Reply Brief — Theodore H. Frank, et al., Petitioners v. Paloma Gaos, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, et al.

Supreme Court briefDec 21, 2018

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

No. 17-961

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

————

THEODORE H. FRANK AND MELISSA ANN HOLYOAK,

Petitioners,

v.

PALOMA GAOS, ON BEHALF OF HERSELF AND

ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, et al.,

Respondents.

————

On Writ of Certiorari

to the United States Court of Appeals

for the Ninth Circuit

————

SUPPLEMENTAL REPLY BRIEF

ON STANDING ISSUES

FOR PETITIONERS

————

THEODORE H. FRANK

Counsel of Record

MELISSA HOLYOAK

ANNA ST. JOHN

ADAM EZRA SCHULMAN

COMPETITIVE ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE

1310 L St., N.W., 7th Floor

Washington, D.C. 20005

(202) 331-2263

tfrank@gmail.com

Counsel for Petitioners

WILSON-EPES PRINTING CO., INC. – (202) 789-0096 – WASHINGTON, D. C. 20002

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................

ii

ARGUMENT ........................................................

1

I. Gaos’s difficulty in prevailing on the

merits does not defeat standing. ..............

1

II. Google’s arguments for limiting the

legislative power fail. ................................

5

CONCLUSION ....................................................

11

(i)

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Page(s)

Ariz. State Leg. v. Ariz. Indep.

Redistricting Comm’n,

135 S. Ct. 2652 (2015) ...............................

1

ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish,

490 U.S. 605 (1989) ...................................

1

Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662 (2009) ...................................

4

Bank of Am. Corp. v. City of Miami,

137 S. Ct. 1296 (2017) ...............................

10

Bartnicki v. Vopper,

532 U.S. 514 (2001) ...................................

6

Bell v. Hood,

327 U.S. 678 (1946) ...................................

1, 3

Carr v. Tillery,

591 F.3d 909 (7th Cir. 2010) .....................

3

Davis v. United States,

564 U.S. 229 (2011) ...................................

1

Doe v. Chao,

540 U.S. 614 (2004) ................................. 3, 4, 11

FEC v. Akins,

524 U.S. 11 (1998) .....................................

10

Folsom v. Marsh,

9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) ............

8

Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman,

455 U.S. 363 (1982) ...................................

7

Johnson v. Wattenberger,

361 F.3d 991 (7th Cir. 2004) .....................

2

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc.,

568 U.S. 519 (2013) ...................................

9

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,

504 U.S. 555 (1992) ....................................

9

Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson,

477 U.S. 57 (1986) .....................................

6

Muransky v. Godiva Chocolatier, Inc.,

905 F.3d 1200 (11th Cir. 2018) .................

8, 9

Olmstead v. United States,

277 U.S. 438 (1928) ...................................

6

Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida,

414 U.S. 661 (1974) ...................................

5

SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu,

138 S. Ct. 1348 (2018) ...............................

10

Smith v. Bayer Corp.,

564 U.S. 299 (2011) ...................................

2

Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins,

136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016) ................... 5, 7, 8, 10, 11

St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co.,

303 U.S. 283 (1938) ...................................

3

Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Knowles,

568 U.S. 588 (2013) ...................................

2

Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t,

523 U.S. 83 (1998) .....................................

1

Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, L.P.,

562 U.S. 170 (2011) ...................................

10

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

Tyler v. Carter,

151 F.R.D. 537 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), aff’d,

41 F.3d 1500 (2d Cir. 1994) ......................

3

CONSTITUTION

U.S. Const. art. III ........................................

1, 2

U.S. Const. amend. I ....................................

6

STATUTES

18 U.S.C. § 2511 ...........................................

6

18 U.S.C. § 2520 ...........................................

6

18 U.S.C. § 2707(a) .......................................

10

28 U.S.C. § 1653 ........................................... 4, 11

RULES

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 ..........................................

4

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) .................................

3

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 ..........................................

3

OTHER AUTHORITIES

Barocas, Solon & Helen Nissenbaum, Big

Data’s End Run around Anonymity and

Consent, in Privacy, Big Data, and the

Public Good: Frameworks for Engagement (Julia Lane et al. ed. 2014) ..............

4

v

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

Desai, Anuj C., Wiretapping Before the

Wires: The Post Office and the Birth of

Communications Privacy, 60 Stan. L.

Rev. 553 (2007)..........................................

8

Graham, Kyle, Why Torts Die, 35 Fla. St. L.

Rev. 359 (2008)..........................................

5

Restatement (Second) of Torts (1977) .........

11

Richards, Neil M. & Daniel J. Solove, Privacy’s Other Path: Recovering the Law of

Confidentiality, 96 Geo. L.J. 123 (2007) ...

8, 9

S. Rep. No. 99-541 (1986) .............................

9

Sinclair, Upton, The Jungle (1906) ..............

6

State of Class Actions Ten Years After the

Enactment of the Class Action Fairness

Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the

Const. and Civil Justice of the H. Comm.

on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. (2015) .......

2

Valentino-deVries, Jennifer, et al., Your

Apps Know Where You Were Last Night,

and They’re Not Keeping It Secret, N.Y.

Times (Dec. 10, 2018)................................

5

Warren, Samuel D. & Louis D. Brandeis,

The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193

(1890) .........................................................

6, 8

PETITIONERS’ REPLY TO

SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEFS

Google and the government have certainly demonstrated that Gaos has a weak case on the merits. We

already knew that from the feebleness of the settlement. But the Court has repeatedly held that “one

must not confuse weakness on the merits with absence

of Article III standing.” Ariz. State Leg. v. Ariz.

Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2663

(2015) (cleaned up). Yet this is precisely what Google

and the government do throughout their briefs.

When one strips away these category mistakes, we see

that there is no basis for a facial challenge to standing

in this case without an unprecedented shift in power

from the legislature to the judiciary and from the

federal government’s ability to regulate interstate

commerce to the states. Google’s arguments against

standing here would undo decades of precedent and

numerous federal civil causes of action.

ARGUMENT

I. Gaos’s difficulty in prevailing on the

merits does not defeat standing.

The government argues (Supp. Br. 13–14) that

search terms embedded in a referrer header are not

“communications” for purposes of the Stored Communications Act, but then concedes that this is a question

of the merits. Just so. That a plaintiff makes an

allegation that may not succeed on the merits does not

defeat the plaintiff’s standing to bring the claim.

Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 249 n.10 (2011);

Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 89

(1998); ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 624

(1989); Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682 (1946). “A

legal shortcoming does not equate to a jurisdictional

shortfall” and “jurisdiction is not defeated by the

2

possibility that the complaint ultimately fails to state

a claim.” Johnson v. Wattenberger, 361 F.3d 991,

993–94 (7th Cir. 2004) (Easterbrook, J.) (cleaned up).

Any other result, and “defendants would never win in

diversity cases. They could at best achieve jurisdictional dismissals, followed by new suits in state court.”

Id. at 994 (emphasis in original).

The same would be true in cases where federal

questions are dismissed on jurisdictional standing

grounds because of a failure of the merits; that simply

invites bringing new suits with different class representatives to state courts that have a more favorable

view of the merits. Cf. Smith v. Bayer Corp., 564 U.S.

299 (2011) (class representatives do not bind absent

class members in an uncertified class); Standard Fire

Ins. Co. v. Knowles, 568 U.S. 588 (2013) (rejecting

shenanigans class counsel used to evade federal jurisdiction). This would be ultimately counterproductive

to whatever Google is attempting to accomplish with

its proposed rule here. Cf. State of Class Actions Ten

Years After the Enactment of the Class Action Fairness

Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Const. and

Civil Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th

Cong. 13 (2015) (statement of Andrew J. Pincus)

(noting importance of federal removal jurisdiction in

preventing “some of the most flagrant abuses of class

actions,” and identifying the use of cy pres “to inflate

the claimed value of the class recovery” as one of those

abuses).

A court faced with a plaintiff who accuses former

President Jimmy Carter of strafing her dormitory

room with planes as part of a conspiracy with IBM and

Ross Perot to use earthquake technology to profit from

reinstating slavery has the Article III jurisdiction to

dismiss the complaint on the merits. This is so even

3

when common sense tells one that Jimmy Carter has

no air force or earthquake technology and the plaintiff

has not suffered any nondelusional redressable injury.

Cf. Tyler v. Carter, 151 F.R.D. 537 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)

(dismissing complaint sua sponte as implausible without considering jurisdiction), aff’d, 41 F.3d 1500 (2d

Cir. 1994). Similarly, if the Gaos plaintiffs misunderstand the definition of “communications” under the

SCA, or would have other difficulty demonstrating

facts specific to themselves (much less on a classwide

basis) necessary to prove damages, this is what Rule

12(b)(6) or Rule 56 are for. Plaintiffs have alleged a

private injury caused by an arguable breach of a duty

reasonably created by Congress and redressable by

statutory damages; no one suggests that the allegations are made in such “bad faith” solely for the purposes

of improperly claiming the mantle of federal jurisdiction. Cf. St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co.,

303 U.S. 283, 289 (1938) (amount in controversy).1

There is “injury enough to open the courthouse door”

even if plaintiffs have little basis to go forward once

inside. Doe v. Chao, 540 U.S. 614, 625 (2004).

Google (Supp. Br. 16–17) and the government (Supp.

Br. 17–19) complain about the implausibility of proving any damages, but that is again a merits question,

as well as precisely the fact pattern of Doe v. Chao,

where there was standing but no claim meriting relief.

Neither Google nor the government reconcile their

arguments with Doe, much less the long Bell v. Hood

line of cases. Compare Pet. Supp. Br. 18–19; Gaos

Supp. Br. 15–17 & n.4. Indeed, Google’s only

1

Compare “the example of a hypothetical dispute over bananas

described by the parties as ‘securities’ so that they could litigate

their dispute in the federal courts under federal securities law.”

Carr v. Tillery, 591 F.3d 909, 917 (7th Cir. 2010).

4

discussion of Doe (Supp. Br. 20–21) is a quote of its

holding on the merits.

Google and the government make other, often questionable, factual arguments regarding difficulty of

proof or insufficiency of allegations that state a claim.

For example, Google (Supp. Br. 7, 11–13, 21) and the

government (Supp. Br. 21) refuse to draw reasonable

inferences from the plaintiffs’ allegations (Supp. Br.

18–19) regarding the ease of reidentification2 to argue

that plaintiffs have failed to plead that reidentification

actually happened. But even if that sort of magicword incantation was required to draw the reasonable

inference, it would be trivial for Gaos to draw up a new

complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1653 with a new

paragraph making that allegation explicit. Pet.

Supp. Br. 21–22.

The government disputes (Supp. Br. 21) that vanity

searches create a higher risk of reidentification, but

plaintiffs’ proposition seems a matter of “common

sense” (Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009)), or

at a minimum a colorable allegation subject to factual

dispute that can survive a Rule 12 challenge. E.g.,

Solon Barocas & Helen Nissenbaum, Big Data’s End

Run around Anonymity and Consent, in Privacy, Big

Data, and the Public Good: Frameworks for Engagement 50 (Julia Lane et al. ed. 2014) (discussing

reidentification in manner consistent with plaintiffs’

complaint). Google alleges (Supp. Br. 13–14) multiple searches are required for reidentification, but their

analysis ignores (Supp. Br. 4–5) that IP addresses

2

Petitioners mistakenly cite (Supp. Br. 21) to the Second

Amended Complaint, Dkt. 39 ¶¶ 42–83. A better citation is the

later Consolidated Complaint, Dkt. 50 ¶¶ 56–98, found at Gaos

Supp. Br. App. 25a–43a, but even the less detailed Second

Amended Complaint demonstrates the point.

5

frequently disclose location and are readily crossreferenced with other collections of aggregated user

data. Gaos Supp. Br. 18–19; Pet. Supp. Br. 22; cf.

Jennifer Valentino-deVries et al., Your Apps Know

Where You Were Last Night, and They’re Not Keeping

It Secret, N.Y. Times (Dec. 10, 2018).

Perhaps Google and the government would be

proven correct about all of these particular factual

contentions after a full trial or even a summary

judgment motion. And the individualized nature of

proof certainly raises severe questions about class

certification for trial. But the plaintiffs’ allegations

are not “so insubstantial, implausible, foreclosed by

prior decisions of this Court or otherwise completely

devoid of merit as not to involve a federal controversy

within the jurisdiction of the District Court, whatever

may be the ultimate resolution of the federal issues on

the merits” and that is all that is needed to satisfy

jurisdiction at the complaint stage. Oneida Indian

Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 666–67

(1974) (cleaned up).

II. Google’s arguments

legislative power fail.

for

limiting

the

1. Google proposes (Supp. Br. 20–21) that commonlaw privacy torts are of too recent a vintage to generate

standing. If so, it would be an extraordinary consequence that Spokeo divested Congress of any power to

create a private cause of action for privacy violations

delineating the rights and obligations in the use of new

technologies—but permitted Congress to federalize

largely obsolete torts like the use of interstate communications in seduction or alienation of affections.

Cf. Kyle Graham, Why Torts Die, 35 Fla. St. L. Rev.

359 (2008). Such a reading of Spokeo would have

repercussions in labor law as well (Pet. Supp. Br. 18),

6

and might even undo portions of modern civil-rights

law. Compare, e.g., Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v.

Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (containing no common-law

standing analysis) with Upton Sinclair, The Jungle

(1906) (protesting turn-of-century working conditions

including, inter alia, lack of remedy for sexual

harassment). It would nullify 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511 and

2520, which impose per se statutory liability of

at least $10,000 for disclosing illegally intercepted

electronic communications—even if the cell-phone

conversation is about men’s shoes. Indeed, the more

important the disclosed illegally intercepted conversation, the more likely it is to be protected by the

First Amendment and immune from liability. Cf.

Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001).

Fortunately, the Court need not reach these questions, because Google’s premise is incorrect. Warren

& Brandeis simply occasioned a change in semantics

(from “property” and “confidence” to “privacy”). It did

not create new substance out of whole cloth:

the principle which has been applied to protect these rights is in reality not the principle

of private property, unless that word be used

in an extended and unusual sense. The

principle which protects personal writings

and other productions of the intellect or of

the emotions, is the right to privacy, and the

law has no new principle to formulate when

it extends this protection to the personal

appearance, sayings, acts, and to personal

relations, domestic or otherwise.

Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right

to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193, 213 (1890). Strictliability privacy claims are an extension of commonlaw trespass. See Olmstead v. United States, 277

7

U.S. 438, 487 (1928) (Butler, J., dissenting) (“The

communications belong to the parties between whom

they pass.”). After all, any violation of privacy—even

a surreptitiously-filmed sex tape—is simply the

disclosure of true facts one would rather have hidden.

The privacy right simply assigns the default property

ownership in those images to the subjects, rather than

the witnesses. The Spokeo analysis does not obviate

privacy torts; any reading of Spokeo that requires that

result is self-refuting.

2. Google argues (Supp. Br. 10) that the complaint

does not allege “pecuniary injury, emotional distress,

or any other potential concrete harm.” But as with

common-law claims, the violation of the legal statutory duty owed plaintiff herself can itself be the harm.

Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1551 (Thomas, J., concurring).

Anyway, the direct allegation was “privacy harm.”

Gaos Supp. Br. App. 40a–43a. And specifically,

Italiano alleged that his queries were “personal,

confidential searches that he did not want disclosed to

third parties without his knowledge or consent.” Id.

45a.

Google’s position cannot be reconciled with other

precedents where recent innovative federal statutes

permitted suit for intangible injury and this Court not

only found standing, but permitted the case to go

forward on the merits. Pet. Supp. Br. 19. For

example, testers who had no intention of actually

renting from defendants had standing to sue under the

Fair Housing Act solely for being given inaccurate

information about the rental market, even when they

knew the information they were to receive would be

inaccurate. Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455

U.S. 363 (1982).

8

3. “[T]he point is not that [plaintiff’s] harm would

have been actionable at common law. The inquiry

under Spokeo is whether the alleged harm bears a

‘close relationship’ to one actionable at common law.”

Muransky v. Godiva Chocolatier, Inc., 905 F.3d 1200,

1211 (11th Cir. 2018). Thus, many of Google’s and

the government’s arguments are simply beside the

point. The breach of confidentiality tort, unlike the

public disclosure tort, “focuses on the source and

protects confidential information without regard to

the degree of its offensiveness.” Neil M. Richards &

Daniel J. Solove, Privacy’s Other Path: Recovering the

Law of Confidentiality, 96 Geo. L.J. 123, 175 (2007)

(cleaned up). Nothing in Spokeo requires judges to

act as gatekeepers and legislate whether a privacy

violation is offensive enough for Congress to act.

4. Google argues (Supp. Br. 19–20) that Justice

Story’s jurisprudence (discussed at Gaos Supp. Br. 7–

12 and Pet. Supp. Br. 8–11) dealt with copyright and

property, rather than privacy. But Folsom v. Marsh

recognized the independent interest in trust and

confidence distinguishing “mere breach of confidence

or contract” from “violation of the exclusive copyright

of the writer.” 9 F. Cas. 342, 346 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841).

“The cases discussed above might be read as intellectual property cases, yet they were often based on

two rationales—property and breach of confidence.”

Richards & Solove, 96 Geo. L.J. at 138; see also Warren

& Brandeis, 4 Harv. L. Rev. at 211 (distinguishing

between breach of confidence actions and the “theory

of property,” the latter being necessary “in granting a

remedy against a stranger”).

The right of confidence was the progenitor of modern

privacy rights, existing “long before Warren and

Brandeis published their article.” Richards & Solove,

9

96 Geo. L.J. at 133; see also Muransky, 905 F.3d at

1209 (grounding standing to assert statutory FCRA

claims in traditional common-law right of action

for breach of confidence). One aspect of the right of

confidence is the protection for confidential communications, a right that has existed in this country from

its inception as early American legislators enshrined

that principle into regulation of the U.S. Postal

Service. Anuj C. Desai, Wiretapping Before the Wires:

The Post Office and the Birth of Communications

Privacy, 60 Stan. L. Rev. 553, 558 (2007); see also

Richards & Solove, 96 Geo. L.J. at 140–45. The

Stored Communications Act extended that time-tested

principle of confidence to electronic modes of communication on the theory that “[f]or the person or business

whose records are involved, the privacy or proprietary

interest in that information should not change” simply

because technology is changing. S. Rep. No. 99-541,

at 3 (1986).

And even if Google were correct that privacy

sounded solely in property, plaintiffs also bring their

complaint on a theory of a property interest. Gaos

Supp. Br. App. 54a–56a.

5. Google’s request for a “clear statement” rule

(Supp. Br. 22), as it interprets it, would have dramatic

retroactive effect on decades of settled legislative

expectations. Neither Google nor the government

contend that the legislative history and context for the

SCA fail to “identify the injury it seeks to vindicate

and relate the injury to the class of persons entitled

to bring suit.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 580 (Kennedy,

J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).

Here, unlike in a copyright case (Kirtsaeng v. John

Wiley & Sons, Inc., 568 U.S. 519 (2013)), Congress was

legislating in a new area where there were no default

10

rules, and wanted to provide a new structural framework defining the scope of the property rights. Pet.

Supp. Br. 12–13.

It is especially ironic that Google, having ignored the

legislative history providing a reasonably clear statement of Congress’s purpose, then goes on to suggest

(Supp. Br. 23) that the “aggrieved” language in the

SCA evidences Congress’s limited concern. As Google

admits (Supp. Br. 23 n.9), FEC v. Akins interpreted

“aggrieved” to “cast the standing net broadly—beyond

the common-law interests and substantive statutory

rights upon which ‘prudential’ standing traditionally

rested.” 524 U.S. 11, 19 (1998). This Court declined

to construe “person aggrieved” in an “artificially narrow” way; rather it adopted a “zone of interests” test

“enabling suit by any plaintiff with an interest

arguably sought to be protected by the statutes.”

Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, L.P., 562 U.S. 170,

177–78 (2011) (cleaned up). Most recently, relying

on the stare decisis of its pre-Akins cases, this Court

interpreted “person aggrieved” language in the Fair

Housing Act broadly to cover municipalities. Bank

of Am. Corp. v. City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. 1296

(2017). Furthermore, the language is “any … person

aggrieved.” 18 U.S.C. § 2707(a) (emphasis added).

“Any” is a qualifier of maximum breadth. SAS Inst.

Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1354 (2018).

The whole issue appears to be a red herring. The

Spokeo elevation inquiry attempts to discern what

interests concerned Congress, not who Congress has

permitted to enforce those interests.

The reason that Spokeo held the FCRA “did not

categorically give rise to concrete injury” (U.S. Supp.

Br. 16) is that the FCRA contains both procedural and

substantive components. Pet. Supp. Br. 11–12. The

11

SCA protections at issue here are only substantive.

Id. The government’s position (Supp. Br. 11–12) that

the FCRA expressed a more robust judgment about

extending rights than the SCA is dubious at best.

6. The government claims (Supp. Br. 16) that

common-law privacy torts do not impose per se

liability, but rather require an additional showing of

harm, yet the government’s very next sentence—a

parenthetical quoting Restatement § 652H—refutes

the proposition. The Restatement authorizes damages for a plaintiff’s “harm to his interest in privacy.”

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652H (1977). If the

SCA violations alleged here do not categorically give

rise to concrete injury (U.S. Supp. Br. 16), that is again

a problem of the merits as in Doe v. Chao.

CONCLUSION

Google concedes (Supp. Br. 8) the pleading standard

should apply. If so, at least named plaintiff Italiano

has sufficiently pled concrete injury. But if the Court

requires a greater showing than Italiano has made to

date, then petitioners believe that plaintiffs should be

able to demonstrate standing with § 1653 amendments and affidavits.

Respectfully submitted,

THEODORE H. FRANK

Counsel of Record

MELISSA HOLYOAK

ANNA ST. JOHN

ADAM EZRA SCHULMAN

COMPETITIVE ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE

1310 L St., N.W., 7th Floor

Washington, D.C. 20005

(202) 331-2263

tfrank@gmail.com

Counsel for Petitioners

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.