Reply Brief — City of Flint, Michigan, et al., Petitioners v. Beatrice Boler, et al.
Supreme Court briefFeb 16, 2018
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No. 17-989
In the
Supreme Court
of the United States
______________
CITY OF FLINT, ET AL.,
Petitioners,
v.
BEATRICE BOLER, ET AL.,
______________________
Respondents.
CITY OF FLINT, ET AL.,
Petitioners,
v.
MELISSA MAYS, ET AL.,
______________________
Respondents.
On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
______________________
PETITIONERS’ REPLY BRIEF
______________________
WILLIAM Y. KIM* (BAR
#303932)
Assistant City Attorney
FLINT LAW DEPARTMENT
1101 S. Saginaw St.
Flint, Mich. 48502
(810) 766-7146
wkim@cityofflint.com
FREDERICK A. BERG, JR.
SHELDON H. KLEIN
JOSEPH E. RICHOTTE
BUTZEL LONG, P.C.
150 W. Jefferson Ave.
Detroit, Mich. 48226
(313) 225-7000
bergf@butzel.com
klein@butzel.com
richotte@butzel.com
Attorney for City of Flint
and Dayne Walling
Attorneys for City of Flint
*COUNSEL OF RECORD
(Additional counsel listed on the reverse of this cover)
2018 − Bachman Legal Printing (612) 339-9518 1-800-715-3582 Fax (612) 337-8053
BRETT T. MEYER
DAVID W. MEYERS
O’NEIL, WALLACE, & DOYLE, P.C. LAW OFFICE OF
300 St. Andrews Rd.
EDWARD A. ZEINEH
Suite 302
2800 E. River Ave., Suite B.
Saginaw, MI 48605
Lansing, MI 48912
(989) 790-0960
(517) 292-7000
bmeyer@owdpc.com
davidmeyerslaw@gmail.com
Attorney for
Michael Glasgow
Attorney for
Daugherty Johnson
TODD PERKINS
PERKINS LAW GROUP
615 W. Griswold Ste. 400
Detroit, MI 48226
(313) 964-1702
tperkins@perkinslawgroup.net
BARRY A. WOLF
LAW OFFICE OF
BARRY A. WOLF, PLLC
503 S. Saginaw St.
Suite 1410
Flint, MI 48502
(810) 762-1084
bwolf718@msn.com
Attorney for
Darnell Earley
Attorney for
Gerald Ambrose
ALEXANDER S. RUSEK
WHITE LAW PLLC
2549 Jolly Rd., Suite 340
Okemos, MI 48664
(517) 316-1195
alexrusek@whitelawpllc.com
Attorney for
Howard Croft
Date: FEBRUARY 16, 2018
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION………………………………………...1
1. Plaintiffs’ claims go to the heart of the
SDWA……………………………………………… 1
2. This Court’s existing case law does not answer
the question presented…………………………. 5
3. The question of SDWA preclusion has
important and far-ranging implications………7
CONCLUSION…………………………………………..10
i
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
City of Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams,
544 U. S. 113 (2005)…………………………………... 6
Fitzgerald v. Barnstable School Committee,
555 U. S. 246 (2009)…………………………………6, 7
Fry v. Napoleon Community Schools,
__ U.S. __, 137 S.Ct. 743 (2017)………………….. 4, 5
Mattoon v. Pittsfield,
980 F. 2d 1 (CA1 1992)………………………………...7
Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea
Clammers Association,
453 U. S. 1 (1981)…............................................... 5-6
OBB Personenverkehr AG v. Sachs, 577 U.S. ____;
136 S.Ct. 390; 193 L.Ed.2d 269 (2015).. .................. 5
Smith v. Robinson, 468 U. S. 992 (1984)..................... 6
Statutes
15 U.S.C. § 2619………………………………………….. 8
33 U.S.C. § 1365………………………………………….. 7
42 U.S.C. § 1983……………………………….1, 5, 6, 7, 8
42 U.S.C. § 6972……………………………………......... 8
42 U.S.C. § 7604………………………………………….. 7
42 U.S.C. § 9659……………………………….................7
Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments
of 1996, Public L. 104-182, §3, 110
Stat. 1614-15 (1996) ................................................. 3
Safe Drinking Water Act, Public L. No,
93-523, §1412(2), 88 Stat. 1662 (1974) ................ 1, 3
ii
Introduction
The Mays Plaintiffs’ Consolidated Brief in
Opposition (“Response”) obfuscates and evades the
important issues raised by this Petition: (1) whether
their claims, brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, fall
within the ambit of the Safe Drinking Water Act
(“SDWA”), (2) whether the Court’s existing
precedents resolve the issue raised in this Petition,
and (3) whether this Petition raises questions of
national importance warranting certiorari. Here,
Plaintiffs’
claims
clearly
fall
within
the
Congressionally-defined scope of the SDWA; whether
the SDWA precludes parallel claims under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 is not answered by this Court’s existing
precedents; and this Petition raises issues of national
importance that extend beyond the case presented.
Petitioners respectfully request that, for any or all of
the foregoing reasons, their petition for certiorari be
granted.
1. Plaintiffs’ claims go to the heart of the SDWA
Plaintiffs’ Response repeatedly suggests that
their claims have little or nothing to do with the
SDWA. They then proceed from that false premise to
the conclusion that it would be perverse to allow the
SDWA to preclude essentially unrelated claims. See,
e.g., “our claim does not rest on any . . . right to clean
water,” Response, p. 14, and “the SDWA has
essentially no connection to constitutional rights.”
Id. p. 4. Plaintiffs offer hypotheticals, with no factual
basis in this case, of a government providing “dirtier,
smellier water” to disfavored groups, id. p. 13, as if
their claims were driven by such purely aesthetic
concerns. However, their Complaint makes it clear
1
that their claims arise from exposure to allegedly
unsafe water.
For example, they complain that:
•
•
•
•
•
•
“Defendants caused a public health crisis by
exposing Plaintiffs to contaminated water,”
First Amended Complaint, ¶ 1;
Defendants were responsible for “highly
dangerous conditions, caused and prolonged by
Defendants’ deliberate decision to (1) use the
toxic Flint River as a primary drinking source;
(2) conceal the resulting public health crisis;
and (3) exacerbate and prolong the harm . . .”
id. ¶ 8;
The water was “highly corrosive and toxic,” id.
¶ 69;
“the State created a dangerous public health
crisis for the users of Flint tap water…” id.;
“Defendants knew that the extreme public
health emergency involved lead poisoning…” id.
at ¶ 95 (emphasis not added); and
“State and local public officials failed to
undertake any measures to effectively address
any of the dangers, including lead poisoning,
identified by EPA Agent Del Toral.” Id. at
¶ 99.
Further, Plaintiffs’ putative class is defined as
persons “exposed to toxic Flint water,” id. ¶ 122.
Numerous references to “toxic water,” “contaminated
water,” “corrosive water,” “unsafe water,” or “lead”
can be found throughout Plaintiffs’ Complaint.
Plaintiffs have clearly asserted a right to relief
because they were provided with, or exposed to,
unsafe water.
2
Such conduct is at the heart of the SDWA.
When Congress first enacted the SDWA in 1974, it
required publication of interim primary drinking
water regulations that “shall protect health to the
extent feasible.” Safe Drinking Water Act, Public L.
No, 93-523, §1412(2), 88 Stat. 1662 (1974). In 1996,
Congress reauthorized and amended the SDWA,
adding specific Congressional findings to the
statutory text.
Safe Drinking Water Act
Amendments of 1996, Public L. 104-182, §3, 110 Stat.
1614-15 (1996). Specifically, Congress found that:
(1) safe drinking water is essential to the
protection of public health;
...
(5) the existing process for the assessment
and selection of additional drinking
water contaminants needs to be revised
and improved to ensure that there is a sound
scientific basis for setting priorities in
establishing drinking water regulations;
(6) procedures for assessing the health
effects of contaminants establishing
drinking water standards should be revised to
provide greater opportunity for public
education and participation;
(7) in considering the appropriate level of
regulation for contaminants in drinking
water, risk assessment, based on sound and
objective science, and benefit-cost analysis
are important analytical tools for improving
the efficiency and effectiveness of drinking
water regulations to protect human health;
(8) more effective protection of public health
requires-3
(A) a Federal commitment to set priorities
that will allow scarce Federal, State, and
local resources to be targeted toward the
drinking water problems of greatest public
health concern;
...
(C)
prevention
of
drinking
water
contamination through well-trained system
operators, water systems with adequate
managerial, technical, and financial capacity,
and enhanced protection of source waters of
public water systems;
...
(10) consumers served by public water
systems should be provided with information
on the source of the water they are drinking
and its quality and safety, as well as prompt
notification of any violation of drinking water
regulations.
Id. (emphasis added). The findings contained in the
SDWA make it clear that Congress intended that the
SDWA address issues of water safety, quality,
treatment, and the resulting effects on public health.
It is true that the Mays Plaintiffs’ First
Amended Complaint never expressly references the
SDWA. However, as this Court recently explained in
Fry v. Napoleon Community Schools, __ U.S. __, 137
S.Ct. 743, 755 (2017), what matters is “substance, not
surface. The use (or non-use) of particular labels and
terms is not what matters.” The inquiry does not
depend on the precise words used in the Complaint.
Id.
In Fry, the precise omitted words in the
Complaint were “FAPE” or “IEP.” Id. Here, the
precise omitted words are “Safe Drinking Water Act”
or “SDWA” or “Lead and Copper Rule.”
The
substance of Plaintiffs’ claims, as set forth by their
4
own words, is that they were provided with “toxic”
water that posed a danger of “lead poisoning.”
Plaintiffs’ allegations directly implicate the SDWA
and its Lead and Copper Rule and reveals Plaintiffs’
hypotheticals to be mere rhetoric, unmoored from
their actual claims.
As in Fry, the “magic words” approach here
would make the SDWA’s comprehensive remedial
scheme “too easy to bypass.” Id. To allow Plaintiffs
to proceed would allow them to evade the SDWA’s
comprehensive remedial scheme merely through
“artful pleading.” Id., citing OBB Personenverkehr
AG v. Sachs, 577 U.S. ____; 136 S.Ct. 390, 396; 193
L.Ed.2d 269 (2015). Certiorari is warranted because
the Plaintiffs seek to elevate surface over substance
while ignoring that their claims fall within the clearly
expressed Congressional intent behind the SDWA.
2. This Court’s existing case law does not
answer the question presented here
Plaintiffs also argue this case requires only “a
straightforward
application
of
this
Court’s
precedents,” Response, p. 1, and that there is no
uncertainty in the case law because there is a single
“test,” Congressional intent. Id., p. 15. Whether a
federal statute precludes parallel claims under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 is, of course, a question of
Congressional intent. However, that statement begs
the question: how should such Congressional intent
be determined? This Court’s decisions make it clear
that discerning Congressional intent is not a matter
of unstructured divination. However, what is not
clear is how Congressional intent to preclude
constitutional claims should be inferred, when there
is a comprehensive remedial scheme, such as that
found in Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v.
5
National Sea Clammers Association, 453 U.S. 1
(1981), Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992 (1984) and
City of Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 544 U.S. 113
(2005), but no express statement of Congressional
intent, as found in Smith. This Court has never
considered whether a statute with a comprehensive
remedial scheme but no express statement of
legislative intent, can preclude constitutional claims,
and, as previously shown, the circuit courts have split
on this issue. Resolving that question and circuit
split is important and worthy of certiorari.
Because this Court has never considered the
question presented here, Plaintiffs’ repeated
statements to the effect that this Court has never
held that constitutional claims are precluded absent
an express statement of Congressional intent, are
ultimately a red herring. See, e.g., Response, p. 18.
Such a holding does not exist because the Court has
never addressed that issue, and the lack of such a
holding does not mean that Plaintiffs’ proposed rule
can or should be inferred from this Court’s
precedents. To the contrary, this Court has clearly
stated that “[i]n determining whether a subsequent
statute precludes the enforcement of a federal right
under § 1983, we have placed primary emphasis on
the nature and extent of that statute's remedial
scheme.” Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 555
U.S. 246, 253, 129 S. Ct. 788, 794 (2009) (emphasis
added).
Instead of addressing this issue, Plaintiffs
instead focus heavily on the difference between the
“contours” of the SDWA and their constitutional
claims. See Response, pp. 17-18. That differences
between SDWA claims and the parallel constitutional
claims advanced by the Plaintiffs exist is
unsurprising - there would be no significance to
6
preclusion if such differences did not exist. However,
under this Court’s precedent, such differences are not
the controlling factor.
Contrary to Plaintiffs’ assertions, this Court’s
case law makes such differences, in the contours of
the statutory and constitutional claims, a
consideration, but it does not make them the
controlling consideration. The Court made this clear
in Fitzgerald, when the Court first determined that
the absence of a comprehensive remedial scheme in
Title IX made preclusion of parallel constitutional
claims under § 1983 inappropriate, and only then
compared the “contours” to “lend further support” to
the conclusion that Title IX did not preempt the
constitutional claims there. Fitzgerald, 555 U.S. at
256.
3. The question of SDWA preclusion
important and far-ranging implications
has
Plaintiffs also suggest that the question
presented is unimportant because it involves only a
conflict with a single case, Mattoon v. City of
Pittsfield, 980 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1992), which they claim
is outdated. This is untrue. But even if Mattoon
were outdated, which it is not, the question presented
is of national importance, with implications that
extend beyond the scope of the SDWA. The SDWA’s
“citizen suit” remedial scheme is virtually identical to
at least five other federal environmental statutes:
the Clean Air Act,1 the Solid Waste Disposal Act,2 the
Clean Water Act,3 the Resource Conservation and
See 42 U.S.C. § 7604.
See 42 U.S.C. § 9659.
3 See 33 U.S.C. § 1365.
1
2
7
Recovery Act,4 and the Toxic Substances Control Act.5
If the Sixth Circuit is correct that the SDWA’s
remedial scheme was not preemptive, then it is
seemingly equally true for these other federal
environmental statutes. Stated differently, the Sixth
Circuit’s holding will effectively constitutionalize
much of the vast federal environmental regime. The
question of whether private individuals can
circumvent these carefully constructed remedial
schemes by bringing constitutional law claims under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 is important and should be
addressed by this Court. This Court’s guidance is
needed in order to provide the lower courts with a
uniform means of interpreting and applying these
statutes.
Furthermore, as of February 14, 2018, there
are 49,918 Community Water Systems6 (CWS)
registered with the EPA, servicing 307,797,630
persons.7 27,005 of those CWS are publicly owned by
federal, state, local, or tribal government. Those
27,005 publicly owned CWS provide water to
271,220,297 people. Phrased another way, almost
90% of the people in this country receive their water
from publicly owned water systems that are operated
not as a means for generating profit, but as a public
service. As previously shown, the issue of aging
water infrastructure extends far beyond the City of
See 42 U.S.C. § 6972.
See 15 U.S.C. § 2619.
6 A Community Water System is “[a] public water system that
supplies water to the same population year-round.” Information
about Public Water Systems, WWW.EPA.GOV (available at
https://www.epa.gov/dwreginfo/information-about-public-watersystems) (last accessed February 14, 2018).
7 Water System Summary, OFMPUB.EPA.GOV (available at
https://ofmpub.epa.gov/apex/sfdw/f?p=108:21:::NO:RP,
RIR::)
(last accessed February 14, 2018).
4
5
8
Flint. Indeed, in 2016, it was reported that more
than 5,300 municipal water systems across the
nation were in violation of the EPA’s Lead and
Copper Rule.8
Uniform guidance by this Court is needed in
order to provide these publicly-owned water systems
guidance on their duties, responsibilities, and
potential liabilities. Furthermore, the guidance of
this Court is needed not just to apply the SDWA, but
other federal environmental statutes with nearly
identical remedial schemes. In short, the national
importance and general applicability of the issues
raised in this Petition provide further justification for
this Court to grant certiorari.
8 Sara Ganim, 5,300 U.S. water systems are in violation of lead
rules,
CNN
(June
29,
2016,
6:50
AM),
https://www.cnn.com/2016/06/28/us/epa-lead-in-u-s-watersystems/index.html.
9
Conclusion
The Petition for Writ of Certiorari should be
granted.
Respectfully submitted,
Attorneys for City of Flint and Dayne Walling
/s/ William Y. Kim
William Y. Kim (Bar #303932)
Assistant City Attorney
City of Flint Dept. of Law
1101 S. Saginaw, 3rd Floor
Flint, MI 48502
(810) 766-7146
wkim@cityofflint.com
Attorneys for City of Flint
/s/ Frederick A. Berg, Jr.
Frederick A. Berg, Jr.
Sheldon H. Klein
Butzel Long, P.C.
150 W. Jefferson Ave., Suite 100
Detroit, MI 48226
(313) 225-7000
bergf@butzel.com
klein@butzel.com
10
Attorney for Gerald Ambrose
/s/ Barry A. Wolf
Barry A. Wolf
Law Office of Barry A. Wolf, PLLC
503 S. Saginaw St., Suite 1410
Flint, MI 48502
(810) 762-1084
bwolf718@msn.com
Attorney for Michael Glasgow
/s/ Brett T. Meyer
Brett T. Meyer
O’Neil, Wallace, & Doyle, P.C.
300 St. Andrews Rd., Suite 302
Saginaw, MI 48605
(989) 790-0960
bmeyer@owdpc.com
Attorney for Darnell Earley
/s/ Todd Perkins
Todd Perkins
Perkins Law Group
615 W. Griswold Ste. 400
Detroit, MI 48226
(313) 964-1702
tperkins@perkinslawgroup.net
Attorney for Howard Croft
/s/ Alexander S. Rusek
Alexander S. Rusek
White Law PLLC
2549 Jolly Rd., Suite 340
Okemos, MI 48664
(517) 316-1195
alexrusek@whitelawpllc.com
11
Attorney for Daugherty Johnson
/s/ David W. Meyers
David W. Meyers
Law Office of Edward A. Zeineh
2800 E. River Ave., Suite B
Lansing, MI 48912
(517) 292-7000
davidmeyerslaw@gmail.com
12
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