Respondents Brief — Center for Regulatory Reasonableness, Petitioner v. Environmental Protection Agency

Supreme Court briefDec 13, 2017

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No. 17-334

In the Supreme Court of the United States

CENTER FOR REGULATORY REASONABLENESS,

PETITIONER

v.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENT IN OPPOSITION

NOEL J. FRANCISCO

Solicitor General

Counsel of Record

JEFFREY H. WOOD

Acting Assistant Attorney

General

ANDREW J. DOYLE

Attorney

Department of Justice

Washington, D.C. 20530-0001

SupremeCtBriefs@usdoj.gov

(202) 514-2217

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether letters in which an Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) official discussed the agency’s interpretation of a judicial decision constituted actions of

EPA “in approving or promulgating any effluent limitation or other limitation,” 33 U.S.C. 1369(b)(1)(E), under

specified sections of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.

1251 et seq.

(I)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Opinion below ................................................................................ 1

Jurisdiction .................................................................................... 1

Statement ...................................................................................... 1

Argument....................................................................................... 8

Conclusion ................................................................................... 16

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967) ..................... 13

American Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 115 F.3d 979

(D.C. Cir. 1997) ..................................................................... 4

Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997).................................. 13

FCC v. ITT World Commc’ns, Inc., 466 U.S. 463

(1984) .................................................................................... 11

Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs.

(TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167 (2000) .......................................... 2

General Motors Corp. v. EPA, 363 F.3d 442

(D.C. Cir. 2004) ................................................................... 12

Iowa League of Cities v. EPA, 711 F.3d 844 (8th Cir.

2013) ................................................................... 4, 5, 8, 12, 13

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) .......... 13

Middlesex Cnty. Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea

Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981) ..................................... 2

NRDC v. EPA, 822 F.2d 104 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ...................... 3

National Envtl. Dev. Ass’n’s Clean Air Project v.

EPA, 752 F.3d 999 (D.C. Cir. 2014) .................................... 9

National Park Hospitality Ass’n v. Department of

the Interior, 538 U.S. 803 (2003) ....................................... 13

(III)

IV

Statutes and regulations:

Page

Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 701 et seq.............. 3

5 U.S.C. 704 ........................................................................ 3

Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7401 et seq. ..................................... 9

42 U.S.C. 7607(b)(1) ........................................................ 10

Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1251 et seq. ................................ 1

33 U.S.C. 1251(a) ............................................................... 1

33 U.S.C. 1311 .................................................................. 16

33 U.S.C. 1311(a) ............................................................... 2

33 U.S.C. 1311(b)(1)(B) ..................................................... 3

33 U.S.C. 1314(d) ............................................................... 3

33 U.S.C. 1342(a)(1) ........................................................... 2

33 U.S.C. 1342(a)(2) ........................................................... 2

33 U.S.C. 1342(b) ............................................................... 2

33 U.S.C. 1362(7) ............................................................... 2

33 U.S.C. 1362(12) ............................................................. 2

33 U.S.C. 1369 .................................................................... 3

33 U.S.C. 1369(b)(1) ...................................3, 10, 11, 12, 15

33 U.S.C. 1369(b)(1)(A)-(D) .............................................. 3

33 U.S.C. 1369(b)(1)(E) .......................................... passim

33 U.S.C. 1369(b)(1)(F) ............................................... 3, 15

33 U.S.C. 1369(b)(1)(G) ..................................................... 3

28 U.S.C. 1331 .......................................................................... 3

28 U.S.C 2342(1) .................................................................... 11

28 U.S.C. 2401(a) ..................................................................... 3

47 U.S.C. 402(a) ..................................................................... 11

40 C.F.R.:

Pt. 122 ................................................................................. 2

Section 122.41........................................................... 2, 6

Section 122.41(m) ......................................................... 3

Section 122.41(m)(4)(i)-(ii) .......................................... 3

V

Regulations—Continued:

Page

Pt. 123:

Section 123.30............................................................. 15

Pt. 125 ................................................................................. 2

Pt. 133 ................................................................................. 3

Miscellaneous:

70 Fed. Reg. 76,014 (Dec. 22, 2005) ....................................... 4

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, National

Pollutant Discharge Elimination System

(NPDES): About NPDES, https://www.epa.gov/

npdes/about-npdes (last visited Dec. 12, 2017) .................. 2

In the Supreme Court of the United States

No. 17-334

CENTER FOR REGULATORY REASONABLENESS,

PETITIONER

v.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENT IN OPPOSITION

OPINION BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. 1-4) is

reported at 849 F.3d 453.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals (Pet. App. 5-6)

was entered on February 28, 2017. A petition for rehearing was denied on June 6, 2017 (Pet. App. 9-11).

The petition for a writ of certiorari was filed on August

30, 2017. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under

28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

STATEMENT

1. Congress enacted the Clean Water Act (CWA or

Act), 33 U.S.C. 1251 et seq., “to restore and maintain the

chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.” 33 U.S.C. 1251(a). The Act generally

bars “the discharge of any pollutant by any person,”

(1)

2

33 U.S.C. 1311(a), unless the person “obtain[s] a permit

and compl[ies] with its terms.” Middlesex Cnty. Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1,

11 (1981) (citation omitted). The Act defines the term

“discharge of a pollutant” to include “any addition of

any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source,”

33 U.S.C. 1362(12), and it defines the term “navigable

waters” to mean “the waters of the United States,”

33 U.S.C. 1362(7).

The CWA established the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) for the permitting of discharges. Under that system, States may administer their own NPDES program and issue permits

for discharges of pollutants within their borders. See

33 U.S.C. 1342(b). Forty-six States currently do so. See

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES): About

NPDES, https://www.epa.gov/npdes/about-npdes. The

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) issues

NPDES permits for discharges within States that do

not operate NPDES permitting programs. 33 U.S.C.

1342(a)(1). NPDES permits generally establish permissible rates, concentrations, quantities of specified

constituents, and other limitations and conditions for

discharges. See 33 U.S.C. 1342(a)(1) and (2); 40 C.F.R.

Pts. 122, 125; see also, e.g., Friends of the Earth, Inc. v.

Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 174,

176 (2000).

EPA promulgates rules for permits issued under the

NPDES program. Pet. App. 2; see, e.g., 40 C.F.R. 122.41.

Under those rules, NPDES permits for publicly owned

wastewater-treatment works must include technologybased effluent limitations based upon “secondary treatment” to achieve a certain degree of effluent quality.

3

33 U.S.C. 1311(b)(1)(B), 1314(d); see 40 C.F.R. Pt. 133.

In addition, treatment facilities generally must not “bypass,” or intentionally divert waste streams from, any

portion of the treatment system. 40 C.F.R. 122.41(m).

The permitting agency may “approve an anticipated bypass,” however, if it determines that certain criteria, including a showing of “no feasible alternatives,” are met.

40 C.F.R. 122.41(m)(4)(i)-(ii); see NRDC v. EPA, 822

F.2d 104, 124-126 (D.C. Cir. 1987).

Under the CWA, federal courts of appeals have exclusive jurisdiction to review challenges to certain enumerated types of EPA decisions implementing the CWA.

Those include, as relevant here, EPA’s “promulgati[on]

[of ] any effluent limitation or other limitation under

section 1311,” or under one of three other specified

CWA provisions. 33 U.S.C. 1369(b)(1)(E). 1 A petition

for review under Section 1369 generally must be filed

within 120 days after the challenged agency action.

33 U.S.C. 1369(b)(1).

Final EPA actions that are reviewable under general

principles of administrative law, but for which direct review in the courts of appeals is not authorized by Section 1369(b)(1), may be challenged in federal district

court under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA),

5 U.S.C. 701 et seq. See 5 U.S.C. 704; 28 U.S.C. 1331.

An APA action may be brought at any time within six

years after the date of the challenged action. 28 U.S.C.

2401(a).

2. a. In 2011, EPA sent two letters to Senator

Charles Grassley addressing the permissibility of “bacteria mixing zones” and “blending” of discharges at

Six other types of EPA action under the CWA are also reviewable directly in the courts of appeals, but those types of action are not

at issue in this case. See 33 U.S.C. 1369(b)(1)(A)-(D), (F), and (G).

1

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publicly owned treatment plants. See Iowa League of

Cities v. EPA, 711 F.3d 844, 857-858 (8th Cir. 2013). “A

mixing zone is [an] area within a navigable water * * *

in which the discharge from a point source is initially

diluted.” American Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 115 F.3d

979, 996 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (per curiam). “Where a permitting authority has authorized a mixing zone, the permittee’s compliance with applicable water quality standards is assessed at the edge of the zone,” rather than

elsewhere in the zone. Ibid.; see Iowa League of Cities,

711 F.3d at 857. “Blending” involves diverting a portion

of peak wet-weather flows around secondary treatment

units. 70 Fed. Reg. 76,014 (Dec. 22, 2005).

Senator Grassley asked EPA whether a State issuing NPDES permits for combined sewer overflows or

stormwater discharges could “approve a bacteria mixing zone” in “waters designated for body contact recreation.” Gov’t C.A. Supp. App. 5. Senator Grassley also

asked whether waste-treatment facilities could divert

some waste streams from their standard secondarytreatment processes, utilize a treatment method known

as ACTIFLO on those streams, and then recombine

waste treated with ACTIFLO with other treatment

streams “without triggering application of federal bypass or secondary treatment rule requirements.” Ibid.;

see id. at 7; see also Iowa League of Cities, 711 F.3d at

858-859.

In letter responses, EPA stated that bacteria mixing

zones in waters designated for “primary contact recreation * * * should not be permitted because they could

result in significant human health risks.” Pet. C.A. App.

10; see Iowa League of Cities, 711 F.3d at 858. EPA

stated that the use of ACTIFLO would “continue to [be]

explore[d],” but that, based on data EPA had reviewed,

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ACTIFLO “systems that do not include a biological

component[] do not provide treatment necessary to meet

the minimum requirements provided in the * * * regulations.” Pet. C.A. App. 14; see Iowa League of Cities,

711 F.3d at 860.

b. An association of publicly owned treatment works

in Iowa filed suit in the Eighth Circuit, seeking to challenge EPA’s 2011 policy letters on the ground that they

set forth new rules that were inconsistent with the CWA

and the APA. See Iowa League of Cities, 711 F.3d at

860. The court of appeals concluded that it had jurisdiction because the letters constituted EPA action “promulgating any effluent limitation or other limitation” under the relevant provisions of the CWA, 33 U.S.C.

1369(b)(1)(E). See Iowa League of Cities, 711 F.3d at

863. Based on the EPA letters’ subject matter and use

of mandatory statements, the court concluded that the

letters had a “binding effect on regulated entities.”

Ibid.; see id. at 861-865.

On the merits, the Eighth Circuit held that EPA’s

letters announced “legislative rules” because they

“[e]xpand[ed] the footprint of [existing] regulation[s] by

imposing new requirements.” Iowa League of Cities,

711 F.3d at 873. As a result, the court held that the rules

could lawfully be promulgated only through notice-andcomment rulemaking procedures. Id. at 876. The court

of appeals also stated that EPA’s “blending rule” exceeded its statutory authority “insofar as [it] imposes

secondary treatment regulations on flows within facilities.” Id. at 877-878. The court did not conclude that

the “new mixing zone rule” that the court found had

been promulgated in EPA’s letters would exceed EPA’s

statutory authority. Id. at 877.

6

3. a. In November 2013, municipal and industrial

associations wrote a letter to EPA setting forth the

groups’ interpretation of the Eighth Circuit’s decision

in Iowa League of Cities. The groups “request[ed] confirmation that EPA will apply the Iowa League of Cities

decision uniformly across the country and so advise its

Regions and delegated States.” Pet. C.A. App. 5.

In April 2014, an EPA official sent a letter response,

stating that Iowa League of Cities “applies as binding

precedent in the Eighth Circuit,” but that the decision

did not vacate a bypass regulation previously upheld by

the D.C. Circuit that is set forth at 40 C.F.R. 122.41.

Pet. C.A. App. 1-2. The official also stated that EPA

was “planning to hold a forum” in summer 2014 to “ask

questions about the public health implications of various

bypass and blending scenarios during wet weather

events.” Id. at 2.

In May 2014, the associations wrote to EPA again,

stating that “[i]t is our position that EPA has made a

policy choice to limit application of the 8th Circuit’s decision,” and asking EPA to justify that approach. Pet.

C.A. App. 6. The letter also discussed member groups’

participation in the upcoming public health forum. Id.

at 7. In June 2014, an EPA official sent a letter response. That letter stated that the official “acknowledge[d] that [the groups] disagree with” her prior letter “that articulated that the [Eighth Circuit’s] decision

applies as binding precedent in the Eighth Circuit,” before providing additional information about the upcoming public health forum. Id. at 3.

b. In August 2014, petitioner filed suit in the D.C.

Circuit, seeking judicial review of EPA’s 2014 letters

responding to queries from municipal and industry

7

groups. See Pet. C.A. Pet. for Review. Petitioner asserted that the court could exercise jurisdiction under

Section 1369(b)(1)(E) because the letters had “modified

NPDES rules and program requirements without rulemaking.” Id. at 2.

c. The court of appeals dismissed petitioner’s challenge for lack of jurisdiction. Pet. App. 1-4. The court

described the challenged letters as containing “statements indicating that [EPA] would not acquiesce in or

follow the Eighth Circuit’s decision” in Iowa League of

Cities “outside of that circuit.” Id. at 2. The court concluded that the letters did not fall within the class of

EPA actions that are reviewable in the courts of appeals

under Section 1369(b)(1)(E). Id. at 3.

The court of appeals stated that it “need not determine whether EPA’s non-acquiescence statement[s]

constitute[] a ‘promulgation’ ” within the meaning of

Section 1369(b)(1)(E), because the statements did “not

announce an effluent or other limit on discharge of pollutants,” as Section 1369(b)(1)(E) also requires. Pet.

App. 3. The court explained that, rather than announcing a limitation, the agency had “merely articulate[d]

how EPA will interpret the Eighth Circuit’s decision.”

Ibid. As a result, the court stated, “to the extent [petitioner] wants to directly challenge EPA’s non-acquiescence statement[s], it must follow the usual path of suing in district court under the Administrative Procedure Act, assuming other reviewability criteria are satisfied.” Ibid. The court added that, “[t]o the extent [petitioner] believes EPA is violating the Eighth Circuit’s

mandate,” it could also “try to seek mandamus or other

appropriate relief in the Eighth Circuit.” Id. at 4. 2

Because the court of appeals found that it lacked subject-matter

jurisdiction, it did not address EPA’s arguments concerning lack of

2

8

ARGUMENT

Petitioner contends (Pet. 16-32) that the court of appeals had jurisdiction under 33 U.S.C. 1369(b)(1)(E) to

review two letters, written by an EPA official to municipal and industrial organizations, that discussed the

agency’s interpretation of a prior Eighth Circuit decision. The court of appeals correctly rejected that contention, and its decision does not conflict with any decision of this Court or another court of appeals. There is

no need to hold the petition for a writ of certiorari pending this Court’s decision in National Ass’n of Manufacturers v. Department of Defense, No. 16-299 (argued

Oct. 11, 2017), because agency letters that discuss the

scope of a judicial decision are far afield from the

agency rulemaking that is at issue in that case. Further

review is not warranted.

1. Section 1369(b)(1)(E) authorizes the courts of appeals to review actions of EPA “in approving or promulgating any effluent limitation or other limitation”

under specified provisions of the CWA. 33 U.S.C.

1369(b)(1)(E). The court of appeals correctly held that

the EPA letters that petitioner seeks to challenge are

not subject to direct appellate review under that provision. Pet. App. 3. Those letters do not impose any limitations on private parties, permit issuers, or others, but

simply describe how EPA understands the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Iowa League of Cities v. EPA, 711 F.3d

844 (2013). Pet. App. 3. Since an EPA official’s statements interpreting a court’s decision do not alter the

meaning of the court’s decision or bind private parties,

state permit issuers, or others, such statements do not

finality, standing, and ripeness. See Gov’t C.A. Br. 21-37 (making

these arguments).

9

alter the scope of the CWA regulatory regime—by setting limitations or otherwise. 3

Petitioner asserts that the challenged letters amount

to a “re-promulgat[ion]” of the limitations that the

Eighth Circuit in Iowa League of Cities found EPA to

have imposed. Pet. 16; see Pet. 18 (describing EPA’s

letters as “the functional equivalent of re-promulgating

the vacated regulations”). Those characterizations reflect a misunderstanding of the EPA letters. Those letters did not purport to alter any constraints to which

private parties or permit issuers are subject in the wake

of Iowa League of Cities. And because EPA’s views

about the precedential effect of Iowa League of Cities

do not alter the scope of that judicial decision, the letters likewise do not have the effect of altering the mandate of Iowa League of Cities.

Petitioner’s reliance (Pet. 17-18) on National Environmental Development Association’s Clean Air Project v. EPA, 752 F.3d 999 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (NEDACAP),

which involved the jurisdictional provisions of the Clean

Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. 7401 et seq., is also misplaced.

The court in NEDACAP held that the CAA’s jurisdictional provisions allowed appellate review of an EPA directive concerning the interpretation and implementation of air quality permitting programs in light of a judicial decision. 752 F.3d at 1003. But the court in that

case had no occasion to decide whether the challenged

EPA directive imposed a “limitation”—as is required

Although the court of appeals read EPA’s letters as “indicating”

that EPA interpreted Iowa League of Cities as binding only in the

Eighth Circuit, Pet. App. 2, EPA stated only that it did regard Iowa

League of Cities as binding in the Eighth Circuit, without addressing the more complicated question whether Iowa League of Cities

controls in other circuits. See Pet. C.A. App. 1-3.

3

10

for review under Section 1369(b)(1)(E)—because the

CAA’s expansive jurisdictional provisions authorize review of certain specified acts “or any other final action

of the Administrator under” the CAA. 42 U.S.C.

7607(b)(1).

Petitioner is also wrong in asserting (Pet. 20) that

the D.C. Circuit erroneously “ignor[ed] the need for a

promulgation analysis” and instead “simply exempt[ed]

all of EPA’s regulatory actions classified as ‘nonacquiescence statement[s]’ from Section 1369(b)(1)(E).”

The court below acknowledged that Section 1369(b)(1)(E)

authorizes review of “EPA-promulgated effluent or

other limits on discharge of pollutants.” Pet. App. 3; see

33 U.S.C. 1369(b)(1)(E) (authorizing direct court of appeals review of agency action “in approving or promulgating any effluent limitation or other limitation” under

specified provisions of the CWA). As the court of appeals explained, however, it was unnecessary for the

court to analyze whether EPA’s issuance of letter responses qualified as a “promulgation” because the letters did “not announce an effluent or other limit on discharge of pollutants.” Pet. App. 3.

Finally, petitioner contends (Pet. 23-25) that its claims

are reviewable in the D.C. Circuit pursuant to Section

1369(b)(1)(E) because EPA’s actions were “ultra vires”

and petitioner’s claim “stemmed from a judicial decision,” Pet. 23. That argument is also unsound. Section

1369(b)(1) confers jurisdiction to review specified types

of EPA action, such as actions “in approving or promulgating any effluent limitation or other limitation” under

particular CWA provisions. 33 U.S.C. 1369(b)(1)(E).

The Act does not authorize direct court of appeals re-

11

view of un-enumerated types of EPA actions simply because a litigant asserts that a particular action is ultra

vires or foreclosed by a prior judicial decision.

FCC v. ITT World Communications, Inc., 466 U.S.

463 (1984) (cited at Pet. 24), is not to the contrary. The

Court in that case found that a suit challenging certain

actions by the Federal Communications Commission

(FCC) as ultra vires should have been brought in the

court of appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2342(1) and

47 U.S.C. 402(a), rather than in the district court. See

466 U.S. at 468-469. But the Court reached that result

by applying the broad standards for direct appellate review set forth in those judicial-review provisions, under

which “[e]xclusive jurisdiction for review of final FCC

orders, such as the FCC’s denial of respondents’ rulemaking petition, lies in the Courts of Appeals.” Id. at 468.

The Court in ITT World Communications did not suggest that a court of appeals may review EPA action outside the categories enumerated in Section 1369(b)(1)

whenever a challenged action is alleged to be ultra vires.

2. The D.C. Circuit’s dismissal of petitioner’s challenge does not conflict with any decision of this Court or

another court of appeals. No other court appears to

have addressed whether Section 1369(b)(1)(E) authorizes direct court of appeals review of statements that

simply set forth the agency’s views on the scope of a

prior judicial decision.

Petitioner suggests (Pet. 27-29) that the decision below conflicts with Iowa League of Cities because the

Eighth Circuit in that case “took jurisdiction under Section 1369(b)(1)(E) to review the same exact regulatory

prohibitions that are being contested in [the instant

p]etition,” Pet. 27. That argument is misconceived.

Iowa League of Cities involved a challenge to 2011 EPA

12

policy letters that the court of appeals concluded set

forth new, binding policies regarding waste-treatment

facilities’ use of mixing zones and blending techniques.

711 F.3d at 863-878. Petitioner is not challenging those

letters. Any effort to challenge the 2011 letters in the

D.C. Circuit would have been untimely, since if petitioner had wished to seek direct court of appeals review

of those letters, it was required to do so “within 120 days

(as another petitioner did in the Eighth Circuit).” Pet.

App. 3; see 33 U.S.C. 1369(b)(1). Instead, petitioner

seeks judicial review of subsequent letters that address

the precedential effect of the Iowa League of Cities decision. And the Eighth Circuit in Iowa League of Cities

had no occasion to decide whether Section 1369(b)(1)(E)

authorizes direct court of appeals review of agency

statements that simply “articulate[] how EPA will interpret” a prior judicial decision, Pet. App. 3.

3. This case would be a poor vehicle for addressing

whether EPA’s interpretation of a judicial decision can

be reviewable under Section 1369(b)(1)(E), because the

petition for review of the EPA letters at issue here fails

on other grounds as well. First, EPA did not “promulgat[e]” a limitation, 33 U.S.C. 1369(b)(1)(E), through

correspondence with municipal and industrial associations about EPA’s interpretation of Iowa League of Cities. In analyzing whether particular agency action constitutes a “promulgation,” courts have considered

“(1) the Agency’s own characterization of the action;

(2) whether the action was published in the Federal

Register or Code of Federal Regulations; and (3) whether

the action has binding effects on private parties or on

the agency,” with the “ ‘first two criteria ser[ving] to illuminate the third.’ ” General Motors Corp. v. EPA, 363

F.3d 442, 448 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (citation omitted); see

13

Iowa League of Cities, 711 F.3d at 862 (applying the

D.C. Circuit’s framework). Those criteria do not support characterizing as a “promulgation” correspondence with private parties that EPA did not describe as

binding or authoritative and did not publish in the Federal Register or Code of Federal Regulations.

The court of appeals lacked authority to adjudicate

petitioner’s challenge for other reasons as well. The

EPA letters at issue here do not satisfy the requirements for final agency action. See Bennett v. Spear,

520 U.S. 154, 177-178 (1997) (explaining that an agency

action is final only if it “mark[s] the consummation of

the agency’s decisionmaking process” and is “one by

which rights or obligations have been determined or

from which legal consequences will flow”) (citations and

internal quotation marks omitted). Review of the EPA

letters would also have been unwarranted under the

ripeness doctrine, which “prevent[s] the courts, through

avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling

themselves in abstract disagreements over administrative policies, and also * * * protect[s] the agencies from

judicial interference until an administrative decision

has been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way

by the challenging parties.” Abbott Labs. v. Gardner,

387 U.S. 136, 148-149 (1967); see National Park Hospitality Ass’n v. Department of the Interior, 538 U.S. 803,

807-808 (2003). And because petitioner cannot demonstrate any actual or imminent injury from EPA’s letters, it also lacks standing to pursue its current challenge. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,

560 (1992). 4

The court of appeals stated that, “to the extent [petitioner]

wants to directly challenge” the EPA letters at issue here, “it must

4

14

Finally, disagreement concerning the proper interpretation of the EPA letters at issue here makes this

case a poor vehicle for considering the reviewability under Section 1369(b)(1)(E) of statements articulating an

agency’s views on the scope of a judicial decision. Petitioner’s argument (Pet. 17-19, 27-29) that the letters are

reviewable under Section 1369(b)(1)(E) depends on its

interpretation of the letters as declaring that EPA did

not view Iowa League of Cities as controlling outside

the Eighth Circuit. But while the court of appeals read

the letters as “indicating that [EPA] would not acquiesce in or follow” Iowa League of Cities “outside of [the

Eighth C]ircuit,” Pet. App. 2, the agency understands

its own letters as recognizing that Iowa League of Cities

is binding in the Eighth Circuit, without addressing

whether the decision controls elsewhere. See Pet. C.A.

App. 1-3. The threshold dispute as to the meaning of

the letters makes this case an especially poor vehicle for

considering the types of agency actions that are reviewable under Section 1369(b)(1)(E).

4. Petitioner suggests (Pet. 32-35) that, unless the

court of appeals’ decision is set aside, local governments

and private entities will lack adequate opportunities to

challenge EPA’s implementation of the CWA in light of

the Iowa League of Cities decision. As the court of appeals explained, however, its determination that it

lacked jurisdiction under Section 1369(b)(1)(E) does not

foreclose petitioner from using other channels to challenge such implementation. To the extent that EPA engages in final agency action that is reviewable under

follow the usual path of suing in district court under the [APA], assuming other reviewability criteria are satisfied.” Pet. App. 3 (emphasis added). For the reasons stated in the text, the EPA letters

would not be reviewable under the APA.

15

general administrative-law principles, APA review remains available. See Pet. App. 3; but see p. 13 & note 4,

supra (explaining why the EPA letters at issue here

would not be reviewable under the APA). And, “[t]o the

extent that [petitioner] believes EPA is violating the

Eighth Circuit’s mandate,” the decision below does not

prevent petitioner from “try[ing] to seek mandamus or

other appropriate relief in the Eighth Circuit.” Pet.

App. 4.

The decision below also does not prevent a litigant

from challenging any final permitting decision that the

litigant regards as ultra vires in light of Iowa League of

Cities. If a facility receives an NPDES permit containing limitations that the facility operator believes are

foreclosed by Iowa League of Cities, or is denied a permit altogether, the operator may seek judicial review of

the permitting decision. See 33 U.S.C. 1369(b)(1)(F)

(direct court of appeals review of EPA decisions issuing

or denying permits); 40 C.F.R. 123.30 (specifying that

States administering the NPDES program must “provide an opportunity for judicial review in State Court of

the final approval or denial of permits”).

5. There is no need to hold the petition for a writ of

certiorari pending this Court’s decision in National Association of Manufacturers, supra. That case presents

the question whether an EPA rule that defines the term

“waters of the United States” for purposes of the CWA

is reviewable in the court of appeals under Section

1369(b)(1). See Pet. at i, National Ass’n of Mfrs., supra

(No. 16-299); Gov’t Br. in Opp. at i, National Ass’n of

Mfrs., supra (No. 16-299). The EPA rule at issue in National Association of Manufacturers limits the conduct

of private parties and permit issuers by identifying the

16

categories of waters on which effluent and other limitations under the CWA will apply. The government has

argued that a rule defining the geographic scope of limitations under Section 1311 establishes an “effluent limitation or other limitation under section 1311,” 33 U.S.C.

1369(b)(1)(E), while the petitioners in National Association of Manufacturers have argued to the contrary.

See Gov’t Br. at 17-30, 35-49, National Ass’n of Mfrs.,

supra (No. 16-299); Pet. Br. at 28-55, National Ass’n of

Mfrs., supra (No. 16-299). The decision below does not

implicate the question presented in National Association of Manufacturers because the EPA letters at issue

in this case do not impose any obligations on private

parties, permit issuers, or others. See Pet. App. 3. Instead, they simply articulate an agency interpretation

of a court of appeals decision. Ibid.

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted.

NOEL J. FRANCISCO

Solicitor General

JEFFREY H. WOOD

Acting Assistant Attorney

General

ANDREW J. DOYLE

Attorney

DECEMBER 2017

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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