Amicus Curiae Brief — Clayvin Herrera, Petitioner v. Wyoming

No. 17-532

In the

Supreme Court of the United States

________________

CLAYVIN B. HERRERA,

Petitioner,

v.

STATE OF WYOMING,

Respondent.

________________

On Writ of Certiorari to the District

Court of Wyoming, Sheridan County

________________

BRIEF OF PACIFIC AND INLAND NORTHWEST

TREATY TRIBES AS AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT

OF PETITIONER

________________

ROB ROY SMITH

Counsel of Record

KILPATRICK TOWNSEND

& STOCKTON LLP

1420 Fifth Ave., Suite 3700

Seattle, WA 98101

(206) 467-9600

rrsmith@kilpatricktownsend

.com

Counsel for Amici Curiae

Pacific and Inland Northwest Treaty Tribes

September 11, 2018

MARYANNE E. MOHAN

NISQUALLY INDIAN TRIBE

OFFICE OF THE TRIBAL

ATTORNEY

4820 She-Nah-Num Dr. SE

Olympia, WA 98513

(360) 456-5221 ext. 2199

ANN E. TWEEDY

MUCKLESHOOT INDIAN

TRIBE, OFFICE OF THE

TRIBAL ATTORNEY

39015 – 172nd Ave. SE

Auburn, WA 98092

(253) 939-3311

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ....................................... ii

I.

INTEREST OF THE AMICI ......................... 1

II.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT .............. 2

III. ARGUMENT .................................................. 3

A.

Tribal Treaty Hunting, Deeply

Rooted in Culture, Religion and

Tradition, Is Vital .................................. 3

B.

Treaty-Reserved Hunting in

National Forests is Consistent with

the Understanding of the Indian

Parties to the Treaties as Confirmed

by Every Court, State or Federal,

Construing these Treaties ..................... 5

C.

Nineteenth Century American

Hunting Law Principles Provide

Additional Interpretative Context

and Support The “Unoccupied”

Status of Subsequent National

Forests .................................................... 9

CONCLUSION .......................................................... 13

Appendix A - List of Amici Curiae...................... App-1

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

Broughton v. Singleton,

5 S.CL. (2 Nott & McC.) 338 (1820) .................... 11

Confederated Tribes of Umatilla Indian Res.

v. Maison,

262 F. Supp. 871 (D. Or. 1966), aff’d. sub

nom, Holcomb v. Confederated Tribes of

Umatilla Indian Res., 382 F.2d 1013

(9th Cir. 1967) ........................................................ 7

Crow Tribe of Indians v. Repsis,

73 F.3d 982 (10th Cir. 1995), cert. denied,

517 U.S. 1221 (1996) .......................................... 2, 3

Jones v. Meehan,

175 U.S. 1 (1899) .................................................... 5

McConico v. Singleton,

2 Mill Const. 244 (1818) ...................................... 11

Minnesota v.

Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians,

526 U.S. 172 (1999) .......................................... 2, 10

Olympic Airways v. Husain,

540 U.S. 644 (2004) .............................................. 10

State of Washington v. Young,

97 Wash. App. 1043 ............................................... 8

State v. Arthur,

261 P.2d 135 (1953), cert. denied,

347 U.S. 937 (1954) ............................................ 6, 7

iii

State v. Buchanan,

138 Wash.2d 186 (1999), cert. denied,

528 U.S. 1154 (2000) .............................................. 8

State v. Miller,

102 Wash.2d 678 (1984) ........................................ 8

State v. Stasso,

172 Mont. 242 (1977) ............................................. 8

United States v. Washington,

384 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Wash. 1974),

aff'd, 520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975), cert.

denied, 423 U.S. 1086 (1976) ................................. 5

United States v. Washington,

853 F.3d 946 (9th Cir. 2017), aff’d,

Washington v. United States, 584 U. S.

____, 138 S. Ct. 1832 (2018) .................................. 6

United States v. Winans,

198 U.S. 371 (1905) ................................................ 3

Ward v. Race Horse,

163 U.S. 504 (1896) ................................................ 2

Washington v. Wash. State Comm.

Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n,

443 U.S. 658 (1979) ................................................ 5

Statutes & Other Authorities:

Supreme Court Rule 37.2 ........................................... 1

Brian Sawers, Property Law as Labor

Control in the Postbellum South, 33 Law

& Hist. Rev. 351 (2015) ....................................... 10

iv

Eric T. Freyfogle, ON PRIVATE PROPERTY:

FINDING COMMON GROUND ON THE

OWNERSHIP OF LAND (2007) ................................. 10

Thomas A. Lund, AMERICAN WILDLIFE LAW

(1980) .................................................................... 11

1

I. INTEREST OF THE AMICI1

Amici are Indian tribes in the Pacific and Inland

Northwest, each of which is a signatory or political

successor in interest to those tribes and bands that

entered into one of several distinct treaties with the

United States in 1854 and 1856, commonly referred

to as the “Stevens Treaties”.2 These tribes ceded vast

amounts of their territories to the United States,

while reserving their rights to hunt and gather outside their Treaty-created reservations on “unclaimed” or “open and unclaimed lands.”3 Today,

Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 37.2, Petitioner and Respondent have granted blanket consent to amicus briefs. None

of the parties or their counsel authored any part of this brief in

whole or in part or made any monetary contribution to fund the

preparation or submission of the brief, and no person or entity

other than Amici and their counsel made such a monetary contribution to the preparation or submission of this brief.

2 A full list of Amici appears at Appendix A.1.

3 Treaty between the United States and the Walla-Walla, Cayuses, and Umatilla Tribes and Bands of Indians in Washington

and Oregon Territories, art. I, 12 Stat. 945, 946 (June 9, 1855);

Treaty with Nisqualli, &c, art. III, 10 Stat. 1132, 1133 (Dec. 26,

1854); Treaty between the United States and the Duwamish,

Suquamish, and other allied and subordinate Tribes of Indians

in Washington Territory, art. V, 12 Stat. 927, 928 (Jan. 22,

1855); Treaty between the United States of America and the

S’Klallam, Skokomish, Toanhooch, and Chimakum Indians,

art. IV, 12 Stat. 933, 934 (Jan. 26, 1855); Treaty between the

United States and the Yakama Nation of Indians, art. III, 12

Stat. 951, 952 (1855); Treaty between the United States of

America and the Nez Percé Indians, art. III, 12 Stat. 957, 958

(June 11, 1855); Treaty between the United States and the

Flathead, Kootenay, and Upper Pend d’Oreilles Indians, art.

III, 12 Stat. 975, 976 (July 16, 1855); Treaty between the United States and the Qui-nai-elt and Quil-leh-ute Indians, art. III,

12 Stat. 971, 972 (Jan. 25, 1856); and, Treaty with the Tribes of

1

2

Amici Tribes continue to exercise their Treatyreserved hunting and gathering rights, as the Indian

signatories at the time of the Treaties understood

them, on such lands, including National Forest lands

located in (and, in some cases, spanning more than

one of) the present-day states of Idaho, Montana,

Oregon and Washington.

II. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

On the narrow question presented in this case

concerning only the Crow Treaty of 1868, Amici

Tribes write separately to emphasize: (1) the continuing significance of Treaty-reserved hunting and

gathering rights; (2) that every state and federal

court construing the Stevens Treaties based on the

Indians’ understanding has confirmed that National

Forest land is “unclaimed” or “open and unclaimed

land” within the meaning of these treaties; and (3)

that early American hunting law, with which the

United States’ negotiators would have been familiar

at the time of the Treaties, is consistent with the Indians’ understanding that the Treaty right to hunt

on “unoccupied lands” would include lands that are

today National Forests.

Amici Tribes support the positions of Petitioner

Herrera, the United States, and the Crow Tribe that

this Court’s ruling in Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band

of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172 (1999) forecloses

the Wyoming lower court’s reliance on Ward v. Race

Horse, 163 U.S. 504 (1896) and Crow Tribe of Indians v. Repsis, 73 F.3d 982 (10th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1221 (1996), to preclude inquiry into

the Indian signatories’ understanding of the Crow

Middle Oregon, art. I, 12 Stat. 963 (June 25, 1855) (negotiated

by Superintendent of Indian Affairs Joel Palmer).

3

Treaty’s reserved right to hunt on “unoccupied lands

of the United States.” Amici Tribes also support Petitioner, the United States, and the Crow Tribe’s position that Crow Tribe of Indians v. Repsis is a poorly reasoned outlier and further note that it is the only instance in which a court has concluded that mere

designation of a National Forest by the United

States could operate to “occupy” land, thus extinguishing the Treaty rights on the federal public

lands at issue here.

III. ARGUMENT

A.

Tribal Treaty Hunting, Deeply Rooted in

Culture, Religion and Tradition, Is Vital

Since time immemorial, and continuing to this

day, hunting, fishing and gathering have been central to Amici Tribes’ subsistence, economy, culture,

spiritual life, and day-to-day existence. These activities “were not much less necessary to the existence of

the Indians than the atmosphere they breathed.”

United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905).

Through treaties, tribes reserved these usufructuary

property rights in perpetuity.

Amici have maintained their traditional culture,

which depends heavily on the traditional use of natural resources. Amici Tribes’ ability to subsist and

thrive continues to require the ability to freely go

beyond reservation boundaries to fish, hunt, and

gather food when it is available. For millennia, Amici have hunted game and gathered botanicals to feed

their families. These food sources remain vitally important to this day not only for traditional and ceremonial purposes, but also for tribal members’ health

and well-being.

4

Historically, Amici hunted all available wildlife

and gathered all harvestable botanicals. These included big and small game animals, fur-bearing animals, birds and waterfowl; and, ferns, grasses,

rushes and tails, root vegetables, fruits, nuts, seeds,

herbs, mosses and fungi. Today, Tribal members

continue to hunt and gather to supply foods for ceremonial and religious purposes such as the canoe

journey, tribal weddings, funerals, name-giving, religious observance and potlatches.

Tribal hunters often hunt for others who cannot

hunt for themselves, including Tribal elders. Tribal

culture is based on extended family relationships of

parents, grandparents, aunts, uncles, cousins and

other relatives. A tribal hunter or gatherer typically

shares the harvest with several families and, because the harvest is widely shared, it is used quickly,

benefiting the whole community. The entire animal

is used to the greatest extent possible, to minimize

waste.

Today, consistent with their historical practices,

Amici manage and co-manage resources with their

federal and state counterparts, and assume the responsibilities that accompany their treaty-reserved

rights through tribal hunting regulations and other

mechanisms. Amici’s co-management with their federal and state counterparts in Idaho, Montana, Oregon and Washington includes wildlife management,

harvest allocation, and regulatory enforcement.

Tribal hunters and gatherers harvest a small fraction of the wildlife and botanical resources taken annually throughout the West. For example, in recent

years in Washington State, tribal members have

harvested between two and five percent of the state-

5

wide non-tribal elk and deer harvest, and tribal deer

harvest remains lower than the yearly state roadkill

rate. https://nwifc.org/about-us/wildlife/.

The continued exercise of Amici’s hunting and

gathering rights, including the exercise of those

rights on National Forest lands, remains of critical

and enduring importance. These rights were expressly reserved by the tribes in exchange for ceding

vast amounts of their homelands to the United

States. As the other party to the Treaties, the United

States secured these rights to the Crow Tribe and to

the Amici Tribes in their Treaties.

B.

Treaty-Reserved Hunting in National

Forests is Consistent with the

Understanding of the Indian Parties to

the Treaties as Confirmed by Every

Court, State or Federal, Construing these

Treaties

Construing Indian treaties involves an inquiry into the intent of the parties; the history of the negotiations, their purpose, and the context in which they

occurred; and the practical construction adopted by

the parties. See Washington v. Wash. State Comm.

Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 443 U.S. 658, 675-79

(1979). Indian Treaty language must “‘be construed,

not according to the technical meaning of its words

to learned lawyers, but in the sense in which they

would naturally be understood by the Indians.’” Id.

at 676 (quoting Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1, 11, 20

(1899)); see also United States v. Washington, 384 F.

Supp. 312, 331 (W.D. Wash. 1974), aff'd, 520 F.2d

676 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1086

(1976).

6

On the narrow issue before this Court of whether

mere designation of a National Forest can serve to

extinguish the Crow Tribe’s 1868 Treaty-reserved

right to hunt on “unoccupied lands of the United

States,” it is informative that every state and federal

court construing the right to hunt on “unclaimed” or

“open and unclaimed” land has held that the Indian

parties to the Stevens Treaties would have understood the concept of a National Forest as consistent

with “unclaimed” or “open and unclaimed” land to

which the reserved hunting right would apply.

Courts, both state and federal, in Idaho, Montana,

Oregon and Washington have long recognized National Forests as subject to reserved Indian treaty

hunting rights. The Idaho Supreme Court, in State v.

Arthur, interpreted treaty language reserving the

Nez Perce Tribe’s right to hunt on “open and unclaimed land” as expressly encompassing National

Forest land. State v. Arthur construed this Treaty

language by examining the understanding of the

Treaty Indians, as reflected in the minutes of the

Treaty negotiations kept by the United States,4

State v. Arthur recites Governor Stevens’ promises at the

treaty negotiations that “You will be allowed . . . to kill game on

land not occupied by the whites” and Looking Glass would be

able to “kill game and go to buffalo when he pleases, that he

can get roots and berries on any of the lands not occupied by

settlers.” 261 P.2d at 140-41. Governor Stevens made similar

assurances in other treaty negotiations. See United States v.

Washington, 853 F.3d 946, 964 (9th Cir. 2017), aff’d, Washington v. United States, 584 U. S. ____, 138 S. Ct. 1832 (2018) (per

curiam) (noting that Governor Stevens told the Indians during

negotiations for the Point Elliott Treaty, “‘I want that you shall

not have simply food and drink now but that you may have

them forever’”); see also Point No Point Treaty Council Minutes

(“Mr. F. Shaw, the Interpreter, explained to them that they

4

7

which document Indian leaders emphasizing that

“our rights shall be protected forever” and receiving

assurances from Governor Stevens that they would

continue to be able to hunt and gather on “lands not

occupied by settlers”. 261 P.2d 135, 140-41 (1953),

cert. denied, 347 U.S. 937 (1954). The Idaho Supreme

Court held that the term “open and unclaimed land”

as employed in the treaty “[w]as intended to include

and embrace such lands as were not settled and occupied by the whites…and was not intended to nor

did it exclude lands title to which rested in the federal government, hence the National Forest Reserve

upon which the game in question was killed was

‘open and unclaimed land’.” Id. at 141. State v. Arthur also rejected Idaho’s argument that these Treaty-reserved rights were altered by statehood. Id. at

140.

In a case affirmed by the Ninth Circuit in which

the Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation sued to enforce their right to hunt in the

Umatilla and Whitman National Forests, the federal

District Court of Oregon held that “‘unclaimed’”

lands within the meaning of the treaty included National Forest lands. Confederated Tribes of Umatilla

Indian Res. v. Maison, 262 F. Supp. 871, 873 (D. Or.

1966), aff’d. sub nom, Holcomb v. Confederated

Tribes of Umatilla Indian Res., 382 F.2d 1013 (9th

Cir. 1967). The Court examined the understanding of

the Indians and the treaty minutes, and emphasized

were not called upon to give up their old modes of living and

places of seeking food.”; “Chits-a-Mah-han or the Duke of

York…My heart is good. I am happy since I heard the paper

read and since I have understood Gov. Stevens, particularly,

since I have been told I could look for food where I pleased, and

not in one place only.).”

8

the hunting right’s application to lands “not actually

occupied by white settlers”; the court elaborated

that, “[t]o construe ‘unclaimed lands’ to exclude land

not occupied by white settlers would violate the solemn promise made to Indians more than a century

ago.” 262 F. Supp. at 872. Both courts rejected Oregon’s statehood arguments, independently examining the understanding of the Indians. 262 F. Supp.

at 872; 382 F.2d at 1014.

The Montana Supreme Court in State v. Stasso, a

case involving a member of the Confederated Salish

and Kootenai Tribes hunting on National Forest

land, examined the understanding of the Indian parties to the 1855 Treaty of Hell Gate, rejected Montana’s statehood arguments, and held that “the National Forest lands involved here are open and unclaimed lands” within the meaning of the Treaty.

172 Mont. 242, 245, 248 (1977).

Washington State courts have concurred that

“open and unclaimed lands” within the meaning of

the Stevens Treaties encompass National Forest

land. State v. Miller, 102 Wash.2d 678, 680 n.2

(1984) (noting that “[s]everal courts have determined

that [National Forest] land is ‘open and unclaimed’

within the meaning of the treaty”); State of Washington v. Young, 97 Wash. App. 1043 (unpublished)

(1999) (reversing conviction of Yakama Indian for

hunting during state’s closed season in a National

Forest, based on treaty right to hunt).5

5 While only the issue of National Forest land is before this

Court, courts have also upheld the right to hunt on other types

of forest lands and in similar areas. See, e.g., State v. Buchanan, 138 Wash.2d 186, 211-12 (1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1154

(2000) (rejecting Washington’s statehood arguments and hold-

9

All of these cases, reviewing the understanding of

the Indians at the time of the Stevens Treaties,6

come to the same conclusion: the mere designation of

a National Forest does not extinguish Treatyreserved rights to hunt on those lands. The evidence

pointed to by Petitioner, the Crow Tribe, and the

United States demonstrates that it is inconceivable

that the Crow negotiators would have understood

that a National Forest designation would extinguish

their hunting rights on those lands under the Crow

Treaty.

C. Nineteenth Century American Hunting

Law Principles Provide Additional Interpretative Context and Support The “Unoccupied” Status of Subsequent National Forests

An understanding of the nineteenth century

American legal landscape provides additional support for the conclusion that the Big Horn National

Forest should be treated as “unoccupied” for purposes of the Crow Treaty hunting right. While the primary interpretive inquiry is the understanding of

the Treaty Indians, who were required to negotiate

critical protections for themselves in a foreign language, contemporary American legal principles make

plain that the United States would have understood

subsequently created National Forests as “unoccuing that publicly owned wildlife area constitutes “open and unclaimed land” within the meaning of the treaty).

6 Amici note that some of the dicta in these cases and some of

the forums in which these issues were litigated (e.g., state criminal prosecutions) are imperfect or incomplete with respect to a

full and proper understanding and application of their Treatyreserved rights. This does not detract from the unanimous, correct conclusions these courts have reached that Amici Tribes’

reserved treaty hunting rights encompass National Forest land.

10

pied” land where hunting, including Treaty-reserved

hunting, could occur. Understanding the common

law landscape helps deduce the intent of the United

States, which, although entitled to less weight than

the Indian signatories’ understanding, is part of the

context of the treaty negotiations. Mille Lacs, 526

U.S. at 196 (stating that courts must “look beyond

the written words to the larger context that frames

the Treaty, including the history of the treaty, the

negotiations, and the practical construction adopted

by the parties”); Olympic Airways v. Husain, 540

U.S. 644, 650 (2004) (noting that the Court regularly

considers the context of a treaty’s negotiation and

adoption to promote interpretations “consistent with

the shared expectations of the contracting parties”).

When the Indian Treaties were negotiated, there

were no hunting laws in effect in the Western United

States territories. Instead, lands free from settlement were open to hunting for all. Brian Sawers,

Property Law as Labor Control in the Postbellum

South, 33 Law & Hist. Rev. 351, 351 (2015) (noting

that, in 1860, “most unfenced land in the United

States was open to the wanderer”); accord Eric T.

Freyfogle, ON PRIVATE PROPERTY: FINDING COMMON

GROUND ON THE OWNERSHIP OF LAND 33 (2007) (noting that, historically in America, “[h]unting and fishing were rather freely allowed except in cultivated

fields and around houses”). This was a result of the

United States’ rejection, at the time of the American

Revolution, of English laws restricting the majority

of English citizens from hunting. In England, the

King claimed ownership over all fisheries and wild

animals, and, by creating Royal Forests and establishing qualification statutes, favored the landed

gentry’s right to hunt over that of the common citi-

11

zen. Thomas A. Lund, AMERICAN WILDLIFE LAW at 810 (1980). The American colonies rejected this aristocratic concept and instead chose the free taking of

animals on all unsettled land. Id. at 24.

The right to access lands for hunting was not necessarily limited by ownership; rather, active settlement was required to bar access. For example, in a

private lands context that predates the creation of

National Forests, the South Carolina Constitutional

Court of Appeals recognized a presumption that “the

forests and unenclosed lands of this country” were

open to hunters. McConico v. Singleton, 2 Mill Const.

244, 246 (1818). Two years after McConico, the same

South Carolina court held that a hunter who entered

a parcel of land enclosed by a dilapidated fence did

not commit trespass. Broughton v. Singleton, 5 S.CL.

(2 Nott & McC.) 338, 340 (1820).

This common principle of nineteenth century

American law was borne out by the laws of the United States existing at the time the Crow Treaty was

negotiated. For example, under the Homestead Act

of 1862, the only way any person could lawfully “occupy” public land in the West was “for the purpose of

actual settlement and cultivation.” Act of May 20,

1862, Pub. L. 37-64 12 Stat. 392.

American law at time of the Crow Treaty, even

from a non-Indian perspective, plainly required more

for land to be considered “occupied” than just title

ownership. The subsequently-created Big Horn National Forest would have been considered “unoccupied” for hunting purposes not only by the Treaty

Indians – for them unquestionably so – but also by

the United States negotiators and ratifiers of the

Treaty. The vast woodland and prairie would have

12

been and, in many ways is still, considered the commons. It is federal public land that to this day is

open to all hunting, including non-Indian recreational hunting.

*****

In the Pacific and Inland Northwest, some feared

that adverse consequences would result from courts

upholding the Amici’s reserved hunting rights on

National Forest land. These fears have not come to

pass. Instead, these court decisions have resulted in

increased acceptance of the tribes as wildlife and

natural resource co-managers with their United

States, Idaho, Montana, Oregon, and Washington

counterparts.

In this case, considering the Crow Tribe’s understanding of its Treaty-reserved hunting right and

the evidence presented by Petitioner, the Crow Tribe

and the United States, it is inconceivable that the

Crow Treaty negotiators would have understood that

the mere designation of lands as a National Forest

would extinguish reserved hunting rights on those

lands.

13

CONCLUSION

Amici Tribes respectfully urge the Court to reverse

the judgment of the Wyoming district court.

Respectfully submitted,

ROB ROY SMITH

Counsel of Record

KILPATRICK TOWNSEND

& STOCKTON LLP

1420 Fifth Ave., Suite 3700

Seattle, WA 98101

(206) 467-9600

rrsmith@kilpatricktownse

nd.com

Counsel for Amici Curiae

Pacific and Inland Northwest Treaty Tribes

September 11, 2018

MARYANNE E. MOHAN

NISQUALLY INDIAN

TRIBE

OFFICE OF THE TRIBAL

ATTORNEY

4820 She-Nah-Num Dr.

SE

Olympia, WA 98513

(360) 456-5221 ext. 2199

ANN E. TWEEDY

MUCKLESHOOT INDIAN TRIBE, OFFICE OF

THE TRIBAL ATTORNEY

39015 – 172nd Ave. SE

Auburn, WA 98092

(253) 939-3311

APPENDIX

App-1

APPENDIX A

This Appendix provides the names of federallyrecognized sovereign Indian tribes which appear as

Amici Curiae.

The Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes

of the Flathead Reservation

The Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation

The Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs

Reservation of Oregon

The Confederated Tribes and Bands of the

Yakama Nation

The Hoh Tribe

The Jamestown S’Klallam Tribe

The Lower Elwha Klallam Tribe

The Muckleshoot Indian Tribe

The Nez Perce Tribe

The Nisqually Indian Tribe

The Nooksack Indian Tribe

The Port Gamble S’Klallam Tribe

The Puyallup Tribe of Indians

The Quileute Tribe

The Skokomish Indian Tribe

The Squaxin Island Tribe

App-2

The Stillaguamish Tribe of Indians

The Suquamish Tribe

The Swinomish Indian Tribal Community

The Tulalip Tribes of Washington