Emergency Application — Robert A. Rucho, et al., Applicants v. Common Cause, et al.
Supreme Court briefJan 12, 2018
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IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
____________
No. ___
____________
ROBERT A. RUCHO, ET AL.
Applicants,
v.
COMMON CAUSE, ET AL.,
Respondents.
________________________
ROBERT A. RUCHO, ET AL.
Applicants,
V.
LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF NORTH CAROLINA, ET AL.
Respondents.
________________________
EMERGENCY APPLICATION FOR STAY
PENDING RESOLUTION OF DIRECT APPEAL TO THIS COURT
________________________
PHILLIP J. STRACH
MICHAEL D. MCKNIGHT
OGLETREE, DEAKINS,
NASH SMOAK &
STEWART, P.C.
4208 Six Forks Road
Suite 1100
Raleigh, NC 27609
PAUL D. CLEMENT
Counsel of Record
ERIN E. MURPHY
KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP
655 Fifteenth Street, NW
Washington, DC 20005
(202) 879-5000
paul.clement@kirkland.com
Counsel for Applicants/Defendants Senator Robert Rucho, in his official capacity as
co-chair of the Joint Select Committee on Congressional Redistricting;
Representative David Lewis, in his official capacity as co-chair of the Committee;
Timothy K. Moore, in his official capacity as Speaker of the North Carolina House of
Representatives; and Philip E. Berger, in his official capacity as President Pro
Tempore of the North Carolina Senate
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .......................................................................................... ii
OPINION BELOW......................................................................................................... 4
JURISDICTION............................................................................................................. 4
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ....................................................................................... 4
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE APPLICATION .................................................. 11
I.
There Is A Reasonable Probability That The Court Will Hold Or Review
This Case, And A Fair Prospect That The Court Will Vacate Or Reverse
The Decision Below ........................................................................................... 12
II. The State And Its Citizens Will Suffer Irreparable Harm Absent A Stay,
And The Balance Of Equities Favors A Stay ................................................... 19
CONCLUSION............................................................................................................. 22
APPENDIX
Appendix A
Opinion of the United States District Court for the Middle District of North
Carolina, Common Cause, et al. v. Rucho, et al., No. 1:16-CV-1026,
(Jan. 9, 2018)
Appendix B
Order of the United States District Court for the Middle District of North
Carolina, Common Cause, et al. v. Rucho, et al., No. 1:16-CV-1026,
(Jan. 11, 2018)
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Benisek v. Lamone,
No. 17-333 (U.S.) ........................................................................................................ 2
Bush v. Vera,
517 U.S. 952 (1996) .................................................................................................. 17
Cooper v. Harris,
137 S. Ct. 1455 (2017) ................................................................................................ 1
Davis v. Bandemer,
478 U.S. 109 (1986) .................................................................................................. 15
Gill v. Whitford,
No. 16A1149 (U.S.) ..................................................................................................... 8
Gill v. Whitford,
No. 16-1161 (U.S.) ...................................................................................................... 2
Harris v. Cooper,
No. 16-166 (U.S.) ........................................................................................................ 7
Harris v. McCrory,
159 F. Supp. 3d 600 (M.D.N.C. 2016) .................................................................... 1, 5
Harris v. McCrory,
No. 1:13-cv-949, 2016 WL 3129213 (M.D.N.C. June 2, 2016) .................................. 7
Herbert v. Kitchen,
134 S. Ct. 893 (2014) ................................................................................................. 22
Hollingsworth v. Perry,
558 U.S. 183 (2010) ................................................................................................... 11
Hunt v. Cromartie,
526 U.S. 541 (1999) .................................................................................................. 16
Karcher v. Daggett,
455 U.S. 1303 (1982) ................................................................................................ 19
League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry,
548 U.S. 399 (2006) .................................................................................................. 14
Maryland v. King,
133 S. Ct. 1 (2012) .................................................................................................... 19
Miller v. Johnson,
515 U.S. 900 (1995) ............................................................................................ 17, 19
Purcell v. Gonzalez,
549 U.S. 1 (2006) ...................................................................................................... 20
ii
San Diegans for Mt. Soledad Nat’l War Mem’l v. Paulson,
548 U.S. 1301 (2006) ................................................................................................. 22
Strange v. Searcy,
135 S. Ct. 940 (2015) ................................................................................................. 22
Vieth v. Jubelirer,
541 U.S. 267 (2004) ................................................................................ 14, 15, 16, 18
Voinovich v. Quilter,
507 U.S. 146 (1993) .................................................................................................. 17
Whitford v. Gill,
No. 15-cv-421-bbc, 2017 WL 383360 (W.D. Wisc. Jan. 27, 2017) ........................... 21
Constitutional Provisions
U.S. Const. art. I, §2 .................................................................................................... 17
U.S. Const. art. I, §4 .................................................................................................... 18
Statutes
28 U.S.C. §1253 .............................................................................................................. 4
N.C. Gen. Stat. §120-2.4 .............................................................................................. 10
Other Authorities
Memorandum, Agre v. Wolf,
No. 17-4392 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 10, 2018), ECF No. 211 ............................................... 18
Memorandum, Agre v. Wolf,
No. 17-4392 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 10, 2018), ECF No. 212 ............................................... 18
Order, Covington v. North Carolina,
No. 1:15-cv-399 (M.D.N.C. Oct. 26, 2017), ECF No. 202 ........................................ 21
Order, Covington v. North Carolina,
No. 1:15-cv-399 (M.D.N.C. Dec. 12, 2017) ECF No. 228 ......................................... 21
Pls.’ Objs. and Mem. of Law Regarding Remedial Redistricting Plan,
Harris v. Cooper, No. 1:13-cv-949 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 3, 2016), ECF No. 157 .............. 7
iii
TO THE HONORABLE JOHN G. ROBERTS, JR., CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES
AND CIRCUIT JUSTICE FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT:
Two years ago, a divided three-judge district court panel invalidated two
districts in North Carolina’s congressional districting map on racial gerrymandering
grounds and ordered the General Assembly to enact a new congressional districting
map within 14 days.
See Harris v. McCrory (Harris I), 159 F. Supp. 3d 600
(M.D.N.C. 2016), aff’d sub nom. Cooper v. Harris (Harris II), 137 S. Ct. 1455 (2017).
The General Assembly promptly and dutifully complied, enacting a new map on
February 19, 2016—only to have its new map challenged as well, this time on
partisan gerrymandering grounds. Now, a mere month before the filing period for
the 2018 elections is set to open, once again, a three-judge panel has invalidated
North Carolina’s duly enacted congressional map, becoming the second court in the
post-Vieth world to purport to divine a justiciable test for partisan gerrymandering,
and the first ever to discern such a test in the Elections Clauses of Article I. After
taking months to issue its opinion, the three-judge panel gave the General
Assembly just 14 days to enact a new map, and ordered it to submit the map along
with a complete description and record of the enactment process for the district
court’s review once it is enacted. Adding insult to injury, the court also announced
its intention to appoint a special master to draw an “alternative” map
simultaneously, to be used in the seemingly inevitable event that the court finds
that the General Assembly’s map “fails to remedy the constitutional violation or is
otherwise legally unacceptable.” App. A at 190.
Simply put, after taking months to issue an opinion adopting multiple
entirely novel theories of partisan gerrymandering, the three-judge court has given
the General Assembly just two weeks to draw a third congressional map, which is
sufficiently unlikely to pass the court’s muster that the court has already decided to
have a special master draw a competing map.
Having already ignored the
prerogatives of the political branches to play the primary role in elections to that
degree, it is no surprise that the district court apparently does not even intend to
decide which map to impose in time to comply with upcoming voter assignment and
filing periods. In sum, the three-judge panel has used an entirely novel legal theory
to hopelessly disrupt North Carolina’s upcoming congressional elections.
That eleventh-hour disruption is reason enough for this Court to grant a stay
pending appeal. Prohibiting the State from using the duly enacted districting map
that governed its last election cycle on the eve of the commencement of the 2018
election cycle is not just practically disruptive, but represents a grave and
irreparable sovereign injury. But a stay is all the more appropriate because this
Court is presently considering two partisan gerrymandering cases.
See Gill v.
Whitford, No. 16-1161 (U.S.); Benisek v. Lamone, No. 17-333 (U.S.). One of those
cases—Gill—was the first post-Vieth case to purport to identify a justiciable
standard for partisan gerrymandering claims, to invalidate a duly enacted map on
such grounds, and to order the state legislature to draw a new map. This Court
stayed the order to draw a new map in Gill pending this Court’s determination
whether a justiciable partisan gerrymandering claim even exists.
2
The decision below constitutes the second-ever post-Vieth decision purporting
to identify a justiciable theory, invalidating a duly enacted map, and ordering a new
map to be drawn. That decision should likewise be stayed. There is no reason to
treat this case differently from Gill. Indeed, the greater time exigencies here, as
well as the fact that the decision below is the first ever to ground a justiciable
theory of partisan gerrymandering in the Elections Clauses, only underscore the
decision’s novelty and the propriety of a stay. Certainly this Court’s decisions in
Gill and Benisek will shed light on whether the plaintiffs here have standing,
whether partisan gerrymandering claims are justiciable, and, in the events both
questions are answered in the affirmative, how a State is to comply with whatever
new requirements the Court may impose. Particularly given the relief this Court
already granted to Wisconsin, it makes no sense whatsoever to force North Carolina
to immediately remedy a purported partisan gerrymandering violation and
commence its 2018 election cycle under a new court-imposed map before this Court
can even decide whether and under what circumstances such claims may be
adjudicated.
The district court’s decision is all the more problematic because it will
inevitably interfere with North Carolina’s congressional election cycle.
As the
district court is well aware, the filing period for the primary elections is set to open
on February 12. If the 2018 election must proceed under a map other than the one
that governed the 2016 congressional elections, then the Board of Elections needs
lead to time assign voters to their new districts, potential candidates need lead time
3
to evaluate the new map and make filing decisions, and voters need lead time to
understand where they will be voting and for whom.
Yet the district court
apparently does not even intend to announce what map will govern the 2018
elections until February 12 at the very earliest. The far more sensible course, and
the course far more respectful of the core sovereign interests at stake, is to stay the
district court’s decision pending resolution of Applicants’ appeal, just as this Court
did in Gill, and ensure that this Court can determine whether and how its decisions
in Gill and Benisek impact this case before it is too late to matter for the 2018
elections. Applicants therefore respectfully request that the Court grant a stay.
And in all events, given the fast-approaching January 24 deadline that the district
court imposed on the General Assembly to enact a new map, Applicants respectfully
request a ruling from the Court on this stay application by January 22, 2018.
OPINION BELOW
The opinion of the three-judge district court enjoining the use of North
Carolina’s congressional map and ordering the General Assembly to enact a new
districting plan by January 24, 2018, is reproduced at Appendix A.
JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1253.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Two years ago, on February 5, 2016, a divided three-judge panel for the
Middle District of North Carolina concluded that two districts in North Carolina’s
2011 congressional districting map, CD1 and CD12, were unconstitutional racial
gerrymanders and ordered the General Assembly to draw a new map within 14
4
days. See Harris I, 159 F. Supp. 3d at 627. The General Assembly immediately set
to work. Because the court’s extraordinary two-week deadline made time of the
essence, the chairs of the most recent Senate and House redistricting committee
promptly engaged expert mapdrawer Dr. Thomas Hofeller to assist in drawing a
new map. App. A at 10. In addition to instructing Dr. Hofeller to comply with the
myriad state and federal districting requirements and traditional districting
criteria, they also instructed him not to consider racial data at all, but to consider
political data and endeavor to draw a map that was likely to preserve the existing
partisan makeup of the State’s congressional delegation. App. A at 11.
Meanwhile, the House and the Senate appointed a new districting committee,
and the committee adopted seven criteria to govern the redistricting effort. Those
criteria included creating districts with populations “nearly as equal as practicable,”
ensuring contiguity and compactness, and making “reasonable efforts” to avoid
pairing incumbents. App. A at 14. The criteria also stated that racial data shall not
be used or considered, but that political data may be used, and that “reasonable
efforts” shall be made “to maintain the current partisan makeup of North Carolina’s
congressional delegation,” which at the time was 10 Republicans and 3 Democrats.
App. A at 14. The committee unanimously adopted five of the seven districting
criteria and adopted the two dealing with racial and political data and partisan
advantage on a party-line vote. The committee ultimately approved the map drawn
with Dr. Hofeller’s assistance by a party-line vote, and on February 19, 2016, the
5
General Assembly enacted the map, with minor modification, on party-line votes as
well. App. A at 17-18.
As a matter of traditional districting criteria, the 2016 Plan fares well by
comparison to the 2011 map.
Indeed, the 2016 Plan adheres more closely to
traditional districting criteria than any congressional map North Carolina has used
in the past 25 years. It preserves 87 (out of 100) whole counties and splits only 12
(out of well more than 2000) precincts across the entire State. App. A at 18. No
county is split into more than two congressional districts. By contrast, the 1992
plan that spawned the infamous “serpentine” version of CD12 divided 44 counties,
seven of which were split into three congressional districts, and split at least 77
precincts. Legislative Defs.’ Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at
143, ECF No. 114. The 1997 plan divided 22 counties, the 1998 plan divided 21, the
2001 plan divided 28, and the 2011 plan divided 40. Id. The 2016 Plan also is more
compact “[u]nder several statistical measures” than the 2011 Plan, and it paired
only two incumbents. App. A at 18.
Because the 2016 Plan was enacted on the order of the district court in
Harris, that court claimed the power to review the map—not only to determine
whether it remedied the racial gerrymander the court had found, but for any and all
potential legal or constitutional deficiencies. he Harris plaintiffs filed objections,
claiming both that the map did not remedy the racial gerrymandering violation
because the General Assembly did not “conduct [a] racial analysis” or consider
racial data when drawing it, and that the map was an unconstitutional partisan
6
gerrymander. See Pls.’ Objs. and Mem. of Law Regarding Remedial Redistricting
Plan at 25, 30-32, No. 1:13-cv-949 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 3, 2016), ECF No. 157. The
district court rejected both of those challenges, concluding that the plaintiffs “failed
to state with specificity” why the General Assembly’s decision not to consider race
failed to cure the racial gerrymander, and had not provided a “clear and
manageable” standard that would render their partisan gerrymandering claim
justiciable. Harris v. McCrory, No. 1:13-cv-949, 2016 WL 3129213, at *2 (M.D.N.C.
June 2, 2016). At the same time, the court essentially invited further challenges to
the 2016 Plan, twice expressly stating that its decision “does not constitute or imply
an endorsement of, or foreclose any additional challenges to,” the plan. Id. at *1, *3.
The Harris plaintiffs filed a jurisdictional statement challenging the partisan
gerrymandering aspect of that order, and this Court directed the parties to file
supplemental briefs addressing whether the plaintiffs had standing to press that
claim, and whether the order denying their objections to the 2016 Plan is
appealable. See Harris v. Cooper, No. 16-166 (U.S.). The parties filed supplemental
briefs on June 6, 2017, and the case has remained pending on this Court’s docket
since then.
Shortly after the Harris district court issued its decision denying the
plaintiffs’ objections, Common Cause, the North Carolina Democratic Party, and 14
voters took the court up on its implicit invitation to further challenge the 2016 Plan
and filed one of the two lawsuits out of which this application arises, alleging that
the 2016 Plan is an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander. About a month later,
7
the League of Women Voters and 12 other voters followed suit. Collectively, their
two complaints allege that the 2016 Plan is an unconstitutional racial gerrymander
that violates the Equal Protection Clause; the First Amendment; Article I, Section 2
of the Constitution (“The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members
chosen every second Year by the People of the several States….”); and Article I,
Section 4 (“The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and
Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof….”).
The cases were assigned to a three-judge district court, which consolidated
them and originally scheduled trial for June 26, 2017, but subsequently postponed
trial on its own motion. Shortly thereafter, on June 19, 2017, this Court issued
orders agreeing to hear the Gill case on the merits and staying the Gill district
court’s order directing Wisconsin to enact a conditional remedial districting plan for
its 2018 elections by November 1, 2017. See Gill v. Whitford, No. 16A1149. At that
point, Applicants promptly filed a motion in the district court asking the court to
stay proceedings in this case pending resolution of Gill, explaining that it would
make little sense to proceed with a trial while this Court was actively considering
whether partisan gerrymandering claims are justiciable at all, and, if so, whether
the same “efficiency gap” measure pressed by the plaintiffs in this case is a viable
means of trying to prove them. See Legislative Defs.’ Mem. of Law in Supp. of Mot.
to Stay, ECF No. 75. But the district court denied the motion and forged ahead,
holding a four-day bench trial in mid-October.
8
Approximately three months later, on January 9, 2018, the district court
issued a divided opinion holding that plaintiffs have standing to bring their
statewide partisan gerrymandering claims, that such claims are justiciable under
the Equal Protection Clause, the First Amendment, and Sections 2 and 4 of Article
I, and that the 2016 Plan violates all four of those provisions. See App. A at 25-187.
Judge Osteen concurred in part and dissented in part, rejecting the exceedingly low
intent standard the majority adopted for Equal Protection Clause claims, and
dissenting from the majority’s conclusion that the 2016 Plan violates the First
Amendment because he was “unconvinced that Plaintiffs have proven an injury to
their First Amendment rights.” App. A at 192.
The district court immediately enjoined the State from using the 2016 Plan in
any future elections, declaring that course of action the appropriate one “[a]bsent
unusual circumstances.” App. A at 187. Although the court acknowledged that “the
deadline for candidates to file to compete in the 2018 election” is “fast approaching,”
it concluded that the State should nonetheless be prohibited from using its map
because “the 2018 general election remains many months away and the 2018
election cycle has not yet formally begun.” App. A at 187, 189. While the court
stated that it would not ordinarily “afford a legislature a second ‘bite-at-the-apple’
to enact a constitutionally compliant plan” after finding its first remedial map
deficient, it concluded that it would make an exception to that purported rule here
because, “at the time the General Assembly drew the 2016 Plan, the [Supreme]
9
Court
had
not
established
a
legal
standard
for
adjudicating
partisan
gerrymandering claims.” App. A at 188.
The court then ordered the General Assembly to enact a new map by 5pm on
January 24, thus giving it a mere two weeks—the absolute minimum time
permissible under state law, see N.C. Gen. Stat. §120-2.4(a) (the “period of time” to
draw a new map if a court finds a duly enacted one deficient “shall not be less than
two weeks”)—to draw, consider, debate, and vote on a new congressional map, and
further ordered the General Assembly to submit its new map, along with a
description and entire record of the process through which it is enacted, to the court
by January 29. App. A at 189-90. And while the filing period for the 2018 elections
is set to open on February 12, the court set a briefing schedule under which
objections to the General Assembly’s map will not even be fully briefed until then.
App. A at 190.
Finally, the court deemed “it appropriate to take steps to ensure the timely
availability of an alternative remedial plan for use in the event the General
Assembly does not enact a remedial plan or enacts a plan that fails to remedy the
constitutional violation or is otherwise legally unacceptable.” App. A at 190. The
court accordingly announced its intention to appoint a special master “to assist the
Court in drawing an alternative remedial plan,” and directed the parties to submit
a list of mutually acceptable candidates by January 16. App. A at 190-91.
Applicants filed an emergency motion first thing in the morning on January
11 asking the district court to stay its decision pending an appeal to this Court, and
10
expressly asked the court to rule on the motion that day, to ensure sufficient time
for this Court to consider an emergency stay application if necessary. Legislative
Defs.’ Emergency Mot. to Stay, ECF No. 119. Instead, the district court issued an
order giving the plaintiffs until 5pm on January 16—more than a third of the time
period the General Assembly has been given to draw and enact a new map—to
respond to the stay motion. App. B at 2. And the court expressly ordered that all of
“Defendants’ obligations under the Order remain in effect during the pendency of
this Motion.” Id. Because waiting until (at a minimum) the evening of January 16
to file a stay application would leave this Court with very little time given the
looming January 24 deadline for the General Assembly to enact a new map,
Applicants have filed this application now to ensure that this Court has sufficient
time to consider it.
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE APPLICATION
To obtain a stay pending appeal, an applicant must show (1) a reasonable
probability that the Court will consider the case on the merits; (2) a fair prospect that
a majority of the Court will vote to reverse the decision below; and (3) a likelihood
that irreparable harm will result from the denial of a stay. Hollingsworth v. Perry,
558 U.S. 183, 190 (2010). Those factors are readily satisfied here. The issues at the
heart of this case are the same as those at the heart of both Gill and Benisek—
namely, whether partisan gerrymandering claims are justiciable and, if so, under
what standard(s). Because the resolution of Gill and Benisek will inevitably impact
the resolution of this case, it is certainly “reasonably probable” that the Court will
hold this case pending their resolution, just as it is presently holding the partisan
11
gerrymandering petition filed by the Harris plaintiffs challenging the same map at
issue here. There is also certainly the requisite “fair prospect” that one or both of
those cases will be resolved in a way that necessitates reversal or vacatur in this
case.
Finally, for the same reasons that this Court found the remaining stay factors
satisfied when it granted a stay in Gill, those factors are satisfied here as well.
Indeed, a grant of a stay here follows almost directly from the grant of a stay in Gill.
It makes no sense for a sovereign State to have to comply with a constitutional norm
that may not exist. There are only two salient differences between this case and Gill,
both of which cut strongly in favor of a stay pending appeal. First, the various
deadlines for the 2018 elections are much nearer in time now than when the Court
granted the stay in Gill. Second, the decision below is even more novel than Gill, in
that it is the first decision ever to ground a justiciable partisan gerrymandering claim
in the Elections Clauses. Accordingly, the Court should issue a stay to preserve the
status quo pending appeal and ensure that North Carolina will not be forced to enact
a third congressional map on an exceedingly expedited basis or commence its fastapproaching 2018 election cycle under a map that the district court may well have no
authority to impose.
I.
There Is A Reasonable Probability That The Court Will Hold Or
Review This Case, And A Fair Prospect That The Court Will Vacate Or
Reverse The Decision Below.
This case plainly satisfies the first two factors in this Court’s stay analysis, as
there is both “a reasonable probability” that the Court will either hold this case or set
it for consideration on the merits, and a “fair prospect” that the Court will vacate or
12
reverse the decision below. The threshold questions in this case are (1) whether the
plaintiffs have standing to press their statewide partisan gerrymandering claims, (2)
if so, whether those claims are justiciable under any or all of the constitutional
provisions the plaintiffs invoked, and (3) if so, what standard(s) a court should apply
when adjudicating those claims. Those are precisely the same threshold questions
this Court is actively considering in the pending Gill and Benisek cases. And if this
Court were to conclude either that statewide partisan gerrymandering claims fail for
lack of standing, or that some or all forms of partisan gerrymandering claims are
nonjusticiable, then that would necessitate reversal of the decision below.
Accordingly, so long as there is a “fair prospect” that the defendants in either Gill or
Benisek will prevail on either of those issues, then there is a fair prospect that the
defendants in this case will as well.
There is also a fair prospect that this Court will reverse or vacate even if the
plaintiffs in one of both of those pending cases prevail. Even assuming partisan
gerrymandering claims are justiciable under one of the assorted constitutional
provisions the plaintiffs have invoked here, the district court candidly acknowledged
that “th[is] Court ha[s] not established a legal standard for adjudicating” such
claims. App. A at 188. Accordingly, even if a majority of this Court ultimately
concludes that some or all forms of partisan gerrymandering claims may proceed,
the Court may well vacate and remand for the district court to reconsider the
plaintiffs’ claims under whatever standard(s) the Court may articulate.
13
That result is all the more likely given the dubious standards (or lack thereof)
the majority embraced. For instance, on the plaintiffs’ Equal Protection Clause
claims, the majority concluded that any intent to district for partisan advantage is
constitutionally suspect, inferring from the fact that a majority of this Court has
rejected “sole” or “predominant intent” standards as too “indeterminate” and
“vague,” Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 284-85 (2004) (plurality op.); see also
League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 417-18 (2006) (opinion
of Kennedy, J.), that an even less demanding intent standard must be the right one.
App. A at 84-86. The majority readily acknowledged that this would make the
intent prong easier to satisfy for partisan gerrymandering claims than for racial
ones, but it deemed that anomalous result “appropriate” on the theory that
“redistricting bodies can—and, in certain circumstances, should—consider race in
drawing district lines,” while there is purportedly never “any legitimate
constitutional, democratic, or public interest” in considering partisan advantage.
App. A at 84 n.16. Accordingly, in the district court’s view, the Equal Protection
Clause—a provision indisputably passed for the principal purpose of prohibiting
race-based discrimination—is less offended by divvying up voters on the basis of
race than by divvying up voters on the basis of politics.
That startling proposition finds no support whatsoever in this Court’s cases.
To the contrary, as Judge Osteen explained in rejecting that aspect of the majority’s
test, “[t]he Court has recognized many times in redistricting and apportionment
cases that some degree of partisanship and political consideration is constitutionally
14
permissible in a redistricting process undertaken by partisan actors.” App. A at
196-97 (collecting cases). Indeed, even Justices who have taken the position that
partisan gerrymandering claims are justiciable have acknowledged that some
degree of districting for partisan advantage is both inevitable and permissible. See,
e.g., Vieth, 541 U.S. at 344 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“[S]ome intent to gain political
advantage is inescapable whenever political bodies devise a district plan, and some
effect results from the intent …. Thus, the issue is one of how much is too much[.]”);
id. at 360 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“The use of purely political boundary-drawing
factors, even where harmful to the members of one party, will often nonetheless find
justification in other desirable democratic ends[.]”); Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S.
109, 164-65 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“the
common practice of the party in power to choose the redistricting plan that gives it
an advantage at the polls” does not “amount[] to unconstitutional gerrymandering”).
The
majority
embraced
an
equally
amorphous,
indeterminate,
and
unsustainable “discriminatory effects” test, concluding that “a plaintiff must show
that a districting plan’s bias towards a favored party is likely to persist in
subsequent elections such that an elected representative from the favored party will
not feel a need to be responsive to constituents who support the disfavored party.”
App. A at 120. The majority did not purport to identify how much “bias” must exist
or persist, or what evidence will suffice to prove that it does. Instead, it concluded
that plaintiffs may rely on any and all manner of social science metrics to try to
prove their case under a “totality of the evidence” approach, and ultimately need
15
only demonstrate that the plan has some “discernable discriminatory effects.” App.
A at 144.
That hardly amounts to a “limited and precise rationale” for
distinguishing permissible districting for partisan advantage from unconstitutional
partisan gerrymandering. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 306 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
The majority’s First Amendment standard fares no better. According to the
majority, to prove a First Amendment violation, a plaintiff must prove: “(1) that the
challenged districting plan was intended to favor or disfavor individuals or entities
that support a particular candidate or political party, (2) that the districting plan
burdened the political speech or associational rights of such individuals or entities,
and (3) that a causal relationship existed between the governmental actor’s
discriminatory motivation and the First Amendment burdens imposed by the
districting plan.” App. A at 162-63. Just as under its Fourteenth Amendment test,
the first prong is proven whenever districting for partisan advantage is any part of
a legislature’s motivation. But see, e.g., Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 551 (1999)
(“Our prior decisions have made clear that a jurisdiction may engage in
constitutional political gerrymandering”); App. A at 196-97 (collecting cases stating
same). And the second prong is proven whenever that intent has anything more
than a “de minimis” “chilling effect or adverse impact” on any First Amendment
activity, be it the desire to vote, motivation to engage in political discourse, or
“raising money, attracting candidates, and mobilizing voters to support … political
causes and issues.” App. A at 164-67.
16
As for the third prong, the majority’s circular “causation” test asks only
whether the impacts of the legislature’s intent to district for at least some degree of
partisan advantage can be explained by something other than its intent to district
for at least some degree of partisan advantage—in other words, it asks only
whether the legislature did in fact intentionally district for at least some degree of
partisan advantage.
App. A at 174.
Accordingly, as Judge Osteen correctly
observed in rejecting it, “the majority’s adopted test would in effect foreclose all
partisan considerations in the redistricting process” and render any degree of
districting for partisan advantage constitutionally verboten, App. A at 201—a
proposition that nearly every member of this Court to consider a partisan
gerrymandering case has emphatically rejected. Thus, even assuming this Court
finds partisan gerrymandering claims justiciable under the First Amendment, there
is more than a fair prospect that it will reject the majority’s toothless test, which
would invalidate nearly every legislatively drawn districting plan in the country
and essentially substitute the federal judiciary for the state legislatures as the
ultimate mapdrawers, despite a host of cases reaffirming the primary role of the
States. See, e.g., Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 978 (1996); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S.
900, 915 (1995); Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 156 (1993).
Finally, there is at least a fair prospect that this Court will independently
review and reverse the district court’s entirely novel conclusion that partisan
gerrymandering violates Sections 2 and 4 of Article I of the Constitution. See U.S.
Const. art. I, §2 (“The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members
17
chosen every second Year by the People of the several States….”); art. I, §4 (“The
Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives,
shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof….”). According to the
district court, partisan gerrymandering violates Section 4 because it “exceeds” the
States’ “delegated authority under the Elections Clause,” App. A at 178, and it
violates Section 2 because it deprives “the People” of their right to elect
Representatives, App. A at 181. While these additional purported constitutional
violations were in part derivative of the majority’s Equal Protection Clause and
First Amendment holdings, see App. A at 180, the majority once again justified
them on the theory that partisan advantage is a forbidden consideration that
always “exceeds” a State’s powers under the Elections Clause, and always deprives
“the People” of their right to elect their representatives. See App. A at 180, 184.
Accordingly, no matter how this Court resolves the Equal Protection Clause and
First Amendment claims at issue in Gill and Benisek, there is at least a fair
prospect that the Court will independently review and reverse the district court’s
unprecedented conclusion that Article I obviates the need to determine “[h]ow much
political motivation and effect is too much.” Vieth, 541 U.S. at 297 (plurality op.).1
In sum, there is undoubtedly a reasonable probability that this Court will
hold this case pending resolution of Gill and Benisek, as there is at least a fair
prospect that the resolution of each of those cases will impact this one and require
1 Notably, the very same day that the district court issued its opinion, another district court
rejected the proposition that “Art. I, § 4, of the Constitution prohibits any political or partisan
considerations in redistricting.” Memorandum at 3, Agre v. Wolf, No. 17-4392 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 10,
2018), ECF No. 211; see also ECF No. 212 at 2 (“the legal test [the plaintiffs] propose for an Elections
Clause claim is inconsistent with established law”).
18
either reversal or vacatur. Accordingly, the first two factors of the stay analysis are
readily satisfied.2
II. The State And Its Citizens Will Suffer Irreparable Harm Absent A Stay,
And The Balance Of Equities Favors A Stay.
Without a stay of the decision below, irreparable injury is certain. “[A]ny
time a State is enjoined by a court from effectuating statutes enacted by
representatives of its people, it suffers a form of irreparable injury.” Maryland v.
King, 133 S. Ct. 1, 3 (2012). That injury is exacerbated in the redistricting context,
as “[f]ederal-court review of districting legislation represents a serious intrusion on
the most vital of local functions.” Miller, 515 U.S. at 915; see also, e.g., id. at 934-35
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“federalism and the slim judicial competence to draw
district lines weigh heavily against judicial intervention in apportionment
decisions”). Accordingly, that the district court has enjoined the use of the 2016
Plan in the fast-approaching 2018 election cycle is itself sufficient irreparable injury
to warrant a stay—as is the court’s demand that the General Assembly “either
adopt an alternative redistricting plan” for the district court’s review in a matter of
weeks “or face the prospect that the District Court will implement its own.”
Karcher v. Daggett, 455 U.S. 1303, 1306 (1982) (Brennan, J., in chambers).
The irreparable injury is all the more acute given the eleventh-hour issuance
of the district court’s decision, and the inevitable interference with the 2018 election
cycle that it will produce. The 2016 Plan has been in place for nearly two years and
2 While Applicants submit that the most appropriate course of action at this juncture is to
hold their appeal pending resolution of Gill and Benisek, Applicants have no objection should this
Court prefer to construe this application as a jurisdictional statement and set this case for expedited
merits briefing and argument.
19
was used in the most recent congressional elections.
Voters thus are already
familiar with the 2016 Plan and have developed relationships with incumbents
elected under that plan. Moreover, candidates have been preparing to run under
that plan for months, if not longer. Yet barely a month before the filing period is set
to open on February 12, the district court has decreed that the 2018 elections will
not take place under the 2016 Plan. And having taken nearly three months to
fashion novel theories of partisan gerrymander to condemn the 2016 Plan, the
three-judge court has given the General Assembly just 14 days to enact a new plan.
Making matters worse, the court has instructed that not one, but two, new maps
must be drawn, thus foreshadowing the court’s skepticism of the General
Assembly’s efforts and producing a situation in which voters and candidates are
entirely uncertain which of three different potential maps will govern the upcoming
elections. Moreover, given the late date on which the court issued its decision and
the briefing schedule it has imposed, the court will not even be in a position to
decide which of the competing maps before it to select until the February 12 opening
of the filing period has come and gone. The court’s injunction thus is bound to
“result in voter confusion and consequent incentive to remain away from the polls.”
Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 4-5 (2006).
The propriety of a stay here follows a fortiori from the grant of a stay in Gill.
There, the district court issued its remedial order more than a year before the 2018
election cycle was set to commence, and gave the State nine months to draw a new
map. Moreover, the court specifically emphasized that the Wisconsin mapdrawers
20
had “produced many alternate maps, some of which may conform to constitutional
standards,” which it thought would “significantly assuage the task now before
them.” Whitford v. Gill, No. 15-cv-421-bbc, 2017 WL 383360, at *2 (W.D. Wisc. Jan.
27, 2017). Here, by contrast, the district court issued its decision more than a year
after Gill and barely a month before the 2018 election cycle is set to commence, and
gave the General Assembly a mere two weeks to enact a new map. And far from
suggesting that enacting a new map that passes muster with the court would be an
easy task, the court declared itself so lacking in confidence in the General
Assembly’s ability to accomplish that task that it announced its intention to appoint
a special master to simultaneously draw an alternative map to be used should the
court yet again find the General Assembly’s effort deficient.3 Moreover, while Gill
was the first post-Vieth decision to invalidate a map on partisan gerrymandering
grounds, this case is only the second, and is the first ever to rely on the Elections
Clauses. Accordingly, if a stay was warranted in Gill, then a stay is even more
appropriate here.
3 Indeed, the district court even went so far as to make the extraordinary insinuation that all
voting-related legislation enacted by the North Carolina General Assembly is presumptively
unconstitutional. App. A at 50 n.13. As the court noted in doing so, another three-judge panel, also
presided over by Judge Wynn, has made clear that it intends to invalidate North Carolina’s state
legislative districting plan any day now as well, and replace it with maps drawn by a special master.
See Order, Covington v. North Carolina, No. 1:15-cv-399 (M.D.N.C. Oct. 26, 2017), ECF No. 202.
While the legislative defendants in that case have repeatedly implored the court to issue a prompt
decision, in hopes of avoiding yet another eve-of-election emergency stay application to this Court,
the panel has refused to do so. See, e.g., Order, ECF No. 228 (Dec. 12, 2017) (denying motion to
expedite). Accordingly, the General Assembly will in all likelihood have both its congressional and
its state plans invalidated mere weeks before the 2018 election cycle is set to commence, and, absent
intervention by this Court, will in all likelihood have both plans replaced by plans drawn by a special
master of the district court’s choosing.
21
A stay pending appeal is also in the public interest. The public is always wellserved by stability and certainty, and always disserved when the state legislature is
forced to devote considerable resources to empty gestures. And the public interest
will further be served by preserving this Court’s ability to consider the merits of this
case before the district court’s order inflicts irreparable harm on a sovereign State.
This Court should therefore follow its “ordinary practice” and prevent the district
court’s order “from taking effect pending appellate review.” Strange v. Searcy, 135 S.
Ct. 940, 940 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Herbert v. Kitchen, 134 S. Ct. 893
(2014), and San Diegans for Mt. Soledad Nat’l War Mem’l v. Paulson, 548 U.S. 1301
(2006) (Kennedy, J., in chambers)).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Applicants respectfully request that this Court
grant this emergency application for a stay of the district court’s order pending
resolution of Applicants’ direct appeal of that order. Given the January 24, 2018,
deadline the district court has imposed for the General Assembly to enact a new
congressional districting map, Applicants further request that, if possible, the Court
rule on this application by January 22, 2018.
22
Respectfully submitted,
PAUL D. CLEMENT
Counsel of Record
ERIN E. MURPHY
KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP
655 Fifteenth Street, NW
Washington, DC 20005
(202) 879-5000
paul.clement@kirkland.com
PHILLIP J. STRACH
MICHAEL D. MCKNIGHT
OGLETREE, DEAKINS,
NASH SMOAK &
STEWART, P.C.
4208 SIX FORKS ROAD
SUITE 1100
RALEIGH, NC 27609
Counsel for Applicants/Defendants Senator Robert Rucho, in his official capacity as
co-chair of the Joint Select Committee on Congressional Redistricting;
Representative David Lewis, in his official capacity as co-chair of the Committee;
Timothy K. Moore, in his official capacity as Speaker of the North Carolina House of
Representatives; and Philip E. Berger, in his official capacity as President Pro
Tempore of the North Carolina Senate
January 12, 2018
23
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.