Amicus Curiae Brief — New Prime Inc., Petitioner v. Dominic Oliveira
Supreme Court briefJul 25, 2018
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No. 17-340
================================================================
In The
Supreme Court of the United States
-----------------------------------------------------------------NEW PRIME, INC.,
Petitioner,
v.
DOMINIC OLIVEIRA,
Respondent.
-----------------------------------------------------------------On Writ Of Certiorari To The
United States Court Of Appeals
For The First Circuit
-----------------------------------------------------------------BRIEF OF THE OWNER-OPERATOR
INDEPENDENT DRIVERS ASSOCIATION, INC.
AS AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT
-----------------------------------------------------------------PAUL D. CULLEN, SR.
PAUL D. CULLEN, JR.*
THE CULLEN LAW FIRM, PLLC
1101 30th Street NW, Suite 300
Washington, DC 20007
(202) 944-8600
PDC@cullenlaw.com
PXC@cullenlaw.com
*Counsel of Record
Counsel for Amicus Curiae
Owner-Operator Independent
Drivers Association, Inc.
================================================================
COCKLE LEGAL BRIEFS (800) 225-6964
WWW.COCKLELEGALBRIEFS.COM
i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...................................
ii
IDENTITY AND INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE
OOIDA ..............................................................
1
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT .....................
2
ARGUMENT ........................................................
4
CONGRESS HAS REGULATED THE CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIPS OF MOTOR CARRIERS AND OWNER-OPERATORS SINCE THE
1950S ......................................................................
4
A.
B.
C.
Congress and The ICC First Mandated
Motor Carrier Control of and Responsibility for Owner-Operators ............................
5
The Expansion of The Leasing Rules to
Address Motor Carrier Exploitation of
Owner-Operators .......................................
7
The Provisions in Federal Law For Motor
Carrier/Owner-Operator Dispute Resolution ............................................................. 10
1. Pre-1995 Enforcement of Owner-Operator
Complaints by the ICC ........................ 10
2. The ICC Termination Act Granted a
Specific Private Right of Action in Federal Court ............................................ 12
CONCLUSION..................................................... 17
ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
CASES
Alford v. Major, 470 F.2d 132 (7th Cir. 1972) ...............5
Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. United States, 344
U.S. 298 (1953) ..........................................................5
Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105
(2001) .........................................................................4
Gagnon v. Serv. Trucking Inc., 266 F. Supp. 2d
1361 (M.D. Fla. 2003) ..............................................15
Global Van Lines v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n,
627 F.2d 546 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ................................ 7, 9
Interstate Commerce Comm’n v. All-American,
Inc., 505 F.2d 1360 (7th Cir. 1974) ........................... 11
Interstate Commerce Comm’n v. Am. Trucking
Ass’ns, Inc., 467 U.S. 354 (1984) ..............................12
Interstate Commerce Comm’n v. Transcon Lines,
513 U.S. 138 (1995) .................................................12
Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974) .....................16
Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers Ass’n, Inc. v. C.R.
England, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 2d 1252 (D. Utah
2004) ............................................................................ 14
Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers Ass’n, Inc. v. Landstar Sys., Inc., No. 3:02-CV-1005-J-25HTS, 2003
WL 23941713 (M.D. Fla. September 30, 2003) ......15
Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers Ass’n, Inc. v. New
Prime, Inc., 192 F.3d 778 (8th Cir. 1999) ............ 3, 13
Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers Ass’n, Inc. v. New
Prime, Inc., 398 F.3d 1067 (8th Cir. 2005) ........ 13, 14
iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES – Continued
Page
Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers Ass’n, Inc. v. United
Van Lines, LLC, 556 F.3d 690 (8th Cir. 2009) ........13
Rediehs Exp., Inc. v. Maple, 491 N.E.2d 1006
(Ind. 1986) .................................................................9
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986
(1984) .......................................................................16
S. Pac. Transp. Co. v. Commercial Metals Co., 456
U.S. 336 (1982) ........................................................11
Shaw Warehouse Co. v. S. R. Co., 308 I.C.C. 609
(1959) .......................................................................11
Transamerican Freight Lines, Inc. v. Brada Miller Freight Sys., Inc., 423 U.S. 28 (1975) ...................5
Westfield Ins. Co. v. Hanover Ins. Co., 9 F.3d 656
(7th Cir. 1993)............................................................9
White v. Excalibur Ins. Co., 599 F.2d 50 (5th Cir.
1979) ..........................................................................5
Zola v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 889 F.2d
508 (3d Cir. 1989) ....................................................12
STATUTES
9 U.S.C. § 1 ....................................................................2
28 U.S.C. § 1658 ..........................................................13
49 U.S.C. §§ 16(8), 11901(a) (1976 ed., Supp. III) ....... 12
49 U.S.C. § 11701 ........................................................11
49 U.S.C. § 11701(a) (1995) ........................................11
49 U.S.C. § 11701(b) (1995) ........................................11
iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES – Continued
Page
49 U.S.C. § 13902 ..........................................................1
49 U.S.C. § 14102 ................................................ 1, 2, 13
49 U.S.C. § 14704 .......................................... 2, 3, 10, 13
49 U.S.C. § 14704(a) ....................................................13
49 U.S.C. § 14704(e) .............................................. 13, 14
REGULATIONS
49 C.F.R. Part 376 ..................................................... 1, 7
49 C.F.R. Part 1057 (1995)............................................7
49 C.F.R. § 1.87(a)(6), (8) ............................................13
49 C.F.R. § 376.12 .........................................................7
49 C.F.R. § 376.12(c)(1) .................................................6
49 C.F.R. § 376.12(j)(1)..................................................9
OTHER AUTHORITIES
Amendments to the Interstate Commerce Act,
Pub. L. No. 84-957 .....................................................5
H.R. Rep. No. 84-2425 (1956) .......................................5
ICC Termination Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-88....... 10
Lease and Interchange of Vehicles, 43 Fed. Reg.
29812 (July 11, 1978) ................................................8
Lease and Interchange of Vehicles, 129 M.C.C.
700 (June 13, 1978) ...................................................7
Lease and Interchange of Vehicles, 131 M.C.C.
141 (January 9, 1979) ....................................... 7, 8, 9
v
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES – Continued
Page
Motor Carrier Transportation; Redesignation of
Regulations From the Surface Transportation
Board Pursuant to the ICC Termination Act of
1995, 61 Fed. Reg. 54706 (October 21, 1996)............7
Study of Interstate Commerce Commission Regulatory Responsibilities Pursuant to Section
210(a) of the Trucking Industry Regulatory
Reform Act of 1994, 1994 WL 639996 (October
25, 1994) ..................................................................11
1
IDENTITY AND INTEREST
OF AMICUS CURIAE OOIDA1
The Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Association, Inc. (“OOIDA”) is a not-for-profit corporation incorporated in 1973 under the laws of the State of
Missouri, with its principal place of business in Grain
Valley, Missouri. OOIDA is the largest international
trade association representing the interests of independent owner-operators, small-business motor carriers, and professional drivers. More than 160,000
members of OOIDA are professional drivers and small
businessmen and women located in all 50 states and
Canada.
“Owner-operator” is the term for an individual
who owns a commercial motor vehicle (“CMV”) and
leases that CMV and his or her driving services to a
motor carrier under rules authorized under 49 U.S.C.
§ 14102 and promulgated at 49 C.F.R. Part 376 (the
“Truth-in-Leasing” rules). Motor carriers, such as New
Prime, Inc., are companies who are authorized and registered by the federal government to operate commercial motor vehicles in interstate commerce. 49 U.S.C.
§ 13902.
The question of whether or not the contracts of
owner-operators are subject to the Federal Arbitration
1
No party’s counsel authored this brief in whole or in part.
No party, party’s counsel, or person – other than the amicus curiae – contributed money intended to fund the preparing or submitting of this brief. Counsel for both parties have consented to
the filing of this brief.
2
Act (“FAA”) will determine whether or not owner-operators will continue to have any meaningful opportunity to protect their small businesses from the type
of predatory behavior described in Mr. Oliveira’s brief.
Congress and federal motor carrier regulators’ concern
for these issues are the reasons the Truth-in-Leasing
rules were promulgated. Especially important is the
right to bring an action in federal court for damages
and injunctive relief specifically granted to owneroperators by Congress in 1995. 49 U.S.C. §§ 14102, 14704.
------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
OOIDA submits this brief as amicus curiae to inform the court how owner-operator truck drivers are a
class of workers engaged in interstate commerce, and
how their lease agreements with motor carriers, such
as New Prime, Inc., are contracts of employment, as
set out in the FAA exemption found at 9 U.S.C. § 1. Congress looked to two factors when it formed the scope
of Section 1 of the FAA: the maintenance of a smooth
operating transportation system and Congressional
concerns for enacting specific regulations governing
the contracts of transportation workers. In the 1950s
Congress authorized the Interstate Commerce Commission (“ICC”) to promulgate rules requiring motor
carriers, such as New Prime, Inc., to assume responsibility and control over the operations of their owneroperators. Motor carriers are also required to obtain
public liability insurance for their owner-operator operations, as if their owner-operators were the carriers’
3
own trucks and employee drivers. Later, the ICC promulgated additional rules under this regulatory scheme
to protect owner-operators from being exploited by motor carriers. The newer rules established standards for
the contracts presented by motor carriers to owner-operators and for the conduct of motor carriers under
those contracts. These statutes and rules support the
economic stability and safety performance of the participants in the motor carrier industry and, therefore,
promote the smooth flow of goods in interstate commerce.
Also, consistent with Congress’ intention to exclude contracts of employment of workers engaged in
interstate commerce from the FAA, Congress specifically provided for the means of resolving owner-operator/motor carrier disputes by statute. Originally, the
ICC was charged with adjudication of such disputes.
Once the ICC was terminated in 1995, Congress
granted owner-operators a private right of action in
federal courts to adjudicate those rights and seek damages and injunctive relief. See 49 U.S.C. § 14704, and
Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers Ass’n, Inc. v. New Prime,
Inc., 192 F.3d 778, 785 (8th Cir. 1999).
This legislative and regulatory history demonstrates that motor carrier/owner-operator contracts
are among the contracts Congress exempted in Section
1 of the FAA.
4
But even if the Court believes that the FAA exemption may not have originally contemplated contracts such as those between motor carriers and owneroperators, Congress’ grant of a private right of action
in federal court was a de facto expansion of the FAA
exemption, providing owner-operators the right to go
to court to resolve disputes with motor carriers.
------------------------------------------------------------------
ARGUMENT
CONGRESS HAS REGULATED THE CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIPS OF MOTOR CARRIERS
AND OWNER-OPERATORS SINCE THE 1950S
Congress relied upon two factors to form the scope
of Section 1 of the FAA: the maintenance of a smooth
operating transportation system and Congressional
concerns for enacting specific regulations governing
the contracts of transportation workers (as detailed in
Respondent’s brief ). In holding that the FAA exemption applies to “transportation workers,” the Court has
held that it was “rational for Congress to ensure that
workers in general would be covered by the provisions
of the FAA, while reserving for itself more specific legislation for those engaged in transportation.” Circuit
City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 119 (2001).
For motor carrier transportation, Congress and
several federal regulatory agencies acted upon those
concerns by establishing requirements for leasing
agreements (the contracts) between motor carriers and
owner-operators and by providing administrative and
5
then statutory schemes for resolving disputes that
arise under those leasing agreements.
A. Congress and The ICC First Mandated Motor Carrier Control of and Responsibility
for Owner-Operators
The federal government’s oversight of owneroperator/motor carrier contracts began when Congress
required motor carriers operating with federal authority to assume responsibility for the safe operation of
owner-operators with whom they contract. Congress
responded to agency and congressional findings that
motor carriers had attempted to immunize themselves
from the negligence of the drivers who operated their
own vehicles by making them all nominally “independent contractors.” See Amendments to the Interstate
Commerce Act, Pub. L. No. 84-957; H.R. Rep. No. 842425, reprinted in 1956 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4304, 4309; see
also White v. Excalibur Ins. Co., 599 F.2d 50, 52 (5th
Cir. 1979) (citing Transamerican Freight Lines, Inc. v.
Brada Miller Freight Sys., Inc., 423 U.S. 28 (1975)); Am.
Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. United States, 344 U.S. 298,
(1953); Alford v. Major, 470 F.2d 132 (7th Cir. 1972).
Because the financial condition of owner-operators was
such that injured members of the public were not able
to recover in legal actions against them, Congress assigned public liability and the responsibility for insurance to motor carriers. Amendments to the Interstate
Commerce Act, Pub. L. No. 84-957; H.R. Rep. No. 842425, reprinted in 1956 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4304, 4309.
6
Congress imposed those requirements upon motor
carriers by authorizing the ICC to promulgate “regulations as may be reasonably necessary to assure that
motor carriers will have full direction and control of
vehicles while they are being used under such leases,
and will be fully responsible for the operation thereof
in accordance with applicable law and regulation, as if
they were the owners of the vehicles,” including compliance with all safety rules. Id.
The ICC thereafter promulgated rules which
stated, in part: “The lease shall provide that the authorized carrier lessee shall have exclusive possession,
control, and use of the equipment for the duration of
the lease. The lease shall further provide that the authorized carrier lessee shall assume complete responsibility for the operation of the equipment for the
duration of the lease.” 49 C.F.R. § 376.12(c)(1).
Congress’ mandate over motor carrier/owneroperator leasing agreements illustrates how it considered and treated such agreements as falling within the
FAA exemption. This statute and the rules directing
motor carriers to assume responsibility and control
over owner-operators in their lease agreements were
intended to promote a safer and more stable motor carrier industry, thereby ensuring the smoother flow of
goods.
7
B. The Expansion of The Leasing Rules to Address Motor Carrier Exploitation of OwnerOperators
The leasing rules were amended significantly by
the ICC in 1979 and have existed without material
change since then. Lease and Interchange of Vehicles,
131 M.C.C. 141 (January 9, 1979); 49 C.F.R. Part 376.2
In promulgating these regulations, the ICC responded
to a well-documented and longstanding history of
abuses by motor carriers of owner-operators in their
lease/contract relationship. Global Van Lines v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 627 F.2d 546, 548 (D.C. Cir.
1980). These amendments, which have become known
as the “Truth-in-Leasing Rules,” were intended to
achieve “full disclosure of the benefits and obligations
of leasing arrangements between owner-operators and
regulated carriers.” Lease and Interchange of Vehicles,
129 M.C.C. 700, 702 (June 13, 1978). Specific provisions are required to be included in the written lease,
such as specifying owner-operator compensation, prohibiting motor carriers from forcing owner-operators to
purchase goods and services from the carrier as a condition for entering the lease, and disclosing the type
and amount of any charge-backs the motor carrier may
deduct from an owner-operator’s compensation during
the term of the lease. See 49 C.F.R. § 376.12. To impart
the importance of these rules to motor carriers, the
2
In 1996, the regulations were redesignated from 49 C.F.R.
Part 1057 to Part 376 without substantive change. See 61 Fed.
Reg. 54706, 54707 (October 21, 1996).
8
ICC required that those provisions “shall be adhered
to and performed by the authorized carrier.” Id.
Particularly pertinent to the FAA transportation
exemption, the ICC’s stated purposes for these regulations were:
(1) to simplify existing and new regulations
and to write them in understandable English;
(2) to promote truth-in-leasing – a full disclosure between the carrier and the owner-operator of the elements, obligations, and benefits
of leasing contracts signed by both parties;
(3) to eliminate or reduce opportunities for
skimming and other illegal or inequitable
practices; and (4) to promote the stability
and economic welfare of the independent
trucker segment of the motor carrier industry.
Lease & Interchange of Vehicles, 131 M.C.C. 141 (January 9, 1979) (emphasis added).
When commenting on the proposed rules, ICC
Chairman O’Neal observed:
My concern is that because they like to eat,
owner-operators will continue to find it necessary to enter into contracts with carriers they
would like to avoid. . . . The difficulty is that
one owner-operator by himself will have very
little chance of bargaining any changes in any
contract. His option will be take it or leave it.
Lease and Interchange of Vehicles, 43 Fed. Reg. 29812,
29813 (July 11, 1978).
9
The regulation of the contractual relationship between motor carriers and owner-operators underscores
Congress’ concern about this particular group of interstate transportation workers and their necessary role
in the free flow of goods. See Lease and Interchange of
Vehicles, 131 M.C.C. 141, 143-44 (January 9, 1979);
Global Van Lines v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 627
F. 2d 546, 550-51 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
These rules protect owner-operators and benefit
the public: “Since only the carrier has ICC authority, it
is not permitted to delegate it, abrogate it, or evade the
responsibilities imposed on it by means of a contractual device, for there are basic requirements that are
inherent in the relationship of the carrier for hire with
operating authority to the public. . . . [T]hus, responsibility to the public under the leasing device is fixed.”
Rediehs Exp., Inc. v. Maple, 491 N.E.2d 1006, 1011 (Ind.
1986) (citations omitted). As the Seventh Circuit noted
in a review of Section 376.12(j)(1), the point of the leasing regulations “is to remove from the domain of private choice the terms on which [those with federal
operating authority] may do business.” Westfield Ins.
Co. v. Hanover Ins. Co., 9 F.3d 656, 657 (7th Cir. 1993).
The immutability of the rights of owner-operators and
the duties of motor carriers under these rules is precisely the type of public policy choice that Congress intended to remove from private discretion and preserve
for itself under the FAA Section 1 exemption. Contracts
by regulated carriers employing owner-operators to
transport goods in interstate commerce are thus
10
squarely within the exemption of Section 1 to the FAA
applicable to “transportation workers.”
That policy is further bolstered by the history of
the government’s direction of the resolution of owneroperator and motor carrier disputes, which New Prime,
Inc. attempts to avoid by requiring its drivers to accept
an arbitration clause in its contracts.
C. The Provisions in Federal Law For Motor
Carrier/Owner-Operator Dispute Resolution
Consistent with Congress’ intent to reserve from
the FAA the resolution of owner-operator/motor carrier
disputes, federal law has long provided for the resolution of contractual disputes between owner-operators
and motor carriers. Originally, the ICC resolved disputes between owner-operators and motor carriers
through enforcement proceedings. Then, when, Congress passed the ICC Termination Act (“ICCTA”), Pub.
L. No. 104-88, 89 Stat. 26 (December 29, 1995), it granted
owner-operators a private right of action in federal court
to resolve these disputes. 49 U.S.C. § 14704.
1. Pre-1995 Resolution of Owner-Operator
Complaints by the ICC
Prior to the 1995 enactment of the ICCTA, the ICC
regulated economic and market rules for motor carriers. The ICC held plenary authority over enforcement
of the Truth-in-Leasing regulations, including the authority to seek court enforcement of a motor carrier’s
11
obligation to safeguard, account for, pay interest on,
and eventually return escrow funds. The ICC could
“begin an investigation [of a violation of the leasing
regulations] on its own authority or on a complaint.”
49 U.S.C. § 11701(a) (1995). Owner-operators could
bring such a complaint under the authority of 49 U.S.C.
§ 11701(b) (1995). As noted by the ICC:
Carrier leasing practices are investigated
based on patterns of complaints and other information received or developed by the Commission’s field staff and through compliance
surveys. The Commission takes enforcement
action to ensure compliance with the leasing
regulations. For example, the Commission
seeks injunctions against carriers that fail to
make payments to owner-operators.
Interstate Commerce Commission, Study of Interstate
Commerce Commission Regulatory Responsibilities
Pursuant to Section 210(a) of the Trucking Industry
Regulatory Reform Act of 1994, 1994 WL 639996, at
*53 (October 25, 1994).
The ICC had broad authority to enforce its regulations, including the Truth-in-Leasing regulations, under 49 U.S.C. §§ 11701, et seq. (1995). See S. Pac. Transp.
Co. v. Commercial Metals Co., 456 U.S. 336, 349-50 (1982).
This authority included the power to issue a cease-anddesist order, Shaw Warehouse Co. v. S. R. Co., 308 I.C.C.
609, 633-634, 637 (1959), to seek a federal court injunction requiring a carrier to comply with its regulations,
Interstate Commerce Comm’n v. All-American, Inc., 505
F.2d 1360 (7th Cir. 1974), and to bring suit for civil
12
forfeiture, 49 U.S.C. §§ 16(8), 11901(a) (1976 ed., Supp.
III), for each knowing violation of an order of the Commission. This Court noted that “[t]he Commission’s authority under the Interstate Commerce Act [wa]s not
bounded by the powers expressly enumerated in the
Act.” Interstate Commerce Comm’n v. Am. Trucking
Ass’ns, Inc., 467 U.S. 354, 365 (1984). Instead, the ICC
could fashion any number of remedies so long as they
were “legitimate, reasonable, and directly adjunct to
the Commission’s explicit statutory power.” Id.; Interstate Commerce Comm’n v. Transcon Lines, 513 U.S.
138, 145 (1995). These broad, undefined remedies were
authorized out of the recognition that Congress could
not be expected to anticipate “every evil sought to be
corrected” by the ICC and that “the absence of express
remedial authority should not force the Commission to
sit idly by and wink at practices that lead to violations
of ICA provisions.” Am. Trucking, 467 U.S. at 371; see
also Zola v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 889 F.2d
508, 516 (3d Cir. 1989) (holding that “[t]he Commission’s discretionary remedial powers are not limited to
the rate-making area”). OOIDA is unaware of any motor carrier ever invoking the FAA and an arbitration
clause in an owner-operator contract to try to deprive
the ICC of its dispute resolution jurisdiction.
2. The ICC Termination Act Granted a Specific Private Right of Action in Federal
Court
Congress terminated the ICC as a federal agency
by passing ICCTA. Congress transferred several areas
13
of the ICC’s authority and functions (including its jurisdiction over the Truth-in-Leasing regulations) to the
U.S. Department of Transportation (“DOT”). See 49
U.S.C. § 14102. Within the DOT, responsibility over the
Truth-in-Leasing regulations now resides with the
Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration. 49
C.F.R. § 1.87(a)(6), (8). The ICCTA provision codified at
49 U.S.C. § 14704(a) expressly authorizes private actions for damages and injunctive relief to remedy violations of that section of the Motor Carrier Act and its
implementing regulations. This private right of action
was first recognized by the courts in litigation between
OOIDA and New Prime, Inc.: Owner-Operator Indep.
Drivers Ass’n, Inc. v. New Prime, Inc., 192 F.3d 778, 785
(8th Cir. 1999).
The courts have further recognized that the federal default four-year statute of limitations under 28
U.S.C. § 1658 applies to actions under 49 U.S.C.
§ 14704. Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers Ass’n, Inc. v.
United Van Lines, LLC, 556 F.3d 690, 696 (8th Cir.
2009), and under the American Rule, prevailing plaintiff owner-operators, but not prevailing motor carrier
defendants, have a right to recover reasonable attorneys fees under 49 U.S.C. § 14704(e). Owner-Operator
Indep. Drivers Ass’n, Inc. v. New Prime, Inc., 398 F.3d
1067, 1071 (8th Cir. 2005). In rejecting New Prime,
Inc.’s assertion that it was entitled to attorneys fees,
the Eighth Circuit observed:
The right to enforce privately the Truth in
Leasing regulations, a right which this court
recognized in Prime I, would be severely
14
chilled if we were to adopt Prime’s interpretation of § 14704(e). Claims of independent
owner operators may often be for a relatively
small amount of damages. The class action
complaint filed in this action, for example,
alleged that each prospective class member
had deposited approximately $1,000—$20,000
with Prime under the disputed contract terms
that established reserve funds and a security
deposit. This shows that the potential rewards
are already low, and increasing the risks by
imposing attorney fees on owner operators
who do not prevail would discourage them
from pursuing their claims in court. Absent
any evidence to the contrary, we do not conclude that Congress established a private
remedy and simultaneously created a unique
and formidable barrier to its attainment.
Id. Similarly, here, New Prime, Inc.’s effort to apply the
FAA to owner-operator contracts would create another
formidable barrier, effectively denying owner-operators the private remedy in federal court granted by
Congress.
Several federal courts have held that motor carriers lease contracts with owner-operators fall into the
FAA exemption: See Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers
Ass’n, Inc. v. C.R. England, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 2d 1252,
1257 (D. Utah 2004) (“It is clear that Plaintiffs, as persons who, pursuant to the Operating Agreements at issue, actually move items in interstate commerce, are
in a class of workers engaged in interstate commerce,
or are transportation workers, within the meaning of
15
the exemption.”); Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers Ass’n,
Inc. v. Landstar Sys., Inc., No. 3:02-CV-1005-J-25HTS,
2003 WL 23941713, at *2 (M.D. Fla. September 30,
2003) (“[B]y operation of federal law the individual
Plaintiffs and Defendants have an employee-employer
relationship.”); Gagnon v. Serv. Trucking Inc., 266
F. Supp. 2d 1361, 1364 (M.D. Fla. 2003), vacated pursuant to settlement, No. 5:02-CV-342-OC-10GRJ, 2004
WL 290743 (M.D. Fla. February 3, 2004) (“The Court
agrees that the Plaintiff – and the other putative class
members, all of whom are truck drivers – fall within
the definition of ‘workers engaged in interstate commerce.’”).
The ICC’s former expansive authority to resolve
complaints of owner-operators against motor carriers
and the current private right of action express the purpose of the FAA exemption: to ensure that conflicts related to persons engaged in interstate commerce are
resolved in ways that best fulfill public policy interests.
If the FAA applied to motor carrier/owner-operator
contracts, then motor carriers’ imposition of an arbitration requirement would defeat the consistent enforcement of rules created to protect the public’s interest in
a stable, reliable transportation system. The public
would not be protected from an owner-operator who
was forced to drive a thousand miles in one week without being paid, damaging that driver’s economic stability, health, safety, and ability to operate within federal
law and meet all of his economic obligations to his motor carrier, the maintenance of his truck and business,
and his family’s needs at home.
16
The FAA exemption applies to whole classes of
contracts of employment of persons engaged in interstate or international commerce. The exemption was
not written to expand and contract to the extent the
federal government chooses to regulate such contracts.
Common law distinctions between “employees” and “independent contractors” were not of concern to Congress
in drafting the FAA exemption. The Court need not determine whether New Prime, Inc.’s labeling of Mr.
Oliveira as an independent contractor was accurate.
Both employees and independent contractors, such as
owner-operators, fall within the FAA exemption.
Even if the court were to find that owner-operator
contracts were not the type of contract contemplated
by the FAA exemption, the subsequent Congressional
grant of a private right of action to owner-operators for
damages and injunctive relief must be harmonized
with whatever the FAA exemption may have existed
previously. “Where there is no clear intention otherwise, a specific statute will not be controlled or nullified by a general one, regardless of the priority of
enactment. The courts are not at liberty to pick and
choose among congressional enactments, and when
two statutes are capable of co-existence, it is the duty
of the courts, absent a clearly expressed congressional
intention to the contrary, to regard each as effective.”
Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 550-51 (1974) (citations omitted), cited with approval by Ruckelshaus v.
Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1018 (1984). By requiring an arbitration clause in owner-operator contracts,
17
motor carriers would defeat the unmistakable public
policy choice of Congress in ICCTA to preserve the
remedy to seek damages and injunctive relief in court
available previously through the ICC. This statute continues Congress’ intent to protect drivers from coercive
contracts and behavior by motor carriers, and ensures
the public benefits from a stable and smooth transportation system.
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CONCLUSION
The Congress and federal agencies’ historical oversight and regulation of motor carrier/owner-operator
contracts, and their provision of different procedures
and forums to resolve disputes under those contracts
demonstrate precisely the type of contract for employment of persons engaged in interstate commerce that
Congress intended to exempt from the FAA. These
statutes and rules ensure a stable transportation industry by requiring motor carriers to take responsibility for the safe operation of owner-operators, requiring
motor carriers to use and comply with owner-operator
contract provisions that remedy the historical ways
that motor carriers have exploited owner-operators,
and giving owner-operators the right to go to federal
court to resolve disputes under those contracts. These
requirements ensure that owner-operators are directed
by motor carriers to operate safely and that they have
the economic predictability and stability to do so. A definitive finding by this Court more than 90 years after the
passage of the FAA that motor carrier/owner-operator
18
contracts are not exempted from the FAA would erect
such a burden (similar to the Eighth Circuit’s observation quoted above) that it would effectively defeat an
owner-operator’s ability to enforce his or her rights,
and therefore frustrate the public policy choices of
Congress and the regulating agencies.
Respectfully submitted,
PAUL D. CULLEN, SR.
PAUL D. CULLEN, JR.
THE CULLEN LAW FIRM, PLLC
1101 30th Street NW, Suite 300
Washington, DC 20007
(202) 944-8600
PDC@cullenlaw.com
PXC@cullenlaw.com
Counsel for Amicus Curiae
Owner-Operator Independent
Drivers Association, Inc.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.