Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Jimie L. Starks, Petitioner v. Parball Corporation, dba Bally's Las Vegas
Supreme Court briefJan 23, 2018
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No,
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
JIMIE L. STARKS PRO SE
—PETITIONER
(Your Name)
vs.
PARBALL CORPORATION
RESPONDENT(S)
-
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
COURT OF APPEALS NINTH CIRCUIT
(NAME OF COURT THAT LAST RULED ON MERITS OF YOUR CASE)
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
JIMIE L. STARKS
(Your Name)
1439 COTTONWOOD PLACE
(Address)
LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89104
(City, State, Zip Code)
702 -410 -4098
(Phone Number)
QUESTION(S) PRESENTED
Whether District Court abused itS discretion by imposing an
even heavier burden on me to show pretext than the burdens that
had existed in Noyes v. Kelly Services, 488 F.3d 1163, *1170(2007)
and Texas Dept. Of Community Affairs v Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,*252
(1981).
Whether a trier of fact could reasonably conclude that my Voluntary Statement Exhibit 2, that was filed in Defendant's H.R.Dept.
on 7-17-05 through 8-22-12, expressing my desires to be considered for future promotional opportunities for supervision would
carry the same weight as Burdine's, 450 U.S. 248,*250 (1981),application that was active on file for six months.
Whether a rational fact finder could reasonably conclude that
my situation in Exhibit 1, was similar to Green, 411 U.S. 792
*804 (1973), in which I was the only Black American and member of
a protected class, who had comparable seriousness performance violations to similary situated co-workers and was the only one terminated, could reach the same decision?
Whether a trier of fact could reasonably conclude that my former immediate supervisors were three biological brothers and I had
filed a charge of discrimination on the elder brother, could that
have been an additional motive for retaliation?
Whether a trier of fact could reasonably conclude that my exer-cise of my FMLA, Intermittent Protected Leave, from Jan. 2006
through Aug. 2012, in whiched I had called out more than 324, times
during this period, could be the real motive to why I was terminated?
LIST OF PARTIES
N All parties appear in the caption of the case on the cover page.
[1 All parties do not appear in the caption of the case on the cover page. A list of
all parties to the proceeding in the court whose judgment is the subject of this
petition is as follows:
TABLE OF CONTENTS
OPINIONSBELOW........................................................................................................1
JURISDICTION...................................................................................................................
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED .................................
STATEMENTOF THE CASE ............................................................................................
.
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT ..........................................................................
CONCLUSION....................................................................................................................
INDEX TO APPENDICES
APPENDIX A
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT Dec's ) Ofl
APPENDIX B U.S. DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEVADADc.cIS/Or
APPENDIX C
APPENDIX D
APPENDIX E
APPENDIX F
PETITION FOR PANEL REHEARING Orde,1' 7€MI
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED
CASES
•
PAGE NUMBER
Noyes v Kelly Services, 488 F.3d 1163,*1170 (2007) ...............
Tex., Dept., Of Cmnty., Affairs v Burdine, 450 U.S 248,*253(1981
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v Green, 411 U.S 792,*804,(1973) ........
Furnco Const., Corp., v Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978) ..............
Anthony Ash v Tyson Foods, Inc., 546 U.S. (2006) .................
Mayes v Winco Holdings, Inc., 846 F.3d 1274 (2017). ...............
Michelle Lindahl v Air France 930 F2d 1434 (1991) ...............
Sischo-Nownejad v Merced Community College Dist. 934 F.2d 1184(19
Dominguez-Curry v Nevada Transp. Dept. 424 F.3d 1027 (2005)o .....
Fabela v Socorro Indep., School Dist.,
329 F.3d 409, 415, (5th Cir. 2003) ...............................
Cordova, v State Farm Ins. Company, 124 F.3d 1145 (1997) .........
Godwin, v Hunt Wesson, Inc., 150 F.3d 1217 (1998) ................
U.S. Postal Service Bd. Of Governors v Aikens, 460 U.S.711(1983).
STATUTES AND RULES
Title Vii of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e.
The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).
Enforces Title Vli, State laws N.R.S. S 613.330 et seq., N.R.S.613.340.
American With Disabilities Act,(ADA) *42 U.S.C. 12101-12213.
Civil Rights Act of 1866 (SEction 1981).
Fed. Rule Civ. P. 56(c).
(FMLA)-of 1993, S 105 (a)(2),29 U.S.C.A. 5 2615 (a)(2).
OTHER
ST. Mary's Honor Center v Hicks, 509 U.S. 502,*511 (1993) ........
Smothers v Solvay Chemicals, Inc., 740 F.3d 530 (2014) ............
Berman v Orkin Exterminating Co., Inc., 160 F.3d 697 (1998) ......
Metzler v Fed. Home Loan 464 F.3d (2006)*22 sec. A...............
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Petitioner respectfully prays that a writ of certiorari issue to review the judgment below.
OPINIONS BELOW
J4 For cases from federal courts:
The opinion of the United States court of appeals appears at Appendix
the petition and is
A
{ I reported at
; or,
[ I has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,
is unpublished.
The opinion of the United States district court appears at Appendix iS to
the petition and is
[ ] reported at
; or,
[ ] has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,
x1 is unpublished.
[ ] For cases from state courts:
The opinion of the highest state court to review the merits appears at
Appendix
to the petition and is
[ ] reported at
; or,
[ ] has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,
[ ] is unpublished.
The opinion of the
appears at Appendix
court
-
to the petition and is
[I reported at
; or,
[ ] has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,
[ ] is unpublished.
1.
to
JURISDICTION
j4 For cases from federal courts:
The date on which the United States Court of Appeals decided my case
was 4PRLIL
OL7[ I No petition for rehearing was timely filed in my case.
fr1 A timely petition for rehearing was denied by the United States Court of
17
Appeals on the following date: DEC 7)
, and a. copy of the
order denying rehearing appears at Appendix C
[1 An extension of time to file the petition for a writ of certiorari was granted
to and including
(date) on ____________________ (date)
in Application No.
A______
The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U. S. C. § 1254(1).
[ ] For cases from state courts:
The date on which the highest state court decided my case was
A copy of that decision appears at Appendix
[I A timely petition for rehearing was thereafter denied on the following date:
and a copy of the order denying rehearing
appears at Appendix
[ J An extension of time to file the petition for a writ of certiorari was granted
to and including
(date) on
(date) in
Application No.
A_______
The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U. S. C. § 1257(a).
61
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED
Amendment 1
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of relgion
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress
of grievances.
Amendment Vii
In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved,
and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any
court of the United States, than according to the rules of the
common law.
Amendment 1X
The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not
be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.
Amendment X
-
The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution
nor prphibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states
respectively, or to the people.
Amendment X1V
All persons or naturalized in th.e United States and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the
State wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law
which shall abrige the privileges or immunities of citizens of
the United States, nor shall any State deprive any person of life
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
1. Title Vii of the Civil Rights Act, of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e.
American With Disabilities Act, (ADA) *42 U.S.C. 12101-12213.
Equal Pay Act, (29 U.S.C. 206(d))
6. Civil Rights Act of 1866 (Section 1981).
NERC, State law (NRS 613.340).
FMLA,of 1993, 9 105 (a)(2), 29 U.S.C.A. S 2615 (a)(2).
TEX. DEPT., OF COMNTY. AFFAIRS, V. BURDINE, 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
Noyes v Kelly Services, 488 F.3d 1163,*1170 (2007).
MCDONNELL DOUGLAS CORP. V. GREEN, L1 J
3
U.S..7*804 (1973).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Concerning the proceedings in Appendix A.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT.
In Noyes v. Kelly Services, 488 F.3d 1163, at* 1170 (2007).
The Ninth Circuit, ruled that: 2. The District Court's misapplication of ST. Mary's Honor, was taken out of context. It states:
"The district court did not apply the proper law governing
proof of pretext, but, rather, imposed a heavier burden on
Noyes at summary judgment. According to the district court,to
show pretext, Noyes had to show both that Kelly Services'
proffered reason was false, and that discrimination was the
real reason".
Further down it states:
"The showing required to direct a finding on the ultimate fact
of intentional discrimination is obviously different and more
difficult than the burden imposed on a plaintiff to raise a
triable issue of fact as to pretext sufficient to defeat
summary judgment".
This ruling and findings from the Ninth Circuit, is in direct
conflict with their ruling in my case for the same important
matter.
For instance, in my case the Ninth Circuit, took the position
that is stated in Appendix A., of their affirm decision on page 3
lines 7 through 8, states:
"We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly
raised and argued in the opening brief".
Furthermore, in Appendix B, on page 6. lines 1 through 6 state$
"plaintiff in a Title Vii case must establish a prima facie
case of discrimination." Cordova v. State Farm Ins. Cos., 124
F.3d 1145, 1148 (9th Cir. 1997). "If the defendant provides
such a reason, then in order to prevail, the plaintiff must
demonstrate that this reason is pretextual."
To demonstrate is to show or prove.
On lines 24 through 27, states:
"Starks argues only that he performed satisfactorily for his
first fifteen years of employment. However, that fact alone
is insufficient evidence to "show" that Starks was performing
satisfactorily at the time he was terminated"....
4
At this stage my burden was simply to raise a triable issue of
material fact, not to show I was performing satisfactorily at the
time I was terminated.
On page 7, lines 2 and 3, states:
"Starks points to no evidence to show the Court that he was
performing his job satisfactorily when he was involuntarily
terminated"
.
On lines 5 through 7, states:
"he was not satisfactorily performing his duties as a baker at
the time of his termination. Accordingly, Starks has not satisfied his burden to establish a prima facie case of race
discrimination".
District Court limited its findings, for me to show that I was
performing my job satisfactorily at the time I was terminated; as
a opposed to rasing a genuine issue of material fact, that may
not have had anything to do with whether or not I was performing
satisfactorily at the time I was terminated. This burden was even
S
heavier than that burden - in Nbyes v. Kelly Services, at*1170; because what district court states in notes 5 and 6, on lines 23
through 28.
In note 5, states:
"Because Starks does not meet his burden to show he performed
his job satisfactorily, the Court will not address whether
similary situated individuals outside his protected class
were treated more favorably".
By refusing to address whether similary situated individuals
were treated more favorably, made it impossible to establish a
prima fade case of racial discrimination by not addressing
element (4); ii which prevented me from raising a triable issue.
This impossible burden that district court had imposed on me,
was even heavier than the burden that had existed in Texas Dept.
Of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, at*255(1981); that
was imposed on the defendant and this U.S. Supreme Court, granted
certiorari to the U.S.C. Of Appeals For The Fifth Circuit; based
on the finding of that burden.
In note 6, states:
"The Court notes that this requirement applies to circumstantial evidence, not to direct evidence. See Dominguez-Curry
v. Nev. Ttansp. Dept., 424 F.3d 1027, 1038 (9th Cir. 2005)
(holding that specific and substantial requirement does not
apply where discrimination plaintiff brought forth direct
evidence of discriminatory animus). Starks claim proceeds on
the basis of cir cumstantial evidence, as he does not present
any direct evidence of bias against African American employee
or in favor of non-African American employees".
This statement in this note 6, is clearly an erroneous statement; because I had presented ample direct evidence of bias
against me, as a Black American; and ample direct evidence of retaliation.
For instance, in Exhibit 6, Voluntary Statement 11-6-11. On
page 2 of 11, lines 4 through 9, Jorge Villa, my supervisor approached me and said:
"Jimie, the last three times you did muffins you early out before you had finished the muffins; So, today Alex, my boss
said "you have to do muffins today".
-
Further down on lines 17 through 20, stating:
"my daily schedule says I'm to do the filling finishing station today". Jorge said "no Alex, told me to have you do muffins today".
On page 4 of 11, lines 5 through 8, stating:
Jorge asked "are you refusing to do muffins today yes or no"?
I responded "for the above reasons no". Jorge, then said "leave
and go home". I said "ok".
On page 5 of 11, lines 5 through 8, Jorge said:
"his boss Alex, want Jimie, to do muffins today because for
the last three times Jimie, did muffins he went home early
and didn't finish the muffins due to FMLA".
Jorge, was speaking to Security Officer Josh.
On page 6 of 11, lines 2 through 4, Jorge, said to Josh, "no
he refused earlier so I want Jimie, to go home". This was after
Josh, had asked me was I willing to work this out?
These five statements by Jorge and Jorge quoting Alex, and their
actions, for sending me home unjustly for insubordination; constitute direct evidence of retaliation, a hostile work environment;
-
in violation of FMLA, of 1993, S 105 (a)(2), 29 U.S.C.A. S 2615(a
(a)(2); sec. 703(a)(1) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
s 2000e-2(a)(1) and 2000e-3(a); and state law (NRS 613.340).
In Exhibit 7, on page 3 of 4, is a Request for information
from Health Care Provider. Jan. 16, 2012. Sent to me by NicoleHaliburton, the Defendant's H.R., Rep., concerning my FMLA, benefit. This request letter on the above date was in violation of
FMLA, of 1993, S 105 (a)(2), 29 U.S.C.A. S 2615 (a)(2); and the
EEOC, Guidance: Retaliation for Discrimination. Which provides
protection for (A14) and protect individuals from coercion, intimidation, threats, harassment, or interference in their exercise of their own rights .... etc.
Because, prior to Jan. 16, 2012, I had not agreed to be subjected to any "interactive process"; and this request constitute
direct evidence for retaliation, harassment and interference with
my rights to exercise my FMLA, benefit.
Also, on page 6 of 6, second paragraph lines 6 through 8, concerning the night of 11-6-11, that was demonstrated in Exhibit 6,
Haliburton states:
"I would also like to clarify that you actually received pay
for a full 8 hours of work on November 6, 2011, even though
you were sent home early for insubordination".
This admission put together with the admission in Exhibit 8,
on page 2 of 2, lines 3 through 6, states:
"Haliburton investigated..., but did not find any wrongdoing..
Haliburton called Plaintiff on or about November 7, 2011
and advised him that he should return to work on that evening
for his scheduled shift."
Both of these two admissions establish that I was sent home
unjustly for insubordination and both admissions constitute direc-Jevidence for retaliation. Invoking Fed. Rule Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A).
Nicole Haliburton, Alex Veliz and Jorge Villa, were three of
four decisionmakers whom were responsible for terminating me on
7
Aug. 22,2012 and based on case laws, any discriminatory or retaliatory actions or remarks by decisionmakers makes summary judgment
inappropriate. See Mayes v. Winco Holdings, Inc., 846 F.3d 1274
*1279 (2017) and headnotes[11 1, [12J.
In Exhibit 23, Voluntary Statement 3-6-12. On Feb. 29, 2012, I
had failed several minutes short of finishing my task before luncfr
at 1:00 A.M., my supervisor Johnny, releaved me. When I had asked
if I could complete the task, without looking at me with a very
hostile demeanor said "no".
While on lunch at about 1:20 A.M., waiting to eat with a coworker from another dept., Johnny, approached me with a large pan
of croissants and lightly tossed them on the counter right next
to me and said:
-
you know those choc. croissants, were over proof and a little
flat and I got these off JJ's, and they are a little flat".
I said "fix the- ovens", Johnny said "what ovens''- ? -I said "the
two I was using".... and I said "Johnny, man I'm on lunch so
go and leave me alone". Johnny said "ok",
he then snatched up the pan of croissants and stormed out of the
break room causing a very embarrassing scene in front of my coworkers. These action by Johnny and what he said to me constitute a
very hostile work environment and are direct evidence of racial
harassment. Because, Johnny, did not treat my co-workers this way
whom were similary situated, but not of my protected class Black
American, Johnny,was the fourth decisionmaker when I was terminatdg
In Exhibit 1, is direct evidence of bias against me, as a
Black American. It is the Defendant's Bakery Disciplinary Action,
Oct. 10, 2012, list of co-workers from the bread crew side of the
bakery including myself but does not list any of my immediate coworkers from the breakfast pastry crew in which I was a member of
Whom all were disciplined for performance violations of comparableseriousness and similar violations. But, I was the only Black-
Ri
American,the only member of a protected class and as of Aug. 22,
2012, I was the only one terminated on the list.
In Exhibit 2, on page 2 of 4, lines 14 through 19. Chef Bruno,
once openly approached me one hour into the beginning of a shift
and said:
"he was keeping time on how much work I've got done up to this
point and that I should of had more done".
This statement by Bruno, constitute direct evidence of racial
harassment and a hostile work environment. Bruno, never approache4
any of my co-workers in this manner, whom were similary situated
but not of my protected class Black American.
On page 3 of 4, lines 1 through 3. Bruno sai/:in front of my
co-workers that:
"the following week he will be working on my shift and he will
push me to work faster". I responded "if you push me to work
faster then you are going to have to push my co-workers too
and the new guy that I'm training right now".
-
-
This statement by Bruno, constitute direct evidence of racial
harassment and a hostile work environment.
On page 3 of 4, lines 7 through 14. I onced started the shift
an hour early and Bruno, notice and had then swing shift supervisor Jesus, to send me back down stairs for the one hour. I asked
Jesus:
"why was he sending me back"? "When there was two other coworkers whom started early too". Jesus replied 'I don't know
he (Bruno) just told me to send you back".
This statement by Jesus, quoting Bruno and their actions of
sending me back and allowing my co-workers to stay; constitute
j
vide,i e o
racial discrimination and a hostile work environment; in violation
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, S 703(a)(1), 42 U.S.C.A. S 2000e-.
(a) (1).
On page 3 of 4, lines 15 through 21. Concerning the point system, when it was implemented back in Oct. 1, 2003. In relation to
tardiness. I had witness Bruno, looking the other way when my co-
workerswould be late. But the first time I was 4, minutes late
he(Bruno)approached me concerning it. This was direct evidence of
racial harassment and a hostile work environment.
On page 4 of 4, lines 15 through 20. I stated:
"I should have been consider for one of those promotions. I am
simply requesting that Chef Bruno hiring and promotional procedures be scrutinize by someone higher up in management to
ensure equal opportunity is given to all who has earned it."
This portion of this statement was written due to the Defendant's unlawful employment practices for failure to promote; in
reference to Exhibit 3.
In Exhibit 3, is a statement to the EEOC, /-j.g--)/
fist of
co-workers whom all were promoted over me, which was approximately (13) times. In which I was more qualified than ten and was equally as the remaining two. And, since the above statement was
written and filed in the Defendant's H.R. Dept., on 7-17-05, the
Defendant has promoted 4, co-workers over me and had hired in
two additional co-workers as supervisors; without given me any
notices, opportunities in the form of an application, nor did
they properly post a Bid that I could have signed.
These two statements collectively give rise to an inference of
unlawful discrimination; in the same manner as Burdine's application in Tex. Dept. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 25253 (1981) ;4nd it stayed on file alot longer than Burdine's application and during that time the Defendant continued to promote coworkers over me and hired in supervisors over me. Which is direct
evidence of bias against me, which is intentional discrimination.
Alex, family ties permeated the promotion process and hired
applicants. Alex, was the ultimate decisionmaker and he exercised
his supervisory authority in favor of his two biological brothers
when he promoted Johnny, over me and when he hired half brother
Jorge over me as a supervisor. See Noyes v. Kelly Services, 488 F-
10
.3d 1163,* 1171 (2007).
In Exhibit 3, * Heraclio Hernandez, on line 11, of this paragr_
aph states: He said (Bruno) "ok tonight when you come to work sigA
the Bid and apply on line".
And, on line 16, Heraclio, had informed me that he was the new
supervisor for the grave shift. He also, informed me that ChefBruno, had called him up earlier that day and told Heraclio, "to
meet him at H.R., to fill out paper work for the position".These
two statements by Bruno, and along with his actions of taking
down the bid prematurely, giving me the wrong web address, avoiding me concerning the matter and calling up Heraclio,to meet him
at H.R., to fill out paper work. These actions constitute direct
evidence for intentional racial discrimination for failier to
promote.
In Exhibit 4, Voluntary Statement - 7-13-05. On page 3 of 7,
lines 4 through 8. At*:
"remarks he (Rocky) has jokingly made against black and white
people in the past in which I was always offended do to the
fact that I am a biracial Black American".
Further down on lines 17 through 21. I'm stating:
"I have complained to Chef Bruno, on 6, occasion concerning a
lack of rotation in job duties and with Rocky, always giving
my hispanic co-workers first pick in job duties"....
Further down on lines 26 through 31. Stating (Rocky quotingBruno):
"you don't have to employ a rotation system you can assign
Jimie, to the same duties everyday and if Jimie, has a problem with this, that is something he has to deal with".
The remarks made by Rocky, my complaint to Bruno and Rocky
quoting Bruno, constitute direct evidence of racial discrimination and disparate treatment and a hostile work environment.
On page 4 of 7, lines 4 through 6. I'm stating:
"Solution to the problem implement a rotation system or let the
senior guy pick first".
On page 5 of 7, bottom paragraph 2. Such things as tardiness:
"when I'm late he likes to take special notice and make sure
my co-workers notice also, but when he's late which is very
offten or my co-workers are late he either has the perfect
excuse or he turns the other way and pretends not to notice."
On page 6 of 7, lines 3 through 6. Daily work assignments:
"he allows my co-workers to select whatever duties they desire
to work that day and I'm usely stuck with whatever is left".
On lines 10 through 14. When mistakes are made:
"he (Rocky) deals with my co-workers discreetly one pn one but
when it comes to me he makes a open issue out of it to the
point of being embarress or I'm offended".
For instance, on lines 22 Mi,gh 26, starting at:
"Mm. later Chef Ernesto showed up. I showed the product to
Ernesto and expressed to him that I didn't appreciate Rocky
approach. Rocky told Ernesto his side of the story in which
he'd expressed to Ernesto"he knows he may have approach me
(Jimie) in the wrong way but he was concerned about the product".
This statement by Rocky, was an admission; I'm invoking Fed.
Rule Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A). Also, the above examples of disparate
treatment and his statement to Ernesto, all constitute direct evidence of racial discrimination, harassment and a hostile work
environment; in violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, S 703
(a)(1), 42 U.S.C.A. S 2000e-2(a)(1).
On page 7 of 7, lines 10 through 17. He (Rocky) said to me
once that:
"he knows that I can do better" and my response was "if you are
going to make excuses or accept it from my co-workers well
then, do likewise for me because we are being paid the same
amount of money so then we should provide the same service".
Rocky's, statement here constitute direct evidence of racial
discrimination, harassment and a hostile work environment. Becaus
Rocky, did not treat my co-workers in this manner, whom were simi
lary situated, but not of my protected class Black American.
In Exhibit 11, Voluntary statement 9-27-06. On page 2 of 3,
lines 2 through 14. While I was speaking with a co-worker, my other co-worker Rey, walked by and called me a "lazy (M.F.-explicive)'
in english. I then approached him to inquired of him of why he
would say that to me. He (Rey) responded:
"(M.F.-explicive) tomarrow you are going to work the (F-ing--ex
plicive) ovens". I responded "(F-explicive) you". Rey, then
refered to my FMLA, benefit concerning my absenty the day before on 9-26-06 and went on to say "M.F.-explicive", you
weren't sick you're never sick you are just a lazy M.F.-explicive)".
These statements by my form e'o-worker Rey Lazoro, constitute
direct evidence of racial harassment and a hostile work environment.
In Exhibit 15, Voluntary Statement 8-29-10. On page 7 of 8,
lines 9 through 24, starting at: Jorge, came to me at 1:00 A.M. a
and said:
"Jimie, times up go to lunch". I asked him if I could finish?
he said "no go to lunch".
I reminded Jorge, that other co-workers such as Rey, Jose,
-Sergio and April1 are not givénthe full task that was given to
mer... Further down on lines 28 and 29, Jorge, responded:
"Jimie, you are more experience than they are".
Jorge's, bias similary situated
,
discriminatory statement in
favor of my former co-workers whom were not of my protected class
constitute direct evidence of racial bias against me a Black American.
In Exhibit 16, Voluntary Statement 12-17-10. On page 3 of 4,
lines 14 through 17, starting at: I asked Jorge,
"was he going to put the Sticky Buns and his pan of sm. muffins
in the office with my 4, muffins", he answered "no".
Jorges answer "no" and his actions of collecting my alleged
product infraction to be placed in office for a negative review
but not willing to do likewise with Quirrino1 s Lg. and sm. Sticky
Buns that were over proof and Jorge,'s, pan of sm. bran muffins
he underfilled when he was helping me and Quirrino. Both answer
and actions constitute direct evidence of racial bias for discrim-
'3
ination against me a Black American and in favor of himself....
InExhibit17, Charge Of Discrimination to the EEOC, 4-4-2011.
The primary reason this charge was filed, was due to the Defendant
repeated intentional discrimination. In this statement on lines 4
through 6, stating:
"I have expressed interest in those positions, however I was
denied. Respondent did not even post some of those positions
and therefore, I did not have a legitimate and equal opportunity to apply".
When Moises Alfaro, the last co-worker in Exhibit 3, that was
promoted over me, had accepted the Bid position for a Lead Baker,
although he immediately suited up as a supervisor, he was not introduce as a supervisor until after the above filing date to the
EEOC. And, since I had filed my Voluntary Statement 7-17-05, in
Exhibit 2, with the Defendant's H.R., Dept., expressing my interest in future opportunities for promotions, this statement to the
EEOC, was the second notification expressing my interest in future.
opportunities for promotions and again Parball chose to intentionally discriminate against me, by promoting Moises, as Relief Supervisor, See Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253,(1981).
In Exhibit 18, Voluntary Statement 4-29-11. In this exhibit
will demonstrate supervisor Jorge, failed attempt to create a product infraction. On page 2 of 5, lines 1 through 3, states:
"I notice supervisor Jorge, revising the master sheet to our
set up order for that day", lines 7 through 22, "I examen the
revised master set up sheet to see what changes he had made
to the order. I notice he had increased the order by two pans
for the small danish and two pans on the large raisn rolls,
in which he didn't say anything to me or my co-workers about
the changes. These were items that I had set up for that day.
I also notice that there were no other changes made on items
that my co-workers had set up, so I set up the additional to
the small danish and as I was rolling these items into the
Proofer to be proof for baking. Jorge, said to me "what happefl
Jimie, did you foreget to set these up"? I said no these are
the items you added on and didn't tell me".
Had I not notice Jorge, making these changes we would have been
short of product at the end of shift and I would have been responsible. Jorges actions and his question, constitute direct evidence of racial harassment and a hostile work environment; crrJ
disparate - treatment. Because, Jorge, did not treat my co-workers
in this manner, whom were similary situated but not of my protected class Black American.
In Exhibit 5, Culinary's Work Schedule, for Graveyard Stations
Duties, 9-28-10. On page 2 of 4, is a weekly, daily, rotation schedule. Approximately one year prior to my Voluntary Statement
7-13-05, thats in Exhibit 4, that was filed in the Defendant's
H.R., Dept., on that date and after seven solid years of suggesting and demanding, the Defendant finally implemented a rotation
system to help resolve some of my issues. On page 3 of 4, just
above my signature states: "assign work station for the day".
In Exhibit 20, Voluntary Statement 7-22-11. On page 3 of 10,
lines 18 through 22, states: supervisor Johnny, approached me and
said:
"I-need you to do me- a favor" I reluctantly said yes what is
it? He asked me "could you do muffins today because David,
doesn't know how to do muffins, I said "ok".
But, I immediately regrebe4it when I had realized Johnny, asked
that favor to punish me for taking protected leave on 7-20-11, 2,
days prior to this date. Exhibit 9, would demonstrate this fact.
On page 4 of 10, lines 11 through 24,,states:
"Johnny, brought the two racks over to me and asked if I could
cover and wrap them when I finish"? I asked Johnny, "if he
could have David, wrap them because I'm a little behind".
Johnny, said "well is it going to take that much more time to
do these"? and I said "well, yes and anyway I'm going to finish your favor so, could you have David, to finish my favor"?
Johnny, asked"what do you mean"? I said "you asked a favor
now you owe a favor and anyway I'm doing David, job I had an
easy day". Johnny, said "you guys are bakers and the schedule
and he paused, so I assumed he wanted to say the schedule is
not written in stone. He then said "when you guys come in we
can have you do whatever".
The point to be made here by Johnny's, statement and actions
proves that Parball's rules ment nothing to him and if he wanted
to punish me he did; the fact that I was on schedule for an easy
day ment nothing. This statement by Johnny, and his actions of
Jff
trading.myschedule easy day for David's, harder schedule; constitute direct evidence of racial discrimination, retaliation, a
hostile work environment and disparate treatment.
Example 2, on page 8 of 10, lines 6 through 15, states:
at this time with 17, mm. to go is when supervisor Johnny,
walked up and asked me what time did I start the order"? I don't remember my response but I'd implied to him that I still
have enough time to finish". Johnny, looked up at the clock
and walked over to the order form and started expressing to
me about how simple he thinks the banquet order was to him".
I said "yes but like I told you I still have time to finish".
Lines 23 through 25, "This back and forth went on for approximately 8, minutes at which time Johnny, looked up at the clocI
and said "I'm going to let you finish so, you can't say because I was talking to you; and I said "yes and you do this all
the time so that I can't finish on time; and being the supervisor you never accept responsibility for it".
And, one week later Johnny, wrote me up. Johnny's, unwelcome
verbal, when he had asked me what time I had started the order an
expressing how simple the order was all constitute direct evidence
-
of racial discrimination, -harassment, disparate treatment and a
hostile work environment. Because Johnny did not treat my former
co-workers in this manner, whom all were similary situaed but not
of my protected class Black American.
I just demonstrated more than a dozen examples of direct evidence with several more that is not mention up to this point and no
not one example was mention in the decisions of District Court,
or the Ninth Circuit, Appeals Courts.
In Exhibit 10, Performance Improvement Notice, 5-25-05. This
action was taken against me for allegedly "no call, no show", I
was suspended for three days. Pending termination. But, it was
retaliatory in nature and had no other basis, for why it was
given to me. Phone records prove the allegation to be false.
In Appendix B, on page 11 of 18, lines 10 through 11. States:
"Starks' retaliation claims fails because he does not provide:
sufficient evidence to establish a causal link between his
involvement in protected activities'...
For my first (15) years of employment, I had enjoyed a clean
-
_r?ccrdwithout any prior write ups for products infractions; but
that all changed. Because during this period my dept. under went
a change in management, which became an all hispanic team, that
consisted of three biological brothers. Alex Veliz, Johnny Veliz,
and Jorge Villa.
And, subsequently I became the subject of repeated write ups.
On 3-11-09, I received a write up, Performance Doc., for allegedly
over proofing large croissants. This write up had retaliatory
motives; with a causal link of 17, days.
In Exhibit 9, FMLA, Intermittent Protected Leave, call outs;
from Jan. 2006 through Aug. 2012, and during this time I had called out more than 324, times. And, it was my sincere belief that
due to my race, protected activity and my taking protected leave
were Parball's main motives for retaliating against me.
On 3-2-10, I received a write up,- Performance Doc., for allege dly over filling 40, large muffins. This was pure retaliation;
P1v fl
causal link of 2, days,
i
/ /ccuzc
On 5-23-10, I had received a Performance Doc., for allegedly
failing to finish in a timely manner. Johnny, purposely sabtmy time so that I wouldn't finish on time. Retaliation, causal
link of 11, days. Cx
-,
--
,r - c/.rA
On 7-19-11, I received a Performance Doc., for allegedly failing to finish on time. Johnny, had came to me about 17, minutes
before quitting time and harassed me to prevent me from finishing
on time. There was no dout that this was retaliatory, causal link
of 1, day.
ç-j- -
Lo1
On 8-4-11, I received a Performance Doc., for allegedly over
proofing all the large cinnamon rolls. Exhibit 9, will show a
causal link of 7, days. Retaliation! ck' prA
-J
On 10-28-11, I engaged in protected activity, Voluntary Statement to the EEOC, due to heighten levels of harassment and retaliation.
17
On 11-15-11, I engaged in protected activity with the EEOC,
Amended Charges for Retaliation.
On 3-15-12, I received a Performance Doc., for refusing tcb
clean off my table before lunch. I had refused the order because
I believed the order to be retaliatory; which is covered by law.
Causal link same day of taking protected leave; see Exhibit 9,
FMLA, callouts.
On 5-17-12, received EEOC's Notice of Suit Rights.
On 7-22-12, I received Performance Doc., for allegedly failed
to complete task in a timely manner.
On 8-12-12, I received a Performance Doc., for suspension Pending Investigation.
On 8-22-12, I received Performance Doc., for separation of employment.
-
As an employee, - I was a person entitled to protection under
Nevada's anti-discrimination statue, N.R.S. S 613.330 et seq. and
the aforemebtioned federal statutes, Title Vii and 5 1981.
The Defendant had a legal obligation, pursuant to the aforemention state and federal statutes, the policy of the State Of Nevadaand their own internal corporate policies, to maintain a workplace
free of unlawful discrimination.
Despite these laws, Defendant and its employees, subjected me
to different terms and conditions of employment because of my race
Black American.
-
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION
In Noyes v. Kelly Services, 488 F.3d 1163, at* 1170 (2007).
The Ninth Circuit, ruled that: 2. The District Court's misapplication of ST. Mary's Honor, was taken out of context. It states:
"The district court did not apply the proper law governing
proof of pretext, but, rather, imposed a heavier burden on
Noyes at summary judgment. According to the district court,to
show pretext, Noyes had to show both that Kelly Services'
proffered reason was false, and that discrimination was the
real reason".
Further down it states:
"The showing required to direct a finding on the ultimate fact
of intentional discrimination is obviously different and more
difficult than the burden imposed on a plaintiff to raise a
triable issue of fact as to pretext sufficient to defeat
summary judgment".
This ruling and findings from the Ninth Circuit, is in direct
conflict with their ruling in my case for the same important
matter.
For instance, in my case the Ninth Circuit, took the position
that is stated in Appendix A., of their affirm decision on page 3
lines 7 through 8, states:
"We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly
raised and argued in the opening brief".
Furthermore, in Appendix B, on page 6, lines 1 through 6,state
"plaintiff in a Title Vil case must establish a prima facie
case of discrimination." Cordova v. State Farm Ins. Cos., 124
F.3d 1145, 1148 (9th Cir. 1997). "If the defendant provides
such a reason, then in order to prevail, the plaintiff must
demonstrate that this reason is pretextual."
To demonstrate is to show or prove.
On lines 24 through 27, states:
"Starks argues only that he performed satisfactorily for his
first fifteen years of employment. However, that fact alone
is insufficient evidence to "show" that Starks was performing
satisfactorily at the time he was terminated"....
At this stage my burden was simply to raise a triable issue of
material fact, not to show I was performing satisfactorily at the
time I was terminated.
On page 7, lines 2 and 3, states:
"Starks points to no evidence to show the Court that he was
performing his job satisfactorily when he was involuntarily
terminated".
On lines 5 through 7, states:
"he was not satisfactorily performing his duties as a baker at
the time of his termination. Accordingly, Starks has not satisfied his burden to establish a prima facie case of race
discrimination".
District Court limited its findings, for me to show that I was
performing my job satisfactorily at the time I was terminated; as
a opposed to raising a genuine issue of material fact, that may
not have had anything to do with whether or not I was performing
satisfactorily at the time I was terminated. This burden was even
heavIer than that burden- in Noyes v. Kelly Services, at*1170; because what district court states in notes 5 and 6, on lines 23
through 28.
In note 5, states:
"Because Starks does not meet his burden to show he performed
his job satisfactorily, the Court will not address whether
similary situated individuals outside his protected class
were treated more favorably".
By refusing to address whether similary situated individuals
were treated more favorably, made it impossible to establish a
prima facie case of racial discrimination by not addressing
element (4); iU which prevented me from raising a triable issue.
This impossible burden that district court had imposed on me,
was even heavier than the burden that had existed in Texas Dept.
Of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, at*255(1981); that
was imposed on the defendant and this U.S. Supreme Court, granted
certiorari to the U.S.C. Of Appeals For The Fifth Circuit; based
on the finding of that burden.
30
Based-on these two findings of heavy burdens that had existed
in Noyes v. Kelly Services, 488 F.3d 1163, at*1170 (2007); and
Texas Dept. Of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 1 *255
(1981); and the impossible burden that was imposed on me in my
case by District Court and the Ninth Circuit; for the same
important matter. These are three valid reason for granting the
petition in this case.
The laws should be consistent and reflect uniformity.
Also, based on the ample direct evidence in this case, should
have been sufficient to allow me to bypass the McDonnell Douglas
framework; and summary judgment should have been inappropriate.
See Fabela v. Socorro Indep. School District, 329 F.3d 409, 415,
and Footnote [81 (5th Cir. 2003).
Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit, ruling in my case conflicts
-
with their ruling in: Cordova, v.-State Farm Insurance Company,
124 F.3d 1145, at* 1148 (1997); stating:
"A plaintiff can also establish a prima fade case of disparate
treatment without satisfying the McDonnell Douglas test, if
she provides evidence suggesting that the employment decision was
based on a discriminatory criterion".
Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit, ruling in Godwin, v. Wesson,
Inc., 150 F.3d 1217, *1219 (1998); states:
"a plaintiff who offers substantial evidence that the employer
proffered reasons were not reliable".... "or direct evidence
of discrimination. See Cordova v. State Farm Ins., 124 F.3d
1145, 1150 (9th Cir. 1997), has made a sufficient showing to
create a triable issues with respect to the employer's motivation".
For examples of direct evidence, see Concise Statement, or
Direct and Concise Argument, in my case.
Finally, the Ninth Circuit, ruling in
case conflicts with
their ruling in Santillan, v. USA Waste of Ca., Inc., 853 F.3d
1035 (9th Cir. 2017); for the same important matter.
The Ninth Circuit, conducted a complete weighted review of the
material facts of this case and properly reversed the District9%'
-
-
Court's erroneous decision; but in my case the Ninth Circuit, tooK
the position stating:
"We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly
raised and argued in the opening brief".
And, affirmed district court's erroneous decision. Even though
I had sincerly thought, I had clearly presented the evidence.
In Appendix B, on page 12 of 18, lines 2 through 4, states:
"Parball presents legitimate reasons for terminating Starks,
which Starks fails to demonstrate as being pretextual."
District Court imposed to heavy of a burden on me to prove at
that stage, to prove retaliation as a posed to raisn a triable
issue of material fact.
DIRECT AND CONCISE ARGUMENT
1
For instance, See Exhibit 1, Defendant's Bakery Disciplinary
2 Action, list of co-workers from the bread crew side of the bakery
3 including myself but does not list any of my immediate co-workers
from the breakfast pastry crew in which I was a member of. Whom
all were disciplined for performance violations of comparable
6 seriousness and similar violations. But, I was the only Black
-
7 American, the only member of a protected class and as of Aug. 22,
8 2012, I was the only one terminated on this list; in violation of
SS 703 (a)(1) and 704 (a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 429
U.S.C. 99 2000e-2(a)(1) and 2000e-3(a). See McDonell Douglas Corp
10
v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 at*804, (1973); See Sischo-Nownejad v.
11
Merced Community College Dist., 934 F.2d 1104, 1109 n.7 (9th Cir.
12
1991).
13
Concerning the second part of element (4) "or other circumst14 ances surrounding the adverse employment action that give rise to
an inference of discrimination".
15
16
Refer back to line 8, of this argument where it states:
"Parball does not dispute that Starks performed satisfactorily
for fifteen years".
17
During this period I was passed over for promotion approximate
18
ly (13) times. See Exhibit 3, Statement to the EEOC, 9-15-11.
19
These are all former co-workers who were similary situated,
20
but not of my protected class Black American.
21
I was more qualified than ten of these individuals and was
22 equally as qualified as the remaining two.
23
At*Heraclio Hernandez, and after reading.refer back to line 11
24 He said (Bruno) "ok tonight when you come to work 5:9r3 the bid and
apply on line".
25
And, on line 16, Heraclio, had informed me that he was the new
26
supervisor for the grave shift. He also, informed me that Chef27
Bruno, had called him up earlier that day and told Heraclio,
28 "to meet him at H .R. to fill out paper work for the position.".
-
.
1
These two statements by Bruno, and along with his actions of
2 taking down the bids prematurely, giving me the wrong web address
3 avoiding me concerning the matter and calling up Heraclio, to
4
meet him at H.R. to fill out paper work. These actions constitute
5 direct evidence for intentional racial discrimination for failier
6 to promote; in violation of the Civil Rights Act, of 1964, S 701
et seq., 42 U.S.C.A. S 2000e et seq.; Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. Rule
7
8 56(c), 28 U.S.C.A. See Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdin
9
10
11
450 U.S. 248, 253,(1981) See Cordova v. State Farm Insurance Corn
anies, 124 F .3d 1145, 1147, 1148, (1997),
When I was asked to acclimate Heraclio, was mis-spoken. I had
actually trained Heraclio; and was acting as his supervisor for
12
for approximately (2) years prior to him being promoted over me.
13
I had more seniority, qualification and was more experienced than
14 he was.
15
At* Oralia De Perez, again acclimating her was grossly mis-
16 spoken. I gave her a more extensive training than I did Heraclio.
17
A lso,
I need to correct the hired period, for Oralia, was in 2004
18 and in 2005, she was promoted over me as Chef Bruno's Assistant
19 Pastry Chef/supervisor. Again there was no Bid posted. I had way
20 more seniority than Oralia, did and my years of qualifidations
21 and experience exceeded the years of her age at that time.
22
At* Johnny Veliz, is one of two younger biological brothers of
23 Chef Alex Veliz. Johnny, was hired in by Alex, as a bread baker
24 and approximately two to three years later Alex, peomoted Johnny,
25 over me as my supervisor.
26
27
28
I had a strong presence in helping with Johnny's training.
ain there was no bid posted and like Oralia, I had more seniority than Johnny and my qualifications and years of experience exeded Johnny's age too.
1
At* Periceles Cordova, when Periceles, joined the graveyard
2 shift, I was his acting supervisor, when Philip Williams, was not
3 available. See..at* Heraclio Hernandez, lines 3 and 4.
4
At* Jorge Villa, it was rumored that Jorge, was the biological
5 half brother of Alex, or his brother-in-law. I'm not sure.
2
At* Moises Alfaro, Alex, had deceptively posted a bid for a
6
7 Lead Baker, so that I would not sign it and I did not; and im8 mediately Noises, received the bid for Lead Baker; but he was
suited up as a Relief Supervisor, in training. I will demonstrate
9
more on this point shortly in exhibit 17.
10
At* Alex Veliz, the Defendant did not post any notice for Ex11
ecutive Pastry. Chef, prior to Alex, being promoted to Executive
12
13
Pastry Chef.
Because, shortly after when I was hired the Defendant had en-
14 gaged in Unlawful Employment Practices, that included unlawful
15 hiring practices. See Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438,16 U.S. at* 567 (1978); See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
-
17 U.S. 792, at* 794 (1973).
18
The Defendant has never given me any notices for any openings
19 in supervision; and has never given me any opportunities in the
20 form of an application; and nor did they ever properly post a bid
21 that I could have signed. Being that this was a Culinary Union's
22 position, in which the Defendant violated the Culinary Union's
23 Collected Barganing Agreement repeatedly.
All of these non postings were due to the Defendant's intent24
25 ional racial discrimination; against me as a Black American; a
26 member of a protected class; to prevent me from being promoted
The evidence demonstrate that a protected characteristic was
27
a motivating factor in the adverse employment actions; and sum28
mary judgment should have been precluded. Civil Rights Act of-
1 1964, S 703(a)(1), 42 U.S.C.A. S 2000e-2(a)(1); Fed. Rules Civ.
2 Proc. Rule 56(c), 28 U.S.C.A.; See Postal Service Bd. of Governor
v Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716 (1983); See Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 245-246 (1989); and See ST. MARY'S HONOR
CENTER et al. v. HICKS, 509 U.S. 502 at* 511 (1993).
6
For the record the Defendant has not challenged these assertions in exhibit 3; only acknowleged them. Therefore, I am involking Fed. Rule 56(c)(e)(2).
8
So, because of these unlawful employment practices, is what
9
prompt me to engaged in protected activity on 7-17-05. See Exhibi
10
2, Voluntary Statement 7-17-05. On page 2 of 4, lines 1 through
11
12
14. I am expressing it is my sincere belief that Chef Bruno Vaxia
ne, singled handedly created a hostile work environment between
13 him and myself and me and my co-workers.
14
For instance, on page 2 of 4, lines 14 through 19. Bruno, once
15 openly approached me one hour into the beginning of theshift and
16 said "he was keeping time on how much work I've got done up to
17 this point and that I should of had more done".... This comment
disc
1t)€ (direct evidence) of
18 C
hostile racial*harassmentE1
19
20
101c-dci Of 44-u
/'i R 49 ti'e f1o'-
g 7o3(x).)9scz-
Example 2: on page 3 of 4, lines 1 through 3. Bruno said in
21 front of my co-workers that "the following week he will be work22
ing on my shift and he will push me to work faster"; I responded
23
"if you push me to work faster then you are going to have to push
co-workers too and the new guy that I'm training right now".
24 my
This statement constitute direct evidence of a hostile, racial
25
harassment. Bruno, never said this to my co-workers, who are
26
similary situated, but not of my protected class, Black American.
27
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 5 703(a)(1), 42 U.S.C.A. S 2000e-2(a)(1
28
()(i)
1 Example 3: on page 3 of 4, lines 7 through 14. I once started the
2 shift an hour early and Bruno, notice and had then swing super3 visoresus, to send me back down stairs for one hour. I asked
Jesus, "why was he sending me back"? When there was two other coworkers whom started early too". Jesus repliedI don't know he (
6 Bruno) just told me to send you back". This statement by Jesus,
7
(quoting Bruno) and their action of sending me back for one hour
and allowing my co-workers who are similary situaded but not of
8
my protected class, black American; to start early, constitute
9
direct evidence of hostile racial discriminatory harassment; in
10
violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, S 703(a)(1), 42 U.S.C.
11
A. S 2000e-2(a)(1). See Mayes v. Winco Holdings, Inc., 846 F .3d
12 1274 at* 1278 (2017); and headnotes.
13
Example 4: on page 3 of 4, lines 15 through 21. Concerning the
14 point system, when it was implemented back in Oct. 1, 2003, in
15 relation to tardiness. I had witness Bruno, looking the other way
16 when my co-workers would be late; but the first time I was 4, mm
17 late he approached me concerning it. This action constitute dit18 ect evidence of hostile racial discriminatory harassment. Civil19 Rights Act of 1964, S 703(a)(1), 42 U.S.C.A. S 2000e-2(a)(1). See
20 Dominguez-Curry, v. Nevada Transp. Dept.; Roc Stacey, 424, F.3d21
1027, at*headnotes: 4, 9, 10, 11, 19, 21, 27 and at* Background.
Also, on page 4 of 4, lines 15 through 20. I stated: "I should
22
23 have been considered for one of those promotions". (Referring to
24 co-workers whom were promoted over me that is listed in Exhibit 3
I go on to state: "I am simply requesting that Chef Bruno, hiring
25
and promotional procedures be scrutinize by someone higher up in
26
management to ensure equal opportunity is given to all who has
27
earned it".
28
III
111 Due to the Defendant purposely denying me any opportunities in
2 the form of a notice, application, or a properly posted Bid for
e to sign. I was prompted to file this statement to show that I
was being intentionally discriminated against; due to my race; a
Black American; and retaliated against for opposing racial discr• 6 imination in the work place; in violation of sec. 703(a)(1) and
704(a), of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. SS 2000e-2(a)
(1) and 2000e-3(a).
8
And, since this Voluntary Statement was filed on 7-17-05, in
9
the Defendant's H.R. Dept.,and prior to my termination date of
10
Aug. 22, 2012; the Defendant had promoted (4) co-workers from
11
within my department and hired in two other supervisors within
12 this time period; all of whom were similary situated, but not of
13 my protected class Black American; and their names were Johnny14 Veliz, the younger biological brother of Alex, Periceles Cordova
15 Moises Alfaro and Alex Veliz. See Exhibit 3, Voluntary Statement
16 9-15-11, gee etJose Lujan through Alex Veliz.
1711
Also, See Texas Dept. Of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.
at* 253 and 260, footnote [6]; See Noyes v. Kelly Services,
18
248
19
488 F.3d 1163 at* 1171 and headnote [91, (2007); See Anthony Ash
20 v. Tyson Foods Inc., 546, U.S. (2006); and See LINDAHL.V. AIR
21
22 11
FRANCE, 930 F.2d 1434, at* 1436, 1437 1438, (1991).
See Exhibit 17, Charge Of Discrimination to the EEOC, 4-4-201
23
In this exhibit there is one significant thing to point out, tha
24
prior to now, I had previously failed to point out. On lines 4
25
through 6, stating: "I have expressed interest in those position
26
27
however I was denied. Respondent did not even post some of those
positions and therefore, I did not have a legitimate and equal
opportunity to apply".
28
1
The one significant thing is, when the intake Officer of the
2 EEOC, was taking down my statement, he inadvertently left out the
3 word promotions.
4
Moises Alfaro, is the last co-worker listed in Exhibit 3, who
was promoted over me. When Moises, had accepted the Bid position
6 for a Lead Baker, although he immediately suited up as a supervisor; he did the duties of a Lead Baker, and was not introduce
8 as a supervisor until shortly after the filing of this Charge Of
Discrimination to the EEOC, on April 4, 2011.
9
Moises', promotion constitute direct evidence of intentional
10
racial Discrimination and retaliation; for filing a Charge Of Dis
11
crimination with the EEOC, on April 4, 2011; in violation of sec.
12
703(a)(1) and 704(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
13 S2000e-2(a)(1) and 2000e-3(a); and FMLA,&F
14
See Exhibit 9, FMLA, Intermi-
15 ttent Protected Leave, call outs; from Jan. 2006 through Aug.201
16 On page 8 of 10, in the month of April, I was absent for 5- days1
17 in May, 7 days, In June, 3 days, in July, 8 days and I know MoisE
18 was promoted before 8-4-11, because he was the supervisor that
19 1 night who was responsible for having me written up on 8-4-11. S
20 reguardless when he was promoted during this 4, month period a
21 11 close causal connection can be establish.
22
This statement to the EEOC, expressing my interest in those
23 promotions that are listed in Exhibit 3, represent the second
24 11 time I put the Defendant on notice that I was interested in fut25
ure promotions; since my Voluntary Statement in Exhibit 2, dated
7-17-05; expressing my interest in future opportunities for pro-
26
motions. Prior to Moises, being promoted; but yet, the Defendant
27
continued to intentionally discriminate against me. See Texas
28
Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254,(1981);
i
See Marsha GODWIN, V. HUNT WESSON, INC., 150 F.3d 1217, 1219,
2 1220 (1998); and See Wallis v. J.R. Simplot Co., 26 F.3d 885, 889
(1994); and See Metzler v. Fed. Home Loan 464 F.3d(2006) at* 22,
sec. A. Prima Fade Case of Retaliation.
See Exhibit 1, Defendant's Bakery Disciplinary Action, Oct.10,
6 2012. Kenneth Gayle, was similary situated, but not of my protect
ed class Black American. He would go on FMLA, protect.4
8
leave,
ranging from six months to one year.1 minus one day; and exaust all
of his leave time and would not be disciplined with attendance
9
points and nor was he ever retaliated against as I was; even t
10
gh everybody on the list committed comparable violations of the
11
same seriousness and I was the only one on the list terminated.
12
See Exhibit 22, Voluntary Statement to the EEOC, 10-28-11. On
13 this date I had engaged in protected activity and the Defendant
14 retaliated against me on 11-6-11; See Exhibit 6, Voluntary State15 ment 11-6-11.
On page 2 of 11, lines 4 through 9.Torge Villa,
16 my supervisor approached me and said:
17
"Jimie, the last three times you did muffins you early out be
fore you had finished the muffins"; so, today Alex, my boss said
18 "you have to do muffins today".
19
This statement by Jorge
and Jorge, quoting Alex, constitute.
20
direct evidence of retaliation for engaging in protected activity
21
on 10-28-11 and engaging in protected activity, by taking inter-
22
mittent protected leave; in violation of the Civil Rights Act of
23
24
1964, 42 U.S.C. ss 2000e-2(a)(1) and 2000e-'3(a), and - state law
(NRS 613.340); and FMLA, of 1993, S 105(a)(2), 29 U.S.C.A. 5 2615
(a)(2). See Berman v. Orkin Exterminating Co., Inc.,160 F.3d 697
25
at* 700 (1998); See Smothers v. Solvay Chemicals, Inc., 740 F.3d
26
530 At* 540 (2014).
27
Further down on lines 17 through 20, stating: my daily schedu
28
says I'm to do the filling finishing station today". Jorge said
3/
1
"no Alex, told me to have you do muffins today". This statemen
2 by Jorge, constitute direct evidence of retaliation, second count
3 jJfor the same situation.
On page 4 of 11, lines 5 through 8, stating: Jorge, then asked
me again "are you refusing to do muffins today yes or no"? I re6 sponded "for the above reasons no". Jorge, then said "leave and
go home". I said "ok". This statement by Jorge, constitute direct
8 evidence of retaliation, count three for the same situation.
9
On page 5 of 11, lines 5 through 8,Jorge, said: "his boss Alex
want Jimie, to do muffins today because for the last three times
10
Jimie, did muffins he went home early and didn't finish the muffins due to FMLA". This statement by Jorge, constitute direct evid
12
ence of retaliation,count four due to me taking FMLA, protected
13
14
15
leave.
On page 6 of 11, lines 2 through 4. Jorge, said to Josh,"no he
refused earlier so I want Jimie, to go home". This was after Josh
16 had asked me was I willing to work this out? This statement by Jo
17 rge, constitute direct evidence of retaliation, count five for
18 engaging in protected activity; All counts constitute direct evid
19 ence of retaliation, in violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
20 42 U.S.C. 88 2000e-2(a)(1) and 2000e-3(a), and state law (NRS)21
613.340); and FMLA, of 1993, 8 105(a)(2), 29 U.S.C.A. 8 2615(a)(2
22 See Sischo-Nownejad v. Merced Community College District, 934 F23
24
25
26
.2d 1104, at* 1112 (1991).
refused the order because of the retaliatory motives behind
it; so I was well within my rights to do so but I was sent home
for insubordination see on page 8 of 11, line 4, "refusing to obey"...., and on page 9 of 11, is the daily rotation schedule
27
that is presented in exhibit 5. Jorge and Alex, wanted me to
28
give up my easy day duties, to take on co-worker Rafael's,
1
heavier muffin duties. So that they could punish.
- me for my usage
2
of my FMLA, benefit.
On page 10 of 11, is my pay stub for that pay period of the
night of 11-6-11; that shows I was not paid a full 8, hours when
Jorge, suspended me and sent me home.
6
On page 11 of 11, I had engaged in protected activity on
2-10-12, concerning the night of 11-6-11. Nicole Haliburton,
8
9
did conduct an investigation and found no wrong doing and
di
call me back to work on 11-7-11, but did not pay me a full S
hours and lied about it. See Exhibit7, Voluntary Statement
10
2-17-12.
11
12
13
This on page 2 of 4, was written in response to the request
letter on page 3 and 4.On page 3 of 4 the date Jan. 16,2012, on
this date this request constitute direct evidence of retaliation
14
in violation of the FMLA, of 1993, sec. 105 (a)(1) , 29 U.S.C.A.
15
sec. 2615 (a)(2); and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
16
sec. 2000e-2(a)(1) and 2000e-3(a) and state law (NRS 613.340).'
17
Because up to the above date I had not agreed to engaged in
18
any "interactive process". Also, it was prohibited to interfere
19
with my FMLA, benefit in anyway unless I had agreed to it The
20
request had retaliatc./'y'motives. See Smothers v Solvay Chemical
21
Inc, 740 F.3d 530 *534 (2014).
22
23
24
25
On page 6 of 6 1 second paragraph on lines 6 through 8, stat-'
ing: "I would also like to clarify that you actually received
pay for a full 8 hours of work on November 6, 2011,even
though you were sent home early for insubordination".
This is where Haliburton, lied about my pay; andthe second
half of this statement is an admission; pursuant to Fed. Rule
26
56(c)(1)(A); Haliburton confirming that I was sent home unjustl
27
See Exhibit 8, on page 2 of 2, lines 3 through 6, states:
28
'
y
1
2
3
4
"Haliburton investigated..., but did not find any wrongdoing"...
"Haliburton called Plaintiff on or about November 7, 2011 and
advised him that he should return to work on that evening for h
his schedule shift".
Both of these two admissions establish that I was sent home
unjustly for insubordination and both admissions constitute
direct evidence for retaliation. Therefore, I'm invoking Fed.
6
Rule Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A).
Nicole Haliburton, Alex Veliz, Johnny Veliz and Jorge Villa,
8 were the four decisionmakers whom were responsible for termin9
ating me and based on this fact, summary judgment should have
10
been precluded. See Dominguez-Curry v Nevada Transp. Dept. 424
ii
F.3d 1027 *1033 and 1034 (2005); and headnotes 4,11,12,20 and 27
12
See Mayes v Winco Holdings, Inc., 846 F.3d 1274 *1279 and 1281
13
(2017); and headnotes 11 and 12.
14
15
See Exhibit 23, Voluntary Statement 3-6-12. On Feb. 29, 2012
I had failed several minutes short of finishing my task, due to
the unfair work conditions I was subjected to. At 1:00 A.M.,my
16
supervisor Johnny, releaved me. when I had asked if I could
17
complete the task, without looking at me with a very hostile
18
demeanor he said "no".
19
While on lunch at about 1:20 A.M., waiting to eat, Johnny,
20
21
22
approached me with a large pan of croissants and lightly tossed
them on the counter right next to me and said:
24
"you know these choc. croissants, were over proof and a little
flat and I got these off JJ's, and they are a little flat".
i said "fix the ovens", Johnny said "what ovens"? I said
"the two I was using".... and I said "Johnny, man I'm on
lunch so go and leave me alone".
25
Johnny, said "ok", he then snatched up
23
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CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.
Respectfully submitted,
Date: APRIL 15, 2018
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.