Supplemental Brief — Teresa Miller, Petitioner v. West Virginia Department of Corrections, et al.

No. 17-6598

In TheSupreme

Court Of The UnitedStates

Teresa Miller petitioner

United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia.

United States District Court for The Fourth Circuit

Supplemental brief on Writ of Certiorari

Teresa Miller

Po. Bx 111

Morgantown Wv 26507

3044135940

RECE!VED

DEC -7 20J

OFFICE OF ThE CLERK

SUPREME COURT, US.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Question

Constitutional and statutory provisions involved

I )

Statement of case

'

Reason for granting

Conclusion

43

/4"

-

-

Question

Due to the actions and negligence of prison employees and the state why should I have

damages and collateral injury for the rest of my life?

Why upon filing a state civil right complaint pursuant to 42 usc 1983 on 5-5-2016 case

number 1:16cv82 was it transferred to the southern district. Upon which time I was made

to refill out another complaint for the southern district were they would not accept a 42

USC 1983 they made me fill out a civil action?

Why was my case divided as Moot when proper grievance procedure was followed?

Why was my case dismissed as moot when appeal was sent in in manner that held to us

code for Federal Rules of Appellate ProcedureRule 4. Appeal as of Right?

And due to the transfer of cases from the northern district to the southern because Judges

were disqualified from presiding due to conflict of interest. Why was the case decided in

the southern district it was filed against them?

Why due to the fact of past probation history was the petitioner released from probation

which released her from states custody six months early at which time the state and

federal courts could evade review of my case?

Why was the fact that my civil rights were violated and acts of cruel and unusual

punishment were done against me but was left off of probation early so they could evade

review of my cases?

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

CONSTITUTIONAL AND.

• 2017 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure /0-1/

,

• Rule 38 Right to a Jury Trial;_Demid

• RULE. 21. Transfer of trial

• 28 U.S. Code § 1332 Diversity of citizenship; amount in controversy* cost

• 8 th admendmant to the U.S. Constitution,

10

• 42 U.S. Code, Section 1983, and the Prison Litigation Reform Act.

• Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 4. Appeal as of Right—When Taken? /Q-( /

-

-

-

.

-

-

OTHER

3.3 Mootness

Updated 2016 by Jeffrey S. Gutman

See Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Environmental Services, Incorporated, 528 U.S. 167,

180

(2000).

Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 68 n.23 (1997).

•

4.

___-

-------

• 5.—

Buckhannon Board and Care Home, Incorporated v. West Virginia Department of Health

and Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598, 608-10 (2001), discussed inChapter 9 of this

MANUAL. See also Gill Deford, The Prevailing Winds After Buckhannon, 36

Clearinghouse Rev. 313 (Sept.-Oct. 2002).

10

0

In Chqfin v. ChafIn, 133 S. Ct. 1017 (2013), the Supreme Court discussed mootness at

length in a complex child abduction case and held that the dispute between the parents

was not moot because issues regarding the custody of the child remained unresolved. The

Court noted that the prospects of success of the suit were irrelevant to the mootness

question, and uncertainty about the effectiveness and enforceability of any future order

did not moot the case. Chajmn, 133 S. Ct. at 1024-26. A case is moot, however, when the

court cannot give any "effectual" relief to the party seeking it. See Knox v. Service

Employees International Union, Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2287 (2012);Church of

Scientolov of California v. United States,506 U.S. 9, 12 (1992); Firefighter's Local

1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561, 571 (1984); see also Tory v. Cochran, 544 U.S. 734, 73637 (2005) (death of attorney Johnnie Cochran did not moot injunction enjoining plaintiff

from defaming Cochran). A case can, of course, become moot when the plaintiff has

abandoned their claims, but such abandonment must be unequivocal. Pacific Bell

Telephone company v. Linkline Communications, 555 U.S. 438, 446 (2009).

-

See, e.g., In re Burrell, 415 F.3d 9949 998 (9th Cir. 2005).

'-

------

Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 370 n.1 (1987), illustrates the use of a damage

claim to avoid mootness. Prisoners who were denied parole without a statement of

W

,

reasons challenged the denial. They claimed that the state statute mandating release urder

certain circumstances created a liberty interest in eligibility for parole protected by

the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiffs sought damages as well as declaratory and

injunctive relief. Although plaintiffs were later released, mooting their individual claims

for injunctive relief, their damage claims remained alive. Because the immunity of

defendants was not settled, the Supreme Court reached the merits, holding that plaintiffs

had a cognizable liberty interest in the processing of their parole applications. The Court

remanded the case for further proceedings. See alsoCitv of Richmond v. J.A. Croson

Company, 488 U.S. 4695 478 n.l (1989). An inability to pay a damages judgment at

present does not moot a claim. See United States v. Behrman, 235 F.3d 1049, 1053 (7th

Cir. 2000). However, if the judgment seemingly could never be paid, a claim might be

dismissed on prudential grounds. See, e.g., Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation v.

Kooyorniian, 220 F.3d 103 14-15 (1st Cir. 2000).

'S7

Litigation challenging discontinued practices or policies that continue to produce

collateral harm is not moot. See, e.g., Reno v. Bossier Parish School Board, 528 U.S.

320, 327 (2000) (challenge to redistricting plan following election is not moot because

prior plan represents baseline for evaluating future challenges);Fireti.hters Local Union

No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561, 568-72 (1984) (city's challenge to injunction

prohibiting layoffs based on seniority system not mooted by recall of laid-off employees

when injunction would require city to ignore seniority rights in future layoffs and wotild

affect its ability to recruit new employees by precluding it from offering protection of.

layoff by seniority); Jago v. Van Curen, 454 U.S. 14, 21 n.3 (1981) (challenge to

procedures leading to rescission of forthcoming parole not mooted by later release on

parole when later release subject to restrictions not contemplated by original grant of

parole); Youakim v. Miller, 425 U.S. 231, 236 n.2 (1976) (challenge to reduction in

benefits for foster children related to foster parents not mooted by increase in benefits:

when effect is to. discourage acceptance of other family members awaiting

placement); Super Tire Engineering Company v McCorkle, 416 U.S. 115, 127 (1974)

(challenge to rule denying Aid to Families with Dependent Children benefits to strikers

not mooted by settlement of strike when rule affects every labor dispute and collective

bargaining agreement).

United States v. WT. Grant Company, 345 U.S. 629, 633 (1953); see also Friends of the

Earth v. Laidlaw Environmental Services, Incorporated, 528 U.S. 167, 189, 193 (2000)

(quoting and citing United States v. Concentrate Phosphate Export Association, 393 U.S.

199, 203 (1968)) ("A case might become moot if subsequent events made it absolutely

clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to

recur."); Adarand Constructors v. Slater,528 U.S. 216, 222 (2000) (burden of showing

non-recurrence lies with party asserting mootness).

15./—

A different issue arises when a third party voluntarily discontinues conduct that is the

focus of the litigation. In Iron Arrow Honor Society v. Heckler, 464 U.S. 67(1983), the

secretary of the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare informed the

University of Miami that the university had violated Title IX by permitting a student

organization that barred women from membership to conduct its initiation ceremony on

campus. The organization sued the secretary to enjoin further enforcement of the

interpretation of Title IX. During the litigation, the university informed the organization

that, irrespective of the outcome of the litigation, the organization would not be permitted

to return to campus until the organization stopped discriminating. Because the

university's action effectively superseded the secretary's action, the Supreme Court held

the challenge to the secretary's interpretation of Title IX moot, reasoning that the

interpretation no longer could affect the organization. The Court did not decide whether

the W T. Grantstandard applied to the voluntary acts of third parties; the Court reasoned

that, even if it did, the public statement of the university president banning the

organization from campus established that the controversy between the organization and

the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare was unlikely ever to recur.

•

16.

'-'---

-

-

Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 193-94.

• 17. '—

City of Erie v. Pap's AM, 529 U.S. 277,287-88 (2000).

~?

• 18. Compare City News and Novelty Incorporated v. City of Waukesha, 531 U.S. 278,

284 (2001) (unsuccessful challenge to city licensing ordinance is moot when adultoriented business decided not to renew license).

3

19. -

For a recent case touching on this factor, see Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020, 203335 (2011).

cY

0

Compare Sheely v. MRJ Radiology Network, 505 F.3d 1173, 1187 (11th Cir. 2007)

(defendant's failure to admit to wrongdoing suggests that cessation was driven by desire

to avoid liability) and DeJohn v. Temple University, 537 F.3d 301, 309 (3rd Cir. 2008)

(challenge to sexual harassment policy not moot when policy changed well into litigation

and university continued to defend it) with Larsen v. U S. Navy, 525 F.3d 1, 4 (D.C. Cir.

2008) (challenge to quota policy for chaplains moot when plaintiffs did not allege that

replaced policy would be reinstated) and Wisconsin Right to Life. Incorporated V.

Schober, 366 F.3d 485, 491-92 (7th Cir. 2004) (accepting assertions of state election

board that it would not enforce a campaign finance law found unconstitutional, but not

struck from the state code); 13A Charles A. Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure

§ 3533.7 at 353 (2d ed. 1984).

d

--

See Wernsing v. Thompson, 423 F.3d 732, 745 (7th Cir. 2005) (plaintiff did not show

need for injunctive relief against prior restraint policy when new supervisor disclaimed

the policy as only that of her predecessor),cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1004 (2006).

-

•

-

See United States v. W.T. Grant Company, 345 U.S. 629, 32 (1953); Desiderio v.

National Association of Securities Dealers, 191 F.3d 198, 201-02 (2d Cir. 1999).

• 28.—

City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle Incorporated, 455 U.S. 283. 288-89 (1982).

• 29.

I

See Pederson v. Louisiana State University, 213 F.3d 858, 874-15 (5th Cir.

(4

2000); Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Laboratories, 135 F.3d 1260, 1274-75

(9th Cir. 1998); American Iron and Steel Institute v. Environmental Protection

Agency, 115 F.3d 979, 1006-07 (D.C. Cir. 1997).

30.

Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 17 (1996); Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 482 (1982).

Federal Energy Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life,55 1 U.S. 449, 463 (2007)

(referring to both formulations); see Buckley v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Company, 111

F.3d 524, 527-28 (7th Cir. 1997) (applying various standards of the possibility of

recurrence, such as "reasonable expectation," "demonstrated probability," and not

"highly unlikely").

Cit-v of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95(1983);Buckley, 111 F.3d at 527-28

("demonstrated possibility" required) (quoting Board of Education v. Steven L., 89 F.3d

464,

8. 468 (7th Cir. 1996)).

3

___-_-----

Lyons, 461 U.S. at 109; see also Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 482 (1982) (per curiam)

(challenge to state constitutional provision denying pretrial release in sexual assault case

mooted by conviction; no probability that plaintiff will again be arrested and detained

pending trial); Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149 (1975) (per curiam) (challenge

to procedures governing release on parole mooted by unconditional release; no

probability that plaintiff will again be affected by procedures).

Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 305 (1988).

'-

-

9

Id. at 320.

Id. at 319 n.6. In Kingdomware, the plaintiffs "reasonable likelihood" of being awarded

future government contracts if its interpretation of particular procurement statute prevails

was sufficient to establish that the dispute was capable of repetition.Kingdomware, 136 S.

Ct. at 1976. See Alvarez v. Smith, 130 S. Ct. 576, 581 (2009) (that plaintiffs will "likely"

not be subject to challenged state procedures again moots challenge to theij

q

(-.-----

I

See Olmstead v. L. C., 527 U.S. 5813 594 n.6 (1999) (action to require treatment for

disabilities not moot even after plaintiffs were placed in requested programs because they

had many institutional placements in the past)

5

Case law.

Americans United for Separation of Church and State v. Prison Fellowship Ministries, 509

(8

.F.3d406, 420-421. th Cir. 2007);

)3 J

th

Potter v. Norwest Mortgage, inc.. 329 F.3d 608, 611, (8 Cir. 2003).

Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1,118 S.Ct. 978, 140 L.Ed.2d 43 (1998)

0 -1 1

Sibron New _York, 392 U.S. 40 at 52, 88 S.Ct. 1889,20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968),

I I

1

St. Pierre v. United States, 319 U.S. 41,63 S.Ct. 910,87 L.Ed. 1199 (1943)

Fiswick v. United States, 329 U.S. 211,67 S.Ct, 224,91 L.Ed. 196 (1946)

1

II

Ginsburg v. State of New York., 390 U.S. 629,633,99 S.Ct. 1274, 1277,20 L.Ed.2d 195, n. 2 f

(1968)

United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 74 S.Ct 247, 98 L.Ed. 248 (1954)

Pollard v. United States, 352 U.S. 354,77 S.Ct 481, 1 L.Ed.2d 393 (1957),

Parker v. Ellis, 362 U.S. 574, 577, 80 S.Ct 909, 911, 4 L.Ed.2d 963 (1960

ID 1 1

-

Peon v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 64, 88 S.Ct. 1549,20 L.Ed.2d 426 (1968)

Port v. Heard, 764 F.2d 423 (1985).

/D 1 /

Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 118 S.Ct. 978,140 L.Ed.2d 43 (1998

Lane v. Williams, 455 U.S. 624,102 S.Ct. 1322,71 L.Ed.2d 508 (1982)

/0-11

/

Supplemental BREW

Mootness as define in the guide for legal aid attorneys. Say that government officials

often make a case moot so they will not have to pay out which probably explains why I

was let off of probation six months early. But this continues to do harm to me by not

having my habeas filed I have to endure jobs for felons. If I was to be incarcerated again

my recorded would not be cleared because I was denied the use of the law liabary which

means I would endure more time for subsequent offenses. By them denying this right I

could not follow proper appellate procedure thus dismissing case 16-0034. I will have

mersa for the rest of my life which is. Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus

(MRSA) is a bacterium that causes infections in different parts of the body. It's tougher to

treat than most strains of staphylococcus aureus or staph because it's resistant to

some commonly used antibiotics.

--

--

The symptoms of MRSA depend on where you're infected. Most often, it causes mild

infections on the skin, like sores or boils. But it can also cause more serious skin

infections or infect surgical wounds, the bloodstream, the lungs, or the urinary tract.

Though most MRSA infections aren't serious, some can be life-threatening. Many public

health experts are alarmed by the spread of tough strains of MRSA. Because it's hard to

treat, MRSA is sometimes called a "super bug."

Thusinsuring I will have collateral" injury for the rest of my life that is an exception to

mootness. There will be damages I have to pay for the rest of my life. Doctors medicine

hospital stays cleaning care death funeral low paying jobs and since I have legal actions

filed against the state and federal courts refusals for employment after I put in 55 job

applications. Bugar king found out about the suit and was not put back on schedule was

told to have probation contact them. Denial of social security benefits and homeless

shelter. Denial of low income housing after being accepted. Not being able to obtain

counsel due to the fact of the defendants that the case is filed against Not being able to

have a life due to the medical reasons. Not able to ensure a beneficial education in most

fields due to a background check. Thus insurancing that reincarnation is most highly

probable. Which means all events that occurred in incarceration are highly probable to

reoccur. By evading review and releasing me from state custody 6. months early. I could

not even ask to have my claim expitided due to the fact of no prior knowledge of release.

.

3.3 Mootness

Updated 2016 by Jeffrey S. Gutman

Both the law of standing and the law of mootness derive from Article III's requirement

that the judicial power of the United States extends only to cases and controversies. 1

While the law of standing involves whether the plaintiff had suffered or is threatened

with injury in fact at the time of the filing of the complaint, the law of mootness inquires

whether events subsequent to the filing of suit have eliminated the controversy between

the parties. Generally, the burden of showing standing rests with the plaintiff, while the

burden of demonstrating mootness lies with the defendant.2 Like standing, because

mootness implicates the court's jurisdiction, it can be raised at any time and cannot be

resolved by stipulation.3Moreover, counsel for the plaintiff has a duty to bring to the

court's attention facts which may raise an issue of mootness.4Advocates can expect to

encounter mootness issues in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Buckhannon Board

and Care Home v. West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources, because

governmental defendants often try to moot out cases in order to avoid paying attorney

fees.5

3.3.A. Considering Mootness

Mootness issues can arise in cases in which the plaintiff challenges actions or policies

which are temporary in nature, in which factual developments after the suit is filed

resolve the harm alleged, and in which claims have been settled. Generally, a case is not

moot so long as the plaintiff continues to have an injury for which the court can award

relief, even if entitlement to the primary relief has been mooted and what remains is

small.6 Put differently, the presence of a "collateral" injury is an exception to mootness.

7.As a result, distinguishing claims for injunctive relief from claims for damages is

important. Because damage claims seek compensation for past harm, they cannot become

moot.8 Short of paying plaintiff the damages sought, a defendant can do little to moot a

damage claim. The virtual impossibility that unpaid damage claims can become moot

gives rise to a technique for avoiding mootness: plead a claim for damages if the claim

has a reasonable basis.

3.3.B. 1. Voluntary Cessation of Unlawful Conduct

"14 Unless the defendant meets that "heavy" burden, the court has the power to hear the

case and the discretion to grant injunctive relief. 15Two recent cases illustrate the relative

difficulty in persuading a court to dismiss a case on mootness grounds on the basis of

voluntary cessation. In Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Environmental Services, the Court

held that a claim for civil penalties intended to deter a polluter from exceeding discharge

limits in a permit was not necessarily moot, even when the facility at issue had closed,

because the defendant retained the permit. 16 In City of Erie v. Pop's A.M., the Court

rejected the suggestion of mootness filed by a prevailing plaintiff in a challenge to city

restrictions on adult dancing establishments. 17Notwithstanding that the club had closed,

the Court noted the city's continued stake in wishing to enforce the statute enjoined by

the lower courts and the possibility that the plaintiff would reopen a new club. 18

Mootness, then, requires a sensitive fact-based prediction of the probability of recurrence,

an analysis of the plaintiff's continued need for relief, 19 the defendant's representations

of future intent, and the public interest in resolution of the dispute. The burden of

demonstrating mootness rests on the defendant, and the essential inquiry is the

genuineness of the defendant's claim of self-correction.20 At the same time, the plaintiff

should be prepared to explain why, as a prudential matter, the court should issue

declaratory and injunctive relief despite the defendant's representations. 21 When, as in

No

City of Erie, the claim implicates public rather than private interests, a reduced risk of

recurrence is sufficient to avoid mootness.22

With respect to suits against governmental entities, mootness issues arise when the

relevant agency or official declares in some way that it will no longer follow the

challenged policy or when superseding or amending legislation is enacted. Courts

generally look favorably on assertions of discontinuance by public officials... .28 From an

advocacy perspective, establishing the defendant's belief in the legality of the conduct at

issue early in the litigation is, therefore, useful. Probing in discovery facts relevant to the

possibility of resumption of the challenged policy is also advisable. Courts frequently

reject suggestions of mootness when the defendant fails to offer some assurance that the

challenged policy will not be resumed.29

3.3.B.2. Conduct Capable of Repetition Yet Evading Review

Challenges to recurrent conduct of short duration often avoid mootness under the

exception for acts "capable of repetition yet evading review." Conduct is capable of

repetition but evading review when (1) the duration of the challenged action is too short

to be litigated fully before the cessation or expiration of the challenged conduct, and (2)

the plaintiff is reasonably expected to be subject to the same action in the future.30

Determining whether this exception applies therefore requires an assessment of the

probability of repetition or recurrence, the risk that repeated harm will be of sufficiently

short duration so as to evade review and remedy, and the extent to which repetition may

affect the plaintiff. .36 In City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, a challenge to a city policy of

using choke holds to subdue suspected criminals, the Court held that a generalized

showing that conduct might recur was not sufficient to trigger the exception.37 The Court

stated that the "doctrine applies only in exceptional situations, and generally only in those

cases in which the named plaintiff can make a reasonable showing that he will again be

subjected to the alleged illegality."38

However, in Honig v. Doe, the Court limited Lyons.39 The Court stated that Lyons held

only that the Court was "unwilling to assume that the party seeking relief will repeat the

type of misconduct that would once again place him or her at risk of that injury."40 The

Court held that a "reasonable expectation" of recurrence was sufficient to overcome a

suggestion of mootness: "in numerous cases we have found controversies capable of

repetition based on expectations that, while reasonable, were hardly demonstrably

probable."4 1 Such a reasonable expectation may be found in the history of the plaintiff's

relationship with the defendant.42

...

Third, the plaintiff must show that he, rather than simply anyone, "will again be subjected

to the alleged illegality

1. I originally filed my caseunder color of law 42 usc 1983 and asked for a jury trial

which I was denied

Case number 1:16cv82

5-6-16

The federal court for the southern district of West Virginia made me fill out a

civil complaint and would not accept a 42 usc 1983 new complaint filed July of

2016 civil action number 3:16-cv-04225.

And due to the transfer of cases from the northern district to the southern district

because Judges were disqualified from presiding due to conflict of interest. Why

was the case held in the southern part because it was filed against the southern

part of the state.

Showing prejudice in civil action number 1: 16cv 1982 were it was originally filed

in the northern district. Which they transferred to the southern district renaming

case number 3:16cv04225 in the same district the defendants were named in.

Transfer in other cases for the following reasons I have had one case transferred

from the United States district court for the northern district of West Virginia

Civil action number 2: 16cv50 renamed 2: 17-cv-04130

.

For conflict of interest see attached transfer order

1. I have had a second case transferred in the United States district court for the

northern district of West Virginia clarksburg

Civil action number 1:17-cv- 128

Renamed

2: 17-cv-03951

Because the judges were disqualified from presiding see the attached orders

By the Supreme Court rules on timely filing of an appeal

Plaintiff followed all proper procedures for filing against personal at the prison.

Was informed by the commissioner that he did not have to answer because there

were more than one grievance per envelope. And when refilling inmate would not

receive an answer due to the fact that she had previously stated the complaint but

could not receive an answer from commissar.

Filed a motion to appeal the decision to dismiss federal court said not filed in a

timely manner dismissed and it was filed before my thirty days were up

dismissal decision

appeal sent in

Why did the Fourth circuit dismiss my case because they said I did not file an

appeal appeal sent in

I sent in additional information on my injury of mersa

Why was my case decided as moot when there are US Supreme Court decisions

in cases similar to mine

They started dismissing all of my cases as moot when I was released on a motion

to discharge defendant from further custody due to failure to provide transcripts in

a habeas corpus filing. They then placed me on a year probation but released me

10

from probation six months early even with past probationer history and refusals of

parole. At which time they decided to dismiss my cases as moot because no

longer incarcerated even though there were still collateral damages. They were

tring to evade review in my state filed habeas case 16-0034 and 16-0235 and my

federal cases 2:16cv7 and 2:17-cv-03951.

8. I file a motion to amend clerical errors because they did not match court

transcripts.

~

a

Reason to grant

The defendants allowed and engaged in acts of cruel and unusual punishment. Refusals of

law library to file a habeas corpus which caused a dismissal in case number 16-0034.

People spitting in your food which in turn gave me mersa which I will suffer from

damages for the rest of my life for this. Segregation in single cell with no reprisals.

Medical lock down three weeks after being returned from work release Refusals to

notarize legal paper causing delays in open court cases. In different treatment as to what I

was allowed to have or eat as compared to other inmates. The prison officials sending me

back from work release after questioning me about court cases filed in state and federal

court. Following proper inmate grievance procedure all the way to the commissioner and

then having him refuse to answer grievance numerous times. Refusals of the West

Virginia parole board on parole even though I was awaiting a reconsideration for house

arrest and had the motion granting house arrest. Refusal of parole saying was a dander to

society but department of military affairs rated me low risk a comm one and two.

Refusal of employment in prison so I could not make parole. Refusal for school and

classes so I could not make parole. Male staff entering females rooms even though the

females were still in rooms alone. Prea numbers no existent and being told I was not

allowed to call to report staff. Hepa law violations at doctor appointments Refusal to

access the courts by not adding attorneys phone numbers and court phone numbers.

These conditions exists and continue to be on going which means they continuously are

violating your civil rights and other inmates civil rights. The state and federal courts

evading review because they left me off of probation six months early so they could

dismiss all cases filed.

.

Conclusion

Certificate

This supplemental brief is presented in good faith and not in delay.

The grounds for the supplemental brief are limited to intervening circumstances of a substantial

or controlling effect or to other substantial grounds not previously presented.

Respectfu y submitted

Date

H