Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Lavelle D. Richardson, Petitioner v. Cynthia Link, Superintendent, State Correctional Institution at Graterford, et al.
Supreme Court briefDec 28, 2017
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Case: 17-1872
Document: 003112717090 Page: 1
Date Filed: 09/01/2017
August 10, 2017
Amended DLD-33 1
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
C.A. No. 17-1872
LAVELLE D. RICHARDSON, Appellant
vs.
SUPERINTENDENT GRATERFORD SCI, ET AL.
(W.D. PA. CIV. NO. 3-14-cv-00015)
Present:
CHAGARES, VANASKIE and KRAUSE, Circuit Judges
Submitted are:
(1)
Appellant's application for a certificate of appealability under 28
U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1);
*(2) Appellant's supplement thereto filed on 8/24/17
in the above captioned case.
Respectfully,
Clerk
MMWILLBIkr
ORDER
The foregoing request for a certificate of appealability is denied. For
substantially the reasons given by the Magistrate Judge, appellant has not made a
substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right nor shown that reasonable
jurists would find the correctness of the District Court's determination of his claims
debatable. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).
-
Case: 17-1872 Document: 003112717090 Page: 2
Date Filed: 09/01/2017
By the Court,
s/ Cheryl Ann Krause
Circuit Judge
Dated: September 1, 2017
sb/cc: LaVelle D. Richardson
Richard A. Consiglio, Esq.
(O
*
••.:..
A True Cop3°
7a
2'
Marcia M. Waldron, Clerk
Certified order issued in lieu of mandate.
--
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
LAVELLE RICHARDSON,
Petitioner,
V.
Case No. 3:14-cv-15-KRG-KAp
MICHAEL WENEROWICZ, WARDEN,
S.C.I. GRATERFORD,
Respondent
RULE AND ORDER
AND NOW, this
Ifl.
day of March, 2014, it is
ORDERED that the petitioner's motion at docket no. 2 to proceed
with service in forma pauperis is granted. The Clerk shall add the
District Attorney of Blair County as counsel for the respondent.
The Clerk shall serve the petition by ECF upon the respondent by
the District Attorney of Blair County. Within sixty days of this
Rule and Order, the respondent through the District Attorney of
Blair County shall file a response complying with Rule 5 of the
Rules governing Habeas Corpus Cases under Section 2254 in the
United States District Courts showing cause, if any, why the writ
should not be granted.
Keith A. Pesto,
United States Magistrate Judge
Notice by ECF to counsel of record and by U.S. Mail to:
Lavelle Richardson FE-0568
S.C.I. Graterford
P.O. Box 244
Graterford, PA 19426-0246
L
Case 3:14-cv-00015-KRG-KAP Document 17 Filed 01/26/17 Page 1 of 4
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
LAVELLE RICHARDSON,
Petitioner,
V.
MICHAEL WENEROWICZ, WARDEN,
S.C.I. GRATERFORD,
Respondent
Case No. 3:14-cv-15-KRG-KAP
Memorandum
Petitioner Richardson at ECF no. 16 filed timely
objections to my Report and Recommendation at ECF no. 15. In part
Richardson contends that I erred in not finding some of his claims
exhausted. ECF no. 16 at 1. Richardson's argument is that he
presented these claims pro se to the Superior Court.
As the Court recalls Richardson's conviction and sentence
were affirmed on direct appeal at Commonwealth v. Richardson, No.
2013 WDA 2003 (Pa.Super. April 6, 2005), petition for allowance of
appeal denied, Commonwealth v. Richardson, No. 222 WAL 2005 (Pa.
December 29, 2005). Richardson's collateral attack under
Pennsylvania's Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa. C.S. § 9541
et sect., was rejected by Judge Carpenter on September 20, 2010.
That denial of relief was affirmed at Commonwealth v. Richardson,
No. 260 WDA 2012 (Pa.Super. April 1, 2013), petition for allowance
of appeal denied, Commonwealth v. Richardson, No. 230 WAL 2013 (Pa.
November 13, 2013)
-
-
Case 3:14-cv-00015-KRG-KAP - Document 17 Filed 01/26/17 Page 2 of 4
As I noted in my Report and Recommendation, "Richardson
appealed from the denial of the [PCRA] petition, at first pro se
and then through Heuston." ECF no. 15 at S.
It is during that pro
se period, Richardson argues, that he exhausted the balance of his
claims. He is wrong.
Cohn Heuston, Esquire, represented Richardson in the
PCRA proceedings. After Judge Carpenter denied the PCRA petition,
Richardson took a pro se appeal that was docketed on October 26,
2010 at Commonwealth v. Richardson, No. 1632 tWA 2010 (Pa.Super.).
On June 13, 2011, September 6, 2011, and December 19, 2011, the
Pennsylvania Superior Court remanded the matter for a determination
by Judge Carpenter whether Richardson had knowingly and voluntarily
waived his statutory right to PCRA counsel and was intending to
proceed pro se. After receipt of a letter from Judge Carpenter on
January 3, 2012 confirming that Heuston continued to represent
Richardson, on January 20, 2012 the Pennsylvania Superior Court
relinquished jurisdiction so that Heuston could file a timely
notice of appeal nunc pro tunc. Heuston did so on February 14,
2012, at Commonwealth v. Richardson, No. 260 WDA 2012 (Pa.Super.)
As discussed in the Report and Recommendation, the appeal proceeded
at that number.
Case 3:14-cv-00015-KRG-KAP Document 17 Filed 01/26/17 Page 3 of 4
It is axiomatic that to exhaust a habeas claim a
petitioner must first fairly present it to the state court, not in
a procedural context in which its merits will not ordinarily be
considered. See Castille V. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346,
351(1989) (presenting a claim for the first time to the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court on discretionary review is not fair presentation)
Pennsylvania does not accept hybrid representation:
A represented appellant may petition to terminate his
representation; he may, acting pursuant to the rules of criminal
procedure, proceed on his own behalf. Conversely, he may elect to
allow counsel to take 'his appeal, but, should counsel not prevail,
assert counsel's ineffectiveness at a later time and, thus
indirectly, assert the claims he would have made on direct appeal.
The only thing he may not do is confuse and overburden the court
by his own pro se filings of briefs at the same time his counsel
is filing briefs on his behalf.
Commonwealth v. Ellis, 626 A.2d 1137, 1141 (Pa.1993), see also
Pa.R.App.P.3304. Whatever Richardson presented
pro
se in
Commonwealth v. Richardson, No. 1632 WDA 2010 (Pa. Super.) would not
have been considered on its merits except insofar as it was raised
by Heuston in the counseled appeal at Commonwealth V. Richardson,
No. 260 WDA 2012 (Pa.Super.).
This explanation of the procedural history is not a new
Report and Recommendation and does not trigger an additional
fourteen days to file written objections. Nevertheless, if any
3
Case 3:14-cv-00015-KRG-KAP Document 17 Filed 01/26/17 Page 4 of 4
-
party wishes to file any further supplement to the record, they may
do so within fourteen days.
DATE:
L1
t(IQ
- AS
2p
Keith A. Pesto,
United States Magistrate Judge
Notice to counsel of record by ECF and by U.S. Mail to:
Lavelle Richardson FE-0568
S.C.I. Graterford
P.O. Box 244
Graterford, PA 19426-0246
4
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
LAVELLE RICHARDSON,
Petitioner,
V.
MICHAEL WENEROWICZ, WARDEN,
S.C.I. GRATERFORD,
Respondent
:
Case No. 3:14-cv-15-KRG--KAP
Report and Recommendation
Recommendation
Petitioner Lavelle Richardson is serving a life sentence
for first-degree murder (with additional consecutive sentences
amounting to 22-48 months for reckless endangering and possession
of a firearm without a license), a sentence imposed by the
Honorable Hiram Carpenter of the Court of Common Pleas of Blair
County on November 14, 2002. Richardson seeks a writ of habeas
corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254. I recommend that the petition be
denied and that a certificate of appealability be denied.
Report
I: Facts and procedural history
At closing time in the early morning hours of July 21,
2001, Richardson was outside the Arandale Elks Club in Altoona
Pennsylvania in a parking lot where there were between 20 and
perhaps as many as 75 persons. According to witnesses Richardson
was engaged in an argument with Vicki Smith about Smith testifying
against Jodi Brown, a relative of Richardson's, in a criminal
matter. In the course of the argument Smith slapped. Richardson, who
went to his car and retrieved a 10 mm/.40 cal. semiautomatic
pistol. According to witnesses, Richardson fired one shot toward.
Smith and four into the air. The bullet aimed toward Smith struck
and killed Patience Ferguson. The bullet that killed Ferguson
entered through her mouth, knocking out one incisor, and exited
through the soft tissues in her neck. Five casings and one bullet
from .40 cal. Smith and Wesson cartridges were found in the parking
lot. Richardson, who was from Mt. Union in Huntingdon County, left
the scene of the shooting before police arrived. On July 25, 2001,
Richardson surrendered in Centre County to members of the
Pennsylvania State Police by arrangement through counsel, William
Fleming, Esquire. A pistol that was identified as the one that
fired the shots in Altoona was subsequently retrieved (with unfired
cartridges of the same type as the casings and bullet recovered at
the scene of the shooting) from Lake Raystown in Huntingdon County
and traced through witness testimony to Richardson.
From newspaper accounts in the record it appears that the
prosecution first believed that because there was no connection
between Richardson and Ms. Ferguson the shooting had been merely
reckless, but after investigation disclosed the argument between
Vicki Smith and Richardson the Commonwealth pursued a charge of
01)
first-degree murder under the doctrine of transferred intent. The
doctrine is codified in the Pennsylvania Crimes Code at 18
Pa.C.S. 303(b), establishing culpability when intent must be
proved if it is shown that the actual result differs from the
contemplated result only in the respect that a different person is
harmed. See Commonwealth v. Gaynor, 648 A.2d 295 (Pa.1994)
(defendant Gaynor and his adversary Johnson engaged in a shootout
in front of a store where children were playing; Gaynor intended
to kill Johnson; a child was shot and killed by Johnson during the
shootout; Gaynor was guilty of first-degree murder under §303 (b)).
George Henry Newman, Esquire, and David McLaughlin,
Esquire, represented Richardson at the preliminary hearing in
August 2001 but then withdrew from the case, and in September 2001
the Court of Common Pleas of Blair County first briefly appointed
Terry Despoy, Esquire, and then appointed John Siford, Esquire, to
represent Richardson. Siford represented Richardson throughout the
pretrial period, filed pretrial motions on December 21, 2001 that
were granted in part (motion to appoint expert witness in
ballistics, motion to dismiss second degree murder charge) and
denied in part (motion to change venue or venire, motion to dismiss
first degree murder charge) on April 30, 2002, and selected a trial
jury on July 15, 2002. According to a pretrial conference at which
3
Judge Carpenter inquired into the knowing and voluntary nature of
Richardson's desire to proceed at trial with new counsel, at some
point after jury selection. Richardson retained Nino Tinari,
Esquire, who entered his appearance on or about July 24, 2002 and
represented Richardson at the trial that began on Monday July 29,
2002.
The defense presented by Tinari was that Richardson did
not have or fire a weapon that night, that in the crowded confusion
of closing time with as many as 75 persons in the parking lot and
at least one other confrontation (between a doorman and a patron)
taking place outside the club, and that there were no reliable
eyewitnesses who could say that it was Richardson and not someone
else who fired the shot that killed Patience Ferguson; the
alternative defense was that even accepting the testimony of the
Commonwealth's witnesses Richardson was not guilty of first-degree
murder because there was no evidence that Richardson had
intentionally shot at Vicki Smith. Richardson himself testified
that he had left the parking lot about the time the shooting began.
The jury returned verdicts of guilty on August 2, 2002.
After being sentenced on November 14, 2002, Richardson proceeded
to a direct appeal, represented by Tinari. The conviction and
sentence were affirmed by the Pennsylvania Superior Court in a
No.
memorandum opinion at Commonwealth v. Richardson,
2013 WDA 2003
eme Court denied
Supr
(Pa.Super. April 6, 2005) and the Pennsylvania
onwealth v.
at Comm
Tinari's petition for allowance of appeal
2005)
Richardson, No. 222 WAL 2005 (Pa. December 29,
In November 2006, Richardson filed a petition
42 Pa. C.S. § 9541
Pennsylvania's Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA),
et seq., alleging
inter alia
under
that trial counsel had been
d Attorney Despoy to
ineffective. The court again briefly appointe
ire, subsequently
represent Richardson, but Cohn Heuston, Esqu
d an amended PCRA
entered an appearance for Richardson and file
petition on June 8, 2007. Judge Carpenter
held an evidentiary
tion on September
hearing on November 10, 2009, and denied the peti
20, 2010. Richardson appealed from the denial
of the petition, at
sylvania Superior
first pro se and then through Heuston. The Penn
randum opinion at
Court affirmed the trial court's decision by memo
Commonwealth v. Richardson, No. 260 WDA 2012
(Pa.Super. April 1,
ton's petition for
2013). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Heus
on, No. 230 WAL 2013
allowance of appeal at Commonwealth v. Richards
(Pa. November 13, 2013). Richardson, who had
already presented
claims exhausted on direct appeal by filing
a petition in this
court while his PCRA petition was pending,
DiGughielmo,
Case No. 3:09-cv-70-KRG-KAP
5
Richardson v.
(W.D.Pa.) (petition
dismissed without prejudice to proceeding in one exhausted
petition) then filed this petition.
Richardson presents what he divides up into 18 claims,
several with subparts. I will summarize the claims because it
serves no useful purpose to quote the petitioner verbatim:
There was a Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), violation
because the prosecution sent the bullet recovered at the crime
scene for testing for blood and human tissue, obtained a negative
test result, and failed to disclose that test and its results.
Restates Claim One and asserts this was a violation of due
process, equal protection, and the right to a fair trial.
There was prosecutorial misconduct when the prosecution failed
to correct the perjured testimony of Carla Jo Thomas Smith
identifying Richardson as the shooter.
The prosecution violated the Fifth Amendment and Sixth Amendment
by the attempt of police officers to have Richardson waive his
right to remain silent and by using Richardson's invocation of his
right to remain silent against him.
The court violated Richardson's rights by denying Tinari a
continuance and forcing Siford to pick the jury even though Tinari
had entered his appearance.
N.
The denial of Tinari's motion for continuance deprived him of
the opportunity to make a Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986)
challenge to the venire, which did not contain any black veniremen.
Siford was ineffective for refusing to participate in jury
selection after being informed that Tinari had entered an
appearance, by failing to object to the all white venire, and by
failing to make any Batson challenges during the selection of the
petit jury.
A new trial should have been granted due to after-discovered
evidence that Richardson was not the shooter.
It was error to deny change of venue or venire because there was
excessive pretrial publicity.
The prosecutor committed misconduct in the closing argument by
simulating use of the murder weapon in his closing, by expressing
his personal opinion, and by appeals to the sympathy of the jury.
The prosecutor committed misconduct by referring to
Richardson's post-arrest silence.
The evidence was insufficient to support the verdict.
13), 14), 15) After the trial Richardson obtained an expert report
contradicting the prosecution's theory that the bullet recovered
in the parking lot was the bullet that killed Ferguson, this
evidence undermines any confidence in the verdict, and Tinari was
7
ineffective for failing to obtain this evidence at the time of
trial.
The state courts erred in failing to find the Brady violation
asserted in Claim One, the prosecutorial misconduct asserted in
Claim Three, and the prosecutorial misconduct asserted in Claim
Four.
The state courts erred in failing to find the violations
connecting with jury selection asserted in Claim Five, Claim Six,
and Claim Seven.
The state courts erred in denying relief based on the afterdiscovered evidence and ineffectiveness claims asserted in Claims
Thirteen, Fourteen, and Fifteen relating to the expert report about
the bullet recovered in the parking lot, and based on the Brady
violation asserted in Claim One, and based on ineffective
assistance of counsel in not proving the Brady violation asserted.
in Claim One.
As can be seen from comparing Richardson's claims with
those raised by counsel in the state courts, Richardson attempts
to present every claim presented to the state court and some not
presented to the state courts.
On direct appeal, Tinari made five claims: 1) that a new
trial should be granted based on after-discovered evidence that
Richardson did not fire the shot that killed the victim; 2) that
because of the sensational nature of the crime and the extensive
pretrial publicity it was error to deny a change of venue or
venire; 3) that the prosecutor committed misconduct in his closing;
4) that the prosecutor improperly referred to Richardson's postarrest silence; and 5) that the evidence was insufficient to
sustain the verdicts.
The Pennsylvania Superior Court rejected the afterdiscovered evidence claim on the merits.
Commonwealth v.
Richardson, No. 2013 WDA 2003 Memorandu!n op. (Pa.Super. April 6,
2005)
.
The foundation for the claim was a transcript dated
September 14, 2004, of a conversation between Karim Shabazz, a
private investigator, and Rena Davis, a resident of Huntingdon
County familiar with Richardson. According to the statement,
hort1y after the shooting took place a Bradley Walker called Rena
Davis, his neighbor, asking for clean clothes because his had blood
on them from being near Ferguson when she was shot, that Rena Davis
met Walker in Tyrone, Blair County, with the clothes, and that when
Shabazz asked whether Walker had said whether Richardson was
involved, Davis stated that "No, he" (from the context it is not
clear and the statement is not explicit whether the reference is
to Walker or Richardson; at points Richardson implies that the
57
reference is to Walker, and the Pennsylvania Superior Court
implicitly found that Walker was being referred to) "said a cousin,
he just said my cousin killed my girl." The statement indicates
that Rena Davis believed the cousin referred to was one Rocky
Robinson, who allegedly also admitted to Davis that he disposed of
a pistol in Lake Raystown immediately after the shooting. Davis
also stated that she had previously seen Robinson, but not Walker
or Richardson, with a weapon, and that the opinion of unnamed
others was that Richardson was not the shooter.
The Pennsylvania Superior Court observed that Davis'
statement was made two years after the trial, that there was no
explanation for the failure to obtain the statement sooner, and
that it contained no direct exculpatory evidence but only vague and
hearsay statements.
The Pennsylvania Superior Court rejected the pretrial
publicity claim on the merits after review of the record, finding
that the pretrial news accounts did not refer to any confession by
or prior record for Richardson and were neither sensational nor
inflammatory, and additionally that Judge Carpenter had conducted
individual voir dire of any individual who claimed knowledge about
the case and excluded any person who claimed to have an opinion or
any reservations about impartiality as a result. The newspaper
10
are from Altoona
articles, which are contained in the record,
on/Mt. Union (The Daily
(Altoona Mirror, Blair County), and Huntingd
News, Huntingdon County) newspapers.
closing
The claim of prosecutorial misconduct during
pistol used in the
comprised claims that the prosecutor handled the
essed his personal
shooting and simulated its use, that he expr
uding a reference to
opinion about the veracity of witnesses, incl
defense counsel as offering "red herrings,"
and that he made a
personal appeal for a conviction based on sympathy
for the victim' s
family. The Pennsylvania Superior Court rejected
this claim on the
merits. After reviewing the closing argument
the panel found the
, and observed in
prosecutor's closing was permissible advocacy
osition that it is
passing that there was no authority for the prop
evidence during a
improper to refer to or demonstrate physical
r gave a requested
closing. The court also noted that Judge Carpente
cautioning against
instruction explaining the duty of the jury and
deciding based on sympathy or prejudice.
on's post-
The claim of an improper reference to Richards
ecutor asked Altoona
arrest silence stemmed from a question the pros
Police Department Patrolman Patrick Himes,
one of the first
officers to respond the night of the shooting,
who testified about
rs who were giving
arriving at the scene and assisting bystande
11
first aid to Ms. Ferguson. After Ms. Ferguson left in an ambulance,
Himes stayed to collect' information from potential witnesses and
to take the.registration information and license plate numbers of
vehicles in the parking lot. Cross examination covered the fact
that there were owners of cars in the parking lot that Himes had
not interviewed. On re-direct, the prosecutor first established
that Himes' investigation of license plates revealed that
Richardson's vehicle was not in the parking lot, and then asked the
following question:
[Keating]: And did you-did you interview him [i.e. Richardson] at
the scene?
[Tinari] : Objection
(Himes] : No, I didn't.
[Tinari] : Move for a mistrial, Your Honor.
[Judge Carpenter]: Counsel, we'll deny the motion for mistrial,
let's have a question Mr. Keating.
Lets
[Keating] : No further questions, Your Honor.
-
Tinari asked for a mistrial without assigning grounds. On appeal
he claimed that there had been an improper reference to Richardson
invoking his right to remain silent, and the Pennsylvania Superior
Court, overlooking the procedural issue, found that there was no
suggestion from the question or answer that Richardson refused to
make a statement or invoked his right to remain silent, and that
it was clear from the testimony that Richardson was not present at
the scene. The court did not expressly state the obvious, that
12
there was no post-arrest silence to refer to for the reason that
there had not yet been any arrest.
As for the sufficiency of evidence, the Pennsylvania
Superior Court mentioned in its brief recounting of the testimony
that it had been established that Richardson was present at the
scene, that Richardson was involved in an argument and retrieved
a gun, and that he fired shots in the direction of an individual
(by implication, Vicki Smith) that struck and killed Patience
Ferguson. The court found the evidence sufficient to support a
verdict of first-degree murder based on a theory, of transferred
intent (again by implication, that Richardson intended the death
of Smith). Although the court did not cite the record, the
testimony of Karla Jo Thomas-Smith (or Carla, as it is sometimes
spelled) was that she witnessed the argument and Richardson's
retrieval of a pistol, and that the first shot by Richardson, to
whom she had been introduced that night as Juan (the court reporter
for that trial day recorded this as "Wan"), was "straight ahead"
toward Vicki Smith, whom she identified as "Princess." (ThomasSmith did not know Vicki Smith until after the shooting but went
to identify her because she wanted to know who was responsible for
the fight and her friend Patience Ferguson getting shot.)
Richardson then fired four times into the air. Thomas-Smith was
13
thereafter focused on the injury to her friend and did not see
Richardson leave but did notice later that his vehicle had gone.
On collateral attack, Heuston made two claims in the
amended PCRA petition, the second claim having two subclaims: 1)
that there was a Brady violation because the Commonwealth conducted
forensic testing of the bullet found in the parking lot, had
discovered that there was no biological material that would match
the victim on it, and withheld this test and its negative results
from the defense; and 2) that based on the report of Doctor
Bonnell, an expert witness retainedafter trial, it was physically
impossible for the bullet recovered by police to have caused the
victim's entry wound because it would have knocked out more than
one tooth, and Tinari provided ineffective assistance of counsel
by failing to retain an expert prior to trial who would have
presented that testimony or possibly caused Tinari to present a
different defense theory. At the PCRA hearing before Judge
Carpenter, to avoid having Doctor Bonnell come from California, the
Commonwealth stipulated that his testimony would be consistent with
his affidavit.
Judge Carpenter, in his opinion Idenying PCRA relief,
found as a fact that there had been no forensic testing of the
bullet and therefore nothing on which to base a Brady claim.
14
Richardson's assertion that there had been such a test was based
on the following portion of the transcript of an exchange between
Attorney Tinari and Altoona Police Department Sergeant Michael
Jones, the evidence custodian, who also happened to have been the
officer who found the bullet and who took photographs of the spot
where it was found:
Q. Did you when you picked up the projectile ascertain whether or
not there was any blood on the projectile?
A. I didn't make a close examination, sir.
Q. Well you sent it away for that determination, didn't you?
A. Yes sir. I did.
Q. And the results were there was no blood or human tissue on it.
Correct?
A. Yes, sir.
There was no foilowup by Tinari, who went on to ask only a couple
of questions about a photographs of the scene. According.to Judge
Carpenter any suggestion from this exchange that there had been
testing was flatly contradicted by the testimony of Pennsylvania
State Police Corporal Jack Wall, the Commonwealth's firearms expert
who actually testified about the ballistic tests done on the
bullet, and Doctor Harold Cottle, the medical examiner who
performed the autopsy on the victim.
As for the report of Doctor Bonnell, Judge Carpenter
found as a matter of fact that "no one knew he existed at the
time." Analyzing the report, Judge Carpenter found it simplistic
15
and refuted by the evidence presented at trial, and observed that
because one could find an expert witness for "almost any position
on almost any issue if one looks for it hard enough" if a new trial
were to be awarded on the basis of such an expert opinion obtained
years after trial, then "we had better be prepared to retry every
murder case." According to Judge Carpenter, since Tinari "had
neither notice nor knowledge of" Doctor Bonnell's report the report
should be analyzed under the standards for after-acquired evidence,
and as so analyzed was untimely and weak impeachment evidence. By
implication Tinari was not ineffective for failing to present such
evidence.
A panel of the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the
denial of the PCPA petition at Commonwealth v. Richardson, No. 260
WDA 2012 Memorandum op. (Pa.Super. April 1, 2013), adopting Judge
Carpenter's Rule 1925 opinion, and making some additional comments
about the merits of the claims. The Pennsylvania Superior Court
observed that there was no reasonable probability that an opinion
like Doctor Bonnell's would have changed the outcome at trial and
that because of the lack of evidence that the absence of the
opinion caused any prejudice, Tinari was not ineffective. Mem. op.
at 6.
II: Standard of review
A: AEDPA
In their arguments, neither petitioner nor respondent
appreciates the effect on this court's standard of review of the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA),
Pub.L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, April 24, 1996. This court does
not review the trial and. PCRA proceedings de novo. Where a state
court (here, the last state court to rule on the merits of a claim
either on direct appeal or collateral attack was the Pennsylvania
Superior Court) adjudicates a claims on the merits, to obtain
relief a petitioner must show that the ruling:
resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
resulted in * a decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in
the State court proceeding.
28 U.S.C. 2254(d).
See also Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,
405-06 (2000); Lambert v. Blackwell, 387 F.3d 210, 234 (3d
Cir.2004) ; Thomas v. Horn, 570 F.3d 105 (3d Cir.2009)
"A state-court decision is 'contrary to' clearly
established federal law if the state court (1) 'contradicts the
governing law set forth in [the Supreme] Court's cases' or
(2) 'confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable
17
0
ss arrives at
from a decision of [the Supreme] Court and neverthele
ing Williams
a [different] result.'" Lambert, 387 F. 3d at 234 (quot
v. Taylor, 529 U.S. at 405-06)
Few state court decisions will be
contrary to precedent.
n"
A challenge that there was an "unreasonable applicatio
t unreasonably
of federal law focuses on whether the state cour
al courts have
applied Supreme Court precedent (not what lower feder
Lett, 559 U.S.
said about Supreme Court precedent). See Renico v.
1702 (2014)
766, 778-79 (2010) ; White v. Woodall, 134 S.Ct. 1697,
n of clearly
A state court decision is an unreasonable applicatio
established federal law "if the state court identifies
the correct
t's cases but
governing legal rule from [the Supreme] Cour
bly extends a
unreasonably applies it to the facts" or "unreasona
legal principle from [Supreme Court] precedent to
a new context
where it should not apply or unreasonably refuses
to extend that
principle to a new context where it should apply,"
Williams v.
Taylor, 529 U.S. at 407.
s
Federal courts "are not authorized to grant habeas corpu
's decision
relief simply because we disagree with the state court
or because we would have reached a different result
if left to our
own devices." Werts v. Vaughn, 228 F.3d 178, 197
(3d Cir.2000).
It is not enough for petitioner to show that the
state court's
18
application of Supreme
adjudication was an incorrect or erroneous"
Court precedent.
3)
Wiggins V. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (200
e court's adjudication
Instead, petitioner must show that the stat
"outcome.. .cannot
was "objectively unreasonable," meaning the
eme Court precedent."
reasonably be justified under existing Supr
Hackett v. Price, 381 F.3d 281, 287 (3d
Cir.2004) (citations
279 (3d Cir.2008)
omitted); Abu-Jamal v. Horn, 520 F.3d 272,
of §2254(d) (1), 'the
("Under the 'unreasonable application' prong
question..
A
s not whether a federal court believes
the state
her thatdetermination
court's determination was incorrect but whet
shold.") As at least
was unreasonable-a substantially higher thre
rved, Section 2254 (d)
seven members of the Supreme Court have obse
reflects the view that habeas corpus is a
guard against extreme
em, not a substitute
malfunctions in the state criminal justice syst
al. A petitioner must
for ordinary error correction through appe
ion so egregious that
show an extreme malfunction in his prosecut
ed disagreement.
it is beyond any possibility for fairmind
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102-03
(2011)
B: Effective Assistance of Counsel
g claims of
The clearly established federal law governin
ineffectiveness is set forth in Strickland v.
668 (1984)
.
Washington, 466 U.S.
Under Strickland, a petitioner must show
19
that
counsel's performance "fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness. 466 U.S. at 688; see also Williams v. Taylor, 529
U.S. at 390-91. The law presumes that counsel was effective:
Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly
It is all too tempting for a defendant to
deferential.
second-guess counsel's assistance after conviction or adverse
sentence, and it is all too easy for a court, examining counsel's
defense after it has proved unsuccessful, to conclude that a
particular act or omission of counsel's was unreasonable. A fair
assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be
made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to
reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and
to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time.
Because of the difficulties inherent in making the evaluation, a
court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct
falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance;
that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under
the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound
trial strategy.
466 U.S. at 689 (internal citations and quotations omitted). There
is no one correct trial strategy. Lewis v. Mazurkiewicz, 915 F.2d
106, 115 (3d Cir.1990) ("[W]hether or not some other strategy would
have ultimately proved more successful, counsel's advice was
reasonable and must therefore be sustained.") it is "only the rare
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel that should succeed
under the properly deferential standard to be applied in
scrutinizing counsel's performance." United States v. Kauffman,
109 F.3d 186, 190 (3d Cir.1997) (quoting United States v. Gray, 878
F.2d 702, 711 (3d Cir.1989))
20
Under Strickland, a petitioner also must show that he was
prejudiced by the deficient performance, that is, "that counsel's
errors were so serious as to deprive [the petitioner] of a fair
trial, a trial whose result is reliable." Strickland, 466 U.S. at
687. A petitioner "must show that there is a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors., the result of the
proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is
a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome."
466 U.S. at 694; see also Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S: at 391.
Habeas review of ineffective assistance of counsel claims
most often proceeds under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1) 's "unreasonable
application" prong. See e.g. Cullen v. Pinhoister, 563 U.S. 170
(2011); Harrington v Richter, supra; Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556
U.S. 111, 123 (2009)
.
Taking Strickland and AEDPA together, a
federal court's review in habeas of a state court's assessment of
counsel's stewardship must be doubly deferential.
Knowles v.
Mirzayance, 556 U.S. at 123.
C: Sufficiency of the evidence
In a habeas corpus proceeding, when there is a challenge
to the sufficiency of the evidence:
[T]he critical inquiry on review of the sufficiency of
does not require
the evidence to support a criminal conviction
a court to ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at the
...
21
.
iA
.Instead, the
reasonable doubt.
a
nd
yo
be
t
il
gu
d
he
is
ence in the
trial establ
after viewing the evid
r,
he
et
wh
is
on
ti
es
qu
of fact
relevant
ion, any rational trier
ut
ec
os
pr
e
th
to
e
bl
ra
light most favo
ime beyond a
ial elements of the cr
nt
se
es
e
th
d
un
fo
ve
could ha
reasonable doubt.
0
Cir.), cert. denied, 52
d
(3
7
14
5,
14
3d
F.
5
Jackson v. Byrd, 10
U.S. 307, 318-19
ckson v. Virginia, 443
Ja
ng
ti
uo
(q
7)
99
(1
68
U.S. 12
Coleman v.
otes omitted). See also
qu
d
an
s
on
ti
ta
ci
l
na
er
(1979) (int
..
Johnson, 132 S.Ct. 2060
(2012)(per curiam)
ew
D: The record for revi
fact made by the state
ndings of
AEDPA provides that fi
ear and convincing
ed in the absence of cl
court cannot be reject
wrong.. 28
evidence that they are
less the
U.S.C. § 2254(e) (1). Un
court did not afford
the state
petitioner shows that
any fair
at he could not have
record or th
opportunity to make a
aim is based
record because the cl
made a
on a new rule of law
or on
e
medies were unavailabl
ed after state re
evidence newly discover
nditions exists
and neither of those co
here
-
-
the evidence that
lusions under Section
reviewing legal conc
this court must use in
the state court under
found by
2254(d) (1) and facts
Section
t. See 28
ented to the state cour
ence pres
2254(d) (2) is the evid
ster, supra; Brown
Cullen v Pinhoi
U.S.C. 2254(e)(2);
v.
t of
d Cir.2011) ("In ligh
(3
9
62
9,
61
3d
F.
3
Wenerowicz, 66
ings to
conduct evidentiary hear
ot
nn
ca
ts
ur
co
ct
ri
st
Pinholster, di
22
Y
-
supplement the existing state court record under 28 U.S.C. §
2254 (d) . Otherwise, federal habeas petitioners would be able to
circumvent the finality of state court judgments by establishing
a new factual record. This would contravene AEDPA, which requires
petitioners to diligently present the facts in state court before
proceeding to the federal courthouse."), cert. denied, 132 S.Ct.
1934 (2012) ; Grant v. Lockett, 709 F.3d 224, 231 (3d cir. 2013) ("In
addition, review of a claim under 52254(d) (2) is. specifically
limited to 'evidence presented in the State court proceeding.' 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2) .")
E: claims not exhausted in the state court
This court cannot grant relief on claims that a
petitioner did not present in substantially similar form both as
to the facts and the federal law to each available level of the
state courts. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1) and (c) . See Baldwin v. Reese,
541 U.S. 27, 33 (2004); Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 366
(1995)(per curiam)
When a petitioner has not exhausted federal claims and
cannot now do so because the state courts would consider them
barred, those claims ordinarily are procedurally defaulted and
cannot be reviewed in habeas unless the petitioner shows either a
miscarriage of justice or cause for his default and prejudice.
23
Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 749-50 (1991). Showing a
miscarriage of justice is synonymous with a credible showing of
actual innocence, see McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133. S.Ct. 1924, 1931
(2013). That ordinarily requires new and trustworthy scientific
evidence, eyewitness accounts, or physical evidence. Hubbard v.
Pinchak, 378 F.3d 333, 340 (3d Cir.2004)
Showing cause for a prbcedural default requires • proof
that counsel was ineffective at a stage of the proceeding at which
the petitioner was entitled to the effective assistance of counsel,
or that the factual basis for a claim was not available to counsel,
or that state officials made compliance with the procedural rule
impracticable. See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986)
Prejudice is shown when. the error "infect[ed] [an] entire trial
with error of constitutional dimensions." Murray v. Carrier, 477
U.S. at 494 (internal quotations omitted).
Ineffective assistance of counsel at trial can constitute
cause. Strickland v. Washington. So can ineffective assistance of
counsel on direct appeal. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985)
Coleman v: Thompson holds, that a petitioner bears the consequences
of attorney error after the first direct appeal, so ineffectiveness
of counsel at any subsequent stage does not constitute cause to
excuse the default of a claim. Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S.Ct. 1309
24
(2012) limits Coleman v. Thompson by holding that attorney error
in collateral proceedings may sometimes establish cause for the
default of a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.
Martinez v. Ryan applies when the attorney error in collateral
proceedings is itself ineffectiveness under the Strickland v.
Washington standard, and where the underlying ineffectiveness of
trial counsel claim is a "substantial" one. Martinez v. Ryan, 132
S.Ct. at 1318. However, Martinez v. Ryan is limited to defaults in
collateral proceedings caused by ineffective counsel at the trial
level, not in appeals. Norris v. Brooks, 794 F.3d 401, 404-05 (3d
Cir. 2015)
,
cert. denied, 136 S.Ct. 1227 (2016)
.
Hence, to obtain
review of any claims not exhausted on direct appeal, Richardson
must show ineffectiveness by Tinari as well as prejudice; to obtain
review of claims not exhausted in the PCPA proceedings, Richardson
would have to show that they are substantial claims of Tinari's
ineffectiveness and that they were defaulted by Heuston's
ineffectiveness in the trial court.
III: Review of claims
The Brady claim presented in Claim One and as a
foundation for Claim Two and subsequent claims was rejected because
Judge Carpenter found as a fact that there had been no testing of
the bullet for blood and tissue. Judge Carpenter found that the
25
testimony by Corporal Wall and Doctor Cottle contradicted that of
Sergeant Jones and outweighed it. Several other reasons for the
discrepancy come readily to mind: Sergeant Jones misspoke; Sergeant
Jones misunderstood the question, believing the question to be
about ballistics testing; the court reporter failed to record the
exchange correctly; or there were nonverbal cues that the jury
understood to put the question and answer in context but that the
transcript could not record, for instance that Tinari was talking
rapidly and asked a new question while Jones was still thinking
about and replying to an earlier one. Since Tinari, Heuston and
Richardson have never pointed to any other evidence that the test
allegedly referred to does exist, Judge Carpenter did not make an
unreasonable determination of the facts, and therefore' did not
unreasonably reject the claim.
It would be gross error for a reviewing court to point
to an isolated portion of the transcript and declare (without even
consideration at credibility) that it establishes a fact so
certainly that any contrary finding is unreasonable. Given a simple
discrepancy that can be explained by dittography, haplography, or
other familiar error in the making of a transcript, a trial judge's
finding about what took place at trial can rarely if ever be
rejected as unreasonable based on a single entry in the transcript.
26
For an illustration in this very matter, the PCRJ transcript
records the current District Attorney, reading aloud the portions
of the trial transcript relevant to this argument, as describing
the bullet referred to in this claim as weighing "162 grams." I am
not certain that the bullet was 162 grains, but I am certain that
it was not 162 grams. Either the District Attorney misspoke or the
court reporter did not hear the difference between grains and
grams, but I am certain that one of the two of them substituted a
word that means small unit of weight for a similar sounding word
that means small unit of weight. On Richardson's view of things the
PCPA
transcript would estop the Commonwealth from denying that
someone fired a five ounce bullet, and therefore that the state
courts erred in not overturning the verdict because there were at
least two shooters at the Elks Club, Tinari was ineffective for not
obtaining an expert to point out a five ounce bullet would not have
produced the entry wound testified to by the Commonwealth's
witnesses, and Heuston.was ineffective for failing to make such a
claim in the PCRA hearing. A litigant's post-trial combing of a
transcript for alleged smoking guns is reasonably rejected by the
trial judge who was there when the transcript was made.
Claim Three, not exhausted in the state courts,
misunderstands what perjured testimony is. Testimony by Karla Jo
27
Smith that Richardson asserts was contradicted by other testimony
from Stephanie Hockenberry is not, simply by reason of the
contradiction, perjured testimony. If this claim had been exhausted
by proper presentation to the state court, there would be no
colorable claim of prosecutorial misconduct. Richardson claims that
the state court refused to hear this claim. Reply Brief at
Paragraph 60. I see no evidence in support of that assertion, but
if there were such the claim is still meritless.
Claim Four, repeated in Claims Sixteen through Eighteen,
is that there was improper comment on Richardson's invocation of
his right to remain silent. It is also not exhausted and also has
no factual foundation. Richardson repeats the claim several times,
see e.g. Reply Brief Paragraphs 61-70, but does not give any record
citation as to when this took place at the trial. Richardson
likewise asserts several times that the state court refused to hear
this claim but there is no citation to any evidence of any refusal.
Because neither Siford, Tinari, or Heuston made this claim in the
state court, for this court to consider it Richardson would have
to offer substantial evidence that Tinari was ineffective for
failing to raise the claim, and Heuston ineffective for failing to
raise Tinari's ineffectiveness in failing to develop the claim, and
he does not.
Claims Five, Six, Seven, Seventeen, and Eighteen, insofar
as they suggest some impropriety in Siford's selection of a jury,
would have required as a foundation for relief in state court some
evidence that it was an abuse of discretion to deny acontinuance
to. allow Tinari to re-do jury selection. In habeas review in
federal court, since the Supreme Court has established no federal
law on continuances, Richardson would further have to show some
ineffectiveness by Siford or other Sixth Amendment violation in the
jury selection. Richardson does not attempt to do the former and
attempts to do the latter solely so by pointing out that he is
black and was tried by an all-white jury chosen from an all-white
venire. Richardson describes this as a Batson challenge, but since
there were no black members of the venire, the challenge is one
under Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879), and Batson
is inapplicable.
I could if I had to take judicial notice of census data:
Blair County has very few persons of African-American ancestry, and
the empaneling of an all-white jury from an all-white venire would
not be unusual there or in many other Pennsylvania counties.
Richardson does not present anything to show that his venire or any
venire in Blair County was chosen in violation of the county' s duty
to select a constitutionally valid venire. Once again, Richardson
29
did not present this claim to the state court and provides no
evidence for his claim that he not only did so but.that the state
courts refused to hear it. There was no challenge by Siford,
Tinäri, or Heuston to the venire, and for this court to consider
Richardson's claims Richardson would have to offer substantial
evidence that Richardson would have to offer substantial evidence
that Siford was ineffective for failing to raise the claim and
Heuston ineffective for failing to raise Siford's ineffectiveness
in failing to develop the claim. He does not.
Claim Eight (and Eighteen in part), the after-discovered
evidence claim based on Rena Davis' statement, is exhausted. It was
thoroughly analyzed and correctly (and therefore not unreasonably
incorrectly) decided by the Pennsylvania Superior Court on direct
appeal. It therefore passes review under AEDPA.
Claim Nine (and Eighteen in part), the change of venue
or venire claim, was likewise analyzed and correctly (and therefore
not unreasonably incorrectly) decided by the Pennsylvania Superior
Court on direct appeal. I note that there was no evidence that the
members of the Blair County venire would have ordinarily been
exposed to the neighboring county's newspaper, so the Pennsylvania
Superior Court, probably gave this claim more weight than the
evidence deserved.
30
Claim Ten (and Eighteen in part), the challenge to the
prosecution's closing, was presented as and analyzed as a state law
claim on direct appeal. Tinari did not refer to any federal law or
cite a single federal case, and. the appellate panel observed that
Tinari had not been able to find any precedent (state or federal)
for the proposition that the prosecutor's handling of the firearm
during the closing was misconduct. To the extent that Richardson
distinguishes between state and federal law (in his Reply Brief at
Paragraph 113 he refers to this as a denial of his "Human Right,"
citing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and at Paragraph
118 he cites a number of federal cases)
,
a claim of. state law error
cannot be considered exhausted for purposes of habeas corpus simply
by attempting to repackage it as a federal claim by adding some
federal citations. See Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. at 366 (1995) ("If
a habeas petitioner wishes to claim that [a] ruling at a state
court trial denied him the due process of law guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment, he must say so, not only in federal court,
but in state court.")
Claim Eleven, the post-arrest silence claim that was
exhausted, was rejected because as the Pennsylvania Superior Court
noted "the facts do not support Richardson's claims that the
prosecutor's question invoked a response involving post-arrest
31
silence in this case." Mem. op. at 10. No doubt because there is
a large body of favorable law that he could cite, on appeal (but
not at trial) Tinari characterized what was at most maladroit
phrasing of the question to Himes as a comment on post-arrest
silence, but as the state court explained neither the question nor
the answer referred to anything "post-arrest." There is no dispute
about the facts underlying the appellate court's analysis and the
analysis is not incorrect, much less so unreasonably wrong that
fair-minded jurists could not agree with it.
Claim Twelve is the sufficiency of the evidence claim.
The jury in this case was convinced by the testimony of Karla o
Thomas-Smith, together with the other eye-witness testimony and
expert witness testimony that Richardson was the one firing the
shots that night and that one of the shots appeared to be aimed at
Vicki Smith. The only question under Jackson is whether the key
finding, that by aiming at Vicki Smith Richardson had specific
intent to kill Vicki Smith that transferred to Patience Ferguson,
was so insupportable as to fall below the threshold of bare
rationality. The state court of last review did not think so, and
that determination in turn is entitled to considerable deference
under AEDPI. See Coleman v. Johnson, 132 S.Ct. at 2065. Tinari
called and Richardson calls attention to the existence of
32
I
contradictory evidence, but that is more appropriate to a state law
weight of the evidence claim than to a Jackson v. Virginia claim.
Because a reasonable jurist could say that a rational jury had
sufficient evidence of Richardson's intent to murder Smith, a
federal habeas court cannot say the verdict was unsupported.
Claims Thirteen, Fourteen, and Fifteen fall for several
reasons, each one of which would be sufficient standing alone.
First, any claim based on Doctor Bonnell's testimony, as with any
claim based on after-discovered evidence, would require evidence
that this testimony existed at the time of trial and was known. to
Tinari. There is none. Richardson implicitly argues that for a
claim of Tinari 's ineffectiveness, such evidence is not necessary:
since Doctor Bonnell gave this testimony and it can be presumed
would have given this testimony at the time of trial, there must
-I
have been someone available to Tinari at the time of trial that
would have testified similarly. This is not correct, and in
addition it certainly was not an argument presented to the state
courts. In his Brief filed at the Superior Court in the appeal
from the denial of PCRA relief, Heuston, recognizing that Doctor
Bonnell's availability and Tinari's knowledge were necessary
elements, made an assertion that the Commonwealth stipulated that
Doctor Bonnell was available at the time of trial. Brief for
33
I
Appellant at 13. This is not so. At the PCRA hearing the
Commonwealth stated "We're prepared to stipulate that that is the
affidavit they received and we're certainly not going to stipulate
to any accuracy." PCRA Transcript at 2. The affidavit itself does.
not mention anything about availability at the time of trial or
Tinari' s knowledge.
Second, it must be stressed that Tinari's effectiveness
is measured by the defense he did present, not the possibly better
defense he might have presented. At trial, Richardson's defense was
straightforward: he was not the shooter. An effort on the part of
Tinari to stitch that defense to one based on Doctor Bonnell's
opinion would force the jury to consider the proposition "the
bullet Richardson didn't shoot isn't the bullet that killed Ms.
Ferguson." That might not itself be ineffective, might well be
weaker in the
.
jury's eyes than either simple defense taken
separately. Judge Carpenter rejected the claims because he found
Doctor Bonnell's testimony to be unknown to Tinari, and
additionally the insubstantial and cursory analysis of a hired gun.
Both of his findings are due deferende under AEDPA (the first is
undisputed, the second is not unreasonable) and either one sinks
a claim that Tinari was ineffective.
34
Third, Doctor Bonnell's testimony is certainly not so
compelling as to make unreasonable the Pennsylvania Superior
Court's additional finding that it would have been insufficient to
affect the outcome of trial. Doctor Bonnell did not dispute that
a bullet did in fact go through Patience Ferguson and did knock out
one tooth. Doctor Bonnell's testimony suggested only that the
bullet found by the Commonwealth was not that bullet, and that some
other bullet must have struck the victim. In the absence of any
evidence • that there was more than one shooter and one pistol to
supply that hypothetical bullet, it would be more than reasonable
for a jury to reject Doctor Bonnell's opinion, even if it were
unrefuted. And as Judge Carpenter noted in his PCR1 Opinion at 5,
the evidence would not have been unrefuted because Doctor Cottle,
who performed the autopsy, did offer an opinion that the bullet
found was capable of'causing the fatal injury to Ms. Ferguson.
Claims Sixteen through Eighteen restate earlier claims
and do not need separate discussion.
The petition should be denied.
A certificate of appealability should not be issued
unless the petitioner "has made a substantial showing of the denial
of a constitutional right." 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c) (2). Richardson does
not show that Judge Carpenter and the Pennsylvania Superior Court,
35
in adjudicating the claims presented to them, made errors so well
understood and comprehended in existing law that they were beyond
any possibility for fairminded disagreement. Harrington v. Richter,
supra. Richardson does not show cause and prejudice that would
permit this court to consider his defaulted claims that he did not
fairly present to the state courts , No certificate of appealability
.
should issue.
Pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 636(b) (1), the parties are given
notice that they have fourteen days to serve and file written
objections to this Report and Recommendation.
A
DATE:
Keith A. P'esto,
United States Magistrate Judge
Notice to counsel of record by ECF and by U.S. Mail to:
Lavelle Richardson FE-0568
S.C.I. Graterford
P.O. Box 244
Graterford, PA 19426-0246
A"
•1
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
LAVELLE RICHARDSON,
Petitioner,
V.
MICHAEL WENEROWICZ, WARDEN,
S.C.I. GRATERFORD,
Respondent
: Case No. 3:14-cv--15-KRG-KAP
RULE AND ORDER
AND NOW, this
day of March, 2014, it is
ORDERED that the petitioner's motion at docket no.
2 to proceed
with service in forma pauperis is granted. The Clerk
shall add the
District Attorney of Blair County as counsel for the
respondent.
The Clerk shall serve the petition by ECF upon the
respondent by
the District Attorney of Blair County. Within sixty
days of this
Rule and Order, the respondent through the District
Attorney of
Blair County shall file a response complying with
Rule 5 of the
Rules governing Habeas Corpus Cases under Section
2254 in the
United States District Courts showing cause, if any,
why the writ
should not be granted.
AQ
,
Keith A. Pesto,
United States Magistrate Judge
.
Notice by ECF to counsel of record and by U.S. Mail
to:
Lavelle Richardson FE-0568
S.C.I. Graterford
P.O. Box 244
Graterford, PA 19426-0246
xL
Case: 17-1872 Document: 003112749033 Page: 1
Date Filed: 10/11/2017
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 17-1872
LAVELLE D. RICHARDSON,
Appellant
V.
SUPERINTENDENT GRATERFORD SCI;
ATTORNEY GENERAL PENNSYLVANIA;
DISTRICT ATTORNEY BLAIR COUNTY
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 3-14-cv-00015)
District Judge: Honorable Kim R. Gibson
SUR PETITION FOR REHEARING
Present: SMITH, Chi ef Judge, McKEE, AMBRO, CHAGARES, JORDAN,
HARDIMAN, GREENAWAY, JR., VANASKIE, SHWARTZ, KRAUSE, and
RESTREPO, Circuit Judges
The petition for rehearing filed by appellant in the above-entitled case having been
submitted to the judges who participated in the decision of this Court and to all the other
available circuit judges of the circuit in regular active service, and no judge who
concurred in the decision having asked for rehearing, and a majority of the judges of the
circuit in regular service not having voted for rehearing, the petition for rehearing by the
-
-
-
Case: 17-1872 Document: 003112749033 Page: 2
panel and the Court en banc, is denied.
BY THE COURT,
s/ Cheryl Ann Krause
Circuit Judge
Dated: October 11, 2107
kr/cc: LaVelle D. Richardson
Richard A. Consiglio, Esq.
Date Filed: 10/11/2017
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.