Reply Brief — DTE Energy Company, et al., Petitioners v. United States, et al.

Supreme Court briefNov 15, 2017

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NO. 17-170

In the

Supreme Court of the United States

________________

DTE ENERGY COMPANY AND

DETROIT EDISON COMPANY ,

Petitioners,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

________________

Respondent.

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals for the

Sixth Circuit

________________

REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONERS

________________

MICHAEL J. SOLO

F. WILLIAM BROWNELL

ANDREA E. HAYDEN

Counsel of Record

HUNTON & WILLIAMS LLP

Of Counsel

DTE ENERGY COMPANY 2200 Pennsylvania Ave., NW

Washington, DC 20037

One Energy Plaza

bbrownell@hunton.com

Detroit, MI 48226

(202) 955-1500

Counsel for Petitioners

(additional counsel listed on signature page)

November 15, 2017

CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

Petitioner DTE Energy Company has no parent

corporation and no corporation owns 10% or more of

its stock. Petitioner Detroit Edison Company, now

known as DTE Electric Company, is a wholly owned

subsidiary of DTE Energy Company.

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT ............. i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...................................... iii

INTRODUCTION ........................................................ 1

ARGUMENT ............................................................... 3

I.

The NSR Rules Measure the Accuracy

of Pre-construction Projections Through

Actual Post-construction Data. ........................ 3

II.

The Rules Allow EPA to Enforce

Compliance With Its Projection

Regulations, But That Is Not the Claim

the Government Raised Here. .......................... 8

III.

The Court Should Grant Certiorari to

Clarify That a Federal Agency Cannot,

Through the Guise of “Interpretation,”

Change the Plain Meaning of Its

Regulations. .................................................... 10

CONCLUSION .......................................................... 12

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

Federal Cases:

Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997) ......................... 2

Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 567

U.S. 142 (2012) ..................................................... 10

Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 568 U.S. 597

(2013) .................................................................... 12

Envtl. Def. v. Duke Energy Corp., 549 U.S. 561

(2007) ...................................................................... 3

New York v. EPA, 413 F.3d 3 (D.C. Cir. 2005) ........... 3

Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct.

1199 (2015) ........................................................... 12

Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 564 U.S.

50, 69 (2011) ......................................................... 12

Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504

(1994) .................................................................... 12

United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Bible, 136 S.

Ct. 1607 (2016) ....................................................... 2

U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs v. Hawkes Co., 136 S.

Ct. 1807 (2016) ....................................................... 2

Federal Statutes:

Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401 et seq.

42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(4) ............................................ 3

iv

Federal Regulations:

40 C.F.R. § 52.21(a)(2)(iv)(a) ............................... 1, 3, 8

40 C.F.R. § 52.21(a)(2)(iv)(b) ............................. 6, 8, 11

40 C.F.R. § 52.21(b)(41) ............................................... 3

40 C.F.R. § 52.21(b)(41)(ii)(a)...................................... 4

40 C.F.R. § 52.21(b)(41)(ii)(c) ...................................... 5

40 C.F.R. § 52.21(r)(6) ............................................. 5, 7

Federal Register:

63 Fed. Reg. 39,857 (July 24 1998) ............................. 5

67 Fed. Reg. 80,186 (Dec. 31, 2002) ............................ 5

72 Fed. Reg. 72,607 (Dec. 21, 2007) ............................ 6

INTRODUCTION

The Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA)

regulations implementing the statutory New Source

Review (NSR) program state that a construction project “is not a major modification if it does not cause a

significant emissions increase.”

40 C.F.R.

§ 52.21(a)(2)(iv)(a).

The challenged projects performed by Petitioners DTE Energy Company and Detroit Edison Company (DTE) did not cause a significant increase in emissions; in fact, emissions decreased substantially. Can the Government nonetheless persist in its claim that Petitioners constructed a

“major modification” without a permit? That is the

stark question this case presents.

The Government seeks to avoid the question by

answering a different one: whether it is “categorically barred” from enforcing its NSR regulations until

emissions increase. U.S. Opp’n (I). But Petitioners

accept that NSR is a pre-construction program with

the possibility of pre-construction enforcement. The

Government could have pursued a permissible action

to enforce its projection regulations, which can proceed regardless of any emissions increase. Instead,

the Government claimed that DTE constructed a major modification without a permit, which, under the

plain text of the regulations, indisputably requires a

showing that the challenged project caused an increase in emissions.

At bottom, the Government wants to punish

DTE for accurately predicting that its 2010 projects

at Monroe 2 would not cause a significant increase in

emissions and thus would not require an NSR permit. The Government’s proof? Demonstrably incorrect post hoc preconstruction projections based on

methodologies that are not specified, let alone man-

2

dated by, the NSR rules. The Government’s legal

justification that this “proof” can suffice? A tortured

reading of the regulations to create ambiguity where

none exists, coupled with the hardy perennial of deference based on Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452

(1997).

This fundamental misapplication of the Clean

Air Act (CAA) and the nationally-significant NSR

program—not to mention the insults to due process

and separation of powers that attend any application

of Auer deference—cries out for correction. The plain

text of the NSR rules incentivizes operators of industrial facilities across the nation to ensure the core

objective of NSR—preventing emissions increases—

is satisfied. The Sixth Circuit’s mandate, in contrast, raises the prospect of retroactive application of

projection methodologies not specified in the regulations and that produce results that defy reality. The

applicability of major environmental programs such

as NSR should not be shrouded in such uncertainty.

Cf. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs v. Hawkes Co., 136 S.

Ct. 1807, 1816 (2016) (Kennedy, J., concurring). Nor

should the Government be permitted to “interpret”

regulations to mean exactly the opposite of what they

say. See United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Bible,

136 S. Ct. 1607, 1608-09 (2016) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (summarizing critiques

against deference based on Auer).

The Court should grant certiorari and address

the important issues presented by this case.

3

ARGUMENT

I. The NSR Rules Measure the Accuracy of

Pre-construction Projections Through Actual Post-construction Data.

Under the CAA, “new” sources of air pollution

must obtain NSR permits before commencing construction. Construction projects at existing plants

qualify as new sources only if they cause an increase

in emissions. So says the statute, which defines an

NSR-triggering “modification” as a “physical change”

that “increases the amount” of air pollution. 42

U.S.C. § 7411(a)(4). And so says EPA’s implementing regulations, which state that a change causing a

significant emissions increase is a “major modification,” and one that does not cause such an increase is

not

a

“major

modification.”

40

C.F.R.

§ 52.21(a)(2)(iv)(a); see also Envtl. Def. v. Duke Energy Corp., 549 U.S. 561, 569 (2007); New York v.

EPA, 413 F.3d 3, 38-40 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (per curiam).1

Because NSR is a pre-construction program—

meaning that, if required, the operator must obtain

its permit before commencing construction—EPA’s

rules specify that operators must predict whether the

project in question will cause “actual emissions” at

the plant to go up. 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(b)(41) (defining

“projected actual emissions”). In the easy case, such

as the construction of a completely new plant, where

it is relatively easy to isolate new emissions and determine whether those emissions exceed the signifi1 While the Government attempts to distinguish these cases,

U.S. Opp’n 15-16, it cannot dispute that, as the D.C. explained,

“‘Congress directed the agency to measure emissions increases

in terms of changes in actual emissions.’” Id. at 16, quoting

New York, 413 F. 3d at 10.

4

cance threshold, these projections are not controversial. But with respect to construction projects at existing plants, the task is significantly more complex.2

A comparison between operations in the past to operations in a five-year window in the future requires

assessment of anticipated demand, which depends on

a host of factors, including weather, economic activity, fuel prices, and regulatory climate. These variables can only be defined prospectively based on business and engineering judgment and thus are inherently subjective. Compounding the difficulty of the

task, even small changes can affect the amount of

projected actual emissions, especially for a large

plant like Monroe 2.

In light of the inherent variability of preconstruction emission projections, EPA in the 2002

NSR rules gave operators certain basic instructions

(e.g., requiring selection of a two-year emission baseline in the prior five years, and specifying “significant” emission thresholds), but otherwise left to the

operator’s judgment how to apply the “projected actual emissions” test for determining NSR applicability. “[T]he owner or operator … [s]hall consider all

relevant information,” including “the company’s own

representations,” its “expected business activity,”

and its “filings with the State or Federal regulatory

authorities.” Id. § 52.21(b)(41)(ii)(a). And operators

shall “exclude, in calculating any increase in emissions that results from [t]he particular project, that

portion of the unit’s emissions following the project”

that the unit “could have accommodated during the

2 As Yogi Berra reportedly quipped, “It is tough to make pre-

dictions, especially about the future.” Famous Quotes & Quotations,

http://www.famous-quotes-and-quotations.com/yogiberra-quotes.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2017).

5

consecutive 24-month period used to establish the

baseline actual emissions … and that are also unrelated to the particular project, including any increased utilization due to product demand growth.”

Id. § 52.21(b)(41)(ii)(c). That is all—the regulations

do not specify what weight should be given to a particular piece of “relevant information”, they do not

impose a specific methodology for excluding emissions unrelated to the project, and they do not require the operator to obtain prior approval of its preconstruction analysis.

EPA recognized that this system—in particular

the absence of specific methodologies governing how

to project or exclude emissions—would allow companies to employ differing projection approaches and

assumptions, with differing results when predicting

what might happen in the future. “Because there is

no specific test available for determining whether an

emissions increase indeed results from an independent factor such as demand growth, versus factors relating to the change at the unit, … [i]nterpretations

may vary from source to source, as well as from what

a permitting agency would accept as appropriate.”

63 Fed. Reg. 39,857, 39,861 (July 24, 1998). So even

a reasonable pre-construction projection that actual

emissions would not increase due to a project could

leave open the “reasonable possibility” that postproject emissions could nonetheless increase. 40

C.F.R. § 52.21(r)(6). But EPA did not use the “reasonable possibility” that a project might cause an

emissions increase to eliminate the projected actual

emissions test, or to provide greater specificity in

how it should be applied, or to require prior approval

of projections. Rather, EPA confirmed the availability of that test, 67 Fed. Reg. 80,186, 80,204 (Dec. 31,

6

2002), and provided that, where there is a “reasonable possibility” that emissions could increase despite

a “no increase” projection, operators would not need

to get a permit but rather would be required to monitor and to report emissions for five or ten years after

the project in order to police their application of the

demand growth exclusion using actual, measured

emissions. 72 Fed. Reg. 72,607, 72,610-11 (Dec. 21,

2007).

It is thus unsurprising that EPA’s 2002 NSR

rules make actual post-construction data the touchstone for assessing, after the fact, the validity of preconstruction projections of actual emissions that

might be caused by a project. “Regardless of any

such preconstruction projections, a major modification results if the project causes a significant emissions increase….” 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(a)(2)(iv)(b) (emphases added). “Any such” preconstruction projection can be wrong—what matters is whether the project significantly increased the amount of air pollution.

By answering a different question—i.e., whether

it is “categorically barred” from enforcing its regulations before construction, U.S. Opp’n 8, 12—the Government avoids any meaningful response to this

straightforward language of EPA’s rules. Instead,

the Government relies on the pre-2002 NSR rules

and cases addressing those rules for the unremarkable proposition that NSR is a pre-construction review

program. See, e.g., id. at 4, 11. And Sierra Club, for

its part, concedes that “an increase in emissions is a

necessary element of a modification.” Sierra Club

Opp’n 24.

EPA’s conscious decision to use actual emissions

to test the validity of NSR applicability decisions has

7

legal consequences. To begin, the rules delineate the

scope of EPA’s ability to “enforce” NSR before construction of projects at existing plants commences.

For example, EPA could have made the preconstruction notifications submitted where there is a

“reasonable possibility” of an emissions increase, 40

C.F.R. § 52.21(r)(6), due months before commencement of construction to allow more thorough regulatory review of the operator’s projection. EPA likewise might have imposed additional specific requirements for projections, including specific methodologies for, inter alia, applying the demand-growth

exclusion. That way, EPA could more closely monitor the projection methodologies employed by operators before the project took place. And EPA could

have required prior approval of projections, a fundamentally different system that would allow State or

federal regulators the opportunity to prevent construction if they disagreed with the operator’s judgment.

But EPA did not promulgate this type of scheme.

Thus, Sierra Club’s suggestion that DTE somehow

failed to provide enough information in its preconstruction notice, Sierra Club Opp’n 2, is wholly

misplaced.3 So, too, is its complaint that DTE erroneously predicted that demand would grow and with

it Monroe 2’s emissions. Id. at 10-11. That is exactly

3 Indeed, Sierra Club’s suggestion is contradicted by the lower

courts finding that DTE’s notice was adequate, Pet. App. 97a99a, and by EPA’s own concession to the lower court that DTE’s

projections were based on a “‘sophisticated computer model’”

that considered “‘exhaustive inputs.’” Id. at 38a (Rogers, J.,

dissenting) (quoting U.S. Br. at 13, United States v. DTE Energy Co., 845 F.3d 735 (6th Cir. 2017) (Nos. 14-2274/2275). (DTE

II)).

8

the point. Under EPA’s all-encompassing yet nonspecific methodology, projections can be highly variable and sometimes even entail the “reasonable possibility” of being incorrect.

Most fundamentally, when an agency (i) defines

a “major modification” as a change that causes an

increase in emissions, 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(a)(2)(iv)(a),

(ii) clarifies that changes not producing such an increase are not major modifications, id., and (iii) emphasizes that the validity of projections is tested using

actual

post-construction

data,

id.

§ 52.21(a)(2)(iv)(b), it cannot later prove that a project that did not cause an emissions increase was

nonetheless a major modification based on an alternative—and demonstrably incorrect—projection. See

U.S. Opp’n 5 (Arguing for NSR applicability determined based on the counter-factual judgment of the

Government’s “expert witness” provided “[d]uring

discovery.”). The rule of law does not work that way.

This Court should grant certiorari to restore

clarity to this important gateway federal program.4

II. The Rules Allow EPA to Enforce Compliance

With Its Projection Regulations, But That Is

Not the Claim the Government Raised Here.

Contrary to the Government’s suggestion, U.S.

Opp’n (I), DTE does not ask the Court to hold that

the Government is categorically precluded from pursuing an enforcement action before construction

commences. As DTE has acknowledged, under the

“project-and-report system” adopted in the 2002 NSR

rules, see Sierra Club Opp’n 22, the Government re4 See DTE Pet. 26-30 (demonstrating the importance of the

issue).

9

tains authority to pursue preconstruction enforcement in a range of circumstances. For example, in

cases where NSR applicability is not in dispute, such

as the construction of a brand-new plant, the Government can seek an injunction mandating that the

operator obtain a permit. And in cases where the

operator has misapplied the unambiguous requirements of the regulations, for example by using an incorrect baseline period or simply failing to perform a

pre-construction projection, the Government can

pursue an injunction to require the operator to perform its pre-construction projection and to use the

correct baseline.

But that is not the enforcement action the Government pursued here. Instead of challenging DTE’s

compliance with the specific requirements of the projection regulations, the Government sought to prove

that the 2010 projects were “major modifications,”

notwithstanding that DTE’s projections complied

with the objective, unambiguous requirements of the

projection rules, and that, in fact, actual post-project

emissions decreased. That difference is of paramount

importance, because it is why Judge Batchelder, the

deciding vote in DTE II, concluded that the DTE I

majority’s limited mandate could be disregarded. “If

the question had been whether or not [the Government] could challenge DTE’s failure to comply with

the regulations, then DTE I would have affirmed the

summary judgment because [the Government] had

raised no such claim.” Pet. App. 21a (Batchelder, J.,

concurring). On Judge Batchelder’s conclusion, the

mandate of the Court below depends entirely.

The Government therefore goes too far when it

suggests that DTE asks the Court to “categorically

bar[ ]” enforcement actions where emissions have not

10

increased. U.S. Opp’n (I). Such actions are permissible, albeit in a much narrower category of circumstances than would have been available had EPA

opted for a prior approval scheme in the 2002 NSR

Rules.

More precisely framed, the question is

whether the Government can prove that a project

was an NSR-permit-triggering major modification,

when it did not, in fact, cause an increase in emissions. Under both the statute and the regulations,

the answer must be “no.”

III. The Court Should Grant Certiorari to Clarify That a Federal Agency Cannot, Through

the Guise of “Interpretation,” Change the

Plain Meaning of Its Regulations.

The Government’s non-textual enforcement-byprojection reading of the rules is deeply offensive to

due process. DTE Pet. 24-26. When an agency leaves

a governing regulation vague, it cannot, consistent

with due process, exploit that vagueness to establish

a hitherto unpublished standard of liability. Id. (citing, inter alia, Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham

Corp., 567 U.S. 142, 158-59 (2012)). The Government’s attempt to prove that the 2010 Monroe 2 projects were major modifications based on application

of a made-for-litigation and never-before-published

projection methodology violates this principle. Id.

The Government claims that this argument was

not raised in the Court below, but that is incorrect.

DTE raised precisely this point in response to the

Government’s invocation of Auer deference in the

Court of Appeals. DTE Br. at 69, DTE II. As DTE

explained there, “The Government could not lawfully

substitute a system that affords that measure of

judgment for one that requires strict adherence to an

unwritten methodology announced for the first time

11

in an enforcement proceeding.” Id. That is the same

argument we raise here. DTE Pet. 24-26.

In its Opposition, the Government carefully

avoids mention of Auer but still invokes that very

dubious deference doctrine. For example, the Government contends that 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(a)(2)(iv)(b)’s

provision subordinating projections to actual postconstruction data when deciding whether a project

was a “major modification” is actually a one-way

street that “simply expands the regulatory definition

of ‘major modification’ to include projects that unexpectedly increase emissions.” U.S. Opp’n 14. Under

this view, if emissions go up unexpectedly, projections do not matter, but if post-project data confirm

the operator’s projection, an inaccurate enforcementgenerated projection can trump. The regulations say

no such thing. Nor can they fairly be read to allow

for so absurd a result. The Government nonetheless

justifies this gloss on the rules as “EPA’s interpretation of its regulations as applied in this enforcement

action.” Id.

Even worse, the Government asks for deference

for “the agency’s interpretations of those [NSR] regulations at the time that it brought this enforcement

action” id. at 10, while observing that “[t]he issues

underlying this enforcement action” are currently

“under consideration,” id. at 9 n.2, and holding open

the possibility that “[t]hat review may result in

changes to the agency’s regulatory approach.” Id. at

17. So while the Government seeks deference to its

counter-textual interpretation of the 2002 NSR rules

in this case, it holds open the possibility that the

meaning of this nationally significant regulatory

program could change further, potentially confirming

that (as the statute says) a “modification” requires

12

an emissions increase. Only in a world of Auer deference could an agency give a regulation different—

and perhaps diametrically opposed—meanings depending on the timing of enforcement.

This case thus presents the Court with the opportunity to address whether Auer remains valid,

and if so, whether it can be applied in the way the

Government would seek to apply it here. As members of this Court have observed, Auer deference

rests on an unstable foundation. Among other infirmities, Auer gives agencies the incentive to “issue

vague regulations, because to do so maximizes agency power and allows the agency greater latitude to

make law through adjudication rather than through

the more cumbersome rulemaking process” Thomas

Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 525 (1994)

(Thomas, J., dissenting). Such vagueness “frustrates

the notice and predictability purposes of rulemaking,

and promotes arbitrary government.” Talk Am., Inc.

v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 564 U.S. 50, 69 (2011) (Scalia,

J., concurring). See also Perez v. Mortgage Bankers

Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1210 (2015) (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Decker

v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 568 U.S. 597, 615-16 (2013)

(Roberts, C.J., concurring).

CONCLUSION

For these reasons and those set forth in DTE’s

opening brief, the petition should be granted.

13

Respectfully submitted,

F. WILLIAM BROWNELL

Counsel of Record

MARK B. BIERBOWER

MAKRAM B. JABER

HUNTON & WILLIAMS LLP

2200 Pennsylvania Ave. NW

Washington, DC 20037

bbrownell@hunton.com

(202) 955-1500

HARRY M. JOHNSON III

GEORGE P. SIBLEY III

HUNTON & WILLIAMS LLP

Riverfront Plaza, East Tower

951 East Byrd Street

Richmond, VA 23219

(804) 788-8200

BRENT A. ROSSER

HUNTON & WILLIAMS LLP

101 South Tryon Street,

Suite 3500

Charlotte, NC 28280

(704) 378-4707

MICHAEL J. SOLO

ANDREA E. HAYDEN

Of Counsel

DTE ENERGY COMPANY

One Energy Plaza

Detroit, MI 48226

November 15, 2017

Counsel for Petitioners

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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