Respondents Brief — First Southern National Bank, Petitioner v. Sunnyslope Housing Limited Partnership

Supreme Court briefNov 27, 2017

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No. 17-455

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In The

Supreme Court of the United States

-----------------------------------------------------------------FIRST SOUTHERN NATIONAL BANK,

Petitioner,

v.

SUNNYSLOPE HOUSING LIMITED PARTNERSHIP,

Respondent.

-----------------------------------------------------------------On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari

To The United States Court Of Appeals

For The Ninth Circuit

-----------------------------------------------------------------RESPONDENT’S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

-----------------------------------------------------------------SUSAN M. FREEMAN

Counsel of Record

JUSTIN J. HENDERSON

DANIEL A. ARELLANO

LEWIS ROCA ROTHGERBER

CHRISTIE LLP

201 E. Washington Street

Suite 1200

Phoenix, Arizona 85004

(602) 262-5756

SFreeman@LRRC.com

Counsel for Respondent

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COCKLE LEGAL BRIEFS (800) 225-6964

WWW.COCKLELEGALBRIEFS.COM

i

QUESTION PRESENTED

Does Bankruptcy Code § 506(a) require valuation

of collateral:

(a) as used by the debtor in the reorganization

plan, when recorded servitudes require such property

use and any buyer from the estate would have to comply with the restrictions and accordingly would take

them into account in its purchase price; or

(b) from the creditor’s perspective of the higher

price a buyer might pay after creditor foreclosure,

when it is no longer merely collateral and the servitudes are eliminated, but that foreclosure will not take

place under the plan?

ii

RULE 29.6 STATEMENT

Sunnyslope Housing Limited Partnership is a limited partnership. No publicly held corporation or entity

owns 10% or more of any general or limited partnership interest.

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTION PRESENTED...................................

i

RULE 29.6 STATEMENT ....................................

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS ......................................

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................

v

INTRODUCTION ................................................

1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE..............................

4

A.

The CC&Rs are Integral to the Secured

Loan, and Remain Binding ........................

4

First Southern’s Valuation Assumes a

Foreclosure.................................................

5

First Southern Is Paid in Full Under the

Plan ............................................................

6

The Investors Fund the Plan, Equitably

Mooting This Appeal ..................................

7

REASONS TO DENY THE WRIT .......................

9

B.

C.

D.

I.

SECTION 506(a) IS CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS ABOUT THE VALUATION TEST

APPLIED IN RASH AND FOLLOWED BY

THE NINTH CIRCUIT ...............................

9

A. The Creditor’s Interest ........................

9

B. The Estate’s Interest ........................... 10

C. The Proposed Disposition or Use ........ 11

II.

THERE IS NO SPLIT OF AUTHORITY;

UNITED AIR LINES AND THE NINTH

CIRCUIT PROPERLY APPLIED RASH ..... 14

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS – Continued

Page

III.

THE ISSUE PRESENTED IS UNLIKELY

TO RECUR, MUCH LESS CAUSE THE

CATASTROPHE FORECAST BY FIRST

SOUTHERN AND ITS AMICI ................... 18

IV.

RASH AND SUNNYSLOPE ARE IN

ACCORD

WITH

FUNDAMENTAL

BANKRUPTCY PRINCIPLES .................. 22

A. Adequate Protection When a Chapter

11 Case is Filed ................................... 24

B. Secured Creditor Reorganization Plan

Protections ........................................... 25

V.

THIS CASE IS BURDENED BY

EQUITABLE MOOTNESS, WHICH THE

COURT HAS REPEATEDLY DECLINED

TO REVIEW .............................................. 27

CONCLUSION..................................................... 32

v

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

FEDERAL CASES

Alabama v. North Carolina, 560 U.S. 330 (2010) ......13

Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 520 U.S.

953 (1997) ........................................................ passim

Aurelius Capital Mgmt., L.P. v. Tribune Media

Co., 136 S. Ct. 1459 (2016) ......................................28

Bank of Am. Nat’l Tr. & Savings Ass’n v. 203 N.

LaSalle St. P’ship, 526 U.S. 434 (1999) ..................18

BFP v. Resolution Tr. Corp., 511 U.S. 531 (1994)..... 5, 12

Brockington v. Rhodes, 396 U.S. 41 (1969) .................29

Church of Scientology of Cal. v. United States,

506 U.S. 9 (1992) .....................................................29

Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410 (1992) ......................19

Fla. Dep’t of Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias,

Inc., 554 U.S. 33 (2008)............................................22

Gouveia v. Tazbir, 37 F.3d 295 (7th Cir. 1994) ...........10

Hall v. Beals, 396 U.S. 45 (1969) ................................29

In re 523 E. Fifth St. Hous. Preservation Dev.

Fund Corp., 79 B.R. 568 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.

1987) ........................................................................11

In re Am. Mariner Indus., Inc., 734 F.2d 426 (9th

Cir. 1984) .................................................................25

In re Bate Land & Timber, LLC, 523 B.R. 483

(Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2015) ............................................16

In re Bell, 304 B.R. 878 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 2003) ........17

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES – Continued

Page

In re Bishop, 339 B.R. 595 (Bankr. D. S.C. 2005) .......17

In re Chateaugay Corp., 10 F.3d 944 (2d Cir.

1993) ........................................................................30

In re Donato, 253 B.R. 151 (M.D. Pa. 2000) ...............17

In re Dow Corning Corp., 237 B.R. 380 (Bankr.

E.D. Mich. 1999) ......................................................19

In re Ehrich, 109 B.R. 390 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1989) ........17

In re Heritage Highgate, 679 F.3d 132 (3d Cir.

2012). .......................................................................16

In re Manges, 29 F.3d 1034 (5th Cir. 1994) ................29

In re McElwee, 449 B.R. 669 (Bankr. M.D. Pa.

2011) ........................................................................17

In re Murel Holding Corp., 75 F.2d 941 (2d Cir.

1935) ........................................................................25

In re Nica Holdings, Inc., 810 F.3d 781 (11th Cir.

2015) ........................................................................29

In re One2One Commc’ns, LLC, 805 F.3d 428 (3d

Cir. 2015) .................................................................28

In re Sherman, 157 B.R. 987 (Bankr. E.D. Tex.

1993) ........................................................................17

In re Sugarleaf Timber, LLC, 529 B.R. 317 (M.D.

Fla. 2015) .................................................................16

In re Thompson, 867 F.2d 416 (7th Cir. 1989) ............24

In re Tribune Media Co., 799 F.3d 272 (3d Cir.

2015) ........................................................................31

vii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES – Continued

Page

In re UNR Indus., Inc., 20 F.3d 766 (7th Cir.

1994) .................................................................. 30, 31

In re Winthrop Old Farm Nurseries, 50 F.3d 72

(1st Cir. 1995) ..........................................................16

In re Young, 367 B.R. 183 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2007) ....... 17

Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90

(1991) .......................................................................17

Lamie v. U.S., Tr., 540 U.S. 526 (2004)........................13

Midlantic Nat’l Bank v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot.,

474 U.S. 499 (1986) .................................................19

Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618

(1978) .......................................................................13

N.J. Tpk. Auth. v. Jersey Cent. Power & Light,

772 F.2d 25 (3d Cir. 1985) .......................................29

NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513 (1984)........ 23

Pioneer Inv. Servs., Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd.

P’ship, 507 U.S. 380 (1993)......................................22

RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated

Bank, 566 U.S. 639 (2012) .......................................26

Speck v. United States, 104 B.R. 1021 (D.S.D.

1989) ........................................................................17

Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465 (2004) ............20

Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157 (1991) .........................22

U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall P’ship,

513 U.S. 18 (1994) ...................................................18

viii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES – Continued

Page

United Air Lines Inc. v. Regional Airports

Improvement Corp., 564 F.3d 873 (7th Cir.

2009) .............................................................. 2, 14, 15

United Sav. Ass’n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood

Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365 (1988)........... 24, 25

United States v. GWI PCS 1, Inc., 533 U.S. 964

(2001) .......................................................................28

Wright v. Vinton Branch of the Mountain Tr.

Bank, 300 U.S. 440 (1937) .......................................24

STATE CASES

Federoff v. Pioneer Title & Tr. Co. of Ariz., 803

P.2d 104 (Ariz. 1990) ...............................................10

Powell v. Washburn, 125 P.3d 373 (Ariz. 2006) ..........10

STATUTES

11 U.S.C. § 101(5) ........................................................11

11 U.S.C. § 101(10) ......................................................11

11 U.S.C. § 101(37) ......................................................11

11 U.S.C. § 361 ............................................................24

11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(8) ...................................................22

11 U.S.C. § 363(f ) ........................................................11

11 U.S.C. § 506 ............................................................12

11 U.S.C. § 506(a) ................................................ passim

11 U.S.C. § 1111(b) .................................. 3, 6, 19, 26, 27

ix

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES – Continued

Page

11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7) ...................................................3

11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7)(A) ...................................... 18, 19

11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7)(B) ............................................19

11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A) ................................ 11, 19, 26

11 U.S.C. § 1141(c) ......................................................11

12 U.S.C. § 1715l(a).....................................................21

12 U.S.C. § 1715l(b).....................................................21

12 U.S.C. § 1715l(d)(3)(iii) ..........................................21

26 U.S.C. § 42 ..............................................................21

26 U.S.C. § 142(d) ..........................................................4

26 U.S.C. § 1033 ...................................................... 8, 31

REGULATIONS

Treas. Reg. § 1.103-8(b)(6) ............................................8

OTHER AUTHORITIES

7 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 111.03[5] (16th ed.

2017) ........................................................................19

Laurie Goodman & Dan Magdar, Selling HUD’s

Nonperforming Loans: A Win-Win for Borrowers, Investors, and HUD, The Urban Institute

(Jan. 2016) ...............................................................21

H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963

(1977) ......................................................................... 19

x

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES – Continued

Page

Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, LowIncome Tax Credits: Affordable Housing Investment Opportunities for Banks, Community Developments – Insights (April 2014) ............21

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES

§ 7.9 (2000) ..............................................................11

1

INTRODUCTION

The en banc opinion below correctly held that under Bankruptcy Code § 506(a) and Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 520 U.S. 953 (1997), the bankruptcy

court properly valued the apartment project owned by

respondent Sunnyslope Housing Limited Partnership

(“Sunnyslope”) as subject to the restrictive covenants

running with the land that limit Sunnyslope’s interest

in the property and obligate it to operate the project as

low-income housing. Even though a foreclosure by secured creditor petitioner First Southern National

Bank (“First Southern”) would eliminate the restrictive covenants and thereby increase the value by allowing a new purchaser from the bank to rent

apartments at market rates, § 506(a) requires valuation to be made in light of the debtor estate’s “actual

use” of the property, rather than from the creditor’s

perspective of a “foreclosure sale that will not take

place.” App.11a–14a; Rash, 520 U.S. at 960–62. First

Southern asks the Court to construe this as meaning

the post-foreclosure resale value the creditor could

achieve or the replacement value of the property as

held by the estate and used under the plan, whichever

is higher.

The low-income use restrictions here must be

taken into account because they are not simply junior

liens that can be ignored in valuing the project. They

limit the bankruptcy estate’s interest in the property

because they are servitudes – binding legal prohibitions on any other use while in the hands of the estate

2

or any buyer from the estate. The original lender

agreed to this when making the loan. Affordable housing is not only the actual use under Sunnyslope’s plan,

but the only legal use until and unless there is a plan

default and First Southern actually forecloses. The

bank’s doomsday scenarios, and its supposition that affordable housing is a mere use of choice, do not take

this uncommon situation into account.

Although First Southern has attempted to manufacture a circuit split, there is none. Both the Ninth

Circuit below and the Seventh Circuit in United Air

Lines Inc. v. Regional Airports Improvement Corp., 564

F.3d 873 (7th Cir. 2009), determined the market value

of collateral based upon what a willing buyer would

pay for a replacement of the property as used by the

reorganized debtor under its plan. The Seventh Circuit

did not apply a hypothetical foreclosure value test.

This case is unusual in other respects that render

it inappropriate for this Court’s time and attention.

First, rarely does foreclosure value exceed replacement

fair market value. Still, this Court acknowledged in

Rash that it may happen, yet held that replacement

value is always the test under § 506(a)’s text. There are

no other circuit cases in this context.

Second, most secured creditors in First Southern’s

position would exercise their right to recover as much

as they would in a chapter 7 liquidation and to prevent

plan confirmation absent such treatment. See Pet.7.

First Southern now seeks the value it would have

3

received in a liquidation by virtue of immediate foreclosure, but it waived that right by exercising an alternative right to full payment of the $8.5 million note

amount. §§ 1129(a)(7), 1111(b). It later sought to rescind its election, but the bankruptcy court’s refusal to

allow its untimely change of heart was upheld on appeal and is not at issue here. App.9a. As the Ninth Circuit recognized, had First Southern elected to exercise

the right to recover liquidation value instead of treating its entire claim as secured, it had “the ability to

prevent approval of the reorganization plan.” App.19a.

The result of First Southern’s choice is that it will

be paid the entire $8.5 million note amount under the

plan, making a $3.5 million profit on its $5 million purchase, and its “under-water” deficiency remains secured. The bank would prefer to foreclose and obtain

$7.6 million from a collateral resale more quickly, but

the Code displaces that right until and unless there is

a plan default. Banks invest in long-term receivables,

and it has that instead.

Finally, this case is a clumsy vehicle for resolving

the question presented because the Court will need to

grapple with the issue of equitable mootness, which

the Court has repeatedly refused to review. First

Southern correctly observes that most plan valuation

appeals are dismissed for equitable mootness, and that

is precisely what would need to happen here in the

event the Court granted the writ.

------------------------------------------------------------------

4

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

The CC&Rs are Integral to the Secured

Loan, and Remain Binding.

Sunnyslope’s affordable housing project was financed through multiple government loans, with equity owners receiving tax credits for their investment.

Critically, the senior secured 40-year “Capstone Loan”

later acquired by First Southern was funded by municipal bonds issued by the Phoenix Industrial Development Authority (“IDA”) only because of multiple

affordable housing restrictions (“CC&Rs”) recorded

immediately after and in conjunction with the senior

deed of trust and State of Arizona and City of Phoenix

junior deeds of trust in an integrated, simultaneous

transaction. App.5a–6a, 98a–103a; Internal Revenue

Code § 142(d). It is undisputed that these CC&Rs run

with the land and terminate only upon foreclosure of

the Capstone Loan. App.5a–6a, 13a.

Sunnyslope defaulted in the depth of the recession, and HUD repaid the IDA bonds and sold the $8.5

million loan to First Southern for $5.05 million. Pet.6a.

The HUD sale conditioned the Capstone Loan sale to

First Southern on continued application of the CC&Rs

by selling only its right, title and interest, and never

causing the CC&Rs to be released. App.13a–14a; see

also Pet.14 (misleading implication of release).

HUD’s sale agreement further provided that the

lien on the property was subject to “any applicable

bankruptcy, insolvency, reorganization and other laws

affecting creditors’ rights generally” as well as

5

“covenants, conditions and restrictions, rights of way,

easements and other matters of public record.” 103a–

104a.

First Southern thus bought the Capstone Loan at

a substantial discount, knowing that it would remain

subject to the CC&Rs until foreclosure and the risk of

a borrower bankruptcy. It bought a lien on property

worth less than its foreclosure value for less than its

foreclosure value. See BFP v. Resolution Tr. Corp., 511

U.S. 531, 539 (1994) (recognizing that characteristics

such as foreclosure-forced sales or undesirable zoning

restrictions mean property is “simply worth less”).

B.

First Southern’s Valuation Assumes a

Foreclosure.

First Southern commenced foreclosure and obtained a receiver. He found a purchaser who agreed to

buy the project for $7.65 million after foreclosure.

Pet.6a, 105a. Sunnyslope filed a chapter 11 petition,

followed by a plan “cramming down” the First Southern secured claim.

In project valuation proceedings, First Southern

relied on an appraisal of $7,740,000 based on the “extraordinary assumption” that “upon transfer of title

via foreclosure or deed-in-lieu of foreclosure, any restriction requiring that the property continue to be utilized as affordable housing would be extinguished and

have no further effect.” App.7a, 105a–106a. First

Southern’s expert thus recognized that the CC&Rs

must be extinguished by foreclosure to enable rental at

6

market rates. App.30a. First Southern initially presented no evidence of project value as restricted by the

CC&Rs. Its expert opined on rebuttal to a restricted

value of $4,885,000, rejected by the bankruptcy court

for lack of supporting facts. App.31a, 69a, 106a–108a,

146a–148a, 166a.

The bankruptcy court valued the CC&R-restricted

project plus the tax credits at $3.9 million. First Southern did not dispute that it would cost $3.9 million to

acquire a property like the project (including tax credits) with similar CC&Rs. App.12a.

C.

First Southern Is Paid in Full Under the

Plan.

The Capstone Loan held by First Southern is paid

in full under Sunnyslope’s reorganization plan. The secured claim value is paid in monthly installments with

interest over the 40-year period typical of affordable

housing financing. The unsecured balance is paid in a

lump sum when that period expires pursuant to

§ 1111(b), according the bank the full benefit of its bargain, as limited by bankruptcy law. First Southern retains its lien until fully paid. The CC&Rs expire at the

end of the plan term, or earlier if there is a plan default

and foreclosure. App.8a.

On an evidentiary record that included the project

useful life exceeding 40 years and sound management

and funding, the court found the increased value from

the CC&Rs terminating at plan end or upon a default,

allowing rentals to increase to market rates, assured

7

sufficient refinancing or sale proceeds for First Southern’s full payment. The bankruptcy court found as a

fact that this overcame the risks of continued use during the term and potential plan defaults, especially in

light of no contradictory First Southern evidence.

App.8a, 16a–17a, 109a–115a, 125a.

D. The Investors Fund the Plan, Equitably Mooting This Appeal.

The district court granted a stay pending appeal

of the initial plan confirmation order. App.8a. It then

ruled on the merits, affirming the bankruptcy court’s

determination that the project should be valued as encumbered by the CC&Rs. But the district court agreed

with First Southern on a subsidiary argument that

First Southern’s secured claim should be increased by

the value of federal tax credits that benefit equity owners in such a Low Income Housing Tax Credit project,

and remanded. App.8a, 70a.

The bankruptcy court conducted an evidentiary

hearing and valued the tax credits, bringing First

Southern’s secured claim to $3.9 million. App.71a–72a.

It found that Sunnyslope could manage the increased

monthly payments in light of a management fee subordination, so the plan remained feasible and other

plan rulings did not need to be changed. It confirmed

the plan as modified. App.72a–74a.

First Southern appealed to the district court

again, but this time the bankruptcy court and district

court denied its stay requests. App.9a. The bankruptcy

8

court found that reversing plan confirmation to allow

First Southern’s foreclosure would extinguish the junior claims of the State of Arizona and the City of Phoenix, also harming their interests and tenants’ interests

in desperately needed affordable housing. The district

court reasoned that there were no significant legal issues on which First Southern was likely to prevail,

that substantial harm to the debtor and the public interest would result from a stay, and that the bank’s injury was monetary, not irreparable. First Southern is a

bank, but it did not offer to post a supersedeas bond

and it did not seek a stay from the Ninth Circuit.

In reliance on these orders, Cornerstone at Camelback LLC transferred $1.2 million, and the Sunnyslope

plan took effect. App.9a. The investment was made under an Internal Revenue Code “1033 exchange” on the

deadline to replace previously owned property condemned by the City. App.34a; 26 U.S.C. § 1033. If plan

confirmation were to be reversed, Cornerstone (and ultimately its principals) would be subjected to tax liabilities from the condemnation proceeds of more than

$1.5 million. App.34a. They would also be subjected to

retroactive forfeiture of the tax credits utilized on federal income tax returns. Treas. Reg. § 1.103-8(b)(6).

And Cornerstone would be unable to recover the $1.2

million that was paid to third parties, which included

plan payments to First Southern and other creditors

and taxing authorities, and for a long-term lease of adjacent parkland and capital improvements to it, project

improvements, and contractual obligations.

9

Cornerstone had no prepetition connections with

Sunnyslope, and it is not a party to this appeal. Yet

First Southern’s requested relief would require complete reversal of the entire plan confirmation order and

revaluation of the bank’s secured claim to the amount

it could obtain by selling the property after foreclosing

out the CC&Rs.

------------------------------------------------------------------

REASONS TO DENY THE WRIT

I.

SECTION 506(a) IS CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS ABOUT THE VALUATION TEST

APPLIED IN RASH AND FOLLOWED BY

THE NINTH CIRCUIT.

Bankruptcy Code § 506(a) provides that a creditor

has a “secured claim to the extent of the value of such

creditor’s interest in the estate’s interest in” collateral

and that “[s]uch value shall be determined in light of

the purpose of the valuation and of the proposed disposition or use of such property.” 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (emphasis added).

A. The Creditor’s Interest.

The “creditor’s interest” may encompass only some

debtor assets, e.g., only accounts receivable, and is a

collateral interest only. The “estate’s interest” may be

limited too, e.g., a life estate, or fee title restricted by

easements. Rash, 520 U.S. at 961 (court may be required to evaluate “limited or partial interests in collateral”).

10

Rash expressly rejected First Southern’s fundamental position, explaining that the statutory term

“creditor’s interest” is not equated to “the net value a

creditor could realize through a foreclosure sale.” Id.;

see also App.54a–55a (comparing First Southern’s arguments to circuit Rash decision overruled by the

Court).

B. The Estate’s Interest.

In this case, the estate’s interest in the project is

encumbered by the rent and occupancy restrictions in

the CC&Rs. Those CC&Rs were integral to the Capstone Loan, which would not have been funded by the

IDA without them. They are subordinate to the Capstone deed of trust, but they are not simply “junior

liens” securing monetary obligations. While the “creditor’s interest” has priority, that allows First Southern

to eliminate the CC&Rs only by foreclosing them out.

Subordination of restrictive covenants does not

make them cease to exist. The Sunnyslope CC&Rs are

servitudes – recorded covenants that run with the

land, binding the estate and its successors – and are

enforceable by injunction, absent a foreclosure. See

Powell v. Washburn, 125 P.3d 373, 375 (Ariz. 2006) (restrictive covenants enforceable by injunction); Federoff

v. Pioneer Title & Tr. Co. of Ariz., 803 P.2d 104, 108

(Ariz. 1990) (requirements for covenant running with

the land); Gouveia v. Tazbir, 37 F.3d 295, 301 (7th Cir.

1994) (trustee cannot sell free of deed restrictions;

creditors had constructive notice of restrictions when

11

extending credit); In re 523 E. Fifth St. Hous. Preservation Dev. Fund Corp., 79 B.R. 568, 571–76 (Bankr.

S.D.N.Y. 1987) (same, in affordable housing case);

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 7.9

(2000) (restrictive covenant servitude extinguishable

by foreclosure of priority lien, but not extinguishable

in bankruptcy unless required by statute).1 As the Restatement explains:

A servitude should not be deemed a “lien”

within the meaning of [Bankruptcy Code]

§ 101(37) because the servitude itself imposes

the obligation, rather than creating security

for performance of an obligation created in

some other transaction. Nor is a servitude an

executory contract. It is an interest in land,

usually of indefinite duration, that is ordinarily enforceable by coercive remedies under

[Restatement] § 8.3.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 7.9

Reporter’s Note.

C. The Proposed Disposition or Use.

Rash held that plan “disposition or use” of collateral “is of paramount importance to the valuation

1

Even if servitudes were to be deemed property interests

subject to free and clear sales under § 363(f), they cannot be extinguished under a plan because they are not “liens” terminable

under a plan sale. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii). Nor are they “interests” of “creditors” having monetary “rights to payment,” because they are enforceable by state and tenant injunctions. 11

U.S.C. §§ 101(5), (10), 1141(c).

12

question.” 520 U.S. at 962. When, as here, collateral is

retained and used, the court determines replacement

value as “the price a willing buyer in the debtor’s trade,

business, or situation would pay a willing seller to obtain property of like age and condition.” Id. at 959 n.2.

Debtor Sunnyslope’s business has always been affordable housing; property of “like” condition is covenant-restricted

affordable

housing. While

a

hypothetical post-foreclosure buyer from the creditor

need not take that into account, any buyer from the

debtor’s estate must do so. App.58a. It is the perspective of a buyer from the debtor that governs when, as

here, the very purpose of the plan is to prevent a foreclosure sale. The Rash majority rejected the dissent’s

position, precisely what First Southern argues here,

“that the value should be determined from the creditor’s perspective, i.e., what the collateral is worth, on

the open market, in the creditor’s hands, rather than

in the hands of another party.” 520 U.S. at 966 (Stevens, J., dissenting). And manifestly, § 506 provides for

valuing property as collateral titled in the debtor, not

post-foreclosure when owned by the creditor free and

clear with a change in permissible use.2

Sunnyslope’s reorganization plan thus provided

for the only legal use that anyone could make of the

project, unless surrendered to First Southern for foreclosure. App.12a–13a. It was not a mere choice as First

2

The foreclosure sale itself does not determine fair market

value. BFP, 511 U.S. at 537–38.

13

Southern argues or idiosyncrasy as the Ninth Circuit

dissent characterized it. Pet.18, App.20a n.1.3

The language of § 506(a), straightforwardly explained in Rash and followed by the en banc Ninth Circuit here, does not include First Southern’s supposed

addition of “or the foreclosure value, whichever is

greater” after “proposed disposition or use of such

property.” Courts do not add language to statutory text.

See Alabama v. North Carolina, 560 U.S. 330, 352

(2010) (“We do not – we cannot – add provisions to a

federal statute.”); Lamie v. U.S. Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 538

(2004) (“ ‘There is a basic difference between filling a

gap left by Congress’ silence and rewriting rules that

Congress has affirmatively and specifically enacted.’ ”

(quoting Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S.

618, 625 (1978)).

The only material difference between this case

and Rash is that here the foreclosure value is higher

than the replacement value. But Rash acknowledged

that this would sometimes be the case. See Rash, 520

U.S. at 960 (noting that foreclosure value is “typically

lower” than replacement value (emphasis added)). And

Rash expressly rejected “a ruleless approach allowing

use of different valuation standards based on the facts

and circumstances of individual cases.” Id. at 964 n.5.

Cram-down value depends on the estate’s proposed use

of the estate’s interest in the property, certainly when

3

The en banc dissent posited that a conservation-minded

debtor might try to impose wilderness restrictions to prevent development, but in this case, the CC&Rs were integral to funding

the Capstone Loan and in effect when First Southern bought it.

14

it is the only legal use, not which calculation will produce the highest dollar figure.

II.

THERE IS NO SPLIT OF AUTHORITY;

UNITED AIR LINES AND THE NINTH CIRCUIT PROPERLY APPLIED RASH.

The Ninth Circuit’s en banc opinion and the Seventh Circuit’s United Air Lines opinion properly applied Rash to very different issues. There is no reason

to expect that the Seventh Circuit would reach a different result than the Ninth Circuit on the same or

similar facts. First Southern’s supposed conflict is fabricated.

United Air Lines concerned improved property collateral: terminal gates at Los Angeles International

Airport. 564 F.3d at 875. In attempting to value the collateral, the bankruptcy court had applied a discount

rate to the annual rent that United paid to the airport.

Id. at 876. But that rent was for unimproved space; the

airport had agreed not to charge rent for the improvements because the airline had paid for their installation. Id. The bankruptcy court’s valuation method did

not value the lenders’ actual collateral – improved

space. Id.

The “disposition or use” of the property under

United’s plan was not an issue in United Air Lines. Rather, the issue was whether bankruptcy court accounted for the value of improved, in-use space. See id.

at 876 (“A price for unimproved space does not measure the value of the collateral.”); id. at 877 (“Any

15

valuation method that treats improvements as worthless can’t be appropriate.”).

The court noted that if the lenders foreclosed,

they “could rent the gates to United or some other airline” at a higher rate than United paid to the airport.

564 F.3d at 876–77. But that was merely illustrative of

the point that the market price of fully built-out gates

must be ascertained, and was dictum irrelevant to the

holding. The court’s analysis focused on the price paid

by other airlines for other LAX improved terminal

gates, evidencing “the price that could be agreed by

willing buyers and sellers negotiating for a replacement.” Id. at 875 (citing Rash), 876–79. In United Air

Lines, the property would have merely changed owners, not usage, after a foreclosure. The court never analyzed potential post-foreclosure alternative use, e.g.,

for post-foreclosure newly authorized luxury private

jets, but only the market value of improved gates

leased to a commercial airline like United.

The Seventh Circuit did not hold, as First Southern contends, that “a bankruptcy court may not value

the collateral based on the debtor’s proposed use if that

use would result in a value less than what the creditor

could obtain in foreclosure.” Pet.16. Nor did the court

say that “proper valuation under § 506(a) could be no

less than the actual value the secured creditor could

obtain in foreclosure.” Pet.17. United Air Lines has

only been cited eight times in the eight years since it

was decided, and never for the proposition for which

First Southern cites it.

16

First Southern argues that the Ninth Circuit was

wrong because it chose the lower value and that the

Seventh Circuit was right because it chose the higher

value. But neither court’s decision was based on the

dollar figure. The statutory language and Rash apply

uniformly, whatever the numbers may be.

Winthrop does not create a circuit split over Rash

because it was a pre-Rash case. In re Winthrop Old

Farm Nurseries, 50 F.3d 72, 74 (1st Cir. 1995). Presaging Rash, Winthrop expressly refused to interpret

§ 506(a) as requiring collateral valuation of “the net

amount a secured creditor could recover if it seized or

foreclosed on the collateral and disposed of it in accordance with applicable state law.” Id. at 74–75. And the

Winthrop parties stipulated to liquidation and fair

market value amounts, with no discussion of calculating liquidation value. Id. at 72.

In re Heritage Highgate never “equated [replacement value] with the asset’s foreclosure value” or set

foreclosure value as a “floor,” as the academic amici

claim. Law Professors’ Br. at 5–6. Rather, the court refused to value collateral based on hypothetical projections of future value recovery, as the creditor sought.

679 F.3d 132, 142–43 (3d Cir. 2012). And the two bankruptcy cases those amici cite as holding Rash inapplicable in chapter 11 cases likewise do no such thing.

They only distinguish Rash in the indubitable equivalence “dirt-for-debt” cram-down context where partial

collateral is surrendered to the secured creditor – an

alternative Rash did not address. In re Sugarleaf Timber, LLC, 529 B.R. 317, 32n n.14 (M.D. Fla. 2015); In re

17

Bate Land & Timber, LLC, 523 B.R. 483, 500 n.15

(Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2015). There is no need to “clarify”

that Rash applies in chapter 11 because the amici’s

cited cases show no such dispute. Potential inapplicability of Rash in chapter 11 cases is also a new argument not raised in the petition. See Kamen v. Kemper

Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 97 n.4 (1991) (“[W]e do not

ordinarily address issues raised only by amici. . . .”).

None of the lower court cases cited by First Southern justify this Court’s review at this time. Three are

pre-Rash.4 Only one concerns a difference between

foreclosure value and market value as used by the

debtor. In that chapter 13 case, a bankruptcy court

held that a creditor secured by a mobile home was not

entitled to the value of a carport and patio on which it

did not have a lien, even though under state foreclosure law it might be able to sell the mobile home “in

place” and a buyer would value the right to lease space

with those improvements. In re Young, 367 B.R. 183

(Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2007). The other cases are chapter 12

and 13 bankruptcies where courts alternatively did

and did not value property based on actual use or a

more lucrative use that the court found was or was not

true replacement value for fact-intensive reasons.5

4

Speck v. United States, 104 B.R. 1021 (D.S.D. 1989); In re

Sherman, 157 B.R. 987 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1993); In re Ehrich, 109

B.R. 390 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1989).

5

In re Donato, 253 B.R. 151 (M.D. Pa. 2000); In re McElwee,

449 B.R. 669 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2011); In re Bishop, 339 B.R. 595

(Bankr. D. S.C. 2005); In re Bell, 304 B.R. 878 (Bankr. N.D. Ind.

2003).

18

III. THE ISSUE PRESENTED IS UNLIKELY

TO RECUR, MUCH LESS CAUSE THE CATASTROPHE FORECAST BY FIRST

SOUTHERN AND ITS AMICI.

This case presents the unique circumstance where

foreclosure value would be higher than the existing use

of the property due to legal restrictions on use by the

estate and any buyer from the estate. The facts are so

uncommon that counsel has not found a single other

reported case like it, and First Southern has cited

none. There has been no debate among the courts of

appeals (or any other courts) on the issue, even though

Rash was decided 20 years ago. See U.S. Bancorp

Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall P’ship, 513 U.S. 18, 27 (1994)

(“[D]ebate among the courts of appeals sufficiently illuminates the questions that come before us for review.”). Without such consideration, this Court’s

intervention would be premature. See Bank of Am.

Nat’l Tr. & Savings Ass’n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P’ship,

526 U.S. 434, 443 (1999) (granting certiorari once clear

circuit split had developed). Sunnyslope by no means

raises an issue where national uniformity is at stake,

especially when binding legal restrictions mandating a

less profitable use are taken into account.

Second, this case is unique because First Southern

waived the protections that Bankruptcy Code

§ 1129(a)(7)(A) provides creditors through the “best interest of creditors test” – something most creditors

would not do. Under that test, creditors are entitled to

receive at least as much as they would “receive or

19

retain if the debtor were liquidated” in a chapter 7

case. § 1129(a)(7)(A).6

First Southern is vigorously arguing here that it

should get its liquidation value, i.e., what it would get

by a resale were it able to foreclose. But First Southern

waived that right by choosing to exercise its rights under § 1111(b) instead. When a secured creditor exercises its option under § 1111(b) to have its collateral

continue to secure the entire amount of its debt and be

paid the entire amount, it waives its unsecured deficiency claim. 7 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 111.03[5], at

111–29 (16th ed. 2017). Thus, the liquidation value test

no longer applies, and instead the court need only find

that the present value of deferred payments equals the

secured creditor’s interest in its collateral, i.e. the deferred payment cram-down test. §§ 1129(a)(7)(B),

1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(II); Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410,

430 n.3 (1992).

In other words, § 1129(a)(7)(B) “in effect exempts

secured creditors making an election under section

1111(b)(2) from application of the best interest of creditors test.” H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.

6

One bankruptcy case has held that the liquidation value

measures what a creditor would receive or retain from a chapter

7 trustee, not what it might realize from other sources. In re Dow

Corning Corp., 237 B.R. 380, 411 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1999). But no

court has applied that to the foreclosure value of collateral. In a

chapter 7 case, a trustee would abandon estate assets with no equity value for unsecured creditors, enabling the secured creditor

to foreclose. See Midlantic Nat’l Bank v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot.,

474 U.S. 499, 508–09 (1986) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (describing

abandonment provision).

20

5963, 6477 (1977). As the Ninth Circuit recognized,

First Southern could have, but did not, utilize its “ability to prevent approval of the reorganization plan.”

App.19a. Most creditors in the bank’s position would

have exercised that right, and defeated plan confirmation.

Third, First Southern inaccurately forecasts the

risks of a creditor receiving less upon a plan

default than it would in foreclosure under the Ninth

Circuit’s holding. The Court recognized in Rash that

cram-downs pose the risk for creditors that the debtor

may again default and the property may deteriorate

from extended use. Rash, 520 U.S. at 962. In this unusual case, however, that risk is reduced for the very

reason that foreclosure value is higher: If and when

there is a plan default, the value will increase with

post-foreclosure market rental rates and the sale price

will concomitantly increase. App.8a. Moreover, as Justice Scalia explained in Till v. SCS Credit Corp., “[i]f

Congress wanted to compensate secured creditors for

the risk of a plan failure, it would not have done so by

prescribing a particular method of valuing collateral.”

541 U.S. 465, 507 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Rash

adopted the replacement value standard because of

§ 506(a)’s text, not to compensate for increased risk.

Finally, it is most unlikely that the Ninth Circuit’s

holding will adversely affect the development of lowincome multi-family housing in the United States or

the credit markets for distressed HUD-guaranteed

loans as First Southern and its bank association amici

posit. It has been a federal priority to “assist private

21

industry in providing housing for low and moderate income families and displaced families,” since enactment

of the National Housing Act of 1961, 12 U.S.C.

§ 1715l(a), long before HUD began selling distressed

loans in 2010. See Laurie Goodman & Dan Magdar,

Selling HUD’s Nonperforming Loans: A Win-Win for

Borrowers, Investors, and HUD, The Urban Institute

(Jan. 2016) (explaining that HUD began selling nonperforming loans insured by the Federal Housing Administration in 2010).

HUD’s ability to sell a defaulted loan in the event

its mortgage guarantee is triggered is irrelevant for

purposes of issuing such guarantees. Instead, Congress mandated only that HUD ensure, through agreement or regulation, that the project be used for

affordable housing. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1715l(b), 1715l(d)(3)(iii).

The availability of HUD-insured loans under the

National Housing Act of 1961, together with the availability of the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit under

the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 26 U.S.C. § 42, is what

drives development of low-income multi-family housing projects in the United States, not the market for

distressed HUD loans. See Office of the Comptroller of

the Currency, Low-Income Tax Credits: Affordable

Housing Investment Opportunities for Banks, Community Developments – Insights (April 2014) (explaining

that “[t]he Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) is

the federal government’s primary program for encouraging the investment of private equity in the development of affordable rental housing for low-income

households”).

22

And if HUD is concerned that a particular borrower might file bankruptcy and that this would actually impact the resale value of a defaulted loan, HUD

can itself foreclose and then sell the property instead

of the loan. The bankruptcy automatic stay does not

apply to HUD’s foreclosure of HUD-insured loans for

multi-family housing projects. § 362(b)(8). The notions

that HUD would elevate a possible impact on purchase

prices for post-foreclosure note sales over its statutory

mandate to further affordable housing, and that HUD

multi-family home loan sales will be depressed because of the Ninth Circuit decision, are nothing but unsupported speculation.

IV. RASH AND SUNNYSLOPE ARE IN ACCORD WITH FUNDAMENTAL BANKRUPTCY PRINCIPLES.

The Bankruptcy Code was drafted to enable reorganization and maximization of value to all parties in

interest – not just creditors, let alone the largest ones.

See Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157, 163 (1991) (“Chapter

11 also embodies the general Code policy of maximizing the value of the bankruptcy estate.”); Fla. Dep’t of

Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc., 554 U.S. 33, 51

(2008) (“Chapter 11 strikes a balance between a

debtor’s interest in reorganizing and restructuring its

debts and the creditors’ interest in maximizing the

value of the bankruptcy estate.”); Pioneer Inv. Servs.,

Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 507 U.S. 380, 389

(1993) (“[T]he bankruptcy courts are necessarily entrusted with broad equitable powers to balance the

23

interests of the affected parties, guided by the overriding goal of ensuring the success of the reorganization.”).

First Southern was Sunnyslope’s largest creditor,

but not the only one deserving of protection. In addition to trade creditors, the City of Phoenix and the

State of Arizona held claims exceeding $3.5 million, as

well as interests in providing affordable housing and

tenant rights.

The bankruptcy court found that Sunnyslope’s

business operations were viable and that it could feasibly pay its debts under the plan. As a result,

Sunnyslope was able to continue its business of providing affordable housing, and new equity invested significant capital. Consistent with the Code’s purpose, the

plan thereby maximized value for all parties in interest, including unsecured and subordinate lien creditors. See NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 528

(1984) (“The fundamental purpose of reorganization is

to prevent a debtor from going into liquidation, with an

attendant loss of jobs and possible misuse of economic

resources. In some cases reorganization may succeed

only if new creditors infuse the ailing firm with additional capital.” (citation omitted)).

While enabling reorganizations, the Code provides

specific protections for secured creditors; these do not,

as First Southern argues, Pet.24, include requiring a

debtor to consent to foreclosure just to maximize the

return to a single creditor at the expense of all others

and the estate. There is no unconstitutional taking

24

when a creditor’s claim is satisfied in accordance with

Code-authorized cram-down treatment that was in effect when the loan was made. In re Thompson, 867 F.2d

416, 422 (7th Cir. 1989).7

A. Adequate Protection When a Chapter

11 Case is Filed.

Secured creditor rights at the inception of a chapter 11 case focus primarily on the automatic stay,

which prevents collateral foreclosure. A secured creditor is entitled to “adequate protection” when foreclosure is blocked and collateral use is allowed, but that

only protects against any decrease during the bankruptcy case “in the value of [the secured creditor’s] interest in such property.” § 361(1),(2),(3).

The meaning of that phrase was elucidated in

Timbers, where this Court agreed with the Fifth Circuit that a bankruptcy court erred by calculating adequate protection payments “on the estimated amount

realizable on foreclosure.” United Sav. Ass’n of Tex. v.

Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365,

369 (1988). It held that a secured creditor’s § 506(a)

7

The petition misleadingly suggests the Frazier-Lemke Act

shows the Takings Clause is a problem. Pet.28–29. The Court

unanimously upheld a modified version of the Frazier-Lemke Act

because it adequately preserved three rights of secured creditors:

(1) the right to retain the lien until the secured indebtedness is

paid; (2) the right to realize on the security by a judicial public

sale after obtaining stay relief; and (3) the right to bid in secured

debt at a collateral sale. Wright v. Vinton Branch of the Mountain

Tr. Bank, 300 U.S. 440, 458–59 (1937).

25

“ ‘interest in property’ obviously means his security interest without taking account of his right to immediate

possession of the collateral on default.” Id. at 372. And

Timbers noted that before the current Bankruptcy

Code, an “undersecured creditor had no absolute entitlement to foreclosure” in a reorganization case. Id. at

380–81.

Resolving a circuit split, Timbers overruled In re

American Mariner Industries, Inc., 734 F.2d 426 (9th

Cir. 1984), which had held that a secured creditor’s

right to take possession of and sell collateral on the

debtor’s default was a state law “interest in property”

that the court had to protect in a bankruptcy case. Id.

at 435. Notably, American Mariner reasoned from the

case touted as “foundational” by First Southern for the

principle that secured creditors are entitled to the indubitable equivalence of their foreclosure rights, In re

Murel Holding Corp., 75 F.2d 941 (2d Cir. 1935). See

734 F.2d at 432–33. And this Court in Timbers rejected

the notion that Murel Holding means more than that

a secured creditor is entitled to the present value of its

collateral under a plan. 484 U.S. at 379.

B. Secured Creditor Reorganization Plan

Protections.

At the end of a reorganization case, the Code again

specifies secured creditor protections. In addition to assurance of the liquidation value that a creditor would

receive in a chapter 7 – waived here by First Southern

– plan treatment can be forced, or “crammed down,”

26

only when one of three alternative tests is met. But

that does not mean that creditors are entitled to recover their collateral foreclosure value. As Rash explained, “[t]he Code’s cram down option displaces a

secured creditor’s state-law right to obtain immediate

foreclosure upon a debtor’s default.” 520 U.S. at 964.

Sunnyslope’s plan utilized the first method, deferred cash payments to the secured creditor retaining

its lien, with sufficient interest to result in receiving

the present value of the secured claim as of the effective date. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i). Collateral alternatively

could be sold with the secured creditor receiving sale

proceeds, but subject to credit bidding rights, and

capped at the loan balance (not a higher amount

the creditor might obtain from a post-foreclosure resale). § 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii). Or the secured creditor could

realize the “indubitable equivalent” of its secured

claim. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii). While First Southern argues

for entitlement to the indubitable equivalent of a foreclosure sale, RadLAX explained that clause (iii) indubitable equivalence is inapplicable when another

alternative is met. RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v.

Amalgamated Bank, 566 U.S. 639, 647–48 and n.4

(2012).

Congress’ comprehensive bankruptcy scheme

deliberately addressed the risk of collateral undervaluation by the bankruptcy court in a deferred payment cram-down with a specific solution: the right to

elect § 1111(b) treatment. Upon such an election, the

lien secures the full amount of the allowed claim, including the portion held by the court to be unsecured,

27

and the full amount must be paid by the end of the plan

term. First Southern exercised that right, and will receive over time the full Capstone Note amount – more

than its perceived foreclosure value.

First Southern and its amici have cobbled together

snippets of language from cases to compile a supposed

principle that a secured creditor must receive from a

bankruptcy estate at least the amount for which it can

resell the collateral after foreclosure. But they have

cited no Code language or case actually holding this.

And they have no explanation why the Code provisions

protecting secured creditors from perceived collateral

undervaluation – the liquidation value test that First

Southern waived and the § 1111(b) election it utilized

– are not the means Congress provided to protect secured creditors in this context.

V.

THIS CASE IS BURDENED BY EQUITABLE MOOTNESS, WHICH THE COURT

HAS REPEATEDLY DECLINED TO REVIEW.

The relief First Southern seeks would effectively

double Sunnyslope’s largest payment obligation under

the plan, and would do so at the expense of all other

parties in interest. Granting that relief would eviscerate the already-consummated plan, with disastrous effects on all other parties in interest who relied on the

plan’s implementation in structuring their business

operations and making post-confirmation capital investments. First Southern could have avoided the

28

potential for such disruption – and thus presented a

cleaner vehicle for certiorari – had it posted a supersedeas bond, easily affordable for the bank, and stayed

confirmation. Instead, First Southern only sought a

free stay, and stopped asking once the district court rejected the request in light of its ruling against the bank

on the merits.

As a result of First Southern’s failure to stay confirmation, this Court could not grant relief without addressing the doctrine of equitable mootness, i.e.,

whether effective relief and “unscrambling the egg” is

possible for the already-consummated plan. Yet the

Court has repeatedly declined to address equitable

mootness, and this case presents no better opportunity

to do so. See In re One2One Commc’ns, LLC, 805 F.3d

428, 448 (3d Cir. 2015) (Krause, J., concurring) (observing that this Court has declined to grant numerous petitions for certiorari presenting the question); see also

Aurelius Capital Mgmt., L.P. v. Tribune Media Co., 136

S. Ct. 1459 (2016). It has not been the subject of robust

debate in the court of appeals, so it is “not surprising

that [this Court] had denied those petitions.” In re

One2One, 805 F.3d at 448 n.18 (Krause, J., concurring).

The Court has denied certiorari on equitable mootness

even when the United States requested review. See id.

at 448 (citing Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, United

States v. GWI PCS 1, Inc., 533 U.S. 964 (2001)).

But if the Court grants the writ here, equitable

mootness is front and center. First Southern has not

disputed that granting the relief it seeks would undo

the plan – forcing the Court to address whether it

29

would accept such a drastic outcome for all parties in

interest (including those not parties to this appeal) in

order to satisfy a single creditor.

The inability to grant effective relief that undergirds equitable mootness mirrors that aspect of the

“case or controversy” mootness doctrine. See Church of

Scientology of Cal. v. United States, 506 U.S. 9, 12

(1992) (“[I]f an event occurs while a case is pending on

appeal that makes it impossible for the court to grant

any effectual relief whatever to a prevailing party, the

appeal must be dismissed.” (internal quotation marks

omitted)). The Court denies review when, despite the

parties remaining before the Court, it cannot realistically undo the action at issue which has irretrievably

occurred. See Brockington v. Rhodes, 396 U.S. 41, 43

(1969) (holding that candidate’s appeal from order

denying writ of mandamus to appear on ballot for 1968

election was moot once that election occurred); Hall v.

Beals, 396 U.S. 45, 48 (1969) (“The 1968 election is history, and it is now impossible to grant the appellants

the relief they sought in the district court.”); see also

N.J. Tpk. Auth. v. Jersey Cent. Power & Light, 772 F.2d

25, 27 (3d Cir. 1985) (finding mootness where “the acts

sought to be enjoined have irretrievably occurred”).

The same principles apply when transactions under a confirmed reorganization plan have been substantially consummated, and appellate courts lack the

ability to grant effective relief without undoing the

plan. See, e.g., In re Nica Holdings, Inc., 810 F.3d 781,

786 (11th Cir. 2015) (equitable mootness when appellate court cannot grant effective judicial relief ); In re

30

Manges, 29 F.3d 1034, 1039 (5th Cir. 1994) (equitable

mootness “is a recognition by the appellate courts that

there is a point beyond which they cannot order fundamental changes in reorganization actions,” and equitably moot cases are dismissed because “effective judicial

relief is no longer available.”); In re UNR Indus., Inc.,

20 F.3d 766, 769 (7th Cir. 1994) (noting that “[u]ndoing

all of [the plan transactions] is impossible” and holding

that an appeal must be dismissed); In re Chateaugay

Corp., 10 F.3d 944, 952 (2d Cir. 1993) (“[T]he finality

rule limits the remedies a court can offer.” (internal

quotation marks omitted)). As with Article III mootness, the thing to be undone has, for all practical purposes, already happened. Parties to the plan, including

non-parties on appeal, have relied on confirmation order finality and the absence of a stay, resulting in consummated reorganization transactions that cannot be

“unscrambled.”

While entitlement to rely on judgment finality is a

basic legal concept in any case, it is especially apt in

bankruptcy for two reasons. If any of the multiple parties to a bankruptcy plan could force alteration of plan

settlements years later, the disincentives to resolve differences and the leverage gained from threats to disrupt consummated transactions would imperil

organizations overall. “Every incremental risk of revision on appeal puts a cloud over the plan of reorganization, and derivatively over the assets of the

reorganized firm.” UNR Indus., 20 F.3d at 770. And

second, “[b]y protecting the interests of persons who

acquire assets in reliance on a plan of reorganization,

31

a court increases the price the estate can realize ex

ante, and thus produces benefits for creditors in the aggregate.” Id. “People pay less for assets that may be

snatched back or otherwise affected by subsequent

events.” Id.

That includes investment in a restructured company as well as the purchase of its assets. “One reason

some third parties have reliance interests more worthy

of protection than others is that we want to encourage

behavior (like investment in a reorganized entity) that

contributes to a successful reorganization.” In re Tribune Media Co., 799 F.3d 272, 279 (3d Cir. 2015).

Here, an investor contributed $1.2 million to fund

the plan. That money has been used by Sunnyslope to

pay creditors and taxing authorities, make capital improvements, implement contracts, and acquire a park

lease. The money simply cannot be recovered. The investor’s equity holders will also face IRC § 1033 tax

consequences costing them $1.5 million if the plan is

undone, as well as losing affordable housing tax credits, potentially even retroactively.

In addition to the investor, the City of Phoenix and

State of Arizona will be adversely affected if the plan

protecting payment of their claims and their interest

in local affordable housing is extinguished by an appellate reversal. Post-closing contracts and expenditures

cannot be rescinded, and individuals and governments

will be irreparably damaged by reversal now.

A case where the appealing creditor posted a bond

and stayed confirmation would present none of these

32

hurdles to resolving the merits. This case therefore

does not present a clean vehicle for the Court to resolve

a circuit split even if there was one.

------------------------------------------------------------------

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the petition for a

writ of certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

SUSAN M. FREEMAN

Counsel of Record

JUSTIN J. HENDERSON

DANIEL A. ARELLANO

LEWIS ROCA ROTHGERBER

CHRISTIE LLP

201 East Washington Street

Suite 1200

Phoenix, Arizona 85004

(602) 262-5756

SFreeman@LRRC.com

Counsel for Respondent

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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