Reply Brief — Theodore H. Frank, et al., Petitioners v. Paloma Gaos, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, et al.
Supreme Court briefDec 21, 2018
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No. 17-961
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
————
THEODORE H. FRANK AND MELISSA ANN HOLYOAK,
Petitioners,
v.
PALOMA GAOS, ON BEHALF OF HERSELF AND
ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, et al.,
Respondents.
————
On Writ of Certiorari
to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit
————
SUPPLEMENTAL REPLY BRIEF
ON STANDING ISSUES
FOR PETITIONERS
————
THEODORE H. FRANK
Counsel of Record
MELISSA HOLYOAK
ANNA ST. JOHN
ADAM EZRA SCHULMAN
COMPETITIVE ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE
1310 L St., N.W., 7th Floor
Washington, D.C. 20005
(202) 331-2263
tfrank@gmail.com
Counsel for Petitioners
WILSON-EPES PRINTING CO., INC. – (202) 789-0096 – WASHINGTON, D. C. 20002
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................
ii
ARGUMENT ........................................................
1
I. Gaos’s difficulty in prevailing on the
merits does not defeat standing. ..............
1
II. Google’s arguments for limiting the
legislative power fail. ................................
5
CONCLUSION ....................................................
11
(i)
ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Page(s)
Ariz. State Leg. v. Ariz. Indep.
Redistricting Comm’n,
135 S. Ct. 2652 (2015) ...............................
1
ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish,
490 U.S. 605 (1989) ...................................
1
Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662 (2009) ...................................
4
Bank of Am. Corp. v. City of Miami,
137 S. Ct. 1296 (2017) ...............................
10
Bartnicki v. Vopper,
532 U.S. 514 (2001) ...................................
6
Bell v. Hood,
327 U.S. 678 (1946) ...................................
1, 3
Carr v. Tillery,
591 F.3d 909 (7th Cir. 2010) .....................
3
Davis v. United States,
564 U.S. 229 (2011) ...................................
1
Doe v. Chao,
540 U.S. 614 (2004) ................................. 3, 4, 11
FEC v. Akins,
524 U.S. 11 (1998) .....................................
10
Folsom v. Marsh,
9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) ............
8
Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman,
455 U.S. 363 (1982) ...................................
7
Johnson v. Wattenberger,
361 F.3d 991 (7th Cir. 2004) .....................
2
iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page(s)
Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc.,
568 U.S. 519 (2013) ...................................
9
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
504 U.S. 555 (1992) ....................................
9
Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson,
477 U.S. 57 (1986) .....................................
6
Muransky v. Godiva Chocolatier, Inc.,
905 F.3d 1200 (11th Cir. 2018) .................
8, 9
Olmstead v. United States,
277 U.S. 438 (1928) ...................................
6
Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida,
414 U.S. 661 (1974) ...................................
5
SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu,
138 S. Ct. 1348 (2018) ...............................
10
Smith v. Bayer Corp.,
564 U.S. 299 (2011) ...................................
2
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins,
136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016) ................... 5, 7, 8, 10, 11
St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co.,
303 U.S. 283 (1938) ...................................
3
Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Knowles,
568 U.S. 588 (2013) ...................................
2
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t,
523 U.S. 83 (1998) .....................................
1
Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, L.P.,
562 U.S. 170 (2011) ...................................
10
iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page(s)
Tyler v. Carter,
151 F.R.D. 537 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), aff’d,
41 F.3d 1500 (2d Cir. 1994) ......................
3
CONSTITUTION
U.S. Const. art. III ........................................
1, 2
U.S. Const. amend. I ....................................
6
STATUTES
18 U.S.C. § 2511 ...........................................
6
18 U.S.C. § 2520 ...........................................
6
18 U.S.C. § 2707(a) .......................................
10
28 U.S.C. § 1653 ........................................... 4, 11
RULES
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 ..........................................
4
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) .................................
3
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 ..........................................
3
OTHER AUTHORITIES
Barocas, Solon & Helen Nissenbaum, Big
Data’s End Run around Anonymity and
Consent, in Privacy, Big Data, and the
Public Good: Frameworks for Engagement (Julia Lane et al. ed. 2014) ..............
4
v
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page(s)
Desai, Anuj C., Wiretapping Before the
Wires: The Post Office and the Birth of
Communications Privacy, 60 Stan. L.
Rev. 553 (2007)..........................................
8
Graham, Kyle, Why Torts Die, 35 Fla. St. L.
Rev. 359 (2008)..........................................
5
Restatement (Second) of Torts (1977) .........
11
Richards, Neil M. & Daniel J. Solove, Privacy’s Other Path: Recovering the Law of
Confidentiality, 96 Geo. L.J. 123 (2007) ...
8, 9
S. Rep. No. 99-541 (1986) .............................
9
Sinclair, Upton, The Jungle (1906) ..............
6
State of Class Actions Ten Years After the
Enactment of the Class Action Fairness
Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the
Const. and Civil Justice of the H. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. (2015) .......
2
Valentino-deVries, Jennifer, et al., Your
Apps Know Where You Were Last Night,
and They’re Not Keeping It Secret, N.Y.
Times (Dec. 10, 2018)................................
5
Warren, Samuel D. & Louis D. Brandeis,
The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193
(1890) .........................................................
6, 8
PETITIONERS’ REPLY TO
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEFS
Google and the government have certainly demonstrated that Gaos has a weak case on the merits. We
already knew that from the feebleness of the settlement. But the Court has repeatedly held that “one
must not confuse weakness on the merits with absence
of Article III standing.” Ariz. State Leg. v. Ariz.
Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2663
(2015) (cleaned up). Yet this is precisely what Google
and the government do throughout their briefs.
When one strips away these category mistakes, we see
that there is no basis for a facial challenge to standing
in this case without an unprecedented shift in power
from the legislature to the judiciary and from the
federal government’s ability to regulate interstate
commerce to the states. Google’s arguments against
standing here would undo decades of precedent and
numerous federal civil causes of action.
ARGUMENT
I. Gaos’s difficulty in prevailing on the
merits does not defeat standing.
The government argues (Supp. Br. 13–14) that
search terms embedded in a referrer header are not
“communications” for purposes of the Stored Communications Act, but then concedes that this is a question
of the merits. Just so. That a plaintiff makes an
allegation that may not succeed on the merits does not
defeat the plaintiff’s standing to bring the claim.
Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 249 n.10 (2011);
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 89
(1998); ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 624
(1989); Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682 (1946). “A
legal shortcoming does not equate to a jurisdictional
shortfall” and “jurisdiction is not defeated by the
2
possibility that the complaint ultimately fails to state
a claim.” Johnson v. Wattenberger, 361 F.3d 991,
993–94 (7th Cir. 2004) (Easterbrook, J.) (cleaned up).
Any other result, and “defendants would never win in
diversity cases. They could at best achieve jurisdictional dismissals, followed by new suits in state court.”
Id. at 994 (emphasis in original).
The same would be true in cases where federal
questions are dismissed on jurisdictional standing
grounds because of a failure of the merits; that simply
invites bringing new suits with different class representatives to state courts that have a more favorable
view of the merits. Cf. Smith v. Bayer Corp., 564 U.S.
299 (2011) (class representatives do not bind absent
class members in an uncertified class); Standard Fire
Ins. Co. v. Knowles, 568 U.S. 588 (2013) (rejecting
shenanigans class counsel used to evade federal jurisdiction). This would be ultimately counterproductive
to whatever Google is attempting to accomplish with
its proposed rule here. Cf. State of Class Actions Ten
Years After the Enactment of the Class Action Fairness
Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Const. and
Civil Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th
Cong. 13 (2015) (statement of Andrew J. Pincus)
(noting importance of federal removal jurisdiction in
preventing “some of the most flagrant abuses of class
actions,” and identifying the use of cy pres “to inflate
the claimed value of the class recovery” as one of those
abuses).
A court faced with a plaintiff who accuses former
President Jimmy Carter of strafing her dormitory
room with planes as part of a conspiracy with IBM and
Ross Perot to use earthquake technology to profit from
reinstating slavery has the Article III jurisdiction to
dismiss the complaint on the merits. This is so even
3
when common sense tells one that Jimmy Carter has
no air force or earthquake technology and the plaintiff
has not suffered any nondelusional redressable injury.
Cf. Tyler v. Carter, 151 F.R.D. 537 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)
(dismissing complaint sua sponte as implausible without considering jurisdiction), aff’d, 41 F.3d 1500 (2d
Cir. 1994). Similarly, if the Gaos plaintiffs misunderstand the definition of “communications” under the
SCA, or would have other difficulty demonstrating
facts specific to themselves (much less on a classwide
basis) necessary to prove damages, this is what Rule
12(b)(6) or Rule 56 are for. Plaintiffs have alleged a
private injury caused by an arguable breach of a duty
reasonably created by Congress and redressable by
statutory damages; no one suggests that the allegations are made in such “bad faith” solely for the purposes
of improperly claiming the mantle of federal jurisdiction. Cf. St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co.,
303 U.S. 283, 289 (1938) (amount in controversy).1
There is “injury enough to open the courthouse door”
even if plaintiffs have little basis to go forward once
inside. Doe v. Chao, 540 U.S. 614, 625 (2004).
Google (Supp. Br. 16–17) and the government (Supp.
Br. 17–19) complain about the implausibility of proving any damages, but that is again a merits question,
as well as precisely the fact pattern of Doe v. Chao,
where there was standing but no claim meriting relief.
Neither Google nor the government reconcile their
arguments with Doe, much less the long Bell v. Hood
line of cases. Compare Pet. Supp. Br. 18–19; Gaos
Supp. Br. 15–17 & n.4. Indeed, Google’s only
1
Compare “the example of a hypothetical dispute over bananas
described by the parties as ‘securities’ so that they could litigate
their dispute in the federal courts under federal securities law.”
Carr v. Tillery, 591 F.3d 909, 917 (7th Cir. 2010).
4
discussion of Doe (Supp. Br. 20–21) is a quote of its
holding on the merits.
Google and the government make other, often questionable, factual arguments regarding difficulty of
proof or insufficiency of allegations that state a claim.
For example, Google (Supp. Br. 7, 11–13, 21) and the
government (Supp. Br. 21) refuse to draw reasonable
inferences from the plaintiffs’ allegations (Supp. Br.
18–19) regarding the ease of reidentification2 to argue
that plaintiffs have failed to plead that reidentification
actually happened. But even if that sort of magicword incantation was required to draw the reasonable
inference, it would be trivial for Gaos to draw up a new
complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1653 with a new
paragraph making that allegation explicit. Pet.
Supp. Br. 21–22.
The government disputes (Supp. Br. 21) that vanity
searches create a higher risk of reidentification, but
plaintiffs’ proposition seems a matter of “common
sense” (Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009)), or
at a minimum a colorable allegation subject to factual
dispute that can survive a Rule 12 challenge. E.g.,
Solon Barocas & Helen Nissenbaum, Big Data’s End
Run around Anonymity and Consent, in Privacy, Big
Data, and the Public Good: Frameworks for Engagement 50 (Julia Lane et al. ed. 2014) (discussing
reidentification in manner consistent with plaintiffs’
complaint). Google alleges (Supp. Br. 13–14) multiple searches are required for reidentification, but their
analysis ignores (Supp. Br. 4–5) that IP addresses
2
Petitioners mistakenly cite (Supp. Br. 21) to the Second
Amended Complaint, Dkt. 39 ¶¶ 42–83. A better citation is the
later Consolidated Complaint, Dkt. 50 ¶¶ 56–98, found at Gaos
Supp. Br. App. 25a–43a, but even the less detailed Second
Amended Complaint demonstrates the point.
5
frequently disclose location and are readily crossreferenced with other collections of aggregated user
data. Gaos Supp. Br. 18–19; Pet. Supp. Br. 22; cf.
Jennifer Valentino-deVries et al., Your Apps Know
Where You Were Last Night, and They’re Not Keeping
It Secret, N.Y. Times (Dec. 10, 2018).
Perhaps Google and the government would be
proven correct about all of these particular factual
contentions after a full trial or even a summary
judgment motion. And the individualized nature of
proof certainly raises severe questions about class
certification for trial. But the plaintiffs’ allegations
are not “so insubstantial, implausible, foreclosed by
prior decisions of this Court or otherwise completely
devoid of merit as not to involve a federal controversy
within the jurisdiction of the District Court, whatever
may be the ultimate resolution of the federal issues on
the merits” and that is all that is needed to satisfy
jurisdiction at the complaint stage. Oneida Indian
Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 666–67
(1974) (cleaned up).
II. Google’s arguments
legislative power fail.
for
limiting
the
1. Google proposes (Supp. Br. 20–21) that commonlaw privacy torts are of too recent a vintage to generate
standing. If so, it would be an extraordinary consequence that Spokeo divested Congress of any power to
create a private cause of action for privacy violations
delineating the rights and obligations in the use of new
technologies—but permitted Congress to federalize
largely obsolete torts like the use of interstate communications in seduction or alienation of affections.
Cf. Kyle Graham, Why Torts Die, 35 Fla. St. L. Rev.
359 (2008). Such a reading of Spokeo would have
repercussions in labor law as well (Pet. Supp. Br. 18),
6
and might even undo portions of modern civil-rights
law. Compare, e.g., Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v.
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (containing no common-law
standing analysis) with Upton Sinclair, The Jungle
(1906) (protesting turn-of-century working conditions
including, inter alia, lack of remedy for sexual
harassment). It would nullify 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511 and
2520, which impose per se statutory liability of
at least $10,000 for disclosing illegally intercepted
electronic communications—even if the cell-phone
conversation is about men’s shoes. Indeed, the more
important the disclosed illegally intercepted conversation, the more likely it is to be protected by the
First Amendment and immune from liability. Cf.
Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001).
Fortunately, the Court need not reach these questions, because Google’s premise is incorrect. Warren
& Brandeis simply occasioned a change in semantics
(from “property” and “confidence” to “privacy”). It did
not create new substance out of whole cloth:
the principle which has been applied to protect these rights is in reality not the principle
of private property, unless that word be used
in an extended and unusual sense. The
principle which protects personal writings
and other productions of the intellect or of
the emotions, is the right to privacy, and the
law has no new principle to formulate when
it extends this protection to the personal
appearance, sayings, acts, and to personal
relations, domestic or otherwise.
Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right
to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193, 213 (1890). Strictliability privacy claims are an extension of commonlaw trespass. See Olmstead v. United States, 277
7
U.S. 438, 487 (1928) (Butler, J., dissenting) (“The
communications belong to the parties between whom
they pass.”). After all, any violation of privacy—even
a surreptitiously-filmed sex tape—is simply the
disclosure of true facts one would rather have hidden.
The privacy right simply assigns the default property
ownership in those images to the subjects, rather than
the witnesses. The Spokeo analysis does not obviate
privacy torts; any reading of Spokeo that requires that
result is self-refuting.
2. Google argues (Supp. Br. 10) that the complaint
does not allege “pecuniary injury, emotional distress,
or any other potential concrete harm.” But as with
common-law claims, the violation of the legal statutory duty owed plaintiff herself can itself be the harm.
Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1551 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Anyway, the direct allegation was “privacy harm.”
Gaos Supp. Br. App. 40a–43a. And specifically,
Italiano alleged that his queries were “personal,
confidential searches that he did not want disclosed to
third parties without his knowledge or consent.” Id.
45a.
Google’s position cannot be reconciled with other
precedents where recent innovative federal statutes
permitted suit for intangible injury and this Court not
only found standing, but permitted the case to go
forward on the merits. Pet. Supp. Br. 19. For
example, testers who had no intention of actually
renting from defendants had standing to sue under the
Fair Housing Act solely for being given inaccurate
information about the rental market, even when they
knew the information they were to receive would be
inaccurate. Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455
U.S. 363 (1982).
8
3. “[T]he point is not that [plaintiff’s] harm would
have been actionable at common law. The inquiry
under Spokeo is whether the alleged harm bears a
‘close relationship’ to one actionable at common law.”
Muransky v. Godiva Chocolatier, Inc., 905 F.3d 1200,
1211 (11th Cir. 2018). Thus, many of Google’s and
the government’s arguments are simply beside the
point. The breach of confidentiality tort, unlike the
public disclosure tort, “focuses on the source and
protects confidential information without regard to
the degree of its offensiveness.” Neil M. Richards &
Daniel J. Solove, Privacy’s Other Path: Recovering the
Law of Confidentiality, 96 Geo. L.J. 123, 175 (2007)
(cleaned up). Nothing in Spokeo requires judges to
act as gatekeepers and legislate whether a privacy
violation is offensive enough for Congress to act.
4. Google argues (Supp. Br. 19–20) that Justice
Story’s jurisprudence (discussed at Gaos Supp. Br. 7–
12 and Pet. Supp. Br. 8–11) dealt with copyright and
property, rather than privacy. But Folsom v. Marsh
recognized the independent interest in trust and
confidence distinguishing “mere breach of confidence
or contract” from “violation of the exclusive copyright
of the writer.” 9 F. Cas. 342, 346 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841).
“The cases discussed above might be read as intellectual property cases, yet they were often based on
two rationales—property and breach of confidence.”
Richards & Solove, 96 Geo. L.J. at 138; see also Warren
& Brandeis, 4 Harv. L. Rev. at 211 (distinguishing
between breach of confidence actions and the “theory
of property,” the latter being necessary “in granting a
remedy against a stranger”).
The right of confidence was the progenitor of modern
privacy rights, existing “long before Warren and
Brandeis published their article.” Richards & Solove,
9
96 Geo. L.J. at 133; see also Muransky, 905 F.3d at
1209 (grounding standing to assert statutory FCRA
claims in traditional common-law right of action
for breach of confidence). One aspect of the right of
confidence is the protection for confidential communications, a right that has existed in this country from
its inception as early American legislators enshrined
that principle into regulation of the U.S. Postal
Service. Anuj C. Desai, Wiretapping Before the Wires:
The Post Office and the Birth of Communications
Privacy, 60 Stan. L. Rev. 553, 558 (2007); see also
Richards & Solove, 96 Geo. L.J. at 140–45. The
Stored Communications Act extended that time-tested
principle of confidence to electronic modes of communication on the theory that “[f]or the person or business
whose records are involved, the privacy or proprietary
interest in that information should not change” simply
because technology is changing. S. Rep. No. 99-541,
at 3 (1986).
And even if Google were correct that privacy
sounded solely in property, plaintiffs also bring their
complaint on a theory of a property interest. Gaos
Supp. Br. App. 54a–56a.
5. Google’s request for a “clear statement” rule
(Supp. Br. 22), as it interprets it, would have dramatic
retroactive effect on decades of settled legislative
expectations. Neither Google nor the government
contend that the legislative history and context for the
SCA fail to “identify the injury it seeks to vindicate
and relate the injury to the class of persons entitled
to bring suit.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 580 (Kennedy,
J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
Here, unlike in a copyright case (Kirtsaeng v. John
Wiley & Sons, Inc., 568 U.S. 519 (2013)), Congress was
legislating in a new area where there were no default
10
rules, and wanted to provide a new structural framework defining the scope of the property rights. Pet.
Supp. Br. 12–13.
It is especially ironic that Google, having ignored the
legislative history providing a reasonably clear statement of Congress’s purpose, then goes on to suggest
(Supp. Br. 23) that the “aggrieved” language in the
SCA evidences Congress’s limited concern. As Google
admits (Supp. Br. 23 n.9), FEC v. Akins interpreted
“aggrieved” to “cast the standing net broadly—beyond
the common-law interests and substantive statutory
rights upon which ‘prudential’ standing traditionally
rested.” 524 U.S. 11, 19 (1998). This Court declined
to construe “person aggrieved” in an “artificially narrow” way; rather it adopted a “zone of interests” test
“enabling suit by any plaintiff with an interest
arguably sought to be protected by the statutes.”
Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, L.P., 562 U.S. 170,
177–78 (2011) (cleaned up). Most recently, relying
on the stare decisis of its pre-Akins cases, this Court
interpreted “person aggrieved” language in the Fair
Housing Act broadly to cover municipalities. Bank
of Am. Corp. v. City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. 1296
(2017). Furthermore, the language is “any … person
aggrieved.” 18 U.S.C. § 2707(a) (emphasis added).
“Any” is a qualifier of maximum breadth. SAS Inst.
Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1354 (2018).
The whole issue appears to be a red herring. The
Spokeo elevation inquiry attempts to discern what
interests concerned Congress, not who Congress has
permitted to enforce those interests.
The reason that Spokeo held the FCRA “did not
categorically give rise to concrete injury” (U.S. Supp.
Br. 16) is that the FCRA contains both procedural and
substantive components. Pet. Supp. Br. 11–12. The
11
SCA protections at issue here are only substantive.
Id. The government’s position (Supp. Br. 11–12) that
the FCRA expressed a more robust judgment about
extending rights than the SCA is dubious at best.
6. The government claims (Supp. Br. 16) that
common-law privacy torts do not impose per se
liability, but rather require an additional showing of
harm, yet the government’s very next sentence—a
parenthetical quoting Restatement § 652H—refutes
the proposition. The Restatement authorizes damages for a plaintiff’s “harm to his interest in privacy.”
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652H (1977). If the
SCA violations alleged here do not categorically give
rise to concrete injury (U.S. Supp. Br. 16), that is again
a problem of the merits as in Doe v. Chao.
CONCLUSION
Google concedes (Supp. Br. 8) the pleading standard
should apply. If so, at least named plaintiff Italiano
has sufficiently pled concrete injury. But if the Court
requires a greater showing than Italiano has made to
date, then petitioners believe that plaintiffs should be
able to demonstrate standing with § 1653 amendments and affidavits.
Respectfully submitted,
THEODORE H. FRANK
Counsel of Record
MELISSA HOLYOAK
ANNA ST. JOHN
ADAM EZRA SCHULMAN
COMPETITIVE ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE
1310 L St., N.W., 7th Floor
Washington, D.C. 20005
(202) 331-2263
tfrank@gmail.com
Counsel for Petitioners
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.