Amicus Curiae Brief — Herman Avery Gundy, Petitioner v. United States
Supreme Court briefJun 1, 2018
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No. 17-6086
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In The
Supreme Court of the United States
-----------------------------------------------------------------HERMAN AVERY GUNDY,
Petitioner,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.
-----------------------------------------------------------------On Writ Of Certiorari To The
United States Court Of Appeals
For The Second Circuit
-----------------------------------------------------------------BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE INSTITUTE
FOR JUSTICE IN SUPPORT OF REVERSAL
-----------------------------------------------------------------INSTITUTE FOR JUSTICE
SHELDON GILBERT*
DANA BERLINER
901 North Glebe Road
Suite 900
Arlington, Virginia 22203
(703) 682-9320
sgilbert@ij.org
*Counsel of Record
Counsel for Amicus Curiae
Institute for Justice
================================================================
COCKLE LEGAL BRIEFS (800) 225-6964
WWW.COCKLELEGALBRIEFS.COM
i
QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act’s delegation to the Attorney General in 34
U.S.C. § 20913(d) violates the constitutional nondelegation doctrine.
ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
QUESTION PRESENTED...................................
i
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................
v
INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE ......................
1
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT .....................
1
ARGUMENT ........................................................
4
I.
Federal Courts Have Abandoned the Nondelegation Doctrine, and Significant Lawmaking Power is Now Concentrated in the
Executive Branch ......................................
5
A. The Modern Intelligible Principle Test
Allows the Executive Branch to Make
Law and Decide Policy .........................
6
B. Although Federal Courts Now Treat the
Nondelegation Doctrine as a Dead Letter, Data Show Federal Courts Routinely Enforced Nondelegation For a
Century, and State Courts Still Do ....... 10
C. Lawmaking by Regulatory Bodies Now
Outpaces Lawmaking by Congress, and
Over One Million ‘Regulatory Restrictions’ Impose Over a Trillion Dollars in Annual Costs ............................. 12
D. Congressional Delegations Have Resulted in Over 300,000 Regulatory
Crimes, Criminalizing Everything from
Mislabeled Marbles to Misshaped
Meatloaf ............................................... 14
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS – Continued
Page
1. The abundance of federal criminal
law is a recent phenomenon ........... 15
2. Examples from the 300,000 regulatory crimes show agencies criminalize harmless, garden-variety private
conduct ............................................ 16
3. The targeted prosecution of the
Shechter Brothers shows the threat
that regulatory criminalization poses
to liberty .......................................... 21
II.
The Court Should Adopt an Originalist
Nondelegation Test Rooted in the Text,
Structure, and History of the Constitution’s Vesting Clauses ................................ 26
A. The Constitution Does Not Expressly
or Implicitly Authorize Congress to
Delegate Away the Exclusively Legislative Power to Regulate Private Conduct ...................................................... 27
1. The Constitution does not expressly
authorize Congress to delegate its
exclusively legislative powers .......... 28
2. The Constitution does not implicitly authorize Congress to delegate
its exclusively legislative powers .... 30
B. Congress May Not Delegate to the Executive the Authority to Establish
Generally Applicable Rules Governing
Private Conduct ................................... 31
iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS – Continued
Page
C. Congress May Not Delegate to the Executive the Authority to Make Law on
Important, Complex Subjects .............. 33
D. Because the Separation of Powers Exists to Protect Liberty, In Close Cases,
the Tie Should Go to Liberty ............... 35
CONCLUSION..................................................... 38
v
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
CASES
A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,
295 U.S. 495 (1935) ......................................... passim
Am. Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90
(1946) ............................................................. 8, 27, 33
Askew v. Cross Key Waterways, 372 So.2d 913
(Fla. 1978)................................................................11
Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014) ...........31
Clinton v. City of New York., 524 U.S. 417 (1998) ....... 35
Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.R., 135 S. Ct.
1225 (2015) .............................................. 4, 31, 32, 36
FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529
U.S. 120 (2000) ........................................................34
FPC v. Hope Nat. Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944) ...........8
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) ..................... 29, 36
J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276
U.S. 394 (1928) ..........................................................8
King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015) ............... 20, 34
Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649
(1892) ................................................................... 5, 35
Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304 (1816) .........28
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316
(1819) .......................................................................27
Metro. Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for Abatement of Aircraft Noise, 501 U.S. 252 (1991)............36
vi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES – Continued
Page
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361
(1989) ............................................................. 4, 28, 33
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) ........................2
Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190
(1943) ..................................................................... 8, 9
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S.
519 (2012) .......................................................... 27, 29
United States v. Baldwin, 745 F.3d 1027 (10th
Cir. 2014) ............................................... 14, 15, 16, 17
United States v. Evans, 333 U.S. 483 (1948)..... 16, 26, 35
United States v. Guzman, 591 F.3d 83 (2d Cir.
2010) ..........................................................................4
United States v. Matchett, 837 F.3d 1118 (11th
Cir. 2016) .................................................................15
United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76
(1820) ................................................................... 6, 16
Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427
(2014) .......................................................................34
Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457
(2001) .........................................................................9
Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1
(1825) ............................................................... passim
Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944) ................8
Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074 (2015) ...........21
vii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES – Continued
Page
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Fla. Const., art. II, § 3 .................................................11
U.S. Const. art. I, § 1 ........................................... 4, 6, 28
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3..................................... 29, 30
U.S. Const. art. II, § 1 .................................................28
U.S. Const. art. III, § 1 ................................................28
STATUTES
Crimes Act of 1790, ch. 9, 1 Stat. 112 ........................16
15 U.S.C. § 1261 ..........................................................19
15 U.S.C. § 1262 ..........................................................19
15 U.S.C. § 1263 ..........................................................19
15 U.S.C. § 1264 ..........................................................19
21 U.S.C. § 331 ............................................................20
21 U.S.C. § 333 ............................................................20
21 U.S.C. § 341 ............................................................20
21 U.S.C. § 343 ............................................................20
21 U.S.C. § 343(g) ........................................................20
21 U.S.C. § 676 ............................................................20
34 U.S.C. § 20913(d) ....................................................27
40 U.S.C. § 1315 .................................................... 17, 18
40 U.S.C. § 1315(c) ......................................................18
40 U.S.C. § 1315(c)(2) ..................................................18
viii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES – Continued
Page
REGULATIONS
7 C.F.R. § 500.8(a)(3)...................................................18
7 C.F.R. § 500.15 .........................................................18
7 C.F.R. § 501.5 ...........................................................18
9 C.F.R. § 301.2 ...........................................................20
9 C.F.R. § 317.8(b)(9)(iii) .............................................20
16 C.F.R. § 1500.18(a)(4) .............................................19
16 C.F.R. § 1500.18(a)(7) .............................................19
16 C.F.R. § 1500.19(b)(4)(i) .........................................19
16 C.F.R. § 1500.19(d)(11)...........................................19
21 C.F.R. § 133.190(a)(3) .............................................20
21 C.F.R. § 136.160(a)(1) .............................................20
21 C.F.R. § 139.110(c) .................................................20
21 C.F.R. § 139.140 .....................................................20
21 C.F.R. § 139.150(b) .................................................20
21 C.F.R. § 145.110(a)(1) .............................................20
28 C.F.R. § 72.3 ...........................................................26
45 C.F.R. § 3.27 ...........................................................18
45 C.F.R § 3.3 ........................................................ 18, 19
45 C.F.R. § 3.42(a) .......................................................18
45 C.F.R. § 3.42(e) .......................................................19
ix
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES – Continued
Page
OTHER AUTHORITIES
A. J. Kritkos, Resuscitating the Non-Delegation
Doctrine: A Compromise and an Experiment,
82 Mo. L. Rev. 441 (2017) ........................................11
Amity Shlaes, The Forgotten Man (2007) ... 22, 23, 24, 25
Brookings Institution’s Vital Statistics, Congressional Workload, 30th-114th Congresses,
1947-2016, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/
uploads/2017/01/vitalstats_ch6_full.pdf .................12
Code of Federal Regulations Total Pages and
Volumes 1938-2017, FederalRegister.gov, https://
www.federalregister.gov/uploads/2018/03/cfrTotal
Pages2017.pdf .........................................................13
Clyde Wayne Crews Jr., Ten Thousand Commandments: An Annual Snapshot of the Federal
Regulatory State, 2017 Edition, Competitive
Enterprise Institute, (2017), https://cei.org/sites/
default/files/Ten%20Thousand%20Commandments
%202017.pdf ............................................................13
Federal Register Pages Published 1936-2017,
FederalRegister.gov, https://www.federalregister.
gov/uploads/2018/03/pagesPublished2017.pdf .......13
Gary Fields and John R. Emshwiller, Many Efforts to Count Nation’s Federal Criminal
Laws, Wall St. J., Jul. 23, 2011, https://www.wsj.
com/articles/SB100014240527023043198045
76389601079728920 ...............................................14
Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 1231 (1994) ...........30
x
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES – Continued
Page
Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 Va. L. Rev. 327 (2002) ..................................30
Gillian E. Metzger, Appointments, Innovation,
and the Judicial-Political Divide, 64 Duke L.J.
1607 (2015) ..............................................................29
Gillian Metzger, Foreword: 1930s Redux: The
Administrative State Under Siege, 131 Harv.
L. Rev. 89 (2017) ......................................................33
Ilan Wurman, Constitutional Administration,
69 Stan. L. Rev. 359 (2017) .....................................14
J. Locke, Second Treatise of Civil Government
§ 22 ..........................................................................31
Jason Iuliano and Keith E. Whittington, The
Nondelegation Doctrine: Alive and Well, 93
Notre Dame L. Rev. 619 (2018) ...............................10
John C. Coffee, Jr., Does “Unlawful” Mean
“Criminal”?: Reflections on the Disappearing
Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71
B.U. L. Rev. 193 (1991) ............................................14
John S. Baker, Revisiting the Explosive Growth
of Federal Crimes, The Heritage Foundation
(2008), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/
2008/06/revisiting-the-explosive-growth-offederal-crimes .................................................... 15, 17
Keith E. Whittington and Jason Iuliano The
Myth of the Nondelegation Doctrine, 165 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 379 (2017) .................................................. 6, 7
xi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES – Continued
Page
Luke W. Goodrich and Rachel N. Busick, Sex,
Drugs, and Eagle Feathers: An Empirical
Study of Federal Religious Freedom Cases, 48
Seton Hall L. Rev. 353 (2018) ...................................7
O.R. Pilat, Brooklyn Hens to Cackle in Duel With
Scream of the Blue Eagle, Brooklyn Daily Eagle (May 1, 1935) .....................................................23
Patrick McLaughlin and Oliver Sherhouse, Regulatory Accumulation since 1970, George Mason University Mercatus Center, https://quant
gov.org/charts/regulatory-accumulation-since1970/ ........................................................................13
Philip Hamburger, Is Administrative Law Unlawful? (2014) .................................................... 31, 32
Pierce Butler, Letter to Weedon Butler, The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, Vol. 3,
Ed. Max Farrand, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1911 .......................................................36
Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet,
80 F.R. 19738 (Apr. 13, 2015) ....................................9
Randolph J. May, The Public Interest Standard:
Is It Too Indeterminate to Be Constitutional?,
53 Fed. Comm. L.J. 427 (2001)..................................9
Sara Sun Beale, Federalizing Crime: Assessing
the Impact on the Federal Courts, 543 Annals
Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 39 (1996) .......................15
xii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES – Continued
Page
Stephen G. Valdes, Frequency and Success: An
Empirical Study of Criminal Law Defenses,
Federal Constitutional Evidentiary Claims,
and Plea Negotiations, 153 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1709
(2005) .........................................................................7
Task Force on the Federalization of Criminal
Law, American Bar Association, The Federalization of Criminal Law (1998) ...............................16
The Federalist No. 47 (James Madison) ....................36
The Federalist No. 51 (James Madison) ................ 5, 36
The Federalist No. 73 (Alexander Hamilton) ............34
The Federalist No. 75 (Alexander Hamilton) ............31
Thomas Paine, Dissertation on First Principles
of Government, The Complete Writings of
Thomas Paine (Philip S. Foner ed., The Citadel Press 1945) (1795) .............................................18
Webster’s Dictionary (2nd ed. 1938) ............................8
@CrimeADay, Twitter, https://twitter.com/
CrimeADay/ ........................................... 17, 18, 19, 20
1
INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE1
The Institute for Justice is the national law firm
for liberty, litigating in state and federal courts nationwide in defense of private property rights, educational
choice, economic liberty, and free speech. The Institute
advocates for adherence to the Constitution’s constraints on the size and scope of government powers,
which are crucial to the preservation of individual liberty. Many of the Institute’s past or current clients are
subject to federal regulations promulgated under congressional delegations. Some of these clients face or
have faced criminal penalties for alleged violations of
federal regulations. For these reasons, the Institute for
Justice has an interest in the enforcement of the Constitution’s separation of powers.
------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
In every high school civics class in America, students learn that in our government’s system of checksand-balances, “the legislature makes [the law], the executive executes [the law], and the judiciary construes
the law.” Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1,
46 (1825). It’s a simple description, but it matches the
basic tripartite structure in our Constitution and
would be familiar to the founding generation.
1
Pursuant to this Court’s Rule 37.3(a), all parties have consented to the filing of this amicus brief. No portion of this brief
was authored by counsel for any party, and no person or entity
other than amicus and its counsel made a monetary contribution
to the preparation or submission of this brief.
2
Unfortunately, it bears no resemblance to the modern
Federal Government. Today, the Executive Branch routinely makes the law, enforces the law, and interprets
the law—and even adjudicates many of its own cases.
This case is not about if, when, or how convicted
sex offenders should register with law enforcement—
all very serious questions which Congress has good
reason to address. This case is about something more
fundamental: “[p]ower” and the “equilibrium the Constitution sought to establish” with our tripartite system of government. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654,
699 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). And this case presents the Court with an opportunity to restore the legislative power to the correct branch.
In Section I, amicus argues that the nondelegation
doctrine derived from the Vesting Clauses is treated as
dead letter by federal courts, and the result is the concentration of lawmaking and law enforcement in the
Executive Branch. From 1940 to 2015, the period of the
modern intelligible principle test, a study reveals 0.06
percent of nondelegation challenges prevailed in federal courts. Compare that to the 12 percent of federal
nondelegation challenges that prevailed before the
Court adopted the modern intelligible principle test.
Or compare it to the 16 percent of state nondelegation
challenges that prevailed in the same period, 19402015. The 12 and 16 percent success rates are comparable to the success rates of constitutional claims
under the Free Speech Clause, Free Exercise Clause,
and Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule.
3
Now, the Executive Branch makes much more law
than the Legislative Branch, thanks to broad and unchecked congressional delegations that outsource lawmaking to the President and independent federal
agencies. In 2016, federal agencies promulgated almost 100,000 pages of federal rules in the Federal
Register, about 17 times as many pages as the
roughly 6,000 pages of statutory law enacted during
the 114th Congress. Today, the Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.) includes one million regulatory mandates or prohibitions, and imposes over one trillion
dollars in costs.
It is particularly troubling that Congress often
outsources to the Executive Branch the job of deciding
what conduct to criminalize (including delegations directly to the Nation’s prosecutors, as in this case).
There are 300,000 or more regulatory crimes scattered
throughout the C.F.R., 67 times as many crimes as the
about 4,500 federal statutory crimes. Some of these
regulatory crimes are seriously absurd, like the criminalization of misshaped meatloaf or mislabeled marbles. Others address serious subjects, like the Sex
Offender Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”)
regulation at issue here. But the serious problem is
that the Executive Branch, not the Legislative Branch,
is deciding what conduct to punish.
In Section II, amicus argues that even if the delegation at issue here is the rare example of a delegation
impermissible even under the intelligible principle
test, as Petitioner persuasively argues, it is nonetheless time for the Court to sever ties with that test. The
4
modern intelligible principle test is utterly divorced
from the Constitution’s text, structure, and history.
This Court should adopt a more originalist nondelegation test that would return lawmaking to where it belongs.
Because the Second Circuit’s decision in United
States v. Guzman, 591 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 2010), on which
the lower Court’s decision relied, see Petitioner’s Brief
at 14, rests on a flawed application of the Vesting
Clauses, this Court should reverse.
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ARGUMENT
The “nondelegation doctrine”—the principle that
Congress may not outsource its exclusively legislative
powers to any other Branch or to private parties—
comes from the Constitution’s opening declaration that
“[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested
in a Congress of the United States.” U.S. Const. art. I,
§ 1. See also Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361,
371 (1989) (the nondelegation doctrine derives from
Article I’s vesting of legislative power in Congress).
Congress’s Vesting Clause does not say “some,” or
“much,” or “most” legislative powers are vested in Congress. It says “all” legislative powers are vested in Congress—and Congress alone.
Yet we “have come to a strange place in our separation-of-powers jurisprudence.” Dep’t of Transp. v.
Ass’n of Am. R.R., 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1240 (2015)
(Thomas, J., concurring). Today, federal agencies, not
5
Congress, create most new federal law. The Executive
Branch routinely regulates—and even more troubling,
criminalizes—garden-variety private conduct. This
new order threatens the individual liberties our Constitution is designed to protect. To help restore the
separation of powers, the Court should adopt an
originalist nondelegation test.
I.
Federal Courts Have Abandoned the Nondelegation Doctrine, and Significant Lawmaking Power is Now Concentrated in the
Executive Branch
The principle that “Congress cannot delegate the
legislative power” is “vital to the integrity and maintenance of the system of government ordained by the
Constitution.” Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S.
649, 692 (1892). But the modern intelligible principle
test has erased that vital principle from this Court’s
jurisprudence.
Since 1935, no public nondelegation challenge has
prevailed at the Supreme Court under the modern “intelligible principle test.” This highly-permissive test
gives Congress a green light to freely delegate away its
exclusive power to regulate private conduct. The result
is the “gradual concentration” of Congress’s exclusive
lawmaking power into the Executive Branch. James
Madison, Federalist No. 51. The President now makes
more law than Congress—by an order of several magnitudes—and regulatory agencies have promulgated
hundreds of thousands of federal criminal offenses.
6
Even if any particular regulation could be defended as a permissible delegation, in the aggregate,
the sheer scope of modern regulatory law would be incomprehensible to the founding generation. It is particularly troubling that the making of criminal law is
now concentrated in the Executive Branch. See United
States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 95 (1820)
(“the power of punishment is vested in the legislative”
branch, “which is to define a crime, and ordain its punishment”). These regulations pose a serious threat to
individual liberty.
A. The Modern Intelligible Principle Test
Allows the Executive Branch to Make
Law and Decide Policy
In 1825, this Court recognized that the Vesting
Clauses prohibit Congress from delegating away enumerated “powers which are strictly and exclusively
legislative.” Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.)
1, 42 (1825). This “nondelegation principle” is rooted in
Article I, § 1 of the U.S. Constitution, which vests Congress with “[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted.”
Amicus discusses the original understanding of this
provision in greater detail infra at Section II.
For more than a century after the Court decided
Wayman, various federal courts held a number of delegations violated the Constitution’s separation of powers. Between 1880 and 1940—during the initial
expansion of the administrative state—12 percent of
federal nondelegation challenges prevailed. Keith E.
7
Whittington and Jason Iuliano The Myth of the Nondelegation Doctrine, 165 U. Pa. L. Rev. 379, 426 (2017).
That figure suggests that federal courts took the nondelegation doctrine seriously2—but also that, consistent with Chief Justice John Marshall’s caution in
Wayman, federal courts do not appear to have “enter[ed] unnecessarily” into nondelegation disputes.
Wayman at 46. The success rate of nondelegation
claims in this period resembles the success rate of
other constitutional claims, such as religious liberty
claims under the Free Speech Clause (14 percent success rate) or under the Free Exercise Clause (20 percent success rate). See Luke W. Goodrich and Rachel N.
Busick, Sex, Drugs, and Eagle Feathers: An Empirical
Study of Federal Religious Freedom Cases, 48 Seton
Hall L. Rev. 353, 382 (2018). And it resembles the success rate of Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule
claims (11.62 percent of suppression motions result in
acquittals). See Stephen G. Valdes, Frequency and Success: An Empirical Study of Criminal Law Defenses,
Federal Constitutional Evidentiary Claims, and Plea
Negotiations, 153 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1709, 1728 (2005).
The most prominent example of a successful nondelegation challenge is probably A. L. A. Schechter
Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935),
2
The study’s authors draw a different conclusion from the
raw numbers: that a 12 percent success rate shows the nondelegation doctrine was “already dead” before 1940, id. at 431. A 12
percent success rate does not support this conclusion, given the
comparable success rates in other constitutional claims discussed
above. But the 0.06 percent success rate under the modern intelligible principle test is definitely “dead.”
8
discussed in greater detail infra at Section I(D)(3). But
then, in a series of cases in the 1940s, the Court
adopted a new nondelegation test, even though it ostensibly invoked the “intelligible principle” test from
an earlier case, J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United
States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928). Under the new version of
the test, Congress may delegate its lawmaking powers
to an agency so long as Congress suggests an “intelligible principle” to guide the agency’s lawmaking—with
the added wrinkle that a statute is sufficiently “intelligible” if Congress sets the “general policy” direction
for the agency to pursue. Am. Power & Light Co. v. SEC,
329 U.S. 90, 105 (1946) (finding no impermissible delegation where Congress authorized the SEC to prohibit
reorganizations that “unfairly or inequitably” distribute voting power).
Applying the modern intelligible principle test,
this Court has held, for example, that Congress can
delegate to an agency the power to fix prices at a level
that the agency finds “fair and equitable,” Yakus v.
United States, 321 U.S. 414, 427 (1944); to decide what
utility charges are “just and reasonable,” FPC v. Hope
Nat. Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 600 (1944); or regulate public broadcasting in a manner that is “in the public interest.” National Broadcasting Co. v. United States,
319 U.S. 190, 224-225 (1943).
“Fair,” “just,” and “public interest” are all “intelligible” terms—in the sense that those words, to some
degree, are “capable of being understood.” Webster’s
Dictionary (Second Edition) (1938). But they’re also capable of being misunderstood, or even manipulated.
9
And they grant broad policymaking authority that is
“too great . . . to be called anything other than legislative.” Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457,
487 (2001) (Thomas, J., concurring) (cleaned up) (arguing that a principle can be both “intelligible” and yet
still legislative).
The National Broadcasting Co. case shows just
how legislative in character “public interest” rulemakings can be. As of at least 2001, Congress had authorized the FCC to act in the “public interest” in close
to a hundred statutory provisions—so many times that
the FCC now couches much if not most of its regulations and enforcement in the public interest rubric. See
Randolph J. May, The Public Interest Standard: Is It
Too Indeterminate to Be Constitutional?, 53 Fed.
Comm. L.J. 427, 429 (2001). The FCC has invoked the
standard to encourage some political programming, to
discourage programming involving drugs or sex, to
transform the ownership structure of TV, cable, newspaper, and wireless companies, and to interfere with
mergers—to name a few. Id. at 429-430. And in 2015,
the FCC invoked the “public interest” to justify much
of its controversial Open Internet Order, which reclassified the Internet under Title II of the Act as a communications service subject to significantly greater
government oversight. See Protecting and Promoting
the Open Internet, 80 F.R. 19738 (Apr. 13, 2015) (referencing the “public interest” over 100 times in final
rule).
10
B. Although Federal Courts now Treat the
Nondelegation Doctrine as a Dead Letter, Data Show Federal Courts Routinely Enforced Nondelegation For a
Century, and State Courts Still Do
The modern intelligible principle test did not
weaken the nondelegation doctrine—it erased it. Between 1940 and 2015 the effective success rate for all
federal nondelegation challenges in the federal appellate courts and U.S. Supreme Court had fallen to a remarkable 0.06 percent. Jason Iuliano and Keith E.
Whittington, The Nondelegation Doctrine: Alive and
Well, 93 Notre Dame L. Rev. 619, 636 (2018) (only five
of 156 nondelegation challenges prevailed in federal
appellate courts; of those five decisions, four were reversed). And this Court has not held that a statute impermissibly delegated legislative power to the
Executive Branch since 1935, when the Court decided
Schechter Poultry, discussed infra at Section I(D)(3).
The experience of state courts applying their own
nondelegation doctrines during the same period provides a stark contrast. From 1940 through 2015, nondelegation challenges prevailed in 151 out of 919 state
court cases—an invalidation rate of 16 percent. Iuliano
and Whittington at 636. That percentage is roughly
comparable to the average success rate of 20 percent
for all constitutional challenges in state courts. Id. at
637.
Florida is illustrative. Like the federal Constitution, the Florida Constitution establishes a similar
11
tripartite system, with each branch’s powers limited to
those enumerated “herein.” Fla. Const., art. II, § 3 (“No
person belonging to one branch shall exercise any powers appertaining to either of the other branches unless
expressly provided herein”). But unlike the federal
Constitution, state courts continue to enforce the Florida Constitution’s separation of powers. See A. J.
Kritkos, Resuscitating the Non-Delegation Doctrine: A
Compromise and an Experiment, 82 Mo. L. Rev. 441
(2017) (describing the Florida experience enforcing the
nondelegation doctrine).
For example, in Askew v. Cross Key Waterways, 372
So.2d 913 (Fla. 1978), the court held that an environmental statute authorizing a state agency to designate
“areas of critical state concern” was impermissible because it ceded to an agency the core legislative power
to determine what “concerns” are “critical” to the state.
Id. at 925. The Florida Supreme Court expressly rejected the federal intelligible principle test, which the
court described as “abandon[ing] the doctrine of nondelegation.” Id. at 924. The court also rejected the argument that the “complexities of modern society”
require the legislature to repose in an agency “the
power to establish fundamental policy.” Id. Instead,
the court ruled that if legislation is “so lacking in
guidelines” that it empowers the agency to become “the
lawgiver rather than the administrator,” it is unconstitutional. Id. at 918-919.
The experience of Florida and other states suggests that greater enforcement of constitutional nondelegation is judicially administrable. Whatever the
12
“correct” success rate for federal nondelegation challenges might be, it should be greater than zero. That
the success rate under the current test is effectively
zero suggests that the current test is incompatible
with what the Constitution demands.
C. Lawmaking by Regulatory Bodies Now
Outpaces Lawmaking by Congress, and
Over One Million ‘Regulatory Restrictions’ Impose Over a Trillion Dollars in Annual Costs
Relying on broad delegations of authority, the
President now routinely sets policy and makes law on
important subjects and routinely regulates private
conduct. Indeed, the President now makes more law
than Congress. During the 114th Congress (20152016), Congress enacted 6,170 pages of law. See Brookings Institution’s Vital Statistics, Congressional Workload, 30th-114th Congresses, 1947-2016, Table 6-4, https://
www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/vitalstats_ch6_full.pdf. In stark contrast, in 2016, federal
agencies promulgated 97,069 pages of federal rules in
the condensed, tri-column format of the Federal Register. Id. at Table 6-5.
That gulf between the amount of lawmaking done
by Congress and the amount of lawmaking done by federal agencies has not always been so immense. The
81st Congress (1949-1950) enacted 2,314 pages of public laws, see Brookings Institution’s Vital Statistics at
Table 6-4, and the same year, federal agencies
13
promulgated 9,562 pages of regulations, see Federal
Register Pages Published 1936-2017, FederalRegister.
gov, https://www.federalregister.gov/uploads/2018/03/
pagesPublished2017.pdf.
The total size of the C.F.R. has grown at an immense rate. Between 1950 and 2016, the total pages of
federal regulatory law grew by 1,890 percent. See Code
of Federal Regulations Total Pages and Volumes 19382017, FederalRegister.gov, https://www.federalregister.
gov/uploads/2018/03/cfrTotalPages2017.pdf (showing
9,745 pages in the C.F.R. in 1950 and 185,053 pages in
the C.F.R. in 2016).
Nor are these pages of regulations merely hortatory. One quantitative study shows that the number of
“regulatory restrictions”—the researchers’ term to describe phrases like “shall” or “must” or other words
that require or prohibit activity—in the C.F.R. has
steadily increased by about 13,000 restrictions per
year. By the end of 2016, the C.F.R. included at least
1,080,000 total regulatory restrictions. See Patrick
McLaughlin and Oliver Sherhouse, Regulatory Accumulation since 1970, George Mason University
Mercatus Center, https://quantgov.org/charts/regulatory-accumulation-since-1970/. These “regulatory restrictions” impose an estimated $1.96 trillion (that’s
with a t) in costs on the U.S. economy each year. See
Clyde Wayne Crews Jr., Ten Thousand Commandments: An Annual Snapshot of the Federal Regulatory
State, 2017 Edition, Competitive Enterprise Institute,
2-3 (2017), https://cei.org/sites/default/files/Ten%20
Thousand%20Commandments%202017.pdf.
14
And often, federal agencies regulate on important,
controversial topics precisely because Congress has
not adopted the policies the agencies prefer, such as the
EPA’s Clean Power Plan or the FCC’s Open Internet
Order. See Ilan Wurman, Constitutional Administration, 69 Stan. L. Rev. 359, 371 fn. 53 (2017) (describing
some of the “recent controversial” rulemakings as “involve[ing] important political issues” Congress debated but had not acted on).
D. Congressional Delegations Have Resulted in Over 300,000 Regulatory
Crimes, Criminalizing Everything from
Mislabeled Marbles to Misshaped Meatloaf
Regulatory criminalization provides a good example of how widespread legislative delegation endangers
individual liberty. There are so many federal crimes today that “scholars actually debate their numbers.”
United States v. Baldwin, 745 F.3d 1027, 1031 (10th
Cir. 2014) (citing John C. Coffee, Jr., Does “Unlawful”
Mean “Criminal”?: Reflections on the Disappearing
Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L.
Rev. 193, 216 (1991)). After the Department of Justice
assigned Ronald Gainer to count all federal criminal
laws in 1982, he had to give up because “[y]ou will have
died and resurrected three times” before counting
them all. Gary Fields and John R. Emshwiller, Many
Efforts to Count Nation’s Federal Criminal Laws, Wall
Street Journal, Jul. 23, 2011, https://www.wsj.com/
articles/SB1000142405270230431980457638960107
15
9728920. The best estimates suggest that with at least
300,000 regulatory crimes in the C.F.R, there are 67
times as many federal regulatory crimes as the 4,450
statutory crimes in the U.S. Code. Baldwin, 745 F.3d at
1031 (citing estimate of 300,000 regulatory crimes)
and John S. Baker, Revisiting the Explosive Growth of
Federal Crimes, The Heritage Foundation (2008), http://
www.heritage.org/research/reports/2008/06/revisitingthe-explosive-growth-of-federal-crimes (estimating 4,450
federal statutory crimes).
1. The abundance of federal criminal
law is a recent phenomenon.
“Before the Civil War, Congress enacted very few
criminal laws and crime control was left largely to the
states.” United States v. Matchett, 837 F.3d 1118, 1119
(11th Cir. 2016) (cleaned up). The few federal crimes
addressed “injury to or interference with the federal
government itself or its programs” or crimes against
individuals that occurred on federal lands or waters.
Sara Sun Beale, Federalizing Crime: Assessing the Impact on the Federal Courts, 543 Annals Am. Acad. Pol.
& Soc. Sci. 39, 40 (1996).
For example, the first federal criminal code—
adopted by the Congress in 1790—only covered seven
categories of offenses against the United States itself
or offenses on federal lands, waters, or the high sea:
treason (including misprision of treason), piracy,
murder and mayhem, larceny, offenses against the
judicial tribunal (such as perjury, bribery of judges,
16
obstruction, theft of executed bodies, and prison
breaks), offenses against diplomats, and counterfeiting. See Crimes Act of 1790, ch. 9, 1 Stat. 112.
Since the New Deal—and in particular, since the
1970s—the number of federal criminal statutory laws
has increased significantly. But whatever broader concerns may exist about the federalization of criminal
law, see, e.g., Task Force on the Federalization of Criminal Law, American Bar Association, The Federalization of Criminal Law (1998), federal statutory crimes
are, at least, enacted by the body the Constitution entrusted with the legislative power. Wiltberger, 18 U.S.
(5 Wheat.) at 95 (describing criminalization as the
province of the Legislative Branch). See also United
States v. Evans, 333 U.S. 483, 486 (1948). But statutory
crimes adopted by Congress constitute only a tiny fraction of all federal criminal offenses today.
2. Examples from the 300,000 regulatory crimes show agencies criminalize harmless, garden-variety private
conduct
Today, Congress “freely delegate[s] the core legislative business of writing criminal offenses to unelected”
bureaucrats. Baldwin, 745 F.3d at 1030. As a result,
the Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.) is now
“crowded” with regulatory crimes because of “generous
congressional delegations” of authority. Id. at 1031.
One estimate from 1990 pegged the number of regulatory crimes at 300,000. Id. Thirty years later, the
17
number is likely much greater. Compare the 300,000
regulatory crimes with the roughly 4,450 statutory
crimes in the U.S. code. John S. Baker, Revisiting the
Explosive Growth of Federal Crimes, The Heritage
Foundation (2008), http://www.heritage.org/research/
reports/2008/06/revisiting-the-explosive-growth-of-federalcrimes.
It’s not always obvious what regulatory violations
carry criminal penalties. Indeed, “[n]ormally we don’t
think of regulatory agencies as entitled to announce
new crimes by fiat,” so understanding whether regulatory noncompliance triggers criminal penalties requires “some scratching around.” Baldwin, 745 F.3d at
1030. Often, it’s necessary to read through several statutory provisions and several regulations.
The popular @CrimeADay Twitter account, which
has reported one federal crime a day for nearly four
years, provides a revealing glimpse into the broad and
bewildering world of regulatory crimes. See @CrimeADay, Twitter (Jul. 17, 2015), https://twitter.com/
CrimeADay/status/622073623013146624 (estimating
it will take 800 years to tweet one federal crime per
day).
Take 40 U.S.C. § 1315, which authorizes “unelected property managers” to write regulations to protect and administer federal property. Baldwin, 745
F.3d at 1030-1031 (expressing reservations about regulatory criminalization while upholding conviction for
refusal to give officer license and registration). The objective of the statute’s delegation, protecting federal
18
property, is reasonable enough. But what measures are
reasonable for the protection of federal property is
tougher to answer. The danger with such a broad delegation is, as the Framers well understood, that the
“avidity to punish . . . leads men to stretch, to misinterpret, and to misapply even the best of laws.” Thomas
Paine, Dissertation on First Principles of Government,
The Complete Writings of Thomas Paine 588 (Philip S.
Foner ed., The Citadel Press 1945) (1795).
How reasonable are these protections of federal
property? Federal regulations issued under 40 U.S.C.
§ 1315 make it a crime to fall asleep at the U.S. Meat
Animal Research Center in Clayton, Nebraska, see 40
U.S.C. § 1315(c), 7 C.F.R. § 501.5, and 7 C.F.R. § 500.153
or to collect on a private debt while in the National Arboretum see 40 U.S.C. § 1315(c), 7 C.F.R. § 500.8(a)(3),
and 7 C.F.R. § 500.15.4 And when at the National Institutes of Health, don’t ride a bicycle without a horn, see
40 U.S.C. § 1315, 45 C.F.R. § 3.27, and 45 C.F.R § 3.3.5
And don’t engage in any hobbies outside designated areas, see 40 U.S.C. § 1315(c), 45 C.F.R. § 3.42(a), and 45
C.F.R § 3.3,6 or go rollerskating, 40 U.S.C. § 1315(c)(2),
3
@CrimeADay, Twitter (Jun. 10, 2015), https://twitter.com/
CrimeADay/status/608826503678316544.
4
@CrimeADay, Twitter (Aug. 8, 2017), https://twitter.com/
CrimeADay/status/895097729025589248.
5
@CrimeADay, Twitter (Nov. 14, 2015), https://twitter.com/
CrimeADay/status/665719787599872000.
6
@CrimeADay, Twitter (Jun. 15, 2015), https://twitter.com/
CrimeADay/status/610626593996828672.
19
45 C.F.R. § 3.42(e), and 45 C.F.R § 3.3.7 Those are
crimes, too.
One need not visit federal property to risk an
amusement-related criminal offense. According to the
Consumer Product Safety Commission (“CPSC”), it’s a
criminal offense to sell classic toys like lawn darts, see
15 U.S.C. §§ 1261, 1262, 1263, 1264 and 16 C.F.R.
§ 1500.18(a)(4),8 and toy clackers see 15 U.S.C. §§ 1261,
1262, 1263, 1264 and 16 C.F.R. § 1500.18(a)(7).9 And
CPSC says it’s a crime to sell a toy marble without an
explicit warning that the toy marble is a toy marble,
see 15 U.S.C. §§ 1261, 1262, 1263, 1264 and 16 C.F.R.
§ 1500.19(b)(4)(i).10 And that warning better include an
exclamation mark inside an “equilateral” triangle—no
isosceles or right triangles allowed—or that’s a crime,
too, 15 U.S.C. § 1264 and 16 C.F.R. § 1500.19(d)(11).11
Federal regulators care a lot about shapes when it
comes to the dizzying array of food crimes, too. Under
regulations by the Food and Drug Administration
(“FDA”), the unwary pasta seller might face federal
criminal sanctions for selling “egg noodles” if they’re
7
@CrimeADay, Twitter (Jul. 23, 2015), https://twitter.com/
CrimeADay/status/624385604395134977.
8
@CrimeADay, Twitter (Aug. 8, 2014), https://twitter.com/
CrimeADay/status/497761129016623104.
9
@CrimeADay, Twitter (Jun. 15, 2016), https://twitter.com/
CrimeADay/status/743246979203989504.
10
@CrimeADay, Twitter (Feb. 23, 2016), https://twitter.com/
CrimeADay/status/702289127325229056.
11
@CrimeADay, Twitter (Aug. 14, 2016), https://twitter.com/
CrimeADay/status/764986590422769665.
20
not ribbon-shaped, see 21 U.S.C. §§ 331, 333, 341,
343(g) and 21 C.F.R. § 139.150(b).12 Ditto selling soy
spaghetti if it’s not tube- or cord-shaped, see 21 U.S.C.
§§ 333, 341 and 21 C.F.R. §§ 139.140 & 139.110(c).13
The FDA is also concerned about the shape of meatloaf—if it’s labeled “Old Fashioned,” it better be rectangular with a rounded top, or circular with a flat bottom,
or that could be a federal crime, too. See 21 U.S.C. § 676
and 9 C.F.R. § 301.2, 9 C.F.R. § 317.8(b)(9)(iii). And woe
unto the baker who sells his raisin buns with an inadequate raisin-to-flour ratio, see 21 U.S.C. §§ 331, 333,
341, 343(g) & 21 C.F.R. § 136.160(a)(1),14 or the fromager who unevenly distributes spices throughout her
spiced cheeses, see 21 U.S.C. §§ 333, 343 and 21 C.F.R.
§ 133.190(a)(3).15
One might be inclined to call these regulatory food
crimes “pure applesauce,” King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct.
2480, 2501 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting)—but be careful: canned applesauce with the apple core left in is a
federal crime, too. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 331, 333, 343 and
21 C.F.R. § 145.110(a)(1).16
12
@CrimeADay, Twitter (Feb. 10, 2018), https://twitter.com/
CrimeADay/status/962517407456784384.
13
@CrimeADay, Twitter (Oct. 14, 2017), https://twitter.com/
CrimeADay/status/919369010030006272.
14
@CrimeADay, Twitter (Nov. 17, 2017), https://twitter.com/
CrimeADay/status/931695361651036160.
15
@CrimeADay, Twitter (Jul. 28, 2017), https://twitter.com/
CrimeADay/status/891086266292416512.
16
@CrimeADay, Twitter (Jul. 2, 2017), https://twitter.com/
CrimeADay/status/881693280207077376.
21
One would hope that no prosecutor would have the
poor judgment to bring charges under any of these regulations. But then, poorly-conceived criminal laws
“give prosecutors too much leverage,” see Yates v. United
States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1100-1101 (2015) (Kagan, J.,
dissenting), and that leverage is tempting. One would
not be surprised to see a prosecutor zealously pursue a
conviction under an ill-fitting criminal statute. See, e.g.
Yates at 1079-1080 (Ginsburg, J., announcing judgment of the Court) (describing the federal prosecution
of a fisherman who faced 60 years in prison for tossing
three under-sized fish back into the ocean).
3. The targeted prosecution of the
Shechter Brothers shows the threat
that regulatory criminalization poses
to liberty
Schechter Poultry, the case most closely associated
with the nondelegation doctrine, also involved a federal food regulation with criminal penalties. Unfairly
nicknamed the “Sick Chickens Case,” the Schechter
Poultry opinion has been invoked by critics of judicial
enforcement of the nondelegation doctrine as a cautionary tale. Schechter Poultry merits rehabilitating:
the broader history and context of the case show the
danger of delegating lawmaking to law enforcement,
and the importance of meaningful judicial enforcement
of the separation of powers.
Schechter Poultry involved a challenge to § 3 of the
National Industrial Recovery Act (“NIRA”), which
22
authorized the President to create “codes of fair
competition” for trades or industries, selected by the
President, so long as the President determines the regulations are “in furtherance of the public interest.”
Schechter Poultry, 295 U.S. at 840.
The Act marked a rapid rise in federal regulatory
lawmaking. In a single year, the federal government
produced around 10,000 pages of new law, mostly regulatory, compared to the 2,735 pages of federal law created during the preceding 145 years, combined. See
Amity Shlaes, The Forgotten Man 201-202 (2007) (“In
twelve months, the NRA had generated more paper
than the entire legislative output of the federal government since 1789”).
The “Live Poultry Code,” promulgated under NIRA,
was among that wave of new regulations. The Live
Poultry Code covered individuals involved in selling,
purchasing for resale, transporting, handling, or slaughtering poultry. Schechter Poultry, 295 U.S. at 840. The
Code regulated an array of business practices, including the maximum number of hours worked per day, the
minimum pay for employees, poultry inspection requirements, record-keeping requirements, price controls, and prohibiting “unfair methods of competition,”
such as a ban on “straight killing,” a curious term that
means letting customers choose which chickens they
want to purchase. Id. at 841-842. The Code required a
customer blindly to put his hand into a chicken coop
“and take the first chicken that comes to hand,” “irrespective of the quality of the chicken.” Shlaes at 241
(quoting from the Schechter Poultry oral argument).
23
Donald Richberg, the co-author of the Act and the
director of the new National Recovery Administration,
warned the Justice Department that the Act could face
constitutional challenges, and so the Roosevelt Administration actively sought a “test case” to try to prove
the Act’s constitutionality. Shlaes at 203. Federal prosecutors eventually settled on the poultry industry to
bring a test case, hoping that negative public sentiments about live chicken butchering would highlight
the health benefits of the New Deal. Id.
At the time, minority groups dominated the purchase of live-butchered chickens in New York City: 80
percent of these chickens were sold to Jewish families,
the rest to African Americans, Chinese, and Italian residents. See O.R. Pilat, Brooklyn Hens to Cackle in Duel
With Scream of the Blue Eagle, Brooklyn Daily Eagle,
May 1, 1935 at 3.
The Schechter family immigrated to the U.S. from
Eastern Europe. The Schechter brothers—Aaron, Alexander, Joseph, and Martin—opened a kosher slaughterhouse in Brooklyn. Shlaes at 215. They purchased
live chickens, butchered them according to Jewish kosher law, and sold the kosher chickens to retailers. Id.
at 215-216. Each day, the Schechters butchered about
600 chickens, officiated by Rabbi Hellal Girschon. See
Pilat, Brooklyn Hens to Cackle in Duel With Scream of
the Blue Eagle, Brooklyn Daily Eagle, May 1, 1935 at
3.
In July 1935, the Schechter brothers were indicted
on 60 counts of violating the Live Poultry Code, Shlaes
24
at 204. Of those, the court convicted the Schechters on
18 counts, two of which were reversed on appeal to the
Second Circuit, leaving 16 counts for consideration by
the Supreme Court. Schechter Poultry, 295 U.S. at 519520. The convictions include (1) one count of conspiracy
to violate the Live Poultry Code, (2) ten counts of
“straight killing,” (3) two counts of failing to follow
New York City chicken-inspection regulations, (4) two
counts of failing to report correctly the “range of daily
prices and volume of sales,” (5) one count of selling to
an unlicensed chicken dealer, and (6) one count of selling an “unfit” chicken. Id. at 525-528.
The number of indictments and convictions may
sound impressive but recall that the Schechters butchered around 600 chickens per day or 3,600 chickens per
week. NRA officials investigated the Schechters for
some period during the summer of 1934. The Schechters described the investigation as intrusive and extensive, not to mention extremely disruptive to the
brothers’ business. See Shlaes at 214-243 (recounting
history of the investigation, prosecution, trial, and appeals). If the NRA Code Authority only investigated
the Shechters for a week, then out of the 3,600 butchered chickens, federal investigators identified a mere
ten times (or 0.028 percent of chickens in a week) in
which the Schechters had unlawfully allowed their
customers to choose for themselves which chicken to
purchase.
As for the ominous-sounding criminal conviction
for the sale of an “unfit” chicken, out of perhaps 3,600
butchered chickens in a week, the Code investigators
25
identified only ten (or 0.028 percent) they thought
might be “unfit,” or unhealthy. Id. at 223-224. Further
investigation narrowed the number to three suspect
chickens (0.0083 percent), and autopsies revealed only
one “unfit” chicken, or 0.0028 percent of the chickens
butchered in a week. Id. And that chicken was found
“unfit” only because it was an “eggbound chicken,” or a
chicken with eggs lodged inside—a fact that would
have been hard for the Schechters to have known. Id.
Calling Shechter Poultry the “Sick Chickens Case”
is misleading: despite an extensive investigation, the
agency never found a single instance where the
Shechters sold a sick chicken. But this myth about the
case fit with the narrative the Richberg and the DOJ
hoped to cultivate in their “test case”: that its regulations were necessary to protect public health. Shlaes at
203.
The Live Poultry Code regulations and the prosecution of the Schechters highlight the danger of Congress delegating away its lawmaking powers—and
why the Court should enforce the nondelegation doctrine. The Live Poultry Code’s extensive regulations
criminalized a wide-range of private, garden-variety
conduct. Not only did the Schechters face imprisonment and other quasi-criminal penalties, the regulations exposed the Schechters to an invasive,
wide-ranging prosecution that nearly destroyed their
family business. Id. at 221-223. Whatever else might
be considered an “important” lawmaking subject, see
Wayman, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 43, the choice whether
to bring the federal government’s weighty criminal
26
prosecution power to bear on private conduct is certainly “important.”
The Live Poultry Code and the criminal offenses
highlighted by @CrimeADay might strike different
people as serious or seriously absurd. But that is beside the point. The C.F.R. is “crowded” with absurd
criminal offenses, as well as criminal offenses that
could be justified on sound legal and policy grounds—
including the Department of Justice regulation at issue here, 28 C.F.R. § 72.3. But these regulations reflect
policymaking and lawmaking by the Executive
Branch, not Congress, even though “defining crimes
and fixing penalties” is an exclusively legislative function. Evans, 333 U.S. at 486.
II.
The Court Should Adopt an Originalist
Nondelegation Test Rooted in the Text,
Structure, and History of the Constitution’s Vesting Clauses
An originalist nondelegation test would look very
different from the modern intelligible principle test. A
test that comports with the text, structure, and history
of the Vesting Clauses would recognize that,
(1) the Constitution does not expressly authorize
Congress to delegate its exclusively legislative powers
to the President;
(2) the Constitution does not implicitly authorize
Congress to delegate its exclusively legislative powers
to the President;
27
(3) even if Congress can assign some discretion
to the President to carry out properly-promulgated legislation, Congress cannot delegate the exclusively
legislative task of regulating private conduct or making law on “important subjects,” including criminalization and other major policy questions; and
(4) because the separation of powers exists to
protect liberty, the tie should go to liberty in close
cases.
The Court should replace the intelligible principle
test with a test rooted in these principles.17
A. The Constitution Does Not Expressly or
Implicitly Authorize Congress to Delegate Away the Exclusively Legislative
Power to Regulate Private Conduct
“The Federal Government ‘is acknowledged by all
to be one of enumerated powers.’ ” Nat’l Fed’n of Indep.
Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 534 (2012) (quoting
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405
(1819)). The text, history, and structure of the U.S. Constitution confirm what this Court recognized long ago:
Congress cannot delegate away enumerated “powers
which are strictly and exclusively legislative.” Wayman,
23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 43. The first section of each of
17
Petitioner persuasively argues that 34 U.S.C. § 20913(d) is
the rare example of a delegation that would fail even the modern
intelligible principle test. Indeed, 34 U.S.C. § 20913(d) is remarkably rudderless because it lacks even the vague “general policy”
direction required by Am. Power & Light Co.
28
articles I, II, and III vests a separate branch with specific, particular powers: art. I, § 1 vests Congress with
“[a]ll legislative Powers”; art. II, § 1 vests the President
with the “executive Power”—the power to carry the
law into effect; and art. III, § 1 vests the “judicial
Power”—the power to interpret the law and render
judgments—in the Supreme Court and any inferior
courts established by Congress.
1. The Constitution does not expressly
authorize Congress to delegate its
exclusively legislative powers
Art. I, § 1 includes two internal textual limitations
on Congress’s legislative powers: first, the legislative
power is limited to enumerated powers “herein
granted” in Article I. See Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 1
Wheat. 304, 326 (1816) (“The Government . . . can
claim no powers which are not granted to it by the Constitution, and the powers actually granted, must be
such as are expressly given, or given by necessary implication”). And second, the Constitution vests “all” legislative powers in Congress, rather than in the other
branches. The “nondelegation doctrine” stems from the
combined effect of U.S. Const. art. I, § 1’s two textual
limitations on Congress’s power. See Mistretta at 371
(explaining the nondelegation doctrine “derives from
the Constitution’s opening declaration”). The Constitution does not dole out legislative power all over the
place—it lists specific powers in one section.
29
The powers enumerated in art. I, § 8 are varied
but specific. For example, Congress has the power to
tax and spend, cl. 1; the power to regulate commerce
among the states and with foreign nations and Indian
tribes, cl. 3; the power to establish post offices and
roads, cl. 7; the power to create inferior courts, cl. 9; and
the power to raise and support armies, cl. 12.
But the power to delegate legislative authority
isn’t among the detailed powers in art. I, § 8. The lack
of this authority is significant, because “[t]he Constitution’s express conferral of some powers makes clear
that it does not grant others. And the Federal Government can exercise only the powers granted to it.” Nat’l
Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 534-535
(2012) (cleaned up).
Without express authority to delegate, defenders
of broad delegations look to the Necessary and Proper
Clause, art. I, § 8, cl. 18, to “approv[e] the modern administrative state.” INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 982984 (1983). See, e.g., Gillian E. Metzger, Appointments,
Innovation, and the Judicial-Political Divide, 64 Duke
L.J. 1607, 1639 (2015) (arguing the Necessary and
Proper Clause gives Congress the “ability to design innovative governmental structures or regulatory
measures”).
But the Necessary and Proper Clause is not a freestanding grant of power. It vests Congress only with
the authority to “make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing powers” mentioned in art. I, § 8, and “all other
30
Powers vested by this Constitution” in any other
branch or to any officer. In other words, the Necessary
and Proper Clause does not itself grant Congress any
additional enumerated powers—it only enables Congress to pass laws to carry into execution other enumerated powers—either its own enumerated powers,
or the enumerated powers of other branches or officers.
See, e.g., Wayman 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 22 (describing
the Process Act of 1792 as enabling the Judicial Branch
to “carry into Execution” the Judiciary’s own vested
power to render judgment, rather than delegating to
the Judiciary Congress’s exclusively legislative power).
See also Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 1231, 1234-1235 (1994).
Whatever authority the Necessary and Proper
Clause provides Congress, it is not the authority to delegate away any legislative powers that are exclusive to
Congress, see Wayman at 43, like regulation of interstate commerce, art. I, § 8, cl. 3—the clause perhaps
most often invoked by Congress in its modern, sweeping delegations to the President.
2. The Constitution does not implicitly
authorize Congress to delegate its
exclusively legislative powers
Nor would the founding generation have understood the Constitution as granting Congress an implicit authority to delegate away legislative power,
either. See generally Gary Lawson, Delegation and
Original Meaning, 88 Va. L. Rev. 327 (2002) (arguing
31
that a power, once delegated, cannot be delegated
away). See also Philip Hamburger, Is Administrative
Law Unlawful? 377-402 (2014) (tracing the centuriesold principle that power delegated from the people cannot be subdelegated).
This principle—that a power delegated from the
people to a department of government may not then be
subdelegated to another department—predates the
Constitution. For example, John Locke argued that
“[t]he legislative cannot transfer the power of making
laws to any other hands. For it being but a delegated
power from the people, they, who have it cannot pass it
to others.” J. Locke, Second Treatise of Civil Government § 22, 71. Because the founding generation is unlikely to have understood the Constitution impliedly
authorizes the delegation of exclusively legislative
powers, this Court should not read an implied authority into the Constitution.
B. Congress May Not Delegate to the Executive the Authority to Establish Generally Applicable Rules Governing
Private Conduct
“[T]he formulation of generally applicable rules of
private conduct” is among the most well-established
and historically-identifiable core legislative powers.
Ass’n of Am. R.R., 135 S. Ct. at 1242 (Thomas, J., concurring). See also Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct.
2077, 2106 (2014) (quoting Alexander Hamilton, in
Federalist No. 75, that the legislative power is the
32
power “to prescribe rules for the regulation of the society”). The principle that the core legislative power is
the authority to establish general rules for private conduct also predates the founding. See Ass’n of Am. R.R.,
135 S. Ct. at 1242-1244 (Thomas, J., concurring). See
also Philip Hamburger, Is Administrative Law Unlawful? 84 (2014) (“the natural dividing line between legislative and nonlegislative power was between rules
that bound subjects and those that did not”).
Early legislation provides evidence of the general
acceptance of this principle. For example, an 1813 statute authorized the Treasury to establish regulations
that “shall be binding on each [federal] assessor in the
performance of ” his duties. The statute did not purport
to delegate to the President the authority to establish
regulations to bind the private conduct of the general
public. See Philip Hamburger, Is Administrative Law
Unlawful? 86 fn. b (2014). Similarly, Hamilton’s own
conduct as Treasury Secretary also tracks Federalist
75; although his circular to customs officers purported
to interpret their obligations under federal customs
statutes, he did not claim those interpretations would
bind private parties. Instead, the regulations only
bound customs officers, who could be fired for failure
to follow his instructions. Philip Hamburger, Is Administrative Law Unlawful? 89-90 (2014).
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C. Congress May Not Delegate to the Executive the Authority to Make Law on
Important, Complex Subjects
Legislative power has also long been understood
as the power to decide, at a minimum, “important subjects.” Wayman, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 43. Yet the modern intelligible principle test flips this on its head,
defending broad delegations as a “reflection of the necessities of modern legislation” to let the Executive decide how to handle important “complex economic and
social problems.” Am. Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329
U.S. 90, 105 (1946). See also Mistretta at 372 (“Congress simply cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate power under broad general directives”). The
most comprehensive contemporary defense of the modern administrative state also embraces this theory, and
even claims that “the modern national administrative
state is the constitutionally mandated consequence of
delegation.” Gillian Metzger, Foreword: 1930s Redux:
The Administrative State Under Siege, 131 Harv. L.
Rev. 89 (2017) (arguing that sweeping delegations “are
necessary given the economic, social, scientific, and
technological realities of our day”).
But the Constitution provides no complexity exception to the carefully-calibrated separation of powers. And it certainly does not support the alchemical
theory that unconstitutional delegations of sufficient
scope and duration transmute constitutional violations into constitutional obligations.
34
If anything, the founding generation understood
and even expected that strict constitutional constraints on government power would “defeat” “good
laws”—and they considered this an acceptable tradeoff
for the “advantage of preventing a number of bad
ones.” Alexander Hamilton, Federalist No. 73. In short,
the Constitution’s constraints on government power
were originally understood as a feature, not a bug.
And the theory that ‘complex’ problems justify
broad policymaking delegations flouts Wayman. Chief
Justice Marshall wrote that the more “important” the
policy subject, the more separation of powers demands
that Congress—and only Congress—provide the policy
answer. Wayman, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 43 (“important
subjects” must be “entirely regulated by the legislature
itself ”).
Similar separation-of-powers concerns have animated this Court’s reluctance to read “ambiguous statutory text” as congressional delegations of “enormous”
and “transformative” power to the executive. Util. Air
Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2444 (2014).
See also King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015);
FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S.
120, 159-160 (2000). Although the major questions
doctrine in cases like UARG, King, and Brown & Williamson is a canon of statutory interpretation, it
shares a common constitutional DNA with the nondelegation doctrine: at bottom, both are rooted in the
Constitution’s vesting of lawmaking power in Congress, not the President.
35
Critics of nondelegation argue that legislation
properly promulgated under one of Congress’s enumerated powers will, sometimes, require the President to
“fill up the details” to carry out Congress’s orders.
Wayman, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 43. But whatever it
might mean to let the President “fill up the details,” it
can’t mean “let the President make important policy
choices where the subject is complex.” After all, only
Congress can regulate “important subjects.” Id. More
likely, to “fill up the details” means to delegate some
fact-finding and supervisory authority to the President. See, e.g., Marshall Field and Co., 143 U.S. at 693
(suspending embargo required after President “ascertained the existence of a particular fact”).
And whatever else may be considered an ‘important subject’ which Congress alone must decide,
whether to criminalize conduct is certainly an important subject rather than a mere “detail” that can be
left to the Executive to “fill up.” See Evans, 333 U.S. at
486 (defining crimes and their punishments is a legislative task).
D. Because the Separation of Powers Exists
to Protect Liberty, In Close Cases, the
Tie Should Go to Liberty
“Liberty demands limits on the ability of any one
branch to influence basic political decisions,” and the
Constitution’s separation of powers imposes those limits. Clinton v. City of New York., 524 U.S. 417, 450-451
(1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“one branch of government ought not possess the power to shape [the
36
people’s] destiny without a sufficient check from the
other two”). Indeed, the one consistent, recurring principle in this Court’s nondelegation jurisprudence is
that the “ultimate purpose” of the doctrine “is to protect the liberty and security of the governed.” Metro.
Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for Abatement of Aircraft Noise, 501 U.S. 252, 272 (1991). See also Ass’n of
Am. R.R. at 1237 (Alito, J., concurring) (the Constitution’s separation of powers “exists to protect liberty”);
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 950 (1983) (describing
that the Framers expressed “the need to divide and
disperse power in order to protect liberty”).
During ratification, supporters of the proposed
Constitution often invoked its separation of powers to
defend against arguments the new federal government
would encroach on individual liberty. For example,
Convention delegate Pierce Butler wrote in a letter
that “[p]ains and attention were not spared” during the
Convention to “preserve to the individual as large a
share of natural rights” by balancing “the powers of the
three Branches, so that no one shoud [sic] too greatly
preponderate.” Pierce Butler, Letter to Weedon Butler,
The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, Vol. 3.
Ed. Max Farrand, New Haven: Yale University Press,
1911. In Federalist No. 47, James Madison, quoting
Baron de Montesquieu, warned that “[t]here can be no
liberty where the legislative and executive powers are
united in the same person, or body of magistrates.” For
that reason, the “enlightened patrons of liberty” regard
“[n]o political truth” as “of greater intrinsic value than
the separation of powers. And in Federalist No. 51,
Madison argued that “separate and distinct exercise of
37
the different powers of government” is “admitted on all
hands to be essential to the preservation of liberty.”
The many statements by the founding generation
and this Court that the separation of powers is essential to protect individual liberty suggest that when
courts are weighing nondelegation challenges, they
should consider what effect a delegation would have on
liberty. And in close cases, the tie should go to liberty.
*
*
*
To decide this case, the Court need not stray
from its description in Wayman of the Federal Government’s structure created by the Vesting Clauses—a
description which has not been improved upon in
the subsequent 193 years: “the legislature makes, the
executive executes, and the judiciary construes the
law.” Wayman, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 46. The President
may not make law—and prosecutors may not create
crimes.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should reverse the decision below.
Respectfully submitted,
INSTITUTE FOR JUSTICE
SHELDON GILBERT*
DANA BERLINER
901 North Glebe Road
Suite 900
Arlington, Virginia 22203
(703) 682-9320
sgilbert@ij.org
*Counsel of Record
Counsel for Amicus Curiae
Institute for Justice
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.