Reply Brief — Honeywell International Inc., et al., Petitioners v. Mexichem Fluor Inc., et al.
Supreme Court briefSep 12, 2018
Ask Donna
What actually matters in this document.
Text
No. 17-1703
IN T H E
Supreme Court of the United States
HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL INC., ET AL.,
Petitioners,
v.
MEXICHEM FLUOR, INC., ET AL.,
Respondents.
On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
to the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit
REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONERS
THOMAS A. LORENZEN
ROBERT J. MEYERS
CROWELL & MORING LLP
1001 Penn. Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20004
(202) 624-2500
tlorenzen@crowell.com
Counsel for Petitioner
The Chemours Company
FC, LLC
LISA S. BLATT
Counsel of Record
JONATHAN S. MARTEL
ELISABETH S. THEODORE
ANDREW T. TUTT
STEPHEN K. WIRTH
ARNOLD & PORTER
KAYE SCHOLER LLP
601 Mass. Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20001
(202) 942-5000
lisa.blatt@arnoldporter.com
DAVID B. RIVKIN JR.
BAKER & HOSTETLER LLP
1050 Conn. Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20036
(202) 861-1500
drivkin@bakerlaw.com
Counsel for Petitioner
Honeywell International
Inc.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Table of Authorities .................................................... ii
Reply Brief ...................................................................1
I.
This Case Is Exceptionally Important and
This Petition Presents the Only Opportunity
for This Court’s Review .......................................2
II. The Decision Below Is Wrong ........................... 10
i
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
Cases
Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc.,
501 U.S. 560 (1991) ................................................ 11
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837 (1984) ............................................ 7, 10
Jama v. ICE,
543 U.S. 335 (2005) ................................................ 11
Philadelphia Television Bd. Co. v. FCC,
359 F.2d 282 (D.C. Cir. 1966) ................................... 9
Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns,
531 U.S. 457 (2001) ................................................ 11
Statutes & Regulations
42 U.S.C.
§ 7475(a)(1) ............................................................... 9
§ 7671k ............................................................ passim
§ 7671k(a) ........................................................... 9, 11
§ 7671k(d) ............................................................... 11
83 Fed. Reg. 18,431 (Apr. 27, 2018) ........................... 6
ii
REPLY BRIEF
5IF EFDJTJPO CFMPX OVMMJmFT B GFEFSBM SFHVMBUPSZ
scheme that ensures the safety of millions of products affecting millions of Americans. The decision
invalidates an interpretation of § 612 of the Clean
Air Act that EPA maintained consistently for nearly
ZFBST UISPVHIUISFFBENJOJTUSBUJPOTBOEUIFmSTU
part of the present administration. It immunizes
GPSFWFS UIF mSTU SFQMBDFNFOU PG BO P[POFEFQMFUJOH
chemical, no matter how harmful that replacement
turns out to be and no matter how safe the alternatives. As Judge Wilkins explained in dissent, this interpretation “makes a mockery of the statutory purpose” to require the replacement of ozone-depleting
chemicals with the safest available alternatives. Pet.
App. 34a-35a.
This Court regularly grants certiorari in cases of
this magnitude, where a federal court of appeals with
exclusive jurisdiction eliminates a federal agency’s
regulatory authority. EPA does not dispute that—
ordinarily—this would be a hugely consequential decision. EPA instead argues—joined by Industry Respondents—that the case is of “limited prospective
importance,” and the Court should deny review, because EPA has suddenly changed its mind about the
meaning of § 612. Opp. 12. But if the Court denies
certiorari, the decision below will bind all future administrations, because the D.C. Circuit held that its
interpretation of “replace” is the only permissible interpretation of that term. Left intact, the decision
will prevent future administrations from enforcing
SNAP regulations against anyone using HFCs—or
any other chemical that is non-ozone-depleting. This
petition thus presents the Court’s only chance to re-
1
2
view the D.C. Circuit’s statute-gutting interpretation
of § 612.
If this Court grants review and reverses on the
theory that the 2015 rule was permitted but not
compelled by § 612, EPA could still seek to revise the
rule through ordinary notice-and-comment rulemaking. That is the appropriate way for administrations
to make discretionary policy decisions that diverge
from prior administrations; it would ensure political
accountability; and it would leave the issue open for
future administrations to revisit. But if this Court
denies certiorari on the ground that this EPA has
DIBOHFE JUT NJOE JU XJMM CF MFUUJOH UIJT &1" mOBMMZ
interpret § 612 for all future EPAs. This Court
TIPVME CF UIF mOBM BSCJUFS $FSUJPSBSJ TIPVME CF
granted.
I.
This Case Is Exceptionally Important and This
Petition Presents the Only Opportunity for
This Court’s Review
The decision below drains § 612 of the Clean Air
Act of nearly all its force. It overturns an EPA interpretation that stood for nearly 25 years, and upon
which state governments and businesses developed
TVCTUBOUJBM SFMJBODF JOUFSFTUT *U OVMMJmFT BO JN
portant regulatory program by forever immunizing
the vast majority of products to which the program is
meant to apply. Pet. 17-21. It sows substantial confusion and uncertainty. Pet. 27-31. It destroys Petitioners’ and other companies’ investment-backed expectations. Pet. 21-23. And it will have a devastating impact on the environment and human health.
Pet. 23-26. In short, the regulatory, economic, environmental, and health consequences of the decision
below are extraordinary. Respondents can offer no
persuasive response.
3
1. The decision below overturns EPA’s longstanding interpretation of the Clean Air Act, one that
persisted since 1994 through three administrations,
Republican and Democrat, and the start of the current administration. For 25 years EPA interpreted
§ 612 to authorize EPA to prohibit the use of nonozone-depleting substitutes. Gov’t Opp. 4-5; Carrier
Br. 8; States Br. 22. There is no dispute that § 612
and SNAP are the principal means by which the government regulates the health and environmental impacts of a vast array of products that historically
were ozone-depleting. Pet. 17-21.
The decision below thus tears the heart out of
the SNAP program. Now, EPA cannot prohibit unsafe non-ozone-depleting substitutes if they have
been used even once, no matter how harmful they
may be and no matter how safe or plentiful the alternatives. And, it is undisputed, the decision below
will terminate EPA’s authority under § 612 not only
to ban chemicals that (as here) contribute to global
warming, but also chemicals that are carcinogenic,
UPYJD PSnBNNBCMF1FU"TBNJDJBUUFTU UIF
decision “renders this scheme essentially meaningless,” Carrier Br. 15, means “the chaotic end of a decades-old predictable and stable regulatory program,”
Daikin Br. 10, and “guts EPA’s effective regulatory
program and exposes human health and the environment to grave risks,” States Br. 2.
Respondents do not dispute that the decision beMPX OVMMJmFT UIF 4/"1 QSPHSBN HPJOH GPSXBSEOPU
just for HFCs but for all non-ozone depleting substitutes no matter their risks. They do not dispute that
the D.C. Circuit’s interpretation of § 612 will allow
product manufacturers to forever escape oversight by
starting to use a substitute before EPA reviews it.
4
Pet. 20-21. They do not dispute that the decision below affects millions of cars, refrigerators, air conditioners, and billions of aerosol products. Pet. 18-19.
And they do not dispute the extraordinary environmental and health consequences that will result from
continued use of HFCs. Pet. 23-26. These are reasons enough to grant certiorari.
Industry Respondents do note that the decision
below permits EPA to regulate HFCs “so long as it is
ozone-depleting substances that are being replaced.”
Opp. 16-17. But this is quibbling. As the Petition observed and no one contests, “[t]he vast majority of
manufacturers today have already begun using substitutes for ozone-depleting chemicals.” Pet. 15. The
decision thus renders the vast majority of companies
free to continue using HFCs (or any other harmful
chemical) forever. Pet. 18-21, 34-35.
2. An enormous number and variety of entities
relied for decades on EPA’s longstanding interpretation, investing over $1 billion. Pet. 4; Carrier Br. 8.
Seventeen states and the District of Columbia explain that the “decision below upset[s] states’ decades-long reliance on the SNAP Program’s robust nationwide regulation of substitutes for ozone-depleting
substances.” States Br. 8. Five leading U.S. product
manufacturers document the “substantial investments” and “other business decisions” made “in reliance on the regulatory framework that was established in 1994.” Carrier Br. 5, 8; see Daikin Br. 3
(noting $500 million in investments).
The government’s brief in opposition says nothing at all about those reliance interests—effectively
ignoring them altogether. Industry Respondents, for
their part, argue that no one could have “relied” on
EPA’s interpretation because the 2015 rule came af-
5
ter Industry Petitioners developed their HFC substitutes. Opp. 20-21. Their timeline is backwards.
From the beginning of the SNAP program, everyone
LOFXTVCTUJUVUFTTBGFSUIBO)'$TmSTUIBEUPCFEF
veloped before EPA could prohibit them. What Petitioners—and countless others, Carrier Br. 5—relied
on was § 612’s requirement that EPA add substitutes
like HFCs to the prohibited list once safer substiUVUFTXFSFEFWFMPQFE BOE&1"TDPOTJTUFOUDPOmSNB
tion of that interpretation dating back to 1994.
As for Industry Respondents’ contention that
&1" BEPQUFE UIBU JOUFSQSFUBUJPO GPS UIF imSTU UJNFw
in 2015, Opp. 20, EPA continues to disagree, Gov’t
Opp. 4-6. In a carefully worded sentence, Industry
Respondents deny that EPA has previously “used the
SNAP program to change the status of a non-ozonedepleting substitute,” Opp. 7 (emphasis added), i.e., to
move such a substitute from the approved list. But
EPA has repeatedly used the SNAP program to ban
non-ozone-depleting substitutes that are already in
use. Pet. 9, 17; NRDC Pet. 11-12. Under the D.C.
Circuit’s decision, EPA may no longer do so. If a
manufacturer that once used a safe substitute for an
ozone-depleting chemical starts using a cheaper nonozone-depleting toxin, EPA is now completely helpless to do anything about it under SNAP.
Industry Respondents also deny that the decision
will have any effect on incentives to innovate going
forward, noting that the D.C. Circuit’s decision does
not prohibit anyone from choosing HFOs over HFCs,
and that certain customers are doing so already.
Opp. 19-20. On that theory, environmental regulations would never merit this Court’s review and inEFFE XPVME CF VOOFDFTTBSZ JO UIF mSTU QMBDF $PO
gress enacted § 612 because it understood that many
6
companies would use cheaper, less-safe chemicals absent a regulatory mandate, and that innovators need
BmOBODJBMJODFOUJWFUPJOWFTUJOEFWFMPQJOHTBGFSBM
ternatives. Section 612 provides that incentive. The
decision below eviscerates it.
3. The decision below has sown substantial confusion and uncertainty. Those are EPA’s own words:
“EPA is aware that regulated entities are experiencing substantial confusion and uncertainty regarding
UIF NFBOJOH PG UIF WBDBUVS JO B WBSJFUZ PG TQFDJmD
situations.” 83 Fed. Reg. 18,431, 18,434 (Apr. 27,
2018). EPA’s own notice responding to the vacatur
demonstrates about as well as any document can just
how perplexing the decision below is. Id. at 18,43335. EPA asserts, for example, that the decision
draws distinctions EPA has never before drawn, and
will likely require EPA to disregard that portion of
the D.C. Circuit’s ruling that upheld EPA’s decision
to list HFCs as unacceptable substitutes going forward. Id."NJDJDPOmSNUIBUUIFEFDJTJPOJTDSFBUJOH
widespread confusion. States Br. 7, 16; Carrier Br.
22-23; Daikin Br. 4-5.
Respondents do not really dispute that the decision sows massive uncertainty, which EPA says it
NVTUmYCZEFDMJOJOHUPJNQMFNFOUBOZBTQFDUPGUIF
rule. Industry Respondents claim that the confusion
is Congress’s fault, not the fault of the court below.
See Opp. 21-22. But the fact that the interpretation
Respondents and the decision below advance turns a
straightforward regulatory program into a muddle of
confusion and uncertainty is strong evidence that it
7
is wrong and an important reason that this Court
should grant review.1
4. Respondents principally argue that the Court
should deny review because EPA no longer supports
the interpretation it has applied since 1994. Gov’t
Opp. 12-13; Ind. Opp. 14-16. As an initial matter, to
roll back the 2015 rule, EPA would have had to justify its decision through notice-and-comment rulemaking. There is no guarantee that EPA would or could
have done so, or that it will do so if the decision below is reversed.2
More important, the D.C. Circuit’s decision will
effectively prevent all future administrations from
ever (1) addressing HFCs or other harmful replacements under the SNAP program or (2) returning to
the interpretation of “replace” that held for 25 years
across three-and-a-half administrations. The court
issued its holding at Chevron Step One, stating that
1
Industry Respondents fault Petitioners for seeking an extension. Opp. 22-23. But the petition would have been set for the
Long Conference even absent an extension. Nor are litigants
obligated to seek a stay of the mandate.
2
Industry Respondents contend that the rule was “promulgated pursuant to President Obama’s 2013 Climate Action Plan,”
and President Trump has directed agencies to move to rescind
TVDISVMFT0QQ#VUXIJMFUIFSVMFTDMBTTJmDBUJPO
of HFCs was “consistent with” the Climate Action Plan, Pet.
"QQBB UIF%$$JSDVJUVQIFMEUIFDMBTTJmDBUJPOPG)'$T
As the government acknowledges, Opp. 4-5, the interpretation
of “replace” that the D.C. Circuit struck down—which is not restricted to HFCs—has been the government’s interpretation
since 1994 and was not a product of the 2013 Climate Action
Plan. The Trump Administration defended the 2015 rule before
the D.C. Circuit in this case and did not change its position
when the Executive Order issued.
8
the 2015 rule’s interpretation of the word “replace”
was impermissible. Pet. App. 16a. Unless this Court
grants review, the D.C. Circuit’s decision will bind all
future administrations and will prevent them from
reverting to the interpretation that lasted from 1994
until EPA’s opposition to certiorari last month.
In other words, the government’s sole argument
for denying certiorari depends on the badly mistaken
premise that only this administration will be affected
by this decision. But 4 or 8 or 12 years from now, a
future EPA may decide that crucial economic and enWJSPONFOUBMCFOFmUTXJMMBDDSVFGSPNBSVMFBEESFTT
ing HFCs or any other non-ozone-depleting chemical
for which a safer substitute may be developed. The
decision below makes such a future rule impossible.
As the Court’s practice of appointing amici demonstrates, this Court regularly grants certiorari when
the government has changed its position, precisely
because court of appeals decisions interpreting fedFSBM MBX IBWF CSPBE SBNJmDBUJPOT CFZPOE BOZ POF
administration. This will be the Court’s only chance
to address the interpretation of this statute, and it is
imperative that the Court grant certiorari now.
If EPA then wishes to revisit the interpretation
of “replace” through notice-and-comment rulemaking,
it may do so consistent with this Court’s interpretation. But the decision below should not evade review
NFSFMZ CFDBVTF &1" IBT nJQQFE QPTJUJPOT &1"
should not be permitted to effectively decide this issue for all future administrations.
5. Industry Respondents offer a smattering of
other objections to certiorari, but none hold water.
Industry Respondents argue that eviscerating
the SNAP program will have limited environmental
9
consequences because EPA might be able to restrict
the use of HFCs through other means. Opp. 3-4, 8-9,
15-18. EPA notably does not join in this argument.
The statutes Respondents identify (Opp. 15) do not
apply to the same breadth of products to which
SNAP applies. For example, the Prevention of SigOJmDBOU %FUFSJPSBUJPO QSPHSBN JT MJNJUFE UP UIF DPO
trol of “major emitting facilit[ies],” not mobile sources
or diverse consumer products. 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(1).
And none of these other authorities allow EPA to
regulate based on “comparative risks.” Pet. 36. Industry Respondents call this an “ipse dixit” because
Petitioners do not “offer any explanation” why a
comparative risk regime is needed. Opp. 16. But a
comparative risk regime is not Petitioners’ idea—it
was Congress’s, and it is express in the statute. See
42 U.S.C. § 7671k(a).
It is undisputed that § 612 has been the principal
means of regulating the environmental consequences
of a vast array of products since 1994. Pet. 17-18.
Even if other regulatory programs could do some of
the work of § 612, that would not diminish the importance of § 612 or of granting certiorari—as EPA
recognized below. “[W]here ‘Congress has given an
agency … various tools with which to protect the
public interest, the agency is entitled to some leeway
in choosing which … regulatory tools will be most effective.’” EPA C.A. Br. 24 (quoting Philadelphia Television Broad. Co. v. FCC, 359 F.2d 282, 284 (D.C. Cir.
1966)).
Industry Respondents also argue that States
might restrict HFCs. Opp. 18. But patchwork regulation by states is no substitute for uniform federal
law—that is why Congress enacted § 612. And the
possibility of such patchwork regulation certainly
10
does not diminish the importance of a decision gutting a federal law at Chevron Step One. Neither do
the other not-yet-existent sources of regulation that
Respondents cite, namely, the introduction of a bill in
the Senate and the existence of a treaty that the
6OJUFE4UBUFTIBTOPUSBUJmFE5IF$PVSUTIPVMEOPU
decline to decide whether Congress has already
passed a statute authorizing EPA to require companies to stop using certain HFCs on the theory that
Congress might pass such a statute in the future.
Finally, Industry Respondents note the absence
of a split. Opp. 12-13. As they acknowledge, however, the D.C. Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction.
II. The Decision Below Is Wrong
5IF NBKPSJUZ DIFSSZQJDLFE POF EFmOJUJPO PG UIF
word “replace” from among many and declared it to
CF UIF POMZ EFmOJUJPO BMMPXFE 1FU 3FTQPOE
ents barely attempt to defend the court’s analysis.
Industry Respondents largely offer block quotations
from the opinion without comment. Opp. 25-26. And
the government states without explanation or meaningful analysis that it “now believes that the decision
CFMPX SFnFDUT UIF CFUUFS VOEFSTUBOEJOH PG 4FDUJPO
612(c).” Opp. 9. Respondents make no effort to confront the dissenting opinion.
The dissent was correct. Respondents do not
dispute that “replace” can mean to “substitute for” or
“to assume the former role, position, or function of”
something that came before. Pet. 32. They insist only that the term must be read “in context.” Ind. Opp.
26. Petitioners could not agree more. The context of
§ 612 clearly demonstrates that Congress intended
EPA to continually update and modify the lists of
safe and prohibited alternatives. It did not imagine
11
the SNAP program would be obsolete by the mid1990s. To that end, § 612(a) directs EPA to regulate
replacements to “reduce overall risks to human
health and the environment” “[t]o the maximum extent practicable.” And § 612(d) allows anyone to petition to move a substance from the safe list to the
prohibited list, without any limitation on when such
petitions can be brought. The majority’s unnatural
EFmOJUJPO PG iSFQMBDFw SFOEFST UIJT QSPWJTJPO B EFBE
letter. Pet. 34-35. Respondents have no answer.
On the other side of the “context” ledger, Respondents cite § 612’s appearance in a subchapter titled “Stratospheric Ozone Protection.” Ind. Opp. 28.
For one, a statute’s title is relevant only to the extent
that a statutory term is “ambiguous.” Whitman v.
American Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 483 (2001).
Of course, if § 612 is ambiguous, then Respondents
should have lost below. Beyond that, Congress’s primary interest in eliminating ozone-depleting substances was intertwined with its interest in “reduc[ing] overall risks to human health and the environment.” 42 U.S.C. § 7671k(a) (emphasis added).
“[A] law may have multiple purposes.” Barnes v.
Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 590 (1991).
Industry Respondents fret (at 28-29) that PetiUJPOFST EFmOJUJPO PG iSFQMBDFw XPVME BVUIPSJ[F &1"
to continue regulating into the next century—in their
view, an “illogical” and “absurd” result. To the contrary, it is perfectly logical that Congress would at
once ban ozone-depleting substances and task EPA
with ensuring that all future substitutes are safe.
Congress knows how to specify time limitations, Jama v. ICE, 543 U.S. 335, 341 (2005), but did not under § 612.
12
If anything, Respondents’ reading of the statute
leads to far greater absurdity. As EPA explained below, “[respondents’] interpretation of the statute
would force EPA to leave a toxic chemical on the approved list where that toxic effect was not discovered
until years later, simply because it does not deplete
ozone. Not only that, but it would also prohibit the
alteration of the list of approved alternatives if one
day after an alternative was added, a far-less-risky
alternative was discovered.” EPA C.A. Br. 24. Respondents make no effort to address these and other
absurd results of their interpretation. Pet. 20-21, 35.
13
CONCLUSION
The Court should grant certiorari.
Respectfully submitted,
THOMAS A. LORENZEN
LISA S. BLATT
ROBERT J. MEYERS
Counsel of Record
CROWELL & MORING LLP JONATHAN S. MARTEL
1001 Penn. Ave., NW
ELISABETH S. THEODORE
Washington, DC 20004 ANDREW T. TUTT
(202) 624-2500
STEPHEN K. WIRTH
tlorenzen@crowell.com
ARNOLD & PORTER
KAYE SCHOLER LLP
Counsel for Petitioner
601
Mass. Ave., NW
The Chemours Company
Washington,
DC 20001
FC, LLC
(202) 942-5000
lisa.blatt@arnoldporter.com
DAVID B. RIVKIN JR.
BAKER & HOSTETLER LLP
1050 Conn. Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20036
(202) 861-1500
drivkin@bakerlaw.com
Counsel for Petitioner
Honeywell International
Inc.
September 12, 2018
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.