Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Lavelle D. Richardson, Petitioner v. Cynthia Link, Superintendent, State Correctional Institution at Graterford, et al.

Supreme Court briefDec 28, 2017

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Case: 17-1872

Document: 003112717090 Page: 1

Date Filed: 09/01/2017

August 10, 2017

Amended DLD-33 1

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

C.A. No. 17-1872

LAVELLE D. RICHARDSON, Appellant

vs.

SUPERINTENDENT GRATERFORD SCI, ET AL.

(W.D. PA. CIV. NO. 3-14-cv-00015)

Present:

CHAGARES, VANASKIE and KRAUSE, Circuit Judges

Submitted are:

(1)

Appellant's application for a certificate of appealability under 28

U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1);

*(2) Appellant's supplement thereto filed on 8/24/17

in the above captioned case.

Respectfully,

Clerk

MMWILLBIkr

ORDER

The foregoing request for a certificate of appealability is denied. For

substantially the reasons given by the Magistrate Judge, appellant has not made a

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right nor shown that reasonable

jurists would find the correctness of the District Court's determination of his claims

debatable. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).

-

Case: 17-1872 Document: 003112717090 Page: 2

Date Filed: 09/01/2017

By the Court,

s/ Cheryl Ann Krause

Circuit Judge

Dated: September 1, 2017

sb/cc: LaVelle D. Richardson

Richard A. Consiglio, Esq.

(O

*

••.:..

A True Cop3°

7a

2'

Marcia M. Waldron, Clerk

Certified order issued in lieu of mandate.

--

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

LAVELLE RICHARDSON,

Petitioner,

V.

Case No. 3:14-cv-15-KRG-KAp

MICHAEL WENEROWICZ, WARDEN,

S.C.I. GRATERFORD,

Respondent

RULE AND ORDER

AND NOW, this

Ifl.

day of March, 2014, it is

ORDERED that the petitioner's motion at docket no. 2 to proceed

with service in forma pauperis is granted. The Clerk shall add the

District Attorney of Blair County as counsel for the respondent.

The Clerk shall serve the petition by ECF upon the respondent by

the District Attorney of Blair County. Within sixty days of this

Rule and Order, the respondent through the District Attorney of

Blair County shall file a response complying with Rule 5 of the

Rules governing Habeas Corpus Cases under Section 2254 in the

United States District Courts showing cause, if any, why the writ

should not be granted.

Keith A. Pesto,

United States Magistrate Judge

Notice by ECF to counsel of record and by U.S. Mail to:

Lavelle Richardson FE-0568

S.C.I. Graterford

P.O. Box 244

Graterford, PA 19426-0246

L

Case 3:14-cv-00015-KRG-KAP Document 17 Filed 01/26/17 Page 1 of 4

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

LAVELLE RICHARDSON,

Petitioner,

V.

MICHAEL WENEROWICZ, WARDEN,

S.C.I. GRATERFORD,

Respondent

Case No. 3:14-cv-15-KRG-KAP

Memorandum

Petitioner Richardson at ECF no. 16 filed timely

objections to my Report and Recommendation at ECF no. 15. In part

Richardson contends that I erred in not finding some of his claims

exhausted. ECF no. 16 at 1. Richardson's argument is that he

presented these claims pro se to the Superior Court.

As the Court recalls Richardson's conviction and sentence

were affirmed on direct appeal at Commonwealth v. Richardson, No.

2013 WDA 2003 (Pa.Super. April 6, 2005), petition for allowance of

appeal denied, Commonwealth v. Richardson, No. 222 WAL 2005 (Pa.

December 29, 2005). Richardson's collateral attack under

Pennsylvania's Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa. C.S. § 9541

et sect., was rejected by Judge Carpenter on September 20, 2010.

That denial of relief was affirmed at Commonwealth v. Richardson,

No. 260 WDA 2012 (Pa.Super. April 1, 2013), petition for allowance

of appeal denied, Commonwealth v. Richardson, No. 230 WAL 2013 (Pa.

November 13, 2013)

-

-

Case 3:14-cv-00015-KRG-KAP - Document 17 Filed 01/26/17 Page 2 of 4

As I noted in my Report and Recommendation, "Richardson

appealed from the denial of the [PCRA] petition, at first pro se

and then through Heuston." ECF no. 15 at S.

It is during that pro

se period, Richardson argues, that he exhausted the balance of his

claims. He is wrong.

Cohn Heuston, Esquire, represented Richardson in the

PCRA proceedings. After Judge Carpenter denied the PCRA petition,

Richardson took a pro se appeal that was docketed on October 26,

2010 at Commonwealth v. Richardson, No. 1632 tWA 2010 (Pa.Super.).

On June 13, 2011, September 6, 2011, and December 19, 2011, the

Pennsylvania Superior Court remanded the matter for a determination

by Judge Carpenter whether Richardson had knowingly and voluntarily

waived his statutory right to PCRA counsel and was intending to

proceed pro se. After receipt of a letter from Judge Carpenter on

January 3, 2012 confirming that Heuston continued to represent

Richardson, on January 20, 2012 the Pennsylvania Superior Court

relinquished jurisdiction so that Heuston could file a timely

notice of appeal nunc pro tunc. Heuston did so on February 14,

2012, at Commonwealth v. Richardson, No. 260 WDA 2012 (Pa.Super.)

As discussed in the Report and Recommendation, the appeal proceeded

at that number.

Case 3:14-cv-00015-KRG-KAP Document 17 Filed 01/26/17 Page 3 of 4

It is axiomatic that to exhaust a habeas claim a

petitioner must first fairly present it to the state court, not in

a procedural context in which its merits will not ordinarily be

considered. See Castille V. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346,

351(1989) (presenting a claim for the first time to the Pennsylvania

Supreme Court on discretionary review is not fair presentation)

Pennsylvania does not accept hybrid representation:

A represented appellant may petition to terminate his

representation; he may, acting pursuant to the rules of criminal

procedure, proceed on his own behalf. Conversely, he may elect to

allow counsel to take 'his appeal, but, should counsel not prevail,

assert counsel's ineffectiveness at a later time and, thus

indirectly, assert the claims he would have made on direct appeal.

The only thing he may not do is confuse and overburden the court

by his own pro se filings of briefs at the same time his counsel

is filing briefs on his behalf.

Commonwealth v. Ellis, 626 A.2d 1137, 1141 (Pa.1993), see also

Pa.R.App.P.3304. Whatever Richardson presented

pro

se in

Commonwealth v. Richardson, No. 1632 WDA 2010 (Pa. Super.) would not

have been considered on its merits except insofar as it was raised

by Heuston in the counseled appeal at Commonwealth V. Richardson,

No. 260 WDA 2012 (Pa.Super.).

This explanation of the procedural history is not a new

Report and Recommendation and does not trigger an additional

fourteen days to file written objections. Nevertheless, if any

3

Case 3:14-cv-00015-KRG-KAP Document 17 Filed 01/26/17 Page 4 of 4

-

party wishes to file any further supplement to the record, they may

do so within fourteen days.

DATE:

L1

t(IQ

- AS

2p

Keith A. Pesto,

United States Magistrate Judge

Notice to counsel of record by ECF and by U.S. Mail to:

Lavelle Richardson FE-0568

S.C.I. Graterford

P.O. Box 244

Graterford, PA 19426-0246

4

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

LAVELLE RICHARDSON,

Petitioner,

V.

MICHAEL WENEROWICZ, WARDEN,

S.C.I. GRATERFORD,

Respondent

:

Case No. 3:14-cv-15-KRG--KAP

Report and Recommendation

Recommendation

Petitioner Lavelle Richardson is serving a life sentence

for first-degree murder (with additional consecutive sentences

amounting to 22-48 months for reckless endangering and possession

of a firearm without a license), a sentence imposed by the

Honorable Hiram Carpenter of the Court of Common Pleas of Blair

County on November 14, 2002. Richardson seeks a writ of habeas

corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254. I recommend that the petition be

denied and that a certificate of appealability be denied.

Report

I: Facts and procedural history

At closing time in the early morning hours of July 21,

2001, Richardson was outside the Arandale Elks Club in Altoona

Pennsylvania in a parking lot where there were between 20 and

perhaps as many as 75 persons. According to witnesses Richardson

was engaged in an argument with Vicki Smith about Smith testifying

against Jodi Brown, a relative of Richardson's, in a criminal

matter. In the course of the argument Smith slapped. Richardson, who

went to his car and retrieved a 10 mm/.40 cal. semiautomatic

pistol. According to witnesses, Richardson fired one shot toward.

Smith and four into the air. The bullet aimed toward Smith struck

and killed Patience Ferguson. The bullet that killed Ferguson

entered through her mouth, knocking out one incisor, and exited

through the soft tissues in her neck. Five casings and one bullet

from .40 cal. Smith and Wesson cartridges were found in the parking

lot. Richardson, who was from Mt. Union in Huntingdon County, left

the scene of the shooting before police arrived. On July 25, 2001,

Richardson surrendered in Centre County to members of the

Pennsylvania State Police by arrangement through counsel, William

Fleming, Esquire. A pistol that was identified as the one that

fired the shots in Altoona was subsequently retrieved (with unfired

cartridges of the same type as the casings and bullet recovered at

the scene of the shooting) from Lake Raystown in Huntingdon County

and traced through witness testimony to Richardson.

From newspaper accounts in the record it appears that the

prosecution first believed that because there was no connection

between Richardson and Ms. Ferguson the shooting had been merely

reckless, but after investigation disclosed the argument between

Vicki Smith and Richardson the Commonwealth pursued a charge of

01)

first-degree murder under the doctrine of transferred intent. The

doctrine is codified in the Pennsylvania Crimes Code at 18

Pa.C.S. 303(b), establishing culpability when intent must be

proved if it is shown that the actual result differs from the

contemplated result only in the respect that a different person is

harmed. See Commonwealth v. Gaynor, 648 A.2d 295 (Pa.1994)

(defendant Gaynor and his adversary Johnson engaged in a shootout

in front of a store where children were playing; Gaynor intended

to kill Johnson; a child was shot and killed by Johnson during the

shootout; Gaynor was guilty of first-degree murder under §303 (b)).

George Henry Newman, Esquire, and David McLaughlin,

Esquire, represented Richardson at the preliminary hearing in

August 2001 but then withdrew from the case, and in September 2001

the Court of Common Pleas of Blair County first briefly appointed

Terry Despoy, Esquire, and then appointed John Siford, Esquire, to

represent Richardson. Siford represented Richardson throughout the

pretrial period, filed pretrial motions on December 21, 2001 that

were granted in part (motion to appoint expert witness in

ballistics, motion to dismiss second degree murder charge) and

denied in part (motion to change venue or venire, motion to dismiss

first degree murder charge) on April 30, 2002, and selected a trial

jury on July 15, 2002. According to a pretrial conference at which

3

Judge Carpenter inquired into the knowing and voluntary nature of

Richardson's desire to proceed at trial with new counsel, at some

point after jury selection. Richardson retained Nino Tinari,

Esquire, who entered his appearance on or about July 24, 2002 and

represented Richardson at the trial that began on Monday July 29,

2002.

The defense presented by Tinari was that Richardson did

not have or fire a weapon that night, that in the crowded confusion

of closing time with as many as 75 persons in the parking lot and

at least one other confrontation (between a doorman and a patron)

taking place outside the club, and that there were no reliable

eyewitnesses who could say that it was Richardson and not someone

else who fired the shot that killed Patience Ferguson; the

alternative defense was that even accepting the testimony of the

Commonwealth's witnesses Richardson was not guilty of first-degree

murder because there was no evidence that Richardson had

intentionally shot at Vicki Smith. Richardson himself testified

that he had left the parking lot about the time the shooting began.

The jury returned verdicts of guilty on August 2, 2002.

After being sentenced on November 14, 2002, Richardson proceeded

to a direct appeal, represented by Tinari. The conviction and

sentence were affirmed by the Pennsylvania Superior Court in a

No.

memorandum opinion at Commonwealth v. Richardson,

2013 WDA 2003

eme Court denied

Supr

(Pa.Super. April 6, 2005) and the Pennsylvania

onwealth v.

at Comm

Tinari's petition for allowance of appeal

2005)

Richardson, No. 222 WAL 2005 (Pa. December 29,

In November 2006, Richardson filed a petition

42 Pa. C.S. § 9541

Pennsylvania's Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA),

et seq., alleging

inter alia

under

that trial counsel had been

d Attorney Despoy to

ineffective. The court again briefly appointe

ire, subsequently

represent Richardson, but Cohn Heuston, Esqu

d an amended PCRA

entered an appearance for Richardson and file

petition on June 8, 2007. Judge Carpenter

held an evidentiary

tion on September

hearing on November 10, 2009, and denied the peti

20, 2010. Richardson appealed from the denial

of the petition, at

sylvania Superior

first pro se and then through Heuston. The Penn

randum opinion at

Court affirmed the trial court's decision by memo

Commonwealth v. Richardson, No. 260 WDA 2012

(Pa.Super. April 1,

ton's petition for

2013). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Heus

on, No. 230 WAL 2013

allowance of appeal at Commonwealth v. Richards

(Pa. November 13, 2013). Richardson, who had

already presented

claims exhausted on direct appeal by filing

a petition in this

court while his PCRA petition was pending,

DiGughielmo,

Case No. 3:09-cv-70-KRG-KAP

5

Richardson v.

(W.D.Pa.) (petition

dismissed without prejudice to proceeding in one exhausted

petition) then filed this petition.

Richardson presents what he divides up into 18 claims,

several with subparts. I will summarize the claims because it

serves no useful purpose to quote the petitioner verbatim:

There was a Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), violation

because the prosecution sent the bullet recovered at the crime

scene for testing for blood and human tissue, obtained a negative

test result, and failed to disclose that test and its results.

Restates Claim One and asserts this was a violation of due

process, equal protection, and the right to a fair trial.

There was prosecutorial misconduct when the prosecution failed

to correct the perjured testimony of Carla Jo Thomas Smith

identifying Richardson as the shooter.

The prosecution violated the Fifth Amendment and Sixth Amendment

by the attempt of police officers to have Richardson waive his

right to remain silent and by using Richardson's invocation of his

right to remain silent against him.

The court violated Richardson's rights by denying Tinari a

continuance and forcing Siford to pick the jury even though Tinari

had entered his appearance.

N.

The denial of Tinari's motion for continuance deprived him of

the opportunity to make a Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986)

challenge to the venire, which did not contain any black veniremen.

Siford was ineffective for refusing to participate in jury

selection after being informed that Tinari had entered an

appearance, by failing to object to the all white venire, and by

failing to make any Batson challenges during the selection of the

petit jury.

A new trial should have been granted due to after-discovered

evidence that Richardson was not the shooter.

It was error to deny change of venue or venire because there was

excessive pretrial publicity.

The prosecutor committed misconduct in the closing argument by

simulating use of the murder weapon in his closing, by expressing

his personal opinion, and by appeals to the sympathy of the jury.

The prosecutor committed misconduct by referring to

Richardson's post-arrest silence.

The evidence was insufficient to support the verdict.

13), 14), 15) After the trial Richardson obtained an expert report

contradicting the prosecution's theory that the bullet recovered

in the parking lot was the bullet that killed Ferguson, this

evidence undermines any confidence in the verdict, and Tinari was

7

ineffective for failing to obtain this evidence at the time of

trial.

The state courts erred in failing to find the Brady violation

asserted in Claim One, the prosecutorial misconduct asserted in

Claim Three, and the prosecutorial misconduct asserted in Claim

Four.

The state courts erred in failing to find the violations

connecting with jury selection asserted in Claim Five, Claim Six,

and Claim Seven.

The state courts erred in denying relief based on the afterdiscovered evidence and ineffectiveness claims asserted in Claims

Thirteen, Fourteen, and Fifteen relating to the expert report about

the bullet recovered in the parking lot, and based on the Brady

violation asserted in Claim One, and based on ineffective

assistance of counsel in not proving the Brady violation asserted.

in Claim One.

As can be seen from comparing Richardson's claims with

those raised by counsel in the state courts, Richardson attempts

to present every claim presented to the state court and some not

presented to the state courts.

On direct appeal, Tinari made five claims: 1) that a new

trial should be granted based on after-discovered evidence that

Richardson did not fire the shot that killed the victim; 2) that

because of the sensational nature of the crime and the extensive

pretrial publicity it was error to deny a change of venue or

venire; 3) that the prosecutor committed misconduct in his closing;

4) that the prosecutor improperly referred to Richardson's postarrest silence; and 5) that the evidence was insufficient to

sustain the verdicts.

The Pennsylvania Superior Court rejected the afterdiscovered evidence claim on the merits.

Commonwealth v.

Richardson, No. 2013 WDA 2003 Memorandu!n op. (Pa.Super. April 6,

2005)

.

The foundation for the claim was a transcript dated

September 14, 2004, of a conversation between Karim Shabazz, a

private investigator, and Rena Davis, a resident of Huntingdon

County familiar with Richardson. According to the statement,

hort1y after the shooting took place a Bradley Walker called Rena

Davis, his neighbor, asking for clean clothes because his had blood

on them from being near Ferguson when she was shot, that Rena Davis

met Walker in Tyrone, Blair County, with the clothes, and that when

Shabazz asked whether Walker had said whether Richardson was

involved, Davis stated that "No, he" (from the context it is not

clear and the statement is not explicit whether the reference is

to Walker or Richardson; at points Richardson implies that the

57

reference is to Walker, and the Pennsylvania Superior Court

implicitly found that Walker was being referred to) "said a cousin,

he just said my cousin killed my girl." The statement indicates

that Rena Davis believed the cousin referred to was one Rocky

Robinson, who allegedly also admitted to Davis that he disposed of

a pistol in Lake Raystown immediately after the shooting. Davis

also stated that she had previously seen Robinson, but not Walker

or Richardson, with a weapon, and that the opinion of unnamed

others was that Richardson was not the shooter.

The Pennsylvania Superior Court observed that Davis'

statement was made two years after the trial, that there was no

explanation for the failure to obtain the statement sooner, and

that it contained no direct exculpatory evidence but only vague and

hearsay statements.

The Pennsylvania Superior Court rejected the pretrial

publicity claim on the merits after review of the record, finding

that the pretrial news accounts did not refer to any confession by

or prior record for Richardson and were neither sensational nor

inflammatory, and additionally that Judge Carpenter had conducted

individual voir dire of any individual who claimed knowledge about

the case and excluded any person who claimed to have an opinion or

any reservations about impartiality as a result. The newspaper

10

are from Altoona

articles, which are contained in the record,

on/Mt. Union (The Daily

(Altoona Mirror, Blair County), and Huntingd

News, Huntingdon County) newspapers.

closing

The claim of prosecutorial misconduct during

pistol used in the

comprised claims that the prosecutor handled the

essed his personal

shooting and simulated its use, that he expr

uding a reference to

opinion about the veracity of witnesses, incl

defense counsel as offering "red herrings,"

and that he made a

personal appeal for a conviction based on sympathy

for the victim' s

family. The Pennsylvania Superior Court rejected

this claim on the

merits. After reviewing the closing argument

the panel found the

, and observed in

prosecutor's closing was permissible advocacy

osition that it is

passing that there was no authority for the prop

evidence during a

improper to refer to or demonstrate physical

r gave a requested

closing. The court also noted that Judge Carpente

cautioning against

instruction explaining the duty of the jury and

deciding based on sympathy or prejudice.

on's post-

The claim of an improper reference to Richards

ecutor asked Altoona

arrest silence stemmed from a question the pros

Police Department Patrolman Patrick Himes,

one of the first

officers to respond the night of the shooting,

who testified about

rs who were giving

arriving at the scene and assisting bystande

11

first aid to Ms. Ferguson. After Ms. Ferguson left in an ambulance,

Himes stayed to collect' information from potential witnesses and

to take the.registration information and license plate numbers of

vehicles in the parking lot. Cross examination covered the fact

that there were owners of cars in the parking lot that Himes had

not interviewed. On re-direct, the prosecutor first established

that Himes' investigation of license plates revealed that

Richardson's vehicle was not in the parking lot, and then asked the

following question:

[Keating]: And did you-did you interview him [i.e. Richardson] at

the scene?

[Tinari] : Objection

(Himes] : No, I didn't.

[Tinari] : Move for a mistrial, Your Honor.

[Judge Carpenter]: Counsel, we'll deny the motion for mistrial,

let's have a question Mr. Keating.

Lets

[Keating] : No further questions, Your Honor.

-

Tinari asked for a mistrial without assigning grounds. On appeal

he claimed that there had been an improper reference to Richardson

invoking his right to remain silent, and the Pennsylvania Superior

Court, overlooking the procedural issue, found that there was no

suggestion from the question or answer that Richardson refused to

make a statement or invoked his right to remain silent, and that

it was clear from the testimony that Richardson was not present at

the scene. The court did not expressly state the obvious, that

12

there was no post-arrest silence to refer to for the reason that

there had not yet been any arrest.

As for the sufficiency of evidence, the Pennsylvania

Superior Court mentioned in its brief recounting of the testimony

that it had been established that Richardson was present at the

scene, that Richardson was involved in an argument and retrieved

a gun, and that he fired shots in the direction of an individual

(by implication, Vicki Smith) that struck and killed Patience

Ferguson. The court found the evidence sufficient to support a

verdict of first-degree murder based on a theory, of transferred

intent (again by implication, that Richardson intended the death

of Smith). Although the court did not cite the record, the

testimony of Karla Jo Thomas-Smith (or Carla, as it is sometimes

spelled) was that she witnessed the argument and Richardson's

retrieval of a pistol, and that the first shot by Richardson, to

whom she had been introduced that night as Juan (the court reporter

for that trial day recorded this as "Wan"), was "straight ahead"

toward Vicki Smith, whom she identified as "Princess." (ThomasSmith did not know Vicki Smith until after the shooting but went

to identify her because she wanted to know who was responsible for

the fight and her friend Patience Ferguson getting shot.)

Richardson then fired four times into the air. Thomas-Smith was

13

thereafter focused on the injury to her friend and did not see

Richardson leave but did notice later that his vehicle had gone.

On collateral attack, Heuston made two claims in the

amended PCRA petition, the second claim having two subclaims: 1)

that there was a Brady violation because the Commonwealth conducted

forensic testing of the bullet found in the parking lot, had

discovered that there was no biological material that would match

the victim on it, and withheld this test and its negative results

from the defense; and 2) that based on the report of Doctor

Bonnell, an expert witness retainedafter trial, it was physically

impossible for the bullet recovered by police to have caused the

victim's entry wound because it would have knocked out more than

one tooth, and Tinari provided ineffective assistance of counsel

by failing to retain an expert prior to trial who would have

presented that testimony or possibly caused Tinari to present a

different defense theory. At the PCRA hearing before Judge

Carpenter, to avoid having Doctor Bonnell come from California, the

Commonwealth stipulated that his testimony would be consistent with

his affidavit.

Judge Carpenter, in his opinion Idenying PCRA relief,

found as a fact that there had been no forensic testing of the

bullet and therefore nothing on which to base a Brady claim.

14

Richardson's assertion that there had been such a test was based

on the following portion of the transcript of an exchange between

Attorney Tinari and Altoona Police Department Sergeant Michael

Jones, the evidence custodian, who also happened to have been the

officer who found the bullet and who took photographs of the spot

where it was found:

Q. Did you when you picked up the projectile ascertain whether or

not there was any blood on the projectile?

A. I didn't make a close examination, sir.

Q. Well you sent it away for that determination, didn't you?

A. Yes sir. I did.

Q. And the results were there was no blood or human tissue on it.

Correct?

A. Yes, sir.

There was no foilowup by Tinari, who went on to ask only a couple

of questions about a photographs of the scene. According.to Judge

Carpenter any suggestion from this exchange that there had been

testing was flatly contradicted by the testimony of Pennsylvania

State Police Corporal Jack Wall, the Commonwealth's firearms expert

who actually testified about the ballistic tests done on the

bullet, and Doctor Harold Cottle, the medical examiner who

performed the autopsy on the victim.

As for the report of Doctor Bonnell, Judge Carpenter

found as a matter of fact that "no one knew he existed at the

time." Analyzing the report, Judge Carpenter found it simplistic

15

and refuted by the evidence presented at trial, and observed that

because one could find an expert witness for "almost any position

on almost any issue if one looks for it hard enough" if a new trial

were to be awarded on the basis of such an expert opinion obtained

years after trial, then "we had better be prepared to retry every

murder case." According to Judge Carpenter, since Tinari "had

neither notice nor knowledge of" Doctor Bonnell's report the report

should be analyzed under the standards for after-acquired evidence,

and as so analyzed was untimely and weak impeachment evidence. By

implication Tinari was not ineffective for failing to present such

evidence.

A panel of the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the

denial of the PCPA petition at Commonwealth v. Richardson, No. 260

WDA 2012 Memorandum op. (Pa.Super. April 1, 2013), adopting Judge

Carpenter's Rule 1925 opinion, and making some additional comments

about the merits of the claims. The Pennsylvania Superior Court

observed that there was no reasonable probability that an opinion

like Doctor Bonnell's would have changed the outcome at trial and

that because of the lack of evidence that the absence of the

opinion caused any prejudice, Tinari was not ineffective. Mem. op.

at 6.

II: Standard of review

A: AEDPA

In their arguments, neither petitioner nor respondent

appreciates the effect on this court's standard of review of the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA),

Pub.L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, April 24, 1996. This court does

not review the trial and. PCRA proceedings de novo. Where a state

court (here, the last state court to rule on the merits of a claim

either on direct appeal or collateral attack was the Pennsylvania

Superior Court) adjudicates a claims on the merits, to obtain

relief a petitioner must show that the ruling:

resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

resulted in * a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in

the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. 2254(d).

See also Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,

405-06 (2000); Lambert v. Blackwell, 387 F.3d 210, 234 (3d

Cir.2004) ; Thomas v. Horn, 570 F.3d 105 (3d Cir.2009)

"A state-court decision is 'contrary to' clearly

established federal law if the state court (1) 'contradicts the

governing law set forth in [the Supreme] Court's cases' or

(2) 'confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable

17

0

ss arrives at

from a decision of [the Supreme] Court and neverthele

ing Williams

a [different] result.'" Lambert, 387 F. 3d at 234 (quot

v. Taylor, 529 U.S. at 405-06)

Few state court decisions will be

contrary to precedent.

n"

A challenge that there was an "unreasonable applicatio

t unreasonably

of federal law focuses on whether the state cour

al courts have

applied Supreme Court precedent (not what lower feder

Lett, 559 U.S.

said about Supreme Court precedent). See Renico v.

1702 (2014)

766, 778-79 (2010) ; White v. Woodall, 134 S.Ct. 1697,

n of clearly

A state court decision is an unreasonable applicatio

established federal law "if the state court identifies

the correct

t's cases but

governing legal rule from [the Supreme] Cour

bly extends a

unreasonably applies it to the facts" or "unreasona

legal principle from [Supreme Court] precedent to

a new context

where it should not apply or unreasonably refuses

to extend that

principle to a new context where it should apply,"

Williams v.

Taylor, 529 U.S. at 407.

s

Federal courts "are not authorized to grant habeas corpu

's decision

relief simply because we disagree with the state court

or because we would have reached a different result

if left to our

own devices." Werts v. Vaughn, 228 F.3d 178, 197

(3d Cir.2000).

It is not enough for petitioner to show that the

state court's

18

application of Supreme

adjudication was an incorrect or erroneous"

Court precedent.

3)

Wiggins V. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (200

e court's adjudication

Instead, petitioner must show that the stat

"outcome.. .cannot

was "objectively unreasonable," meaning the

eme Court precedent."

reasonably be justified under existing Supr

Hackett v. Price, 381 F.3d 281, 287 (3d

Cir.2004) (citations

279 (3d Cir.2008)

omitted); Abu-Jamal v. Horn, 520 F.3d 272,

of §2254(d) (1), 'the

("Under the 'unreasonable application' prong

question..

A

s not whether a federal court believes

the state

her thatdetermination

court's determination was incorrect but whet

shold.") As at least

was unreasonable-a substantially higher thre

rved, Section 2254 (d)

seven members of the Supreme Court have obse

reflects the view that habeas corpus is a

guard against extreme

em, not a substitute

malfunctions in the state criminal justice syst

al. A petitioner must

for ordinary error correction through appe

ion so egregious that

show an extreme malfunction in his prosecut

ed disagreement.

it is beyond any possibility for fairmind

Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102-03

(2011)

B: Effective Assistance of Counsel

g claims of

The clearly established federal law governin

ineffectiveness is set forth in Strickland v.

668 (1984)

.

Washington, 466 U.S.

Under Strickland, a petitioner must show

19

that

counsel's performance "fell below an objective standard of

reasonableness. 466 U.S. at 688; see also Williams v. Taylor, 529

U.S. at 390-91. The law presumes that counsel was effective:

Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly

It is all too tempting for a defendant to

deferential.

second-guess counsel's assistance after conviction or adverse

sentence, and it is all too easy for a court, examining counsel's

defense after it has proved unsuccessful, to conclude that a

particular act or omission of counsel's was unreasonable. A fair

assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be

made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to

reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and

to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time.

Because of the difficulties inherent in making the evaluation, a

court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct

falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance;

that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under

the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound

trial strategy.

466 U.S. at 689 (internal citations and quotations omitted). There

is no one correct trial strategy. Lewis v. Mazurkiewicz, 915 F.2d

106, 115 (3d Cir.1990) ("[W]hether or not some other strategy would

have ultimately proved more successful, counsel's advice was

reasonable and must therefore be sustained.") it is "only the rare

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel that should succeed

under the properly deferential standard to be applied in

scrutinizing counsel's performance." United States v. Kauffman,

109 F.3d 186, 190 (3d Cir.1997) (quoting United States v. Gray, 878

F.2d 702, 711 (3d Cir.1989))

20

Under Strickland, a petitioner also must show that he was

prejudiced by the deficient performance, that is, "that counsel's

errors were so serious as to deprive [the petitioner] of a fair

trial, a trial whose result is reliable." Strickland, 466 U.S. at

687. A petitioner "must show that there is a reasonable probability

that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors., the result of the

proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is

a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome."

466 U.S. at 694; see also Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S: at 391.

Habeas review of ineffective assistance of counsel claims

most often proceeds under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1) 's "unreasonable

application" prong. See e.g. Cullen v. Pinhoister, 563 U.S. 170

(2011); Harrington v Richter, supra; Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556

U.S. 111, 123 (2009)

.

Taking Strickland and AEDPA together, a

federal court's review in habeas of a state court's assessment of

counsel's stewardship must be doubly deferential.

Knowles v.

Mirzayance, 556 U.S. at 123.

C: Sufficiency of the evidence

In a habeas corpus proceeding, when there is a challenge

to the sufficiency of the evidence:

[T]he critical inquiry on review of the sufficiency of

does not require

the evidence to support a criminal conviction

a court to ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at the

...

21

.

iA

.Instead, the

reasonable doubt.

a

nd

yo

be

t

il

gu

d

he

is

ence in the

trial establ

after viewing the evid

r,

he

et

wh

is

on

ti

es

qu

of fact

relevant

ion, any rational trier

ut

ec

os

pr

e

th

to

e

bl

ra

light most favo

ime beyond a

ial elements of the cr

nt

se

es

e

th

d

un

fo

ve

could ha

reasonable doubt.

0

Cir.), cert. denied, 52

d

(3

7

14

5,

14

3d

F.

5

Jackson v. Byrd, 10

U.S. 307, 318-19

ckson v. Virginia, 443

Ja

ng

ti

uo

(q

7)

99

(1

68

U.S. 12

Coleman v.

otes omitted). See also

qu

d

an

s

on

ti

ta

ci

l

na

er

(1979) (int

..

Johnson, 132 S.Ct. 2060

(2012)(per curiam)

ew

D: The record for revi

fact made by the state

ndings of

AEDPA provides that fi

ear and convincing

ed in the absence of cl

court cannot be reject

wrong.. 28

evidence that they are

less the

U.S.C. § 2254(e) (1). Un

court did not afford

the state

petitioner shows that

any fair

at he could not have

record or th

opportunity to make a

aim is based

record because the cl

made a

on a new rule of law

or on

e

medies were unavailabl

ed after state re

evidence newly discover

nditions exists

and neither of those co

here

-

-

the evidence that

lusions under Section

reviewing legal conc

this court must use in

the state court under

found by

2254(d) (1) and facts

Section

t. See 28

ented to the state cour

ence pres

2254(d) (2) is the evid

ster, supra; Brown

Cullen v Pinhoi

U.S.C. 2254(e)(2);

v.

t of

d Cir.2011) ("In ligh

(3

9

62

9,

61

3d

F.

3

Wenerowicz, 66

ings to

conduct evidentiary hear

ot

nn

ca

ts

ur

co

ct

ri

st

Pinholster, di

22

Y

-

supplement the existing state court record under 28 U.S.C. §

2254 (d) . Otherwise, federal habeas petitioners would be able to

circumvent the finality of state court judgments by establishing

a new factual record. This would contravene AEDPA, which requires

petitioners to diligently present the facts in state court before

proceeding to the federal courthouse."), cert. denied, 132 S.Ct.

1934 (2012) ; Grant v. Lockett, 709 F.3d 224, 231 (3d cir. 2013) ("In

addition, review of a claim under 52254(d) (2) is. specifically

limited to 'evidence presented in the State court proceeding.' 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2) .")

E: claims not exhausted in the state court

This court cannot grant relief on claims that a

petitioner did not present in substantially similar form both as

to the facts and the federal law to each available level of the

state courts. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1) and (c) . See Baldwin v. Reese,

541 U.S. 27, 33 (2004); Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 366

(1995)(per curiam)

When a petitioner has not exhausted federal claims and

cannot now do so because the state courts would consider them

barred, those claims ordinarily are procedurally defaulted and

cannot be reviewed in habeas unless the petitioner shows either a

miscarriage of justice or cause for his default and prejudice.

23

Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 749-50 (1991). Showing a

miscarriage of justice is synonymous with a credible showing of

actual innocence, see McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133. S.Ct. 1924, 1931

(2013). That ordinarily requires new and trustworthy scientific

evidence, eyewitness accounts, or physical evidence. Hubbard v.

Pinchak, 378 F.3d 333, 340 (3d Cir.2004)

Showing cause for a prbcedural default requires • proof

that counsel was ineffective at a stage of the proceeding at which

the petitioner was entitled to the effective assistance of counsel,

or that the factual basis for a claim was not available to counsel,

or that state officials made compliance with the procedural rule

impracticable. See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986)

Prejudice is shown when. the error "infect[ed] [an] entire trial

with error of constitutional dimensions." Murray v. Carrier, 477

U.S. at 494 (internal quotations omitted).

Ineffective assistance of counsel at trial can constitute

cause. Strickland v. Washington. So can ineffective assistance of

counsel on direct appeal. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985)

Coleman v: Thompson holds, that a petitioner bears the consequences

of attorney error after the first direct appeal, so ineffectiveness

of counsel at any subsequent stage does not constitute cause to

excuse the default of a claim. Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S.Ct. 1309

24

(2012) limits Coleman v. Thompson by holding that attorney error

in collateral proceedings may sometimes establish cause for the

default of a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

Martinez v. Ryan applies when the attorney error in collateral

proceedings is itself ineffectiveness under the Strickland v.

Washington standard, and where the underlying ineffectiveness of

trial counsel claim is a "substantial" one. Martinez v. Ryan, 132

S.Ct. at 1318. However, Martinez v. Ryan is limited to defaults in

collateral proceedings caused by ineffective counsel at the trial

level, not in appeals. Norris v. Brooks, 794 F.3d 401, 404-05 (3d

Cir. 2015)

,

cert. denied, 136 S.Ct. 1227 (2016)

.

Hence, to obtain

review of any claims not exhausted on direct appeal, Richardson

must show ineffectiveness by Tinari as well as prejudice; to obtain

review of claims not exhausted in the PCPA proceedings, Richardson

would have to show that they are substantial claims of Tinari's

ineffectiveness and that they were defaulted by Heuston's

ineffectiveness in the trial court.

III: Review of claims

The Brady claim presented in Claim One and as a

foundation for Claim Two and subsequent claims was rejected because

Judge Carpenter found as a fact that there had been no testing of

the bullet for blood and tissue. Judge Carpenter found that the

25

testimony by Corporal Wall and Doctor Cottle contradicted that of

Sergeant Jones and outweighed it. Several other reasons for the

discrepancy come readily to mind: Sergeant Jones misspoke; Sergeant

Jones misunderstood the question, believing the question to be

about ballistics testing; the court reporter failed to record the

exchange correctly; or there were nonverbal cues that the jury

understood to put the question and answer in context but that the

transcript could not record, for instance that Tinari was talking

rapidly and asked a new question while Jones was still thinking

about and replying to an earlier one. Since Tinari, Heuston and

Richardson have never pointed to any other evidence that the test

allegedly referred to does exist, Judge Carpenter did not make an

unreasonable determination of the facts, and therefore' did not

unreasonably reject the claim.

It would be gross error for a reviewing court to point

to an isolated portion of the transcript and declare (without even

consideration at credibility) that it establishes a fact so

certainly that any contrary finding is unreasonable. Given a simple

discrepancy that can be explained by dittography, haplography, or

other familiar error in the making of a transcript, a trial judge's

finding about what took place at trial can rarely if ever be

rejected as unreasonable based on a single entry in the transcript.

26

For an illustration in this very matter, the PCRJ transcript

records the current District Attorney, reading aloud the portions

of the trial transcript relevant to this argument, as describing

the bullet referred to in this claim as weighing "162 grams." I am

not certain that the bullet was 162 grains, but I am certain that

it was not 162 grams. Either the District Attorney misspoke or the

court reporter did not hear the difference between grains and

grams, but I am certain that one of the two of them substituted a

word that means small unit of weight for a similar sounding word

that means small unit of weight. On Richardson's view of things the

PCPA

transcript would estop the Commonwealth from denying that

someone fired a five ounce bullet, and therefore that the state

courts erred in not overturning the verdict because there were at

least two shooters at the Elks Club, Tinari was ineffective for not

obtaining an expert to point out a five ounce bullet would not have

produced the entry wound testified to by the Commonwealth's

witnesses, and Heuston.was ineffective for failing to make such a

claim in the PCRA hearing. A litigant's post-trial combing of a

transcript for alleged smoking guns is reasonably rejected by the

trial judge who was there when the transcript was made.

Claim Three, not exhausted in the state courts,

misunderstands what perjured testimony is. Testimony by Karla Jo

27

Smith that Richardson asserts was contradicted by other testimony

from Stephanie Hockenberry is not, simply by reason of the

contradiction, perjured testimony. If this claim had been exhausted

by proper presentation to the state court, there would be no

colorable claim of prosecutorial misconduct. Richardson claims that

the state court refused to hear this claim. Reply Brief at

Paragraph 60. I see no evidence in support of that assertion, but

if there were such the claim is still meritless.

Claim Four, repeated in Claims Sixteen through Eighteen,

is that there was improper comment on Richardson's invocation of

his right to remain silent. It is also not exhausted and also has

no factual foundation. Richardson repeats the claim several times,

see e.g. Reply Brief Paragraphs 61-70, but does not give any record

citation as to when this took place at the trial. Richardson

likewise asserts several times that the state court refused to hear

this claim but there is no citation to any evidence of any refusal.

Because neither Siford, Tinari, or Heuston made this claim in the

state court, for this court to consider it Richardson would have

to offer substantial evidence that Tinari was ineffective for

failing to raise the claim, and Heuston ineffective for failing to

raise Tinari's ineffectiveness in failing to develop the claim, and

he does not.

Claims Five, Six, Seven, Seventeen, and Eighteen, insofar

as they suggest some impropriety in Siford's selection of a jury,

would have required as a foundation for relief in state court some

evidence that it was an abuse of discretion to deny acontinuance

to. allow Tinari to re-do jury selection. In habeas review in

federal court, since the Supreme Court has established no federal

law on continuances, Richardson would further have to show some

ineffectiveness by Siford or other Sixth Amendment violation in the

jury selection. Richardson does not attempt to do the former and

attempts to do the latter solely so by pointing out that he is

black and was tried by an all-white jury chosen from an all-white

venire. Richardson describes this as a Batson challenge, but since

there were no black members of the venire, the challenge is one

under Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879), and Batson

is inapplicable.

I could if I had to take judicial notice of census data:

Blair County has very few persons of African-American ancestry, and

the empaneling of an all-white jury from an all-white venire would

not be unusual there or in many other Pennsylvania counties.

Richardson does not present anything to show that his venire or any

venire in Blair County was chosen in violation of the county' s duty

to select a constitutionally valid venire. Once again, Richardson

29

did not present this claim to the state court and provides no

evidence for his claim that he not only did so but.that the state

courts refused to hear it. There was no challenge by Siford,

Tinäri, or Heuston to the venire, and for this court to consider

Richardson's claims Richardson would have to offer substantial

evidence that Richardson would have to offer substantial evidence

that Siford was ineffective for failing to raise the claim and

Heuston ineffective for failing to raise Siford's ineffectiveness

in failing to develop the claim. He does not.

Claim Eight (and Eighteen in part), the after-discovered

evidence claim based on Rena Davis' statement, is exhausted. It was

thoroughly analyzed and correctly (and therefore not unreasonably

incorrectly) decided by the Pennsylvania Superior Court on direct

appeal. It therefore passes review under AEDPA.

Claim Nine (and Eighteen in part), the change of venue

or venire claim, was likewise analyzed and correctly (and therefore

not unreasonably incorrectly) decided by the Pennsylvania Superior

Court on direct appeal. I note that there was no evidence that the

members of the Blair County venire would have ordinarily been

exposed to the neighboring county's newspaper, so the Pennsylvania

Superior Court, probably gave this claim more weight than the

evidence deserved.

30

Claim Ten (and Eighteen in part), the challenge to the

prosecution's closing, was presented as and analyzed as a state law

claim on direct appeal. Tinari did not refer to any federal law or

cite a single federal case, and. the appellate panel observed that

Tinari had not been able to find any precedent (state or federal)

for the proposition that the prosecutor's handling of the firearm

during the closing was misconduct. To the extent that Richardson

distinguishes between state and federal law (in his Reply Brief at

Paragraph 113 he refers to this as a denial of his "Human Right,"

citing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and at Paragraph

118 he cites a number of federal cases)

,

a claim of. state law error

cannot be considered exhausted for purposes of habeas corpus simply

by attempting to repackage it as a federal claim by adding some

federal citations. See Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. at 366 (1995) ("If

a habeas petitioner wishes to claim that [a] ruling at a state

court trial denied him the due process of law guaranteed by the

Fourteenth Amendment, he must say so, not only in federal court,

but in state court.")

Claim Eleven, the post-arrest silence claim that was

exhausted, was rejected because as the Pennsylvania Superior Court

noted "the facts do not support Richardson's claims that the

prosecutor's question invoked a response involving post-arrest

31

silence in this case." Mem. op. at 10. No doubt because there is

a large body of favorable law that he could cite, on appeal (but

not at trial) Tinari characterized what was at most maladroit

phrasing of the question to Himes as a comment on post-arrest

silence, but as the state court explained neither the question nor

the answer referred to anything "post-arrest." There is no dispute

about the facts underlying the appellate court's analysis and the

analysis is not incorrect, much less so unreasonably wrong that

fair-minded jurists could not agree with it.

Claim Twelve is the sufficiency of the evidence claim.

The jury in this case was convinced by the testimony of Karla o

Thomas-Smith, together with the other eye-witness testimony and

expert witness testimony that Richardson was the one firing the

shots that night and that one of the shots appeared to be aimed at

Vicki Smith. The only question under Jackson is whether the key

finding, that by aiming at Vicki Smith Richardson had specific

intent to kill Vicki Smith that transferred to Patience Ferguson,

was so insupportable as to fall below the threshold of bare

rationality. The state court of last review did not think so, and

that determination in turn is entitled to considerable deference

under AEDPI. See Coleman v. Johnson, 132 S.Ct. at 2065. Tinari

called and Richardson calls attention to the existence of

32

I

contradictory evidence, but that is more appropriate to a state law

weight of the evidence claim than to a Jackson v. Virginia claim.

Because a reasonable jurist could say that a rational jury had

sufficient evidence of Richardson's intent to murder Smith, a

federal habeas court cannot say the verdict was unsupported.

Claims Thirteen, Fourteen, and Fifteen fall for several

reasons, each one of which would be sufficient standing alone.

First, any claim based on Doctor Bonnell's testimony, as with any

claim based on after-discovered evidence, would require evidence

that this testimony existed at the time of trial and was known. to

Tinari. There is none. Richardson implicitly argues that for a

claim of Tinari 's ineffectiveness, such evidence is not necessary:

since Doctor Bonnell gave this testimony and it can be presumed

would have given this testimony at the time of trial, there must

-I

have been someone available to Tinari at the time of trial that

would have testified similarly. This is not correct, and in

addition it certainly was not an argument presented to the state

courts. In his Brief filed at the Superior Court in the appeal

from the denial of PCRA relief, Heuston, recognizing that Doctor

Bonnell's availability and Tinari's knowledge were necessary

elements, made an assertion that the Commonwealth stipulated that

Doctor Bonnell was available at the time of trial. Brief for

33

I

Appellant at 13. This is not so. At the PCRA hearing the

Commonwealth stated "We're prepared to stipulate that that is the

affidavit they received and we're certainly not going to stipulate

to any accuracy." PCRA Transcript at 2. The affidavit itself does.

not mention anything about availability at the time of trial or

Tinari' s knowledge.

Second, it must be stressed that Tinari's effectiveness

is measured by the defense he did present, not the possibly better

defense he might have presented. At trial, Richardson's defense was

straightforward: he was not the shooter. An effort on the part of

Tinari to stitch that defense to one based on Doctor Bonnell's

opinion would force the jury to consider the proposition "the

bullet Richardson didn't shoot isn't the bullet that killed Ms.

Ferguson." That might not itself be ineffective, might well be

weaker in the

.

jury's eyes than either simple defense taken

separately. Judge Carpenter rejected the claims because he found

Doctor Bonnell's testimony to be unknown to Tinari, and

additionally the insubstantial and cursory analysis of a hired gun.

Both of his findings are due deferende under AEDPA (the first is

undisputed, the second is not unreasonable) and either one sinks

a claim that Tinari was ineffective.

34

Third, Doctor Bonnell's testimony is certainly not so

compelling as to make unreasonable the Pennsylvania Superior

Court's additional finding that it would have been insufficient to

affect the outcome of trial. Doctor Bonnell did not dispute that

a bullet did in fact go through Patience Ferguson and did knock out

one tooth. Doctor Bonnell's testimony suggested only that the

bullet found by the Commonwealth was not that bullet, and that some

other bullet must have struck the victim. In the absence of any

evidence • that there was more than one shooter and one pistol to

supply that hypothetical bullet, it would be more than reasonable

for a jury to reject Doctor Bonnell's opinion, even if it were

unrefuted. And as Judge Carpenter noted in his PCR1 Opinion at 5,

the evidence would not have been unrefuted because Doctor Cottle,

who performed the autopsy, did offer an opinion that the bullet

found was capable of'causing the fatal injury to Ms. Ferguson.

Claims Sixteen through Eighteen restate earlier claims

and do not need separate discussion.

The petition should be denied.

A certificate of appealability should not be issued

unless the petitioner "has made a substantial showing of the denial

of a constitutional right." 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c) (2). Richardson does

not show that Judge Carpenter and the Pennsylvania Superior Court,

35

in adjudicating the claims presented to them, made errors so well

understood and comprehended in existing law that they were beyond

any possibility for fairminded disagreement. Harrington v. Richter,

supra. Richardson does not show cause and prejudice that would

permit this court to consider his defaulted claims that he did not

fairly present to the state courts , No certificate of appealability

.

should issue.

Pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 636(b) (1), the parties are given

notice that they have fourteen days to serve and file written

objections to this Report and Recommendation.

A

DATE:

Keith A. P'esto,

United States Magistrate Judge

Notice to counsel of record by ECF and by U.S. Mail to:

Lavelle Richardson FE-0568

S.C.I. Graterford

P.O. Box 244

Graterford, PA 19426-0246

A"

•1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

LAVELLE RICHARDSON,

Petitioner,

V.

MICHAEL WENEROWICZ, WARDEN,

S.C.I. GRATERFORD,

Respondent

: Case No. 3:14-cv--15-KRG-KAP

RULE AND ORDER

AND NOW, this

day of March, 2014, it is

ORDERED that the petitioner's motion at docket no.

2 to proceed

with service in forma pauperis is granted. The Clerk

shall add the

District Attorney of Blair County as counsel for the

respondent.

The Clerk shall serve the petition by ECF upon the

respondent by

the District Attorney of Blair County. Within sixty

days of this

Rule and Order, the respondent through the District

Attorney of

Blair County shall file a response complying with

Rule 5 of the

Rules governing Habeas Corpus Cases under Section

2254 in the

United States District Courts showing cause, if any,

why the writ

should not be granted.

AQ

,

Keith A. Pesto,

United States Magistrate Judge

.

Notice by ECF to counsel of record and by U.S. Mail

to:

Lavelle Richardson FE-0568

S.C.I. Graterford

P.O. Box 244

Graterford, PA 19426-0246

xL

Case: 17-1872 Document: 003112749033 Page: 1

Date Filed: 10/11/2017

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 17-1872

LAVELLE D. RICHARDSON,

Appellant

V.

SUPERINTENDENT GRATERFORD SCI;

ATTORNEY GENERAL PENNSYLVANIA;

DISTRICT ATTORNEY BLAIR COUNTY

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. No. 3-14-cv-00015)

District Judge: Honorable Kim R. Gibson

SUR PETITION FOR REHEARING

Present: SMITH, Chi ef Judge, McKEE, AMBRO, CHAGARES, JORDAN,

HARDIMAN, GREENAWAY, JR., VANASKIE, SHWARTZ, KRAUSE, and

RESTREPO, Circuit Judges

The petition for rehearing filed by appellant in the above-entitled case having been

submitted to the judges who participated in the decision of this Court and to all the other

available circuit judges of the circuit in regular active service, and no judge who

concurred in the decision having asked for rehearing, and a majority of the judges of the

circuit in regular service not having voted for rehearing, the petition for rehearing by the

-

-

-

Case: 17-1872 Document: 003112749033 Page: 2

panel and the Court en banc, is denied.

BY THE COURT,

s/ Cheryl Ann Krause

Circuit Judge

Dated: October 11, 2107

kr/cc: LaVelle D. Richardson

Richard A. Consiglio, Esq.

Date Filed: 10/11/2017

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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