Reply Brief — City of Flint, Michigan, et al., Petitioners v. Beatrice Boler, et al.

Supreme Court briefFeb 16, 2018

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No. 17-989

In the

Supreme Court

of the United States

______________

CITY OF FLINT, ET AL.,

Petitioners,

v.

BEATRICE BOLER, ET AL.,

______________________

Respondents.

CITY OF FLINT, ET AL.,

Petitioners,

v.

MELISSA MAYS, ET AL.,

______________________

Respondents.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

______________________

PETITIONERS’ REPLY BRIEF

______________________

WILLIAM Y. KIM* (BAR

#303932)

Assistant City Attorney

FLINT LAW DEPARTMENT

1101 S. Saginaw St.

Flint, Mich. 48502

(810) 766-7146

wkim@cityofflint.com

FREDERICK A. BERG, JR.

SHELDON H. KLEIN

JOSEPH E. RICHOTTE

BUTZEL LONG, P.C.

150 W. Jefferson Ave.

Detroit, Mich. 48226

(313) 225-7000

bergf@butzel.com

klein@butzel.com

richotte@butzel.com

Attorney for City of Flint

and Dayne Walling

Attorneys for City of Flint

*COUNSEL OF RECORD

(Additional counsel listed on the reverse of this cover)

2018 − Bachman Legal Printing  (612) 339-9518  1-800-715-3582  Fax (612) 337-8053

BRETT T. MEYER

DAVID W. MEYERS

O’NEIL, WALLACE, & DOYLE, P.C. LAW OFFICE OF

300 St. Andrews Rd.

EDWARD A. ZEINEH

Suite 302

2800 E. River Ave., Suite B.

Saginaw, MI 48605

Lansing, MI 48912

(989) 790-0960

(517) 292-7000

bmeyer@owdpc.com

davidmeyerslaw@gmail.com

Attorney for

Michael Glasgow

Attorney for

Daugherty Johnson

TODD PERKINS

PERKINS LAW GROUP

615 W. Griswold Ste. 400

Detroit, MI 48226

(313) 964-1702

tperkins@perkinslawgroup.net

BARRY A. WOLF

LAW OFFICE OF

BARRY A. WOLF, PLLC

503 S. Saginaw St.

Suite 1410

Flint, MI 48502

(810) 762-1084

bwolf718@msn.com

Attorney for

Darnell Earley

Attorney for

Gerald Ambrose

ALEXANDER S. RUSEK

WHITE LAW PLLC

2549 Jolly Rd., Suite 340

Okemos, MI 48664

(517) 316-1195

alexrusek@whitelawpllc.com

Attorney for

Howard Croft

Date: FEBRUARY 16, 2018

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION………………………………………...1

1. Plaintiffs’ claims go to the heart of the

SDWA……………………………………………… 1

2. This Court’s existing case law does not answer

the question presented…………………………. 5

3. The question of SDWA preclusion has

important and far-ranging implications………7

CONCLUSION…………………………………………..10

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

City of Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams,

544 U. S. 113 (2005)…………………………………... 6

Fitzgerald v. Barnstable School Committee,

555 U. S. 246 (2009)…………………………………6, 7

Fry v. Napoleon Community Schools,

__ U.S. __, 137 S.Ct. 743 (2017)………………….. 4, 5

Mattoon v. Pittsfield,

980 F. 2d 1 (CA1 1992)………………………………...7

Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea

Clammers Association,

453 U. S. 1 (1981)…............................................... 5-6

OBB Personenverkehr AG v. Sachs, 577 U.S. ____;

136 S.Ct. 390; 193 L.Ed.2d 269 (2015).. .................. 5

Smith v. Robinson, 468 U. S. 992 (1984)..................... 6

Statutes

15 U.S.C. § 2619………………………………………….. 8

33 U.S.C. § 1365………………………………………….. 7

42 U.S.C. § 1983……………………………….1, 5, 6, 7, 8

42 U.S.C. § 6972……………………………………......... 8

42 U.S.C. § 7604………………………………………….. 7

42 U.S.C. § 9659……………………………….................7

Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments

of 1996, Public L. 104-182, §3, 110

Stat. 1614-15 (1996) ................................................. 3

Safe Drinking Water Act, Public L. No,

93-523, §1412(2), 88 Stat. 1662 (1974) ................ 1, 3

ii

Introduction

The Mays Plaintiffs’ Consolidated Brief in

Opposition (“Response”) obfuscates and evades the

important issues raised by this Petition: (1) whether

their claims, brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, fall

within the ambit of the Safe Drinking Water Act

(“SDWA”), (2) whether the Court’s existing

precedents resolve the issue raised in this Petition,

and (3) whether this Petition raises questions of

national importance warranting certiorari. Here,

Plaintiffs’

claims

clearly

fall

within

the

Congressionally-defined scope of the SDWA; whether

the SDWA precludes parallel claims under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 is not answered by this Court’s existing

precedents; and this Petition raises issues of national

importance that extend beyond the case presented.

Petitioners respectfully request that, for any or all of

the foregoing reasons, their petition for certiorari be

granted.

1. Plaintiffs’ claims go to the heart of the SDWA

Plaintiffs’ Response repeatedly suggests that

their claims have little or nothing to do with the

SDWA. They then proceed from that false premise to

the conclusion that it would be perverse to allow the

SDWA to preclude essentially unrelated claims. See,

e.g., “our claim does not rest on any . . . right to clean

water,” Response, p. 14, and “the SDWA has

essentially no connection to constitutional rights.”

Id. p. 4. Plaintiffs offer hypotheticals, with no factual

basis in this case, of a government providing “dirtier,

smellier water” to disfavored groups, id. p. 13, as if

their claims were driven by such purely aesthetic

concerns. However, their Complaint makes it clear

1

that their claims arise from exposure to allegedly

unsafe water.

For example, they complain that:

•

•

•

•

•

•

“Defendants caused a public health crisis by

exposing Plaintiffs to contaminated water,”

First Amended Complaint, ¶ 1;

Defendants were responsible for “highly

dangerous conditions, caused and prolonged by

Defendants’ deliberate decision to (1) use the

toxic Flint River as a primary drinking source;

(2) conceal the resulting public health crisis;

and (3) exacerbate and prolong the harm . . .”

id. ¶ 8;

The water was “highly corrosive and toxic,” id.

¶ 69;

“the State created a dangerous public health

crisis for the users of Flint tap water…” id.;

“Defendants knew that the extreme public

health emergency involved lead poisoning…” id.

at ¶ 95 (emphasis not added); and

“State and local public officials failed to

undertake any measures to effectively address

any of the dangers, including lead poisoning,

identified by EPA Agent Del Toral.” Id. at

¶ 99.

Further, Plaintiffs’ putative class is defined as

persons “exposed to toxic Flint water,” id. ¶ 122.

Numerous references to “toxic water,” “contaminated

water,” “corrosive water,” “unsafe water,” or “lead”

can be found throughout Plaintiffs’ Complaint.

Plaintiffs have clearly asserted a right to relief

because they were provided with, or exposed to,

unsafe water.

2

Such conduct is at the heart of the SDWA.

When Congress first enacted the SDWA in 1974, it

required publication of interim primary drinking

water regulations that “shall protect health to the

extent feasible.” Safe Drinking Water Act, Public L.

No, 93-523, §1412(2), 88 Stat. 1662 (1974). In 1996,

Congress reauthorized and amended the SDWA,

adding specific Congressional findings to the

statutory text.

Safe Drinking Water Act

Amendments of 1996, Public L. 104-182, §3, 110 Stat.

1614-15 (1996). Specifically, Congress found that:

(1) safe drinking water is essential to the

protection of public health;

...

(5) the existing process for the assessment

and selection of additional drinking

water contaminants needs to be revised

and improved to ensure that there is a sound

scientific basis for setting priorities in

establishing drinking water regulations;

(6) procedures for assessing the health

effects of contaminants establishing

drinking water standards should be revised to

provide greater opportunity for public

education and participation;

(7) in considering the appropriate level of

regulation for contaminants in drinking

water, risk assessment, based on sound and

objective science, and benefit-cost analysis

are important analytical tools for improving

the efficiency and effectiveness of drinking

water regulations to protect human health;

(8) more effective protection of public health

requires-3

(A) a Federal commitment to set priorities

that will allow scarce Federal, State, and

local resources to be targeted toward the

drinking water problems of greatest public

health concern;

...

(C)

prevention

of

drinking

water

contamination through well-trained system

operators, water systems with adequate

managerial, technical, and financial capacity,

and enhanced protection of source waters of

public water systems;

...

(10) consumers served by public water

systems should be provided with information

on the source of the water they are drinking

and its quality and safety, as well as prompt

notification of any violation of drinking water

regulations.

Id. (emphasis added). The findings contained in the

SDWA make it clear that Congress intended that the

SDWA address issues of water safety, quality,

treatment, and the resulting effects on public health.

It is true that the Mays Plaintiffs’ First

Amended Complaint never expressly references the

SDWA. However, as this Court recently explained in

Fry v. Napoleon Community Schools, __ U.S. __, 137

S.Ct. 743, 755 (2017), what matters is “substance, not

surface. The use (or non-use) of particular labels and

terms is not what matters.” The inquiry does not

depend on the precise words used in the Complaint.

Id.

In Fry, the precise omitted words in the

Complaint were “FAPE” or “IEP.” Id. Here, the

precise omitted words are “Safe Drinking Water Act”

or “SDWA” or “Lead and Copper Rule.”

The

substance of Plaintiffs’ claims, as set forth by their

4

own words, is that they were provided with “toxic”

water that posed a danger of “lead poisoning.”

Plaintiffs’ allegations directly implicate the SDWA

and its Lead and Copper Rule and reveals Plaintiffs’

hypotheticals to be mere rhetoric, unmoored from

their actual claims.

As in Fry, the “magic words” approach here

would make the SDWA’s comprehensive remedial

scheme “too easy to bypass.” Id. To allow Plaintiffs

to proceed would allow them to evade the SDWA’s

comprehensive remedial scheme merely through

“artful pleading.” Id., citing OBB Personenverkehr

AG v. Sachs, 577 U.S. ____; 136 S.Ct. 390, 396; 193

L.Ed.2d 269 (2015). Certiorari is warranted because

the Plaintiffs seek to elevate surface over substance

while ignoring that their claims fall within the clearly

expressed Congressional intent behind the SDWA.

2. This Court’s existing case law does not

answer the question presented here

Plaintiffs also argue this case requires only “a

straightforward

application

of

this

Court’s

precedents,” Response, p. 1, and that there is no

uncertainty in the case law because there is a single

“test,” Congressional intent. Id., p. 15. Whether a

federal statute precludes parallel claims under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 is, of course, a question of

Congressional intent. However, that statement begs

the question: how should such Congressional intent

be determined? This Court’s decisions make it clear

that discerning Congressional intent is not a matter

of unstructured divination. However, what is not

clear is how Congressional intent to preclude

constitutional claims should be inferred, when there

is a comprehensive remedial scheme, such as that

found in Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v.

5

National Sea Clammers Association, 453 U.S. 1

(1981), Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992 (1984) and

City of Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 544 U.S. 113

(2005), but no express statement of Congressional

intent, as found in Smith. This Court has never

considered whether a statute with a comprehensive

remedial scheme but no express statement of

legislative intent, can preclude constitutional claims,

and, as previously shown, the circuit courts have split

on this issue. Resolving that question and circuit

split is important and worthy of certiorari.

Because this Court has never considered the

question presented here, Plaintiffs’ repeated

statements to the effect that this Court has never

held that constitutional claims are precluded absent

an express statement of Congressional intent, are

ultimately a red herring. See, e.g., Response, p. 18.

Such a holding does not exist because the Court has

never addressed that issue, and the lack of such a

holding does not mean that Plaintiffs’ proposed rule

can or should be inferred from this Court’s

precedents. To the contrary, this Court has clearly

stated that “[i]n determining whether a subsequent

statute precludes the enforcement of a federal right

under § 1983, we have placed primary emphasis on

the nature and extent of that statute's remedial

scheme.” Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 555

U.S. 246, 253, 129 S. Ct. 788, 794 (2009) (emphasis

added).

Instead of addressing this issue, Plaintiffs

instead focus heavily on the difference between the

“contours” of the SDWA and their constitutional

claims. See Response, pp. 17-18. That differences

between SDWA claims and the parallel constitutional

claims advanced by the Plaintiffs exist is

unsurprising - there would be no significance to

6

preclusion if such differences did not exist. However,

under this Court’s precedent, such differences are not

the controlling factor.

Contrary to Plaintiffs’ assertions, this Court’s

case law makes such differences, in the contours of

the statutory and constitutional claims, a

consideration, but it does not make them the

controlling consideration. The Court made this clear

in Fitzgerald, when the Court first determined that

the absence of a comprehensive remedial scheme in

Title IX made preclusion of parallel constitutional

claims under § 1983 inappropriate, and only then

compared the “contours” to “lend further support” to

the conclusion that Title IX did not preempt the

constitutional claims there. Fitzgerald, 555 U.S. at

256.

3. The question of SDWA preclusion

important and far-ranging implications

has

Plaintiffs also suggest that the question

presented is unimportant because it involves only a

conflict with a single case, Mattoon v. City of

Pittsfield, 980 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1992), which they claim

is outdated. This is untrue. But even if Mattoon

were outdated, which it is not, the question presented

is of national importance, with implications that

extend beyond the scope of the SDWA. The SDWA’s

“citizen suit” remedial scheme is virtually identical to

at least five other federal environmental statutes:

the Clean Air Act,1 the Solid Waste Disposal Act,2 the

Clean Water Act,3 the Resource Conservation and

See 42 U.S.C. § 7604.

See 42 U.S.C. § 9659.

3 See 33 U.S.C. § 1365.

1

2

7

Recovery Act,4 and the Toxic Substances Control Act.5

If the Sixth Circuit is correct that the SDWA’s

remedial scheme was not preemptive, then it is

seemingly equally true for these other federal

environmental statutes. Stated differently, the Sixth

Circuit’s holding will effectively constitutionalize

much of the vast federal environmental regime. The

question of whether private individuals can

circumvent these carefully constructed remedial

schemes by bringing constitutional law claims under

42 U.S.C. § 1983 is important and should be

addressed by this Court. This Court’s guidance is

needed in order to provide the lower courts with a

uniform means of interpreting and applying these

statutes.

Furthermore, as of February 14, 2018, there

are 49,918 Community Water Systems6 (CWS)

registered with the EPA, servicing 307,797,630

persons.7 27,005 of those CWS are publicly owned by

federal, state, local, or tribal government. Those

27,005 publicly owned CWS provide water to

271,220,297 people. Phrased another way, almost

90% of the people in this country receive their water

from publicly owned water systems that are operated

not as a means for generating profit, but as a public

service. As previously shown, the issue of aging

water infrastructure extends far beyond the City of

See 42 U.S.C. § 6972.

See 15 U.S.C. § 2619.

6 A Community Water System is “[a] public water system that

supplies water to the same population year-round.” Information

about Public Water Systems, WWW.EPA.GOV (available at

https://www.epa.gov/dwreginfo/information-about-public-watersystems) (last accessed February 14, 2018).

7 Water System Summary, OFMPUB.EPA.GOV (available at

https://ofmpub.epa.gov/apex/sfdw/f?p=108:21:::NO:RP,

RIR::)

(last accessed February 14, 2018).

4

5

8

Flint. Indeed, in 2016, it was reported that more

than 5,300 municipal water systems across the

nation were in violation of the EPA’s Lead and

Copper Rule.8

Uniform guidance by this Court is needed in

order to provide these publicly-owned water systems

guidance on their duties, responsibilities, and

potential liabilities. Furthermore, the guidance of

this Court is needed not just to apply the SDWA, but

other federal environmental statutes with nearly

identical remedial schemes. In short, the national

importance and general applicability of the issues

raised in this Petition provide further justification for

this Court to grant certiorari.

8 Sara Ganim, 5,300 U.S. water systems are in violation of lead

rules,

CNN

(June

29,

2016,

6:50

AM),

https://www.cnn.com/2016/06/28/us/epa-lead-in-u-s-watersystems/index.html.

9

Conclusion

The Petition for Writ of Certiorari should be

granted.

Respectfully submitted,

Attorneys for City of Flint and Dayne Walling

/s/ William Y. Kim

William Y. Kim (Bar #303932)

Assistant City Attorney

City of Flint Dept. of Law

1101 S. Saginaw, 3rd Floor

Flint, MI 48502

(810) 766-7146

wkim@cityofflint.com

Attorneys for City of Flint

/s/ Frederick A. Berg, Jr.

Frederick A. Berg, Jr.

Sheldon H. Klein

Butzel Long, P.C.

150 W. Jefferson Ave., Suite 100

Detroit, MI 48226

(313) 225-7000

bergf@butzel.com

klein@butzel.com

10

Attorney for Gerald Ambrose

/s/ Barry A. Wolf

Barry A. Wolf

Law Office of Barry A. Wolf, PLLC

503 S. Saginaw St., Suite 1410

Flint, MI 48502

(810) 762-1084

bwolf718@msn.com

Attorney for Michael Glasgow

/s/ Brett T. Meyer

Brett T. Meyer

O’Neil, Wallace, & Doyle, P.C.

300 St. Andrews Rd., Suite 302

Saginaw, MI 48605

(989) 790-0960

bmeyer@owdpc.com

Attorney for Darnell Earley

/s/ Todd Perkins

Todd Perkins

Perkins Law Group

615 W. Griswold Ste. 400

Detroit, MI 48226

(313) 964-1702

tperkins@perkinslawgroup.net

Attorney for Howard Croft

/s/ Alexander S. Rusek

Alexander S. Rusek

White Law PLLC

2549 Jolly Rd., Suite 340

Okemos, MI 48664

(517) 316-1195

alexrusek@whitelawpllc.com

11

Attorney for Daugherty Johnson

/s/ David W. Meyers

David W. Meyers

Law Office of Edward A. Zeineh

2800 E. River Ave., Suite B

Lansing, MI 48912

(517) 292-7000

davidmeyerslaw@gmail.com

12

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