Respondents Brief — Center for Regulatory Reasonableness, Petitioner v. Environmental Protection Agency
Supreme Court briefDec 13, 2017
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No. 17-334
In the Supreme Court of the United States
CENTER FOR REGULATORY REASONABLENESS,
PETITIONER
v.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENT IN OPPOSITION
NOEL J. FRANCISCO
Solicitor General
Counsel of Record
JEFFREY H. WOOD
Acting Assistant Attorney
General
ANDREW J. DOYLE
Attorney
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530-0001
SupremeCtBriefs@usdoj.gov
(202) 514-2217
QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether letters in which an Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) official discussed the agency’s interpretation of a judicial decision constituted actions of
EPA “in approving or promulgating any effluent limitation or other limitation,” 33 U.S.C. 1369(b)(1)(E), under
specified sections of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.
1251 et seq.
(I)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Opinion below ................................................................................ 1
Jurisdiction .................................................................................... 1
Statement ...................................................................................... 1
Argument....................................................................................... 8
Conclusion ................................................................................... 16
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases:
Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967) ..................... 13
American Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 115 F.3d 979
(D.C. Cir. 1997) ..................................................................... 4
Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997).................................. 13
FCC v. ITT World Commc’ns, Inc., 466 U.S. 463
(1984) .................................................................................... 11
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs.
(TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167 (2000) .......................................... 2
General Motors Corp. v. EPA, 363 F.3d 442
(D.C. Cir. 2004) ................................................................... 12
Iowa League of Cities v. EPA, 711 F.3d 844 (8th Cir.
2013) ................................................................... 4, 5, 8, 12, 13
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) .......... 13
Middlesex Cnty. Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea
Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981) ..................................... 2
NRDC v. EPA, 822 F.2d 104 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ...................... 3
National Envtl. Dev. Ass’n’s Clean Air Project v.
EPA, 752 F.3d 999 (D.C. Cir. 2014) .................................... 9
National Park Hospitality Ass’n v. Department of
the Interior, 538 U.S. 803 (2003) ....................................... 13
(III)
IV
Statutes and regulations:
Page
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 701 et seq.............. 3
5 U.S.C. 704 ........................................................................ 3
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7401 et seq. ..................................... 9
42 U.S.C. 7607(b)(1) ........................................................ 10
Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1251 et seq. ................................ 1
33 U.S.C. 1251(a) ............................................................... 1
33 U.S.C. 1311 .................................................................. 16
33 U.S.C. 1311(a) ............................................................... 2
33 U.S.C. 1311(b)(1)(B) ..................................................... 3
33 U.S.C. 1314(d) ............................................................... 3
33 U.S.C. 1342(a)(1) ........................................................... 2
33 U.S.C. 1342(a)(2) ........................................................... 2
33 U.S.C. 1342(b) ............................................................... 2
33 U.S.C. 1362(7) ............................................................... 2
33 U.S.C. 1362(12) ............................................................. 2
33 U.S.C. 1369 .................................................................... 3
33 U.S.C. 1369(b)(1) ...................................3, 10, 11, 12, 15
33 U.S.C. 1369(b)(1)(A)-(D) .............................................. 3
33 U.S.C. 1369(b)(1)(E) .......................................... passim
33 U.S.C. 1369(b)(1)(F) ............................................... 3, 15
33 U.S.C. 1369(b)(1)(G) ..................................................... 3
28 U.S.C. 1331 .......................................................................... 3
28 U.S.C 2342(1) .................................................................... 11
28 U.S.C. 2401(a) ..................................................................... 3
47 U.S.C. 402(a) ..................................................................... 11
40 C.F.R.:
Pt. 122 ................................................................................. 2
Section 122.41........................................................... 2, 6
Section 122.41(m) ......................................................... 3
Section 122.41(m)(4)(i)-(ii) .......................................... 3
V
Regulations—Continued:
Page
Pt. 123:
Section 123.30............................................................. 15
Pt. 125 ................................................................................. 2
Pt. 133 ................................................................................. 3
Miscellaneous:
70 Fed. Reg. 76,014 (Dec. 22, 2005) ....................................... 4
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, National
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
(NPDES): About NPDES, https://www.epa.gov/
npdes/about-npdes (last visited Dec. 12, 2017) .................. 2
In the Supreme Court of the United States
No. 17-334
CENTER FOR REGULATORY REASONABLENESS,
PETITIONER
v.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENT IN OPPOSITION
OPINION BELOW
The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. 1-4) is
reported at 849 F.3d 453.
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the court of appeals (Pet. App. 5-6)
was entered on February 28, 2017. A petition for rehearing was denied on June 6, 2017 (Pet. App. 9-11).
The petition for a writ of certiorari was filed on August
30, 2017. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under
28 U.S.C. 1254(1).
STATEMENT
1. Congress enacted the Clean Water Act (CWA or
Act), 33 U.S.C. 1251 et seq., “to restore and maintain the
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.” 33 U.S.C. 1251(a). The Act generally
bars “the discharge of any pollutant by any person,”
(1)
2
33 U.S.C. 1311(a), unless the person “obtain[s] a permit
and compl[ies] with its terms.” Middlesex Cnty. Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1,
11 (1981) (citation omitted). The Act defines the term
“discharge of a pollutant” to include “any addition of
any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source,”
33 U.S.C. 1362(12), and it defines the term “navigable
waters” to mean “the waters of the United States,”
33 U.S.C. 1362(7).
The CWA established the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) for the permitting of discharges. Under that system, States may administer their own NPDES program and issue permits
for discharges of pollutants within their borders. See
33 U.S.C. 1342(b). Forty-six States currently do so. See
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES): About
NPDES, https://www.epa.gov/npdes/about-npdes. The
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) issues
NPDES permits for discharges within States that do
not operate NPDES permitting programs. 33 U.S.C.
1342(a)(1). NPDES permits generally establish permissible rates, concentrations, quantities of specified
constituents, and other limitations and conditions for
discharges. See 33 U.S.C. 1342(a)(1) and (2); 40 C.F.R.
Pts. 122, 125; see also, e.g., Friends of the Earth, Inc. v.
Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 174,
176 (2000).
EPA promulgates rules for permits issued under the
NPDES program. Pet. App. 2; see, e.g., 40 C.F.R. 122.41.
Under those rules, NPDES permits for publicly owned
wastewater-treatment works must include technologybased effluent limitations based upon “secondary treatment” to achieve a certain degree of effluent quality.
3
33 U.S.C. 1311(b)(1)(B), 1314(d); see 40 C.F.R. Pt. 133.
In addition, treatment facilities generally must not “bypass,” or intentionally divert waste streams from, any
portion of the treatment system. 40 C.F.R. 122.41(m).
The permitting agency may “approve an anticipated bypass,” however, if it determines that certain criteria, including a showing of “no feasible alternatives,” are met.
40 C.F.R. 122.41(m)(4)(i)-(ii); see NRDC v. EPA, 822
F.2d 104, 124-126 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
Under the CWA, federal courts of appeals have exclusive jurisdiction to review challenges to certain enumerated types of EPA decisions implementing the CWA.
Those include, as relevant here, EPA’s “promulgati[on]
[of ] any effluent limitation or other limitation under
section 1311,” or under one of three other specified
CWA provisions. 33 U.S.C. 1369(b)(1)(E). 1 A petition
for review under Section 1369 generally must be filed
within 120 days after the challenged agency action.
33 U.S.C. 1369(b)(1).
Final EPA actions that are reviewable under general
principles of administrative law, but for which direct review in the courts of appeals is not authorized by Section 1369(b)(1), may be challenged in federal district
court under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA),
5 U.S.C. 701 et seq. See 5 U.S.C. 704; 28 U.S.C. 1331.
An APA action may be brought at any time within six
years after the date of the challenged action. 28 U.S.C.
2401(a).
2. a. In 2011, EPA sent two letters to Senator
Charles Grassley addressing the permissibility of “bacteria mixing zones” and “blending” of discharges at
Six other types of EPA action under the CWA are also reviewable directly in the courts of appeals, but those types of action are not
at issue in this case. See 33 U.S.C. 1369(b)(1)(A)-(D), (F), and (G).
1
4
publicly owned treatment plants. See Iowa League of
Cities v. EPA, 711 F.3d 844, 857-858 (8th Cir. 2013). “A
mixing zone is [an] area within a navigable water * * *
in which the discharge from a point source is initially
diluted.” American Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 115 F.3d
979, 996 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (per curiam). “Where a permitting authority has authorized a mixing zone, the permittee’s compliance with applicable water quality standards is assessed at the edge of the zone,” rather than
elsewhere in the zone. Ibid.; see Iowa League of Cities,
711 F.3d at 857. “Blending” involves diverting a portion
of peak wet-weather flows around secondary treatment
units. 70 Fed. Reg. 76,014 (Dec. 22, 2005).
Senator Grassley asked EPA whether a State issuing NPDES permits for combined sewer overflows or
stormwater discharges could “approve a bacteria mixing zone” in “waters designated for body contact recreation.” Gov’t C.A. Supp. App. 5. Senator Grassley also
asked whether waste-treatment facilities could divert
some waste streams from their standard secondarytreatment processes, utilize a treatment method known
as ACTIFLO on those streams, and then recombine
waste treated with ACTIFLO with other treatment
streams “without triggering application of federal bypass or secondary treatment rule requirements.” Ibid.;
see id. at 7; see also Iowa League of Cities, 711 F.3d at
858-859.
In letter responses, EPA stated that bacteria mixing
zones in waters designated for “primary contact recreation * * * should not be permitted because they could
result in significant human health risks.” Pet. C.A. App.
10; see Iowa League of Cities, 711 F.3d at 858. EPA
stated that the use of ACTIFLO would “continue to [be]
explore[d],” but that, based on data EPA had reviewed,
5
ACTIFLO “systems that do not include a biological
component[] do not provide treatment necessary to meet
the minimum requirements provided in the * * * regulations.” Pet. C.A. App. 14; see Iowa League of Cities,
711 F.3d at 860.
b. An association of publicly owned treatment works
in Iowa filed suit in the Eighth Circuit, seeking to challenge EPA’s 2011 policy letters on the ground that they
set forth new rules that were inconsistent with the CWA
and the APA. See Iowa League of Cities, 711 F.3d at
860. The court of appeals concluded that it had jurisdiction because the letters constituted EPA action “promulgating any effluent limitation or other limitation” under the relevant provisions of the CWA, 33 U.S.C.
1369(b)(1)(E). See Iowa League of Cities, 711 F.3d at
863. Based on the EPA letters’ subject matter and use
of mandatory statements, the court concluded that the
letters had a “binding effect on regulated entities.”
Ibid.; see id. at 861-865.
On the merits, the Eighth Circuit held that EPA’s
letters announced “legislative rules” because they
“[e]xpand[ed] the footprint of [existing] regulation[s] by
imposing new requirements.” Iowa League of Cities,
711 F.3d at 873. As a result, the court held that the rules
could lawfully be promulgated only through notice-andcomment rulemaking procedures. Id. at 876. The court
of appeals also stated that EPA’s “blending rule” exceeded its statutory authority “insofar as [it] imposes
secondary treatment regulations on flows within facilities.” Id. at 877-878. The court did not conclude that
the “new mixing zone rule” that the court found had
been promulgated in EPA’s letters would exceed EPA’s
statutory authority. Id. at 877.
6
3. a. In November 2013, municipal and industrial
associations wrote a letter to EPA setting forth the
groups’ interpretation of the Eighth Circuit’s decision
in Iowa League of Cities. The groups “request[ed] confirmation that EPA will apply the Iowa League of Cities
decision uniformly across the country and so advise its
Regions and delegated States.” Pet. C.A. App. 5.
In April 2014, an EPA official sent a letter response,
stating that Iowa League of Cities “applies as binding
precedent in the Eighth Circuit,” but that the decision
did not vacate a bypass regulation previously upheld by
the D.C. Circuit that is set forth at 40 C.F.R. 122.41.
Pet. C.A. App. 1-2. The official also stated that EPA
was “planning to hold a forum” in summer 2014 to “ask
questions about the public health implications of various
bypass and blending scenarios during wet weather
events.” Id. at 2.
In May 2014, the associations wrote to EPA again,
stating that “[i]t is our position that EPA has made a
policy choice to limit application of the 8th Circuit’s decision,” and asking EPA to justify that approach. Pet.
C.A. App. 6. The letter also discussed member groups’
participation in the upcoming public health forum. Id.
at 7. In June 2014, an EPA official sent a letter response. That letter stated that the official “acknowledge[d] that [the groups] disagree with” her prior letter “that articulated that the [Eighth Circuit’s] decision
applies as binding precedent in the Eighth Circuit,” before providing additional information about the upcoming public health forum. Id. at 3.
b. In August 2014, petitioner filed suit in the D.C.
Circuit, seeking judicial review of EPA’s 2014 letters
responding to queries from municipal and industry
7
groups. See Pet. C.A. Pet. for Review. Petitioner asserted that the court could exercise jurisdiction under
Section 1369(b)(1)(E) because the letters had “modified
NPDES rules and program requirements without rulemaking.” Id. at 2.
c. The court of appeals dismissed petitioner’s challenge for lack of jurisdiction. Pet. App. 1-4. The court
described the challenged letters as containing “statements indicating that [EPA] would not acquiesce in or
follow the Eighth Circuit’s decision” in Iowa League of
Cities “outside of that circuit.” Id. at 2. The court concluded that the letters did not fall within the class of
EPA actions that are reviewable in the courts of appeals
under Section 1369(b)(1)(E). Id. at 3.
The court of appeals stated that it “need not determine whether EPA’s non-acquiescence statement[s]
constitute[] a ‘promulgation’ ” within the meaning of
Section 1369(b)(1)(E), because the statements did “not
announce an effluent or other limit on discharge of pollutants,” as Section 1369(b)(1)(E) also requires. Pet.
App. 3. The court explained that, rather than announcing a limitation, the agency had “merely articulate[d]
how EPA will interpret the Eighth Circuit’s decision.”
Ibid. As a result, the court stated, “to the extent [petitioner] wants to directly challenge EPA’s non-acquiescence statement[s], it must follow the usual path of suing in district court under the Administrative Procedure Act, assuming other reviewability criteria are satisfied.” Ibid. The court added that, “[t]o the extent [petitioner] believes EPA is violating the Eighth Circuit’s
mandate,” it could also “try to seek mandamus or other
appropriate relief in the Eighth Circuit.” Id. at 4. 2
Because the court of appeals found that it lacked subject-matter
jurisdiction, it did not address EPA’s arguments concerning lack of
2
8
ARGUMENT
Petitioner contends (Pet. 16-32) that the court of appeals had jurisdiction under 33 U.S.C. 1369(b)(1)(E) to
review two letters, written by an EPA official to municipal and industrial organizations, that discussed the
agency’s interpretation of a prior Eighth Circuit decision. The court of appeals correctly rejected that contention, and its decision does not conflict with any decision of this Court or another court of appeals. There is
no need to hold the petition for a writ of certiorari pending this Court’s decision in National Ass’n of Manufacturers v. Department of Defense, No. 16-299 (argued
Oct. 11, 2017), because agency letters that discuss the
scope of a judicial decision are far afield from the
agency rulemaking that is at issue in that case. Further
review is not warranted.
1. Section 1369(b)(1)(E) authorizes the courts of appeals to review actions of EPA “in approving or promulgating any effluent limitation or other limitation”
under specified provisions of the CWA. 33 U.S.C.
1369(b)(1)(E). The court of appeals correctly held that
the EPA letters that petitioner seeks to challenge are
not subject to direct appellate review under that provision. Pet. App. 3. Those letters do not impose any limitations on private parties, permit issuers, or others, but
simply describe how EPA understands the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Iowa League of Cities v. EPA, 711 F.3d
844 (2013). Pet. App. 3. Since an EPA official’s statements interpreting a court’s decision do not alter the
meaning of the court’s decision or bind private parties,
state permit issuers, or others, such statements do not
finality, standing, and ripeness. See Gov’t C.A. Br. 21-37 (making
these arguments).
9
alter the scope of the CWA regulatory regime—by setting limitations or otherwise. 3
Petitioner asserts that the challenged letters amount
to a “re-promulgat[ion]” of the limitations that the
Eighth Circuit in Iowa League of Cities found EPA to
have imposed. Pet. 16; see Pet. 18 (describing EPA’s
letters as “the functional equivalent of re-promulgating
the vacated regulations”). Those characterizations reflect a misunderstanding of the EPA letters. Those letters did not purport to alter any constraints to which
private parties or permit issuers are subject in the wake
of Iowa League of Cities. And because EPA’s views
about the precedential effect of Iowa League of Cities
do not alter the scope of that judicial decision, the letters likewise do not have the effect of altering the mandate of Iowa League of Cities.
Petitioner’s reliance (Pet. 17-18) on National Environmental Development Association’s Clean Air Project v. EPA, 752 F.3d 999 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (NEDACAP),
which involved the jurisdictional provisions of the Clean
Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. 7401 et seq., is also misplaced.
The court in NEDACAP held that the CAA’s jurisdictional provisions allowed appellate review of an EPA directive concerning the interpretation and implementation of air quality permitting programs in light of a judicial decision. 752 F.3d at 1003. But the court in that
case had no occasion to decide whether the challenged
EPA directive imposed a “limitation”—as is required
Although the court of appeals read EPA’s letters as “indicating”
that EPA interpreted Iowa League of Cities as binding only in the
Eighth Circuit, Pet. App. 2, EPA stated only that it did regard Iowa
League of Cities as binding in the Eighth Circuit, without addressing the more complicated question whether Iowa League of Cities
controls in other circuits. See Pet. C.A. App. 1-3.
3
10
for review under Section 1369(b)(1)(E)—because the
CAA’s expansive jurisdictional provisions authorize review of certain specified acts “or any other final action
of the Administrator under” the CAA. 42 U.S.C.
7607(b)(1).
Petitioner is also wrong in asserting (Pet. 20) that
the D.C. Circuit erroneously “ignor[ed] the need for a
promulgation analysis” and instead “simply exempt[ed]
all of EPA’s regulatory actions classified as ‘nonacquiescence statement[s]’ from Section 1369(b)(1)(E).”
The court below acknowledged that Section 1369(b)(1)(E)
authorizes review of “EPA-promulgated effluent or
other limits on discharge of pollutants.” Pet. App. 3; see
33 U.S.C. 1369(b)(1)(E) (authorizing direct court of appeals review of agency action “in approving or promulgating any effluent limitation or other limitation” under
specified provisions of the CWA). As the court of appeals explained, however, it was unnecessary for the
court to analyze whether EPA’s issuance of letter responses qualified as a “promulgation” because the letters did “not announce an effluent or other limit on discharge of pollutants.” Pet. App. 3.
Finally, petitioner contends (Pet. 23-25) that its claims
are reviewable in the D.C. Circuit pursuant to Section
1369(b)(1)(E) because EPA’s actions were “ultra vires”
and petitioner’s claim “stemmed from a judicial decision,” Pet. 23. That argument is also unsound. Section
1369(b)(1) confers jurisdiction to review specified types
of EPA action, such as actions “in approving or promulgating any effluent limitation or other limitation” under
particular CWA provisions. 33 U.S.C. 1369(b)(1)(E).
The Act does not authorize direct court of appeals re-
11
view of un-enumerated types of EPA actions simply because a litigant asserts that a particular action is ultra
vires or foreclosed by a prior judicial decision.
FCC v. ITT World Communications, Inc., 466 U.S.
463 (1984) (cited at Pet. 24), is not to the contrary. The
Court in that case found that a suit challenging certain
actions by the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) as ultra vires should have been brought in the
court of appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2342(1) and
47 U.S.C. 402(a), rather than in the district court. See
466 U.S. at 468-469. But the Court reached that result
by applying the broad standards for direct appellate review set forth in those judicial-review provisions, under
which “[e]xclusive jurisdiction for review of final FCC
orders, such as the FCC’s denial of respondents’ rulemaking petition, lies in the Courts of Appeals.” Id. at 468.
The Court in ITT World Communications did not suggest that a court of appeals may review EPA action outside the categories enumerated in Section 1369(b)(1)
whenever a challenged action is alleged to be ultra vires.
2. The D.C. Circuit’s dismissal of petitioner’s challenge does not conflict with any decision of this Court or
another court of appeals. No other court appears to
have addressed whether Section 1369(b)(1)(E) authorizes direct court of appeals review of statements that
simply set forth the agency’s views on the scope of a
prior judicial decision.
Petitioner suggests (Pet. 27-29) that the decision below conflicts with Iowa League of Cities because the
Eighth Circuit in that case “took jurisdiction under Section 1369(b)(1)(E) to review the same exact regulatory
prohibitions that are being contested in [the instant
p]etition,” Pet. 27. That argument is misconceived.
Iowa League of Cities involved a challenge to 2011 EPA
12
policy letters that the court of appeals concluded set
forth new, binding policies regarding waste-treatment
facilities’ use of mixing zones and blending techniques.
711 F.3d at 863-878. Petitioner is not challenging those
letters. Any effort to challenge the 2011 letters in the
D.C. Circuit would have been untimely, since if petitioner had wished to seek direct court of appeals review
of those letters, it was required to do so “within 120 days
(as another petitioner did in the Eighth Circuit).” Pet.
App. 3; see 33 U.S.C. 1369(b)(1). Instead, petitioner
seeks judicial review of subsequent letters that address
the precedential effect of the Iowa League of Cities decision. And the Eighth Circuit in Iowa League of Cities
had no occasion to decide whether Section 1369(b)(1)(E)
authorizes direct court of appeals review of agency
statements that simply “articulate[] how EPA will interpret” a prior judicial decision, Pet. App. 3.
3. This case would be a poor vehicle for addressing
whether EPA’s interpretation of a judicial decision can
be reviewable under Section 1369(b)(1)(E), because the
petition for review of the EPA letters at issue here fails
on other grounds as well. First, EPA did not “promulgat[e]” a limitation, 33 U.S.C. 1369(b)(1)(E), through
correspondence with municipal and industrial associations about EPA’s interpretation of Iowa League of Cities. In analyzing whether particular agency action constitutes a “promulgation,” courts have considered
“(1) the Agency’s own characterization of the action;
(2) whether the action was published in the Federal
Register or Code of Federal Regulations; and (3) whether
the action has binding effects on private parties or on
the agency,” with the “ ‘first two criteria ser[ving] to illuminate the third.’ ” General Motors Corp. v. EPA, 363
F.3d 442, 448 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (citation omitted); see
13
Iowa League of Cities, 711 F.3d at 862 (applying the
D.C. Circuit’s framework). Those criteria do not support characterizing as a “promulgation” correspondence with private parties that EPA did not describe as
binding or authoritative and did not publish in the Federal Register or Code of Federal Regulations.
The court of appeals lacked authority to adjudicate
petitioner’s challenge for other reasons as well. The
EPA letters at issue here do not satisfy the requirements for final agency action. See Bennett v. Spear,
520 U.S. 154, 177-178 (1997) (explaining that an agency
action is final only if it “mark[s] the consummation of
the agency’s decisionmaking process” and is “one by
which rights or obligations have been determined or
from which legal consequences will flow”) (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted). Review of the EPA
letters would also have been unwarranted under the
ripeness doctrine, which “prevent[s] the courts, through
avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling
themselves in abstract disagreements over administrative policies, and also * * * protect[s] the agencies from
judicial interference until an administrative decision
has been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way
by the challenging parties.” Abbott Labs. v. Gardner,
387 U.S. 136, 148-149 (1967); see National Park Hospitality Ass’n v. Department of the Interior, 538 U.S. 803,
807-808 (2003). And because petitioner cannot demonstrate any actual or imminent injury from EPA’s letters, it also lacks standing to pursue its current challenge. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,
560 (1992). 4
The court of appeals stated that, “to the extent [petitioner]
wants to directly challenge” the EPA letters at issue here, “it must
4
14
Finally, disagreement concerning the proper interpretation of the EPA letters at issue here makes this
case a poor vehicle for considering the reviewability under Section 1369(b)(1)(E) of statements articulating an
agency’s views on the scope of a judicial decision. Petitioner’s argument (Pet. 17-19, 27-29) that the letters are
reviewable under Section 1369(b)(1)(E) depends on its
interpretation of the letters as declaring that EPA did
not view Iowa League of Cities as controlling outside
the Eighth Circuit. But while the court of appeals read
the letters as “indicating that [EPA] would not acquiesce in or follow” Iowa League of Cities “outside of [the
Eighth C]ircuit,” Pet. App. 2, the agency understands
its own letters as recognizing that Iowa League of Cities
is binding in the Eighth Circuit, without addressing
whether the decision controls elsewhere. See Pet. C.A.
App. 1-3. The threshold dispute as to the meaning of
the letters makes this case an especially poor vehicle for
considering the types of agency actions that are reviewable under Section 1369(b)(1)(E).
4. Petitioner suggests (Pet. 32-35) that, unless the
court of appeals’ decision is set aside, local governments
and private entities will lack adequate opportunities to
challenge EPA’s implementation of the CWA in light of
the Iowa League of Cities decision. As the court of appeals explained, however, its determination that it
lacked jurisdiction under Section 1369(b)(1)(E) does not
foreclose petitioner from using other channels to challenge such implementation. To the extent that EPA engages in final agency action that is reviewable under
follow the usual path of suing in district court under the [APA], assuming other reviewability criteria are satisfied.” Pet. App. 3 (emphasis added). For the reasons stated in the text, the EPA letters
would not be reviewable under the APA.
15
general administrative-law principles, APA review remains available. See Pet. App. 3; but see p. 13 & note 4,
supra (explaining why the EPA letters at issue here
would not be reviewable under the APA). And, “[t]o the
extent that [petitioner] believes EPA is violating the
Eighth Circuit’s mandate,” the decision below does not
prevent petitioner from “try[ing] to seek mandamus or
other appropriate relief in the Eighth Circuit.” Pet.
App. 4.
The decision below also does not prevent a litigant
from challenging any final permitting decision that the
litigant regards as ultra vires in light of Iowa League of
Cities. If a facility receives an NPDES permit containing limitations that the facility operator believes are
foreclosed by Iowa League of Cities, or is denied a permit altogether, the operator may seek judicial review of
the permitting decision. See 33 U.S.C. 1369(b)(1)(F)
(direct court of appeals review of EPA decisions issuing
or denying permits); 40 C.F.R. 123.30 (specifying that
States administering the NPDES program must “provide an opportunity for judicial review in State Court of
the final approval or denial of permits”).
5. There is no need to hold the petition for a writ of
certiorari pending this Court’s decision in National Association of Manufacturers, supra. That case presents
the question whether an EPA rule that defines the term
“waters of the United States” for purposes of the CWA
is reviewable in the court of appeals under Section
1369(b)(1). See Pet. at i, National Ass’n of Mfrs., supra
(No. 16-299); Gov’t Br. in Opp. at i, National Ass’n of
Mfrs., supra (No. 16-299). The EPA rule at issue in National Association of Manufacturers limits the conduct
of private parties and permit issuers by identifying the
16
categories of waters on which effluent and other limitations under the CWA will apply. The government has
argued that a rule defining the geographic scope of limitations under Section 1311 establishes an “effluent limitation or other limitation under section 1311,” 33 U.S.C.
1369(b)(1)(E), while the petitioners in National Association of Manufacturers have argued to the contrary.
See Gov’t Br. at 17-30, 35-49, National Ass’n of Mfrs.,
supra (No. 16-299); Pet. Br. at 28-55, National Ass’n of
Mfrs., supra (No. 16-299). The decision below does not
implicate the question presented in National Association of Manufacturers because the EPA letters at issue
in this case do not impose any obligations on private
parties, permit issuers, or others. See Pet. App. 3. Instead, they simply articulate an agency interpretation
of a court of appeals decision. Ibid.
CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.
Respectfully submitted.
NOEL J. FRANCISCO
Solicitor General
JEFFREY H. WOOD
Acting Assistant Attorney
General
ANDREW J. DOYLE
Attorney
DECEMBER 2017
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.