Petitioners Brief — United States, Petitioner v. Rene Sanchez-Gomez, et al.
Supreme Court briefJan 22, 2018
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No. 17-312
In the Supreme Court of the United States
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PETITIONER
v.
RENE SANCHEZ-GOMEZ, ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES
NOEL J. FRANCISCO
Solicitor General
Counsel of Record
JOHN P. CRONAN
Acting Assistant Attorney
General
EDWIN S. KNEEDLER
Deputy Solicitor General
ERIC J. FEIGIN
ALLON KEDEM
Assistants to the Solicitor
General
DAVID B. GOODHAND
Attorney
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530-0001
SupremeCtBriefs@usdoj.gov
(202) 514-2217
QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether the court of appeals erred in asserting authority to review respondents’ interlocutory challenge
to pretrial physical restraints and in ruling on that challenge notwithstanding its recognition that respondents’
individual claims were moot.
(I)
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING
Petitioner, the United States of America, was the
only appellee in the court of appeals. The four
respondents—Rene Sanchez-Gomez, Moises PatricioGuzman, Jasmin Isabel Morales (a.k.a. Jasmin Morales), and Mark William Ring—were appellants in the
court of appeals.
(II)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Opinions below .............................................................................. 1
Jurisdiction .................................................................................... 1
Statutory provisions involved ..........................................................2
Statement ...................................................................................... 2
Summary of argument ............................................................... 13
Argument:
The Ninth Circuit exceeded its authority by
invalidating the security policy in this case ........................ 16
A. The Ninth Circuit lacked statutory authority for
its decision ........................................................................ 17
1. The district court’s orders were not “final
decisions” immediately appealable under
28 U.S.C. 1291 ........................................................... 17
2. The Ninth Circuit did not have authority to
issue a writ of “supervisory mandamus” ................ 27
B. Respondents’ claims had become moot before the
Ninth Circuit adjudicated them ..................................... 31
1. Respondents lost their personal interest in the
outcome of the litigation when their criminal
cases ended ................................................................ 31
2. Respondents’ claims cannot be saved from
mootness by construing their challenges as
“functional class actions”......................................... 32
3. The exception to mootness for cases “capable of
repetition, yet evading review” does not apply
to respondents’ claims .............................................. 40
Conclusion ................................................................................... 44
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases:
Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651 (1977) ................ 20, 22
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979) ............................... 25, 29
(III)
IV
Cases—Continued:
Page
Berman v. United States, 302 U.S. 211 (1937) ................... 19
Board of Sch. Comm’rs v. Jacobs,
420 U.S. 128 (1975)........................................................ 37, 38
Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663 (2016) ........ 31
Cheney v. United States Dist. Court,
542 U.S. 367 (2004)................................. 14, 15, 27, 28, 29, 30
City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983) ............... 40
Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323 (1940) ............... 18
Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp.,
337 U.S. 541 (1949).............................................................. 19
Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463 (1978) ... 20, 21
County of Riverside v. McLaughlin,
500 U.S. 44 (1991) ............................................. 24, 29, 35, 38
De Abadia-Peixoto v. United States Dep’t of
Homeland Sec., 277 F.R.D. 572 (N.D. Cal. 2011) ............ 25
Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622 (2005) ............... 11, 21, 28, 29
DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974) ......................... 32
Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976) ............................. 28
Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259 (1984) ....... passim
Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders,
566 U.S. 318 (2012)........................................................ 25, 29
General Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147 (1982) ................. 37
Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk,
569 U.S. 66 (2013) ......................................................... 35, 36
Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975) ........................ passim
Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251 (2013) .................................. 16
Helstoski v. Meanor, 442 U.S. 500 (1979) ..................... 20, 22
Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305 (1988) ........................................ 42
Kingdomware Techs., Inc. v. United States,
136 S. Ct. 1969 (2016) ................................................... 41, 43
Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am.,
511 U.S. 375 (1994).............................................................. 16
V
Cases—Continued:
Page
Kremens v. Bartley, 431 U.S. 119 (1977)............................. 37
Lane v. Williams, 455 U.S. 624 (1982) ................................ 42
Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472 (1990) ..... 31
Midland Asphalt Corp. v. United States,
489 U.S. 794 (1989)............................................ 19, 20, 21, 22
Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter,
558 U.S. 100 (2009)........................................................ 24, 26
Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478 (1982) ................................. 40
O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1973) ........................ 41, 42
Parr v. United States, 351 U.S. 513 (1956) ......................... 30
Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler,
427 U.S. 424 (1976)........................................................ 38, 39
Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court,
478 U.S. 1 (1986) ........................................................... 41, 43
Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass’n, 319 U.S. 21 (1943)......... 30
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) ................................... 41, 43
Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984) .................................. 38
Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003) ........................... 22
Smith v. Bayer Corp., 564 U.S. 299 (2011) .......................... 37
Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975) ......... 15, 33, 34, 35, 37, 38
Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1 (1998) ................................... 43
Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951) .................................... 20, 22
Swisher v. Brady, 438 U.S. 204 (1978) .......................... 35, 38
Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431 (2011) ........................... 41, 43
United States Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty,
445 U.S. 388 (1980)........................................................ 36, 38
United States v. Hollywood Motor Car Co.,
458 U.S. 263 (1982)............................................ 17, 18, 21, 26
United States v. Howard, 480 F.3d 1005 (2007) ..... 3, 8, 9, 29
United States v. MacDonald,
435 U.S. 850 (1978)............................................ 21, 23, 25, 26
United States v. Zuber, 118 F. 3d 101 (2d Cir. 1997) ........... 3
VI
Cases—Continued:
Page
Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147 (1975) ........................ 43
Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90 (1967) ................ 12, 29, 30
Constitution, statutes, and rules:
U.S. Const.:
Art. III .................................................................. 13, 15, 31
Amend. IV ........................................................................ 34
Amend. V .......................................................................... 35
Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 27, 1 Stat. 87 ......................... 2
All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. 1651(a) ........................... 2, 10, 14, 27
8 U.S.C. 1325 ............................................................................ 8
18 U.S.C. 875(c) ........................................................................ 8
18 U.S.C. 1544 .......................................................................... 8
18 U.S.C. 3145(c) .................................................................... 18
18 U.S.C. 3731 ........................................................................ 18
18 U.S.C. 3742 ........................................................................ 18
21 U.S.C. 952 ............................................................................ 8
21 U.S.C. 960 ............................................................................ 8
28 U.S.C. 566(a) ....................................................................... 2
28 U.S.C. 566(i) ........................................................................ 2
28 U.S.C. 1291 ............................................. 2, 13, 14, 16, 17, 20
Fed. R. Civ. P.:
Rule 23 ................................................. 15, 33, 34, 36, 37, 39
Rule 23(e) ......................................................................... 37
Rules 26-37 ....................................................................... 24
Rule 65 .............................................................................. 24
Fed. R. Crim. P. 16 ................................................................ 24
Miscellaneous:
U.S. Marshals Serv., Policy Directives: Prisoner
Operations, https://www.usmarshals.gov/foia/
directives/prisoner_operations.pdf ............................. 2, 3, 5
In the Supreme Court of the United States
No. 17-312
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PETITIONER
v.
RENE SANCHEZ-GOMEZ, ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the en banc court of appeals (Pet. App.
1a-70a) is reported at 859 F.3d 649. The opinion of the
court of appeals panel (Pet. App. 71a-82a) is reported at
798 F.3d 1204. The order of the district court (Pet. App.
83a-99a) is not published in the Federal Supplement but
is available at 2013 WL 6145601.
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on
May 31, 2017. The petition for a writ of certiorari was
filed on August 29, 2017, and was granted on December
8, 2017. The jurisdiction of this Court rests on 28 U.S.C.
1254(1).
(1)
2
STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED
1. Title 28, Section 1291 of the United States Code
provides in pertinent part:
The courts of appeals (other than the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit) shall have
jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the
district courts of the United States.
2. Title 28, Section 1651(a) of the United States
Code provides:
The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act
of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and
agreeable to the usages and principles of law.
STATEMENT
1. The United States Marshals Service was created
by the Judiciary Act of 1789 to ensure the safety of federal court personnel, litigants, and the public. Act of
Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 27, 1 Stat. 87. Congress has declared it “the primary role and mission of the United
States Marshals Service to provide for the security” of
the federal judiciary, including “the United States District Courts.” 28 U.S.C. 566(a). The Marshals Service
performs its functions in “consult[ation] with the Judicial Conference of the United States,” but it “retains
final authority regarding security requirements for the
judicial branch of the Federal Government.” 28 U.S.C.
566(i).
The Marshals Service has determined that the use of
physical restraints can provide a vital tool for ensuring
the safety of court personnel, the public, and detainees
themselves. See U.S. Marshals Service, Policy Directives: Prisoner Operations § 9.18.E (Prisoner Operations),
https://www.usmarshals.gov/foia/directives/prisoner_
3
operations.pdf. The Marshals Service has directed, for
example, that detainees should typically be restrained
during transportation to and from the courtroom. Id.
§§ 9.18.D.3, 9.18.E.a. And in particular judicial districts, the Marshals Service has, in consultation with the
district courts, implemented policies involving the
maintenance of physical restraints on detainees in the
courtroom during at least some non-jury proceedings.
See id. § 9.18.E.b.
In United States v. Howard, 480 F.3d 1005 (2007),
the Ninth Circuit upheld a policy “implemented by the
United States Marshals Service for the Central District
of California after consultation with the magistrate
judges,” under which “pretrial detainees making their
first appearance before a magistrate judge wear leg
shackles.” Id. at 1007. The court explained that the policy “concern[ed] only proceedings conducted without
the presence of a jury” and “address[ed] legitimate security concerns,” including that “security-related information concerning defendants typically is incomplete”
at the time of their first courtroom appearances, and
that “understaffed security officers must provide courtroom security in a large and unsecured space.” Id. at
1013-1014. The court noted that its decision was consistent with a previous decision of the Second Circuit,
which had upheld, based on deference to a Marshals
Service recommendation, the use of arm and leg restraints during a non-jury sentencing proceeding. Id.
at 1013; see United States v. Zuber, 118 F.3d 101, 104
(2d Cir. 1997) (reasoning that a district judge in a nonjury proceeding may, “without further inquiry,” elect
to “defer to the professional judgment of the Marshals
Service regarding the precautions that seem appropriate or necessary in the circumstances”).
4
2. Courtroom security concerns are particularly
acute in the five judicial districts—the Southern District of California, the Districts of Arizona and New
Mexico, and the Western and Southern Districts of
Texas—on the Nation’s southwest border. Those districts alone account for nearly 40% of the Marshals Service’s total daily prisoner population. C.A. S.E.R. 64.
They also “handle[ ] a large volume of criminal cases
arising from reactive arrests, where the arresting agent
typically will know far less about the defendant’s background and behavior than agents effectuating arrests
following proactive investigations.” Ibid.
By mid-2013, four of those five districts had adopted
a policy of “routinely using full restraints for most nonjury proceedings.” C.A. S.E.R. 64. “ ‘Full restraints’
means that a defendant’s hands are closely handcuffed
together, these handcuffs are connected by chain to another chain running around the defendant’s waist, and
the defendant’s feet are shackled and chained together.” Pet. App. 3a. The only southwest-border district not yet following such a policy by that time was the
Southern District of California. C.A. S.E.R. 61.
The Southern District, however, had been “experienc[ing] an increase in security incidents” during the
preceding years. C.A. S.E.R. 61. The Marshals Service
in that district was (and is) responsible for the security
of a recently constructed 16-story Annex courthouse in
San Diego, a separate five-story courthouse in San Diego, and a smaller courthouse in El Centro. Id. at 59.
The Marshals Service was required to cover “as many
as 18 to 22 different district judge and magistrate judge
calendars on a single day.” Id. at 60. It also routinely
produced as many as 40 to 50 detainees to a single magistrate’s courtroom at the same time. Ibid. Detainees
5
usually stand in the jury box, which is 2 to 7 feet from
defense counsel’s table, 2 to 9 feet from the public gallery, 2 to 7 feet from the interpreter, 11 to 16 feet from
the courtroom clerk, 14 to 18 feet from the magistrate
judge, and 14 to 19 feet from the unlocked courtroom
doors leading to the public hallway. Ibid.
In March 2013, the United States Marshal for the
Southern District of California submitted a letter requesting that the district’s judges approve a “districtwide policy of allowing the Marshals Service to produce
all in-custody defendants in full restraints for most nonjury proceedings.” J.A. 76. The Marshal’s request was
prompted by a combination of factors: a high volume of
detainees moving through the district’s cell blocks
(more than 44,000 during Fiscal Year 2012), concerns
about understaffing, and “multiple incidents” in which
weapons had been found in holding cells. J.A. 76-77.
The Marshal also noted that two serious incidents—an
assault and a stabbing—had recently occurred in the
district’s courtrooms, explaining that another such incident “would clearly endanger those present.” J.A. 77.
The Marshal emphasized that “other comparable districts” had already adopted a full-restraints policy,
which was also consistent with the directive of the national Marshals Service. Ibid.; see Prisoner Operations
§ 9.18.E.3.b.
In October 2013, after soliciting and considering
views from a variety of sources (including the Offices of
the U.S. Attorney and the Federal Defender), the Chief
Judge informed the Marshal that the judges of the
Southern District had approved the Marshal’s request
in most respects. J.A. 78. The request was denied, however, as to detainees appearing at plea and sentencing
hearings, during which hand and arm restraints would
6
be removed. J.A. 78-79. In addition, any district or
magistrate judge could “direct the Marshals to produce
an in-custody defendant without restraints.” J.A. 78.
Finally, individual detainees could “ask [a] judge to direct that the[ir] restraints be removed in whole or in
part,” at which point the judge would make an individualized determination about the need for restraints. J.A. 79.
3. Respondents are four former federal pretrial detainees who made initial appearances before magistrate
judges in the Southern District of California in October
2013. Pet. App. 34a-35a & n.2. Consistent with the security policy approved by the district’s judges, the Marshals Service produced each respondent in full restraints. Id. at 35a. Respondents raised constitutional
objections to the security policy at their initial hearings
or arraignments but were overruled. Id. at 35a & n.2.
Three respondents filed emergency motions challenging the rulings in their cases and asking the district
court to “[r]evoke” the district-wide security policy.
Pet. App. 84a. Relying on the Ninth Circuit’s prior decision in Howard, the court denied those motions (as
well as a separate challenge to the magistrate judge’s
ruling in the fourth respondent’s case). Id. at 83a-99a,
104a. In denying the motions, the court emphasized
several district-specific factors that justified the security policy, including: the large number of in-custody
detainees; the physical layout of the district’s courtrooms and courthouses; and a troubling record of recent
in-court assaults, including a stabbing, as well as “multiple incidents of prisoner-made weapons.” Id. at 92a93a. The court also noted that the district’s “need for
security [had] increased” in recent years due to a focus
“on prosecuting defendants with violent or extensive
7
criminal histories, and ties to gangs or drug cartels.”
Id. at 93a.
The district court further explained that “proceedings involving multiple defendants,” such as cases in
which defendants “enter pleas en masse before magistrate judges,” pose particularly “heightened” security
risks. Pet. App. 93a, 95a. Judges in the Southern District hear “upwards of 20 cases or more” on a typical
calendar day, and “practical considerations make it impossible to know the sequence in which each case will be
called.” Id. at 94a. The process of removing the restraints from a defendant (each of whom is transported
in full restraints) “ordinarily requires three Marshals,”
because two “stand guard to prevent attacks on the
Marshal who is unlocking and removing the shackles,
either by kicking, or by swinging hand shackles like a
mace.” Ibid. Thus, in addition to overtaxing the Marshals Service’s limited resources, “[r]equiring the unshackling of each defendant before the hearings, and reshackling each one afterwards for safe transport, would
result in delays of up to two hours” per day per courtroom, “eating up court time” and requiring that detainees “be held in restraints longer (while waiting for their
cases to be called).” Ibid.
In light of those considerations—and the expertise
of the Marshals Service, which is “familiar with the
tasks of guarding detainees, maintaining courtroom security, and transferring detainees to and from court”—
the district court determined that the security policy “is
reasonably related to legitimate government interests
and does not violate [respondents’] constitutional
rights.” Pet. App. 98a-99a. The court emphasized, however, that judges must continue to weigh “countervail-
8
ing interests” in appropriate cases and to direct “deviations from the policy” when necessary. Id. at 98a (citing
Howard, 480 F.3d at 1013-1014).
4. In November 2013, respondents filed separate appeals to the Ninth Circuit. J.A. 1, 5, 10, 15. Before the
court of appeals issued any decision on those appeals,
however, each respondent’s criminal case was resolved.
Patricio-Guzman: On October 31, 2013, respondent
Patricio-Guzman pleaded guilty to misdemeanor illegal
entry, in violation of 8 U.S.C. 1325, and was sentenced
to 30 days of imprisonment. J.A. 36-37 (Dkt. No. 12).
Sanchez-Gomez: On November 21, 2013, respondent
Sanchez-Gomez pleaded guilty to felony misuse of a
passport, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1544. J.A. 26-27 (Dkt.
No. 36). On December 20, 2013, he was sentenced to
five years of probation. J.A. 30-31 (Dkt. No. 48).
Morales: On March 11, 2014, after being released on
bond and rearrested for failure to appear, respondent
Morales pleaded guilty to a controlled-substance offense, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 952 and 960. J.A. 60-61
(Dkt. No. 85). On June 19, 2014, she was sentenced to
18 months of imprisonment and three years of supervised release. J.A. 61-62 (Dkt. No. 95).
Ring: On October 23, 2014, the district court granted
the government’s motion, pursuant to a deferredprosecution agreement, to dismiss the charges against
respondent Ring for making an interstate threat to kidnap, kill, or injure, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 875(c). J.A.
63, 66, 75 (Dkt. Nos. 1, 19, 47).
5. In August 2015, a panel of the court of appeals vacated and remanded for further proceedings. Pet. App.
71a-82a. In asserting appellate jurisdiction, the panel
cited Howard, which had relied on the collateral-order
9
doctrine to entertain interlocutory appeals from the denials of motions seeking the removal of restraints during pretrial proceedings. Id. at 75a; see Howard, 480
F.3d at 1009, 1011-1012. And although the panel recognized that respondents were “no longer detained,” it
viewed their claims as “not moot” under “the exception
to the mootness doctrine for cases that are ‘capable of
repetition, yet evading review.’ ” Pet. App. 75a (quoting
Howard, 480 F.3d at 1009).
On the merits, the panel declined to hold “that a blanket policy of shackling defendants in non-jury proceedings is never permissible,” and it recognized that Howard previously had “approved of one such policy.” Pet.
App. 81a (citing 480 F.3d at 1008). But the panel concluded that, “[o]n this record, the Southern District has
failed to provide adequate justification for its restrictive
shackling policy.” Id. at 73a.
6. The court of appeals granted rehearing en banc
and requested supplemental briefing on “whether we
lack appellate jurisdiction over these appeals, contrary
to our holding in United States v. Howard.” J.A. 3. Following argument, the court issued a 6-5 decision invalidating the security policy approved by the Southern
District’s judges. Pet. App. 1a-30a.
a. Addressing the threshold question of its own authority to adjudicate the appeals, the majority observed
that respondents had requested “relief not merely for
themselves, but for all in-custody defendants in the district.” Pet. App. 7a. The majority acknowledged that
the request did not fit within its limited jurisdiction over
“immediately appealable collateral orders.” Id. at 6a.
But the majority reasoned that respondents had raised
“class-like claims * * * asking for class-like relief,”
10
which could be treated as petitions for writs of mandamus under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. 1651(a). Pet.
App. 7a. The majority stated that it was authorized to
issue “[s]upervisory and advisory writs,” through which
a court may “provide broader relief ” than would be
available under a traditional writ of mandamus. Id. at
8a. And although granting the writ required a showing
of “clear error,” id. at 9a (citation omitted), the majority
deemed it sufficient that “some form of routine shackling has become a common practice and thus is an oftrepeated error,” id. at 10a.
The majority further held that the case was not
moot, notwithstanding the completion of respondents’
criminal cases. Pet. App. 11a-17a. The majority recognized that respondents are “no longer subject to the
complained-of policy” and no longer have “personal interests in the outcome of this case.” Id. at 11a-12a. The
majority further acknowledged that it could not apply
the “capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-review exception”
to mootness, because the exception requires a likelihood
of repetition “as to the particular complainants, and we
cannot presume that [respondents] will be subject to
criminal proceedings in the future.” Id. at 12a. The majority concluded, however, that it was authorized to decide this case by Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975),
which had permitted the continuation of a civil classaction suit notwithstanding the mootness of the original
named plaintiffs’ claims. Pet. App. 13a-16a. Although
Gerstein, unlike this case, involved a civil suit that had
formally been certified as a class action, the majority
labeled this case a “functional class action” that could
be treated in the same manner. Id. at 13a-14a. In the
majority’s view, so long as a case can be deemed to have
three features present in Gerstein—a challenge to
11
“broader policies” rather than “individual violations,” a
“continually changing group[ ] of injured individuals
who would benefit from any relief,” and “common
representation”—a mandamus claim may outlast the
claimant’s personal interest in its resolution. Id. at 14a.
On the merits, the majority invalidated the district’s
security policy, although it withheld “the issuance of a
formal writ of mandamus” because the challenged security policy “isn’t presently in effect” as a result of the
earlier panel ruling. Pet. App. 30a; see id. at 31a
(Schroeder, J., concurring). The majority based its
merits ruling on Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622 (2005),
which had concluded that due process requires an individualized justification for visibly restraining a defendant in front of a jury during the guilt and penalty phases
of a capital trial. Id. at 624, 629, 633. In the majority’s
view, that rule “applies whether the proceeding is pretrial, trial, or sentencing, with a jury or without.” Pet.
App. 19a. The majority acknowledged that Deck had
found “that the common law drew a distinction between
trial and pretrial proceedings,” because “ ‘Blackstone
and other English authorities recognized that the rule
[disfavoring restraints] did not apply at the time of arraignment, or like proceedings before the judge.’ ” Id.
at 24a (quoting Deck, 544 U.S. at 626) (internal quotation marks omitted). But it viewed Deck’s statement as
“dictum” that is “contradicted by the very sources on
which the Supreme Court relied.” Ibid.; see id. at 24a28a.
b. Judge Ikuta dissented, reasoning that the majority’s analysis was “wrong at every turn” and invited “potentially grave consequences for state and federal courthouses throughout [the] circuit.” Pet. App. 32a, 70a.
12
The dissent first explained that respondents’ appeals
should have been dismissed as moot because respondents “have no ongoing interest in the purely prospective
relief they seek.” Pet. App. 37a. It rejected the majority’s “functional class action” exception to mootness, id.
at 39a (citation omitted), observing that jurisdiction in
Gerstein was not based on the three features identified
by the majority, but rather on the concept that a formal
class action acquires “independent legal status”
through certification, id. at 40a (citation omitted). The
dissent explained that, whereas a formal class certification can “relate back” to the live controversy that existed at the time a civil suit was filed, id. at 42a, this case
involved no “class that has an independent legal status,
whether under Rule 23 or otherwise,” and hence “nothing a court can ‘relate back’ after a criminal defendant’s
individual claim becomes moot.” Id. at 46a.
The dissent added that this case also “do[es] not
meet the requirements for granting a writ of supervisory mandamus,” which the dissent viewed as being limited to instances in which “a district court has engaged
in ‘willful disobedience.’ ” Pet. App. 52a (quoting Will v.
United States, 389 U.S. 90, 100 (1967)). In this case, the
dissent observed, the district court had relied on Howard and thus had “complied with [the Ninth Circuit’s]
last word on the matter.” Id. at 53a.
On the merits, the dissent would have “follow[ed]
Deck’s reading of the common law,” which “establishes
that there is no common law rule against the use of restraints during pretrial proceedings,” and would have
abstained from “inventing a new right out of whole
cloth.” Pet. App. 63a. “The majority’s rule,” the dissent
concluded, “fails not only as a matter of law, but also as
a matter of common sense.” Id. at 70a. It will require
13
the Marshals Service either to “do the impossible (predict risks based on a dearth of predictive information),”
or else to “sit idly by and suffer an identifiable, compelling harm (violence in the courtroom).” Ibid. The dissent predicted that the majority’s “one-size-fits-all security decree,” laid down “by appellate jurists far removed from the day-to-day administration of criminal
justice,” would “put[ ] federal district courts at risk” and
potentially create “even greater dangers” for state
courts. Id. at 69a & n.14.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Ninth Circuit lacked authority to adjudicate the
merits of respondents’ challenge to the security policy
adopted by the judges of the Southern District of California. Its decision striking down that policy was neither authorized by statute nor permissible under Article III.
A. The federal courts of appeals are vested, under
28 U.S.C. 1291, with jurisdiction only over appeals from
“final decisions of the district courts.” That final judgment rule is construed with particular strictness in the
criminal context, where piecemeal review is especially
harmful. The district-court orders at issue here, which
rejected respondents’ objections to the use of restraints
during pretrial proceedings, were not final decisions in
their criminal cases.
Respondents err in asserting that the Ninth Circuit
was nevertheless authorized to assume jurisdiction over
their appeals under the collateral-order doctrine.
That doctrine recognizes a limited class of pre-finaljudgment orders, deemed “final” for purposes of appellate review, that may be appealed to vindicate an important right that would lose all value if not upheld immediately. Regardless of whether respondents’ claims
are construed narrowly or broadly, they do not qualify
14
for immediate appeal. To the extent that respondents
challenge the procedures followed in their criminal
cases, those claims could be reviewed at the conclusion
of those proceedings, at which point any necessary
showing of prejudice could be made and relief could be
granted. And to the extent that respondents are raising
“district-wide shackling claims [that] aren’t connected
to [their] individual criminal cases,” Pet. App. 10a, their
claims are effectively challenges to their conditions of
confinement, which are more appropriately addressed
through a civil action. Finally, relaxing the collateralorder doctrine as respondents suggest, to create a new
category of interlocutory criminal appeals, would cause
disruption and undermine the purposes of the finaljudgment rule.
The en banc majority recognized that it could not assume jurisdiction over respondents’ appeals under Section 1291. The majority believed it was nevertheless
empowered by the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. 1651(a), to
invalidate the security policy by means of a “ ‘supervisory’ or ‘advisory’ ” writ of mandamus. Pet. App. 8a.
Respondents’ appeals, however, do not satisfy any of
the “three conditions” necessary for a writ of mandamus, Cheney v. United States Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367,
380 (2004). First, respondents had “other adequate
means” of obtaining appellate review of their claims, id.
at 380 (citation omitted), either by filing appeals of final
judgments of conviction in the normal course in their
own cases, or by filing a civil class action seeking
district-wide relief. Second, respondents have no “clear
and indisputable” right to issuance of the writ, id. at 381
(citation omitted), given that the district court, in rejecting their claims, relied on pertinent rulings by the
Ninth Circuit and this Court. Third, this case does not
15
exhibit “exceptional circumstances amounting to a judicial usurpation of power, or a clear abuse of discretion,”
id. at 380-381 (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted). At most, respondents have raised a run-ofthe-mill claim of pretrial error on a contestable issue,
which cannot justify mandamus review in a criminal
case.
B. The Ninth Circuit also lacked authority to adjudicate respondents’ claims for the additional reason that
those claims became moot before the court ruled. The
criminal cases of all four respondents—and thus all pretrial proceedings to which the challenged security policy could have applied—had completely ended before
the Ninth Circuit decided their appeals. Respondents
therefore had no continuing personal stake, sufficient
for purposes of Article III, in the fate of the policy.
The Ninth Circuit purported to rescue respondents’
appeals from mootness by conceiving of their challenges
as “functional class actions.” Pet. App. 13a. But that
procedural invention has no grounding in this Court’s
decisions. Only a true class action can outlast a litigant’s personal stake in the case’s outcome: Once certified under Rule 23, a class action “acquire[s] a legal
status separate from the interest asserted by” the plaintiff, such that the class’s interest may survive even if the
plaintiff ’s has ended. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 399
(1975). And where the plaintiff ’s claims become moot
before the district court has ruled on class certification,
a subsequent certification may be deemed to “relate
back” to the filing of the complaint. See Gerstein v.
Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 110 n.11 (1975). But the existence
of that Federal Rules-based mechanism for addressing
inherently transitory claims provides no license for
courts to create their own “functional” analogues that
16
lack any affirmative authorization, formal procedures,
or doctrinal safeguards. A “functional” class action in
which a litigant seeks relief only in his personal capacity
has no independent legal status, no interest separate
from the litigant’s, and no certification that can be “related back” to a time when an actual case or controversy
existed.
Respondents’ claims also cannot be saved from mootness under the exception for cases that are capable of
repetition, yet evading review. That exception applies
only where the same complaining party reasonably expects to face the challenged governmental practice
again in the future. The Southern District’s security
policy will not be applied to respondents again unless
they face new criminal charges, and this Court has consistently refused to base jurisdiction on litigants’ predictions of their own future criminal activity.
ARGUMENT
THE NINTH CIRCUIT EXCEEDED ITS AUTHORITY BY
INVALIDATING THE SECURITY POLICY IN THIS CASE
“ ‘Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction,’
possessing ‘only that power authorized by Constitution
and statute.’ ” Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 256 (2013)
(quoting Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am.,
511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994)). The Ninth Circuit’s decision
in this case disregarded both the constitutional and
statutory constraints on its authority. Respondents’ individual appeals were moot long before the en banc
court of appeals ruled, because their individual criminal
cases had concluded. With respect to statutory authority, although the majority correctly recognized that it
lacked appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1291, it
erred in concluding that it could circumvent that deficiency by relying on its mandamus powers to invalidate
17
a policy that accorded with all relevant precedent of
both the Ninth Circuit and this Court. And it further
erred in creating a novel “functional class action” device
with no legal foundation to avoid the mootness of respondents’ claims following the completion of their
criminal proceedings.
A. The Ninth Circuit Lacked Statutory Authority For Its
Decision
No statute provided the Ninth Circuit with authority
to issue its decision in this case. The orders that respondents challenged were not “final decisions” appealable under 28 U.S.C. 1291, because they did not resolve
respondents’ criminal cases and were not collateral orders that could be treated as final for purposes of appeal. Nor could the Ninth Circuit permissibly rely on
its mandamus authority (which it ultimately declined to
exercise) to reconsider its previously expressed views
on the circumstances under which pretrial restraints
are permissible.
1. The district court’s orders were not “final decisions”
immediately appealable under 28 U.S.C. 1291
The general appellate-jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C.
1291, vests the courts of appeals with jurisdiction only
over appeals from “final decisions of the district courts.”
Ibid. It thus embodies a final judgment rule that “is
inimical to piecemeal appellate review of trial court decisions which do not terminate the litigation.” United
States v. Hollywood Motor Car Co., 458 U.S. 263, 265
(1982) (per curiam). The en banc majority correctly declined to rely on Section 1291 to assert jurisdiction over
the interlocutory appeals in this case. Pet. App. 6a-7a.
18
a. As this Court has explained, “[f ]inality as a condition of review is an historic characteristic of federal appellate procedure.” Cobbledick v. United States, 309
U.S. 323, 324 (1940); see ibid. (finality requirement “was
written into the first Judiciary Act”). The final-judgment
rule is “crucial to the efficient administration of justice”
and “serves several important interests.” Flanagan v.
United States, 465 U.S. 259, 263-264 (1984). Among
other things, it “helps preserve the respect due trial
judges by minimizing appellate-court interference with
the numerous decisions they must make in the prejudgment stages of litigation,” and it “reduces the ability of
litigants to harass opponents and to clog the courts
through a succession of costly and time-consuming appeals.” Ibid.
The policy against piecemeal review “is at its strongest” in criminal cases. Hollywood Motor Car, 458 U.S.
at 265. In that context, the final-judgment rule normally “prohibits appellate review until conviction and
imposition of sentence.” Flanagan, 465 U.S. at 263; see
18 U.S.C. 3742 (authorizing appeals from final sentences in certain circumstances). Congress has expressly permitted appeals from pretrial orders in criminal cases only in a few limited circumstances. See
18 U.S.C. 3145(c) (authorizing jurisdiction over appeals
from pretrial release or detention orders); 18 U.S.C.
3731 (authorizing jurisdiction over government appeals
from certain pretrial dismissal, suppression, and release orders). For other such orders, “[t]he correctness
of a trial court’s rejection even of a constitutional claim
made by the accused in the process of prosecution must
await his conviction before its reconsideration by an appellate tribunal.” Cobbledick, 309 U.S. at 325-326.
19
Here, each respondent raised his or her objection to
the security policy during an initial appearance or arraignment before a magistrate judge. J.A. 20-21 (Dkt.
No. 3); J.A. 33-34 (Dkt. No. 3); J.A. 44-45 (Dkt. No. 5);
J.A. 65-66 (Dkt. No. 16). When those objections were
overruled, respondents filed “Emergency Motion[s]” in
the district court challenging the use of restraints during pretrial criminal proceedings. Pet. App. 84a. Respondents then appealed from the denials of those motions, but their criminal cases continued (and concluded
without generating any further appeals). Accordingly,
no respondent in this case appealed from a “final determination of the merits of [his or her] criminal charge[s].”
Berman v. United States, 302 U.S. 211, 212 (1937).
b. Neither respondents nor the Ninth Circuit has
suggested that respondents’ appeals are from a final
judgment. See Berman, 302 U.S. at 212-213 (“In criminal cases, as well as civil, the judgment is final for the
purpose of appeal when it terminates the litigation on
the merits and leaves nothing to be done but to enforce
by execution what has been determined.”) (citation, ellipsis, and internal quotation marks omitted). Respondents have instead contended (Br. in Opp. 21-22)—and
the Ninth Circuit panel initially held (Pet. App. 75a)—
that appeal of the district court’s rulings was permitted
under the “collateral order doctrine.”
First recognized in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial
Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949), the collateral-order
doctrine “carve[s] out a narrow exception to the normal
application of the final judgment rule.” Midland Asphalt Corp. v. United States, 489 U.S. 794, 798 (1989).
The doctrine identifies a “limited class” of collateral rulings that may be treated as “final,” and thus appealable
under Section 1291, even though they do not end the
20
proceedings in the district court. Id. at 799. To come
within that “small class” of immediately appealable interlocutory rulings, “the order must conclusively determine the disputed question, resolve an important issue
completely separate from the merits of the action, and
be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.” Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463,
468 (1978) (citation omitted).
Because “the reasons for the final judgment rule are
especially compelling in the administration of criminal
justice,” this Court has “interpreted the requirements
of the collateral-order exception to the final judgment
rule with the utmost strictness in criminal cases.”
Flanagan, 465 U.S. at 264-265 (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted); see id. at 264 (“Promptness
in bringing a criminal case to trial has become increasingly important as crime has increased, court dockets
have swelled, and detention facilities have become overcrowded.”). In the nearly 70 years since Cohen was decided, despite “numerous opportunities” to expand the
doctrine, Midland Asphalt, 489 U.S. at 799, the Court
has identified only four types of pretrial orders in criminal cases that fall within the collateral-order doctrine:
an order denying a bond, Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1
(1951); an order denying a motion to dismiss on Double
Jeopardy grounds, see Abney v. United States, 431 U.S.
651 (1977); an order denying a motion to dismiss under
the Speech or Debate Clause, see Helstoski v. Meanor,
442 U.S. 500 (1979); and an order permitting the forced
administration of antipsychotic drugs to render a defendant competent for trial, see Sell v. United States,
539 U.S. 166 (2003).
The circumstances in which the Court has “refused
to permit interlocutory appeals” in criminal cases, by
21
contrast, have been “far more numerous.” Midland Asphalt, 489 U.S. at 799. Those include an order denying
a motion to dismiss under the Speedy Trial Clause,
United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850 (1978); an order denying a motion to dismiss for prosecutorial vindictiveness, see Hollywood Motor Car, supra; an order
disqualifying counsel, see Flanagan, supra; and an order denying a motion to dismiss for failure to maintain
grand jury secrecy, see Midland Asphalt, supra.
c. As the en banc majority recognized, Pet. App. 6a7a, the collateral-order doctrine does not permit the assertion of appellate jurisdiction over respondents’ appeals here. An order requiring that a defendant be subject to physical restraints during pretrial proceedings
is not “effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final
judgment.” Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 468. In the
primary decision on which respondents’ merits argument has relied, Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622 (2005),
appellate review of the defendant’s objection to physical
restraints at sentencing occurred only after the defendant had been sentenced. See id. at 625. Upon determining that the defendant’s due process rights had indeed been violated by the use of restraints, this Court
reversed the decision affirming his sentence and remanded for further proceedings. See id. at 635. Respondents’ own similar claims here could likewise have
been considered—and, if appropriate, vindicated—on
appeal in the normal course.
The right asserted by respondents is also distinct
from the types of claims as to which this Court has permitted interlocutory review in criminal cases. Respondents are not invoking “an explicit statutory or constitutional guarantee that trial will not occur,” Midland Asphalt, 489 U.S. at 801, for which “appellate review must
22
occur before trial to be fully effective,” Flanagan,
465 U.S. at 266. See Helstoski, 442 U.S. at 507-508; Abney, 431 U.S. at 660-662. Nor do respondents claim a
right to avoid an involuntary physical invasion that
would allow for a trial that would otherwise be barred,
see Sell, 539 U.S. at 176-177, or a right relating to pretrial release, see Stack, 342 U.S. at 4, either of which
could similarly “become[ ] moot if review awaits conviction and sentence,” Flanagan, 465 U.S. at 266. Instead,
respondents are, at bottom, simply objecting to the
procedures under which their criminal proceedings will
take place—an objection that is indistinguishable from
the sorts of claims that are regularly reviewed on appeal
following final judgment. Cf. Sell, 539 U.S. at 176 (observing that litigant’s forced-medication claim was
“wholly separate * * * from questions concerning trial
procedures”).
The Court has recognized that such objections are
not only capable of resolution, but are often more readily resolved, in an appeal following final judgment in the
criminal case. They typically involve assertions of prejudice in the conduct of particular proceedings, such as
respondents’ assertions here that they could have been
“hamstrung in communicating with their counsel, frustrating participation in their own defense,” as a result
of being maintained in restraints during pretrial hearings. Br. in Opp. 33; see Resp. C.A. Br. 24 (expressing
concern that detainee may be “unnecessarily distracted
or embarrassed to assist counsel in his defense”) (emphasis omitted). As this Court has explained, however,
when a litigant claims that a particular procedure will
“make a trial unfair,” the litigant is asserting a right for
which “an ordinary appeal permits vindication.” Sell,
539 U.S. at 177.
23
An interlocutory appeal would not be appropriate
under the collateral-order doctrine, moreover, regardless whether respondents would have to demonstrate
actual prejudice in order to succeed on their claim. If
the “asserted right is one that is not violated absent
some specifically demonstrated prejudice to the defense,” then its “validity cannot be adequately reviewed
until trial is complete,” and thus it is not “independent
of the issues to be tried.” Flanagan, 465 U.S. at 268.
Claims that such rights have been violated “necessitate[ ] a careful assessment of the particular facts of the
case,” and are therefore “best considered only after the
relevant facts have been developed.” MacDonald, 435
U.S. at 858; cf. Flanagan, 465 U.S. at 268-269. Conversely, “if establishing a violation of [the] asserted
right requires no showing of prejudice to [the] defense,
a pretrial order violating the right * * * is not ‘effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment’ ”
for purposes of the collateral-order doctrine, because
reversal after final judgment would be assured. Flanagan, 465 U.S. at 268. Thus, “whether or not [respondents’] claim requires a showing of prejudice,” the district court’s order upholding the use of restraints “does
not qualify as an immediately appealable collateral order in a straightforward application of the necessary
conditions laid down in prior cases.” Id. at 269.
d. Notwithstanding that respondents have raised
“concerns of prejudice” in their criminal proceedings to
support their merits argument, Resp. C.A. Br. 23, they
have premised their collateral-order doctrine argument
on the asserted absence of prejudice in those proceedings. In particular, respondents have suggested (Br. in
Opp. 21-22) that the security-related orders in their
24
cases could not effectively have been reviewed after final judgment was entered because, since the physical
restraints were applied only in non-jury proceedings,
“there would be no prejudice to review in appealing
[the] criminal conviction.” Even if that contention could
be squared with their arguments on the merits, it would
not justify appellate jurisdiction in this case.
The collateral-order doctrine does not authorize review of claims that “can be adequately vindicated by
other means.” Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558
U.S. 100, 107 (2009). If respondents’ claims truly were
not relevant to the substance of their criminal cases,
they could have challenged the security policy through
a civil suit. See, e.g., County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44 (1991) (civil suit challenging timing of
probable-cause hearing); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103
(1975) (civil suit challenging absence of probable-cause
hearing). Such a suit would have provided a far superior
mechanism for resolving that type of claim. The civil
process includes detailed rules and procedures for appropriate fact development. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26-37.
Comparable fact-finding procedures do not exist within
the criminal context. Cf. Fed. R. Crim. P. 16 (imposing
limited discovery obligations on prosecution and defense for evidence to be used at criminal trial). And civil
courts, unlike criminal courts, are expressly authorized
to issue preliminary and permanent injunctive relief.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65. A civil suit would thus have ensured that appropriate relief was available and that appellate review of respondents’ claims was based on an
adequate record.
If, as the majority concluded below, respondents’
“district-wide shackling claims aren’t connected to [respondents’] individual criminal cases,” Pet. App. 10a,
25
then respondents are, in substance, challenging the conditions of their confinement. The essence of their claim
would be that, although they may be restrained in this
manner while in other locations—such as during transportation to and from the courthouse, or between the
holding cell and the courtroom—they may not be restrained in the courtroom itself. Conditions-of-confinement claims are commonly raised in civil, not criminal,
actions. See, e.g., Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, 566 U.S. 318 (2012) (civil suit challenging detainee strip-search policy); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520
(1979) (civil suit challenging conditions of pretrial confinement); cf. De Abadia-Peixoto v. United States Dep’t
of Homeland Sec., 277 F.R.D. 572 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (civil
challenge to use of restraints in immigration court).
e. Permitting such claims to be litigated on interlocutory appeal in a criminal case also “would severely undermine the policies behind the final judgment rule,”
Flanagan, 465 U.S. at 270, because “nothing about the
circumstances * * * inherently limits the availability of
the claim.” MacDonald, 435 U.S. at 862. Any detainee
dissatisfied with a trial court’s decision about the manner in which he is brought before the court (protective
measures, clothing, etc.) could immediately appeal that
decision. If trial proceedings were to be put on hold until the appeal was resolved, the result would be to freeze
the criminal process altogether, imposing costly delays
and inviting gamesmanship. See ibid. (“Among other
things, delay may prejudice the prosecution’s ability to
prove its case, [and] increase the cost to society of maintaining those defendants subject to pretrial detention.”). If, instead, appeal of the pretrial order imposing
restraints proceeded simultaneously with the trial, the
26
legal proceedings would multiply, requiring the prosecution and defense to litigate the restraint issue on appeal at the same time that the defendant’s guilt or innocence was being adjudicated in district court. Either
option “would severely undermine the policies behind
the final judgment rule.” Flanagan, 465 U.S. at 270.
The effect of expanding the collateral-order doctrine
in the manner respondents suggest would not be limited
to claims challenging the use of physical restraints or the
conditions of confinement. “Nothing about” an order imposing pretrial restraints “distinguishes it from the run
of pretrial judicial decisions that affect the rights of
criminal defendants yet must await completion of trial
court proceedings for review.” Flanagan, 465 U.S. at
270. Although respondents assert dignitary and other
harms that are unrelated to prejudice in their criminal
cases, that does not adequately differentiate their
claims from other types of claims that are not subject to
collateral-order appeal. See, e.g., MacDonald, 435 U.S.
at 858 (noting that, although the Speedy Trial Clause
seeks primarily “to limit the possibility that the defense
will be impaired,” it also seeks “to prevent oppressive
pretrial incarceration” and “to minimize anxiety and
concern of the accused”) (citation omitted); cf. Mohawk
Indus., 558 U.S. at 108-113 (rejecting argument that
“confidentiality” interest justified collateral-order appeals of denials of claims of attorney-client privilege).
If defendants could obtain immediate appellate review
simply by asserting claims of dignitary harm, separate
from claims of prejudice in the context of their criminal
proceedings, “the policy against piecemeal appeals in
criminal cases would be swallowed by ever-multiplying
exceptions.” Hollywood Motor Car, 458 U.S. at 270.
27
f. Respondents cannot have it both ways. To the extent that their claims relate to their criminal proceedings, and are appropriately raised as motions in their
criminal cases, respondents cannot sever the prejudice
aspects of their argument in order to invoke the
collateral-order doctrine. And to the extent the en banc
majority correctly assessed that the substance of respondents’ request was “not review [of] the individual
[respondents’] shackling decisions,” but instead review
of their “district-wide challenges” to the security policy,
Pet. App. 6a (emphasis added), such review was available by other means. The majority thus correctly “s[aw]
no reason” to consider the collateral-order doctrine as
providing a jurisdictional basis for its decision. Ibid.
2. The Ninth Circuit did not have authority to issue a
writ of “supervisory mandamus”
The majority below recognized that it lacked appellate jurisdiction over respondents’ claims. See Pet.
App. 6a-7a. It determined instead that it had authority
to review those claims under the All Writs Act,
28 U.S.C. 1651(a). That was incorrect. Even if respondents’ appeals could properly be “construe[d] * * * as
petitions for writs of mandamus,” Pet. App. 7a, the
Ninth Circuit was not empowered to “exercise [its] ‘supervisory’ or ‘advisory’ authority” to invalidate the
Southern District of California’s security policy, id. at 8a.
This Court has recognized three “conditions” that
limit a court’s authority to issue a writ of mandamus under the All Writs Act. Cheney v. United States Dist.
Court, 542 U.S. 367, 380 (2004). First, “the party seeking issuance of the writ must have no other adequate
means to attain the relief he desires.” Ibid. (brackets
and citation omitted). Second, the party seeking the
writ must demonstrate “that his right to issuance of the
28
writ is clear and indisputable.” Id. at 381 (brackets, citation, and internal quotation marks omitted). Third,
that party must also demonstrate that issuance of the
writ is “appropriate under the circumstances,” by pointing to “exceptional circumstances amounting to a judicial usurpation of power, or a clear abuse of discretion.”
Id. at 380-381 (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted). Those conditions are more readily satisfied in
some circumstances than in others; the Court has recognized, for example, that the “paramount necessity of
protecting the Executive Branch from vexatious litigation” deserves significant weight in the analysis. Id. at
382. Respondents here, however, can satisfy none of
them.
First, respondents had “other adequate means” to
obtain appellate review of their claims, Cheney, 542 U.S.
at 380 (citation omitted). As previously explained, to the
extent respondents objected to the use of pretrial restraints in their own criminal cases, they could have
sought to overturn their convictions in the normal
course following final judgment. See Deck, 544 U.S. at
635 (reversing and remanding based on defendant’s due
process challenge to use of restraints during capital
sentencing); cf. Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 512513 (1976) (declining to reverse conviction, despite defendant’s due process objection to being compelled to
wear jail garb in front of jury, because objection was not
adequately preserved). And insofar as respondents
sought to challenge the security policy as a general
matter—separate from whether the use of restraints in
their individual cases provided a basis for challenging
their convictions on appeal—that challenge would more
properly have been brought in a civil suit, as a class ac-
29
tion if appropriate, with appellate review available following issuance or denial of the requested relief. See,
e.g., Florence, supra; McLaughlin, supra; Bell, supra.
Proceedings on a writ of supervisory mandamus—
which, inter alia, are unlikely to allow for the development of a full record—cannot take the place of an orderly civil action.
Second, respondents cannot show that their “right to
issuance of the writ is clear and indisputable,” Cheney,
542 U.S. at 381 (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted). In rejecting respondents’ claims, the district
court relied on the Ninth Circuit’s prior decision in
United States v. Howard, 480 F.3d 1005 (2007), which
had upheld the Central District of California’s policy of
maintaining leg restraints on criminal defendants during their initial appearances. Howard, in turn, relied on
this Court’s statement in Deck that the common-law
rule against physically restraining criminal defendants
“did not apply at ‘the time of arraignment,’ or like proceedings before the judge.” Id. at 1012 (quoting Deck,
544 U.S. at 626); see id. at 1014 (upholding the policy at
issue because it “concern[ed] only proceedings conducted without the presence of a jury,” and “was
adopted by the magistrate judges of the court following
consultation with the Marshals Service to address legitimate security concerns”).
The district court’s reliance on Howard—and, by extension, Deck—is not a circumstance that warrants the
corrective remedy of mandamus. See Pet. App. 87a
(district court observing that respondents were “essentially arguing the losing position in Howard”). “Mandamus, it must be remembered, does not run the gauntlet
of reversible errors.” See Will v. United States,
389 U.S. 90, 104 (1967) (citation and internal quotation
30
marks omitted). Although the district court failed to
anticipate that a bare majority of Ninth Circuit judges
sitting on the en banc panel would distinguish this case
from Howard, “the most that can be claimed on this record is that [the district court] may have erred in ruling
on matters within [its] jurisdiction.” Id. at 103-104.
That is not enough for mandamus relief. See id. at 104.
Third, for related reasons, respondents have identified no “exceptional circumstances amounting to a judicial usurpation of power, or a clear abuse of discretion,”
Cheney, 542 U.S. at 380 (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted), sufficient to warrant mandamus. Because the “general policy against piecemeal appeals
takes on added weight in criminal cases,” Will, 389 U.S.
at 96, this Court has been particularly reluctant to allow
mandamus review in such cases. See id. at 96-98; see
also Parr v. United States, 351 U.S. 513, 519-520 (1956).
Although mandamus may be appropriate in certain circumstances, such as “willful disobedience of the rules
laid down by this Court,” Will, 389 U.S. at 100, or “a
deliberate policy in open defiance of the federal rules in
matters of pretrial criminal discovery,” id. at 102, the
district court’s “good faith effort to follow [circuit] case
law” here does not present such a circumstance. Pet.
App. 53a (Ikuta, J., dissenting). Rather, because the
“district court has acted within its jurisdiction and has
rendered a decision which, even if erroneous, involved
no abuse of judicial power,” the Ninth Circuit in this
case “has done no more than substitute mandamus for
an appeal contrary to the statutes and the policy of Congress, which has restricted that court’s appellate review
to final judgments of the district court.” Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass’n, 319 U.S. 21, 32 (1943).
31
B. Respondents’ Claims Had Become Moot Before The
Ninth Circuit Adjudicated Them
Even assuming the Ninth Circuit had statutory footing for its decision, it lacked authority under the Constitution to issue that decision in the context of criminal
cases that had long since concluded. Article III’s caseor-controversy requirement “subsists through all stages
of federal judicial proceedings, trial and appellate.”
Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477
(1990). Therefore, if the party invoking a court’s jurisdiction ceases to have a “personal stake in the outcome
of the lawsuit, at any point during litigation, the action
can no longer proceed and must be dismissed as moot.”
Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663, 669 (2016)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The
court of appeals erred in declining to adhere to that rule
here.
1. Respondents lost their personal interest in the outcome of the litigation when their criminal cases
ended
In the district court, respondents raised objections
to the maintenance of physical restraints during nonjury pretrial proceedings. Although respondents assuredly had a concrete, personal interest in the resolution
of those claims when they were raised, respondents’
personal stake ended when their criminal proceedings
were completed, thereby eliminating any possibility of
further pretrial non-jury proceedings.
Three respondents pleaded guilty and received criminal sentences, with the last final judgment imposed on
June 19, 2014. See J.A. 37 ( judgment entered November 6, 2013, against respondent Patricio-Guzman) (Dkt.
No. 15); J.A. 30-31 ( judgment entered December 20,
2013, against respondent Sanchez-Gomez) (Dkt. No.
32
48); J.A. 61-62 ( judgment entered June 19, 2014, against
respondent Morales) (Dkt. No. 95). The remaining respondent (Ring) entered into a deferred-prosecution
agreement with the government, J.A. 66 (Dkt. No. 19),
and an order dismissing the charges against him was
entered on October 23, 2014, J.A. 75 (Dkt. No. 47). No
respondent appealed from the final judgment entered
by the district court in his or her case.
Respondents’ criminal cases were therefore over by
the time the Ninth Circuit issued its decisions on August 25, 2015 (panel), and May 31, 2017 (en banc). See
Pet. App. 2a, 72a. As the en banc majority accordingly
recognized, respondents’ “personal interests in the outcome of th[e] case ha[d] expired,” because they were “no
longer subject to the policy.” Id. at 12a. Their appeals
(even if properly treated as mandamus petitions) accordingly should have been dismissed as moot, as “federal courts are without power to decide questions that
cannot affect the rights of litigants in the case before
them,” DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 316 (1974)
(per curiam) (citation omitted).
2. Respondents’ claims cannot be saved from mootness
by construing their challenges as “functional class
actions”
The en banc majority concluded that it could avoid
the necessity of dismissal because its resolution of respondents’ outdated challenges would affect other criminal defendants in the Southern District of California.
Invoking Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975), the majority asserted that respondents’ challenges could be
treated as “functional class actions” amenable to adjudication long after respondents themselves had ceased
to have a stake in the outcome. Pet. App. 13a. But the
33
rule applied in Gerstein is limited to actual class actions, which—unlike the “functional class action” created by the Ninth Circuit—involve a formally certified
class with an independent legal status and a continuing
interest in the case that persists even after the named
plaintiff ’s own interest expires.
a. In Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975), this Court
considered a constitutional challenge to an Iowa law that
imposed a residency requirement for initiating a divorce
proceeding. Id. at 395-396. The plaintiff filed her challenge as a class action and successfully obtained class certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, but
she lost on the merits. 419 U.S. at 397-398. “By the time
her case reached this Court,” she “had long since satisfied
the Iowa durational residency requirement,” id. at 398,
and she had also obtained a divorce in another state, id. at
398 n.7. The Court thus observed that if the plaintiff “had
sued only on her own behalf,” her lack of continued personal stake in the outcome “would make this case moot
and require dismissal.” Id. at 399.
Crucially, however, the plaintiff had “brought th[e] suit
as a class action,” a “factor [that] significantly affects the
mootness determination.” Sosna, 419 U.S. at 399.
“When the District Court certified the propriety of the
class action,” the Court explained, “the class of unnamed persons described in the certification acquired a
legal status separate from the interest asserted by [the
plaintiff ].” Ibid. (footnote omitted). As a result, even
though the controversy had become moot as to the
named plaintiff, it “remain[ed] very much alive for the
class of persons she ha[d] been certified to represent.”
Id. at 401. Thus, after satisfying itself that the requirements of Rule 23 had been met and that the class was
34
properly certified, id. at 403, the Court went on to resolve the plaintiff ’s claim on the merits, id. at 404-410.
In Sosna, the plaintiff ’s claim became moot only after she had obtained class certification. 419 U.S. at 398.
But the Court also addressed in a footnote the possibility that “the controversy involving the named plaintiffs
[might be] such that it becomes moot as to them before
the district court can reasonably be expected to rule on
a certification motion.” Id. at 402 n.11 (emphasis added).
“In such instances,” the Court continued, “whether the
certification can be said to ‘relate back’ to the filing of
the complaint may depend upon the circumstances of
the particular case and especially the reality of the
claim that otherwise the issue would evade review.”
Ibid.
In Gerstein, the Court addressed the relation-back
issue left open in Sosna. The plaintiffs there had filed a
class action challenging, on Fourth Amendment
grounds, state procedures that permitted certain criminal defendants to be jailed before trial without a probable cause determination. 420 U.S. at 106-107. Before
addressing the merits of the plaintiffs’ claims, the Court
noted its discovery at oral argument that “the named
[plaintiffs] ha[d] been convicted,” thus ending their pretrial detention. Id. at 110 n.11. The Court determined,
however, that the plaintiffs’ challenge belonged “to that
narrow class of cases in which the termination of a class
representative’s claim does not moot the claims of the
unnamed members of the class.” Ibid. Although “the
record d[id] not indicate whether any of [the plaintiffs]
were still in custody awaiting trial when the District
Court certified the class,” the case was “suitable” for
application of relation-back principles, because the inherently short duration of pretrial custody rendered it
35
“by no means certain that any given individual, named
as a plaintiff, would be in pretrial custody long enough
for a district judge to certify the class.” Ibid. (citing
Sosna, 419 U.S. at 402 n.11). The Court also noted “the
constant existence of a class of persons suffering the
deprivation,” as well as the plaintiffs’ attorney, a public
defender, who “has other clients with a continuing live
interest in the case.” Ibid.
Following Gerstein, the Court has continued to apply
relation-back principles in cases involving claims “so inherently transitory that the trial court will not have
even enough time to rule on a motion for class certification before the proposed representative’s individual interest expires.” McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 52 (citing Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 110 n.11). For instance, McLaughlin
involved a class action challenging the county’s failure
to provide arrestees with a prompt probable-cause
hearing. Id. at 48. Although “the class was not certified
until after the named plaintiffs’ claims had become
moot,” the “ ‘relation back’ doctrine [was] properly invoked to preserve the merits of the case for judicial resolution.” Id. at 52 (citing Sosna, 419 U.S. at 402 n.11);
see Swisher v. Brady, 438 U.S. 204, 213 n.11 (1978) (applying relation-back doctrine to Fifth Amendment challenge to juvenile court proceedings); see also Genesis
Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, 569 U.S. 66, 75-77 (2013)
(describing application of relation-back doctrine to “inherently transitory” claims).
b. The Ninth Circuit recognized that this case was
not brought as a class action (or even as a civil suit). See
Pet. App. 14a. The court nevertheless determined that
it could treat the case as a “[f ]unctional class action[ ]”
based on the presence of “the same three features” discussed in Gerstein: (1) a challenge to “broader policies,”
36
rather than “individual violations”; (2) an “inherently
transitory” claim, which produces a “continually changing group[ ] of injured individuals who would benefit
from any relief ”; and (3) “common representation.”
Ibid. The Ninth Circuit considered those features, in
combination with its view that “this is a supervisory
mandamus case,” as sufficient to overcome the mootness of respondents’ own claims. Id. at 15a. And it
viewed any focus on the absence of a “formal” class action as “misplaced.” Ibid.
The Ninth Circuit erred in viewing Gerstein as support for its novel and legally unsupported notion of a
“functional class action.” As the foregoing discussion
makes clear, Gerstein rests on an application of
relation-back principles, under which the grant of a
class-certification motion under Rule 23 may be deemed
to relate back to the filing of the complaint. See United
States Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 407
n.11 (1980) (“The ‘relation back’ principle [is] a traditional equitable doctrine [that was] applied to class certification claims in Gerstein.”). Application of those principles, first identified as a possibility in Sosna (upon
which Gerstein relied), expressly depends on “the fact
that a putative class acquires an independent legal status once it is certified under Rule 23.” Genesis
Healthcare, 569 U.S. at 75. Those principles do not apply
where, as here, the plaintiffs have sought relief solely in
their individual capacities.
A focus on class status is therefore not “misplaced,”
Pet. App. 15a, but is instead critical, in the mootness
analysis. “The class-action device was designed as an
exception to the usual rule that litigation is conducted
by and on behalf of the individual named parties only.”
37
General Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 155 (1982) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). But “it is
only a ‘properly certified’ class that may succeed to the
adversary position of a named representative whose
claim becomes moot.” Kremens v. Bartley, 431 U.S.
119, 132-133 (1977) (citation omitted). Certification represents a judicial determination that injured parties
other than the named plaintiff exist. Sosna, 419 U.S. at
399. And it provides a definition by which injured parties can be identified, which “is especially important in
cases” in which “the litigation is likely to become moot
as to the initially named [challengers] prior to the exhaustion of appellate review.” Board of Sch. Comm’rs
v. Jacobs, 420 U.S. 128, 130 (1975) (per curiam). Certification also ensures that class members will be bound
by the outcome, Smith v. Bayer Corp., 564 U.S. 299, 315
(2011), and that the action will not be settled or dismissed without appropriate notice, see Fed. R. Civ. P.
23(e). The Ninth Circuit’s “functional class action” device, in contrast, serves no such functions and provides
no such assurances.
Contrary to the Ninth Circuit’s suggestion (Pet.
App. 14a), Gerstein’s observation about the “inherently
transitory” nature of the claims at issue there does not
provide a license for courts to avoid mootness concerns
by supplementing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23
with informal class-action analogues of their own creation. The Court in Gerstein recognized that “avoid[ing]
mootness under Sosna” would “ordinarily * * * require[]” a “showing” of a live controversy as to at least
one named plaintiff at the time of class certification. 420
U.S. at 110 n.11. But it deemed the situation in Gerstein
to present “a suitable exception to that requirement,”
ibid., citing Sosna’s suggestion that the relation-back
38
doctrine is most appropriately applied where “otherwise the issue would evade review” because the named
plaintiffs’ claims are so transitory in nature that the
controversy is likely to “become[ ] moot as to them before
the district court can reasonably be expected to rule on
a certification motion.” Sosna, 419 U.S. at 402 n.11; see
Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 110 n.11 (citing Sosna, 419 U.S. at
402 n.11). In identifying the transient nature of the
plaintiffs’ claims as a reason for applying relation-back
principles to class certification, the Court never suggested that transience alone was a permissible substitute
for class certification.
A properly certified class—with its own independent
legal status—was present not only in Gerstein itself, but
in every decision in which this Court has relied on the
“inherently transitory” nature of a claim as a reason to
adjudicate the merits notwithstanding mootness as to
the plaintiff. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 52 (quoting
Geraghty, 445 U.S. at 399); see Schall v. Martin, 467
U.S. 253, 256 n.3 (1984); Swisher, 438 U.S. at 213 n.11.
Conversely, in cases in which class certification was denied, or was granted but later invalidated, the lack of a
properly certified class has required dismissal when the
named party’s personal stake in the matter expired.
See Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S.
424, 430 (1976); Jacobs, 420 U.S. at 129 (finding case
moot due to “inadequate compliance with the requirements of Rule 23(c)”); see also Geraghty, 445 U.S. at 404
(observing that a case “must be dismissed as moot”
upon appellate determination “that class certification
properly was denied”).
c. The Ninth Circuit’s notion of a “functional class
action” is particularly difficult to square with Pasadena
City Board of Education v. Spangler, supra. In that
39
case, a public school board that had been involved in litigation with students and the United States over its
segregation-related policies sought appellate review of
the district court’s denial of leave to modify its desegregation plan. 427 U.S. at 427-429. Before addressing the
merits, the Court noted the concern that the case had
become moot when “all the original student plaintiffs
* * * graduated from the Pasadena school system.” Id.
at 430. Because the district court had “never certified”
the case as a class action under Rule 23, the Court explained, the case “would clearly be moot” without the
involvement of the United States. Ibid. The Court rejected the contention that, because the litigation had
been “filed as a class action” and the parties had
“treated” it as a class action, Rule 23 certification was
an unnecessary “ ‘verbal recital.’ ” Ibid. The Court explained that, “while counsel may wish to represent a
class of unnamed individuals still attending the Pasadena public schools who do have some substantial interest in the outcome of this litigation, there has been no
certification of any such class which is or was represented by a named party to this litigation.” Ibid.
The same considerations that led the Court in Spangler to say that the case “would clearly be moot” without
the United States are present here. 427 U.S. at 430.
Here, as there, the individual challengers’ interests in
the outcome of the litigation have expired, and “there
has been no certification” of a class with its own independent interest. Ibid. Respondents assert that their
“functional class action” has certain useful features: a
challenge not only to “individual violations, but also
broader policies or practices”; a “continually changing
group[ ] of injured individuals”; and “common representation.” Br. in Opp. 19-20 (citation omitted). Yet the
40
same was true in Spangler, where mootness was
avoided only by the presence of another challenger (the
United States) with a continuing interest of its own. Because no such challenger exists here, respondents’
claims should have been dismissed as moot.
3. The exception to mootness for cases “capable of repetition, yet evading review” does not apply to respondents’ claims
At the certiorari stage, respondents argued that
their cases fall under the exception to mootness for “disputes that are capable of repetition while evading review.” Br. in Opp. 17 (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted). The court of appeals correctly rejected
that argument, Pet. App. 12a, which cannot be squared
with this Court’s precedents.
This Court has explained that “in the absence of a
class action, the ‘capable of repetition, yet evading review’ doctrine [i]s limited to the situation where two elements [are] combined: (1) the challenged action [i]s in
its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration, and (2) there [i]s a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party would be
subjected to the same action again.” Murphy v. Hunt,
455 U.S. 478, 482 (1982) (per curiam) (citation omitted).
Respondents cannot meet the second requirement, because they cannot demonstrate a “reasonable expectation” that they will themselves be subject to a future
prosecution in the Southern District in which the security policy will again be applied to them. See City of Los
Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102-103 (1983).
Respondents contend (Br. in Opp. 18) that a future
recurrence of the dispute is reasonably likely because
two of them, Sanchez-Gomez and Patricio-Guzman, have
41
already “[r]eturn[ed] to the Southern District of California on new criminal charges,” where they “were
again subjected to unwarranted shackling.” Respondents also note (ibid.) that the new charges (illegal
reentry in both cases) are “not unusual for individuals
who reenter the United States after removal.” Respondents assert, therefore, that yet another prosecution in the Southern District is equally “as likely” as the
recurrence of other disputes that this Court has
adjudicated under the capable-of-repetition-yet-evadingreview exception. Id. at 19 (citing Kingdomware Techs.,
Inc. v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1969 (2016); Turner v.
Rogers, 564 U.S. 431 (2011); Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1 (1986); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973)).
This Court’s decisions make clear, however, that a
party’s avowed commitment to criminal recidivism is
not a sufficient basis for maintaining his challenge on a
matter of criminal procedure. In O’Shea v. Littleton,
414 U.S. 488 (1973), the Court declined to adjudicate on
the merits the constitutional claims of plaintiffs who
sought injunctive relief barring the discriminatory execution of certain criminal procedures (such as the setting of pretrial bonds). Id. at 491-492. The Court noted
that the plaintiffs’ “prospect of future injury rests on
the likelihood that [they] will again be arrested for and
charged with violations of the criminal law and will
again be subjected to” the challenged practices. Id. at
496. Observing that the plaintiffs did not dispute that
“the statutes that might possibly be enforced against”
them (i.e., the substantive criminal laws) were valid, the
Court rejected their argument: “that if [the plaintiffs]
proceed to violate an unchallenged law and if they are
charged, held to answer, and tried in any proceedings,
42
* * * they will be subjected to the discriminatory practices.” Id. at 496-497. Even accepting that the plaintiffs
were “deeply” committed to eradicating those practices,
the Court was unwilling to rest jurisdiction on the notion “that [the plaintiffs] will be prosecuted for violating
valid criminal laws.” Id. at 497. Rather, the Court felt
bound to “assume that [the plaintiffs] will conduct their
activities within the law and so avoid prosecution and
conviction.” Ibid.
The Court’s decisions following O’Shea “reveal that,
for purposes of assessing the likelihood that state authorities will reinflict a given injury, [the Court] generally ha[s] been unwilling to assume that the party seeking relief will repeat the type of misconduct that would
once again place him or her at risk of that injury.” Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 320 (1988) (citing O’Shea).
Thus, in Lane v. Williams, 455 U.S. 624 (1982), the
Court dismissed as moot a suit brought by prisoners
who objected to the trial court’s failure to inform them,
at the time of their guilty pleas, of a mandatory parole
term (which they later violated). The case was moot,
the Court explained, because the objected-to parole
term had “expired of its own accord” during the litigation. Id. at 631. The Court rejected a dissenter’s argument that the prisoners could maintain their suit because they might again commit a crime, at which point
their parole violation would be held against them in a
future parole proceeding. See id. at 632 n.13. “The parole violations,” the Court explained, “cannot affect a
subsequent parole determination unless [the prisoners]
again violate state law, are returned to prison, and become eligible for parole. [The prisoners] themselves are
able—and indeed required by law—to prevent such a
possibility from occurring.” Ibid.
43
Similarly, in Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1 (1998), the
Court refused to consider the claims of a prisoner who
objected to an order revoking his parole, because the
prisoner had been released from prison before his challenge was adjudicated. Even though the prisoner was
later rearrested on separate charges, id. at 14, the
Court declined to accept his argument that “the Order
of Revocation could be used to increase his sentence in
a future sentencing proceeding” as a basis for continuing his suit. Id. at 15. That argument, the Court explained, was “contingent upon [his] violating the law,
getting caught, and being convicted.” Ibid.; see Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149 (1975) (per curiam)
(declining, “in the absence of a class action,” to apply
mootness exception where plaintiff was no longer subject to challenged parole procedures).
None of the cases cited by respondents, all of which
arise outside the criminal context, undermines the principle that a litigant may not establish a “reasonable expectation” that a dispute will recur, for purposes of the
capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-review exception, by
arguing that he is likely in the future to violate a lawful
criminal statute. See Kingdomware Techs., 136 S. Ct.
at 1975-1976 (company likely to bid for future procurement contracts); Turner, 564 U.S. at 440 (litigant with
substantial child-support debts and no ability to pay
likely to face civil contempt); Press-Enter., 478 U.S. at
6 (media company likely to report on future court
cases); Roe, 410 U.S. at 125 (female litigant likely to
have future pregnancy). The Ninth Circuit was therefore correct in declining to “presume that [respondents]
will be subject to criminal proceedings in the future,”
whether in the Southern District of California or elsewhere. Pet. App. 12a.
44
CONCLUSION
The decision below should be vacated.
Respectfully submitted.
NOEL J. FRANCISCO
Solicitor General
JOHN P. CRONAN
Acting Assistant Attorney
General
EDWIN S. KNEEDLER
Deputy Solicitor General
ERIC J. FEIGIN
ALLON KEDEM
Assistants to the Solicitor
General
DAVID B. GOODHAND
Attorney
JANUARY 2018
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.