Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Marie-Therese Assa'ad-Faltas, Petitioner v. City of Columbia, South Carolina

Supreme Court briefJan 12, 2018

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NoA17BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM 2017

Marie Assa'ad-Faltas, MD, MPH, Petitioner

vs.

City of Columbia, South Carolina, Respondent

PETITION FORA WRIT OF CERTIORARITO THE SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH CAROLINA

Respectfully Submitted by:

Marie Assa'ad- Faiths, MD, MPH

P.O. Box 9115, Columbia, SC 29290

Phone: (803) 783-4536

Cell: (330) 232 4164

e-mail: Marie Faltas@hotmail.com AND MarieAssaadFaltas@GMail.com

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

This Court's Rule 10 provides in relevant part that certiorari may be granted where:

(a) a United States court of appeals

has so far departed from the accepted and usual

course of judicial proceedings, or sanctioned such a departure by a lower court, as to call

for an exercise of this Court's supervisory power,

federal law that has not been, but should be, settled by this Court, or has decided an

important federal question in a way that conflicts with relevant decisions of this Court[;]

...

This Court exercised its supervisory power in Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007):

The holding departs in so stark a manner from the pleading standard mandated by the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that we grant review.

The first question presented is one answerable only by this Court as only this Court is

empowered to interpret its own powers:

Does this Court have supervisory power over state courts of last resort as it

does over the United States courts of appeals?

If so, did the Supreme Court of South Carolina "so far depart from the accepted

and usual course of judicial proceedings," by sua sponte barring a person who

had successfully defended herself pro se in several criminal proceedings from so

appearing again, so as to call for an exercise of this Court's supervisory power?

ALTERNATIVE STATEMENT OF THE QUESTIONS PRESENTED

May a state court of last resort ex ante issue a blanket denial of a person's Faretta right

and require the lower courts to enforce that denial "right or wrong" based solely on what

the state appellate court speculated would have been that person's criminal defense style?

Do Griffin v. Illinois, 315 U.S. 12 (1956), and Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972), inter

alia, limit Martinez v. Court ofAppeals of California, 528 U.S. 152 (2000), so that a state

which allows one criminally-convicted person to appeal pro se must, to provide equal

protection, allow all similarly-situated appellants to appeal pro se if they so desire?

Is the right to speak/write for oneself, whether in a trial or an appeal, a basic human

rikht derived from humanity, not the law, and inalienable by a court of law?

- U-.

Contents and Table of authorities

Page

Questions Presented.

1PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI.

OPINIONS BELOW:.

JURIDICTION:

Constitutional Provisions Involved.

Statement of the Case

1-2

REASONS TO GRANT THE PETITION

3-9

To announce and exercise this Court's supervisory authority.

SC's supreme court's self-admitted "extreme" deprivations of Dr. Faltas'

constitutional rights make this case an excellent vehicle.

3-9

I. Opinion 27723s purported extension of a SCOTUS order is objectively unreasonable.. 4-5

II. Opinion 27723s note 1 betrays its authors' reliance on total irrelevancies.

III. Opinion 27723's page 2's "unrelenting litigation and harassment" phrasing betrays its

authors' viewing Petitioner as guilty after having been proven innocent.

IV. Petitioner's refusal to "go away" before delivering her letter is NOT an assault.

5-6

V. There is no basis in fact or in law to have denied Dr. Faltas' Faretta rights.

6-7

1. Dr. Faltas' contacts with the lower court in its administrative capacity were necessary and proper. 6

2. Dr. Faltas' prose advocacy in civil cases is totally irrelevant to Faretta.

3. Opinion 27723's recitation of Dr. Faltas' litigation conduct IS objective1yFALSE.

6-7

VI. There is no basis for maintaining a period of denial of Dr. Faltas' Faretta rights.

VII. Hybrid representation does NOT cure denial of self-representation..

7-8

VIII. This IS the proper case to challenge SC's supreme court's orders.

IX. SC's supreme court has no basis for claiming that an "altered?' transcript was filed.

X. Published Opinion 27723 makes bad law which penalizes truthfiiltestimony.

8-9

XI. At the very least, the case should have been remanded for re-sentencing due to Faretta error. 9

XII. The talented Dr. Faltas is treated worse than Dillon Roof in South Carolina.

CONCLUSION

APPENDICES

INDEXED SEPARATELY

Table of authorities

Cases

Chessman v. Teets, 350 U.S. 3 (1955)

City of Columbia v. Assa'ad-Faltas, 420 SC 28, 800 S.E.2d 782 (Sc 2017)

. sim

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007)

Faretta v. California. 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525. 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975)

passim

Griffin v. illinois, 315 U.S. 12 (1956).

Lindseyv. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972)

Martinezv. Court ofAppeals of California, 528 U.S. 152 (2000)

McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177 (1984)

State v. Rivera, 741 SE2d694 (SC 2013)

U.S. v. Carver, 260 U.S. 482, 490 (1923)

United States v. Chisholm (4th Cir. [unpublished] 2005)

4-5

United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U. S. 140 (2006)

Statutes

Rules

pas

28 U.S.C. §1257

U.S. Supreme Court Rule 10

U.S. Supreme Court Rule 39.8

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioner ("Dr. Faltas") prays this Court by certiorari to review South Carolina's

("SC") supreme court's 21 June 2017 affirmance of her simple assault conviction in

City of Columbia's municipal court ("CMC") and 17 August 2017 denial of rehearing.

OPINIONS BELOW: SC's supreme court's opinion ("Opinion 27723") is fully reported as

City of Columbia v.Assa'ad-Faltas, 420 SC 28, 800 S.E.2d 782 (SC 2017).

JURIDICTION: On 8 November 2017, the Honorable Chief Justice Roberts kindly extended the time to file petition to 12 January 2018 (17-A-503). This Court's

Jurisdiction of this timely petition is thus invoked under 28 U.S.C. §1257.

Constitutional Provisions Involved: Amendments VI and XIV to the U.S. Constitution are not here recited in deference to this

Court's profound knowledge thereof.

Statement of the Case

In September 2008, Dr. Faltas rented an apartment in two rental quadriplexes

owned by Dinah Steele, Dr. Faltas' later-accuser of simple assault inter alia. In

March 2009, Dr. Faltas and her mother bought vacant land adjacent to Steele's

south quadriplex, unaware that the latter was built in violation of legal set-back

from the vacant lot and that the sewer lines from both quadriplexes ran illegally

and surreptitiously across and under the lot without any easement, permissive or

prescriptive. Upon learning of said purchase, Steele and her consort, Larry Wayne

Mason, started, against Dr. Faltas and her mother, a war ultimately found by SC

Circuit Judge Lee to have been "designed to harass [Dr. Faltas] to the point of frustration with the hope that she will abandon her appeal, vacate the rented apartment, and

abandon any plans to develop the property she purchased next door" based on evidence

adduced in a 1 December 2009 injunction hearing Dr. Faltas sought in a state civil

suit she filed against Steele and Mason inter alia to halt their interference with Dr.

Faltas' life and building plans and to reroute their sewer lines away from her land.'

Judge Lee took the motion under advisement. The next morning, Mason, a private

detective, led ten Columbia Police Department ("CPD") officers in a long preplanned raid on Dr. Faltas' apartment and car, therefrom to take evidence she had

gathered for, and presented in, her civil suit. CPD's false pretext was that said evidence proves Dr. Faltas harassed Steele and one of her tenants, Ingram. Before 2

December 2009, Dr. Faltas had sought to add, to her state civil suit against Steele

and Mason, the City of Columbia as a defendant for using Dr. Faltas' land, against

her will, to run sewer lines to Steele's two quadriplexes. Leave to amend was not

heard and granted until May 2010 by then-SC-trial judge Childs.2 Dr. Faltas chose

to defend herself pro se against the harassment charges. Through pre-trial discovery and investigations, Dr. Faltas obtained massive proof of extensive collusion to

harm her among defendants in her civil suit and her eventual prosecutors.

1 The full transcript of that hearing and relevant documents from Petitioner's pre-arrest civil suit in

SC state court are on file with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in # 17-1672.

2 Shortly thereafter, Judge Childs assumed a federal judgeship; but her order is also on file below.

page 1 of 9

Judge Lee wrote in the 22 December 2009 order belatedly granting in part the injunction Dr. Faltas had sought before her arrest:

[Clombined with the additional actions of [ ... ] instituting criminal proceedings

against [Dr. Faltas], this court has no doubt that such conduct is done solely for

the purpose of harassing [Dr. Faltas. .... Dr. Faltas] will suffer irreparable harm

in the form of continued criminal prosecution and undue mental stress and anguish if the injunction is not granted.

Unable to survive the harsh bond conditions or get a hearing on the falsity of her

arrest, but certain of her innocence, Dr. Faltas pressed pro se for speedy trial. Based

on then-Prosecutor Weiss' assurance of readiness and that Dr. Faltas will have all

due discovery by then, an administrative judge set both charges for trial in the 2226 February 2010 session. But at trial, Weiss insisted on trying only the charge pretended by Ingram; and the judge yielded to an SC law, later held unconstitutional,

which then vested exclusive control of the criminal docket in SC's circuit solicitors.3

Dr. Faltas defended herself ably pro se; the jury deadlocked after six hours of deliberation, causing a mistrial. Thereafter, Dr. Faltas' research objectively documented

378 perjuries and forgeries in Ingram's trial testimony alone. Equipped therewith,

Dr. Faltas sought speedy retrial or dismissal of the charges for lack of evidence. But

Weiss falsely pretended to have evidence to retry the Ingram count and try the

Steele count, in the interim causing Dr. Faltas to be arrested three more times on

false charges of trespass and bond violation. Dr. Faltas was exonerated of all of new

crimes Weiss fabricated. The initial harassment charges were not again called for

trial until 13 August 2012, whereupon Dr. Faltas pro se sought and won their dismissal with prejudice.4 The simple assault charge had remained untried since September 2009 despite Dr. Faltas' many requests for a speedy trial.5 In response to one

of Dr. Faltas' pro se requests for SC's appellate courts to require the lower trial

courts to speedily try or dismiss the pending criminal charges, SC's supreme court,

on 8 April 2011, barred Dr. Faltas from filing anything pro se in SC's state courts,

and, in October 2012, two months after Dr. Faltas had totally exonerated herself pro

se of the harassment charges, SC's supreme court barred Dr. Faltas from even

speaking for herself in all SC's state courts. On 5 November 2013, SC's supreme

court restored Dr. Faltas' right to defend herself pro se in criminal cases and, on 27

September 2017, restored her right to defend herself pro se in civil cases.

On 25 April 2013, the September 2009 simple assault charge was tried by forced

counsel; Dr. Faltas was convicted and sentenced to 20 days. SC's supreme court refused to accept a pro se appeal from her and later affirmed, opining mainly that the

ban on self-representation then in effect "right or wrong" bound the trial court.

3 SC's circuit solicitors are state prosecutors elected by the respective counties forming one of SC's 16

judicial circuits.

4 The transcripts of the 22-26 February 2010 trial and relevant hearings (objectively proving Weiss

always knew the charges to be false but brought them to give Dr. Faltas' opponents unfair advantages in the civil litigation) are also on file with the state courts.

5 For judicial economy, Dr. Faltas incorporates by reference her case No. 16-329, before this Court,

and the factual records of her cases below which are too voluminous to be appended to this petition.

page 2 of 9

REASONS TO GRANT THE PETITION

A. To announce and exercise this Court's supervisory authority.

The perfection of union of the states requires this Court to find and exercise supervisory power over the state courts of last resort; otherwise, they become republics to

themselves unchecked by the judicial power of the United States. Federalism allows

the President to overrule the choice of a governor in matters affecting national interests and equal protection. Congress, when it so chooses, enacts laws in areas preempting state laws. Were this Court to leave the highest state courts outside federal

supervisory power, it would leave the union imperfect in an entire third of its being.

As the U.S. courts of appeals occasionally "depart," so do states' highest courts; and

this Court's supervisory power is needed over state courts as it is over federal ones.

B. SC's supreme court's self-admitted "extreme" deprivations of Dr.

Faltas' constitutional rights make this case an excellent vehicle.

This is NOT a case where a state appellate court affirmed a trial court's exercise of

its discretion to halt pro se defense based on a criminal defendant's trial conduct. It

is a case where the appellate court ex ante eliminated the trial court's discretion to

grant the right to self-representation ab initio. Opinion 27723 replaced a temple of

truth with a museum of tyranny and must be reversed lest its self-contradictions,

faithlessness to the factual record, and self-admitted "extreme" deviation from established law, all to discredit an innocent Coptic Orthodox Christian lawful immigrant, in posterity's eyes dishonor both this Court and that court.

Opinion 27723 confuses: (1) SC's supreme court's administrative and ceremonial

functions with its adjudicative role; (2) rule-prescribed suspension of a waiver of filing fees and printing requirements with ex ante impermissible elimination of the

Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments rights to pro se advocacy and the basic human

right, freedom, and dignity to speak for oneself, (3) rights of civil plaintiffs with

rights of criminal defendants; () a criminal defendant's testimony in a case with her

advocacy in others, all of which Dr. Faltas, thank God, ultimately WON pro Se; and

() established power of a trial court to control actual conduct of all witnesses and

advocates with a non-existent right of appellate courts to prophesize that a party

would have "bombarded" the trial court with "frivolous and irrelevant" arguments

when neither the trial court nor the appellate court heard arguments or defenses

Dr. Faltas would have made had she been left to plan and present her own defense

from the start. Established law teaches that constitutional structural error precludes all courts from knowing what would have been absent the structural error.

Opinion 27723's starkly oppressive clichés are introductorily sampled below.

Opinion 27723's page 10's "the municipal court granted Appellant free-reign to present

'narrative' testimony" is false: she had exactly five minutes (R.p. 105, line 12) and

was cut off mid-sentence (R.p. 108, lines 15-19). Opinion 27723 devotes pages 79 to

Lupton's whining that his "personal life" was invaded by Dr. Faltas' seeing Lupton's

Law Firm's world-wide website and offering to help improve it. What is more public

and less 'oersonal" than a lawyer's www.11.com inviting the public to hire him?

page 3 of 9

Opinion 27723's note 8 mocks Dr. Faltas' anxiety at Lupton's "inability to obtain

nonexistent police 'dash cam' videos of [an] incident ...." How can any court possibly

know that video of anything never existed? Opinion 27723's page 9 claims that

Judge Barber's 7 March 2013 "order simply commended Mr. Lupton for his adept representation of Appellant." Judge Barber wrote he did not know a more adept lawyer

(R.p. 225). Lupton did not try this case (or any other) of Dr. Faltas' before Judge

Barber and lost it at trial, a result justifying Dr. Faltas' anxiety that she was not

given the effective assistance she deserves (R.p. 14, lines 14-24), was thsserved by

Lupton (R.p. 21, lines 10-17), and could be harmed by lawyers (R.p. 16, lines 21-22).

Opinion 27723's note 9 is a gratuitous pronouncement on a matter NOT then or now

before Opinion 27723's authors which likely signals that the authors will side

against Dr. Faltas in any case challenging Lupton's effectiveness. Lawyers who lost

this case at trial and on appeal get SC's supreme court's "commendations" while Dr.

Faltas, who won all other cases she tried pro se, received that court's wrath!

I.Opinion 27723s purported extension of a SCOTUS order is objectively unreasonable.

The entirety of this Court 23 February 2015 ORDER in No 14-7472 (cited at Opinion 27723

page 1) is:

The motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis is denied, and the petition for a writ

of certiorari is dismissed. See Rule 39.8. As the petitioner has repeatedly abused this

Court's process, the Clerk is directed not to accept any further petitions in non-criminal

matters from petitioner unless the docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) is paid and the

petition is submitted in compliance with Rule 33.1. See Martin v. District of Columbia

Court ofAppeals, 506 U. S. 1 (1992) (per curiam).

First, SCOTUS' decision cites, and is limited by, a published, Congress-approved,

and often-previously-applied rule; but SC's supreme court has no similar rule and

never previously took the "extreme" actions directed against Dr. Faltas.

Second, SCOTUS' Rule 39.8 does NOT eliminate anyone's right to file anything pro

Se. The default is for all parties to pay applicable filing fees and to conform to SCOTUS' peculiar and onerous printing requirements. Indigents may seek waiver of

those requirements. SCOTUS' Rule 39.8 merely denies a waiver of a general rule; it

does not single a party out for requirements not imposed on other parties.

Third, SCOTUS' Rule 39.8, and SCOTUS' denial of waiver to Dr. Faltas, are expressly limited to non-criminal matters. The U.S. Constitution recognizes all criminal defendant's right to a full defense and plenary appeal opportunities. Dr. Faltas

thereafter filed TWO pro se petitions, Nos. 16-329 and 16-1061 before this Court.

Denial of certiorari does NOT reflect on the merits; U.S. v. Carver, 260 U.S. 482, 490

(1923), recently quoted in U.S. Chief Justice Roberts' 15 May 2017 statement in No.

16-833. Please also see, e.g., United States v. Chisholm (unpublished 2005)

Pursuant to the plan adopted by the Fourth Circuit Judicial Council in implementation of the Criminal Justice Act of 1964, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1994), this court requires

that each counsel inform his client, in writing, of his right to petition the Supreme

Court for further review. If requested by his client to do so, counsel should prepare a

timely petition for writ of certiorari. If [...1 counsel believes that such a petition would

page 4 of 9

be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel's motion must state that a copy thereof was served on the client.

Opinion 27723s note 1 betrays its authors' reliance on total irrelevancies.

Had a prosecutor implied to a jury of that a tenant's loss of an appeal of an eviction

brought by a landlord makes same tenant guilty of assaulting a different landlord, a

fair court would have found prosecutorial misconduct. Opinion 27723's opening with

citations to civil cases with no possible probative value of whether Dr. Faltas did or

did not assault Dinah Steele on 11 September 2009 is "a partisan seeking combat's"

blow, not a neutral and self-disciplined adjudicator's sound logic. That Court's own

actual irrelevancies aggravate Opinion 27723's prophesies that Dr. Faltas would

have "bombarded" the trial court with irrelevancies. Who was bombarding whom?

Opinion 27723s page 2's "unrelenting litigation and harassment" phrasing

betrays its authors' viewing Dr. Faltas as guilty after having been proven innocent.

The only two harassment counts (one by Steele, the false accuser here) ever brought

against Dr. Faltas were dismissed with prejudice on 13 August 2012. Opinion

27723's condemnation of one already proven innocent is a deliberate use of incorrect

legal standards. On 11 September 2009, only two civil actions existed between Appellant and Steele: an eviction brought by the latter and a civil suit brought by the

former, a 1-1 tie in a "litigation match." Opinion 27723's branding the one action

brought by Dr. Faltas as "unrelenting litigation," while ignoring the action brought

by her false accuser and mentioned in that accuser's 911-call, proves justice blind

but only in one eye the eye under which facts favorable to Dr. Faltas were placed.

W. Dr. Faltas' refusal to "go away" before delivering her letter is NOT an assault.

Respondent's brief below and Opinion 27723's p 3 so describe the totality of events:

Appellant repeatedly and forcefully shoved the papers into Landlord's chest and

stated in a loud, hostile manner "You got it! You got it!" Landlord immediately called

the police. Appellant was charged with simple assault by way of a courtesy summons.

That is NOT assault by any definition. A fair court would have sua sponte reversed.

All concerned admit Dr. Faltas neither offered to, nor actually did, injure Steele.

Nor would a reasonable person fear any injury from an older lady with only a piece

of paper in her hand.6 Lupton (Dr. Faltas' forced counsel) never challenged the reasonableness of Steele's claim that the momentary uncertainty about the writing on

the paper caused same Steele to start therapy four months later. Lupton insisted

that he did all that is necessary by pointing out the obvious: that January 2010 is

four months after September 2009. "Adept" Lupton took as gospel Steele's pretense

that she saw "the doctor" and filled a four-year prescription. Inquiryinto medical effects is standard discovery in such cases; yet Lupton never objected to non-receipt of

a discovery response and never objected to admission of testimony that was not disclosed in discovery. Lupton's only objection was to his own client's objections. Dr.

Faltas' direct appeal counsel did not even raise those carefully-preserved issues.

6 Even if fear were initially aroused by ignorance of what writing is on the paper, any reasonable per-

son would have been reassured upon reading a letter which only sought to reschedule an inspection.

page 5 of 9

Opinion 27723 overlooks that Steele, not her lawyer, had scheduled the inspection

by a letter from Steele, not her lawyer. Inspection would also have been contact by

Steele with Dr. Faltas in the small confmes of her apartment. Lupton, Appellate

counsel, and Opinion 27723, ignore the irreconcilable contradiction between Steele

"running as fast as I could" to avoid contact with Dr. Faltas out in the open on 11

September 2009 while insisting on entering Dr. Faltas' closed small apartment on

14 September 2009. Steele and Mason knocked on Dr. Faltas' apartment's door

three days after the alleged assault but were not allowed in. (R.p. 107, lines 17-23).

V. There is no basis in fact or in law to have denied Dr. Faltas' Faretta rights.

1. Dr. Faltas' contacts with the lower court in its administrative capacity were necessary and proper.

Opinion 27723's page 4 recites administrative/ceremonial requests obtainable only

from SC's supreme court:

During the last six months, Appellant has requested that this Court grant her permission to sit for either the July 2017 or February 2018 bar examination without paying

an application fee or obtaining a law school degree; she has asked to be appointed the

Director of South Carolina Court Administration to implement an initiative applying

scientific principles to the administration of justice; [...] and she has asked this Court

to make a public show of support for Coptic Christians in Egypt in the wake of recent

violent attacks targeting the religious group.

yet claims "these matters are typical of Appellant's frequent submissions which fall outside

this Court's purview." That is error. SC's bar exam in is administered solely by SC's

supreme court. A director of court administration is appointed solely by that court.7

Opinion 27723's authors should not even have known of Dr. Faltas' administrative

contacts, much less penalized her for them by wrongly affirming her conviction.

2. Dr. Faltas' pro se advocacy in civil cases is totally irrelevant to Faretta.

Dr. Faltas could not possibly have initiated any criminal case against herself. The

volume of criminal-charge-related submissions prove the system abused Faltas, not

the reverse. In criminal trial practice, defenses are not "frivolous" or serious, only

successful or failed —a determination made by a jury, not an appellate court. Whatever is said of Dr. Faltas' pro se civil advocacy, her criminal trial pro se defenses

were successful. That history is the only one relevant to the Faretta inquiry.

3. Opinion 27723's recitation of Dr. Faltas' litigation conduct IS objectively FALSE.

What Opinion 27723 pp 4-5 quote was rescinded an d cancelled in June 2016, as

having been based on ex parte reports without notice or opportunity for Dr. Faltas

to respond. Stories of "placards" and "offering opinion," like the story of the false accuser herein, get worse with every retelling. Dr. Faltas never "stood during oral arguments" before SC's supreme court. It is objectively proven by the video-recording

of that Jan uary 2011 oral argument which is posted from beginning to end on SC's

7 That court also regularly performs ceremonies: setting Christmas tree in its hall, naming a room in

honor of public servant, receiving students and answering their questions monthly, etc. Paris'

mayor ordered the Eiffel Tower dimmed for the 2017 Coptic martyrs. SC's supreme court could have

emulated the touching gesture by lowering the state flag over court buildings within its authority.

page 6 of 9

supreme court's website as a "case of the month" www.sccourts.org/Case0i'Month/Jan2011 and

does NOT show Dr. Faltas standing or making any sound during argument. She did

in writing offer an idea, within the proper procedure of a motion to file an amicus in

State v. Duncan (trial court case No. 2007-GS-23-05016), to which SC's supreme

court responded in writing on 7Apr11 2011 in toto [with emphasis added]:

While the Court appreciates Dr. Faltas' good faith attempt to opine on a legal

matter pending before the Court, she totally misapprehends the nature and purpose of an Amicus Curiae brief. The Motion for Reconsideration is respectfully denied.

How Faltas could have gone from "good faith" on 7 April 2011 to "frivolous [and]

vexatious" on 8 April 2011 calls for this Court's supervisory investigation.

VI. There is no basis for maintaining a period of denial of Dr. Faltas' Faretta rights.

Opinion 277223 admits Dr. Faltas' Faretta right was restored on 6 November 2013,

after SC's supreme court acknowledged its prior orders violated Faretta. Either the

8 April 2011 and October 2012 orders were correct if Dr. Faltas' prior conduct triggered a Faretta exception or the 6 November 2013 order was correct in acknowledging the error of denying Dr. Faltas' Faretta right absent a Faretta exception.

The newer supersedes the older; and the specific supersedes the general. The November 2013 specific restoration of Dr. Faltas' right to self-defense in criminal cases

puts fault to the October 2012 general denial of her right to self-representation.

If it was correct to deny Dr. Faltas' Faretta right, that right should not have been

restored. 'If it was it was error to have denied that right of hers ab initio, this as

sault conviction was in structural error. There is no reason for restoration to have

been only prospective. The restoration was not an act of grace but a remedy of the

wrong of the denial of the right ab initito. That restoration should not be withheld

from the one instance where the denial injured Dr. Faltas most: the one case where,

with counsel forced on her, a conviction was obtained against her in a misdemeanor

charge of which, by past experience, she would have exonerated herself pro Se.

VII. Hybrid representation does NOT cure denial of self-representation.

"The right to speak for speak for oneself entails more than the opportunity to add

one's voice to a cacophony of others." McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177

(1984), followed in State v. Rivera, 741 SE2d 694 (SC 2013). The little Dr. Faltas

was allowed to say for herself at trial was spent correcting errors or filling gaps left

by Lupton. That would have been unnecessary had Dr. Faltas been allowed to plan

and present her own defense alone. Lupton's expected hostile body language (an extension of his hostility evidenced in an e-mail chain forwarded to SC's supreme

court on 21 April 2013 in a plea to be rescued from Lupton) forced forfeiture of jury

trial "under duress." A jury unaware of the forced representation story, would have

blamed Dr. Faltas for choosing Lupton, a lawyer so disdainful of his client. Such

concerns are upheld in United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U. S. 140 (2006):

If and when counsel's ineffectiveness "pervades" a trial, it does so (to the extent we

can detect it) through identifiable mistakes. We can assess how those mistakes affected the outcome. To determine the effect of wrongful denial of choice of counsel,

page 7 of 9

however, we would not be looking for mistakes committed by the actual counsel,

but for differences in the defense that would have been made by the rejected counsel—in matters ranging from questions asked on voir dire and cross-examination

to such intangibles as argument style and relationship with the prosecutors.

Would have to speculate upon what matters the rejected counsel would have han

lled differently— or indeed, would have handled the same but with the benefit o.

ore jurv-pleasingcourtroom style /... an upon what effect those

ces or different intangibles might have had. The difficulties of condi

assessments of Dreiudice are not remotely comnarablef

Dr. Faltas' transcript-documented successful pro se defense against two harassment

charges (one pretended by Steele) a defense complimented by the presiding judge,

is the only reliable predictor of how she would have defended against this charge if

completely pro se. Otherwise, this structural error compels reversal.

VIII. This IS the proper case to challenge SC's supreme court's orders.

Dr. Faltas' pro se notice of appeal to SCIS supreme court by-passed SC's Court of Appeals because, below this Court, only SC's supreme court can overrule itself. Contrary to Opinion 27723s p 18, this is the case to challenge SC's supreme court's erroneous suspension of Dr. Faltas' Faretta right from October 2012 to November

2013 as this is the conviction—a concrete complete injury—from that interim.

All other criminal charges against Dr. Faltas were successfully defended pro se before October 2012, ended in acquittal despite forced counsel in March-April 2013, or

PCR was granted on any resulting conviction. This conviction is the proper and necessary procedural avenue. Even if, arguendo, the trial court had to follow SC's supreme court "right or wrong," SC's supreme court did not have to follow itself when

wrong. This was not an appeal from SC's supreme court to CMC, it was an appeal to

SC's supreme court from itself (its interim suspension of Faretta) and from the circuit court's (SC's first stage of appeal from convictions in SC's summary courts)

choice of an incorrect standard. To the extent Opinion 27723 relied on Dr. Faltas'

advocacy in civil cases before and after the instant charge was made and tried, it

was also proper to challenge SC's supreme court's erroneous views.

IX. SC's supreme court has no basis for claiming that an "altered" transcript was filed.

Dr. Faltas declared under penalty of perjury that she accurately transcribed the audio CMC

provided to her. Opinion 27723's use of the word "altered" is both inaccurate, in that no

other transcript was created, and irresponsible, in that it can be later manipulated to

falsely suggest that Dr. Faltas forged a transcript. The transcript Dr. Faltas prepared

should have been accepted as authentic and dispositive of the issue-preservation question

or an official transcript of that hearing should have been ordered as a supplement to the record of rehearing. The three orders then-Municipal-Judge Solomon made part of the record

should also be obtained and filed to comply with Chessman v. Teets, 350 U.S. 3 (1955).

X. Published Opinion 27723 makes bad law which penalizes truthful testimony.

If witnesses are immune from damage suits for their testimony, a fortiorori, truthful

testimony cannot be made a basis for denial of Faretta right to self-representation.

A witness may be punished only by: (1) contempt if (s)he repeatedly disobeys a

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judge's orders to stop talking or to avoid certain areas and/or (2) a charge of perjury

if (s)he demonstrably testifies falsely. But to deny a witness her constitutional right

to self-representation in a criminal matter simply because her testimony was "rambling," combative, boring or repetitive is unprecedented, unprincipled and unfair.

The right to self-defense is not a prize for winning a witness-charm contest, it is a

right which may be forfeited after some concrete act of abuse of the self-defense in

the actual criminal case actually observed by the trial court, not because of an appellate court's unfounded prophesor do Opinion 27723s authors have any ide

bow Dr. Faltas' testimony would have flowed in a pro se setting to jurors she would1

gave selected herself and addressed herself in opening and closing arguments.!

XI. At the very least, the case should have been remanded for re-sentencing

due to Faretta error.

Opinion 27723 admits Dr. Faltas clearly invoked her right to self-representation before sentencing and the trial court made no Faretta inquiry and no ruling. Lupton

had already spoken in sentencing and done great harm which could not be overcome

by Dr. Faltas speaking for herself after Lupton. Please see the right to speak alone

explained in VII above. Also, Circuit Judge Lee never affirmed the sentence, only

the conviction. It was thus premature for SC's supreme court to affirm the sentence.

XII. The talented Dr. Faltas is treated worse than Dillon Roof in South Carolina.

Dillon Roof admitted killing the nine Charleston saints before his trial began; yet he

was allowed to represent himself at trial, change his mind and reinstate counsel,

then proceed to sentencing without counsel hybrid representation at its fullest.

Apparently, Dr. Faltas' having won her own prior cases pro Se, even if she occasionally boasts about having done so, is a worse crime than Dillon Roof's.

CONCLUSION

WHEREFORE, certiorari should be granted; SC's supreme court's judgment should

be reversed; and the conviction and sentence should be vacated.

Respectfully submitted on 12 January 2018 and timely resubmitted as corrected per

this Court's Clerk's directions on 24 April 2018.

Marie Assa'ad- Faltas, MD, MPH, Petitioner

P.O. Box 9115, Columbia, SC 29290

Phone: (803) 783-4536 Cell: (330) 232 4164

e-mail: Marie Faltas@hotmail.com AND MarieAssaadFaltas@GMail.com

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.