Respondents Brief — Southern California Alliance of Publicly Owned Treatment Works, Petitioner v. Environmental Protection Agency, et al.
Supreme Court briefJan 12, 2018
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No. 17-542
In the Supreme Court of the United States
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA ALLIANCE OF PUBLICLY
OWNED TREATMENT WORKS, PETITIONER
v.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL.
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENTS IN OPPOSITION
NOEL J. FRANCISCO
Solicitor General
Counsel of Record
JEFFREY H. WOOD
Acting Assistant Attorney
General
EILEEN T. MCDONOUGH
Attorney
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530-0001
SupremeCtBriefs@usdoj.gov
(202) 514-2217
QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether 33 U.S.C. 1369(b)(1)(E) or (F) vests the court
of appeals with jurisdiction over a petition for review
challenging a letter in which the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency asserted an objection to draft National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permits
prepared by a state agency.
(I)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Opinion below ................................................................................ 1
Jurisdiction .................................................................................... 1
Statement ...................................................................................... 1
Argument....................................................................................... 8
Conclusion ................................................................................... 14
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases:
American Paper Inst., Inc. v. United States EPA,
890 F.2d 869 (7th Cir. 1989) ........................................... 8, 12
Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 208 F.3d 1015
(D.C. Cir. 2000) ................................................................... 10
City of Ames v. Reilly, 986 F.2d 253 (8th Cir. 1993) ...... 7, 12
Crown Simpson Pulp Co. v. Costle, 445 U.S. 193
(1980) .......................................................................... 7, 11, 12
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs.
(TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167 (2000) .......................................... 2
General Elec. Co. v. EPA, 290 F.3d 377 (D.C. Cir.
2002) ..................................................................................... 10
General Motors Corp. v. EPA, 168 F.3d 1377
(D.C. Cir. 1999) ..................................................................... 4
Iowa League of Cities v. EPA, 711 F.3d 844 (8th Cir.
2013) ................................................................................... 6, 9
Middlesex Cnty. Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea
Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981) ..................................... 2
Statutes and regulations:
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 701 et seq.............. 4
5 U.S.C. 704 ........................................................................ 4
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7607(b)(1) ..................................... 10
(III)
IV
Statutes and regulations—Continued:
Page
Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1251 et seq. ................................ 1
33 U.S.C. 1251(a) ............................................................... 1
33 U.S.C. 1311(a) ............................................................... 1
33 U.S.C. 1313(a) ............................................................... 2
33 U.S.C. 1313(c)(2) ........................................................... 2
33 U.S.C. 1342(a)(1) ........................................................... 2
33 U.S.C. 1342(a)(2) ........................................................... 2
33 U.S.C. 1342(b) ............................................................... 2
33 U.S.C. 1342(d)(1) .......................................................... 3
33 U.S.C. 1342(d)(2)(B) ..................................................... 3
33 U.S.C. 1342(d)(4) .......................................................... 3
33 U.S.C. 1369(b)(1) ...................................................... 3, 6
33 U.S.C. 1369(b)(1)(A)-(D) .............................................. 3
33 U.S.C. 1369(b)(1)(E) ..............................3, 6, 8, 9, 10, 13
33 U.S.C. 1369(b)(1)(F) .......................................... passim
33 U.S.C. 1369(b)(1)(G) ..................................................... 3
Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. 2618(a)(1)(A)
(2000).........................................................................................10
28 U.S.C. 1331 .......................................................................... 4
40 C.F.R.:
Pt. 122 ................................................................................. 2
Section 122.44(a)(1) ..................................................... 2
Section 122.44(d)(1)(i).................................................. 2
Pt. 123:
Section 123.25(15) ........................................................ 2
Section 123.30............................................................... 4
Section 123.43(a)(1)-(2)................................................ 3
Section 123.44(c)(1)-(9) ................................................ 3
Section 123.44(e) .......................................................... 3
Section 123.44(g) .......................................................... 3
Section 123.44(h) .......................................................... 3
V
Regulation—Continued:
Page
Pt. 125 ................................................................................. 2
Miscellaneous:
39 Fed. Reg. 26,061 (July 16, 1974) ........................................ 2
U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System (NPDES):
NPDES State Program Information:
State Program Authority https://www.epa.
gov/npdes/npdes-state-program-information
(last updated Sept. 27, 2017) ................................................ 2
In the Supreme Court of the United States
No. 17-542
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA ALLIANCE OF PUBLICLY
OWNED TREATMENT WORKS, PETITIONER
v.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL.
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENTS IN OPPOSITION
OPINION BELOW
The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. 1-24)
is reported at 853 F.3d 1076.
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on
April 12, 2017. A petition for rehearing was denied on
July 10, 2017 (Pet. App. 31-32). The petition for a writ
of certiorari was filed on October 6, 2017. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).
STATEMENT
1. Congress enacted the Clean Water Act (CWA or
Act), 33 U.S.C. 1251 et seq., “to restore and maintain the
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.” 33 U.S.C. 1251(a). The Act generally
bars “the discharge of any pollutant by any person,”
33 U.S.C. 1311(a), unless the person “obtain[s] a permit
(1)
2
and compl[ies] with its terms.” Middlesex Cnty. Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1,
11 (1981) (citation omitted).
The CWA established the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) for the permitting
of discharges. A State may administer its own NPDES
program and approve permits for discharges of pollutants within its borders. See 33 U.S.C. 1342(b). Fortysix States, including California, currently administer
NPDES programs. See 39 Fed. Reg. 26,061 (July 16,
1974); U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System (NPDES): NPDES
State Program Information: State Program Authority, https://www.epa.gov/npdes/npdes-state-programinformation. If a State does not operate an NPDES
permitting program, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) issues NPDES permits for discharges within the State. 33 U.S.C. 1342(a)(1).
NPDES permits generally establish permissible rates,
concentrations, or quantities of specified constituents,
or other limitations and conditions for discharges. See
33 U.S.C. 1342(a)(1) and (2); 40 C.F.R. Pts. 122, 125;
see also, e.g., Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw
Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 174, 176 (2000).
EPA promulgates rules describing the conditions that
the permits must impose. See 40 C.F.R. 123.25(15).
Permits must include limitations based on the degree
of control that can be achieved by implementing specified levels of pollution-control technology. 40 C.F.R.
122.44(a)(1). In addition, when necessary to meet statespecific water quality standards, permits must include more stringent water-quality-based limitations.
40 C.F.R. 122.44(d)(1)(i); see 33 U.S.C. 1313(a) and (c)(2).
3
A State that administers the NPDES program
within its borders must provide EPA with a copy of each
permit application it receives and must notify EPA of
any proposed permit. 33 U.S.C. 1342(d)(1); 40 C.F.R.
123.43(a)(1)-(2). A State may not issue a permit if
EPA timely objects to the permit “as being outside the
guidelines and requirements of ” the CWA. 33 U.S.C.
1342(d)(2)(B); see 40 C.F.R. 123.44(c)(1)-(9). If EPA objects, the State or any interested person may request a
hearing on the permit, after which EPA can reaffirm,
modify, or withdraw its objection. 33 U.S.C. 1342(d)(4);
40 C.F.R. 123.44(e) and (g). If EPA raises and does not
withdraw an objection to a permit, the issuing State may
either revise the proposed permit to address EPA’s objection or decline to do so. 33 U.S.C. 1342(d)(4). If the
State declines to revise the proposed permit, the authority to issue the permit passes to EPA, which undertakes its own permitting process and then makes a
final decision on the proposed permit. Ibid.; 40 C.F.R.
123.44(h).
The CWA vests the federal courts of appeals with exclusive jurisdiction to review challenges to some types
of EPA decisions implementing the CWA. Those include, as relevant here, EPA’s “promulgati[on] [of ] any
effluent limitation or other limitation under section
1311,” 33 U.S.C. 1369(b)(1)(E), and EPA action in “issuing
or denying any permit under section 1342,” 33 U.S.C.
1369(b)(1)(F). * Final EPA actions that are reviewable
under principles of administrative law, but are not subject to direct court of appeals review under Section
Challenges to five other types of EPA action are also directly
routed to the courts of appeals under the CWA, but those types of
action are not at issue in this case. See 33 U.S.C. 1369(b)(1)(A)-(D)
and (G).
*
4
1369(b)(1), may be challenged in federal district court
under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C.
701 et seq. See 5 U.S.C. 704; 28 U.S.C. 1331. In addition, when a State serves as the NPDES permitting
agency, the State’s final permitting decisions can be reviewed in state court. See 40 C.F.R. 123.30; see, e.g.,
General Motors Corp. v. EPA, 168 F.3d 1377, 1382 (D.C.
Cir. 1999).
2. a. Petitioner is a trade association whose members include the county sanitation districts that operate
the Whittier Narrows Water Reclamation Plant and the
Pomona Water Reclamation Plant (Plants). Pet. App.
4, 8. The Los Angeles Regional Office of the California
State Water Board (L.A. Board) prepared draft NPDES
permits for the Plants. Id. at 8. The L.A. Board attached to the draft permits a fact sheet that specified
that effluent limitations were necessary in order to address the risk of chronic toxicity from “whole effluent
toxicity”—the toxicity risk that may result from several
pollutants operating together even when no one pollutant alone would likely cause harm to aquatic organisms.
Ibid.; see id. at 8 n.2. The draft permits addressed whole
effluent toxicity in a section entitled “Chronic Toxicity
Trigger and Requirements,” which required additional
testing and investigation if chronic toxicity were established, but did not include any numeric limitations to address whole effluent toxicity. Id. at 8-9.
After the L.A. Board submitted the draft permits to
EPA for review, EPA objected to the draft permits.
Pet. App. 9; see id. at 37-65 (EPA objection letter).
EPA stated that the L.A. Board was required to include
numeric effluent limitations for whole effluent toxicity
unless it could explain why the calculation of such limits
5
would be infeasible. Id. at 38-39, 43. EPA further explained that the “Chronic Toxicity Trigger and Requirements” sections of the draft permits did not meet
the requirements for an effluent limitation because they
simply required additional testing and investigation if
chronic toxicity were detected, without requiring the
Plants to restrict effluent discharges. Id. at 40. EPA
also objected that the L.A. Board had failed to explain
how “Chronic Toxicity Trigger and Requirements”
would achieve the water quality criterion for chronic
toxicity. Id. at 43-44. Finally, EPA explained that, because the L.A. Board’s fact sheets had concluded that
daily effluent limitations were needed to protect against
highly toxic peaks of toxicity in order to meet the water
quality standards, the permits should have included
daily effluent limitations. Id. at 46-47.
The L.A. Board revised the draft permits in light of
EPA’s objections. Pet. App. 9. EPA reviewed the revised permits and notified the L.A. Board that its objections had been satisfied. Ibid. After completing procedures required by state law, the L.A. Board issued final
permits for the Plants. Ibid.
Petitioner—along with other parties—filed an administrative appeal of the final permits with the California State Water Board (State Board). Pet. App. 10. Petitioner then requested that the State Board hold its appeal of the final permits in abeyance until August 2017
and—later—for an additional two years. Ibid.; Pet. 5.
The State Board granted petitioner’s requests to hold
its appeals of the state permitting decisions in abeyance. Ibid.
b. Meanwhile, petitioner filed a petition for review
in the Ninth Circuit, challenging the EPA letter that
had objected to the L.A. Board’s draft permits. Pet.
6
App. 10. The court dismissed petitioner’s challenge to
EPA’s objection letter for lack of jurisdiction. Id. at 1-24.
The court explained that, when a State is responsible
for issuing NPDES permits within its borders, “[a]n objection by EPA to a draft state permit is merely an interim step in the state permitting process,” and is not
itself subject to review in the federal courts of appeals
under Section 1369(b)(1). Id. at 11.
The court of appeals held that the interim permitting
step of an EPA objection letter was not reviewable under 33 U.S.C. 1369(b)(1)(E), which “provides for federal
appellate review of EPA action ‘in approving or promulgating any effluent limitation or other limitation’ ” under specified sections of the CWA. Pet. App. 12 (quoting 33 U.S.C. 1369(b)(1)(E)). Applying circuit precedent, the court explained that EPA’s objection letter did
not fall under Section 1369(b)(1)(E) because it did not
“approve or promulgate” any limitation. Id. at 14 (citation omitted). Instead, the court explained, EPA’s letter simply “applied preexisting regulations on an individualized basis to determine that the [d]raft [p]ermits
were inadequate.” Ibid. The court further explained
that EPA’s objection letter did not finally determine
whether the disputed permits should issue, but merely
served as “an interim step in a complex statutory
scheme” to decide that question. Id. at 16. The court
distinguished the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Iowa
League of Cities v. EPA, 711 F.3d 844 (2013), which had
found reviewable certain guidance letters, because the
objection letter here did not set out any new effluent
limitations or finally determine whether the Plants
should receive the permits in question. Pet. App. 15-16.
The court of appeals also held that EPA’s objection
letter was not reviewable under Section 1369(b)(1)(F),
7
which authorizes direct court of appeals review of “an
EPA action ‘issuing or denying any permit under section
1342.’ ” Pet. App. 18 (quoting 33 U.S.C. 1369(b)(1)(F)). The
court recognized that, under Crown Simpson Pulp Co.
v. Costle, 445 U.S. 193 (1980) (per curiam), EPA objections to NPDES permits under the pre-1977 CWA were
reviewable in the courts of appeals under Section
1369(b)(1)(F), because such objections were the functional equivalent of permit denials. Pet. App. 18-22. The
court observed, however, that this Court in Crown
Simpson had “expressly declined to consider” whether
that conclusion would still hold under amendments to
the CWA that Congress had enacted in 1977. Id. at 18.
Turning to that question, the court of appeals concluded that EPA permit objections are not reviewable
under Section 1369(b)(1)(F) following the 1977 amendments because those amendments “alter[ed] the permit-approval process so that an EPA objection no
longer automatically and finally results in the denial of
a permit if the state refuses to conform to EPA’s request.” Pet. App. 21. Instead, if EPA objects, there are
“other procedures still available to the interested parties before the state denies the permit.” Ibid. And if
the State declines to revise the permit to accommodate
EPA’s objection, the permit is not finally denied; rather,
authority to issue the permit “simply transfers out of
the state’s hands and back to the federal level,” where
EPA must conduct its own permitting process before
deciding whether to issue the permit. Id. at 21-22.
The court of appeals observed that its conclusion
that EPA objection letters are not reviewable under
Section 1369(b)(1)(F) accords with the holdings of the
other courts of appeals that have addressed the post1977 CWA framework. Pet. App. 22-23 (citing City of
8
Ames v. Reilly, 986 F.2d 253, 256 (8th Cir. 1993); American Paper Inst., Inc. v. United States EPA, 890 F.2d
869, 873-875 (7th Cir. 1989)).
ARGUMENT
Petitioner contends (Pet. 11-25) that the court of appeals had jurisdiction under 33 U.S.C. 1369(b)(1)(E) and
(F) to review an EPA letter to the L.A. Board objecting
to several draft permits. The court of appeals correctly
rejected those arguments, and its decision does not conflict with any decision of this Court or another court of
appeals. There is no need to hold the petition for a writ
of certiorari pending this Court’s decision in National
Ass’n of Manufacturers v. Department of Defense,
No. 16-299 (argued Oct. 11, 2017) (NAM), because the
decision below rests on grounds that are not at issue in
that case. Further review is not warranted.
1. a. The court of appeals correctly held that EPA’s
letter to the L.A. Board objecting to several draft permits is not reviewable under Section 1369(b)(1)(E). Section 1369(b)(1)(E) authorizes direct court of appeals review of EPA action “in approving or promulgating any
effluent limitation or other limitation” under specified
CWA provisions. 33 U.S.C. 1369(b)(1)(E). An EPA letter objecting that draft permits do not meet existing
EPA rules is not reviewable under this provision because such a letter does not effect the “establishment of
new regulations,” but simply “determine[s] the proper
application of already promulgated effluent limitation
regulations” to particular permits. Pet. App. 14 (citation omitted). And because such a letter is merely “an
interim step in a complex statutory scheme,” it does not
finally determine whether a proposed permit is consistent with EPA regulations. Id. at 16; see id. at 16-17.
9
Petitioner asserts (Pet. 15, 20) that the court of appeals failed to take into account petitioner’s allegation
that EPA’s objection imposed new requirements, rather
than simply applying preexisting rules. But EPA’s objection letter does not itself impose any constraints because it is simply an intermediate step in the process of
determining whether petitioner is entitled to a permit.
See Pet. App. 17, 21-22. Insofar as petitioner believes
that the final permits issued by the L.A. Board imposed
requirements that lack a basis in EPA regulations or
the CWA, petitioner can challenge the L.A. Board’s permitting decision through state channels culminating in
state-court review—as it has already done.
b. Petitioner’s contention (Pet. 21-22) that EPA’s objection letter is reviewable under Section 1369(b)(1)(E)
does not implicate any conflict among the courts of
appeals.
Contrary to petitioner’s suggestion (Pet. 21-22), the
decision below is consistent with Iowa League of Cities
v. EPA, 711 F.3d 844 (8th Cir. 2013). That decision
found jurisdiction under Section 1369(b)(1)(E) to review
EPA letters to a U.S. Senator that the Eighth Circuit
understood to set forth new, binding effluent limitations
pertaining to waste-treatment facilities’ use of bacteria
mixing zones and blending techniques. Id. at 863-878.
The EPA letter at issue here, by contrast, did not set
out any binding effluent limitations, but simply objected
to particular permits as inconsistent with preexisting
policies. Pet. App. 15-16. Further, the EPA letter was
“an interim step in a complex statutory scheme” that
did not finally establish the terms of the permits to be
issued for the Plants. Id. at 16.
Petitioner also asserts (Pet. 22) that the court of appeals’ refusal to exercise jurisdiction under Section
10
1369(b)(1)(E) conflicts with two decisions of the D.C.
Circuit asserting jurisdiction over challenges to certain
agency guidance documents. Petitioner’s reliance on
those decisions is misplaced, since neither decision addressed jurisdiction under Section 1369(b)(1)(E). In
General Electric Co. v. EPA, 290 F.3d 377 (D.C. Cir.
2002), the court addressed whether a guidance document was reviewable under the judicial-review provision of the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA),
15 U.S.C. 2618(a)(1)(A) (2000). See 290 F.3d at 381-385.
In Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 208 F.3d 1015 (D.C.
Cir. 2000), it addressed whether EPA’s action in promulgating a guidance document constituted final agency
action that was reviewable under the broad jurisdictional provisions of the Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C.
7607(b)(1). See 208 F.3d at 1020-1023 & n.10. In each
case, moreover, the D.C. Circuit determined that the
challenged policy document set out the agency’s final,
binding guidance regarding, respectively, CAA monitoring requirements, see id. at 1022-1023, and the assessment of risks under the TSCA, see General Elec.
Co., 290 F.3d at 385. In the present case, by contrast,
the court below concluded that EPA’s objection letter
was only an intermediate step in the permitting process
and did not set out new rules or policies. Pet. App. 12-18.
There is thus no conflict between the decision below and
the D.C. Circuit decisions on which petitioner relies.
2. a. The court of appeals also correctly held that
EPA’s letter to the L.A. Board is not subject to direct
court of appeals review under Section 1369(b)(1)(F) because it is not an EPA action “in issuing or denying any
permit under section 1342.” 33 U.S.C. 1369(b)(1)(F).
Under the current version of the CWA, EPA’s submission of a letter that objects to a proposed permit is not
11
tantamount to denial of the permit. Pet. App. 19-22.
Rather, an EPA objection is simply an intermediate
step in the process of permit review, following which
“[t]he state and EPA may resolve their dispute over the
objection informally, * * * the state may request that
EPA hold a public hearing, or [the State may] hold its
own public hearing.” Id. at 21. Thereafter, “EPA may
reaffirm, withdraw, or modify its objection, * * * the
state may decide to modify the permit, and EPA may
accept the modifications; or the state may decide not to
act or refuse to accept EPA’s modifications, and EPA
may then issue the permit on its own authority.” Ibid.
EPA’s transmission of an objection letter therefore is
not an EPA action “in issuing or denying any permit under section 1342.” 33 U.S.C. 1369(b)(1)(F).
Contrary to petitioner’s contention (Pet. 12-13), the
court of appeals’ conclusion on this point is consistent
with this Court’s decision in Crown Simpson Pulp Co.
v. Costle, 445 U.S. 193 (1980) (per curiam). In holding
that EPA permitting objections under the pre-1977
CWA were reviewable under Section 1369(b)(1)(F), id.
at 196-197, the Court explained that an EPA objection
had “the precise effect” of “deny[ing] a permit within
the meaning of ” Section 1369(b)(1)(F), id. at 196 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see Pet.
App. 19 (noting that, under the pre-1977 CWA, “once
EPA objected to a state permit, the permit could not be
issued unless the state revised it to remedy EPA’s objection”). Under the current version of the CWA, by
contrast, an EPA objection no longer has that effect.
Instead, the objection is one step in “a process in which
the state can request a hearing, following which there is
additional opportunity for back and forth between the
state and EPA.” Pet. App. 20. And while an unresolved
12
EPA objection under the earlier statute resulted in an
“impasse” that precluded issuance of a permit, id. at 19,
the CWA now provides that, if a State declines to revise
a permit to which EPA maintains its objection, authority to issue the permit returns to EPA, which begins its
own permitting process, id. at 21-22.
This Court in Crown Simpson observed that its holding avoided a “seemingly irrational bifurcated system”
in which EPA’s permit denials were routed directly to
the courts of appeals, while EPA vetoes of state permits
were routed to the district courts under the APA.
445 U.S. at 197; see id. at 196-197 (stating that its interpretation eliminated conditions under which “denials of
NPDES permits would be reviewable at different levels
of the federal-court system”). Contrary to petitioner’s
contention (Pet. 11-14), the decision below does not produce any such irrational bifurcation. That decision does
not route denials to different levels of the federal judiciary; rather, it sends permit denials by state authorities to state courts, while sending permit denials by federal authorities to federal courts. See Pet. App. 6.
There is nothing “irrational” about a system that limits
federal judicial oversight to cases in which a federal
agency is the ultimate decision-maker.
b. The court of appeals’ interpretation of Section
1369(b)(1)(F) does not implicate any circuit conflict.
The decision below is consistent with the holdings of the
other courts of appeals that have addressed the application of Section 1369(b)(1)(F) to EPA permitting objections under the post-1977 CWA framework. See Pet.
App. 22-23 (citing City of Ames v. Reilly, 986 F.2d 253,
256 (8th Cir. 1993); American Paper Inst., Inc. v. United
States EPA, 890 F.2d 869, 873-875 (7th Cir. 1989)).
13
Petitioner identifies no decision adopting a contrary
approach.
3. There is no need to hold the petition for a writ of
certiorari pending this Court’s decision in NAM. NAM
concerns the reviewability under Section 1369(b)(1)(E)
and (F) of a final EPA rule that defines the term “waters of the United States” in the CWA, and thereby dictates the geographic scope of effluent and other limitations promulgated under the CWA as well as the geographic scope of NPDES permitting requirements.
See Pet. at i, NAM, supra (No. 16-299); Gov’t Br. in Opp.
at i, NAM, supra (No. 16-299). The government has argued that the final rule is reviewable under Section
1369(b)(1)(E) because it establishes an “effluent limitation or other limitation under section 1311,” 33 U.S.C.
1369(b)(1)(E), by setting the geographic scope of CWA
obligations. The government has further argued that
the rule is reviewable under Section 1369(b)(1)(F) because it determines whether particular discharges are
subject to CWA permitting requirements at all. See
Gov’t Br. at 17-49, NAM, supra (No. 16-299).
NAM thus concerns a final rule that alters the extent
of permitting and other obligations under the CWA.
The Court’s decision in that case therefore cannot be
expected to call into question the court of appeals’ determination that EPA’s objection letter here is not reviewable because it is merely “an interim step in a complex statutory scheme,” Pet. App. 16, and does not impose new constraints beyond those set out in EPA’s regulations, id. at 14-15.
14
CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.
Respectfully submitted.
NOEL J. FRANCISCO
Solicitor General
JEFFREY H. WOOD
Acting Assistant Attorney
General
EILEEN T. MCDONOUGH
Attorney
JANUARY 2018
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.