Respondents Brief — First Southern National Bank, Petitioner v. Sunnyslope Housing Limited Partnership
Supreme Court briefNov 27, 2017
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No. 17-455
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In The
Supreme Court of the United States
-----------------------------------------------------------------FIRST SOUTHERN NATIONAL BANK,
Petitioner,
v.
SUNNYSLOPE HOUSING LIMITED PARTNERSHIP,
Respondent.
-----------------------------------------------------------------On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari
To The United States Court Of Appeals
For The Ninth Circuit
-----------------------------------------------------------------RESPONDENT’S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION
-----------------------------------------------------------------SUSAN M. FREEMAN
Counsel of Record
JUSTIN J. HENDERSON
DANIEL A. ARELLANO
LEWIS ROCA ROTHGERBER
CHRISTIE LLP
201 E. Washington Street
Suite 1200
Phoenix, Arizona 85004
(602) 262-5756
SFreeman@LRRC.com
Counsel for Respondent
================================================================
COCKLE LEGAL BRIEFS (800) 225-6964
WWW.COCKLELEGALBRIEFS.COM
i
QUESTION PRESENTED
Does Bankruptcy Code § 506(a) require valuation
of collateral:
(a) as used by the debtor in the reorganization
plan, when recorded servitudes require such property
use and any buyer from the estate would have to comply with the restrictions and accordingly would take
them into account in its purchase price; or
(b) from the creditor’s perspective of the higher
price a buyer might pay after creditor foreclosure,
when it is no longer merely collateral and the servitudes are eliminated, but that foreclosure will not take
place under the plan?
ii
RULE 29.6 STATEMENT
Sunnyslope Housing Limited Partnership is a limited partnership. No publicly held corporation or entity
owns 10% or more of any general or limited partnership interest.
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
QUESTION PRESENTED...................................
i
RULE 29.6 STATEMENT ....................................
ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS ......................................
iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................
v
INTRODUCTION ................................................
1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE..............................
4
A.
The CC&Rs are Integral to the Secured
Loan, and Remain Binding ........................
4
First Southern’s Valuation Assumes a
Foreclosure.................................................
5
First Southern Is Paid in Full Under the
Plan ............................................................
6
The Investors Fund the Plan, Equitably
Mooting This Appeal ..................................
7
REASONS TO DENY THE WRIT .......................
9
B.
C.
D.
I.
SECTION 506(a) IS CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS ABOUT THE VALUATION TEST
APPLIED IN RASH AND FOLLOWED BY
THE NINTH CIRCUIT ...............................
9
A. The Creditor’s Interest ........................
9
B. The Estate’s Interest ........................... 10
C. The Proposed Disposition or Use ........ 11
II.
THERE IS NO SPLIT OF AUTHORITY;
UNITED AIR LINES AND THE NINTH
CIRCUIT PROPERLY APPLIED RASH ..... 14
iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS – Continued
Page
III.
THE ISSUE PRESENTED IS UNLIKELY
TO RECUR, MUCH LESS CAUSE THE
CATASTROPHE FORECAST BY FIRST
SOUTHERN AND ITS AMICI ................... 18
IV.
RASH AND SUNNYSLOPE ARE IN
ACCORD
WITH
FUNDAMENTAL
BANKRUPTCY PRINCIPLES .................. 22
A. Adequate Protection When a Chapter
11 Case is Filed ................................... 24
B. Secured Creditor Reorganization Plan
Protections ........................................... 25
V.
THIS CASE IS BURDENED BY
EQUITABLE MOOTNESS, WHICH THE
COURT HAS REPEATEDLY DECLINED
TO REVIEW .............................................. 27
CONCLUSION..................................................... 32
v
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
FEDERAL CASES
Alabama v. North Carolina, 560 U.S. 330 (2010) ......13
Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 520 U.S.
953 (1997) ........................................................ passim
Aurelius Capital Mgmt., L.P. v. Tribune Media
Co., 136 S. Ct. 1459 (2016) ......................................28
Bank of Am. Nat’l Tr. & Savings Ass’n v. 203 N.
LaSalle St. P’ship, 526 U.S. 434 (1999) ..................18
BFP v. Resolution Tr. Corp., 511 U.S. 531 (1994)..... 5, 12
Brockington v. Rhodes, 396 U.S. 41 (1969) .................29
Church of Scientology of Cal. v. United States,
506 U.S. 9 (1992) .....................................................29
Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410 (1992) ......................19
Fla. Dep’t of Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias,
Inc., 554 U.S. 33 (2008)............................................22
Gouveia v. Tazbir, 37 F.3d 295 (7th Cir. 1994) ...........10
Hall v. Beals, 396 U.S. 45 (1969) ................................29
In re 523 E. Fifth St. Hous. Preservation Dev.
Fund Corp., 79 B.R. 568 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1987) ........................................................................11
In re Am. Mariner Indus., Inc., 734 F.2d 426 (9th
Cir. 1984) .................................................................25
In re Bate Land & Timber, LLC, 523 B.R. 483
(Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2015) ............................................16
In re Bell, 304 B.R. 878 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 2003) ........17
vi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES – Continued
Page
In re Bishop, 339 B.R. 595 (Bankr. D. S.C. 2005) .......17
In re Chateaugay Corp., 10 F.3d 944 (2d Cir.
1993) ........................................................................30
In re Donato, 253 B.R. 151 (M.D. Pa. 2000) ...............17
In re Dow Corning Corp., 237 B.R. 380 (Bankr.
E.D. Mich. 1999) ......................................................19
In re Ehrich, 109 B.R. 390 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1989) ........17
In re Heritage Highgate, 679 F.3d 132 (3d Cir.
2012). .......................................................................16
In re Manges, 29 F.3d 1034 (5th Cir. 1994) ................29
In re McElwee, 449 B.R. 669 (Bankr. M.D. Pa.
2011) ........................................................................17
In re Murel Holding Corp., 75 F.2d 941 (2d Cir.
1935) ........................................................................25
In re Nica Holdings, Inc., 810 F.3d 781 (11th Cir.
2015) ........................................................................29
In re One2One Commc’ns, LLC, 805 F.3d 428 (3d
Cir. 2015) .................................................................28
In re Sherman, 157 B.R. 987 (Bankr. E.D. Tex.
1993) ........................................................................17
In re Sugarleaf Timber, LLC, 529 B.R. 317 (M.D.
Fla. 2015) .................................................................16
In re Thompson, 867 F.2d 416 (7th Cir. 1989) ............24
In re Tribune Media Co., 799 F.3d 272 (3d Cir.
2015) ........................................................................31
vii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES – Continued
Page
In re UNR Indus., Inc., 20 F.3d 766 (7th Cir.
1994) .................................................................. 30, 31
In re Winthrop Old Farm Nurseries, 50 F.3d 72
(1st Cir. 1995) ..........................................................16
In re Young, 367 B.R. 183 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2007) ....... 17
Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90
(1991) .......................................................................17
Lamie v. U.S., Tr., 540 U.S. 526 (2004)........................13
Midlantic Nat’l Bank v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot.,
474 U.S. 499 (1986) .................................................19
Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618
(1978) .......................................................................13
N.J. Tpk. Auth. v. Jersey Cent. Power & Light,
772 F.2d 25 (3d Cir. 1985) .......................................29
NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513 (1984)........ 23
Pioneer Inv. Servs., Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd.
P’ship, 507 U.S. 380 (1993)......................................22
RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated
Bank, 566 U.S. 639 (2012) .......................................26
Speck v. United States, 104 B.R. 1021 (D.S.D.
1989) ........................................................................17
Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465 (2004) ............20
Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157 (1991) .........................22
U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall P’ship,
513 U.S. 18 (1994) ...................................................18
viii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES – Continued
Page
United Air Lines Inc. v. Regional Airports
Improvement Corp., 564 F.3d 873 (7th Cir.
2009) .............................................................. 2, 14, 15
United Sav. Ass’n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood
Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365 (1988)........... 24, 25
United States v. GWI PCS 1, Inc., 533 U.S. 964
(2001) .......................................................................28
Wright v. Vinton Branch of the Mountain Tr.
Bank, 300 U.S. 440 (1937) .......................................24
STATE CASES
Federoff v. Pioneer Title & Tr. Co. of Ariz., 803
P.2d 104 (Ariz. 1990) ...............................................10
Powell v. Washburn, 125 P.3d 373 (Ariz. 2006) ..........10
STATUTES
11 U.S.C. § 101(5) ........................................................11
11 U.S.C. § 101(10) ......................................................11
11 U.S.C. § 101(37) ......................................................11
11 U.S.C. § 361 ............................................................24
11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(8) ...................................................22
11 U.S.C. § 363(f ) ........................................................11
11 U.S.C. § 506 ............................................................12
11 U.S.C. § 506(a) ................................................ passim
11 U.S.C. § 1111(b) .................................. 3, 6, 19, 26, 27
ix
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES – Continued
Page
11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7) ...................................................3
11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7)(A) ...................................... 18, 19
11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7)(B) ............................................19
11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A) ................................ 11, 19, 26
11 U.S.C. § 1141(c) ......................................................11
12 U.S.C. § 1715l(a).....................................................21
12 U.S.C. § 1715l(b).....................................................21
12 U.S.C. § 1715l(d)(3)(iii) ..........................................21
26 U.S.C. § 42 ..............................................................21
26 U.S.C. § 142(d) ..........................................................4
26 U.S.C. § 1033 ...................................................... 8, 31
REGULATIONS
Treas. Reg. § 1.103-8(b)(6) ............................................8
OTHER AUTHORITIES
7 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 111.03[5] (16th ed.
2017) ........................................................................19
Laurie Goodman & Dan Magdar, Selling HUD’s
Nonperforming Loans: A Win-Win for Borrowers, Investors, and HUD, The Urban Institute
(Jan. 2016) ...............................................................21
H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963
(1977) ......................................................................... 19
x
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES – Continued
Page
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, LowIncome Tax Credits: Affordable Housing Investment Opportunities for Banks, Community Developments – Insights (April 2014) ............21
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES
§ 7.9 (2000) ..............................................................11
1
INTRODUCTION
The en banc opinion below correctly held that under Bankruptcy Code § 506(a) and Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 520 U.S. 953 (1997), the bankruptcy
court properly valued the apartment project owned by
respondent Sunnyslope Housing Limited Partnership
(“Sunnyslope”) as subject to the restrictive covenants
running with the land that limit Sunnyslope’s interest
in the property and obligate it to operate the project as
low-income housing. Even though a foreclosure by secured creditor petitioner First Southern National
Bank (“First Southern”) would eliminate the restrictive covenants and thereby increase the value by allowing a new purchaser from the bank to rent
apartments at market rates, § 506(a) requires valuation to be made in light of the debtor estate’s “actual
use” of the property, rather than from the creditor’s
perspective of a “foreclosure sale that will not take
place.” App.11a–14a; Rash, 520 U.S. at 960–62. First
Southern asks the Court to construe this as meaning
the post-foreclosure resale value the creditor could
achieve or the replacement value of the property as
held by the estate and used under the plan, whichever
is higher.
The low-income use restrictions here must be
taken into account because they are not simply junior
liens that can be ignored in valuing the project. They
limit the bankruptcy estate’s interest in the property
because they are servitudes – binding legal prohibitions on any other use while in the hands of the estate
2
or any buyer from the estate. The original lender
agreed to this when making the loan. Affordable housing is not only the actual use under Sunnyslope’s plan,
but the only legal use until and unless there is a plan
default and First Southern actually forecloses. The
bank’s doomsday scenarios, and its supposition that affordable housing is a mere use of choice, do not take
this uncommon situation into account.
Although First Southern has attempted to manufacture a circuit split, there is none. Both the Ninth
Circuit below and the Seventh Circuit in United Air
Lines Inc. v. Regional Airports Improvement Corp., 564
F.3d 873 (7th Cir. 2009), determined the market value
of collateral based upon what a willing buyer would
pay for a replacement of the property as used by the
reorganized debtor under its plan. The Seventh Circuit
did not apply a hypothetical foreclosure value test.
This case is unusual in other respects that render
it inappropriate for this Court’s time and attention.
First, rarely does foreclosure value exceed replacement
fair market value. Still, this Court acknowledged in
Rash that it may happen, yet held that replacement
value is always the test under § 506(a)’s text. There are
no other circuit cases in this context.
Second, most secured creditors in First Southern’s
position would exercise their right to recover as much
as they would in a chapter 7 liquidation and to prevent
plan confirmation absent such treatment. See Pet.7.
First Southern now seeks the value it would have
3
received in a liquidation by virtue of immediate foreclosure, but it waived that right by exercising an alternative right to full payment of the $8.5 million note
amount. §§ 1129(a)(7), 1111(b). It later sought to rescind its election, but the bankruptcy court’s refusal to
allow its untimely change of heart was upheld on appeal and is not at issue here. App.9a. As the Ninth Circuit recognized, had First Southern elected to exercise
the right to recover liquidation value instead of treating its entire claim as secured, it had “the ability to
prevent approval of the reorganization plan.” App.19a.
The result of First Southern’s choice is that it will
be paid the entire $8.5 million note amount under the
plan, making a $3.5 million profit on its $5 million purchase, and its “under-water” deficiency remains secured. The bank would prefer to foreclose and obtain
$7.6 million from a collateral resale more quickly, but
the Code displaces that right until and unless there is
a plan default. Banks invest in long-term receivables,
and it has that instead.
Finally, this case is a clumsy vehicle for resolving
the question presented because the Court will need to
grapple with the issue of equitable mootness, which
the Court has repeatedly refused to review. First
Southern correctly observes that most plan valuation
appeals are dismissed for equitable mootness, and that
is precisely what would need to happen here in the
event the Court granted the writ.
------------------------------------------------------------------
4
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.
The CC&Rs are Integral to the Secured
Loan, and Remain Binding.
Sunnyslope’s affordable housing project was financed through multiple government loans, with equity owners receiving tax credits for their investment.
Critically, the senior secured 40-year “Capstone Loan”
later acquired by First Southern was funded by municipal bonds issued by the Phoenix Industrial Development Authority (“IDA”) only because of multiple
affordable housing restrictions (“CC&Rs”) recorded
immediately after and in conjunction with the senior
deed of trust and State of Arizona and City of Phoenix
junior deeds of trust in an integrated, simultaneous
transaction. App.5a–6a, 98a–103a; Internal Revenue
Code § 142(d). It is undisputed that these CC&Rs run
with the land and terminate only upon foreclosure of
the Capstone Loan. App.5a–6a, 13a.
Sunnyslope defaulted in the depth of the recession, and HUD repaid the IDA bonds and sold the $8.5
million loan to First Southern for $5.05 million. Pet.6a.
The HUD sale conditioned the Capstone Loan sale to
First Southern on continued application of the CC&Rs
by selling only its right, title and interest, and never
causing the CC&Rs to be released. App.13a–14a; see
also Pet.14 (misleading implication of release).
HUD’s sale agreement further provided that the
lien on the property was subject to “any applicable
bankruptcy, insolvency, reorganization and other laws
affecting creditors’ rights generally” as well as
5
“covenants, conditions and restrictions, rights of way,
easements and other matters of public record.” 103a–
104a.
First Southern thus bought the Capstone Loan at
a substantial discount, knowing that it would remain
subject to the CC&Rs until foreclosure and the risk of
a borrower bankruptcy. It bought a lien on property
worth less than its foreclosure value for less than its
foreclosure value. See BFP v. Resolution Tr. Corp., 511
U.S. 531, 539 (1994) (recognizing that characteristics
such as foreclosure-forced sales or undesirable zoning
restrictions mean property is “simply worth less”).
B.
First Southern’s Valuation Assumes a
Foreclosure.
First Southern commenced foreclosure and obtained a receiver. He found a purchaser who agreed to
buy the project for $7.65 million after foreclosure.
Pet.6a, 105a. Sunnyslope filed a chapter 11 petition,
followed by a plan “cramming down” the First Southern secured claim.
In project valuation proceedings, First Southern
relied on an appraisal of $7,740,000 based on the “extraordinary assumption” that “upon transfer of title
via foreclosure or deed-in-lieu of foreclosure, any restriction requiring that the property continue to be utilized as affordable housing would be extinguished and
have no further effect.” App.7a, 105a–106a. First
Southern’s expert thus recognized that the CC&Rs
must be extinguished by foreclosure to enable rental at
6
market rates. App.30a. First Southern initially presented no evidence of project value as restricted by the
CC&Rs. Its expert opined on rebuttal to a restricted
value of $4,885,000, rejected by the bankruptcy court
for lack of supporting facts. App.31a, 69a, 106a–108a,
146a–148a, 166a.
The bankruptcy court valued the CC&R-restricted
project plus the tax credits at $3.9 million. First Southern did not dispute that it would cost $3.9 million to
acquire a property like the project (including tax credits) with similar CC&Rs. App.12a.
C.
First Southern Is Paid in Full Under the
Plan.
The Capstone Loan held by First Southern is paid
in full under Sunnyslope’s reorganization plan. The secured claim value is paid in monthly installments with
interest over the 40-year period typical of affordable
housing financing. The unsecured balance is paid in a
lump sum when that period expires pursuant to
§ 1111(b), according the bank the full benefit of its bargain, as limited by bankruptcy law. First Southern retains its lien until fully paid. The CC&Rs expire at the
end of the plan term, or earlier if there is a plan default
and foreclosure. App.8a.
On an evidentiary record that included the project
useful life exceeding 40 years and sound management
and funding, the court found the increased value from
the CC&Rs terminating at plan end or upon a default,
allowing rentals to increase to market rates, assured
7
sufficient refinancing or sale proceeds for First Southern’s full payment. The bankruptcy court found as a
fact that this overcame the risks of continued use during the term and potential plan defaults, especially in
light of no contradictory First Southern evidence.
App.8a, 16a–17a, 109a–115a, 125a.
D. The Investors Fund the Plan, Equitably Mooting This Appeal.
The district court granted a stay pending appeal
of the initial plan confirmation order. App.8a. It then
ruled on the merits, affirming the bankruptcy court’s
determination that the project should be valued as encumbered by the CC&Rs. But the district court agreed
with First Southern on a subsidiary argument that
First Southern’s secured claim should be increased by
the value of federal tax credits that benefit equity owners in such a Low Income Housing Tax Credit project,
and remanded. App.8a, 70a.
The bankruptcy court conducted an evidentiary
hearing and valued the tax credits, bringing First
Southern’s secured claim to $3.9 million. App.71a–72a.
It found that Sunnyslope could manage the increased
monthly payments in light of a management fee subordination, so the plan remained feasible and other
plan rulings did not need to be changed. It confirmed
the plan as modified. App.72a–74a.
First Southern appealed to the district court
again, but this time the bankruptcy court and district
court denied its stay requests. App.9a. The bankruptcy
8
court found that reversing plan confirmation to allow
First Southern’s foreclosure would extinguish the junior claims of the State of Arizona and the City of Phoenix, also harming their interests and tenants’ interests
in desperately needed affordable housing. The district
court reasoned that there were no significant legal issues on which First Southern was likely to prevail,
that substantial harm to the debtor and the public interest would result from a stay, and that the bank’s injury was monetary, not irreparable. First Southern is a
bank, but it did not offer to post a supersedeas bond
and it did not seek a stay from the Ninth Circuit.
In reliance on these orders, Cornerstone at Camelback LLC transferred $1.2 million, and the Sunnyslope
plan took effect. App.9a. The investment was made under an Internal Revenue Code “1033 exchange” on the
deadline to replace previously owned property condemned by the City. App.34a; 26 U.S.C. § 1033. If plan
confirmation were to be reversed, Cornerstone (and ultimately its principals) would be subjected to tax liabilities from the condemnation proceeds of more than
$1.5 million. App.34a. They would also be subjected to
retroactive forfeiture of the tax credits utilized on federal income tax returns. Treas. Reg. § 1.103-8(b)(6).
And Cornerstone would be unable to recover the $1.2
million that was paid to third parties, which included
plan payments to First Southern and other creditors
and taxing authorities, and for a long-term lease of adjacent parkland and capital improvements to it, project
improvements, and contractual obligations.
9
Cornerstone had no prepetition connections with
Sunnyslope, and it is not a party to this appeal. Yet
First Southern’s requested relief would require complete reversal of the entire plan confirmation order and
revaluation of the bank’s secured claim to the amount
it could obtain by selling the property after foreclosing
out the CC&Rs.
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REASONS TO DENY THE WRIT
I.
SECTION 506(a) IS CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS ABOUT THE VALUATION TEST
APPLIED IN RASH AND FOLLOWED BY
THE NINTH CIRCUIT.
Bankruptcy Code § 506(a) provides that a creditor
has a “secured claim to the extent of the value of such
creditor’s interest in the estate’s interest in” collateral
and that “[s]uch value shall be determined in light of
the purpose of the valuation and of the proposed disposition or use of such property.” 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (emphasis added).
A. The Creditor’s Interest.
The “creditor’s interest” may encompass only some
debtor assets, e.g., only accounts receivable, and is a
collateral interest only. The “estate’s interest” may be
limited too, e.g., a life estate, or fee title restricted by
easements. Rash, 520 U.S. at 961 (court may be required to evaluate “limited or partial interests in collateral”).
10
Rash expressly rejected First Southern’s fundamental position, explaining that the statutory term
“creditor’s interest” is not equated to “the net value a
creditor could realize through a foreclosure sale.” Id.;
see also App.54a–55a (comparing First Southern’s arguments to circuit Rash decision overruled by the
Court).
B. The Estate’s Interest.
In this case, the estate’s interest in the project is
encumbered by the rent and occupancy restrictions in
the CC&Rs. Those CC&Rs were integral to the Capstone Loan, which would not have been funded by the
IDA without them. They are subordinate to the Capstone deed of trust, but they are not simply “junior
liens” securing monetary obligations. While the “creditor’s interest” has priority, that allows First Southern
to eliminate the CC&Rs only by foreclosing them out.
Subordination of restrictive covenants does not
make them cease to exist. The Sunnyslope CC&Rs are
servitudes – recorded covenants that run with the
land, binding the estate and its successors – and are
enforceable by injunction, absent a foreclosure. See
Powell v. Washburn, 125 P.3d 373, 375 (Ariz. 2006) (restrictive covenants enforceable by injunction); Federoff
v. Pioneer Title & Tr. Co. of Ariz., 803 P.2d 104, 108
(Ariz. 1990) (requirements for covenant running with
the land); Gouveia v. Tazbir, 37 F.3d 295, 301 (7th Cir.
1994) (trustee cannot sell free of deed restrictions;
creditors had constructive notice of restrictions when
11
extending credit); In re 523 E. Fifth St. Hous. Preservation Dev. Fund Corp., 79 B.R. 568, 571–76 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1987) (same, in affordable housing case);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 7.9
(2000) (restrictive covenant servitude extinguishable
by foreclosure of priority lien, but not extinguishable
in bankruptcy unless required by statute).1 As the Restatement explains:
A servitude should not be deemed a “lien”
within the meaning of [Bankruptcy Code]
§ 101(37) because the servitude itself imposes
the obligation, rather than creating security
for performance of an obligation created in
some other transaction. Nor is a servitude an
executory contract. It is an interest in land,
usually of indefinite duration, that is ordinarily enforceable by coercive remedies under
[Restatement] § 8.3.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 7.9
Reporter’s Note.
C. The Proposed Disposition or Use.
Rash held that plan “disposition or use” of collateral “is of paramount importance to the valuation
1
Even if servitudes were to be deemed property interests
subject to free and clear sales under § 363(f), they cannot be extinguished under a plan because they are not “liens” terminable
under a plan sale. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii). Nor are they “interests” of “creditors” having monetary “rights to payment,” because they are enforceable by state and tenant injunctions. 11
U.S.C. §§ 101(5), (10), 1141(c).
12
question.” 520 U.S. at 962. When, as here, collateral is
retained and used, the court determines replacement
value as “the price a willing buyer in the debtor’s trade,
business, or situation would pay a willing seller to obtain property of like age and condition.” Id. at 959 n.2.
Debtor Sunnyslope’s business has always been affordable housing; property of “like” condition is covenant-restricted
affordable
housing. While
a
hypothetical post-foreclosure buyer from the creditor
need not take that into account, any buyer from the
debtor’s estate must do so. App.58a. It is the perspective of a buyer from the debtor that governs when, as
here, the very purpose of the plan is to prevent a foreclosure sale. The Rash majority rejected the dissent’s
position, precisely what First Southern argues here,
“that the value should be determined from the creditor’s perspective, i.e., what the collateral is worth, on
the open market, in the creditor’s hands, rather than
in the hands of another party.” 520 U.S. at 966 (Stevens, J., dissenting). And manifestly, § 506 provides for
valuing property as collateral titled in the debtor, not
post-foreclosure when owned by the creditor free and
clear with a change in permissible use.2
Sunnyslope’s reorganization plan thus provided
for the only legal use that anyone could make of the
project, unless surrendered to First Southern for foreclosure. App.12a–13a. It was not a mere choice as First
2
The foreclosure sale itself does not determine fair market
value. BFP, 511 U.S. at 537–38.
13
Southern argues or idiosyncrasy as the Ninth Circuit
dissent characterized it. Pet.18, App.20a n.1.3
The language of § 506(a), straightforwardly explained in Rash and followed by the en banc Ninth Circuit here, does not include First Southern’s supposed
addition of “or the foreclosure value, whichever is
greater” after “proposed disposition or use of such
property.” Courts do not add language to statutory text.
See Alabama v. North Carolina, 560 U.S. 330, 352
(2010) (“We do not – we cannot – add provisions to a
federal statute.”); Lamie v. U.S. Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 538
(2004) (“ ‘There is a basic difference between filling a
gap left by Congress’ silence and rewriting rules that
Congress has affirmatively and specifically enacted.’ ”
(quoting Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S.
618, 625 (1978)).
The only material difference between this case
and Rash is that here the foreclosure value is higher
than the replacement value. But Rash acknowledged
that this would sometimes be the case. See Rash, 520
U.S. at 960 (noting that foreclosure value is “typically
lower” than replacement value (emphasis added)). And
Rash expressly rejected “a ruleless approach allowing
use of different valuation standards based on the facts
and circumstances of individual cases.” Id. at 964 n.5.
Cram-down value depends on the estate’s proposed use
of the estate’s interest in the property, certainly when
3
The en banc dissent posited that a conservation-minded
debtor might try to impose wilderness restrictions to prevent development, but in this case, the CC&Rs were integral to funding
the Capstone Loan and in effect when First Southern bought it.
14
it is the only legal use, not which calculation will produce the highest dollar figure.
II.
THERE IS NO SPLIT OF AUTHORITY;
UNITED AIR LINES AND THE NINTH CIRCUIT PROPERLY APPLIED RASH.
The Ninth Circuit’s en banc opinion and the Seventh Circuit’s United Air Lines opinion properly applied Rash to very different issues. There is no reason
to expect that the Seventh Circuit would reach a different result than the Ninth Circuit on the same or
similar facts. First Southern’s supposed conflict is fabricated.
United Air Lines concerned improved property collateral: terminal gates at Los Angeles International
Airport. 564 F.3d at 875. In attempting to value the collateral, the bankruptcy court had applied a discount
rate to the annual rent that United paid to the airport.
Id. at 876. But that rent was for unimproved space; the
airport had agreed not to charge rent for the improvements because the airline had paid for their installation. Id. The bankruptcy court’s valuation method did
not value the lenders’ actual collateral – improved
space. Id.
The “disposition or use” of the property under
United’s plan was not an issue in United Air Lines. Rather, the issue was whether bankruptcy court accounted for the value of improved, in-use space. See id.
at 876 (“A price for unimproved space does not measure the value of the collateral.”); id. at 877 (“Any
15
valuation method that treats improvements as worthless can’t be appropriate.”).
The court noted that if the lenders foreclosed,
they “could rent the gates to United or some other airline” at a higher rate than United paid to the airport.
564 F.3d at 876–77. But that was merely illustrative of
the point that the market price of fully built-out gates
must be ascertained, and was dictum irrelevant to the
holding. The court’s analysis focused on the price paid
by other airlines for other LAX improved terminal
gates, evidencing “the price that could be agreed by
willing buyers and sellers negotiating for a replacement.” Id. at 875 (citing Rash), 876–79. In United Air
Lines, the property would have merely changed owners, not usage, after a foreclosure. The court never analyzed potential post-foreclosure alternative use, e.g.,
for post-foreclosure newly authorized luxury private
jets, but only the market value of improved gates
leased to a commercial airline like United.
The Seventh Circuit did not hold, as First Southern contends, that “a bankruptcy court may not value
the collateral based on the debtor’s proposed use if that
use would result in a value less than what the creditor
could obtain in foreclosure.” Pet.16. Nor did the court
say that “proper valuation under § 506(a) could be no
less than the actual value the secured creditor could
obtain in foreclosure.” Pet.17. United Air Lines has
only been cited eight times in the eight years since it
was decided, and never for the proposition for which
First Southern cites it.
16
First Southern argues that the Ninth Circuit was
wrong because it chose the lower value and that the
Seventh Circuit was right because it chose the higher
value. But neither court’s decision was based on the
dollar figure. The statutory language and Rash apply
uniformly, whatever the numbers may be.
Winthrop does not create a circuit split over Rash
because it was a pre-Rash case. In re Winthrop Old
Farm Nurseries, 50 F.3d 72, 74 (1st Cir. 1995). Presaging Rash, Winthrop expressly refused to interpret
§ 506(a) as requiring collateral valuation of “the net
amount a secured creditor could recover if it seized or
foreclosed on the collateral and disposed of it in accordance with applicable state law.” Id. at 74–75. And the
Winthrop parties stipulated to liquidation and fair
market value amounts, with no discussion of calculating liquidation value. Id. at 72.
In re Heritage Highgate never “equated [replacement value] with the asset’s foreclosure value” or set
foreclosure value as a “floor,” as the academic amici
claim. Law Professors’ Br. at 5–6. Rather, the court refused to value collateral based on hypothetical projections of future value recovery, as the creditor sought.
679 F.3d 132, 142–43 (3d Cir. 2012). And the two bankruptcy cases those amici cite as holding Rash inapplicable in chapter 11 cases likewise do no such thing.
They only distinguish Rash in the indubitable equivalence “dirt-for-debt” cram-down context where partial
collateral is surrendered to the secured creditor – an
alternative Rash did not address. In re Sugarleaf Timber, LLC, 529 B.R. 317, 32n n.14 (M.D. Fla. 2015); In re
17
Bate Land & Timber, LLC, 523 B.R. 483, 500 n.15
(Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2015). There is no need to “clarify”
that Rash applies in chapter 11 because the amici’s
cited cases show no such dispute. Potential inapplicability of Rash in chapter 11 cases is also a new argument not raised in the petition. See Kamen v. Kemper
Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 97 n.4 (1991) (“[W]e do not
ordinarily address issues raised only by amici. . . .”).
None of the lower court cases cited by First Southern justify this Court’s review at this time. Three are
pre-Rash.4 Only one concerns a difference between
foreclosure value and market value as used by the
debtor. In that chapter 13 case, a bankruptcy court
held that a creditor secured by a mobile home was not
entitled to the value of a carport and patio on which it
did not have a lien, even though under state foreclosure law it might be able to sell the mobile home “in
place” and a buyer would value the right to lease space
with those improvements. In re Young, 367 B.R. 183
(Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2007). The other cases are chapter 12
and 13 bankruptcies where courts alternatively did
and did not value property based on actual use or a
more lucrative use that the court found was or was not
true replacement value for fact-intensive reasons.5
4
Speck v. United States, 104 B.R. 1021 (D.S.D. 1989); In re
Sherman, 157 B.R. 987 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1993); In re Ehrich, 109
B.R. 390 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1989).
5
In re Donato, 253 B.R. 151 (M.D. Pa. 2000); In re McElwee,
449 B.R. 669 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2011); In re Bishop, 339 B.R. 595
(Bankr. D. S.C. 2005); In re Bell, 304 B.R. 878 (Bankr. N.D. Ind.
2003).
18
III. THE ISSUE PRESENTED IS UNLIKELY
TO RECUR, MUCH LESS CAUSE THE CATASTROPHE FORECAST BY FIRST
SOUTHERN AND ITS AMICI.
This case presents the unique circumstance where
foreclosure value would be higher than the existing use
of the property due to legal restrictions on use by the
estate and any buyer from the estate. The facts are so
uncommon that counsel has not found a single other
reported case like it, and First Southern has cited
none. There has been no debate among the courts of
appeals (or any other courts) on the issue, even though
Rash was decided 20 years ago. See U.S. Bancorp
Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall P’ship, 513 U.S. 18, 27 (1994)
(“[D]ebate among the courts of appeals sufficiently illuminates the questions that come before us for review.”). Without such consideration, this Court’s
intervention would be premature. See Bank of Am.
Nat’l Tr. & Savings Ass’n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P’ship,
526 U.S. 434, 443 (1999) (granting certiorari once clear
circuit split had developed). Sunnyslope by no means
raises an issue where national uniformity is at stake,
especially when binding legal restrictions mandating a
less profitable use are taken into account.
Second, this case is unique because First Southern
waived the protections that Bankruptcy Code
§ 1129(a)(7)(A) provides creditors through the “best interest of creditors test” – something most creditors
would not do. Under that test, creditors are entitled to
receive at least as much as they would “receive or
19
retain if the debtor were liquidated” in a chapter 7
case. § 1129(a)(7)(A).6
First Southern is vigorously arguing here that it
should get its liquidation value, i.e., what it would get
by a resale were it able to foreclose. But First Southern
waived that right by choosing to exercise its rights under § 1111(b) instead. When a secured creditor exercises its option under § 1111(b) to have its collateral
continue to secure the entire amount of its debt and be
paid the entire amount, it waives its unsecured deficiency claim. 7 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 111.03[5], at
111–29 (16th ed. 2017). Thus, the liquidation value test
no longer applies, and instead the court need only find
that the present value of deferred payments equals the
secured creditor’s interest in its collateral, i.e. the deferred payment cram-down test. §§ 1129(a)(7)(B),
1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(II); Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410,
430 n.3 (1992).
In other words, § 1129(a)(7)(B) “in effect exempts
secured creditors making an election under section
1111(b)(2) from application of the best interest of creditors test.” H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6
One bankruptcy case has held that the liquidation value
measures what a creditor would receive or retain from a chapter
7 trustee, not what it might realize from other sources. In re Dow
Corning Corp., 237 B.R. 380, 411 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1999). But no
court has applied that to the foreclosure value of collateral. In a
chapter 7 case, a trustee would abandon estate assets with no equity value for unsecured creditors, enabling the secured creditor
to foreclose. See Midlantic Nat’l Bank v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot.,
474 U.S. 499, 508–09 (1986) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (describing
abandonment provision).
20
5963, 6477 (1977). As the Ninth Circuit recognized,
First Southern could have, but did not, utilize its “ability to prevent approval of the reorganization plan.”
App.19a. Most creditors in the bank’s position would
have exercised that right, and defeated plan confirmation.
Third, First Southern inaccurately forecasts the
risks of a creditor receiving less upon a plan
default than it would in foreclosure under the Ninth
Circuit’s holding. The Court recognized in Rash that
cram-downs pose the risk for creditors that the debtor
may again default and the property may deteriorate
from extended use. Rash, 520 U.S. at 962. In this unusual case, however, that risk is reduced for the very
reason that foreclosure value is higher: If and when
there is a plan default, the value will increase with
post-foreclosure market rental rates and the sale price
will concomitantly increase. App.8a. Moreover, as Justice Scalia explained in Till v. SCS Credit Corp., “[i]f
Congress wanted to compensate secured creditors for
the risk of a plan failure, it would not have done so by
prescribing a particular method of valuing collateral.”
541 U.S. 465, 507 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Rash
adopted the replacement value standard because of
§ 506(a)’s text, not to compensate for increased risk.
Finally, it is most unlikely that the Ninth Circuit’s
holding will adversely affect the development of lowincome multi-family housing in the United States or
the credit markets for distressed HUD-guaranteed
loans as First Southern and its bank association amici
posit. It has been a federal priority to “assist private
21
industry in providing housing for low and moderate income families and displaced families,” since enactment
of the National Housing Act of 1961, 12 U.S.C.
§ 1715l(a), long before HUD began selling distressed
loans in 2010. See Laurie Goodman & Dan Magdar,
Selling HUD’s Nonperforming Loans: A Win-Win for
Borrowers, Investors, and HUD, The Urban Institute
(Jan. 2016) (explaining that HUD began selling nonperforming loans insured by the Federal Housing Administration in 2010).
HUD’s ability to sell a defaulted loan in the event
its mortgage guarantee is triggered is irrelevant for
purposes of issuing such guarantees. Instead, Congress mandated only that HUD ensure, through agreement or regulation, that the project be used for
affordable housing. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1715l(b), 1715l(d)(3)(iii).
The availability of HUD-insured loans under the
National Housing Act of 1961, together with the availability of the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit under
the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 26 U.S.C. § 42, is what
drives development of low-income multi-family housing projects in the United States, not the market for
distressed HUD loans. See Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency, Low-Income Tax Credits: Affordable
Housing Investment Opportunities for Banks, Community Developments – Insights (April 2014) (explaining
that “[t]he Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) is
the federal government’s primary program for encouraging the investment of private equity in the development of affordable rental housing for low-income
households”).
22
And if HUD is concerned that a particular borrower might file bankruptcy and that this would actually impact the resale value of a defaulted loan, HUD
can itself foreclose and then sell the property instead
of the loan. The bankruptcy automatic stay does not
apply to HUD’s foreclosure of HUD-insured loans for
multi-family housing projects. § 362(b)(8). The notions
that HUD would elevate a possible impact on purchase
prices for post-foreclosure note sales over its statutory
mandate to further affordable housing, and that HUD
multi-family home loan sales will be depressed because of the Ninth Circuit decision, are nothing but unsupported speculation.
IV. RASH AND SUNNYSLOPE ARE IN ACCORD WITH FUNDAMENTAL BANKRUPTCY PRINCIPLES.
The Bankruptcy Code was drafted to enable reorganization and maximization of value to all parties in
interest – not just creditors, let alone the largest ones.
See Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157, 163 (1991) (“Chapter
11 also embodies the general Code policy of maximizing the value of the bankruptcy estate.”); Fla. Dep’t of
Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc., 554 U.S. 33, 51
(2008) (“Chapter 11 strikes a balance between a
debtor’s interest in reorganizing and restructuring its
debts and the creditors’ interest in maximizing the
value of the bankruptcy estate.”); Pioneer Inv. Servs.,
Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 507 U.S. 380, 389
(1993) (“[T]he bankruptcy courts are necessarily entrusted with broad equitable powers to balance the
23
interests of the affected parties, guided by the overriding goal of ensuring the success of the reorganization.”).
First Southern was Sunnyslope’s largest creditor,
but not the only one deserving of protection. In addition to trade creditors, the City of Phoenix and the
State of Arizona held claims exceeding $3.5 million, as
well as interests in providing affordable housing and
tenant rights.
The bankruptcy court found that Sunnyslope’s
business operations were viable and that it could feasibly pay its debts under the plan. As a result,
Sunnyslope was able to continue its business of providing affordable housing, and new equity invested significant capital. Consistent with the Code’s purpose, the
plan thereby maximized value for all parties in interest, including unsecured and subordinate lien creditors. See NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 528
(1984) (“The fundamental purpose of reorganization is
to prevent a debtor from going into liquidation, with an
attendant loss of jobs and possible misuse of economic
resources. In some cases reorganization may succeed
only if new creditors infuse the ailing firm with additional capital.” (citation omitted)).
While enabling reorganizations, the Code provides
specific protections for secured creditors; these do not,
as First Southern argues, Pet.24, include requiring a
debtor to consent to foreclosure just to maximize the
return to a single creditor at the expense of all others
and the estate. There is no unconstitutional taking
24
when a creditor’s claim is satisfied in accordance with
Code-authorized cram-down treatment that was in effect when the loan was made. In re Thompson, 867 F.2d
416, 422 (7th Cir. 1989).7
A. Adequate Protection When a Chapter
11 Case is Filed.
Secured creditor rights at the inception of a chapter 11 case focus primarily on the automatic stay,
which prevents collateral foreclosure. A secured creditor is entitled to “adequate protection” when foreclosure is blocked and collateral use is allowed, but that
only protects against any decrease during the bankruptcy case “in the value of [the secured creditor’s] interest in such property.” § 361(1),(2),(3).
The meaning of that phrase was elucidated in
Timbers, where this Court agreed with the Fifth Circuit that a bankruptcy court erred by calculating adequate protection payments “on the estimated amount
realizable on foreclosure.” United Sav. Ass’n of Tex. v.
Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365,
369 (1988). It held that a secured creditor’s § 506(a)
7
The petition misleadingly suggests the Frazier-Lemke Act
shows the Takings Clause is a problem. Pet.28–29. The Court
unanimously upheld a modified version of the Frazier-Lemke Act
because it adequately preserved three rights of secured creditors:
(1) the right to retain the lien until the secured indebtedness is
paid; (2) the right to realize on the security by a judicial public
sale after obtaining stay relief; and (3) the right to bid in secured
debt at a collateral sale. Wright v. Vinton Branch of the Mountain
Tr. Bank, 300 U.S. 440, 458–59 (1937).
25
“ ‘interest in property’ obviously means his security interest without taking account of his right to immediate
possession of the collateral on default.” Id. at 372. And
Timbers noted that before the current Bankruptcy
Code, an “undersecured creditor had no absolute entitlement to foreclosure” in a reorganization case. Id. at
380–81.
Resolving a circuit split, Timbers overruled In re
American Mariner Industries, Inc., 734 F.2d 426 (9th
Cir. 1984), which had held that a secured creditor’s
right to take possession of and sell collateral on the
debtor’s default was a state law “interest in property”
that the court had to protect in a bankruptcy case. Id.
at 435. Notably, American Mariner reasoned from the
case touted as “foundational” by First Southern for the
principle that secured creditors are entitled to the indubitable equivalence of their foreclosure rights, In re
Murel Holding Corp., 75 F.2d 941 (2d Cir. 1935). See
734 F.2d at 432–33. And this Court in Timbers rejected
the notion that Murel Holding means more than that
a secured creditor is entitled to the present value of its
collateral under a plan. 484 U.S. at 379.
B. Secured Creditor Reorganization Plan
Protections.
At the end of a reorganization case, the Code again
specifies secured creditor protections. In addition to assurance of the liquidation value that a creditor would
receive in a chapter 7 – waived here by First Southern
– plan treatment can be forced, or “crammed down,”
26
only when one of three alternative tests is met. But
that does not mean that creditors are entitled to recover their collateral foreclosure value. As Rash explained, “[t]he Code’s cram down option displaces a
secured creditor’s state-law right to obtain immediate
foreclosure upon a debtor’s default.” 520 U.S. at 964.
Sunnyslope’s plan utilized the first method, deferred cash payments to the secured creditor retaining
its lien, with sufficient interest to result in receiving
the present value of the secured claim as of the effective date. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i). Collateral alternatively
could be sold with the secured creditor receiving sale
proceeds, but subject to credit bidding rights, and
capped at the loan balance (not a higher amount
the creditor might obtain from a post-foreclosure resale). § 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii). Or the secured creditor could
realize the “indubitable equivalent” of its secured
claim. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii). While First Southern argues
for entitlement to the indubitable equivalent of a foreclosure sale, RadLAX explained that clause (iii) indubitable equivalence is inapplicable when another
alternative is met. RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v.
Amalgamated Bank, 566 U.S. 639, 647–48 and n.4
(2012).
Congress’ comprehensive bankruptcy scheme
deliberately addressed the risk of collateral undervaluation by the bankruptcy court in a deferred payment cram-down with a specific solution: the right to
elect § 1111(b) treatment. Upon such an election, the
lien secures the full amount of the allowed claim, including the portion held by the court to be unsecured,
27
and the full amount must be paid by the end of the plan
term. First Southern exercised that right, and will receive over time the full Capstone Note amount – more
than its perceived foreclosure value.
First Southern and its amici have cobbled together
snippets of language from cases to compile a supposed
principle that a secured creditor must receive from a
bankruptcy estate at least the amount for which it can
resell the collateral after foreclosure. But they have
cited no Code language or case actually holding this.
And they have no explanation why the Code provisions
protecting secured creditors from perceived collateral
undervaluation – the liquidation value test that First
Southern waived and the § 1111(b) election it utilized
– are not the means Congress provided to protect secured creditors in this context.
V.
THIS CASE IS BURDENED BY EQUITABLE MOOTNESS, WHICH THE COURT
HAS REPEATEDLY DECLINED TO REVIEW.
The relief First Southern seeks would effectively
double Sunnyslope’s largest payment obligation under
the plan, and would do so at the expense of all other
parties in interest. Granting that relief would eviscerate the already-consummated plan, with disastrous effects on all other parties in interest who relied on the
plan’s implementation in structuring their business
operations and making post-confirmation capital investments. First Southern could have avoided the
28
potential for such disruption – and thus presented a
cleaner vehicle for certiorari – had it posted a supersedeas bond, easily affordable for the bank, and stayed
confirmation. Instead, First Southern only sought a
free stay, and stopped asking once the district court rejected the request in light of its ruling against the bank
on the merits.
As a result of First Southern’s failure to stay confirmation, this Court could not grant relief without addressing the doctrine of equitable mootness, i.e.,
whether effective relief and “unscrambling the egg” is
possible for the already-consummated plan. Yet the
Court has repeatedly declined to address equitable
mootness, and this case presents no better opportunity
to do so. See In re One2One Commc’ns, LLC, 805 F.3d
428, 448 (3d Cir. 2015) (Krause, J., concurring) (observing that this Court has declined to grant numerous petitions for certiorari presenting the question); see also
Aurelius Capital Mgmt., L.P. v. Tribune Media Co., 136
S. Ct. 1459 (2016). It has not been the subject of robust
debate in the court of appeals, so it is “not surprising
that [this Court] had denied those petitions.” In re
One2One, 805 F.3d at 448 n.18 (Krause, J., concurring).
The Court has denied certiorari on equitable mootness
even when the United States requested review. See id.
at 448 (citing Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, United
States v. GWI PCS 1, Inc., 533 U.S. 964 (2001)).
But if the Court grants the writ here, equitable
mootness is front and center. First Southern has not
disputed that granting the relief it seeks would undo
the plan – forcing the Court to address whether it
29
would accept such a drastic outcome for all parties in
interest (including those not parties to this appeal) in
order to satisfy a single creditor.
The inability to grant effective relief that undergirds equitable mootness mirrors that aspect of the
“case or controversy” mootness doctrine. See Church of
Scientology of Cal. v. United States, 506 U.S. 9, 12
(1992) (“[I]f an event occurs while a case is pending on
appeal that makes it impossible for the court to grant
any effectual relief whatever to a prevailing party, the
appeal must be dismissed.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)). The Court denies review when, despite the
parties remaining before the Court, it cannot realistically undo the action at issue which has irretrievably
occurred. See Brockington v. Rhodes, 396 U.S. 41, 43
(1969) (holding that candidate’s appeal from order
denying writ of mandamus to appear on ballot for 1968
election was moot once that election occurred); Hall v.
Beals, 396 U.S. 45, 48 (1969) (“The 1968 election is history, and it is now impossible to grant the appellants
the relief they sought in the district court.”); see also
N.J. Tpk. Auth. v. Jersey Cent. Power & Light, 772 F.2d
25, 27 (3d Cir. 1985) (finding mootness where “the acts
sought to be enjoined have irretrievably occurred”).
The same principles apply when transactions under a confirmed reorganization plan have been substantially consummated, and appellate courts lack the
ability to grant effective relief without undoing the
plan. See, e.g., In re Nica Holdings, Inc., 810 F.3d 781,
786 (11th Cir. 2015) (equitable mootness when appellate court cannot grant effective judicial relief ); In re
30
Manges, 29 F.3d 1034, 1039 (5th Cir. 1994) (equitable
mootness “is a recognition by the appellate courts that
there is a point beyond which they cannot order fundamental changes in reorganization actions,” and equitably moot cases are dismissed because “effective judicial
relief is no longer available.”); In re UNR Indus., Inc.,
20 F.3d 766, 769 (7th Cir. 1994) (noting that “[u]ndoing
all of [the plan transactions] is impossible” and holding
that an appeal must be dismissed); In re Chateaugay
Corp., 10 F.3d 944, 952 (2d Cir. 1993) (“[T]he finality
rule limits the remedies a court can offer.” (internal
quotation marks omitted)). As with Article III mootness, the thing to be undone has, for all practical purposes, already happened. Parties to the plan, including
non-parties on appeal, have relied on confirmation order finality and the absence of a stay, resulting in consummated reorganization transactions that cannot be
“unscrambled.”
While entitlement to rely on judgment finality is a
basic legal concept in any case, it is especially apt in
bankruptcy for two reasons. If any of the multiple parties to a bankruptcy plan could force alteration of plan
settlements years later, the disincentives to resolve differences and the leverage gained from threats to disrupt consummated transactions would imperil
organizations overall. “Every incremental risk of revision on appeal puts a cloud over the plan of reorganization, and derivatively over the assets of the
reorganized firm.” UNR Indus., 20 F.3d at 770. And
second, “[b]y protecting the interests of persons who
acquire assets in reliance on a plan of reorganization,
31
a court increases the price the estate can realize ex
ante, and thus produces benefits for creditors in the aggregate.” Id. “People pay less for assets that may be
snatched back or otherwise affected by subsequent
events.” Id.
That includes investment in a restructured company as well as the purchase of its assets. “One reason
some third parties have reliance interests more worthy
of protection than others is that we want to encourage
behavior (like investment in a reorganized entity) that
contributes to a successful reorganization.” In re Tribune Media Co., 799 F.3d 272, 279 (3d Cir. 2015).
Here, an investor contributed $1.2 million to fund
the plan. That money has been used by Sunnyslope to
pay creditors and taxing authorities, make capital improvements, implement contracts, and acquire a park
lease. The money simply cannot be recovered. The investor’s equity holders will also face IRC § 1033 tax
consequences costing them $1.5 million if the plan is
undone, as well as losing affordable housing tax credits, potentially even retroactively.
In addition to the investor, the City of Phoenix and
State of Arizona will be adversely affected if the plan
protecting payment of their claims and their interest
in local affordable housing is extinguished by an appellate reversal. Post-closing contracts and expenditures
cannot be rescinded, and individuals and governments
will be irreparably damaged by reversal now.
A case where the appealing creditor posted a bond
and stayed confirmation would present none of these
32
hurdles to resolving the merits. This case therefore
does not present a clean vehicle for the Court to resolve
a circuit split even if there was one.
------------------------------------------------------------------
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the petition for a
writ of certiorari should be denied.
Respectfully submitted,
SUSAN M. FREEMAN
Counsel of Record
JUSTIN J. HENDERSON
DANIEL A. ARELLANO
LEWIS ROCA ROTHGERBER
CHRISTIE LLP
201 East Washington Street
Suite 1200
Phoenix, Arizona 85004
(602) 262-5756
SFreeman@LRRC.com
Counsel for Respondent
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.