Reply Brief — Honeywell International Inc., et al., Petitioners v. Mexichem Fluor Inc., et al.

Supreme Court briefSep 12, 2018

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No. 17-1703

IN T H E

Supreme Court of the United States

HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL INC., ET AL.,

Petitioners,

v.

MEXICHEM FLUOR, INC., ET AL.,

Respondents.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari

to the United States Court of Appeals for the

District of Columbia Circuit

REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONERS

THOMAS A. LORENZEN

ROBERT J. MEYERS

CROWELL & MORING LLP

1001 Penn. Ave., NW

Washington, DC 20004

(202) 624-2500

tlorenzen@crowell.com

Counsel for Petitioner

The Chemours Company

FC, LLC

LISA S. BLATT

Counsel of Record

JONATHAN S. MARTEL

ELISABETH S. THEODORE

ANDREW T. TUTT

STEPHEN K. WIRTH

ARNOLD & PORTER

KAYE SCHOLER LLP

601 Mass. Ave., NW

Washington, DC 20001

(202) 942-5000

lisa.blatt@arnoldporter.com

DAVID B. RIVKIN JR.

BAKER & HOSTETLER LLP

1050 Conn. Ave., NW

Washington, DC 20036

(202) 861-1500

drivkin@bakerlaw.com

Counsel for Petitioner

Honeywell International

Inc.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Table of Authorities .................................................... ii

Reply Brief ...................................................................1

I.

This Case Is Exceptionally Important and

This Petition Presents the Only Opportunity

for This Court’s Review .......................................2

II. The Decision Below Is Wrong ........................... 10

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

Cases

Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc.,

501 U.S. 560 (1991) ................................................ 11

Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources

Defense Council, Inc.,

467 U.S. 837 (1984) ............................................ 7, 10

Jama v. ICE,

543 U.S. 335 (2005) ................................................ 11

Philadelphia Television Bd. Co. v. FCC,

359 F.2d 282 (D.C. Cir. 1966) ................................... 9

Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns,

531 U.S. 457 (2001) ................................................ 11

Statutes & Regulations

42 U.S.C.

§ 7475(a)(1) ............................................................... 9

§ 7671k ............................................................ passim

§ 7671k(a) ........................................................... 9, 11

§ 7671k(d) ............................................................... 11

83 Fed. Reg. 18,431 (Apr. 27, 2018) ........................... 6

ii

REPLY BRIEF

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scheme that ensures the safety of millions of products affecting millions of Americans. The decision

invalidates an interpretation of § 612 of the Clean

Air Act that EPA maintained consistently for nearly

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part of the present administration. It immunizes

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chemical, no matter how harmful that replacement

turns out to be and no matter how safe the alternatives. As Judge Wilkins explained in dissent, this interpretation “makes a mockery of the statutory purpose” to require the replacement of ozone-depleting

chemicals with the safest available alternatives. Pet.

App. 34a-35a.

This Court regularly grants certiorari in cases of

this magnitude, where a federal court of appeals with

exclusive jurisdiction eliminates a federal agency’s

regulatory authority. EPA does not dispute that—

ordinarily—this would be a hugely consequential decision. EPA instead argues—joined by Industry Respondents—that the case is of “limited prospective

importance,” and the Court should deny review, because EPA has suddenly changed its mind about the

meaning of § 612. Opp. 12. But if the Court denies

certiorari, the decision below will bind all future administrations, because the D.C. Circuit held that its

interpretation of “replace” is the only permissible interpretation of that term. Left intact, the decision

will prevent future administrations from enforcing

SNAP regulations against anyone using HFCs—or

any other chemical that is non-ozone-depleting. This

petition thus presents the Court’s only chance to re-

1

2

view the D.C. Circuit’s statute-gutting interpretation

of § 612.

If this Court grants review and reverses on the

theory that the 2015 rule was permitted but not

compelled by § 612, EPA could still seek to revise the

rule through ordinary notice-and-comment rulemaking. That is the appropriate way for administrations

to make discretionary policy decisions that diverge

from prior administrations; it would ensure political

accountability; and it would leave the issue open for

future administrations to revisit. But if this Court

denies certiorari on the ground that this EPA has

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interpret § 612 for all future EPAs. This Court

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granted.

I.

This Case Is Exceptionally Important and This

Petition Presents the Only Opportunity for

This Court’s Review

The decision below drains § 612 of the Clean Air

Act of nearly all its force. It overturns an EPA interpretation that stood for nearly 25 years, and upon

which state governments and businesses developed

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portant regulatory program by forever immunizing

the vast majority of products to which the program is

meant to apply. Pet. 17-21. It sows substantial confusion and uncertainty. Pet. 27-31. It destroys Petitioners’ and other companies’ investment-backed expectations. Pet. 21-23. And it will have a devastating impact on the environment and human health.

Pet. 23-26. In short, the regulatory, economic, environmental, and health consequences of the decision

below are extraordinary. Respondents can offer no

persuasive response.

3

1. The decision below overturns EPA’s longstanding interpretation of the Clean Air Act, one that

persisted since 1994 through three administrations,

Republican and Democrat, and the start of the current administration. For 25 years EPA interpreted

§ 612 to authorize EPA to prohibit the use of nonozone-depleting substitutes. Gov’t Opp. 4-5; Carrier

Br. 8; States Br. 22. There is no dispute that § 612

and SNAP are the principal means by which the government regulates the health and environmental impacts of a vast array of products that historically

were ozone-depleting. Pet. 17-21.

The decision below thus tears the heart out of

the SNAP program. Now, EPA cannot prohibit unsafe non-ozone-depleting substitutes if they have

been used even once, no matter how harmful they

may be and no matter how safe or plentiful the alternatives. And, it is undisputed, the decision below

will terminate EPA’s authority under § 612 not only

to ban chemicals that (as here) contribute to global

warming, but also chemicals that are carcinogenic,

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decision “renders this scheme essentially meaningless,” Carrier Br. 15, means “the chaotic end of a decades-old predictable and stable regulatory program,”

Daikin Br. 10, and “guts EPA’s effective regulatory

program and exposes human health and the environment to grave risks,” States Br. 2.

Respondents do not dispute that the decision beMPX OVMMJmFT UIF 4/"1 QSPHSBN HPJOH GPSXBSE‰OPU

just for HFCs but for all non-ozone depleting substitutes no matter their risks. They do not dispute that

the D.C. Circuit’s interpretation of § 612 will allow

product manufacturers to forever escape oversight by

starting to use a substitute before EPA reviews it.

4

Pet. 20-21. They do not dispute that the decision below affects millions of cars, refrigerators, air conditioners, and billions of aerosol products. Pet. 18-19.

And they do not dispute the extraordinary environmental and health consequences that will result from

continued use of HFCs. Pet. 23-26. These are reasons enough to grant certiorari.

Industry Respondents do note that the decision

below permits EPA to regulate HFCs “so long as it is

ozone-depleting substances that are being replaced.”

Opp. 16-17. But this is quibbling. As the Petition observed and no one contests, “[t]he vast majority of

manufacturers today have already begun using substitutes for ozone-depleting chemicals.” Pet. 15. The

decision thus renders the vast majority of companies

free to continue using HFCs (or any other harmful

chemical) forever. Pet. 18-21, 34-35.

2. An enormous number and variety of entities

relied for decades on EPA’s longstanding interpretation, investing over $1 billion. Pet. 4; Carrier Br. 8.

Seventeen states and the District of Columbia explain that the “decision below upset[s] states’ decades-long reliance on the SNAP Program’s robust nationwide regulation of substitutes for ozone-depleting

substances.” States Br. 8. Five leading U.S. product

manufacturers document the “substantial investments” and “other business decisions” made “in reliance on the regulatory framework that was established in 1994.” Carrier Br. 5, 8; see Daikin Br. 3

(noting $500 million in investments).

The government’s brief in opposition says nothing at all about those reliance interests—effectively

ignoring them altogether. Industry Respondents, for

their part, argue that no one could have “relied” on

EPA’s interpretation because the 2015 rule came af-

5

ter Industry Petitioners developed their HFC substitutes. Opp. 20-21. Their timeline is backwards.

From the beginning of the SNAP program, everyone

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veloped before EPA could prohibit them. What Petitioners—and countless others, Carrier Br. 5—relied

on was § 612’s requirement that EPA add substitutes

like HFCs to the prohibited list once safer substiUVUFTXFSFEFWFMPQFE BOE&1"TDPOTJTUFOUDPOmSNB

tion of that interpretation dating back to 1994.

As for Industry Respondents’ contention that

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in 2015, Opp. 20, EPA continues to disagree, Gov’t

Opp. 4-6. In a carefully worded sentence, Industry

Respondents deny that EPA has previously “used the

SNAP program to change the status of a non-ozonedepleting substitute,” Opp. 7 (emphasis added), i.e., to

move such a substitute from the approved list. But

EPA has repeatedly used the SNAP program to ban

non-ozone-depleting substitutes that are already in

use. Pet. 9, 17; NRDC Pet. 11-12. Under the D.C.

Circuit’s decision, EPA may no longer do so. If a

manufacturer that once used a safe substitute for an

ozone-depleting chemical starts using a cheaper nonozone-depleting toxin, EPA is now completely helpless to do anything about it under SNAP.

Industry Respondents also deny that the decision

will have any effect on incentives to innovate going

forward, noting that the D.C. Circuit’s decision does

not prohibit anyone from choosing HFOs over HFCs,

and that certain customers are doing so already.

Opp. 19-20. On that theory, environmental regulations would never merit this Court’s review and inEFFE XPVME CF VOOFDFTTBSZ JO UIF mSTU QMBDF  $PO

gress enacted § 612 because it understood that many

6

companies would use cheaper, less-safe chemicals absent a regulatory mandate, and that innovators need

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ternatives. Section 612 provides that incentive. The

decision below eviscerates it.

3. The decision below has sown substantial confusion and uncertainty. Those are EPA’s own words:

“EPA is aware that regulated entities are experiencing substantial confusion and uncertainty regarding

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situations.” 83 Fed. Reg. 18,431, 18,434 (Apr. 27,

2018). EPA’s own notice responding to the vacatur

demonstrates about as well as any document can just

how perplexing the decision below is. Id. at 18,43335. EPA asserts, for example, that the decision

draws distinctions EPA has never before drawn, and

will likely require EPA to disregard that portion of

the D.C. Circuit’s ruling that upheld EPA’s decision

to list HFCs as unacceptable substitutes going forward. Id."NJDJDPOmSNUIBUUIFEFDJTJPOJTDSFBUJOH

widespread confusion. States Br. 7, 16; Carrier Br.

22-23; Daikin Br. 4-5.

Respondents do not really dispute that the decision sows massive uncertainty, which EPA says it

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rule. Industry Respondents claim that the confusion

is Congress’s fault, not the fault of the court below.

See Opp. 21-22. But the fact that the interpretation

Respondents and the decision below advance turns a

straightforward regulatory program into a muddle of

confusion and uncertainty is strong evidence that it

7

is wrong and an important reason that this Court

should grant review.1

4. Respondents principally argue that the Court

should deny review because EPA no longer supports

the interpretation it has applied since 1994. Gov’t

Opp. 12-13; Ind. Opp. 14-16. As an initial matter, to

roll back the 2015 rule, EPA would have had to justify its decision through notice-and-comment rulemaking. There is no guarantee that EPA would or could

have done so, or that it will do so if the decision below is reversed.2

More important, the D.C. Circuit’s decision will

effectively prevent all future administrations from

ever (1) addressing HFCs or other harmful replacements under the SNAP program or (2) returning to

the interpretation of “replace” that held for 25 years

across three-and-a-half administrations. The court

issued its holding at Chevron Step One, stating that

1

Industry Respondents fault Petitioners for seeking an extension. Opp. 22-23. But the petition would have been set for the

Long Conference even absent an extension. Nor are litigants

obligated to seek a stay of the mandate.

2

Industry Respondents contend that the rule was “promulgated pursuant to President Obama’s 2013 Climate Action Plan,”

and President Trump has directed agencies to move to rescind

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of HFCs was “consistent with” the Climate Action Plan, Pet.

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As the government acknowledges, Opp. 4-5, the interpretation

of “replace” that the D.C. Circuit struck down—which is not restricted to HFCs—has been the government’s interpretation

since 1994 and was not a product of the 2013 Climate Action

Plan. The Trump Administration defended the 2015 rule before

the D.C. Circuit in this case and did not change its position

when the Executive Order issued.

8

the 2015 rule’s interpretation of the word “replace”

was impermissible. Pet. App. 16a. Unless this Court

grants review, the D.C. Circuit’s decision will bind all

future administrations and will prevent them from

reverting to the interpretation that lasted from 1994

until EPA’s opposition to certiorari last month.

In other words, the government’s sole argument

for denying certiorari depends on the badly mistaken

premise that only this administration will be affected

by this decision. But 4 or 8 or 12 years from now, a

future EPA may decide that crucial economic and enWJSPONFOUBMCFOFmUTXJMMBDDSVFGSPNBSVMFBEESFTT

ing HFCs or any other non-ozone-depleting chemical

for which a safer substitute may be developed. The

decision below makes such a future rule impossible.

As the Court’s practice of appointing amici demonstrates, this Court regularly grants certiorari when

the government has changed its position, precisely

because court of appeals decisions interpreting fedFSBM MBX IBWF CSPBE SBNJmDBUJPOT CFZPOE BOZ POF

administration. This will be the Court’s only chance

to address the interpretation of this statute, and it is

imperative that the Court grant certiorari now.

If EPA then wishes to revisit the interpretation

of “replace” through notice-and-comment rulemaking,

it may do so consistent with this Court’s interpretation. But the decision below should not evade review

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should not be permitted to effectively decide this issue for all future administrations.

5. Industry Respondents offer a smattering of

other objections to certiorari, but none hold water.

Industry Respondents argue that eviscerating

the SNAP program will have limited environmental

9

consequences because EPA might be able to restrict

the use of HFCs through other means. Opp. 3-4, 8-9,

15-18. EPA notably does not join in this argument.

The statutes Respondents identify (Opp. 15) do not

apply to the same breadth of products to which

SNAP applies. For example, the Prevention of SigOJmDBOU %FUFSJPSBUJPO QSPHSBN JT MJNJUFE UP UIF DPO

trol of “major emitting facilit[ies],” not mobile sources

or diverse consumer products. 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(1).

And none of these other authorities allow EPA to

regulate based on “comparative risks.” Pet. 36. Industry Respondents call this an “ipse dixit” because

Petitioners do not “offer any explanation” why a

comparative risk regime is needed. Opp. 16. But a

comparative risk regime is not Petitioners’ idea—it

was Congress’s, and it is express in the statute. See

42 U.S.C. § 7671k(a).

It is undisputed that § 612 has been the principal

means of regulating the environmental consequences

of a vast array of products since 1994. Pet. 17-18.

Even if other regulatory programs could do some of

the work of § 612, that would not diminish the importance of § 612 or of granting certiorari—as EPA

recognized below. “[W]here ‘Congress has given an

agency … various tools with which to protect the

public interest, the agency is entitled to some leeway

in choosing which … regulatory tools will be most effective.’” EPA C.A. Br. 24 (quoting Philadelphia Television Broad. Co. v. FCC, 359 F.2d 282, 284 (D.C. Cir.

1966)).

Industry Respondents also argue that States

might restrict HFCs. Opp. 18. But patchwork regulation by states is no substitute for uniform federal

law—that is why Congress enacted § 612. And the

possibility of such patchwork regulation certainly

10

does not diminish the importance of a decision gutting a federal law at Chevron Step One. Neither do

the other not-yet-existent sources of regulation that

Respondents cite, namely, the introduction of a bill in

the Senate and the existence of a treaty that the

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decline to decide whether Congress has already

passed a statute authorizing EPA to require companies to stop using certain HFCs on the theory that

Congress might pass such a statute in the future.

Finally, Industry Respondents note the absence

of a split. Opp. 12-13. As they acknowledge, however, the D.C. Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction.

II. The Decision Below Is Wrong

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word “replace” from among many and declared it to

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ents barely attempt to defend the court’s analysis.

Industry Respondents largely offer block quotations

from the opinion without comment. Opp. 25-26. And

the government states without explanation or meaningful analysis that it “now believes that the decision

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612(c).” Opp. 9. Respondents make no effort to confront the dissenting opinion.

The dissent was correct. Respondents do not

dispute that “replace” can mean to “substitute for” or

“to assume the former role, position, or function of”

something that came before. Pet. 32. They insist only that the term must be read “in context.” Ind. Opp.

26. Petitioners could not agree more. The context of

§ 612 clearly demonstrates that Congress intended

EPA to continually update and modify the lists of

safe and prohibited alternatives. It did not imagine

11

the SNAP program would be obsolete by the mid1990s. To that end, § 612(a) directs EPA to regulate

replacements to “reduce overall risks to human

health and the environment” “[t]o the maximum extent practicable.” And § 612(d) allows anyone to petition to move a substance from the safe list to the

prohibited list, without any limitation on when such

petitions can be brought. The majority’s unnatural

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letter. Pet. 34-35. Respondents have no answer.

On the other side of the “context” ledger, Respondents cite § 612’s appearance in a subchapter titled “Stratospheric Ozone Protection.” Ind. Opp. 28.

For one, a statute’s title is relevant only to the extent

that a statutory term is “ambiguous.” Whitman v.

American Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 483 (2001).

Of course, if § 612 is ambiguous, then Respondents

should have lost below. Beyond that, Congress’s primary interest in eliminating ozone-depleting substances was intertwined with its interest in “reduc[ing] overall risks to human health and the environment.” 42 U.S.C. § 7671k(a) (emphasis added).

“[A] law may have multiple purposes.” Barnes v.

Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 590 (1991).

Industry Respondents fret (at 28-29) that PetiUJPOFST EFmOJUJPO PG iSFQMBDFw XPVME BVUIPSJ[F &1"

to continue regulating into the next century—in their

view, an “illogical” and “absurd” result. To the contrary, it is perfectly logical that Congress would at

once ban ozone-depleting substances and task EPA

with ensuring that all future substitutes are safe.

Congress knows how to specify time limitations, Jama v. ICE, 543 U.S. 335, 341 (2005), but did not under § 612.

12

If anything, Respondents’ reading of the statute

leads to far greater absurdity. As EPA explained below, “[respondents’] interpretation of the statute

would force EPA to leave a toxic chemical on the approved list where that toxic effect was not discovered

until years later, simply because it does not deplete

ozone. Not only that, but it would also prohibit the

alteration of the list of approved alternatives if one

day after an alternative was added, a far-less-risky

alternative was discovered.” EPA C.A. Br. 24. Respondents make no effort to address these and other

absurd results of their interpretation. Pet. 20-21, 35.

13

CONCLUSION

The Court should grant certiorari.

Respectfully submitted,

THOMAS A. LORENZEN

LISA S. BLATT

ROBERT J. MEYERS

Counsel of Record

CROWELL & MORING LLP JONATHAN S. MARTEL

1001 Penn. Ave., NW

ELISABETH S. THEODORE

Washington, DC 20004 ANDREW T. TUTT

(202) 624-2500

STEPHEN K. WIRTH

tlorenzen@crowell.com

ARNOLD & PORTER

KAYE SCHOLER LLP

Counsel for Petitioner

601

Mass. Ave., NW

The Chemours Company

Washington,

DC 20001

FC, LLC

(202) 942-5000

lisa.blatt@arnoldporter.com

DAVID B. RIVKIN JR.

BAKER & HOSTETLER LLP

1050 Conn. Ave., NW

Washington, DC 20036

(202) 861-1500

drivkin@bakerlaw.com

Counsel for Petitioner

Honeywell International

Inc.

September 12, 2018

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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Reply Brief — Honeywell International Inc., et al., Petitioners v. Mexichem Fluor Inc., et al. | Frix