Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Haroutyun Karabajakyan, Petitioner v. Nancy A. Berryhill, Deputy Commissioner for Operations, Social Security Administration

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FILED

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

OCT 182017

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

HAROUTYUN KARABAJAKYAN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

No. 15-55242

D.C. No.

2: 14-cv-0 1024-SJO-AN

NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting

Commissioner of the Social Security

Administration,

MEMORANDUM*

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

S. James Otero, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted October 18, 2017

Before: CLIFTON, N.R. SMITH, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.

Haroutyun Karabajakyan appeals pro se the district court's decision

affirming the Commissioner of Social Security's denial of Karabajakyan's

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

,C- AIg

il-

application for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income

under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act. We review de novo, Ghanim v.

Colvin, 763 F.3d 1154, 1159 (9th Cir. 2014), and affirm.

Karabajakyan contends that the administrative law judge ("AU") erred in

rejecting his testimony about his symptoms and limitations. We disagree. The

AU provided two, specific, clear and convincing reasons for finding

Karabajakyan's symptom testimony less than fully credible: (1) the considerable

gaps in his cardiac treatment; and (2) his failure to follow medical advice,

including his refusal to undergo recommended testing and treatment. See Fair v.

Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 603-04 (9th Cir. 1989) (explaining that "unexplained, or

inadequately explained" failure to seek treatment and failure to follow a prescribed

course of treatment can constitute clear and convincing reasons for discounting a

claimant's credibility regarding his or her symptoms). The record reflects a nearly

seven-year gap between Karabajakyan's 2004 visit to one cardiologist and his next

visit to another cardiologist in 2011. Even if Karabajakyan had limited funds and

no medical insurance, the ALJ permissibly concluded that Karabajakyan's ability

to seek and obtain low-cost medical care during the relevant period supports a

reasonable inference that he could have obtained some cardiac care had his

symptoms from his heart condition been as disabling as he reported. See Orn v.

Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 638 (9th Cir. 2007); see also Fair, 885 F.2d at 603 ("While

there are any number of good reasons for not [seeking treatment], a claimant's

failure to assert one, or a finding by the AU that the proffered reason is not

believable, can cast doubt on the sincerity of the claimant's pain testimony.")

(internal citations omitted); see also Flaten v. Sec 'y of Health and Human Servs.,

44 F.3d 1453, 1464 (9th Cir. 1995) (noting that the ALJ properly discounted

claimant's assertion "that lack of money prevented her from seeking help for

ongoing problems, because she sought appropriate medical care from a [doctor] for

other medical symptoms.. during the intervening years"). Karabajakyan's

argument that, because he completed medical training in Armenia, he does not

need to "run to a doctor with every pain or discomfort," does not explain the long

gap in treatment for what he alleges is a disabling cardiac condition.

Finally, the record contains no medical records to substantiate

Karabajakyan's claim that he was seen by cardiologists while in Armenia in 2008,

nor would one month of treatment in Armenia undermine the AL's reasoning

about the considerable gaps in seeking cardiac treatment. As a result, any error in

the AL's third reason—Karabajakyan's continued smoking against medical

advice—was harmless because the AL's specific findings regarding

Karabajakyan's refusal to seek regular cardiac care and to submit to the testing and

-4)

treatment recommended by his treating physicians were clear and convincing

reasons. See Bray v. Astrue, 554 F.3d 1219, 1227 (9th Cir. 2009) (affirming an

adverse credibility determination that rested in part on the fact that the claimant

failed to quit smoking because the ALJ provided other independent bases for

discounting the claimant's testimony).

Karabajakyan contends that the ALJ improperly gave little weight to the

opinion of his treating physician, Manvel M. Mazmanyan, M.D., which was

recorded on a physical Residual Functional Capacity ("RFC") Assessment form

completed in January 2012. We disagree. The AU provided a specific and

legitimate reason for giving little weight to Dr. Mazmanyan's opinion: his

statement was not supported by the sparse medical record, and it lacks objective

medical evidence for the limitations he imposed. Neither the RFC Assessment

form nor Dr. Mazmanyan's earlier treatment notes provide any information about

how Karabajakyan's diagnoses translate into the specific and severe limitations

detailed in the RFC Assessment, e.g., leg elevation and frequency of required

breaks. See Connett v. Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 874-75 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding

that the ALJ did not err in rejecting the controverted opinion of a treating physician

whose restrictive functional assessment was not supported by treatment notes);

Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir. 2002) ("The ALJ need not accept

the opinion of any physician, including a treating physician, if that opinion is brief,

conclusory, and inadequately supported by clinical findings.")

We also disagree with Karabajakyan's contention that the ALJ should have

granted his request for a pre-hearing on the record ("OTR") decision on the basis

of record evidence demonstrating that he met Listing 4.02A1 and B for cardiac

impairments ("the cardiac listing"). The long gaps in Karabajakyan's cardiac

treatment, coupled with his refusal to comply with his doctors' advice and

recommendations, support the AL's determination that Karabajakyan failed to

satisfy Listing 4.02's introductory requirement that a claimant present evidence of

chronic heart failure "while on a regimen of prescribed treatment." 20 C.F.R. Pt.

404, Subpt. P, App. 1, Listing 4.02. As a result of failing to show that the listing's

introductory requirement was met, Karabajakyan failed to establish that he was

entitled to a favorable finding at Step 3. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1099 (9th

Cir. 1999) ("To meet a listed impairment, a claimant must establish that he or she

meets each characteristic of a listed impairment relevant to his or her claim.").

Because Karabajakyan failed to establish that he met essential requirements for

Listing 4.02 at the time of his hearing, the AU did not err by failing to issue an

OTR decision prior to the hearing date. See Curry v. Sullivan, 925 F.2d 1127,

1131(9th Cir. 199 1) (applying harmless error rule to review of administrative

decisions regarding disability).

Karabajakyan also contends that the AU failed to include all of his

limitations in the RFC assessment and the hypothetical questions posed to the

vocational expert ("yE"), and that, as a result, the AL's Step 5 determination is

incorrect. We disagree. The ALJ gave clear and convincing reasons for

discounting Karabajakyan's symptom testimony and specific and legitimate

reasons for giving limited weight to Dr. Mazmanyan's opinion that Karabajakyan's

limitations exceeded those set out in the RFC. For this reason, the ALJ did not

need to incorporate those limitations in the RFC finding or in the hypothetical

questions posed to the VE. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a), 416.945(a); Bayliss v.

Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1217 (9th Cir. 2005); Osenbrockv. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1157,

1163 (9th Cir. 2001). Moreover, because the functional limitations identified by

the AU in the RFC for light work were supported by the medical evidence the AU

credited, and because the record contains no medical evidence supporting

Karabajakyan's assertion that the ALJ erred by not incorporating limitations

related to his suffering from hemorrhoids, the AL's Step 5 determination is

supported by substantial evidence. See Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747,

756-57 (9th Cir. 1989).

rel

Finally, Karabajakyan's contentions that the AU was biased against him,

and that the Appeals Council erred in denying his request for review, lack merit.

The record does not support his allegations that the AL's behavior reflected a

clear inability to render fair judgment. The presumption of impartiality was not

rebutted. Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 857-58 (9th Cir. 2001).

Additionally, this court lacks jurisdiction to review the Appeals Council's denial

of a request for review, which is a non-final agency action. Brewes v. Comm 'r of

Soc. Sec. Admin., 682 F.3d 1157, 1161 (9th Cir. 2012).

AFFIRMED.

FILED - SOUTHERN DIVISION

CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COURT

I-

DEC - 8 2014

CENTRAL

CALIFORNIA

DEPUTY

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

10 HAROUTYUN KARABAJAKYAN,

Case No. CV 14-01024-SJO (AN)

ORDER ACCEPTING THE FINDINGS

AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Plaintiff,

13 CAROLYN W. COLVIN, ACTING

COMMISSIONER OF THE SOCIAL

14 SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,

Defendant.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636, the Court has reviewed the file, including the

18 Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation ("R&R") and Petitioner's Objections,

19 which were filed on November 20, 2014. The Court has completed a de novo review of

20 those portions of the R&R to which Petitioner has objected.

IT IS ORDERED that:

The Objections are overruled because the Court finds Petitioner's Objections

23 do not raise any arguments that show or establish that the findings and conclusions set

24 forth in the R&R are erroneous as a matter of fact or law. Further, Petitioner's 18-page

Objections raise arguments that are conclusory, speculative, or discuss and/or restate

26 various cases and legal principles.

The Court accepts the findings and recommendation of the R&R.

Judgment shall be entered dismissing this action with prejudice.

km,-Vvy,

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the clerk shall serve a copy of this Order and the

Judgment on all counsel or parties of record.

DATED:

tfr

,2014

S. JAMES OTERO

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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a:14-cv-01024-SJO-AN Document 17 Filed 11/06/14 Page 1 of 17 Page ID #:479

I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THIS DOCUMENT WAS SERVED BY

FIRST CLASS MAIL POSTAGE PREPAID, TO PLAINTIFF

AT HIS RESPECTIVE MOST RECENT ADDRESS OF

RECORD IN THIS ACTION ON THIS DATE.

FILED

CLERK. U.S. DISTRICT COURT

November 6, 2014

CENTRAl, DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DEPITn'

DATED: November 6,2014

DEPUTY CLERK

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

'a ..

11 HAROUTYUN KARABAJAKYAN,

Case No. CV 14-01024-SJO (AN)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE

JUDGE

Plaintiff,

CAROLYN W. COLVIN ACTING

COMMISSIONER OF TAE SOCIAL

SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,

Defendant.

1. SUMMARY

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to the Honorable S. James Otero,

20 United States District Judge, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and General Order 05-07 of the

21 United States District Court for the Central District of California.

Haroutyun Karabajakyan ("Plaintiff'), who is proceeding in pro se, seeks review

23 of the Commissioner's final decision denying his applications for disability insurance

24 benefits ("DIB") and Supplemental Security Income ("SSI"), pursuant to Titles II and

25 XVI of the Social Security Act. In accordance with the Court's Case Management Order,

26 the parties have filed the Administrative Record ("AR") and a Joint Stipulation ("JS")

27 raising seven disputed issues concerning remand and/or immediate payment of benefits.

ffihJ;;YY(

14-cv-01024-SJO-AN Document 17 Filed 11/06/14 Page 2 of 17 Page ID #:480

For the reasons discussed below, it is recommended that Plaintiffs request for an

order remanding this case for further proceedings be denied, and the Commissioner's

request for an order affirming the final decision be granted.

2. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff was born on July 29, 1960, is able to communicate in English, and has at

least a high school education. (AR 23.) On November 6, 2009, Plaintiff filed applications

7 for DIB and SSI, alleging that he had been disabled since April 27, 2004. (AR 12, 1578 62.) After Plaintiffs applications were denied, a hearing was held before an

Administrative Law Judge ("AU"). (AR 12, 37-92, 95-99.) On February 21, 2012, the

10 ALJ issued a decision finding Plaintiff not disabled. (AR 12-25.) On November 15, 2013,

11 the Appeals Council denied review, making the AL's decision the final decision of the

Commissioner. (AR 1-5.) Plaintiff, proceeding pro Se, challenges the Commissioner's

13 decision.

3. DISCUSSION

15 13.1 STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under 42 U.S.C. section 405(g), this Court reviews the Commissioner's final

17 decision to determine if: (1) the Commissioner's findings are supported by substantial

18 evidence; and (2) the Commissioner used correct legal standards. See Carmickle v.

19 Comm 'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1159 (9th Cir. 2008); Hoopai v. Astrue, 499

F.3d 1071, 1074 (9th Cir. 2007). Substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence as a

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v.

22 Perales, 402 U.S. 389,401, 91 S. Ct. 1420 (1971) (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted). To determine whether substantial evidence supports a finding, the reviewing

court "must review the administrative record as a whole, weighing both the evidence that

supports and the evidence that detracts from the Commissioner's conclusion." Reddick

v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 720 (9th Cir. 1996). "If the evidence can reasonably support

27 either affirming or reversing," the reviewing court "may not substitute its judgment" for

that of the Commissioner. Id. at 720-21.

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People are "disabled" for purposes of receiving Social Security benefits if they are

unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity because of a severe physical or mental

impairment that is expected to result in death or which has lasted, or is expected to last,

4 for a continuous period of at least 12 months. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); Drouin v.

Sullivan, 966 F.2d 1255, 1257 (9th Cir. 1992).

Generally, the Social Security Administration ("SSA") uses a five-step sequential

analysis for determining whether a claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a),

8 416.920(a). In the first step, the Commissioner must determine whether the claimant is

9 currently engaged in substantial gainful activity; if so, the claimant is not disabled and

10 the claim is denied. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i), 416.920(a)(4)(i). If the claimant is

11 not currently engaged in substantial gainful activity, the second step requires the

12 Commissioner to determine whether the claimant has a "severe" impairment or

combination of impairments significantly limiting his ability to do basic work activities;

14 if not, a finding of nondisability is made and the claim is denied. 20 C.F.R. §

15 404.15 20(a)(4)(ii), 412 .920(a)(4)(ii). If the claimant has a "severe" impairment or

16 combination of impairments, the third step requires the Commissioner to determine

17, whether the impairment or combination of impairments meets or equals an impairment

18 in the Listing of Impairments ("Listings") set forth at 20 C.F.R., Part 404, Subpart P,

19 Appendix 1; if so, disability is conclusively presumed and benefits are awarded. 20

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 416.920(a)(4)(iii). If the claimant's impairment or

combination of impairments does not meet or equal an impairment in the Listings, the

fourth step requires the Commissioner to determine whether the claimant has sufficient

residual functional capacity ("RFC")" to perform his past work; if so, the claimant is not

disabled and the claim is denied. 20 C.F.R. § § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 416.920(a)(4)(iv). The

25 claimant has the burden of proving that he is unable to perform past relevant work.

RFC is what a claimant can still do despite existing exertional and nonexertional

limitations.

20 C.F.R. §

, § 404.1545(a)(1), 416.945(a)(1); see Cooperv. Sullivan, 880 F.2d

1152, 1155 n.5(9thCir. 1989).

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1 Drouin, 966 F.2d at 1257. If the claimant meets that burden, a prima facie case of

disability is established. Id. If that happens or if the claimant has no past relevant work,

the Commissioner then bears the burden of establishing the claimant is not disabled

4 because he can perform other substantial gainful work available in the national economy.

5 20 C.F.R. § § 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416 .920(a)(4)(v). That determination comprises the fifth

6 and final step in the sequential analysis. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v),

7 I 416.920(a)(4)(v); Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 828 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995); Drouin, 966

8 F.2d at 1257.

In this case, the AU determined at step one of the sequential process that Plaintiff

10 has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since April 27, 2004. (AR 17.)At step two,

11 the ALJ determined that Plaintiff has severe impairments consisting of a history of

12 myocardial infarction in 2004 and coronary artery disease. (AR 17.) At step three, the

13 ALJ found that Plaintiff does not have an impairment or a combination of impairments

14 that meets or medically equals the severity of an impairment in the Listings. (AR 18-19);

see 20 C.F.R., Part 404, Subpart P, App. 1. The AU then determined that Plaintiff has

16 the RFC for light work, as defined in 20 C.F.R. § § 404.1567(b), 416.967(b). (AR 19.)

At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiffs RFC precluded the performance of his past

18 relevant work as a taxi driver. (AR 23.) At step five, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was

19 capable of performing work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy,

including work as a sorter, inspector, and basket filler. (AR 24.)

I/I

Specifically, the ALJ found that Plaintiff is able to: exert up to 20 pounds of force

occasionally, up to 10 pounds of force frequently and/or negligible amounts of force

constantly to move objects; stand and walk up to ô hours in an 8-hour workday; sit upto

6 hours in an 8-hour workday, with normal breaks perform work that does not require

20/20 vision or climbing of ladders, ropes or scaffolds; and occasionally stoop, kneel

crouch, crawl, and climb ramps and stairs. (AR 19.) The AU further found that Plaintiff

should not engage in work involving concentrated exposure to extreme cold, extreme

heat, hazardous machinery , unprotected heights or other high risk, hazardous or unsafe

conditions, or even moderate exposure to environmental respiratory irritants or poorly

ventilated areas. (AR 19.)

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1 3.2 ANALYSIS

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred by: (1) failing to issue a favorable

3 determination on the record ("OTR") finding Plaintiff disabled under section 4.02 of the

4 Listings for chronic heart failure; (2) improperly assessing Plaintiff's RFC; (3) making

numerous errors at step five of the sequential evaluation process; (4) improperly

questioning Plaintiff's credibility; (5) violating the treating physician rule; and (6) failing

7 to disqualify himself as the AU due to bias. Plaintiff also challenges the Appeals

8 Council's denial of review as untimely and improper.

3.2.1 The Listings (issue #1)

Plaintiff contends that the AU erred in failing to issue an OTR decision concluding

Ill I that Plaintiff's heart condition meets section 4.02 of the Listings for chronic heart failure,

12 based on the criteria in sections 4.02A1 and 4.02B1. (JS 3-9); see 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404,

13 Subpt. P, App. 1, § 4.02.

To meet the introductory requirements of section 4.02, Plaintiff must show

15 I evidence of chronic heart failure "while on a regimen of prescribed treatment," with

16 "symptoms and signs" of chronic heart failure, as described in section 4.00D2 of the

17 Listings. See 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, § 4.02. To establish the required level

18 of severity for chronic heart failure under sections 4.02A1 and 4.02B1, Plaintiff must

19 provide medically documented evidence of: 1) systolic failure, "with left ventricular end

diastolic dimensions greater than 6.0 cm" or an "ejection fraction of 30 percent or less

21 during a period of stability (not during an episode of acute heart failure);" and 2)

22 "persistent symptoms of heart failure which very seriously limit the ability to

23 independently initiate, sustain, or complete activities of daily living in an individual for

24 whom an MC [medical consultant], preferably one experienced in the care of patients

with cardiovascular disease, has concluded that the performance of an exercise test would

present a significant risk to the individual;" 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, §

27 4.02A1, B I. The ALJ properly found that Plaintiff failed to meet the requirements of

section 4.02. (AR 19.)

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First, Plaintiff has not satisfied the introductory requirement of section 4.02, by

2 showing that he suffered from chronic heart failure while on a regimen of prescribed

treatment. (AR 19); see 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, § 4.02. The record reflects

4 that Plaintiffs physicians recommended that Plaintiff undergo an angiogram/angiography

5 or heart catheterization to help diagnose and treat Plaintiff's heart condition. (AR 239,

6 261, 262, 265, 317, 328, 332.) Despite his doctors' warnings that he was in urgent need

7 of such procedures, Plaintiff refused the recommended treatment. (AR 239, 261, 262,

8 265, 317, 328, 332.) While Plaintiff suggested that he declined an angiogram because he

9 did not have insurance, the ALJJ reasonably concluded that Plaintiffs financial condition

did not excuse his failure to follow his doctors' treatment recommendations as Plaintiff

11 had access to and had availed himself of low-cost or free medical treatment in the past.

(AR 20, 49-50, 61, 77-78.) Further, Plaintiff admitted that he refused to undergo an

angiogram because he did not believe it would be beneficial to him. (AR 49, 61, 77-78.)

14 The record also shows that Plaintiff failed to comply with his doctors' recommendations

15 that he quit smoking. (AR 20, 239, 328.) Plaintiff acknowledged that his doctors took

16 issue with his smoking, yet he continued his habit of smoking a pack of cigarettes every

17 day. (AR 55, 60, 80, 246, 252, 262, 279.) Plaintiff also admitted that he refused to take

18 cholesterol lowering medication (statins) recommended by his cardiologist because he

19 questioned the benefit of such medications. (AR 78, 328.) In sum, the AL's finding that

Plaintiff had not followed the prescribed treatment regimen is supported by substantial

evidence. See 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, § 4.02.

Second, Plaintiff failed to show that his heart condition met the severity

requirements of section 4.02B 1, as there is no evidence that a medical consultants-' opined

that Plaintiff could not perform an exercise test. 20 C.F.R. Part § 404, Subpt. P, App. 1,

§ 4.02B 1 (requiring "persistent symptoms of heart failure which very seriously limit the

A "medical consultant" is an individual "who is a member of a team that makes

disability determinations in a State agency" or for the SSA. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1616(a),

28 416. 10 16(a).

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1 ability to independently initiate, sustain, or complete activities of daily living in an

individual for whom an MC [medical consultant], preferably one experienced in the care

3 ofpatients with cardiovascular disease, has concluded that the performance of an exercise

4 test would present a significant risk to the individual;"). Rather, Plaintiff acknowledged

5 that both his treating physician and his cardiologist actually recommended that he

6 participate in an exercise test. (AR 61-63.) Although Plaintiff claims that a physician in

7 Armenia had told him an exercise test could be dangerous, Plaintiff's Armenian physician

8 does not qualify as a medical consultant under the regulations. (JS 16-17; AR 61-63); see

9 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1616(a), 416.1016(a). Plaintiff has not met the criteria of subsection

10 4.02B1 and, therefore, fails to satisfy the requirements of section 4.02 for chronic heart

11 failure. 20 C.F.R. Part § 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, § 4.02.

Plaintiff's related argument that the ALJ erred by failing to make an OTR

13 determination of disability based on section 4.02 of the Listings also lacks merit. (JS 3-9;

14 AR 146-47, 235, 237, 240-41, 317-19.) Because Plaintiff failed to establish that he met

15 the introductory requirement of section 4.02 and the criteria set forth in section 4.02B1,

16 any asserted errors in the AL's failure to issue a timely OTR decision was harmless. See

17 Curry v. Sullivan, 925 F.2d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 1991) (harmless error rule applies to

18 review of administrative decisions regarding disability).

Accordingly, Plaintiff is not entitled to a reversal or remand based upon Issue #1.

3.2.2 RFC and Treating Physician's Opinion (Issues #2 and #5)

Plaintiff contends that the AU erred in assessing his RFC, as he failed to give

22 I proper consideration to the opinion of Plaintiff's treating physician, Manvel M.

Mazmanyan, M.D. (JS 18-20, 56-58, 60-62.)

Plaintiff began seeing Dr. Mazmanyan in May 2004. (AR 265.) Plaintiff had

25 I experienced a myocardial infarction a couple of weeks earlier, and was complaining of

Plaintiff stated that he refused to take a stress test, as he did not want to sign an

acknowledgment concerning the risks associated with the test and he believed that an

28 echocardiogram could properly assess his heart function. (AR 61-63.)

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1 continued chest discomfort. (AR 265.) Dr. Mazmanyan noted that Plaintiff needed an

2 angiogram for proper evaluation of his condition, but Plaintiff had declined the

3 procedure. (AR 265.) Thereafter, Plaintiff's follow-up treatment was sporadic. Plaintiff

4 saw Dr. Mazmanyan once more in 2004, once in 2005, and once in 2006. (AR 262-64.)

5 Plaintiff did not see Dr. Mazmanyan in 2007. From 2008 through 2012, Plaintiff saw Dr.

6 Mazmanyan once or twice a year. (AR 257-60, 276-77, 329, 331-37.) In August 2010,

7 Dr. Mazmanyan completed a Treating Physician General Medical Evaluation. (AR 2768 77.) In addition to citing Plaintiff's 2004 myocardial infarction, Dr. Mazmanyan reported

9 that Plaintiff had wheezing in both lungs, orthopnea and paroxysmal nocturnal dyspnea

10 due to coronary artery disease, precordial chest pain, constant left chest tenderness,

11 shortness of breath, decreased vascular pulses due to severe stenotic disease, and some

12 tenderness in the abdominal area. (AR 276-77.) There were no significant abnormalities

13 in Plaintiff's musculoskeletal or neurological systems. (AR 277.) While Plaintiff's

14 coronary artery disease was described as severe, Dr. Mazmanyan noted that evaluation

15 of Plaintiff's condition had not been "constant and proper," due to a lack of medical

16 insurance. (AR 277.)

In January 2012, Dr. Mazmanyan completed a Physical RFC Questionnaire. (AR

18 1 333-37.) Dr. Mazmanyan diagnosed Plaintiff with a history of myocardial infarction in

19 2004, coronary artery disease, ischemic heart disease, chronic obstructive pulmonary

20 disease, depressed mood, insomnia, and lumbosacral radiculopathy. (AR 333.) Plaintiff's

21 reported symptoms included shortness of breath, precordial chest pain aggravated with

22 ambulation and minimal isometric exercises, low back pain associated with numbness of

23 the lower extremities, and peripheral vascular disease. (AR 333.) Dr. Mazmanyan also

24 cited a displaced apex beat (PMI), symptomatic arrhythmia, abnormal electrocardiogram

25 (ECG), and severe stenotic disease of the arteries at the lower extremities, bilaterally. (AR

26 333.) Unlike any of his earlier reports, Dr. Mazmanyan assessed Plaintiff with significant

27 restrictions, including lifting and carrying less than 10 pounds frequently and 10 pounds

28 occasionally, walking less than 2 blocks, sitting 30 minutes continuously and less than 2

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1 hours in an 8-hour workday, standing 15 to 20 minutes continuously and less than 2 hours

2 in an 8-hour workday, and bending and twisting at the waist 10 to 20 percent of time

3 during an 8-hour workday. (AR 335-36.) Dr. Mazmanyan further found that Plaintiff

4 would need to walk around for 5 minutes at a time every 20 minutes during an 8-hour

5 llworkday, shift positions at will from sitting, standing or walking, take unscheduled 20 to

6 30 minute breaks every 15 to 20 minutes in an 8-hour workday, and elevate his legs 30 to

7 40 degrees for 30 to 40 percent of the time during an 8-hour workday. (AR 335-36.) Dr.

8 Mazmanyan opined that Plaintiffs pain and symptoms would result in frequent

9 interference with his ability to maintain attention and concentration, a moderate limitation

10 in the ability to deal with work stress, and absence from work about two times a month.

11 (AR 334-37.) Dr. Mazmanyan indicated that Plaintiffs symptoms and limitations had

12 existed since Plaintiffs myocardial infarction in 2004. (AR 337.) The ALJ accorded little

13 weight to Dr. Mazmanyan's January 2012 RFC assessment. (AR 21-22.)

Dr. Mazmanyan's opinion was controverted by the opinions of other medical

15 sources. Accordingly, the ALJ was obligated to provide specific and legitimate reasons

16 for rejecting it. Lester, 81 F.3d at 830-31 (if a treating or examining physician's opinion

17 on disability is controverted, it can be rejected only with specific and legitimate reasons

18 supported by substantial evidence in the record). The ALJ did so here. The AU

19 appropriately discounted Dr. Mazmanyan's opinion because it was not adequately

20 supported by his "sparse" treatment records. (AR 21-22); see Thomas v. Barnhart, 278

21 F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir. 2002) ("[t]he ALJ need not accept the opinion of any physician,

22 including a treating physician, if that opinion is brief, conclusory, and inadequately

23 supported by clinical findings"); Connett v. Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 874-75 (9th Cir.

24 2003) (holding that the ALJ did not err in rejecting the controverted opinion of a treating

25 physician whose restrictive functional assessment was not supported by treatment notes).

26 Nowhere do Dr. Mazmanyan's notes indicate reasons why Plaintiff would be limited to

27 standing for only 20 minutes, walking less than 2 blocks, sitting for only 30 minutes, or

28 lifting only ten pounds, nor do they indicate that such limitations were ever recommended

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1 to Plaintiff. See Conneit, 340 F.3d at 874-75. As discussed, Plaintiff saw Dr. Mazmanyan

2 no more than once or twice a year since 2004. (AR 235-53, 245-50.) While Dr.

3 Mazmanyan did note that Plaintiff had severe coronary artery disease in August 2010, Dr.

4 Mazmanyan himself questioned the propriety of this evaluation, due to Plaintiff's lack of

5 constant and proper treatment. (AR 277.) Indeed, the ALJ found that the medical record

6 reveals a lengthy period of several years during which Plaintiff failed to seek specialized

7 treatment for his heart-related symptoms. (AR 21.) The ALJ also noted that Dr.

8 Mazmanyan's RFC assessment was inconsistent with his August 2010 evaluation in which

9 he reported, among other things, that Plaintiffs musculoskeletal system had no significant

10 abnormalities. (AR 21, 276-77.) The ALJ reasonably concluded that Dr. Mazmanyan's

11 treatment notes did not support the severity of limitations described in the January 2012

12 RFC assessment. See Morgan v. Apfel, 169 F.3d 595, 601 (9th Cir. 1999) ("Where the

13 evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, it is the AL's conclusion

14 that must be upheld.") (citing Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 1995)).

The ALJ also properly discounted Dr. Mazmanyan's assessment in favor of the

16 conflicting opinion of the examining physician, Rocely Ella-Tamayo, M.D. (AR 22, 27817 84.) In September 2010, Dr. Ella-Tamayo conducted a complete internal medicine

18 evaluation of Plaintiff. (AR 278-84.) No significant abnormalities were reported in

19 Plaintiff's physical examination, musculoskeletal examination, or neurological

20 examination. (AR 280-83.) Dr. Ella-Tamayo diagnosed Plaintiff with status post

21 myocardial infarction with a history of angina pectoris, hypertension, history of

22 hemorrhoids, and chronic nicotine abuse, and opined that Plaintiff was capable of

23 performing a range of light work. (AR 283.) As the ALJ noted, Dr. Ella-Tamayo' s opinion

24 was entitled to significant weight, as she examined Plaintiff, and had reviewed Plaintiff's

25 chest x-ray and electrocardiogram. (AR 22, 278-85, 287); see Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242

26 F.3d 1144, 1149 (9th Cir. 2001) (consultative examiner's opinion on its own constituted

27 substantial evidence, because it rested on independent examination of claimant); Andrews,

28 53 F.3d at 1041. Although Plaintiff challenges Dr. Ella-Tamayo's opinion based on an

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1 allegedly incomplete examination, incompetent staff, and inadequate x-rays and

2 electrocardiogram, the AU properly found Plaintiff not fully credible, as discussed in

3 detail below. (JS 19, 73-76.) Further, the AU gave weight to the opinion of the non4 examining state agency medical consultant, who based his opinion in part on the medical

5 findings of Dr. Ella-Tamayo. (AR 22, 288-95.) Based on a review of Plaintiff's medical

6 I records, the medical consultant found that Plaintiff had no limitations beyond those

7 accounted for in the AL's RFC. (AR 22, 288-95.) The medical consultant's opinion,

8 which was consistent with the bulk of the evidence of record, supported the AL's

9 rejection of Dr. Mazmanyan's RFC assessment. See Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1041 ("reports

10 l ofthe nonexamining advisor need not be discounted and may serve as substantial evidence

11 when they are supported by other evidence in the record and are consistent with it"). Any

12 conflict in the properly supported medical opinion evidence was the sole province of the

13 ALJ to resolve. Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1041.

Next, Plaintiff suggests that the AU failed to adequately consider the opinions of

15 his treating cardiologists. (JS 19-20, 58.) This claim lacks merit. The ALJ reviewed and

16 discussed the findings and recommendations of Plaintiff's cardiologists of record, Onkar

17 Marwah, M.D., and Harry Balian, M.D. (AR 21-22, 238-41, 317, 318, 328.) The AU

18 noted that Plaintiff refused to follow these doctors' recommendations that Plaintiff

19 undergo an angiogram or heart catheterization and stop smoking. (AR 20-22, 239, 328.)

20 Dr. Balian even warned that Plaintiff could be at risk of death or myocardial infarction,

21 yet Plaintiff failed to comply with his recommendations. (AR 19, 328.) The ALJ drew

22 rational inferences from Plaintiff's refusal to follow his doctors' treatment

ommendations. Morgan, 169 F.3d at 601. Further, while the doctors' records reflect

I Plaintiff had echocardiograms indicating an ejection fraction of less than 30 percent

two occasions, the ALJ found that the ejection fraction evidence did not constitute

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opinion evidence from a treating source indicative of disability. (AR 15, 19-22,

1, 318); see 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, § 4.02k'

In sum, the AL's resolution of the conflicting medical opinions and assessment of

laintiff's RFC is supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, Plaintiff is not entitled

a reversal or remand based upon Issues #2 and #5.

3.2.3 Hypothetical Question (Issue #3)

Plaintiff asserts that the hypothetical questions presented to the vocational expert

were incomplete because they conflicted with his RFC. (JS 36-41, 43-45.) He

specifically asserts that the hypothetical questions did not incorporate the findings

The ALJ noted that the first echocardiogram report indicating .an.ejection fraction

11 of less than 30 percent was from June 2004, shortly after Plaintiff s myocardial

infarction. (AR 21, 241.) The ALJ found that the low ejection fraction was not

12 documented during a period of stability, and therefore, did not indicate Plaintiff was

disabled under section 4.02 of the Listings. (AR 21, 241); see 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt.

13 P, App. 1, § 4.02A1. The ALJ found that the second report of a low ejection fraction was

from an August 2011 echocardiogram report, which appeared to contain conflicting data.

14 (AR 21, 318.) While the report indicated that Plaintiffs ejection fraction was "25-30%

by visual inspection," the report also reflected a cornputerized ejection fraction of 39.1

15 percent. CAR 318-19.) The AU questioned the significance of the low ejection fraction

because the report did not clarify whether a physician or a technician had reported the

16 visualized ejection fraction, nor did the report explain the apparent conflict between the

visualized and computerized ejection fraction rates. (AR 21, 318-19.)

Plaintiff also indicates that he received treatment from some cardiologists in

18 Armenia. (JS 19-20.) Plaintiff suggests that if the ALJ had been interested, the Armenian

medical records could have been translated into English. (JS 19-20.) However, Plaintiff

19 did not provide any records of such treatment, and there is no indication that Plaintiff

provided the ALJ with adequate contact information for the Armenian physicians. (AR

20 178-79, 181.) It is well established that a claimant bears the burden of providing medical

and other evidence that support the existence of a medically determinable impairment.

21 Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146, 107 S.Ct. 2287 (1987); Tidwell v. Apfel, 161 F.3d

599, 601 (9th Cir. 1998) ("At all times the burden is on the claimant to establish her

22 entitlement to disability insurance benefits."). While the ALJ still has a duty to frilly and

fairly develop the record, it is "not unreasonable to require the claimant, who is in a better

23 position to provide information about his own medical condition, to do so." Yuckert, 482

U.S. at 146 n. 5. The AL's "duty to develop the record further is triggered only when

24 there is ambiguous evidence or when the record is inadequate to allow for prqper

459-60 (9th Cir. 2001).

evaluation of the evidence." Mayes v. Massanari, 276 F.3d

25 Here, the record was not inadequate to allow for proper evaluation of Dr. Mazmanyan s

functional capacity assessment, given the AL's consideration of Plaintiff's treatment

26 records and the opinions of the examining and non-examining physicians. Thus, the AU

did not commit legal error by failing to obtain the Armenian medical records. See id. at

27 459-460 (rejecting the argument that the ALJ breached his duty to develop the record as

an impermissible attempt to shift the burden of proving disability away from the

28 claimant).

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1 of Dr. Mazmanyan and his cardiologists, Drs. Marwah and Balian. (JS 36-40,43-45.)

The record reflects that the ALJ adequately conveyed the extent of Plaintiff's

3 limitations in the hypothetical questions. (AR 84-86.) The ALJ asked the VE to consider

4 a hypothetical individual similar to Plaintiff, with the limitations assessed in the AL's

5 final RFC determination. (AR 84-86.) As discussed above, the AL's interpretation of the

6 medical evidence is supported by the record and entitled to deference. Because the

7 hypothetical questions contained all of Plaintiff's limitations supported by substantial

8 evidence, the AL's reliance on the VE's testimony was not error. Tackett v. Apfel, 180

9 F.3d 1094, 1101 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining that the AL's depiction of a claimant's

10 limitations must be "accurate, detailed, and supported by the medical record.").

Plaintiff further challenges the hypothetical questions as incomplete because they

12 did not adequately account for his pain, fatigue, and need for frequent and lengthy

13 bathroom breaks associated with his hemorrhoids. (JS 37; AR 52, 64.) While Plaintiff's

14 records reflect a history of hemorrhoids, there is no medical opinion indicating that they

15 resulted in more than minimal functional limitations. (AR 18, 260, 283.) And, although

16 Plaintiff testified about his pain and symptoms, including the need to use the bathroom

17 several times a day, the ALJ provided clear and convincing reasons for discrediting

18 Plaintiff's testimony, as discussed below. Thus, the ALJ did not need to factor these

19 additional claimed symptoms and limitations into the RFC analysis or the hypothetical

20 questions. Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1217 (9th Cir. 2005) ("Preparing a

21 function-by-function analysis for the medical conditions or impairments that the AU

neither credible nor supported by the record is unnecessary.").

Accordingly, Plaintiff is not entitled to reversal or remand on Issue #3.

3.2.4 Plaintiff's Credibility (Issue #4)

Plaintiff alleges he is unable to work due to his heart condition and hemorrhoids.

26 (AR 176.) Plaintiff reports a variety of symptoms, including fatigue, weakness, numbness

27 in his extremities, pain, shortness of breath, insomnia, the need for frequent bathroom

28 breaks, and difficulty with standing and walking. (AR 52, 54, 64, 67, 69-72.) The AU

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1 found that Plaintiffs alleged symptoms were not credible to the extent they are

2 inconsistent with the AL's RFC assessment. (AR 20.) Plaintiff asserts that the AU

3 improperly rejected his subjective symptom testimony. (JS 38, 44, 46-5 1, 53-55.)

The AU provided specific, clear and convincing reasons for discounting Plaintiff's

5 subjective complaints. (AR 20-21); see Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1112 (9th Cir.

6 2012) (the AU must give "specific, clear and convincing reasons" for rejecting the

7 claimant's subjective symptom testimony when there is no evidence of malingering)

8 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). As discussed above, the AU noted that

9 Plaintiff had a history of medical noncompliance. (AR 19-22); see Fair v. Bowen, 885

10 F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that non-compliance with prescribed treatment is

11 proper evidence relating to the credibility of the claimant); Social Security Ruling 96-7p

12 ("[The individual's statements may be less credible if the level or frequency of treatment

13 is inconsistent with the level of complaints, or if the medical reports or records show the

14 individual is not following the treatment as prescribed and there are no good reasons for

15 this failure.") Plaintiff repeatedly refused any "invasive procedures" such as an angiogram

16 or heart catheterization even though his doctors emphasized the importance of such

17 procedures. (AR 19-22, 49, 61, 77-78.) Plaintiff continued to abuse nicotine by smoking

18 a pack of cigarettes each day despite his doctors' recommendations that he stop smoking,

19 and he refused to take recommended medication (statins) because he disagreed with his

20 cardiologist regarding the benefits of the medication. (AR 20-22, 78, 239, 252, 279, 328.)

21 Plaintiff never participated in a cardiac rehabilitation program and failed to pursue

22 specialized treatment for his heart condition for a number of years. (AR at 20, 51); see

23 Fair, 885 F.2d at 603 (failure to assert good reason for not seeking treatment can cast

24 doubt on sincerity of a claimant's subjective symptom testimony); see Burch v. Barnhart,

25 400 F.3d 676, 681 (9th Cir. 2005) (ALJ may consider the inconsistency between

26 claimant's subjective complaints and objective medical findings in the credibility

27 analysis). Though Plaintiff lacked medical insurance, the ALJ properly found that the

28 labsence of insurance did not excuse his lack of treatment because Plaintiff had availed

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1 himself of low-cost or free treatment in the past. (AR 20,252.) Further, the ALJ noted that

2 Plaintiff failed to attend a scheduled consultative examination with a cardiologist, which

3 would have been free of charge and helpful in the evaluation of his claim. (AR 13, 20.)

4 Although Plaintiff claims that the consultative examiner was not a licensed cardiologist,

5 Plaintiffs doubts about the physician's credentials did not amount to a good reason for

6 declining the examination. (AR 44-45); see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1518(a) (a claimant's failure

7 to attend a consultative examination can support a finding that the claimant is not disabled

8 where the claimant does not have a "good reason" for not attending a scheduled

9 appointment), 416.918(a). The ALJ properly determined that Plaintiffs failure to

10 cooperate undermined his credibility. (AR 13. 20.)In sum, the ALJ offered specific, clear

11 and convincing reasons to discount Plaintiffs credibility and testimony regarding the

12 extent of his pain and limitations.

Accordingly, reversal or remand is not warranted on the basis of Issue #4.

3.2.5 ALJ Bias (Issue #6)

Before the hearing, Plaintiff sent a letter to the Appeals Council requesting that the

16 ALJ recuse himself based upon perceived bias against Plaintiff. (AR 150-54.) Plaintiff

17 complained that the ALJ was biased because of his low rate of approving disability claims,

18 as compared to the national approval average of "above 60 [percent]." (AR 150, 154.)

19 Plaintiff further alleged bias because the AU, the VE, and the consultative examiner

20 (cardiologist) shared the same religion or nationality. (JS 63; AR 152.) Plaintiff also

21 faulted the ALJ for failing to timely respond to his pre-hearing request for an OTR

22 decision of disability, ordering a consultative examination with a physician who was not

23 a cardiologist,2" and failing to update the record with new evidence from Plaintiffs

24 cardiologist. (JS 64-65, 68-69; AR 146-47, 152, 208, 215-18.)

Although, as discussed above, Plaintiff ultimately declined to attend the scheduled

26 consultative examination with the cardiologist, Plaintiff had requested a consultative

examination with a cardiologist, as well as an additional electrocardiogram, earlier in the

27 proceedings. (AR 42, 208.) Plaintiff claimed that a second consultative examination was

necessary because the examination conducted by internist Dr. Ella-Tamayo had been

28 inadequate. (AR 42, 208.)

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The ALJ denied Plaintiffs request for recusal. (AR 13-15.) At the hearing, the AU

2 explained that he gives the utmost attention to his cases, and considers each case

3 individually. (AR 41.) In the decision, the ALJ explained that he did not know Plaintiff

4 or any of Plaintiffs friends, was not partial to any party, had no personal or financial

5 interest in the outcome of Plaintiffs case, and had not been involved in the selection of

6 the consultative examiner or the yE. (AR 13-15.)

Plaintiff has not carried his burden of demonstrating judicial bias. See Liteky v.

8 UnitedStates, 510 U.S. 540, 555, 114 S. Ct. 1147 (1994) ("judicial rulings alone almost

9 never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion"). ALJs are presumed to be

10 unbiased. Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001). To overcome this

11 presumption of impartiality, Plaintiff would need to show that the AL's behavior, in the

12 context of the whole case, was "so extreme as to display clear inability to render fair

13judgment." Liteky, 510 U.S. at 551; Rollins, 261 F.3d at 857-58 (the presumption of

14 impartiality "can be rebutted by a showing of conflict of interest or some other specific

15 reason for disqualification" (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). Plaintiff has

16 pointed to nothing in the record that rises to this level. Plaintiffs allegations of

17 impropriety are simply not sufficient to prove any bias against Plaintiff, when considered

18 in the context of the entire record. See Rollins, 261 F.3d at 857-58.

Accordingly, reversal or remand is not warranted on the basis of Issue #6.

3.2.6 Appeals Council Abuse of Discretion (Issue #7)

After the ALJ issued the decision denying benefits in February 2012, Plaintiff filed

22 a request for review with the Appeals Council. (AR 224-30.) Plaintiff alleged that the

23 AL's decision was not supported by substantial evidence because the ALJ abused his

24 discretion, was biased against Plaintiff, and violated the treating physician rule. (AR 22425 30.) The Appeals Council denied Plaintiffs request for review on November 15, 2013.

26 (AR 1-3.) Plaintiff challenges the Appeals Council's decision as untimely, because the

Plaintiffs former attorney also submitted a request for review of the AL's

decision. (AR 219-21.)

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1 average processing time for such requests is 364 days. (JS 71, 73.) Plaintiff also asserts

2 that the appeals officer who issued the denial was a person of the "AL's same religion3 nationality." (JS 71.) In response, the Commissioner argues that the Appeals Council's

4 denial of review is not subject to judicial review and remand is improper because Plaintiff

5 failed to identify any reversible error in the AL's decision. (JS 72.)

The Appeals Council's decision denying Plaintiff's request for review is not

7 subject to judicial review. "The Social Security Act grants to district courts jurisdiction

8 to review only 'final decisions' of the Commissioner." Klemm v. Astrue, 543 F.3d 1139,

9 1144 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 405(g))). When the Appeals Council denies a

10 request for review, it is a non-final agency action that is not subject to judicial review

11 because the AL's decision becomes the final decision of the Commissioner. See Brewes

12 v. Comm 'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 682 F.3d 1157, 1161 (9th Cir. 2012), Taylor v. Comm 'r

13 of Soc. Sec. Admin., 659 F.3d 1228, 1231 (9th Cir. 2011). Thus, this Court lacks

14 burisdiction to review the Appeals Council's decision or to reverse the AL's decision

15 based on the alleged defects in the Appeals Council's decision denying review.

Accordingly, Plaintiff is not entitled to reversal or remand on Issue #7.

4. RECOMMENDATION

For the reasons reported above, IT IS RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's request for

19 an order remanding this case to the Commissioner for further proceedings pursuant to

20 Sentence Four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) be DENIED, and the Commissioner's request for

21 an order affirming the Commissioner's final decision and dismissing the action be

22 GRANTED and that judgment be entered affirming the Commissioner's final decision.

24 DATED: November 5, 2014

2511

ARTHUR NA

UNITED STATES MAGr1t7-E JUDGE

2611

27 II

28 H

Page 17

FILED

DEC 5 2017

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

HAROUTYUN KARABAJAKYAN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

15-55242

No.

D.C. No.

2: 14-cv-0 1024-SJO-AN

Central District of California,

Los Angeles

NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting

Commissioner Social Security,

ORDER

Defendant-Appellee.

Before: CLIFTON, N.R. SMITH, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.

The panel has unanimously voted to deny Appellant Karabajakyan's petition

for panel rehearing and petition for rehearing en banc.

The full court has been advised of Appellant's petition for rehearing en banc,

and no judge of the court has requested a vote on the petition for rehearing en banc.

Fed. R. App. P. 35.

The petition for rehearing and the petition for rehearing en bane are

DENIED.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.