Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Christopher Colman Chambers, Petitioner v. United States

Supreme Court briefMay 21, 2018

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

CHRISTOPHER COLMAN CHAMBERS,

Petitioner,

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

Julia L. O’Connell

Federal Public Defender

Stephen J. Greubel

(Counsel of Record)

Assistant Federal Public Defender

stephen_greubel@fd.org

Office of Federal Public Defender

Northern District of Oklahoma

One West Third Street, Ste. 1225

Tulsa, OK 74103

(918) 581-7656

fax (918) 581-7630

Counsel for Petitioner

May 21, 2018

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

On review of a search warrant affidavit, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals

assumed a deficiency of probable cause without deciding the issue and applied the

good-faith analysis of United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), to conclude that the

affidavit provided a minimally sufficient nexus between the place to be searched and

the suspected criminal activity.

Issue presented: Where the body of a search warrant affidavit failed to connect

the suspected illegal activity to the specific address to be searched, were the additional

facts within the body of the affidavit sufficient to provide a minimally sufficient nexus

that warranted application of the good-faith exception.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii

PREVIOUS OPINIONS AND ORDERS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

JURISDICTION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

APPLICABLE LEGAL PROVISION.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

DISTRICT COURT PROCEEDINGS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Motion to Suppress.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Statement of Facts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

DIRECT APPEAL.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

REASON FOR GRANTING A WRIT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

CONCLUSION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

ATTACHED EXHIBITS:

EXHIBIT 1: United States v. Chambers, 882 F.3d 1305 (10th Cir. 2018)

EXHIBIT 2: Judgment in United States v. Chambers (Tenth Circuit)

EXHIBIT 3: Opinion and Order (Northern District of Oklahoma)

EXHIBIT 4: Judgment in a Criminal Case (Northern District of Oklahoma)

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Page

United States v. Biglow, 562 F.3d 1272 (10th Cir. 2009) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

United States v. Chambers, 882 F.3d 1305 (10th Cir. 2018) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

United States v. Gonzales, 399 F.3d 1225 (10th Cir. 2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 6

United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

United States v. Roach, 582 F.3d 1192 (10th Cir. 2009) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-6

Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Zurcher v. Standford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Statutes and Federal Rules

Page

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

28 U.S.C. § 1291 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Supreme Court Rules

Page

S. Ct. R. 10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

U.S. Constitution

Page

U.S. Const., Amend IV. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

PREVIOUS OPINIONS AND ORDERS

In United States v. Chambers, 882 F.3d 1305 (10th Cir. 2018), the United States

Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit issued an Opinion denying a direct appeal in

which the Petitioner was the Appellant/Defendant. See Exhibit 1 (attached hereto).

This Petition seeks issuance of a writ of certiorari to the Tenth Circuit Court of

Appeals in regard to its decision.

Chambers affirmed a Judgment in a Criminal Case filed in the United States

District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma, in United States v. Christopher

Colman Chambers, Case No. 16-CR-118-JHP. See Exhibits 3 and 4 (attached hereto).

JURISDICTION

The Tenth Circuit reviewed the district court’s order denying Petitioner’s

Motion to Suppress under the authority of 28 U.S.C. § 1291. On February 27, 2018,

the Tenth Circuit filed the Opinion now presented for review. Exhibit 1 (attached

hereto). The Petitioner did not file for rehearing. A final judgment was entered.

Exhibit 2 (attached hereto).

Jurisdiction for a writ of certiorari lies in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§1254(1), applicable to cases in the courts of appeals, which permits a writ of certiorari

to be “granted upon the petition of any party to any civil or criminal case, before or

after rendition of judgment or decree.” Petitioner was the Appellant in the Opinion

now submitted for review.

APPLICABLE LEGAL PROVISION

U.S. Constitution, Amendment IV:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,

and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be

violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,

supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the

place to be searched, and the person or things to be seized.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

1. DISTRICT COURT PROCEEDINGS

Mr. Chambers was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2)

(felon in possession of firearms and ammunition) after pleading guilty to the single

count indictment in the Northern District of Oklahoma, Case No. 16-CR-118-JHP.

The plea was conditional, reserving the right to appeal an adverse ruling on a motion

to suppress. The motion asserted that Mr. Chambers’ Fourth Amendment rights were

violated, requiring suppression of firearms and ammunition illegally seized during a

search of his home. The district court issued an order denying the motion. Exhibit 3

(attached hereto).

The district court sentenced Mr. Chambers to 30 months in custody and

committed him to the U.S. Bureau of Prisons.

Motion to Suppress

In his motion to suppress, Mr. Chambers argued that the affidavit in support of

search warrant lacked probable cause because it failed to tie the residence to be

searched with the facts proffered in support of probable cause to search.

Mr.

Chambers further argued that the good-faith exception of United States v. Leon, 468

U.S. 897 (1984), was inapplicable because the affidavit was so lacking in indicia of

probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.

The affidavit sought a warrant to search 11470 S. 4210 Road (hereinafter

referred to as “the Foyil residence”). The Foyil residence was particularly described

and its location was set out with specificity. However, the remainder of the affidavit

failed to explain why or how the Foyil residence was connected to any of the criminal

activity described within the body of the affidavit. In other words, there was no nexus.

After describing the illegal drug activities of two other individuals sufficient to

establish probable cause to search, the affidavit stated that a confidential informant

was able to give directions to the residence where those individuals resided. The

affidavit stated that “[t]he address is known as

.” The affidavit was simply blank.

There was no address. There was nothing that connected the confidential informant’s

statement concerning his knowledge of the residency of the individuals to the specific

home (the Foyil residence) for which the search warrant was being sought.

To be constitutional, a warrant must set forth a “nexus ... between the item to be

seized and criminal behavior.” Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294,

307 (1967). In other words, there must be a relationship between the items sought and

the place law enforcement requests to search for them. See Zurcher v. Standford

Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 556 (1978)(“The critical element in a reasonable search is not

that the owner of property is suspected of crime but that there is reasonable cause to

believe that the specific ‘things’ to be searched for and seized are located on the

property to which entry is sought.”); United States v. Biglow, 562 F.3d 1272, 1279

(10th Cir. 2009)(“[W]e have indicated that a sufficient nexus is established once an

affidavit describes circumstances which would warrant a person of reasonable caution

in the belief that the articles sought are at a particular place.” (internal quotation marks

omitted)).

Mr. Chambers argued that Leon’s good-faith exception was inapplicable and

that the case should be directly controlled by United States v. Gonzales, 399 F.3d 1225

(10th Cir. 2005), a case in which the Tenth Circuit declined to apply the good-faith

exception because the affidavit provided no facts linking the address of the place to be

searched with the suspect or the suspected criminal activity and failed to explain why

the affiant thought evidence would be found there.

The district court denied the motion to suppress, finding that the affidavit

provided probable cause and that, even if it did not, the officers’ reliance on the

affidavit was justified by Leon’s good-faith exception.

Statement of Facts

The facts are not in dispute, as noted in the appellate briefs of both parties.

Relying on the August 6, 2016, affidavit of Rogers County, Oklahoma, Deputy

Sheriff Quint Tucker, a state district judge issued a search warrant authorizing a search

of the Foyil residence. That same day, law enforcement officers also obtained arrest

warrants for Kevin Chambers (Mr. Chambers’ brother) and Charity Drozd (the

girlfriend of Kevin Chambers) (hereinafter referred to as “the pair”). The arrest

warrants resulted from an investigation of the pair and others who were believed to be

involved in the distribution of methamphetamine. Mr. Chambers was not a suspect in

that investigation, and no warrant had been issued for his arrest.

On the morning of August 8, 2016, law enforcement officers arrived at the

Foyil residence, informed Mr. Chambers that they had a search warrant for his

residence, and – after conducting a protective sweep and detaining the occupants of

the home – executed the search warrant. During their search of the Foyil residence,

law enforcement officers recovered seven firearms and 1,386 rounds of ammunition.

Mr. Chambers, a convicted felon, was arrested at the scene.

2. DIRECT APPEAL

On direct appeal, Mr. Chambers presented the Fourth Amendment claim that he

preserved in district court.

In its Opinion, the court of appeals declined to review the district court’s

determination of probable cause and proceeded to an analysis of the good-faith

exception. The court of appeals found that even though the body of the affidavit

omitted the address of the place to be searched, its remaining content nonetheless

established a minimally sufficient nexus between evidence of the illegal activity and

the place to be searched.

Despite its failure to specify the Address in the Residence Identified

paragraph, the affidavit adequately connected the Pair’s criminal activity

to the Address because it established that (1) in Deputy Tucker’s

experience, methamphetamine dealers–like the Pair–keep items at their

residences related to distributing the drug; (2) the Pair resided in Mr.

Chambers’s home; and (3) Mr. Chambers’s home was located at 11470

S. 4210 Road.

...

Deputy Tucker’s affidavit ... provided a sufficient factual basis for

concluding that the Pair resided with Mr. Chambers and that Mr.

Chambers’s home was located at the Address, even though it did not

explicitly say so in the Residence Identified paragraph. ... The CI, who

had been a reliable source for officers in previous cases, “was able to

give directions to the residence he knew Kevin and Charity to live.” ...

Officers then verified that this “address ... belong[ed] to Kevin’s brother

Christopher Chambers from previous encounters with law enforcement.”

The court of appeals concluded that the facts in Mr. Chambers’ case were more

comparable to those in United States v. Roach, 582 F.3d 1192 (10th Cir. 2009), rather

than to those in United States v. Gonzales, 399 F.3d 1225 (10th Cir. 2005).

Ultimately the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court judgment.

REASON FOR GRANTING A WRIT

This Petition concerns the Tenth Circuit misapplication of a properly stated rule

of law. Though the affidavit contained the additional matters cited in the Tenth

Circuit opinion (the pair resided in Mr. Chambers’ home, the CI was able to give

directions to Mr. Chambers’ home, and officers verified the address belonged to Mr.

Chambers), the affidavit failed to establish that that home was the same home for

which the warrant was being sought.

Review on a writ of certiorari is a matter of judicial discretion, and Mr.

Chambers acknowledges that “[a] petition for a writ of certiorari is rarely granted

when the asserted error consists of ... the misapplication of a properly stated rule of

law.” S. Ct. R. 10. Nonetheless, Mr. Chambers argues that a writ should be granted in

this case to clarify the amount of supporting facts necessary for establishing a nexus

that is sufficient to invoke Leon’s good-faith exception.

CONCLUSION

Certiorari review is discretionary, but appropriate. The Petitioner seeks reversal

of the Opinion and remand to the Tenth Circuit with instructions to apply the Fourth

Amendment standards and to recognize that the exclusionary rule is applicable

Respectfully submitted,

s/Stephen J. Greubel

Stephen J. Greubel

Okla. Bar. Assn. No. 10659

Assistant Federal Public Defender

stephen_greubel@fd.org

Counsel of Record for Petitioner

Julia L. O’Connell

Okla. Bar Assn. No. 13882

Federal Public Defender

Office of Federal Public Defender

Northern District Oklahoma

1 West 3rd St, Ste. 1225

Tulsa, Oklahoma 74103

(918) 581-7656

EXHIBIT 1:

United States v. Chambers, 882 F.3d 1305 (10th Cir. 2018)

Appellate Case: 17-5046

Document: 01019950438

Date Filed: 02/27/2018

PUBLISH

Page: 1

FILED

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

February 27, 2018

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

_________________________________

Elisabeth A. Shumaker

Clerk of Court

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

No. 17-5046

CHRISTOPHER COLMAN CHAMBERS,

Defendant - Appellant.

_________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Oklahoma

(No. 16-CR-118-JHP-2)

_________________________________

Stephen J. Greubel, Senior Litigator (Julia L. O’Connell, Federal Public Defender, Office

of the Federal Public Defender, with him on the briefs), Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Defendant

- Appellant.

Leena Alam, Assistant United States Attorney (Loretta F. Radford, Acting United States

Attorney, and Janet S. Reincke, Assistant United States Attorney, with her on the brief),

Office of the United States Attorney for the Northern District of Oklahoma, Tulsa,

Oklahoma, for Plaintiff - Appellee.

_________________________________

Before MATHESON, BALDOCK, and EID, Circuit Judges.

_________________________________

MATHESON, Circuit Judge.

_________________________________

Appellate Case: 17-5046

Document: 01019950438

Date Filed: 02/27/2018

Page: 2

Christopher Chambers was indicted on one count of being a felon in possession of

firearms and ammunition under 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). Law enforcement

officers from Rogers County, Oklahoma discovered the firearms after searching his home

pursuant to a search warrant. They had been investigating Kevin Chambers

(Christopher’s brother) and Charity Drozd (collectively, “the Pair”), who were suspected

of selling methamphetamine and were residing at Christopher Chambers’s home.1

After he was indicted, Mr. Chambers moved to suppress the firearms evidence.

He argued the affidavit submitted in support of the search warrant application failed to

establish probable cause and that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule did not

apply. The district court rejected these arguments and denied the motion. Mr. Chambers

pled guilty, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his suppression motion, which he

has done here.

Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm. The affidavit

established a minimally sufficient nexus between the place to be searched and the

suspected criminal activity to make the officers’ reliance on the warrant reasonable.

I. BACKGROUND

A. The Investigation and Search

1. Officers’ Investigation of the Pair

On August 1, 2016, Rogers County officers monitored communication between

the Pair and a confidential police informant (the “CI”). The Pair told the CI they were

We refer to Defendant - Appellant Christopher Chambers as Mr. Chambers.

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returning to Rogers County from Tulsa with methamphetamine. Ms. Drozd said they

could not deliver drugs to him that night because they needed to make other customer

deliveries. Officers arranged with the CI to make a controlled buy from the Pair on the

next day.

The next morning, the Pair texted and called the CI, stating they had awakened

and would meet him soon. The three met and the CI bought one gram of

methamphetamine from the Pair for $100. Law enforcement officers also monitored their

communication before and during the transaction. At the meeting, the Pair bragged to the

CI about how much methamphetamine they had. After the transaction, officers met the

CI to debrief him and to secure the drugs, which tested positive as methamphetamine.

The CI gave directions to where the Pair lived. The officers in turn confirmed that

the location belonged to Kevin Chambers’s brother, Mr. Chambers, based on their

previous encounters with him.

2. The Search of Mr. Chambers’s Home

On August 6, 2016, Rogers County Deputy Sheriff Quaint Tucker prepared an

affidavit to search 11470 S. 4210 Road (“the Address”), Mr. Chambers’s residence. A

Rogers County District Judge signed the search warrant, which authorized officers to

seize methamphetamine and other items related to drug dealing. On August 8, 2016,

officers searched Mr. Chambers’s home. They encountered the Pair and Mr. Chambers

and detained them outside. In the home, they discovered seven firearms loaded with

ammunition. They also recovered marijuana, methamphetamine, and drug paraphernalia.

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Mr. Chambers was indicted for being a felon in possession of firearms and ammunition

under 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). He had nine prior felonies.

B. The Affidavit

Deputy Tucker’s nine-page affidavit listed the Address on the first page and

contained aerial photos of the property on the first two pages, including a label stating

“Residence to be searched” and an arrow pointing to the location. The affidavit

addressed four subjects: (1) a description of the property and items to be seized, (2)

Deputy Tucker’s training and experience, (3) drug traffickers’ common practices, and (4)

facts to establish probable cause.2 The fourth part was based mostly on information from

two sources: Deputy Tucker and the CI.

First, based on “his training and experience both formal and informal,” ROA, Vol.

I at 85, and information from the investigation, Deputy Tucker said the Pair likely:

 are“career criminal [sic] involved in the possession of narcotics.” Id.

 “will keep and store items, like those sought in this affidavit, at their

residence.” Id.

The affidavit is reproduced in the Appendix. Each part is briefly described

below:

(1) Description of the property and items to be seized - The address, description,

photos, directions, and items to be seized—such as methamphetamine and drug

paraphernalia.

(2) Deputy Tucker’s training and experience - Length of employment, hours of

training, and number of narcotics investigations.

(3) Drug traffickers’ common practices - Officer Tucker stated that “[d]rug

distributors/traffickers commonly maintain books, records, receipts, notes, ledgers,

and other documents.” ROA, Vol. I at 82.

(4) Facts to establish probable cause - Information about the investigation, reliability

of the CI, and the Pair’s residence.

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

“will store evidence, such as that sought in this affidavit, throughout their

property.” Id.



“will have in their residence and surrounding property items used to ingest

methamphetamine” and items for methamphetamine distribution. Id. at 8586.

Second, the affidavit included facts about the CI’s interactions with the Pair on

August 1 and 2, 2016. It also included:

 Kevin Chambers’s statement to the CI about encountering the police in July

2016 at a bank drive-thru when he was carrying methamphetamine.

 The following paragraph on the eighth page titled “Residence Identified”:

[The CI] was able to give directions to the residence

he knew Kevin and Charity to live. Investigators were

able to confirm the address to belong to Kevin’s

brother Christopher Chambers from previous

encounters with law enforcement. The address is

known as.

Id. at 85. The paragraph ended without stating the address of the residence.3

Finally, the affidavit included a statement from officers verifying the reliability of

the CI, describing his help in previous cases that led to the seizure of eight pounds of

methamphetamine and other illicit items.4

We refer to this paragraph as the “Residence Identified paragraph.”

The affidavit stated that officers had verified information that the CI provided

about the Pair. For example, officers had corroborated from the police log the CI’s

statement that “Kevin had bragged to him about being awoken by a deputy in the month

of July 2016 asleep in a bank drive through.” ROA, Vol. I at 84.

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C. The Motion to Suppress

Mr. Chambers moved to suppress the firearms and ammunition evidence. He

argued the affidavit did not establish probable cause and the good-faith exception did not

apply because the affidavit failed to tie evidence of the Pair’s criminal activity to the

Address. The magistrate judge concluded in a Report and Recommendation (“R&R”)

that the motion should be granted. The Government objected, stating there was enough

factual support linking the evidence of criminal activity to the Address.

The district court rejected the magistrate judge’s R&R and denied Mr. Chambers’s

motion. It concluded the affidavit sufficiently connected information about the criminal

activity to the location to be searched both (1) to provide probable cause and (2) to justify

the application of the good-faith exception. United States v. Chambers, No. 16-CR-118JHP, 2016 WL 7429441, at *5 (N.D. Okla. Dec. 23, 2016)

Mr. Chambers next entered into a plea agreement. He pled guilty to the sole count

of the indictment, but reserved the right to appeal the district court’s denial of his motion

to suppress.

II. DISCUSSION

Mr. Chambers challenges the district court’s rulings regarding probable cause and

the good-faith exception. We review only the latter. “We have previously taken this

approach of assuming a deficiency [of probable cause] without deciding the issue and

applying Leon [good-faith analysis.]” United States v. Potts, 586 F.3d 823, 832 (10th

Cir. 2009); see also United States v. Quezada-Enriquez, 567 F.3d 1228, 1230 (10th Cir.

2009).

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As explained below, we affirm the district court’s ruling on the good-faith

exception because officers conducting the search could have relied in objective good faith

on the search warrant.

A. Standard of Review

“Determinations relating to the . . . the applicability of the good-faith exception are

conclusions of law . . . which this court reviews de novo.” United States v. Danhauer,

229 F.3d 1002, 1005 (10th Cir. 2000). “In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress,

this court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and upholds

the district court’s factual findings unless clearly erroneous.” Id.5

B. Legal Background

1. The Exclusionary Rule and the Leon Good-Faith Exception

The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from “unreasonable searches and

seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. To authorize a valid search under the Fourth

Amendment, “[a] search warrant must be supported by probable cause, requiring more

than mere suspicion but less evidence than is necessary to convict.” Danhauer, 229 F.3d

at 1005 (quotations omitted).

“Ordinarily, courts will remedy a Fourth Amendment violation by invoking the

exclusionary rule to exclude the Government’s introduction of the unlawfully seized

evidence as direct evidence against the defendant in a criminal prosecution.” United

States v. Herrera, 444 F.3d 1238, 1248 (10th Cir. 2006). But if a search warrant is later

Both parties agree that there are no facts in dispute. See Aplt. Br. at 5 (“The

underlying facts are not in issue.”); Aplee. Br. at 1 (same).

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found to lack probable cause, evidence seized “does not necessarily have to be

suppressed.” United States v. Riccardi, 405 F.3d 852, 863 (10th Cir. 2005). In United

States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), the Supreme Court recognized the “good-faith

exception” to the exclusionary rule.

“Under the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule, if a warrant is not

supported by probable cause, the evidence seized pursuant to the warrant need not be

suppressed if the executing officer acted with an objective good-faith belief . . . .” United

States v. Edwards, 813 F.3d 953, 970 (10th Cir. 2015) (quotations omitted); see also

Leon, 468 U.S. at 922. Reliance upon a warrant issued by a neutral magistrate creates a

“presumption . . . [that] the officer is acting in good faith.” United States v. Cardall, 773

F.2d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1985) (citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 925-26).

2. No Good-Faith Exception when the Affidavit Lacks Indicia of Probable Cause

The good-faith presumption is not absolute. See Danhauer, 229 F.3d at 1007

(noting exceptions to the presumption). An “officer’s reliance on the defective warrant

still must be objectively reasonable.” United States v. Russian, 848 F.3d 1239, 1246

(10th Cir. 2017). An officer’s reliance is objectively unreasonable when the warrant is

based on an affidavit “so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief

in its existence entirely unreasonable.” Leon, 468 U.S. at 923 (quotations omitted).6

The Leon Court also specified three other situations when an officer’s reliance

would be objectively unreasonable: (1) the affiant knowingly or recklessly misled the

issuing magistrate regarding information material to the probable cause determination;

(2) the magistrate judge “wholly abandoned his judicial role;” and (3) the warrant was

“so facially deficient—i.e., in failing to particularize the place to be searched or the

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An affidavit lacks indicia of probable cause when it does not contain factual

support. “When we consider whether the officer relied in good faith upon a warrant, we

must look to the underlying documents to see whether they are devoid of factual support,

not merely whether the facts they contain are legally sufficient.” Cardall, 773 F.2d at

1133; see United States v. Augustine, 742 F.3d 1258, 1263 (10th Cir. 2014). An affidavit

devoid of factual support is “one that merely states suspicions, beliefs, or conclusions,

without providing some underlying factual circumstances regarding veracity, reliability,

and basis of knowledge.” United States v. Roach, 582 F.3d 1192, 1204-05 (10th Cir.

2009).

The affidavit does not have to be a model of specificity. See United States v.

Henderson, 595 F.3d 1198, 1202 (10th Cir. 2010). “An affidavit has enough factual

support to justify reliance if it establishes a minimally sufficient nexus between the illegal

activity and the place to be searched.” Id. (emphasis added) (quotations omitted).

C. Analysis

We review only the district court’s application of the Leon good-faith exception.

The court concluded the exception applied because the affidavit established a minimally

sufficient nexus between evidence of the illegal activity and the place to be searched. On

appeal, Mr. Chambers argues the affidavit’s omission of the Address in the Residence

Identified paragraph rendered the affidavit devoid of factual support and precluded goodfaith reliance on the warrant.

things to be seized—that the executing officers [could not] reasonably presume it to be

valid.” Leon, 468 U.S. at 923.

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To justify a search of the Address, the affidavit needed to present evidence

connecting the Pair’s criminal activity and the Address, which in this case involved three

steps. The affidavit was supposed to show probable cause that (1) the Pair’s home would

likely contain evidence of their criminal activity, (2) the Pair lived at Mr. Chambers’s

home, and (3) Mr. Chambers’s home was located at the Address. Mr. Chambers contests

the second and third steps. Although the affidavit listed 11470 S. 4210 Road on its first

page, he argues the Address’s omission from the Residence Identified paragraph severed

any connection between the Pair and his home or between his home and the Address.

Without such a connection, he contends the affidavit lacked a minimally sufficient nexus

between evidence of the Pair’s criminal activity and the place to be searched.

We disagree with this argument. Deputy Tucker’s affidavit was not devoid of

factual support. Contrary to Mr. Chambers’s assertions, the affidavit linked the Pair to

Mr. Chambers’s home and linked his home to the Address. It was objectively reasonable

for the officers who searched Mr. Chambers’s home to rely on the warrant.

1. Deputy Tucker’s Affidavit Was Not Devoid of Factual Support

Deputy Tucker’s affidavit established a minimally sufficient nexus between the

criminal activity and the place to be searched. Despite its failure to specify the Address

in the Residence Identified paragraph, the affidavit adequately connected the Pair’s

criminal activity to the Address because it established that (1) in Deputy Tucker’s

experience, methamphetamine dealers—like the Pair—keep items at their residences

related to distributing the drug; (2) the Pair resided in Mr. Chambers’s home; and (3) Mr.

Chambers’s home was located at 11470 S. 4210 Road. See ROA, Vol. I at 78-86.

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Mr. Chambers argues the omission of the Address in the Residence Identified

paragraph “rendered the warrant so lacking in any indicia of probable cause that the

officers’ belief in its existence was entirely unreasonable.” Aplt. Br. at 10. He contends

that the “affidavit . . . lacked any factual basis whatsoever to support the belief that [the

Pair] resided at [Mr. Chambers’s home].” Aplt. Br. at 32. He further argues “[the

Address] is not identified as that of Christopher Chambers.” Aplt. Br. 11-12.

Deputy Tucker’s affidavit, however, provided a sufficient factual basis for

concluding that the Pair resided with Mr. Chambers and that Mr. Chambers’s home was

located at the Address, even though it did not explicitly say so in the Residence Identified

paragraph. An affidavit is not generally devoid of factual support if it provides

“underlying factual circumstances regarding veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge”

to support its assertions. Roach, 582 F.3d at 1204-05. Here, the affidavit did so. The CI,

who had been a reliable source for officers in previous cases, “was able to give directions

to the residence he knew Kevin and Charity to live.” ROA, Vol. I at 85. Officers then

verified that this “address . . . belong[ed] to Kevin’s brother Christopher Chambers from

previous encounters with law enforcement.” Id.

The warrant was not based on an affidavit that “merely states suspicions, beliefs,

or conclusions.” Roach, 582 F.3d at 1204-05. It adequately linked the Pair’s criminal

activity to the place to be searched.

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2. Deputy Tucker’s Affidavit Had More Factual Support than the Affidavit in

Gonzales

Mr. Chambers argues that this “appeal should be directly controlled by United

States v. Gonzales,” a case in which we declined to apply the good-faith exception. Aplt.

Br. at 32 (citing United States v. Gonzales, 399 F.3d 1225 (10th Cir. 2005)). We disagree

because the affidavit in this case contains more factual support than the one in Gonzales.

a. United States v. Gonzales

In Gonzales, after law enforcement officers found live ammunition in the

defendant’s car, they decided to obtain a search warrant for defendant’s home. Id. at

1228. The affidavit (1) stated the defendant was a convicted felon; (2) reported the

discovery of ammunition in the defendant’s car; (3) stated that based on the affiant’s

experience and training, the defendant would likely keep firearms at his residence; and

(4) identified the place to be searched as 321 E. Church. Id. at 1227-28, 1230. We held

that the good-faith exception did not apply because the affidavit failed to connect the

place to be searched with the defendant. Id. at 1231.

The panel said the affidavit lacked a “minimal nexus between the place to be

searched and the suspected criminal activity.” Id. The affidavit “listed the address of the

place to be searched . . . . [but] there were no facts explaining how the address was linked

to [the defendant] . . . or the suspected criminal activity.” Id. at 1230. Rather, the “only

attempt at a connection was the detective’s assertion that in his experience” firearms are

often kept at residences. Id.

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b. Deputy Tucker’s affidavit compared to the one in Gonzales

Unlike the affidavit in Gonzales, Deputy Tucker’s affidavit contained “facts

explaining how the address was linked to [the defendant] . . . or the suspected criminal

activity.” Id.

In Gonzales, the affidavit included the officer’s opinion that individuals often keep

firearms at their residences, and it listed an address. Without more “facts explaining how

the address was linked to [the defendant],” we rejected an inference that the listed address

was the defendant’s residence. Id. Although Deputy Tucker’s affidavit also included his

opinion that drug dealers often keep drugs and drug paraphernalia at their residences, this

statement was not the affidavit’s “only attempt at . . . connect[ing]” the Pair to the home

or the home to Mr. Chambers. Id. Rather, Deputy Tucker’s affidavit stated that the CI

provided directions to the Pair’s residence and that the authorities verified the address as

Mr. Chambers’s from their previous encounters.

Deputy Tucker’s affidavit more closely resembles the affidavit in United States v.

Roach, 582 F.3d 1192 (10th Cir. 2009), in which we determined that the search warrant

affidavit contained indicia of probable cause justifying the application of the good-faith

exception. Id. at 1204-05. The affidavit (1) identified 1441 N. Minneapolis Street as the

place to be searched and (2) stated that officers verified the defendant lived at the address

“through investigations, which included checking for utilities information, driver’s

license records, real estate records, Wichita Police Department records, tax records,

social security records, U.S. Postal Service records, interviews and/or surveillance.” Id.

at 1198. Although we determined the affidavit lacked probable cause because it did not

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specify which one of these methods law enforcement used to verify Mr. Roach lived at

the address, id. at 1203,7 “the language of the affidavit indicates that officers did so using

at least one of a list of investigatory methods, any one of which would—assuming they

were successful—provide a ‘minimal nexus’ connecting [the defendant] to the address,”

id. at 1204.

Like the affidavit in Roach, Deputy Tucker’s affidavit described the investigatory

methods used—a reliable CI’s information and independent corroboration through

officers’ previous encounters with Mr. Chambers—in determining the Pair’s residential

address. “[I]t would not be entirely unreasonable, therefore, for officers executing the

warrant to rely on the magistrate’s authorization of it.” Id. at 1204.

****

Deputy Tucker’s affidavit possessed a minimally sufficient nexus between the

place to be searched and the Pair’s criminal activity. Because the affidavit contained a

factual basis connecting the Pair to Mr. Chambers’s home and the home to the Address,

the district court properly applied the good-faith exception in this case.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s denial of Mr. Chambers’s

motion to suppress the evidence.

In addition to specifying the investigatory method, the affidavit faced other

problems that precluded our finding of probable cause, such as stale information. Roach,

582 F.3d at 1202.

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EXHIBIT 2:

Judgment in United States v. Chambers (Tenth Circuit)

Case 4:16-cr-00118-JHP Document 52 Filed in USDC ND/OK on 02/27/18 Page 1 of 3

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

EALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

_________________________________

___

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Page: 1

FILED

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

February 27, 2018

Elisabeth A. Shumaker

Clerk of Court

Plaintiff - Appellee,

CHRISTOPHER COLMAN CHAMBERS,

a/k/a Christopher C. Chambers,

No. 17-5046

(D.C. No. 4:16-CR-00118-JHP-2)

(N.D. Okla.)

Defendant - Appellant.

_________________________________

JUDGMENT

_________________________________

Before MATHESON, BALDOCK, and EID, Circuit Judges.

_________________________________

This case originated in the Northern District of Oklahoma and was argued by

counsel.

The judgment of that court is affirmed.

If defendant, Christopher Colman Chambers, was released pending appeal, the

court orders that, within 30 days of this court’s mandate being filed in District Court, the

defendant shall surrender to the United States Marshal for the Northern District of

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Oklahoma. The District Court may, however, in its discretion, permit the defendant to

surrender directly to a designated Bureau of Prisons institution for service of sentence.

Entered for the Court

ELISABETH A. SHUMAKER, Clerk

Case 4:16-cr-00118-JHP Document 52 Filed in USDC ND/OK on 02/27/18 Page 3 of 3

17-5046 United States v. Chambers "Opinion judgment filed "

(4:16-CR-00118-JHP-2)

ca10_cmecf_notify to: CM-ECFIntake_OKND

From:

ca10_cmecf_notify@ca10.uscourts.gov

To:

CM-ECFIntake_OKND@oknd.uscourts.gov

02/27/2018 09:44 AM

***NOTE TO PUBLIC ACCESS USERS*** Judicial Conference of the United States

policy permits attorneys of record and parties in a case (including pro se litigants) to

receive one free electronic copy of all documents filed electronically, if receipt is required

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Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals

Notice of Docket Activity

The following transaction was entered on 02/27/2018 at 8:43:47 AM MST and filed on

02/27/2018

United States v. Chambers

Case Name:

Case Number: 17-5046

Document(s): Document(s)

Docket Text:

[10538750] Judgment for opinion filed. [17-5046]

Notice will be electronically mailed to:

Ms. Leena Alam: leena.alam@usdoj.gov, bill.wright@usdoj.gov

Mr. Stephen James Greubel: stephen_greubel@fd.org, okn_ecf@fd.org

Ms. Janet Sue Reincke: jan.s.reincke@usdoj.gov, janreincke@att.net, theresa.craft@usdoj.gov

The following document(s) are associated with this transaction:

Document Description: Judgment

Original Filename: 17-5046.pdf

Electronic Document Stamp:

[STAMP acecfStamp_ID=1104938855 [Date=02/27/2018] [FileNumber=10538750-0]

[909d0f1df9c271db940906c16bc3e8f44a90c590ac1b24ec41347b30a0919074906758a261587f46

4a4fc36be8a8260b46057262eaf2477d5535c56706dc18d1]]

EXHIBIT 3:

Opinion and Order (Northern District of Oklahoma)

Case 4:16-cr-00118-JHP Document 25 Filed in USDC ND/OK on 12/23/16 Page 1 of 10

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

CHRISTOPHER COLMAN

CHAMBERS,

Defendant.

)

Case No. 16-CR-118-JHP

OPINION AND ORDER

On November 22, 2016, United States Magistrate Judge Frank H. McCarthy entered a

Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) in regard to Defendant’s Motion to Suppress Evidence

(Doc. No. 15). (Doc. No. 22). The Magistrate Judge recommended that Defendant’s Motion to

Suppress Evidence be granted. Plaintiff the United States of America has filed an Objection to

the Magistrate Judge’s R&R pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed. R. Crim. P. 59(b)(2).

(Doc. No. 23). On December 6, 2016, the Defendant filed a Response. (Doc. No. 24).

In its Objection to the Magistrate Judge’s R&R, Plaintiff asserts the Magistrate Judge

erred in concluding the affidavit in support of the subject warrant did not provide a sufficient

nexus between Defendant’s property and the criminal activity alleged to have been committed by

Kevin Chambers and Charity Drozd. Upon de novo review, this Court finds the Report and

Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge is not supported by the record. Accordingly, the Court

REJECTS the Report and Recommendation and DENIES Defendant’s Motion to Suppress.

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BACKGROUND

On August 6, 2016, Rogers County Deputy Quint Tucker prepared an Affidavit seeking a

search warrant for defendant’s residence at 11470 S. 4210 Rd in the Foyil area of Rogers County,

Oklahoma, in the Northern District of Oklahoma (the “Affidvait”). (See Doc. Nos. 23-1, 23-2, 233). The Affidavit contained a specific description of the property to be searched, 11470 S. 4210

Rd in the Foyil area of Rogers County (the “Residence”), specific directions to get to the

Residence, and an aerial photo of the property to be searched. (See Doc. No. 23-1, at 1-2; Doc.

Nos. 23-2, 23-3).

The following description of and directions to the property to be searched followed the

aerial photo:

Description of property to be searched: The property to be searched has two residences

on it that all occupants on the property frequent. The main residence on the property is a

single family residence. The door to this residence faces to the east towards S. 4210 Rd.

The second residence is a metal structured shop with living quarters. The door to this

residence faces south and is located directly south east of the main residence. The

residences are both located on the same property at the dead end of S. 4210 Rd.

Directions to property to be searched: From the intersection of E. 390 Rd and S. 4210

Rd in the Foyil area of Rogers County travel south on S. 4210 Rd. The road will dead end

into the driveway identified as 11470 S. 4210 Rd on the Google mapping system.

(Doc. No. 23-1, at 2).

The Affidavit details Deputy Tucker’s extensive training and experience in investigating

drug cases, as well as the common practices of unlawful drug users/distributors/traffickers of

controlled dangerous substances of which Deputy Tucker was aware. (Id. at 3-6).

The Affidavit then sets forth the following facts:

Investigators monitored conversations among Kevin Chambers, Charity Drozd, and

a confidential informant on August 1, 2016, in which Drozd told the informant that she and Kevin

Chambers “re-upped” in Tulsa and were on their way back; that they had several stops to make to

individuals who had purchased product; and it would be late before they could deliver any

methamphetamine to the informant. (Id. at 6).

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On August 2, 2016, investigators monitored text messages and phone calls among

Kevin Chambers, Drozd, and the informant, in which Kevin Chambers and Drozd stated they just

woke up and would head straight to the informant from their residence. (Id. at 7).

On August 2, 2016, investigators monitored text messages and phone calls among

Drozd, Kevin Chambers, and the informant to make arrangements to bring methamphetamine to

the informant, after which Drozd and Kevin Chambers arrived at the informant’s location and

distributed methamphetamine to the informant. (Id.).

During the August 2, 2016, transaction, Drozd and Kevin Chambers bragged to the

informant how much methamphetamine they had and were moving. Kevin Chambers told the

informant he had a large amount the night before and had run from police in the Verdigris area of

Rogers County.

After Drozd and Kevin Chambers left, investigators retrieved the

methamphetamine from the informant. (Id.).

Kevin Chambers bragged to the informant about being awoken by a deputy in July

2016 asleep in a bank drive-through. The informant stated that Kevin Chambers boasted about

having seven eight-balls of methamphetamine on his person at the time of contact. Kevin

Chambers stated the deputy woke him up and told him to move on, which Chambers found funny

because the deputy had no idea about the methamphetamine. Investigators confirmed that this

encounter did occur between a Rogers County deputy and Kevin Chambers from an activity log

kept by Rogers County dispatch. (Id.).

The Affidavit further provides the basis for the informant’s reliability and states that all

knowledge shared by the informant proved to be true and correct and based on firsthand

knowledge. (Id. at 7-8).

Regarding the residence to be searched, the Affidavit provides as follows:

Residence Identified

[The informant] was able to give directions to the residence he knew Kevin and

Charity to live. Investigators were able to confirm the address to belong to Kevin’s

brother Christopher Chambers from previous encounters with law enforcement.

The address is known as .

(Id. at 8) (omission in original). Deputy Tucker further states that through his training and

experience, he has learned that individuals involved in narcotics violations over an extended period

of time tend to be habitual offenders. (Id.). Based on information provided by the informant,

along with Drozd’s and Kevin Chambers’ criminal history, Drozd and Kevin Chambers were

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indicated to be career criminals involved in the possession of narcotics. (Id.). Deputy Tucker

further states he has learned that offenders such as Drozd and Kevin Chambers will store items,

such as those sought in the warrant, at their residence, and it is the opinion of Deputy Tucker and

other Rogers County Sheriff’s Office investigators that the items sought in the warrant would be

located at the place to be searched. (Id.). Deputy Tucker also states he has learned that offenders

such as Drozd and Kevin Chambers will store evidence, such as that sought in the Affidavit,

throughout their property. (Id.). Deputy Tucker further states that, based on the observations of

vehicles and other items concealed from view, it is Deputy Tucker’s opinion that the items sought

in the Affidavit would be throughout the property, which is why he is “seeking authorization to

conduct the search on the entire parcel described herein.” (Id.).

DISCUSSION

This Court’s review of the Magistrate Judge’s decision is de novo when, as here, a party

makes timely objections to the R&R. Fed. R. Crim. P. 59(b)(3); Bueno v. Pyle, 24 F. App’x 917,

918 (10th Cir. 2001) (citing Northington v. Marin, 102 F.3d 1564, 1570 (10th Cir. 1996)). The

Court’s review is limited to the “four corners” of the Affidavit itself, and the Court must determine

whether the facts stated in the Affidavit establish probable cause to believe the particular address

to be searched was linked to Kevin Chambers and Charity Drozd.

See Hackney, Inc. v.

McLaughlin, 895 F.2d 1298, 1299-1300 (10th Cir. 1990).

The Magistrate Judge found that, because the Affidavit omits the address from the last line

of the “Residence Identified” section of the Affidavit, it “does not tie the address contained in the

search warrant or any particular address, to Kevin Chambers or Charity Drozd or to any suspected

criminal activity. Nor does the affidavit specify where Kevin Chambers and Charity Drozd

reside.” (R&R at 2). The Magistrate Judge therefore concluded that “the warrant is not supported

Case 4:16-cr-00118-JHP Document 25 Filed in USDC ND/OK on 12/23/16 Page 5 of 10

by probable cause to believe that evidence of a crime would be found at the particular address

specified in the warrant.” (Id.).

The Magistrate Judge also found that the good-faith exception did not apply, because the

Affidavit was “so lacking in indicia of probable cause that official belief that probable cause exists

[was] unreasonable.” (Id. at 3). In so finding, the Magistrate Judge employed an objective

standard that asks “whether a reasonably well trained officer would have known that the search

was illegal despite the magistrate authorization.” (Id. (quoting United States v. Gonzales, 399 F.3d

1225, 1230 (10th Cir. 2005)) (quotation marks omitted)); see United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897,

922 n.23 (1984). Under this standard, the Magistrate Judge noted, “when the underlying affidavit

is devoid of factual support, the good faith exception is not available.” (R&R at 3 (citing Gonzales,

399 F.3d at 1230)). Because “there is nothing in the affidavit that states where Kevin Chambers

and Charity Drozd reside or that the particular address in the warrant is connected with suspected

criminal activity,” the Magistrate Judge concluded the good faith exception could not apply and

suppression was required. (Id. at 3-4).

On de novo review, this Court must consider whether there was sufficient probable cause

to establish a nexus between the property to be searched and the criminal activity described in the

Affidavit. The Tenth Circuit’s “test for determining the adequacy of the description of the location

to be searched is whether the description is sufficient to enable the executing officer to locate and

identify the premises with reasonable effort, and whether there is any reasonable probability that

another premise might be mistakenly searched.” United States v. Lora-Solano, 330 F.3d 1288,

1293 (10th Cir. 2003) (quotation omitted). The Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement for

warrants is governed by the concept of “practical accuracy rather than technical precision,” and a

“technically wrong address does not invalidate a warrant if it otherwise describes the premises

Case 4:16-cr-00118-JHP Document 25 Filed in USDC ND/OK on 12/23/16 Page 6 of 10

with sufficient particularity so that the police can ascertain and identify the place to be searched.”

United States v. Brakeman, 475 F.3d 1206, 1211 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting Lora-Solano, 330 F.3d

at 1293) (brackets and quotation marks omitted).

After a thorough review, the Court finds the Affidavit contains the following statements

that, when taken together, provide a sufficient nexus between Defendant’s property and the

criminal activity alleged to have been committed by Kevin Chambers and Charity Drozd:

The Affidavit sets forth the address to be searched: 11470 S. 4210 Rd. near Foyil

in Rogers County, a specific description of the property, directions to the property and includes an

aerial photo showing the property and the residence to be searched. (Doc. No. 23-1, at 1-2).

On August 1, 2016, Drozd told an informant that she and Kevin Chambers re-upped

in Tulsa and were on their way back; that they had several stops to make to individuals who had

purchased product; and that it would be late before they could deliver any methamphetamine to

the informant. (Id. at 6).

On August 2, 2016, the informant purchased methamphetamine from Kevin

Chambers and Charity Drozd in a controlled buy monitored by law enforcement. (Id.).

On August 2, 2016, investigators monitored text messages and phone calls made

among Kevin Chambers, Charity Drozd, and an informant, in which Kevin Chambers and Charity

Drozd stated they just woke up and would head straight to the informant from their residence. (Id.

at 6-7).

An informant gave directions to the residence he knew Kevin Chambers and

Charity Drozd to live. Investigators confirmed the address to belong to Kevin Chambers' brother,

Christopher Chambers, from previous encounters with law enforcement. (Id. at 8).

Deputy Tucker states, “offenders such as Kevin Chambers and Charity Drozd will

store evidence, such as that sought in this affidavit, throughout their property,” and “[b]ased on

the observations of vehicles and other items concealed from view, it is my opinion that the items

sought in this affidavit will be throughout the property, which is why I am seeking authorization

to conduct the search on the entire parcel described herein.” (Id. at 8) (emphasis added).

It is undisputed that Deputy Tucker inadvertently omitted the address of “the residence [the

informant] knew Kevin and Charity to live” from the “Residence Identified” paragraph on page 8

of the Affidavit. Accordingly, the Court finds Deputy Tucker’s omission of the address from that

paragraph is merely a scrivener’s error. The address to be searched, and its connection to Drozd

Case 4:16-cr-00118-JHP Document 25 Filed in USDC ND/OK on 12/23/16 Page 7 of 10

and Kevin Chambers, are apparent from a full reading of the Affidavit. See United States v. De

La Torre, 543 F. App’x 827, 829 (10th Cir. 2013) (“Even if a warrant is facially invalid, the

reviewing court ‘must also review the text of the warrant and the circumstances of the search to

ascertain whether the agents might have reasonably presumed it to be valid.’”) (quoting United

States v. Leary, 846 F.2d 592, 607 (10th Cir. 1988)).

Here, a full reading of the Affidavit leaves no doubt as to the address where the informant

“knew Kevin and Charity to live”:

The Affidavit states the informant gave directions to that residence to investigators,

who confirmed the address belonged to Kevin Chambers’ brother, Christopher Chambers. (Doc.

No. 23-1, at 8).

The Affidavit lists the address of the property to be searched, contains a specific

description of the property, directions to the property, and an aerial photograph of the property and

the residence to be searched. (Id. at 1-2).

The affiant, Deputy Tucker, states that he had learned that “offenders such as Kevin

Chambers and Charity Drozd will store evidence, such as that sought in this affidavit, throughout

their property.” (Id. at 8).

Based on his observations, Deputy Tucker opines “that the items sought in this

affidavit will be throughout the property, which is why I am seeking authorization to conduct the

search on the entire parcel described herein.” (Id.) (emphasis added).

The only “parcel described herein” is the address set forth on the first page of the Affidavit:

“11470 S. 4210 Rd. in the Foyil area of Rogers County.”

Accordingly, Deputy Tucker’s

inadvertent omission of the address from the “Residence Identified” paragraph on page 8 left no

possibility that another property could have been searched.

Because a full reading of the Affidavit leaves no doubt that Kevin Chambers and Charity

Drozd lived at the parcel identified and described with particularity on pages 1-2 of the Affidavit,

the Court finds the Affidavit provides a sufficient nexus between the criminal activity described

and the location to be searched.

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Moreover, even if the inadvertent omission of the address on page 8 of the Affidavit did,

in fact, render the warrant invalid, the good-faith exception under Leon would apply, because the

Affidavit was not “so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence

entirely unreasonable.” Leon, 468 U.S. at 923. “When police officers act in good faith and

reasonable reliance on a search warrant, the evidence obtained during the search should not be

suppressed even if the warrant was lacking in probable cause.” Lora-Solano, 330 F.3d at 1294-95

(quoting United States v. Price, 265 F.3d 1097, 1102 (10th Cir. 2001)) (brackets and quotation

marks omitted). Here, a reasonably well trained officer would not have known the search based

on the Affidavit was illegal despite the magistrate’s authorization because, for the reasons

explained above, the connection between the suspected criminal activity and Christopher

Chambers’ residence can be inferred from a full reading of the Affidavit. See Leon, 468 U.S. at

922 n.23 (“our good-faith inquiry is confined to the objectively ascertainable question whether a

reasonably well trained officer would have known that the search was illegal despite the

magistrate’s authorization.”). Here, Plaintiff has established the executing officer’s reliance was

objectively reasonable, because the Affidavit establishes at least “a minimally sufficient nexus

between the illegal activity and the place to be searched.” United States v. Gonzales, 399 F.3d

1225, 1231 (10th Cir. 2005) (quotation omitted).

Defendant attempts to analogize this case to the situation in Gonzales, in which the Tenth

Circuit found the good-faith exception did not apply where a search warrant affidavit listed an

address, but failed to specify that the address was the defendant’s residence or that there was any

other connection between that location, the defendant, or the suspected criminal activity.

Gonzales, 399 F.3d at 1228, 1230. The analogy is inapt. In Gonzales, the only facts before the

magistrate were the physical description of the address, that the defendant was a convicted felon,

Case 4:16-cr-00118-JHP Document 25 Filed in USDC ND/OK on 12/23/16 Page 9 of 10

and that a Glock 10mm magazine was found in a vehicle in which he was the only occupant. Id.

at 1230. The only attempt at a connection was the detective’s assertion that in his experience,

firearms are often kept at the residence. Id.

In this case, by contrast, a full and natural reading of the Affidavit indicates the home and

property described in the “Residence Identified” and “Probable Cause” sections on page 8 are the

same as the home described in significant detail and pictured on pages 1-2 of the Affidavit. This

case is rather more analogous to United States v. Beck, 139 F. App’x 950, 957-58 (10th Cir. 2005).

In Beck, the Tenth Circuit affirmed an application of the good-faith exception, finding the

underlying documents were not “devoid of factual support” where the Affidavit described a vehicle

in the “Property to be Searched” section and described criminal activity that took place in a vehicle

in the “Probable Cause” section. Id. The Court concluded that, “[a]lthough it does not say so

explicitly, the natural reading of the affidavit indicates that the vehicle identified in the probable

cause section is the vehicle involved in the criminal offense.” Id. at 957. Therefore, the panel

found that, [a]lthough the affidavit is weak, it establishes a minimally sufficient nexus between the

illegal activity and the place to be searched” and affirmed the district court’s application of the

good-faith exception. Id. (quoting Gonzales, 399 F.3d at 1230) (quotation marks omitted). See

also De La Torre, 543 F. App’x at 830 (finding warrant incorporating language allowing seizure

of evidence related to any conceivable drug crime, but authorizing in preamble section the seizure

of evidence of only one crime—possession and consumption of methamphetamine—was not

subject to suppression, because a “reasonable officer could conclude that the authorized search,

though purporting to extend to an exhaustive array of items, was limited to the only offense

described.”).

Case 4:16-cr-00118-JHP Document 25 Filed in USDC ND/OK on 12/23/16 Page 10 of 10

Here, as explained above, the Affidavit contained more than a minimally sufficient nexus

between the illegal activity and the place to be searched. In light of the details present in the

Affidavit, and the investigators’ knowledge of where Kevin Chambers and Charity Drozd lived,

the inadvertent omission of the address from the last line of the “Residence Identified” section of

the Affidavit did not render unreasonable the officers’ good-faith reliance on the issuance of the

search warrant by a neutral magistrate.

CONCLUSION

Upon full consideration of the entire record and the issues presented herein, the Court

orders that the Report and Recommendation entered by the United States Magistrate Judge on

November 22, 2016, be REJECTED and Defendant’s Motion to Suppress Evidence (Doc. No.

15) be DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 23rd day of December, 2016.

EXHIBIT 4:

Judgment in a Criminal Case (Northern District of Oklahoma)

Case 4:16-cr-00118-JHP Document 41 Filed in USDC ND/OK on 05/03/17 Page 1 of 7

AO 245B

(Rev. 11/16) Judgment in a Criminal Case

Sheet 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Northern District of Oklahoma

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

CHRISTOPHER COLMAN CHAMBERS

a/k/a “Christopher C. Chambers”

)

JUDGMENT IN A CRIMINAL CASE

Case Number:

4:16CR00118–1

USM Number:

09725-062

Stephen James Greubel

Defendant’s Attorney

THE DEFENDANT:

☒ pleaded guilty to count

One of the Indictment

☐ pleaded nolo contendere to count(s)

which was accepted by the Court.

☐ was found guilty on count(s)

after a plea of not guilty.

The defendant is adjudicated guilty of these offenses:

Title & Section

18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1)

and 924(a)(2)

Nature of Offense

Felon in Possession of Firearms and Ammunition

Offense Ended

8/8/16

Count

The defendant is sentenced as provided in this Judgment. The sentence is imposed pursuant to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.

☐ The defendant has been found not guilty on count(s)

☐ Count(s)

☐ is

☐ are dismissed on the motion of the United States.

It is ordered that the defendant must notify the United States attorney for this district within 30 days of any change of name,

residence, or mailing address until all fines, restitution, costs, and special assessments imposed by this Judgment are fully paid. If ordered to

pay restitution, the defendant must notify the Court and United States Attorney of material changes in economic circumstances.

April 26, 2017

Date of Imposition of Judgment

Signature of Judge

James H. Payne, United States District Court Judge

Name and Title of Judge

May 3, 2017

Date

Case 4:16-cr-00118-JHP Document 41 Filed in USDC ND/OK on 05/03/17 Page 2 of 7

Judgment - Page 2 of 7

AO 245B

(Rev. 11/16) Judgment in Criminal Case

Sheet 2 — Imprisonment

DEFENDANT:

CASE NUMBER:

Christopher Colman Chambers

4:16CR00118-1

IMPRISONMENT

The defendant is hereby committed to the custody of the United States Bureau of Prisons to be imprisoned for a

total term of:

Thirty months.

☒

The Court makes the following recommendations to the Bureau of Prisons:

The Court recommends the defendant be placed in a facility that will allow him the opportunity to participate in the most

comprehensive substance abuse treatment available.

☒

The defendant is remanded to the custody of the United States Marshal.

☐

The defendant shall surrender to the United States Marshal for this district:

☐

☐ a.m. ☐

☐

as notified by the United States Marshal.

p.m. on

The defendant shall surrender for service of sentence at the institution designated by the Bureau of Prisons:

☐

before 2 p.m. on

☐

as notified by the United States Marshal.

☐

as notified by the Probation or Pretrial Services Office.

RETURN

I have executed this Judgment as follows:

Defendant delivered on

, with a certified copy of this Judgment.

UNITED STATES MARSHAL

DEPUTY UNITED STATES MARSHAL

Case 4:16-cr-00118-JHP Document 41 Filed in USDC ND/OK on 05/03/17 Page 3 of 7

Judgment - Page 3 of 7

AO 245B

(Rev. 11/16) Judgment in a Criminal Case

Sheet 3 — Supervised Release

DEFENDANT:

CASE NUMBER:

Christopher Colman Chambers

4:16CR00118-1

SUPERVISED RELEASE

Upon release from imprisonment, you will be on supervised release for a term of:

Three years.

MANDATORY CONDITIONS

You must not commit another federal, state or local crime.

You must not unlawfully possess a controlled substance.

You must refrain from any unlawful use of a controlled substance. You must submit to one drug test within 15 days of release from

imprisonment and at least two periodic drug tests thereafter, as determined by the court.

☐ The above drug testing condition is suspended, based on the court's determination that you

pose a low risk of future substance abuse. (check if applicable)

You

must

cooperate in the collection of DNA as directed by the probation officer. (check if applicable)

☒

☐ You must comply with the requirements of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (42 U.S.C. § 16901, et seq.) as

directed by the probation officer, the Bureau of Prisons, or any state sex offender registration agency in the location where you

reside, work, are a student, or were convicted of a qualifying offense. (check if applicable)

☐ You must participate in an approved program for domestic violence. (check if applicable)

You must comply with the standard conditions that have been adopted by this court as well as with any other conditions on the attached

page.

Case 4:16-cr-00118-JHP Document 41 Filed in USDC ND/OK on 05/03/17 Page 4 of 7

Judgment - Page 4 of 7

AO 245B

(Rev. 11/16) Judgment in a Criminal Case

Sheet 3A — Supervised Release

DEFENDANT:

CASE NUMBER:

Christopher Colman Chambers

4:16CR00118-1

STANDARD CONDITIONS OF SUPERVISION

As part of your supervised release, you must comply with the following standard conditions of supervision. These conditions are imposed

because they establish the basic expectations for your behavior while on supervision and identify the minimum tools needed by probation

officers to keep informed, report to the court about, and bring about improvements in your conduct and condition.

10.

11.

12.

13.

You must report to the probation office in the federal judicial district where you are authorized to reside within 72 hours of

release from imprisonment, unless the probation officer instructs you to report to a different probation office or within a different

time frame.

After initially reporting to the probation office, you will receive instructions from the court or the probation officer about how and

when to report to the probation officer, and you must report to the probation officer as instructed.

You must not knowingly leave the federal judicial district where you are authorized to reside without first getting permission

from the court or the probation officer.

You must answer truthfully the questions asked by the probation officer.

You must live at a place approved by the probation officer. If you plan to change where you live or anything about your living

arrangements (such as the people you live with), you must notify the probation officer at least 10 days before the change. If

notifying the probation officer at least 10 days in advance is not possible due to unanticipated circumstances, you must notify the

probation officer within 72 hours of becoming aware of a change or expected change.

You must allow the probation officer to visit you at any time at your home or elsewhere, and you must permit the probation

officer to take any items prohibited by the conditions of your supervision that he or she observes in plain view.

You must work full time (at least 30 hours per week) at a lawful type of employment, unless the probation officer excuses you

from doing so. If you do not have full-time employment you must try to find full-time employment, unless the probation officer

excuses you from doing so. If you plan to change where you work or anything about your work (such as your position or your job

responsibilities), you must notify the probation officer at least 10 days before the change. If notifying the probation officer in

advance is not possible due to unanticipated circumstances, you must notify the probation officer within 72 hours of becoming

aware of a change or expected change.

You must not communicate or interact with someone you know is engaged in criminal activity. If you know someone has been

convicted of a felony, you must not knowingly communicate or interact with that person without first getting the permission of

the probation officer.

If you are arrested or questioned by a law enforcement officer, you must notify the probation officer within 72 hours.

You must not own, possess, or have access to a firearm, ammunition, destructive device, or dangerous weapon (i.e., anything that

was designed, or was modified for, the specific purpose of causing bodily injury or death to another person, such as nunchakus or

tasers).

You must not act or make any agreement with a law enforcement agency to act as a confidential human source or informant

without first getting the permission of the court.

If the probation officer determines that you pose a risk to another person (including an organization), the probation officer may

require you to notify the person about the risk and you must comply with that instruction. The probation officer may contact the

person and confirm that you have notified the person about the risk.

You must follow the instructions of the probation officer related to the conditions of supervision.

Case 4:16-cr-00118-JHP Document 41 Filed in USDC ND/OK on 05/03/17 Page 5 of 7

Judgment - Page 5 of 7

AO 245B

(Rev. 11/16) Judgment in a Criminal Case

Sheet 3B — Supervised Release

DEFENDANT:

CASE NUMBER:

Christopher Colman Chambers

4:16CR00118-1

SPECIAL CONDITIONS OF SUPERVISION

The defendant shall submit his person, residence, office or vehicle to a search, conducted by the United States Probation Officer

at a reasonable time and in a reasonable manner, based upon reasonable suspicion of contraband or evidence of a violation of a

condition of release; failure to submit to a search may be grounds for revocation; the defendant shall warn any other residents that

the premises may be subject to searches pursuant to this condition.

The defendant shall successfully participate in a program of testing and treatment, to include inpatient treatment, for drug and

alcohol abuse, at a treatment facility and on a schedule determined by the probation officer. The defendant shall abide by the

policies and procedures of the testing and treatment program to include directions that the defendant undergo urinalysis or other

types of drug testing consisting of no more than eight tests per month if contemplated as part of the testing and treatment

program. The defendant shall waive any right of confidentiality in any records for drug and alcohol treatment to allow the

probation officer to review the course of testing and treatment and progress with the treatment provider.

The defendant shall participate in a program of mental health treatment, to include inpatient, with a treatment provider and on a

schedule approved by the probation officer. The defendant shall waive any right of confidentiality in any records for mental

health treatment to allow the probation officer to review the course of treatment and progress with the treatment provider.

The defendant shall abstain from the use of any form of alcohol or intoxicating beverages.

U.S. Probation Officer Use Only

A U.S Probation officer has instructed me on the conditions specified by the court and has provided me with a written copy of this

Judgement containing these conditions. For further information regarding these conditions, see Overview of Probation and Supervised

Release Conditions, available at: www.uscourts.gov.

Defendant’s Signature _____________________________________

Date _________________

Case 4:16-cr-00118-JHP Document 41 Filed in USDC ND/OK on 05/03/17 Page 6 of 7

Judgment - Page 6 of 7

AO 245B

(Rev. 11/16) Judgment in a Criminal Case

Sheet 5 — Criminal Monetary Penalties

DEFENDANT:

CASE NUMBER:

Christopher Colman Chambers

4:16CR00118-1

CRIMINAL MONETARY PENALTIES

The defendant must pay the total criminal monetary penalties under the Schedule of Payments on Sheet 6.

TOTALS

☐

Assessment

JVTA Assessment*

Fine

Restitution

$100

N/A

The determination of restitution is deferred until

An Amended Judgment in a Criminal Case (AO 245C) will be entered after such determination.

☐

The defendant must make restitution (including community restitution) to the following payees in the amount listed below.

If the defendant makes a partial payment, each payee shall receive an approximately proportioned payment, unless specified otherwise

in the priority order or percentage payment column below. However, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3664(i), all nonfederal victims must be

paid before the United States is paid.

Name of Payee

TOTALS

Restitution Ordered

Total Loss**

Priority or Percentage

☐

Restitution amount ordered pursuant to Plea Agreement $

☐

The defendant must pay interest on restitution and a fine of more than $2,500, unless the restitution or fine is paid in full before the

fifteenth day after the date of the Judgment, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3612(f). All of the payment options on Sheet 6 may be subject

to penalties for delinquency and default, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3612(g).

☐

The Court determined that the defendant does not have the ability to pay interest and it is ordered that:

☐

the interest requirement is waived for the

☐

fine

☐

restitution.

restitution is modified as follows:

☐ the interest requirement for the ☐ fine ☐

* Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-22.

* Findings for the total amount of losses are required under Chapters 109A, 110, 110A, and 113A of Title 18 for offenses committed on or

after September 13, 1994, but before April 23, 1996.

Case 4:16-cr-00118-JHP Document 41 Filed in USDC ND/OK on 05/03/17 Page 7 of 7

Judgment - Page 7 of 7

AO 245B

(Rev. 11/16) Judgment in a Criminal Case

Sheet 6 — Schedule of Payments

DEFENDANT:

CASE NUMBER:

Christopher Colman Chambers

4:16CR00118-1

SCHEDULE OF PAYMENTS

Having assessed the defendant’s ability to pay, payment of the total criminal monetary penalties is due as follows:

☒ Lump sum payment of $ 100

☐

due immediately, balance due

not later than

in accordance with

, or

☐ C,

☐

☐ Payment to begin immediately (may be combined with

☐ Payment in equal

E, or

☐ F below; or

☐ C,

☐ D, or

☐ F below); or

(e.g., weekly, monthly, quarterly) installments of $

over a period of

(e.g., months or years), to commence

(e.g., 30 or 60 days) after the date of this Judgment; or

(e.g., weekly, monthly, quarterly) installments of $

(e.g., months or years), to commence

over a period of

(e.g., 30 or 60 days) after release from imprisonment to a

term of supervision; or

☐

Payment during the term of supervised release will commence within

(e.g., 30 or 90 days) after release from

imprisonment. The court will set the payment plan based on an assessment of the defendant’s ability to pay at that time; or

☐

Special instructions regarding the payment of criminal monetary penalties:

Unless the Court has expressly ordered otherwise, if this Judgment imposes imprisonment, payment of criminal monetary penalties

is due during imprisonment. All criminal monetary penalties, except those payments made through the Federal Bureau of Prisons’

Inmate Financial Responsibility Program, are made to the Clerk of the Court.

The defendant shall receive credit for all payments previously made toward any criminal monetary penalties imposed.

☐

Joint and Several

Defendant and Co-Defendant Names and Case Numbers (including defendant number), Total Amount, Joint and Several Amount,

and corresponding payee, if appropriate.

☐

The defendant shall pay the cost of prosecution.

☐

The defendant shall pay the following court cost(s):

☐

The defendant shall forfeit the defendant’s interest in the following property to the United States:

Payments shall be applied in the following order: (1) assessment, (2) restitution principal, (3) restitution interest, (4) fine principal,

(5) fine interest, (6) community restitution, (7) JVTA assessments, (8) penalties, and (9) costs, including cost of prosecution and court costs.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.