Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Jimie L. Starks, Petitioner v. Parball Corporation, dba Bally's Las Vegas

Supreme Court briefJan 23, 2018

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No,

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

JIMIE L. STARKS PRO SE

—PETITIONER

(Your Name)

vs.

PARBALL CORPORATION

RESPONDENT(S)

-

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

COURT OF APPEALS NINTH CIRCUIT

(NAME OF COURT THAT LAST RULED ON MERITS OF YOUR CASE)

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

JIMIE L. STARKS

(Your Name)

1439 COTTONWOOD PLACE

(Address)

LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89104

(City, State, Zip Code)

702 -410 -4098

(Phone Number)

QUESTION(S) PRESENTED

Whether District Court abused itS discretion by imposing an

even heavier burden on me to show pretext than the burdens that

had existed in Noyes v. Kelly Services, 488 F.3d 1163, *1170(2007)

and Texas Dept. Of Community Affairs v Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,*252

(1981).

Whether a trier of fact could reasonably conclude that my Voluntary Statement Exhibit 2, that was filed in Defendant's H.R.Dept.

on 7-17-05 through 8-22-12, expressing my desires to be considered for future promotional opportunities for supervision would

carry the same weight as Burdine's, 450 U.S. 248,*250 (1981),application that was active on file for six months.

Whether a rational fact finder could reasonably conclude that

my situation in Exhibit 1, was similar to Green, 411 U.S. 792

*804 (1973), in which I was the only Black American and member of

a protected class, who had comparable seriousness performance violations to similary situated co-workers and was the only one terminated, could reach the same decision?

Whether a trier of fact could reasonably conclude that my former immediate supervisors were three biological brothers and I had

filed a charge of discrimination on the elder brother, could that

have been an additional motive for retaliation?

Whether a trier of fact could reasonably conclude that my exer-cise of my FMLA, Intermittent Protected Leave, from Jan. 2006

through Aug. 2012, in whiched I had called out more than 324, times

during this period, could be the real motive to why I was terminated?

LIST OF PARTIES

N All parties appear in the caption of the case on the cover page.

[1 All parties do not appear in the caption of the case on the cover page. A list of

all parties to the proceeding in the court whose judgment is the subject of this

petition is as follows:

TABLE OF CONTENTS

OPINIONSBELOW........................................................................................................1

JURISDICTION...................................................................................................................

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED .................................

STATEMENTOF THE CASE ............................................................................................

.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT ..........................................................................

CONCLUSION....................................................................................................................

INDEX TO APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT Dec's ) Ofl

APPENDIX B U.S. DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEVADADc.cIS/Or

APPENDIX C

APPENDIX D

APPENDIX E

APPENDIX F

PETITION FOR PANEL REHEARING Orde,1' 7€MI

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED

CASES

•

PAGE NUMBER

Noyes v Kelly Services, 488 F.3d 1163,*1170 (2007) ...............

Tex., Dept., Of Cmnty., Affairs v Burdine, 450 U.S 248,*253(1981

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v Green, 411 U.S 792,*804,(1973) ........

Furnco Const., Corp., v Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978) ..............

Anthony Ash v Tyson Foods, Inc., 546 U.S. (2006) .................

Mayes v Winco Holdings, Inc., 846 F.3d 1274 (2017). ...............

Michelle Lindahl v Air France 930 F2d 1434 (1991) ...............

Sischo-Nownejad v Merced Community College Dist. 934 F.2d 1184(19

Dominguez-Curry v Nevada Transp. Dept. 424 F.3d 1027 (2005)o .....

Fabela v Socorro Indep., School Dist.,

329 F.3d 409, 415, (5th Cir. 2003) ...............................

Cordova, v State Farm Ins. Company, 124 F.3d 1145 (1997) .........

Godwin, v Hunt Wesson, Inc., 150 F.3d 1217 (1998) ................

U.S. Postal Service Bd. Of Governors v Aikens, 460 U.S.711(1983).

STATUTES AND RULES

Title Vii of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e.

The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).

Enforces Title Vli, State laws N.R.S. S 613.330 et seq., N.R.S.613.340.

American With Disabilities Act,(ADA) *42 U.S.C. 12101-12213.

Civil Rights Act of 1866 (SEction 1981).

Fed. Rule Civ. P. 56(c).

(FMLA)-of 1993, S 105 (a)(2),29 U.S.C.A. 5 2615 (a)(2).

OTHER

ST. Mary's Honor Center v Hicks, 509 U.S. 502,*511 (1993) ........

Smothers v Solvay Chemicals, Inc., 740 F.3d 530 (2014) ............

Berman v Orkin Exterminating Co., Inc., 160 F.3d 697 (1998) ......

Metzler v Fed. Home Loan 464 F.3d (2006)*22 sec. A...............

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioner respectfully prays that a writ of certiorari issue to review the judgment below.

OPINIONS BELOW

J4 For cases from federal courts:

The opinion of the United States court of appeals appears at Appendix

the petition and is

A

{ I reported at

; or,

[ I has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,

is unpublished.

The opinion of the United States district court appears at Appendix iS to

the petition and is

[ ] reported at

; or,

[ ] has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,

x1 is unpublished.

[ ] For cases from state courts:

The opinion of the highest state court to review the merits appears at

Appendix

to the petition and is

[ ] reported at

; or,

[ ] has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,

[ ] is unpublished.

The opinion of the

appears at Appendix

court

-

to the petition and is

[I reported at

; or,

[ ] has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,

[ ] is unpublished.

1.

to

JURISDICTION

j4 For cases from federal courts:

The date on which the United States Court of Appeals decided my case

was 4PRLIL

OL7[ I No petition for rehearing was timely filed in my case.

fr1 A timely petition for rehearing was denied by the United States Court of

17

Appeals on the following date: DEC 7)

, and a. copy of the

order denying rehearing appears at Appendix C

[1 An extension of time to file the petition for a writ of certiorari was granted

to and including

(date) on ____________________ (date)

in Application No.

A______

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U. S. C. § 1254(1).

[ ] For cases from state courts:

The date on which the highest state court decided my case was

A copy of that decision appears at Appendix

[I A timely petition for rehearing was thereafter denied on the following date:

and a copy of the order denying rehearing

appears at Appendix

[ J An extension of time to file the petition for a writ of certiorari was granted

to and including

(date) on

(date) in

Application No.

A_______

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U. S. C. § 1257(a).

61

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

Amendment 1

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of relgion

or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress

of grievances.

Amendment Vii

In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved,

and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any

court of the United States, than according to the rules of the

common law.

Amendment 1X

The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not

be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.

Amendment X

-

The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution

nor prphibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states

respectively, or to the people.

Amendment X1V

All persons or naturalized in th.e United States and subject to the

jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the

State wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law

which shall abrige the privileges or immunities of citizens of

the United States, nor shall any State deprive any person of life

liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any

person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

1. Title Vii of the Civil Rights Act, of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e.

American With Disabilities Act, (ADA) *42 U.S.C. 12101-12213.

Equal Pay Act, (29 U.S.C. 206(d))

6. Civil Rights Act of 1866 (Section 1981).

NERC, State law (NRS 613.340).

FMLA,of 1993, 9 105 (a)(2), 29 U.S.C.A. S 2615 (a)(2).

TEX. DEPT., OF COMNTY. AFFAIRS, V. BURDINE, 450 U.S. 248 (1981).

Noyes v Kelly Services, 488 F.3d 1163,*1170 (2007).

MCDONNELL DOUGLAS CORP. V. GREEN, L1 J

3

U.S..7*804 (1973).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Concerning the proceedings in Appendix A.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT.

In Noyes v. Kelly Services, 488 F.3d 1163, at* 1170 (2007).

The Ninth Circuit, ruled that: 2. The District Court's misapplication of ST. Mary's Honor, was taken out of context. It states:

"The district court did not apply the proper law governing

proof of pretext, but, rather, imposed a heavier burden on

Noyes at summary judgment. According to the district court,to

show pretext, Noyes had to show both that Kelly Services'

proffered reason was false, and that discrimination was the

real reason".

Further down it states:

"The showing required to direct a finding on the ultimate fact

of intentional discrimination is obviously different and more

difficult than the burden imposed on a plaintiff to raise a

triable issue of fact as to pretext sufficient to defeat

summary judgment".

This ruling and findings from the Ninth Circuit, is in direct

conflict with their ruling in my case for the same important

matter.

For instance, in my case the Ninth Circuit, took the position

that is stated in Appendix A., of their affirm decision on page 3

lines 7 through 8, states:

"We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly

raised and argued in the opening brief".

Furthermore, in Appendix B, on page 6. lines 1 through 6 state$

"plaintiff in a Title Vii case must establish a prima facie

case of discrimination." Cordova v. State Farm Ins. Cos., 124

F.3d 1145, 1148 (9th Cir. 1997). "If the defendant provides

such a reason, then in order to prevail, the plaintiff must

demonstrate that this reason is pretextual."

To demonstrate is to show or prove.

On lines 24 through 27, states:

"Starks argues only that he performed satisfactorily for his

first fifteen years of employment. However, that fact alone

is insufficient evidence to "show" that Starks was performing

satisfactorily at the time he was terminated"....

4

At this stage my burden was simply to raise a triable issue of

material fact, not to show I was performing satisfactorily at the

time I was terminated.

On page 7, lines 2 and 3, states:

"Starks points to no evidence to show the Court that he was

performing his job satisfactorily when he was involuntarily

terminated"

.

On lines 5 through 7, states:

"he was not satisfactorily performing his duties as a baker at

the time of his termination. Accordingly, Starks has not satisfied his burden to establish a prima facie case of race

discrimination".

District Court limited its findings, for me to show that I was

performing my job satisfactorily at the time I was terminated; as

a opposed to rasing a genuine issue of material fact, that may

not have had anything to do with whether or not I was performing

satisfactorily at the time I was terminated. This burden was even

S

heavier than that burden - in Nbyes v. Kelly Services, at*1170; because what district court states in notes 5 and 6, on lines 23

through 28.

In note 5, states:

"Because Starks does not meet his burden to show he performed

his job satisfactorily, the Court will not address whether

similary situated individuals outside his protected class

were treated more favorably".

By refusing to address whether similary situated individuals

were treated more favorably, made it impossible to establish a

prima fade case of racial discrimination by not addressing

element (4); ii which prevented me from raising a triable issue.

This impossible burden that district court had imposed on me,

was even heavier than the burden that had existed in Texas Dept.

Of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, at*255(1981); that

was imposed on the defendant and this U.S. Supreme Court, granted

certiorari to the U.S.C. Of Appeals For The Fifth Circuit; based

on the finding of that burden.

In note 6, states:

"The Court notes that this requirement applies to circumstantial evidence, not to direct evidence. See Dominguez-Curry

v. Nev. Ttansp. Dept., 424 F.3d 1027, 1038 (9th Cir. 2005)

(holding that specific and substantial requirement does not

apply where discrimination plaintiff brought forth direct

evidence of discriminatory animus). Starks claim proceeds on

the basis of cir cumstantial evidence, as he does not present

any direct evidence of bias against African American employee

or in favor of non-African American employees".

This statement in this note 6, is clearly an erroneous statement; because I had presented ample direct evidence of bias

against me, as a Black American; and ample direct evidence of retaliation.

For instance, in Exhibit 6, Voluntary Statement 11-6-11. On

page 2 of 11, lines 4 through 9, Jorge Villa, my supervisor approached me and said:

"Jimie, the last three times you did muffins you early out before you had finished the muffins; So, today Alex, my boss

said "you have to do muffins today".

-

Further down on lines 17 through 20, stating:

"my daily schedule says I'm to do the filling finishing station today". Jorge said "no Alex, told me to have you do muffins today".

On page 4 of 11, lines 5 through 8, stating:

Jorge asked "are you refusing to do muffins today yes or no"?

I responded "for the above reasons no". Jorge, then said "leave

and go home". I said "ok".

On page 5 of 11, lines 5 through 8, Jorge said:

"his boss Alex, want Jimie, to do muffins today because for

the last three times Jimie, did muffins he went home early

and didn't finish the muffins due to FMLA".

Jorge, was speaking to Security Officer Josh.

On page 6 of 11, lines 2 through 4, Jorge, said to Josh, "no

he refused earlier so I want Jimie, to go home". This was after

Josh, had asked me was I willing to work this out?

These five statements by Jorge and Jorge quoting Alex, and their

actions, for sending me home unjustly for insubordination; constitute direct evidence of retaliation, a hostile work environment;

-

in violation of FMLA, of 1993, S 105 (a)(2), 29 U.S.C.A. S 2615(a

(a)(2); sec. 703(a)(1) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.

s 2000e-2(a)(1) and 2000e-3(a); and state law (NRS 613.340).

In Exhibit 7, on page 3 of 4, is a Request for information

from Health Care Provider. Jan. 16, 2012. Sent to me by NicoleHaliburton, the Defendant's H.R., Rep., concerning my FMLA, benefit. This request letter on the above date was in violation of

FMLA, of 1993, S 105 (a)(2), 29 U.S.C.A. S 2615 (a)(2); and the

EEOC, Guidance: Retaliation for Discrimination. Which provides

protection for (A14) and protect individuals from coercion, intimidation, threats, harassment, or interference in their exercise of their own rights .... etc.

Because, prior to Jan. 16, 2012, I had not agreed to be subjected to any "interactive process"; and this request constitute

direct evidence for retaliation, harassment and interference with

my rights to exercise my FMLA, benefit.

Also, on page 6 of 6, second paragraph lines 6 through 8, concerning the night of 11-6-11, that was demonstrated in Exhibit 6,

Haliburton states:

"I would also like to clarify that you actually received pay

for a full 8 hours of work on November 6, 2011, even though

you were sent home early for insubordination".

This admission put together with the admission in Exhibit 8,

on page 2 of 2, lines 3 through 6, states:

"Haliburton investigated..., but did not find any wrongdoing..

Haliburton called Plaintiff on or about November 7, 2011

and advised him that he should return to work on that evening

for his scheduled shift."

Both of these two admissions establish that I was sent home

unjustly for insubordination and both admissions constitute direc-Jevidence for retaliation. Invoking Fed. Rule Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A).

Nicole Haliburton, Alex Veliz and Jorge Villa, were three of

four decisionmakers whom were responsible for terminating me on

7

Aug. 22,2012 and based on case laws, any discriminatory or retaliatory actions or remarks by decisionmakers makes summary judgment

inappropriate. See Mayes v. Winco Holdings, Inc., 846 F.3d 1274

*1279 (2017) and headnotes[11 1, [12J.

In Exhibit 23, Voluntary Statement 3-6-12. On Feb. 29, 2012, I

had failed several minutes short of finishing my task before luncfr

at 1:00 A.M., my supervisor Johnny, releaved me. When I had asked

if I could complete the task, without looking at me with a very

hostile demeanor said "no".

While on lunch at about 1:20 A.M., waiting to eat with a coworker from another dept., Johnny, approached me with a large pan

of croissants and lightly tossed them on the counter right next

to me and said:

-

you know those choc. croissants, were over proof and a little

flat and I got these off JJ's, and they are a little flat".

I said "fix the- ovens", Johnny said "what ovens''- ? -I said "the

two I was using".... and I said "Johnny, man I'm on lunch so

go and leave me alone". Johnny said "ok",

he then snatched up the pan of croissants and stormed out of the

break room causing a very embarrassing scene in front of my coworkers. These action by Johnny and what he said to me constitute a

very hostile work environment and are direct evidence of racial

harassment. Because, Johnny, did not treat my co-workers this way

whom were similary situated, but not of my protected class Black

American, Johnny,was the fourth decisionmaker when I was terminatdg

In Exhibit 1, is direct evidence of bias against me, as a

Black American. It is the Defendant's Bakery Disciplinary Action,

Oct. 10, 2012, list of co-workers from the bread crew side of the

bakery including myself but does not list any of my immediate coworkers from the breakfast pastry crew in which I was a member of

Whom all were disciplined for performance violations of comparableseriousness and similar violations. But, I was the only Black-

Ri

American,the only member of a protected class and as of Aug. 22,

2012, I was the only one terminated on the list.

In Exhibit 2, on page 2 of 4, lines 14 through 19. Chef Bruno,

once openly approached me one hour into the beginning of a shift

and said:

"he was keeping time on how much work I've got done up to this

point and that I should of had more done".

This statement by Bruno, constitute direct evidence of racial

harassment and a hostile work environment. Bruno, never approache4

any of my co-workers in this manner, whom were similary situated

but not of my protected class Black American.

On page 3 of 4, lines 1 through 3. Bruno sai/:in front of my

co-workers that:

"the following week he will be working on my shift and he will

push me to work faster". I responded "if you push me to work

faster then you are going to have to push my co-workers too

and the new guy that I'm training right now".

-

-

This statement by Bruno, constitute direct evidence of racial

harassment and a hostile work environment.

On page 3 of 4, lines 7 through 14. I onced started the shift

an hour early and Bruno, notice and had then swing shift supervisor Jesus, to send me back down stairs for the one hour. I asked

Jesus:

"why was he sending me back"? "When there was two other coworkers whom started early too". Jesus replied 'I don't know

he (Bruno) just told me to send you back".

This statement by Jesus, quoting Bruno and their actions of

sending me back and allowing my co-workers to stay; constitute

j

vide,i e o

racial discrimination and a hostile work environment; in violation

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, S 703(a)(1), 42 U.S.C.A. S 2000e-.

(a) (1).

On page 3 of 4, lines 15 through 21. Concerning the point system, when it was implemented back in Oct. 1, 2003. In relation to

tardiness. I had witness Bruno, looking the other way when my co-

workerswould be late. But the first time I was 4, minutes late

he(Bruno)approached me concerning it. This was direct evidence of

racial harassment and a hostile work environment.

On page 4 of 4, lines 15 through 20. I stated:

"I should have been consider for one of those promotions. I am

simply requesting that Chef Bruno hiring and promotional procedures be scrutinize by someone higher up in management to

ensure equal opportunity is given to all who has earned it."

This portion of this statement was written due to the Defendant's unlawful employment practices for failure to promote; in

reference to Exhibit 3.

In Exhibit 3, is a statement to the EEOC, /-j.g--)/

fist of

co-workers whom all were promoted over me, which was approximately (13) times. In which I was more qualified than ten and was equally as the remaining two. And, since the above statement was

written and filed in the Defendant's H.R. Dept., on 7-17-05, the

Defendant has promoted 4, co-workers over me and had hired in

two additional co-workers as supervisors; without given me any

notices, opportunities in the form of an application, nor did

they properly post a Bid that I could have signed.

These two statements collectively give rise to an inference of

unlawful discrimination; in the same manner as Burdine's application in Tex. Dept. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 25253 (1981) ;4nd it stayed on file alot longer than Burdine's application and during that time the Defendant continued to promote coworkers over me and hired in supervisors over me. Which is direct

evidence of bias against me, which is intentional discrimination.

Alex, family ties permeated the promotion process and hired

applicants. Alex, was the ultimate decisionmaker and he exercised

his supervisory authority in favor of his two biological brothers

when he promoted Johnny, over me and when he hired half brother

Jorge over me as a supervisor. See Noyes v. Kelly Services, 488 F-

10

.3d 1163,* 1171 (2007).

In Exhibit 3, * Heraclio Hernandez, on line 11, of this paragr_

aph states: He said (Bruno) "ok tonight when you come to work sigA

the Bid and apply on line".

And, on line 16, Heraclio, had informed me that he was the new

supervisor for the grave shift. He also, informed me that ChefBruno, had called him up earlier that day and told Heraclio, "to

meet him at H.R., to fill out paper work for the position".These

two statements by Bruno, and along with his actions of taking

down the bid prematurely, giving me the wrong web address, avoiding me concerning the matter and calling up Heraclio,to meet him

at H.R., to fill out paper work. These actions constitute direct

evidence for intentional racial discrimination for failier to

promote.

In Exhibit 4, Voluntary Statement - 7-13-05. On page 3 of 7,

lines 4 through 8. At*:

"remarks he (Rocky) has jokingly made against black and white

people in the past in which I was always offended do to the

fact that I am a biracial Black American".

Further down on lines 17 through 21. I'm stating:

"I have complained to Chef Bruno, on 6, occasion concerning a

lack of rotation in job duties and with Rocky, always giving

my hispanic co-workers first pick in job duties"....

Further down on lines 26 through 31. Stating (Rocky quotingBruno):

"you don't have to employ a rotation system you can assign

Jimie, to the same duties everyday and if Jimie, has a problem with this, that is something he has to deal with".

The remarks made by Rocky, my complaint to Bruno and Rocky

quoting Bruno, constitute direct evidence of racial discrimination and disparate treatment and a hostile work environment.

On page 4 of 7, lines 4 through 6. I'm stating:

"Solution to the problem implement a rotation system or let the

senior guy pick first".

On page 5 of 7, bottom paragraph 2. Such things as tardiness:

"when I'm late he likes to take special notice and make sure

my co-workers notice also, but when he's late which is very

offten or my co-workers are late he either has the perfect

excuse or he turns the other way and pretends not to notice."

On page 6 of 7, lines 3 through 6. Daily work assignments:

"he allows my co-workers to select whatever duties they desire

to work that day and I'm usely stuck with whatever is left".

On lines 10 through 14. When mistakes are made:

"he (Rocky) deals with my co-workers discreetly one pn one but

when it comes to me he makes a open issue out of it to the

point of being embarress or I'm offended".

For instance, on lines 22 Mi,gh 26, starting at:

"Mm. later Chef Ernesto showed up. I showed the product to

Ernesto and expressed to him that I didn't appreciate Rocky

approach. Rocky told Ernesto his side of the story in which

he'd expressed to Ernesto"he knows he may have approach me

(Jimie) in the wrong way but he was concerned about the product".

This statement by Rocky, was an admission; I'm invoking Fed.

Rule Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A). Also, the above examples of disparate

treatment and his statement to Ernesto, all constitute direct evidence of racial discrimination, harassment and a hostile work

environment; in violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, S 703

(a)(1), 42 U.S.C.A. S 2000e-2(a)(1).

On page 7 of 7, lines 10 through 17. He (Rocky) said to me

once that:

"he knows that I can do better" and my response was "if you are

going to make excuses or accept it from my co-workers well

then, do likewise for me because we are being paid the same

amount of money so then we should provide the same service".

Rocky's, statement here constitute direct evidence of racial

discrimination, harassment and a hostile work environment. Becaus

Rocky, did not treat my co-workers in this manner, whom were simi

lary situated, but not of my protected class Black American.

In Exhibit 11, Voluntary statement 9-27-06. On page 2 of 3,

lines 2 through 14. While I was speaking with a co-worker, my other co-worker Rey, walked by and called me a "lazy (M.F.-explicive)'

in english. I then approached him to inquired of him of why he

would say that to me. He (Rey) responded:

"(M.F.-explicive) tomarrow you are going to work the (F-ing--ex

plicive) ovens". I responded "(F-explicive) you". Rey, then

refered to my FMLA, benefit concerning my absenty the day before on 9-26-06 and went on to say "M.F.-explicive", you

weren't sick you're never sick you are just a lazy M.F.-explicive)".

These statements by my form e'o-worker Rey Lazoro, constitute

direct evidence of racial harassment and a hostile work environment.

In Exhibit 15, Voluntary Statement 8-29-10. On page 7 of 8,

lines 9 through 24, starting at: Jorge, came to me at 1:00 A.M. a

and said:

"Jimie, times up go to lunch". I asked him if I could finish?

he said "no go to lunch".

I reminded Jorge, that other co-workers such as Rey, Jose,

-Sergio and April1 are not givénthe full task that was given to

mer... Further down on lines 28 and 29, Jorge, responded:

"Jimie, you are more experience than they are".

Jorge's, bias similary situated

,

discriminatory statement in

favor of my former co-workers whom were not of my protected class

constitute direct evidence of racial bias against me a Black American.

In Exhibit 16, Voluntary Statement 12-17-10. On page 3 of 4,

lines 14 through 17, starting at: I asked Jorge,

"was he going to put the Sticky Buns and his pan of sm. muffins

in the office with my 4, muffins", he answered "no".

Jorges answer "no" and his actions of collecting my alleged

product infraction to be placed in office for a negative review

but not willing to do likewise with Quirrino1 s Lg. and sm. Sticky

Buns that were over proof and Jorge,'s, pan of sm. bran muffins

he underfilled when he was helping me and Quirrino. Both answer

and actions constitute direct evidence of racial bias for discrim-

'3

ination against me a Black American and in favor of himself....

InExhibit17, Charge Of Discrimination to the EEOC, 4-4-2011.

The primary reason this charge was filed, was due to the Defendant

repeated intentional discrimination. In this statement on lines 4

through 6, stating:

"I have expressed interest in those positions, however I was

denied. Respondent did not even post some of those positions

and therefore, I did not have a legitimate and equal opportunity to apply".

When Moises Alfaro, the last co-worker in Exhibit 3, that was

promoted over me, had accepted the Bid position for a Lead Baker,

although he immediately suited up as a supervisor, he was not introduce as a supervisor until after the above filing date to the

EEOC. And, since I had filed my Voluntary Statement 7-17-05, in

Exhibit 2, with the Defendant's H.R., Dept., expressing my interest in future opportunities for promotions, this statement to the

EEOC, was the second notification expressing my interest in future.

opportunities for promotions and again Parball chose to intentionally discriminate against me, by promoting Moises, as Relief Supervisor, See Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253,(1981).

In Exhibit 18, Voluntary Statement 4-29-11. In this exhibit

will demonstrate supervisor Jorge, failed attempt to create a product infraction. On page 2 of 5, lines 1 through 3, states:

"I notice supervisor Jorge, revising the master sheet to our

set up order for that day", lines 7 through 22, "I examen the

revised master set up sheet to see what changes he had made

to the order. I notice he had increased the order by two pans

for the small danish and two pans on the large raisn rolls,

in which he didn't say anything to me or my co-workers about

the changes. These were items that I had set up for that day.

I also notice that there were no other changes made on items

that my co-workers had set up, so I set up the additional to

the small danish and as I was rolling these items into the

Proofer to be proof for baking. Jorge, said to me "what happefl

Jimie, did you foreget to set these up"? I said no these are

the items you added on and didn't tell me".

Had I not notice Jorge, making these changes we would have been

short of product at the end of shift and I would have been responsible. Jorges actions and his question, constitute direct evidence of racial harassment and a hostile work environment; crrJ

disparate - treatment. Because, Jorge, did not treat my co-workers

in this manner, whom were similary situated but not of my protected class Black American.

In Exhibit 5, Culinary's Work Schedule, for Graveyard Stations

Duties, 9-28-10. On page 2 of 4, is a weekly, daily, rotation schedule. Approximately one year prior to my Voluntary Statement

7-13-05, thats in Exhibit 4, that was filed in the Defendant's

H.R., Dept., on that date and after seven solid years of suggesting and demanding, the Defendant finally implemented a rotation

system to help resolve some of my issues. On page 3 of 4, just

above my signature states: "assign work station for the day".

In Exhibit 20, Voluntary Statement 7-22-11. On page 3 of 10,

lines 18 through 22, states: supervisor Johnny, approached me and

said:

"I-need you to do me- a favor" I reluctantly said yes what is

it? He asked me "could you do muffins today because David,

doesn't know how to do muffins, I said "ok".

But, I immediately regrebe4it when I had realized Johnny, asked

that favor to punish me for taking protected leave on 7-20-11, 2,

days prior to this date. Exhibit 9, would demonstrate this fact.

On page 4 of 10, lines 11 through 24,,states:

"Johnny, brought the two racks over to me and asked if I could

cover and wrap them when I finish"? I asked Johnny, "if he

could have David, wrap them because I'm a little behind".

Johnny, said "well is it going to take that much more time to

do these"? and I said "well, yes and anyway I'm going to finish your favor so, could you have David, to finish my favor"?

Johnny, asked"what do you mean"? I said "you asked a favor

now you owe a favor and anyway I'm doing David, job I had an

easy day". Johnny, said "you guys are bakers and the schedule

and he paused, so I assumed he wanted to say the schedule is

not written in stone. He then said "when you guys come in we

can have you do whatever".

The point to be made here by Johnny's, statement and actions

proves that Parball's rules ment nothing to him and if he wanted

to punish me he did; the fact that I was on schedule for an easy

day ment nothing. This statement by Johnny, and his actions of

Jff

trading.myschedule easy day for David's, harder schedule; constitute direct evidence of racial discrimination, retaliation, a

hostile work environment and disparate treatment.

Example 2, on page 8 of 10, lines 6 through 15, states:

at this time with 17, mm. to go is when supervisor Johnny,

walked up and asked me what time did I start the order"? I don't remember my response but I'd implied to him that I still

have enough time to finish". Johnny, looked up at the clock

and walked over to the order form and started expressing to

me about how simple he thinks the banquet order was to him".

I said "yes but like I told you I still have time to finish".

Lines 23 through 25, "This back and forth went on for approximately 8, minutes at which time Johnny, looked up at the clocI

and said "I'm going to let you finish so, you can't say because I was talking to you; and I said "yes and you do this all

the time so that I can't finish on time; and being the supervisor you never accept responsibility for it".

And, one week later Johnny, wrote me up. Johnny's, unwelcome

verbal, when he had asked me what time I had started the order an

expressing how simple the order was all constitute direct evidence

-

of racial discrimination, -harassment, disparate treatment and a

hostile work environment. Because Johnny did not treat my former

co-workers in this manner, whom all were similary situaed but not

of my protected class Black American.

I just demonstrated more than a dozen examples of direct evidence with several more that is not mention up to this point and no

not one example was mention in the decisions of District Court,

or the Ninth Circuit, Appeals Courts.

In Exhibit 10, Performance Improvement Notice, 5-25-05. This

action was taken against me for allegedly "no call, no show", I

was suspended for three days. Pending termination. But, it was

retaliatory in nature and had no other basis, for why it was

given to me. Phone records prove the allegation to be false.

In Appendix B, on page 11 of 18, lines 10 through 11. States:

"Starks' retaliation claims fails because he does not provide:

sufficient evidence to establish a causal link between his

involvement in protected activities'...

For my first (15) years of employment, I had enjoyed a clean

-

_r?ccrdwithout any prior write ups for products infractions; but

that all changed. Because during this period my dept. under went

a change in management, which became an all hispanic team, that

consisted of three biological brothers. Alex Veliz, Johnny Veliz,

and Jorge Villa.

And, subsequently I became the subject of repeated write ups.

On 3-11-09, I received a write up, Performance Doc., for allegedly

over proofing large croissants. This write up had retaliatory

motives; with a causal link of 17, days.

In Exhibit 9, FMLA, Intermittent Protected Leave, call outs;

from Jan. 2006 through Aug. 2012, and during this time I had called out more than 324, times. And, it was my sincere belief that

due to my race, protected activity and my taking protected leave

were Parball's main motives for retaliating against me.

On 3-2-10, I received a write up,- Performance Doc., for allege dly over filling 40, large muffins. This was pure retaliation;

P1v fl

causal link of 2, days,

i

/ /ccuzc

On 5-23-10, I had received a Performance Doc., for allegedly

failing to finish in a timely manner. Johnny, purposely sabtmy time so that I wouldn't finish on time. Retaliation, causal

link of 11, days. Cx

-,

--

,r - c/.rA

On 7-19-11, I received a Performance Doc., for allegedly failing to finish on time. Johnny, had came to me about 17, minutes

before quitting time and harassed me to prevent me from finishing

on time. There was no dout that this was retaliatory, causal link

of 1, day.

ç-j- -

Lo1

On 8-4-11, I received a Performance Doc., for allegedly over

proofing all the large cinnamon rolls. Exhibit 9, will show a

causal link of 7, days. Retaliation! ck' prA

-J

On 10-28-11, I engaged in protected activity, Voluntary Statement to the EEOC, due to heighten levels of harassment and retaliation.

17

On 11-15-11, I engaged in protected activity with the EEOC,

Amended Charges for Retaliation.

On 3-15-12, I received a Performance Doc., for refusing tcb

clean off my table before lunch. I had refused the order because

I believed the order to be retaliatory; which is covered by law.

Causal link same day of taking protected leave; see Exhibit 9,

FMLA, callouts.

On 5-17-12, received EEOC's Notice of Suit Rights.

On 7-22-12, I received Performance Doc., for allegedly failed

to complete task in a timely manner.

On 8-12-12, I received a Performance Doc., for suspension Pending Investigation.

On 8-22-12, I received Performance Doc., for separation of employment.

-

As an employee, - I was a person entitled to protection under

Nevada's anti-discrimination statue, N.R.S. S 613.330 et seq. and

the aforemebtioned federal statutes, Title Vii and 5 1981.

The Defendant had a legal obligation, pursuant to the aforemention state and federal statutes, the policy of the State Of Nevadaand their own internal corporate policies, to maintain a workplace

free of unlawful discrimination.

Despite these laws, Defendant and its employees, subjected me

to different terms and conditions of employment because of my race

Black American.

-

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

In Noyes v. Kelly Services, 488 F.3d 1163, at* 1170 (2007).

The Ninth Circuit, ruled that: 2. The District Court's misapplication of ST. Mary's Honor, was taken out of context. It states:

"The district court did not apply the proper law governing

proof of pretext, but, rather, imposed a heavier burden on

Noyes at summary judgment. According to the district court,to

show pretext, Noyes had to show both that Kelly Services'

proffered reason was false, and that discrimination was the

real reason".

Further down it states:

"The showing required to direct a finding on the ultimate fact

of intentional discrimination is obviously different and more

difficult than the burden imposed on a plaintiff to raise a

triable issue of fact as to pretext sufficient to defeat

summary judgment".

This ruling and findings from the Ninth Circuit, is in direct

conflict with their ruling in my case for the same important

matter.

For instance, in my case the Ninth Circuit, took the position

that is stated in Appendix A., of their affirm decision on page 3

lines 7 through 8, states:

"We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly

raised and argued in the opening brief".

Furthermore, in Appendix B, on page 6, lines 1 through 6,state

"plaintiff in a Title Vil case must establish a prima facie

case of discrimination." Cordova v. State Farm Ins. Cos., 124

F.3d 1145, 1148 (9th Cir. 1997). "If the defendant provides

such a reason, then in order to prevail, the plaintiff must

demonstrate that this reason is pretextual."

To demonstrate is to show or prove.

On lines 24 through 27, states:

"Starks argues only that he performed satisfactorily for his

first fifteen years of employment. However, that fact alone

is insufficient evidence to "show" that Starks was performing

satisfactorily at the time he was terminated"....

At this stage my burden was simply to raise a triable issue of

material fact, not to show I was performing satisfactorily at the

time I was terminated.

On page 7, lines 2 and 3, states:

"Starks points to no evidence to show the Court that he was

performing his job satisfactorily when he was involuntarily

terminated".

On lines 5 through 7, states:

"he was not satisfactorily performing his duties as a baker at

the time of his termination. Accordingly, Starks has not satisfied his burden to establish a prima facie case of race

discrimination".

District Court limited its findings, for me to show that I was

performing my job satisfactorily at the time I was terminated; as

a opposed to raising a genuine issue of material fact, that may

not have had anything to do with whether or not I was performing

satisfactorily at the time I was terminated. This burden was even

heavIer than that burden- in Noyes v. Kelly Services, at*1170; because what district court states in notes 5 and 6, on lines 23

through 28.

In note 5, states:

"Because Starks does not meet his burden to show he performed

his job satisfactorily, the Court will not address whether

similary situated individuals outside his protected class

were treated more favorably".

By refusing to address whether similary situated individuals

were treated more favorably, made it impossible to establish a

prima facie case of racial discrimination by not addressing

element (4); iU which prevented me from raising a triable issue.

This impossible burden that district court had imposed on me,

was even heavier than the burden that had existed in Texas Dept.

Of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, at*255(1981); that

was imposed on the defendant and this U.S. Supreme Court, granted

certiorari to the U.S.C. Of Appeals For The Fifth Circuit; based

on the finding of that burden.

30

Based-on these two findings of heavy burdens that had existed

in Noyes v. Kelly Services, 488 F.3d 1163, at*1170 (2007); and

Texas Dept. Of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 1 *255

(1981); and the impossible burden that was imposed on me in my

case by District Court and the Ninth Circuit; for the same

important matter. These are three valid reason for granting the

petition in this case.

The laws should be consistent and reflect uniformity.

Also, based on the ample direct evidence in this case, should

have been sufficient to allow me to bypass the McDonnell Douglas

framework; and summary judgment should have been inappropriate.

See Fabela v. Socorro Indep. School District, 329 F.3d 409, 415,

and Footnote [81 (5th Cir. 2003).

Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit, ruling in my case conflicts

-

with their ruling in: Cordova, v.-State Farm Insurance Company,

124 F.3d 1145, at* 1148 (1997); stating:

"A plaintiff can also establish a prima fade case of disparate

treatment without satisfying the McDonnell Douglas test, if

she provides evidence suggesting that the employment decision was

based on a discriminatory criterion".

Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit, ruling in Godwin, v. Wesson,

Inc., 150 F.3d 1217, *1219 (1998); states:

"a plaintiff who offers substantial evidence that the employer

proffered reasons were not reliable".... "or direct evidence

of discrimination. See Cordova v. State Farm Ins., 124 F.3d

1145, 1150 (9th Cir. 1997), has made a sufficient showing to

create a triable issues with respect to the employer's motivation".

For examples of direct evidence, see Concise Statement, or

Direct and Concise Argument, in my case.

Finally, the Ninth Circuit, ruling in

case conflicts with

their ruling in Santillan, v. USA Waste of Ca., Inc., 853 F.3d

1035 (9th Cir. 2017); for the same important matter.

The Ninth Circuit, conducted a complete weighted review of the

material facts of this case and properly reversed the District9%'

-

-

Court's erroneous decision; but in my case the Ninth Circuit, tooK

the position stating:

"We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly

raised and argued in the opening brief".

And, affirmed district court's erroneous decision. Even though

I had sincerly thought, I had clearly presented the evidence.

In Appendix B, on page 12 of 18, lines 2 through 4, states:

"Parball presents legitimate reasons for terminating Starks,

which Starks fails to demonstrate as being pretextual."

District Court imposed to heavy of a burden on me to prove at

that stage, to prove retaliation as a posed to raisn a triable

issue of material fact.

DIRECT AND CONCISE ARGUMENT

1

For instance, See Exhibit 1, Defendant's Bakery Disciplinary

2 Action, list of co-workers from the bread crew side of the bakery

3 including myself but does not list any of my immediate co-workers

from the breakfast pastry crew in which I was a member of. Whom

all were disciplined for performance violations of comparable

6 seriousness and similar violations. But, I was the only Black

-

7 American, the only member of a protected class and as of Aug. 22,

8 2012, I was the only one terminated on this list; in violation of

SS 703 (a)(1) and 704 (a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 429

U.S.C. 99 2000e-2(a)(1) and 2000e-3(a). See McDonell Douglas Corp

10

v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 at*804, (1973); See Sischo-Nownejad v.

11

Merced Community College Dist., 934 F.2d 1104, 1109 n.7 (9th Cir.

12

1991).

13

Concerning the second part of element (4) "or other circumst14 ances surrounding the adverse employment action that give rise to

an inference of discrimination".

15

16

Refer back to line 8, of this argument where it states:

"Parball does not dispute that Starks performed satisfactorily

for fifteen years".

17

During this period I was passed over for promotion approximate

18

ly (13) times. See Exhibit 3, Statement to the EEOC, 9-15-11.

19

These are all former co-workers who were similary situated,

20

but not of my protected class Black American.

21

I was more qualified than ten of these individuals and was

22 equally as qualified as the remaining two.

23

At*Heraclio Hernandez, and after reading.refer back to line 11

24 He said (Bruno) "ok tonight when you come to work 5:9r3 the bid and

apply on line".

25

And, on line 16, Heraclio, had informed me that he was the new

26

supervisor for the grave shift. He also, informed me that Chef27

Bruno, had called him up earlier that day and told Heraclio,

28 "to meet him at H .R. to fill out paper work for the position.".

-

.

1

These two statements by Bruno, and along with his actions of

2 taking down the bids prematurely, giving me the wrong web address

3 avoiding me concerning the matter and calling up Heraclio, to

4

meet him at H.R. to fill out paper work. These actions constitute

5 direct evidence for intentional racial discrimination for failier

6 to promote; in violation of the Civil Rights Act, of 1964, S 701

et seq., 42 U.S.C.A. S 2000e et seq.; Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. Rule

7

8 56(c), 28 U.S.C.A. See Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdin

9

10

11

450 U.S. 248, 253,(1981) See Cordova v. State Farm Insurance Corn

anies, 124 F .3d 1145, 1147, 1148, (1997),

When I was asked to acclimate Heraclio, was mis-spoken. I had

actually trained Heraclio; and was acting as his supervisor for

12

for approximately (2) years prior to him being promoted over me.

13

I had more seniority, qualification and was more experienced than

14 he was.

15

At* Oralia De Perez, again acclimating her was grossly mis-

16 spoken. I gave her a more extensive training than I did Heraclio.

17

A lso,

I need to correct the hired period, for Oralia, was in 2004

18 and in 2005, she was promoted over me as Chef Bruno's Assistant

19 Pastry Chef/supervisor. Again there was no Bid posted. I had way

20 more seniority than Oralia, did and my years of qualifidations

21 and experience exceeded the years of her age at that time.

22

At* Johnny Veliz, is one of two younger biological brothers of

23 Chef Alex Veliz. Johnny, was hired in by Alex, as a bread baker

24 and approximately two to three years later Alex, peomoted Johnny,

25 over me as my supervisor.

26

27

28

I had a strong presence in helping with Johnny's training.

ain there was no bid posted and like Oralia, I had more seniority than Johnny and my qualifications and years of experience exeded Johnny's age too.

1

At* Periceles Cordova, when Periceles, joined the graveyard

2 shift, I was his acting supervisor, when Philip Williams, was not

3 available. See..at* Heraclio Hernandez, lines 3 and 4.

4

At* Jorge Villa, it was rumored that Jorge, was the biological

5 half brother of Alex, or his brother-in-law. I'm not sure.

2

At* Moises Alfaro, Alex, had deceptively posted a bid for a

6

7 Lead Baker, so that I would not sign it and I did not; and im8 mediately Noises, received the bid for Lead Baker; but he was

suited up as a Relief Supervisor, in training. I will demonstrate

9

more on this point shortly in exhibit 17.

10

At* Alex Veliz, the Defendant did not post any notice for Ex11

ecutive Pastry. Chef, prior to Alex, being promoted to Executive

12

13

Pastry Chef.

Because, shortly after when I was hired the Defendant had en-

14 gaged in Unlawful Employment Practices, that included unlawful

15 hiring practices. See Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438,16 U.S. at* 567 (1978); See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411

-

17 U.S. 792, at* 794 (1973).

18

The Defendant has never given me any notices for any openings

19 in supervision; and has never given me any opportunities in the

20 form of an application; and nor did they ever properly post a bid

21 that I could have signed. Being that this was a Culinary Union's

22 position, in which the Defendant violated the Culinary Union's

23 Collected Barganing Agreement repeatedly.

All of these non postings were due to the Defendant's intent24

25 ional racial discrimination; against me as a Black American; a

26 member of a protected class; to prevent me from being promoted

The evidence demonstrate that a protected characteristic was

27

a motivating factor in the adverse employment actions; and sum28

mary judgment should have been precluded. Civil Rights Act of-

1 1964, S 703(a)(1), 42 U.S.C.A. S 2000e-2(a)(1); Fed. Rules Civ.

2 Proc. Rule 56(c), 28 U.S.C.A.; See Postal Service Bd. of Governor

v Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716 (1983); See Price Waterhouse v.

Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 245-246 (1989); and See ST. MARY'S HONOR

CENTER et al. v. HICKS, 509 U.S. 502 at* 511 (1993).

6

For the record the Defendant has not challenged these assertions in exhibit 3; only acknowleged them. Therefore, I am involking Fed. Rule 56(c)(e)(2).

8

So, because of these unlawful employment practices, is what

9

prompt me to engaged in protected activity on 7-17-05. See Exhibi

10

2, Voluntary Statement 7-17-05. On page 2 of 4, lines 1 through

11

12

14. I am expressing it is my sincere belief that Chef Bruno Vaxia

ne, singled handedly created a hostile work environment between

13 him and myself and me and my co-workers.

14

For instance, on page 2 of 4, lines 14 through 19. Bruno, once

15 openly approached me one hour into the beginning of theshift and

16 said "he was keeping time on how much work I've got done up to

17 this point and that I should of had more done".... This comment

disc

1t)€ (direct evidence) of

18 C

hostile racial*harassmentE1

19

20

101c-dci Of 44-u

/'i R 49 ti'e f1o'-

g 7o3(x).)9scz-

Example 2: on page 3 of 4, lines 1 through 3. Bruno said in

21 front of my co-workers that "the following week he will be work22

ing on my shift and he will push me to work faster"; I responded

23

"if you push me to work faster then you are going to have to push

co-workers too and the new guy that I'm training right now".

24 my

This statement constitute direct evidence of a hostile, racial

25

harassment. Bruno, never said this to my co-workers, who are

26

similary situated, but not of my protected class, Black American.

27

Civil Rights Act of 1964, 5 703(a)(1), 42 U.S.C.A. S 2000e-2(a)(1

28

()(i)

1 Example 3: on page 3 of 4, lines 7 through 14. I once started the

2 shift an hour early and Bruno, notice and had then swing super3 visoresus, to send me back down stairs for one hour. I asked

Jesus, "why was he sending me back"? When there was two other coworkers whom started early too". Jesus repliedI don't know he (

6 Bruno) just told me to send you back". This statement by Jesus,

7

(quoting Bruno) and their action of sending me back for one hour

and allowing my co-workers who are similary situaded but not of

8

my protected class, black American; to start early, constitute

9

direct evidence of hostile racial discriminatory harassment; in

10

violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, S 703(a)(1), 42 U.S.C.

11

A. S 2000e-2(a)(1). See Mayes v. Winco Holdings, Inc., 846 F .3d

12 1274 at* 1278 (2017); and headnotes.

13

Example 4: on page 3 of 4, lines 15 through 21. Concerning the

14 point system, when it was implemented back in Oct. 1, 2003, in

15 relation to tardiness. I had witness Bruno, looking the other way

16 when my co-workers would be late; but the first time I was 4, mm

17 late he approached me concerning it. This action constitute dit18 ect evidence of hostile racial discriminatory harassment. Civil19 Rights Act of 1964, S 703(a)(1), 42 U.S.C.A. S 2000e-2(a)(1). See

20 Dominguez-Curry, v. Nevada Transp. Dept.; Roc Stacey, 424, F.3d21

1027, at*headnotes: 4, 9, 10, 11, 19, 21, 27 and at* Background.

Also, on page 4 of 4, lines 15 through 20. I stated: "I should

22

23 have been considered for one of those promotions". (Referring to

24 co-workers whom were promoted over me that is listed in Exhibit 3

I go on to state: "I am simply requesting that Chef Bruno, hiring

25

and promotional procedures be scrutinize by someone higher up in

26

management to ensure equal opportunity is given to all who has

27

earned it".

28

III

111 Due to the Defendant purposely denying me any opportunities in

2 the form of a notice, application, or a properly posted Bid for

e to sign. I was prompted to file this statement to show that I

was being intentionally discriminated against; due to my race; a

Black American; and retaliated against for opposing racial discr• 6 imination in the work place; in violation of sec. 703(a)(1) and

704(a), of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. SS 2000e-2(a)

(1) and 2000e-3(a).

8

And, since this Voluntary Statement was filed on 7-17-05, in

9

the Defendant's H.R. Dept.,and prior to my termination date of

10

Aug. 22, 2012; the Defendant had promoted (4) co-workers from

11

within my department and hired in two other supervisors within

12 this time period; all of whom were similary situated, but not of

13 my protected class Black American; and their names were Johnny14 Veliz, the younger biological brother of Alex, Periceles Cordova

15 Moises Alfaro and Alex Veliz. See Exhibit 3, Voluntary Statement

16 9-15-11, gee etJose Lujan through Alex Veliz.

1711

Also, See Texas Dept. Of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.

at* 253 and 260, footnote [6]; See Noyes v. Kelly Services,

18

248

19

488 F.3d 1163 at* 1171 and headnote [91, (2007); See Anthony Ash

20 v. Tyson Foods Inc., 546, U.S. (2006); and See LINDAHL.V. AIR

21

22 11

FRANCE, 930 F.2d 1434, at* 1436, 1437 1438, (1991).

See Exhibit 17, Charge Of Discrimination to the EEOC, 4-4-201

23

In this exhibit there is one significant thing to point out, tha

24

prior to now, I had previously failed to point out. On lines 4

25

through 6, stating: "I have expressed interest in those position

26

27

however I was denied. Respondent did not even post some of those

positions and therefore, I did not have a legitimate and equal

opportunity to apply".

28

1

The one significant thing is, when the intake Officer of the

2 EEOC, was taking down my statement, he inadvertently left out the

3 word promotions.

4

Moises Alfaro, is the last co-worker listed in Exhibit 3, who

was promoted over me. When Moises, had accepted the Bid position

6 for a Lead Baker, although he immediately suited up as a supervisor; he did the duties of a Lead Baker, and was not introduce

8 as a supervisor until shortly after the filing of this Charge Of

Discrimination to the EEOC, on April 4, 2011.

9

Moises', promotion constitute direct evidence of intentional

10

racial Discrimination and retaliation; for filing a Charge Of Dis

11

crimination with the EEOC, on April 4, 2011; in violation of sec.

12

703(a)(1) and 704(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.

13 S2000e-2(a)(1) and 2000e-3(a); and FMLA,&F

14

See Exhibit 9, FMLA, Intermi-

15 ttent Protected Leave, call outs; from Jan. 2006 through Aug.201

16 On page 8 of 10, in the month of April, I was absent for 5- days1

17 in May, 7 days, In June, 3 days, in July, 8 days and I know MoisE

18 was promoted before 8-4-11, because he was the supervisor that

19 1 night who was responsible for having me written up on 8-4-11. S

20 reguardless when he was promoted during this 4, month period a

21 11 close causal connection can be establish.

22

This statement to the EEOC, expressing my interest in those

23 promotions that are listed in Exhibit 3, represent the second

24 11 time I put the Defendant on notice that I was interested in fut25

ure promotions; since my Voluntary Statement in Exhibit 2, dated

7-17-05; expressing my interest in future opportunities for pro-

26

motions. Prior to Moises, being promoted; but yet, the Defendant

27

continued to intentionally discriminate against me. See Texas

28

Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254,(1981);

i

See Marsha GODWIN, V. HUNT WESSON, INC., 150 F.3d 1217, 1219,

2 1220 (1998); and See Wallis v. J.R. Simplot Co., 26 F.3d 885, 889

(1994); and See Metzler v. Fed. Home Loan 464 F.3d(2006) at* 22,

sec. A. Prima Fade Case of Retaliation.

See Exhibit 1, Defendant's Bakery Disciplinary Action, Oct.10,

6 2012. Kenneth Gayle, was similary situated, but not of my protect

ed class Black American. He would go on FMLA, protect.4

8

leave,

ranging from six months to one year.1 minus one day; and exaust all

of his leave time and would not be disciplined with attendance

9

points and nor was he ever retaliated against as I was; even t

10

gh everybody on the list committed comparable violations of the

11

same seriousness and I was the only one on the list terminated.

12

See Exhibit 22, Voluntary Statement to the EEOC, 10-28-11. On

13 this date I had engaged in protected activity and the Defendant

14 retaliated against me on 11-6-11; See Exhibit 6, Voluntary State15 ment 11-6-11.

On page 2 of 11, lines 4 through 9.Torge Villa,

16 my supervisor approached me and said:

17

"Jimie, the last three times you did muffins you early out be

fore you had finished the muffins"; so, today Alex, my boss said

18 "you have to do muffins today".

19

This statement by Jorge

and Jorge, quoting Alex, constitute.

20

direct evidence of retaliation for engaging in protected activity

21

on 10-28-11 and engaging in protected activity, by taking inter-

22

mittent protected leave; in violation of the Civil Rights Act of

23

24

1964, 42 U.S.C. ss 2000e-2(a)(1) and 2000e-'3(a), and - state law

(NRS 613.340); and FMLA, of 1993, S 105(a)(2), 29 U.S.C.A. 5 2615

(a)(2). See Berman v. Orkin Exterminating Co., Inc.,160 F.3d 697

25

at* 700 (1998); See Smothers v. Solvay Chemicals, Inc., 740 F.3d

26

530 At* 540 (2014).

27

Further down on lines 17 through 20, stating: my daily schedu

28

says I'm to do the filling finishing station today". Jorge said

3/

1

"no Alex, told me to have you do muffins today". This statemen

2 by Jorge, constitute direct evidence of retaliation, second count

3 jJfor the same situation.

On page 4 of 11, lines 5 through 8, stating: Jorge, then asked

me again "are you refusing to do muffins today yes or no"? I re6 sponded "for the above reasons no". Jorge, then said "leave and

go home". I said "ok". This statement by Jorge, constitute direct

8 evidence of retaliation, count three for the same situation.

9

On page 5 of 11, lines 5 through 8,Jorge, said: "his boss Alex

want Jimie, to do muffins today because for the last three times

10

Jimie, did muffins he went home early and didn't finish the muffins due to FMLA". This statement by Jorge, constitute direct evid

12

ence of retaliation,count four due to me taking FMLA, protected

13

14

15

leave.

On page 6 of 11, lines 2 through 4. Jorge, said to Josh,"no he

refused earlier so I want Jimie, to go home". This was after Josh

16 had asked me was I willing to work this out? This statement by Jo

17 rge, constitute direct evidence of retaliation, count five for

18 engaging in protected activity; All counts constitute direct evid

19 ence of retaliation, in violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964

20 42 U.S.C. 88 2000e-2(a)(1) and 2000e-3(a), and state law (NRS)21

613.340); and FMLA, of 1993, 8 105(a)(2), 29 U.S.C.A. 8 2615(a)(2

22 See Sischo-Nownejad v. Merced Community College District, 934 F23

24

25

26

.2d 1104, at* 1112 (1991).

refused the order because of the retaliatory motives behind

it; so I was well within my rights to do so but I was sent home

for insubordination see on page 8 of 11, line 4, "refusing to obey"...., and on page 9 of 11, is the daily rotation schedule

27

that is presented in exhibit 5. Jorge and Alex, wanted me to

28

give up my easy day duties, to take on co-worker Rafael's,

1

heavier muffin duties. So that they could punish.

- me for my usage

2

of my FMLA, benefit.

On page 10 of 11, is my pay stub for that pay period of the

night of 11-6-11; that shows I was not paid a full 8, hours when

Jorge, suspended me and sent me home.

6

On page 11 of 11, I had engaged in protected activity on

2-10-12, concerning the night of 11-6-11. Nicole Haliburton,

8

9

did conduct an investigation and found no wrong doing and

di

call me back to work on 11-7-11, but did not pay me a full S

hours and lied about it. See Exhibit7, Voluntary Statement

10

2-17-12.

11

12

13

This on page 2 of 4, was written in response to the request

letter on page 3 and 4.On page 3 of 4 the date Jan. 16,2012, on

this date this request constitute direct evidence of retaliation

14

in violation of the FMLA, of 1993, sec. 105 (a)(1) , 29 U.S.C.A.

15

sec. 2615 (a)(2); and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.

16

sec. 2000e-2(a)(1) and 2000e-3(a) and state law (NRS 613.340).'

17

Because up to the above date I had not agreed to engaged in

18

any "interactive process". Also, it was prohibited to interfere

19

with my FMLA, benefit in anyway unless I had agreed to it The

20

request had retaliatc./'y'motives. See Smothers v Solvay Chemical

21

Inc, 740 F.3d 530 *534 (2014).

22

23

24

25

On page 6 of 6 1 second paragraph on lines 6 through 8, stat-'

ing: "I would also like to clarify that you actually received

pay for a full 8 hours of work on November 6, 2011,even

though you were sent home early for insubordination".

This is where Haliburton, lied about my pay; andthe second

half of this statement is an admission; pursuant to Fed. Rule

26

56(c)(1)(A); Haliburton confirming that I was sent home unjustl

27

See Exhibit 8, on page 2 of 2, lines 3 through 6, states:

28

'

y

1

2

3

4

"Haliburton investigated..., but did not find any wrongdoing"...

"Haliburton called Plaintiff on or about November 7, 2011 and

advised him that he should return to work on that evening for h

his schedule shift".

Both of these two admissions establish that I was sent home

unjustly for insubordination and both admissions constitute

direct evidence for retaliation. Therefore, I'm invoking Fed.

6

Rule Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A).

Nicole Haliburton, Alex Veliz, Johnny Veliz and Jorge Villa,

8 were the four decisionmakers whom were responsible for termin9

ating me and based on this fact, summary judgment should have

10

been precluded. See Dominguez-Curry v Nevada Transp. Dept. 424

ii

F.3d 1027 *1033 and 1034 (2005); and headnotes 4,11,12,20 and 27

12

See Mayes v Winco Holdings, Inc., 846 F.3d 1274 *1279 and 1281

13

(2017); and headnotes 11 and 12.

14

15

See Exhibit 23, Voluntary Statement 3-6-12. On Feb. 29, 2012

I had failed several minutes short of finishing my task, due to

the unfair work conditions I was subjected to. At 1:00 A.M.,my

16

supervisor Johnny, releaved me. when I had asked if I could

17

complete the task, without looking at me with a very hostile

18

demeanor he said "no".

19

While on lunch at about 1:20 A.M., waiting to eat, Johnny,

20

21

22

approached me with a large pan of croissants and lightly tossed

them on the counter right next to me and said:

24

"you know these choc. croissants, were over proof and a little

flat and I got these off JJ's, and they are a little flat".

i said "fix the ovens", Johnny said "what ovens"? I said

"the two I was using".... and I said "Johnny, man I'm on

lunch so go and leave me alone".

25

Johnny, said "ok", he then snatched up

23

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CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

Date: APRIL 15, 2018

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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