the

61. Id. at C. 436.

62. ALA. R. CRIM P. 32.7(b), (d); see Ex parte Rhone, 900 So. 2d

455, 458 (Ala. 2004) (“[I]t is clear that only grounds such as

actual prejudice or undue delay will support a trial court’s

refusal to allow, or to consider, an amendment to a Rule 32

petition.”).

20

opportunity to prove the allegations in those

claims and to establish that he is entitled to

relief.” The Court detects no instruction which

would allow it to permit amendments to

Taylor’s petition on remand, either to

supplement those specific claims or to add new

ones.63

The Court of Criminal Appeals denied Taylor’s

subsequent petition for mandamus, holding that the

circuit court was correct to disallow the amendment.

While Taylor claimed that his posture was like that of

the petitioner in Ex parte Apicella,64 who was

improperly prohibited from filing an amended petition

after the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the

circuit court’s summary dismissal of his petition, the

Court of Criminal Appeals explained why the cases

were distinguishable:

Taylor argues that according to the Alabama

Supreme Court’s opinion in Ex parte Apicella,

87 So. 3d 1150 (Ala. 2011), because his case was

reversed and remanded, “no final judgment was

in effect, and Ex parte Rhone, 900 So. 2d 455

(Ala. 2004), must govern the consideration of

that amended petition.” 87 So. 3d at 1154–55.

This Court did not reverse and remand the case

for further proceedings as was the case in

Apicella. We limited the scope of the circuit’s

court remand to specific claims of ineffective

assistance and we affirmed the other claims

raised by Taylor on appeal. This case is not

63. Vol. 53, Tab #R-129, at C. 694 (internal citation omitted).

64. 87 So. 3d 1150 (Ala. 2011).

21

governed by the Supreme Court’s decision in

Apicella.

As we have stated: “On remand, the issues

decided by an appellate court become the law of

the case, and the trial court’s duty is to comply

with the directions given by the reviewing

court.” Ellis v. State, 705 So. 2d 843, 847 (Ala.

Crim. App. 1996). If [the circuit court] allowed

Taylor to amend his Rule 32 petition he would

be acting beyond the scope of our remand

directions. The circuit court’s ruling was

consistent with this Court’s instructions in our

October 1, 2010, opinion.65

Pursuing certiorari in the Alabama Supreme

Court, Taylor argued that the Court of Criminal

Appeals’ decision prohibiting him from amending his

petition was improper, based on Ex parte Apicella and

Ex parte Rhone.66 That court declined to grant

certiorari.67

B. The district court correctly deemed the

claim procedurally defaulted.

As the United States Code and this Court have

made clear, with limited exception, habeas relief

cannot be granted on a claim that has not been

exhausted in state court.68 A claim is not exhausted

65. Vol. 53, Tab #R-130, at 2 (cleaned up).

66. Vol. 52, Tab #R-112, at 36–54.

67. Vol. 53, Tab #R-135.

68. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1); e.g., Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170,

208 (2011); Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011);

Medellin v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660, 666 (2005).

22

unless the petitioner has “invoke[ed] one complete

round of the State’s established appellate review

process.”69 This requirement “is designed to avoid the

unseemly result of a federal court upsetting a state

court conviction without first according the state

courts an opportunity to . . . correct a constitutional

violation.”70 Moreover, “a federal court may not review

federal claims that were procedurally defaulted in

state court—that is, claims that the state court denied

based on an adequate and independent state

procedural rule.”71 A petitioner can, however,

circumvent this bar if he meets certain criteria:

A state prisoner may overcome the prohibition

on reviewing procedurally defaulted claims if

he can show “cause” to excuse his failure to

comply with the state procedural rule and

“actual prejudice resulting from the alleged

constitutional violation.” Wainwright v. Sykes,

433 U.S. 72, 84 (1977); Coleman v. Thompson,

501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991). To establish “cause[,]”

the prisoner must “show that some objective

factor external to the defense impeded counsel’s

efforts to comply with the State’s procedural

rule.” Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488

(1986). A factor is external to the defense if it

“cannot fairly be attributed to” the prisoner.

Coleman, supra, at 753.72

In other words:

69. O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999).

70. Davila v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 2058, 2064 (2017) (cleaned up).

71. Id.

72. Id. at 2064–65 (citations edited).

23

[A]bsent showings of “cause” and “prejudice,”

see Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 84–85

(1977), federal habeas relief will be unavailable

when (1) “a state court [has] declined to address

a prisoner’s federal claims because the prisoner

had failed to meet a state procedural

requirement,” and (2) “the state judgment rests

on independent and adequate state procedural

grounds.” Coleman, 501 U.S. at 729–730.73

Here, when Taylor initiated federal habeas

proceedings, the district court was presented with a

clear-cut case of an unexhausted claim and no

showing of cause and prejudice to excuse the

procedural default. The court rejected his claim,

explaining that Taylor could not establish cause to

overcome the procedural default because the facts

were reasonably available to him in 1998:

In particular, in his Amended Motion for New

Trial filed in October 1998, Taylor moved for

relief on the grounds that on August 13 and 14,

1998, a juror had stated “on the air” that “the

jury was made aware of the prior criminal

record of Jarrod Taylor through evidence

and/or personal effects purportedly belonging

to the defendant Taylor.” At a hearing on

October 5, 1998, Taylor’s counsel explained to

Judge Johnstone that a female juror (whose

identity was known to them) had appeared on

a radio talk show airing on the Thursday and

73. Walker v. Martin, 562 U.S. 307, 316 (2011) (citations edited).

A second exception, not at issue here, is that default may be

excused if the petitioner makes a showing of actual

innocence. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995).

24

Friday after the August 1998 sentencing

hearing, and that the juror “was discussing the

fact that they had seen evidence during the

guilt phase that Jarrod Taylor had a prior

conviction and I don’t know what that might

have been.” In response, Judge Johnstone

commented that “for the sake of getting as good

a record as we can we ought to try to get the

lady here, if she can be brought here.” Yet

defendants did not bring the juror in to testify

at the hearing on the motion for new trial. Nor

is there any indication that defense counsel

(including trial counsel, direct appeal counsel,

or state post-conviction counsel) attempted to

contact that juror (or any other juror) to

identify what evidence of Taylor’s criminal

history

the

jury

had

seen

in

its

deliberations. . . .

[. . .]

The point is straightforward. Taylor’s

counsel have known—or have had good reason

to believe—since no later than October 1998

that the jury had seen something they should

not have seen relating to Taylor’s criminal

history. Had Taylor performed reasonable

follow-up between then and 2005, he would

have learned about the contents of the duffel

bag in advance of the final judgment entered by

Judge Thomas in the Rule 32 proceedings, and

therefore could have pleaded Claim II.C in the

state post-conviction proceedings in a timely

manner that complied with the state

procedural rule. Yet Taylor has made no

25

showing that he ever conducted such inquiries

in a reasonably diligent manner. Because the

Court finds that the factual basis for Claim II.C

was reasonably available to Taylor many years

before he actually attempted to raise the claim,

such that he readily could have avoided the

state procedural bar, he has not shown cause to

overcome the procedural default. Accordingly,

Claim II.C will not be considered on federal

habeas review.74

C. Taylor’s contentions do not excuse his

default.

Taylor now asks this Court to overlook his own

procedural failings, contending that reasonable

jurists could debate whether the State’s alleged

misconduct violated his constitutional rights and

whether the claim was procedurally defaulted.75

Neither contention is meritorious or cert-worthy.

First, while Taylor cites various authorities to

support his claim that he is entitled to a new trial due

to the State’s alleged misconduct,76 these cases are

distinguishable on both procedural and factual

grounds. Paz v. United States,77 United States v.

Perkins,78 and United States v. Dressler79 were

appeals from federal convictions, not federal review of

74. App’x C at 148a–150a (footnote and citations omitted).

75. Pet. 21–38.

76. Pet. 23–27.

77. 462 F.2d 740 (5th Cir. 1972).

78. 748 F.2d 1519 (11th Cir. 1984).

79. 112 F.2d 972 (7th Cir. 1940).

26

state convictions, while Ex parte Johnson80 was on

direct appeal to the Alabama Supreme Court.

Benjamin v. Fischer,81 a habeas decision arising from

a district court in the Second Circuit, is

distinguishable because Benjamin, unlike Taylor,

exhausted his claims in state court. Most important,

none of the authorities upon which Taylor relies

excuses a petitioner’s failure to exhaust his claims,

particularly not, as here, where the petitioner had

notice of the factual basis of his claim at the time of

trial, or at the very latest, in time for direct appeal.

Second, Taylor’s claim that the procedural bar is

reasonably debatable is unsupported. Again, this is a

case in which the object at issue—Taylor’s own duffel

bag, stuffed with his own papers—was before the

petitioner at the time of trial. Knowledge of the

contents of his own bag may reasonably be imputed to

Taylor. And even if he had forgotten, the district court

found that Taylor was on notice that the jury might

have seen something concerning his criminal history

as of August 1998. Indeed, Taylor sought a new trial

in October 1998 based on a juror’s purported

statement that the jury had seen evidence of Taylor’s

prior conviction. Yet Taylor waited thirteen years

before raising this claim in a procedurally improper

petition. For that reason, Taylor’s claim that the state

procedural bar was manifestly unfair is likewise

mistaken.

Third, while Taylor alleges that the state’s

procedural rule was improperly applied to bar his

80. 507 So. 2d 1351 (Ala. 1986).

81. 248 F. Supp. 2d 251 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).

27

second amended petition, he is mistaken. As discussed

above, while Ex parte Apicella and Ex parte Rhone

generally stand for the proposition that leave to

amend should be freely granted in state

postconviction proceedings, that grant is not absolute,

and it certainly does not apply when a case is on

limited remand from an appellate court. Here, the

case was remanded to the circuit court for a limited

purpose:

The State concedes in its brief to this Court that

it had not moved to dismiss all the claims

Taylor had raised in his petition and that the

circuit court’s partial-dismissal orders had not

previously disposed of all claims. The State also

concedes that Claims IV.B.10 and V.C. of the

petition initially had been improperly

summarily dismissed based on Rule 32.2(c)

grounds and that the circuit court had

reinstated them. Therefore, the State argues in

its brief on appeal that this Court should order

a limited remand for an evidentiary hearing on

those claims that have not been dismissed. The

parties’ having agreed that the foregoing claims

remained pending after the circuit court

entered the orders of partial dismissal, the

circuit court erred in entering its August 1,

2005, final order summarily dismissing the

petition in its entirety; we therefore remand the

cause to the trial court for resolution of the

pending claims.82

82. Vol. 53, Tab #R-128, at *4 (footnote omitted, emphasis

added).

28

In refusing to exceed the scope of the limited

remand and permit Taylor to file a second amended

petition with new claims, the circuit court relied upon

state precedent, particularly Hyde v. State.83 In that

case, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that a circuit

court’s order on remand, which had allowed the

defendant

to

supplement

and amend his

postconviction petition, was void for lack of

jurisdiction because the circuit court was limited to

the scope of the remand order.84 Hyde remains an

accurate statement of the law in Alabama.85 As the

Alabama Supreme Court has explained:

“In Lynch v. State, 587 So. 2d 306, 307 (Ala.

1991), the Supreme Court of Alabama held that

a lower court acts beyond its authority if it

takes any action on remand that differs from

the explicit instructions of the higher appellate

court. In Anderson v. State, 796 So. 2d 1151

(Ala. Crim. App. 2000), the Alabama Court of

Criminal Appeals interpreted Lynch as holding

that ‘any act by a trial court beyond the scope

of an appellate court’s remand order is void for

lack of jurisdiction.’ 796 So. 2d at 1156 (citing

Ellis v. State, 705 So. 2d 843, 847 (Ala. Crim.

App. 1996) (stating that on remand, ‘the trial

83. 894 So. 2d 808 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004).

84. Id. at 810.

85. See, e.g., Ward v. State, 228 So. 3d 490, 494 n.2 (Ala. Crim.

App. 2017) (“In Ward V, the Supreme Court limited the

remand proceedings to the issue of equitable tolling. Thus,

the circuit court correctly prohibited any amendment to

Ward’s petition that addressed issues that were outside the

scope of the Supreme Court’s remand instructions.”).

29

court had no jurisdiction to modify the original

or base sentence imposed or to take any action

beyond the express mandate of this court’)); see

also Hyde v. State, 894 So. 2d 808 (Ala. Crim.

App. 2004), and Moore v. State, 871 So. 2d 106

(Ala. Crim. App. 2003) (accord).”86

Taylor’s claim that the state procedural rule was not

adequate and independent because it is not “firmly

established and regularly followed”87 is simply wrong.

Simply put, this is a case in which Taylor blames

everyone but himself for his failure to raise a claim

about a piece of evidence with an alleged problem

known to him no later than the time of sentencing.

Reasonable jurists would not debate the district

court’s decision to deem this claim procedurally

defaulted, and the Eleventh Circuit correctly denied a

COA.

II. Taylor’s petition is due to be denied because

the Eleventh Circuit did not apply an

incorrect standard.

Taylor alleges that this Court should grant

certiorari because the Eleventh Circuit applied an

incorrect standard of review to his motion for COA as

to his duffel bag claim.88 This contention is meritless.

86. Ex parte DuBose Const. Co., LLC, 92 So. 3d 49, 55 (Ala. 2012)

(quoting lower court’s answer to petitioner’s mandamus

petition).

87. Lee v. Kemna, 534 U.S. 362, 376 (2002).

88. Pet. 16–20.

30

In denying the motion as to the duffel bag claim,

Judge Tjoflat wrote:

In Claim One, Petitioner argues that his

constitutional rights to due process, a fair trial,

and an impartial jury were violated when “the

State knowingly secreted to the jury evidence of

[his] prior criminal history.” After Petitioner

was arrested, he allowed police to search the

hotel room where he was staying. During the

search, police seized a duffel bag that contained

several documents, and some of these

documents were related to Petitioner’s criminal

history. At trial—without objection—the State

introduced the full bag. Now, Petitioner claims

his due process right to a fair trial was violated

because the State “secreted” his own stuff into

evidence. Of course, Petitioner knew what

documents were in the bag, and he knew the

bag was admitted into evidence in the same

condition as when the police seized it. There

was no secret, and Petitioner has not shown

that reasonable jurists would debate whether

Claim One states a valid due process claim.1

[FN 1: The District Court found that this claim

was procedurally defaulted. Petitioner has not

shown reasonable jurists would debate whether

the District Court’s procedural ruling was

correct because he cannot show cause to excuse

the procedural default. The factual basis for

this claim was available to Petitioner the

31

moment the bag was offered into evidence. It

was his bag with his documents.]89

A three-judge panel denied reconsideration without

further analysis.90

As this Court has explained, in determining

whether a COA should issue, the reviewing court

must “look to the District Court’s application of

AEDPA to petitioner’s constitutional claims and ask

whether that resolution was debatable amongst

jurists of reason.”91 While “a COA does not require a

showing that the appeal will succeed,”92 “issuance of a

COA must not be pro forma or a matter of course.”93

Rather, “[a] prisoner seeking a COA must prove

something more than the absence of frivolity or the

existence of mere good faith on his or her part.”94 The

showing required for a COA is “straightforward: The

petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists

would find the district court’s assessment of the

constitutional claims debatable or wrong.”95

Here, the Eleventh Circuit correctly found that

Taylor failed to make this threshold showing for a

COA, as reasonable jurists would not debate the

merits of the district court’s ruling as to the

procedural default of the duffel bag claim. In so doing,

the Eleventh Circuit reiterated the primary factual

89. App’x A at 2a–3a.

90. App’x D at 298a.

91. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003).

92. Id. at 337 (citing Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (2000)).

93. Id.

94. Id. at 338 (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893

(1983)) (cleaned up).

95. Slack, 529 U.S. at 484.

32

points brought up by the courts below: the duffel bag

was Taylor’s, it was introduced without objection, and

Taylor had notice of the factual basis of his claim long

before September 2011, when he attempted to file a

second amended postconviction petition. If the court

erred at all in its order, it was in going beyond the

district court’s holding that Taylor knew of the alleged

problem by the motion for new trial in August 1998 to

find that Taylor should have known as soon as the bag

was introduced at trial earlier that month—after all,

it was “his own stuff.” If this commonsense statement

constitutes error, such error is not cert-worthy, as the

court also correctly noted that Taylor failed to show

that the district court’s procedural ruling was

debatable.

***

Jarrod Taylor shot three innocent people in the

head—including the parents of young children, two

weeks before Christmas—in order to steal a Mustang

and a few wallets. What papers, if any, were

improperly seen by jurors and which jurors saw these

papers was never established in the state courts. Nor

has Taylor ever shown a scintilla of evidence that the

papers in his duffel bag caused the jury to convict him

of a crime he did not commit or improperly sentence

him. Instead, Taylor simply failed to raise a claim

until it was too late to present and exhaust it in the

state courts, then blamed everyone but himself for the

default. The lower courts correctly denied this claim

and denied a COA, and this Court should deny

certiorari.

33

CONCLUSION

This Court should deny certiorari.

Respectfully submitted,

Steve Marshall

Alabama Attorney General

Lauren A. Simpson

Alabama Assistant Attorney

General

*Counsel of Record for

Respondent

OFFICE OF ALA. ATT’Y

GENERAL

501 Washington Avenue

Montgomery, AL 36104

(334) 242-7300

lsimpson@ago.state.al.us

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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Opposition Brief — Jarrod Taylor, Petitioner v. Jefferson S. Dunn, Commissioner, Alabama Department of Corrections | Frix