Reply Brief — DTE Energy Company, et al., Petitioners v. United States, et al.
Supreme Court briefNov 15, 2017
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NO. 17-170
In the
Supreme Court of the United States
________________
DTE ENERGY COMPANY AND
DETROIT EDISON COMPANY ,
Petitioners,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
________________
Respondent.
On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit
________________
REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONERS
________________
MICHAEL J. SOLO
F. WILLIAM BROWNELL
ANDREA E. HAYDEN
Counsel of Record
HUNTON & WILLIAMS LLP
Of Counsel
DTE ENERGY COMPANY 2200 Pennsylvania Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20037
One Energy Plaza
bbrownell@hunton.com
Detroit, MI 48226
(202) 955-1500
Counsel for Petitioners
(additional counsel listed on signature page)
November 15, 2017
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
Petitioner DTE Energy Company has no parent
corporation and no corporation owns 10% or more of
its stock. Petitioner Detroit Edison Company, now
known as DTE Electric Company, is a wholly owned
subsidiary of DTE Energy Company.
ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT ............. i
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...................................... iii
INTRODUCTION ........................................................ 1
ARGUMENT ............................................................... 3
I.
The NSR Rules Measure the Accuracy
of Pre-construction Projections Through
Actual Post-construction Data. ........................ 3
II.
The Rules Allow EPA to Enforce
Compliance With Its Projection
Regulations, But That Is Not the Claim
the Government Raised Here. .......................... 8
III.
The Court Should Grant Certiorari to
Clarify That a Federal Agency Cannot,
Through the Guise of “Interpretation,”
Change the Plain Meaning of Its
Regulations. .................................................... 10
CONCLUSION .......................................................... 12
iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
Federal Cases:
Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997) ......................... 2
Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 567
U.S. 142 (2012) ..................................................... 10
Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 568 U.S. 597
(2013) .................................................................... 12
Envtl. Def. v. Duke Energy Corp., 549 U.S. 561
(2007) ...................................................................... 3
New York v. EPA, 413 F.3d 3 (D.C. Cir. 2005) ........... 3
Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct.
1199 (2015) ........................................................... 12
Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 564 U.S.
50, 69 (2011) ......................................................... 12
Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504
(1994) .................................................................... 12
United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Bible, 136 S.
Ct. 1607 (2016) ....................................................... 2
U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs v. Hawkes Co., 136 S.
Ct. 1807 (2016) ....................................................... 2
Federal Statutes:
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401 et seq.
42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(4) ............................................ 3
iv
Federal Regulations:
40 C.F.R. § 52.21(a)(2)(iv)(a) ............................... 1, 3, 8
40 C.F.R. § 52.21(a)(2)(iv)(b) ............................. 6, 8, 11
40 C.F.R. § 52.21(b)(41) ............................................... 3
40 C.F.R. § 52.21(b)(41)(ii)(a)...................................... 4
40 C.F.R. § 52.21(b)(41)(ii)(c) ...................................... 5
40 C.F.R. § 52.21(r)(6) ............................................. 5, 7
Federal Register:
63 Fed. Reg. 39,857 (July 24 1998) ............................. 5
67 Fed. Reg. 80,186 (Dec. 31, 2002) ............................ 5
72 Fed. Reg. 72,607 (Dec. 21, 2007) ............................ 6
INTRODUCTION
The Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA)
regulations implementing the statutory New Source
Review (NSR) program state that a construction project “is not a major modification if it does not cause a
significant emissions increase.”
40 C.F.R.
§ 52.21(a)(2)(iv)(a).
The challenged projects performed by Petitioners DTE Energy Company and Detroit Edison Company (DTE) did not cause a significant increase in emissions; in fact, emissions decreased substantially. Can the Government nonetheless persist in its claim that Petitioners constructed a
“major modification” without a permit? That is the
stark question this case presents.
The Government seeks to avoid the question by
answering a different one: whether it is “categorically barred” from enforcing its NSR regulations until
emissions increase. U.S. Opp’n (I). But Petitioners
accept that NSR is a pre-construction program with
the possibility of pre-construction enforcement. The
Government could have pursued a permissible action
to enforce its projection regulations, which can proceed regardless of any emissions increase. Instead,
the Government claimed that DTE constructed a major modification without a permit, which, under the
plain text of the regulations, indisputably requires a
showing that the challenged project caused an increase in emissions.
At bottom, the Government wants to punish
DTE for accurately predicting that its 2010 projects
at Monroe 2 would not cause a significant increase in
emissions and thus would not require an NSR permit. The Government’s proof? Demonstrably incorrect post hoc preconstruction projections based on
methodologies that are not specified, let alone man-
2
dated by, the NSR rules. The Government’s legal
justification that this “proof” can suffice? A tortured
reading of the regulations to create ambiguity where
none exists, coupled with the hardy perennial of deference based on Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452
(1997).
This fundamental misapplication of the Clean
Air Act (CAA) and the nationally-significant NSR
program—not to mention the insults to due process
and separation of powers that attend any application
of Auer deference—cries out for correction. The plain
text of the NSR rules incentivizes operators of industrial facilities across the nation to ensure the core
objective of NSR—preventing emissions increases—
is satisfied. The Sixth Circuit’s mandate, in contrast, raises the prospect of retroactive application of
projection methodologies not specified in the regulations and that produce results that defy reality. The
applicability of major environmental programs such
as NSR should not be shrouded in such uncertainty.
Cf. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs v. Hawkes Co., 136 S.
Ct. 1807, 1816 (2016) (Kennedy, J., concurring). Nor
should the Government be permitted to “interpret”
regulations to mean exactly the opposite of what they
say. See United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Bible,
136 S. Ct. 1607, 1608-09 (2016) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (summarizing critiques
against deference based on Auer).
The Court should grant certiorari and address
the important issues presented by this case.
3
ARGUMENT
I. The NSR Rules Measure the Accuracy of
Pre-construction Projections Through Actual Post-construction Data.
Under the CAA, “new” sources of air pollution
must obtain NSR permits before commencing construction. Construction projects at existing plants
qualify as new sources only if they cause an increase
in emissions. So says the statute, which defines an
NSR-triggering “modification” as a “physical change”
that “increases the amount” of air pollution. 42
U.S.C. § 7411(a)(4). And so says EPA’s implementing regulations, which state that a change causing a
significant emissions increase is a “major modification,” and one that does not cause such an increase is
not
a
“major
modification.”
40
C.F.R.
§ 52.21(a)(2)(iv)(a); see also Envtl. Def. v. Duke Energy Corp., 549 U.S. 561, 569 (2007); New York v.
EPA, 413 F.3d 3, 38-40 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (per curiam).1
Because NSR is a pre-construction program—
meaning that, if required, the operator must obtain
its permit before commencing construction—EPA’s
rules specify that operators must predict whether the
project in question will cause “actual emissions” at
the plant to go up. 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(b)(41) (defining
“projected actual emissions”). In the easy case, such
as the construction of a completely new plant, where
it is relatively easy to isolate new emissions and determine whether those emissions exceed the signifi1 While the Government attempts to distinguish these cases,
U.S. Opp’n 15-16, it cannot dispute that, as the D.C. explained,
“‘Congress directed the agency to measure emissions increases
in terms of changes in actual emissions.’” Id. at 16, quoting
New York, 413 F. 3d at 10.
4
cance threshold, these projections are not controversial. But with respect to construction projects at existing plants, the task is significantly more complex.2
A comparison between operations in the past to operations in a five-year window in the future requires
assessment of anticipated demand, which depends on
a host of factors, including weather, economic activity, fuel prices, and regulatory climate. These variables can only be defined prospectively based on business and engineering judgment and thus are inherently subjective. Compounding the difficulty of the
task, even small changes can affect the amount of
projected actual emissions, especially for a large
plant like Monroe 2.
In light of the inherent variability of preconstruction emission projections, EPA in the 2002
NSR rules gave operators certain basic instructions
(e.g., requiring selection of a two-year emission baseline in the prior five years, and specifying “significant” emission thresholds), but otherwise left to the
operator’s judgment how to apply the “projected actual emissions” test for determining NSR applicability. “[T]he owner or operator … [s]hall consider all
relevant information,” including “the company’s own
representations,” its “expected business activity,”
and its “filings with the State or Federal regulatory
authorities.” Id. § 52.21(b)(41)(ii)(a). And operators
shall “exclude, in calculating any increase in emissions that results from [t]he particular project, that
portion of the unit’s emissions following the project”
that the unit “could have accommodated during the
2 As Yogi Berra reportedly quipped, “It is tough to make pre-
dictions, especially about the future.” Famous Quotes & Quotations,
http://www.famous-quotes-and-quotations.com/yogiberra-quotes.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2017).
5
consecutive 24-month period used to establish the
baseline actual emissions … and that are also unrelated to the particular project, including any increased utilization due to product demand growth.”
Id. § 52.21(b)(41)(ii)(c). That is all—the regulations
do not specify what weight should be given to a particular piece of “relevant information”, they do not
impose a specific methodology for excluding emissions unrelated to the project, and they do not require the operator to obtain prior approval of its preconstruction analysis.
EPA recognized that this system—in particular
the absence of specific methodologies governing how
to project or exclude emissions—would allow companies to employ differing projection approaches and
assumptions, with differing results when predicting
what might happen in the future. “Because there is
no specific test available for determining whether an
emissions increase indeed results from an independent factor such as demand growth, versus factors relating to the change at the unit, … [i]nterpretations
may vary from source to source, as well as from what
a permitting agency would accept as appropriate.”
63 Fed. Reg. 39,857, 39,861 (July 24, 1998). So even
a reasonable pre-construction projection that actual
emissions would not increase due to a project could
leave open the “reasonable possibility” that postproject emissions could nonetheless increase. 40
C.F.R. § 52.21(r)(6). But EPA did not use the “reasonable possibility” that a project might cause an
emissions increase to eliminate the projected actual
emissions test, or to provide greater specificity in
how it should be applied, or to require prior approval
of projections. Rather, EPA confirmed the availability of that test, 67 Fed. Reg. 80,186, 80,204 (Dec. 31,
6
2002), and provided that, where there is a “reasonable possibility” that emissions could increase despite
a “no increase” projection, operators would not need
to get a permit but rather would be required to monitor and to report emissions for five or ten years after
the project in order to police their application of the
demand growth exclusion using actual, measured
emissions. 72 Fed. Reg. 72,607, 72,610-11 (Dec. 21,
2007).
It is thus unsurprising that EPA’s 2002 NSR
rules make actual post-construction data the touchstone for assessing, after the fact, the validity of preconstruction projections of actual emissions that
might be caused by a project. “Regardless of any
such preconstruction projections, a major modification results if the project causes a significant emissions increase….” 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(a)(2)(iv)(b) (emphases added). “Any such” preconstruction projection can be wrong—what matters is whether the project significantly increased the amount of air pollution.
By answering a different question—i.e., whether
it is “categorically barred” from enforcing its regulations before construction, U.S. Opp’n 8, 12—the Government avoids any meaningful response to this
straightforward language of EPA’s rules. Instead,
the Government relies on the pre-2002 NSR rules
and cases addressing those rules for the unremarkable proposition that NSR is a pre-construction review
program. See, e.g., id. at 4, 11. And Sierra Club, for
its part, concedes that “an increase in emissions is a
necessary element of a modification.” Sierra Club
Opp’n 24.
EPA’s conscious decision to use actual emissions
to test the validity of NSR applicability decisions has
7
legal consequences. To begin, the rules delineate the
scope of EPA’s ability to “enforce” NSR before construction of projects at existing plants commences.
For example, EPA could have made the preconstruction notifications submitted where there is a
“reasonable possibility” of an emissions increase, 40
C.F.R. § 52.21(r)(6), due months before commencement of construction to allow more thorough regulatory review of the operator’s projection. EPA likewise might have imposed additional specific requirements for projections, including specific methodologies for, inter alia, applying the demand-growth
exclusion. That way, EPA could more closely monitor the projection methodologies employed by operators before the project took place. And EPA could
have required prior approval of projections, a fundamentally different system that would allow State or
federal regulators the opportunity to prevent construction if they disagreed with the operator’s judgment.
But EPA did not promulgate this type of scheme.
Thus, Sierra Club’s suggestion that DTE somehow
failed to provide enough information in its preconstruction notice, Sierra Club Opp’n 2, is wholly
misplaced.3 So, too, is its complaint that DTE erroneously predicted that demand would grow and with
it Monroe 2’s emissions. Id. at 10-11. That is exactly
3 Indeed, Sierra Club’s suggestion is contradicted by the lower
courts finding that DTE’s notice was adequate, Pet. App. 97a99a, and by EPA’s own concession to the lower court that DTE’s
projections were based on a “‘sophisticated computer model’”
that considered “‘exhaustive inputs.’” Id. at 38a (Rogers, J.,
dissenting) (quoting U.S. Br. at 13, United States v. DTE Energy Co., 845 F.3d 735 (6th Cir. 2017) (Nos. 14-2274/2275). (DTE
II)).
8
the point. Under EPA’s all-encompassing yet nonspecific methodology, projections can be highly variable and sometimes even entail the “reasonable possibility” of being incorrect.
Most fundamentally, when an agency (i) defines
a “major modification” as a change that causes an
increase in emissions, 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(a)(2)(iv)(a),
(ii) clarifies that changes not producing such an increase are not major modifications, id., and (iii) emphasizes that the validity of projections is tested using
actual
post-construction
data,
id.
§ 52.21(a)(2)(iv)(b), it cannot later prove that a project that did not cause an emissions increase was
nonetheless a major modification based on an alternative—and demonstrably incorrect—projection. See
U.S. Opp’n 5 (Arguing for NSR applicability determined based on the counter-factual judgment of the
Government’s “expert witness” provided “[d]uring
discovery.”). The rule of law does not work that way.
This Court should grant certiorari to restore
clarity to this important gateway federal program.4
II. The Rules Allow EPA to Enforce Compliance
With Its Projection Regulations, But That Is
Not the Claim the Government Raised Here.
Contrary to the Government’s suggestion, U.S.
Opp’n (I), DTE does not ask the Court to hold that
the Government is categorically precluded from pursuing an enforcement action before construction
commences. As DTE has acknowledged, under the
“project-and-report system” adopted in the 2002 NSR
rules, see Sierra Club Opp’n 22, the Government re4 See DTE Pet. 26-30 (demonstrating the importance of the
issue).
9
tains authority to pursue preconstruction enforcement in a range of circumstances. For example, in
cases where NSR applicability is not in dispute, such
as the construction of a brand-new plant, the Government can seek an injunction mandating that the
operator obtain a permit. And in cases where the
operator has misapplied the unambiguous requirements of the regulations, for example by using an incorrect baseline period or simply failing to perform a
pre-construction projection, the Government can
pursue an injunction to require the operator to perform its pre-construction projection and to use the
correct baseline.
But that is not the enforcement action the Government pursued here. Instead of challenging DTE’s
compliance with the specific requirements of the projection regulations, the Government sought to prove
that the 2010 projects were “major modifications,”
notwithstanding that DTE’s projections complied
with the objective, unambiguous requirements of the
projection rules, and that, in fact, actual post-project
emissions decreased. That difference is of paramount
importance, because it is why Judge Batchelder, the
deciding vote in DTE II, concluded that the DTE I
majority’s limited mandate could be disregarded. “If
the question had been whether or not [the Government] could challenge DTE’s failure to comply with
the regulations, then DTE I would have affirmed the
summary judgment because [the Government] had
raised no such claim.” Pet. App. 21a (Batchelder, J.,
concurring). On Judge Batchelder’s conclusion, the
mandate of the Court below depends entirely.
The Government therefore goes too far when it
suggests that DTE asks the Court to “categorically
bar[ ]” enforcement actions where emissions have not
10
increased. U.S. Opp’n (I). Such actions are permissible, albeit in a much narrower category of circumstances than would have been available had EPA
opted for a prior approval scheme in the 2002 NSR
Rules.
More precisely framed, the question is
whether the Government can prove that a project
was an NSR-permit-triggering major modification,
when it did not, in fact, cause an increase in emissions. Under both the statute and the regulations,
the answer must be “no.”
III. The Court Should Grant Certiorari to Clarify That a Federal Agency Cannot, Through
the Guise of “Interpretation,” Change the
Plain Meaning of Its Regulations.
The Government’s non-textual enforcement-byprojection reading of the rules is deeply offensive to
due process. DTE Pet. 24-26. When an agency leaves
a governing regulation vague, it cannot, consistent
with due process, exploit that vagueness to establish
a hitherto unpublished standard of liability. Id. (citing, inter alia, Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham
Corp., 567 U.S. 142, 158-59 (2012)). The Government’s attempt to prove that the 2010 Monroe 2 projects were major modifications based on application
of a made-for-litigation and never-before-published
projection methodology violates this principle. Id.
The Government claims that this argument was
not raised in the Court below, but that is incorrect.
DTE raised precisely this point in response to the
Government’s invocation of Auer deference in the
Court of Appeals. DTE Br. at 69, DTE II. As DTE
explained there, “The Government could not lawfully
substitute a system that affords that measure of
judgment for one that requires strict adherence to an
unwritten methodology announced for the first time
11
in an enforcement proceeding.” Id. That is the same
argument we raise here. DTE Pet. 24-26.
In its Opposition, the Government carefully
avoids mention of Auer but still invokes that very
dubious deference doctrine. For example, the Government contends that 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(a)(2)(iv)(b)’s
provision subordinating projections to actual postconstruction data when deciding whether a project
was a “major modification” is actually a one-way
street that “simply expands the regulatory definition
of ‘major modification’ to include projects that unexpectedly increase emissions.” U.S. Opp’n 14. Under
this view, if emissions go up unexpectedly, projections do not matter, but if post-project data confirm
the operator’s projection, an inaccurate enforcementgenerated projection can trump. The regulations say
no such thing. Nor can they fairly be read to allow
for so absurd a result. The Government nonetheless
justifies this gloss on the rules as “EPA’s interpretation of its regulations as applied in this enforcement
action.” Id.
Even worse, the Government asks for deference
for “the agency’s interpretations of those [NSR] regulations at the time that it brought this enforcement
action” id. at 10, while observing that “[t]he issues
underlying this enforcement action” are currently
“under consideration,” id. at 9 n.2, and holding open
the possibility that “[t]hat review may result in
changes to the agency’s regulatory approach.” Id. at
17. So while the Government seeks deference to its
counter-textual interpretation of the 2002 NSR rules
in this case, it holds open the possibility that the
meaning of this nationally significant regulatory
program could change further, potentially confirming
that (as the statute says) a “modification” requires
12
an emissions increase. Only in a world of Auer deference could an agency give a regulation different—
and perhaps diametrically opposed—meanings depending on the timing of enforcement.
This case thus presents the Court with the opportunity to address whether Auer remains valid,
and if so, whether it can be applied in the way the
Government would seek to apply it here. As members of this Court have observed, Auer deference
rests on an unstable foundation. Among other infirmities, Auer gives agencies the incentive to “issue
vague regulations, because to do so maximizes agency power and allows the agency greater latitude to
make law through adjudication rather than through
the more cumbersome rulemaking process” Thomas
Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 525 (1994)
(Thomas, J., dissenting). Such vagueness “frustrates
the notice and predictability purposes of rulemaking,
and promotes arbitrary government.” Talk Am., Inc.
v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 564 U.S. 50, 69 (2011) (Scalia,
J., concurring). See also Perez v. Mortgage Bankers
Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1210 (2015) (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Decker
v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 568 U.S. 597, 615-16 (2013)
(Roberts, C.J., concurring).
CONCLUSION
For these reasons and those set forth in DTE’s
opening brief, the petition should be granted.
13
Respectfully submitted,
F. WILLIAM BROWNELL
Counsel of Record
MARK B. BIERBOWER
MAKRAM B. JABER
HUNTON & WILLIAMS LLP
2200 Pennsylvania Ave. NW
Washington, DC 20037
bbrownell@hunton.com
(202) 955-1500
HARRY M. JOHNSON III
GEORGE P. SIBLEY III
HUNTON & WILLIAMS LLP
Riverfront Plaza, East Tower
951 East Byrd Street
Richmond, VA 23219
(804) 788-8200
BRENT A. ROSSER
HUNTON & WILLIAMS LLP
101 South Tryon Street,
Suite 3500
Charlotte, NC 28280
(704) 378-4707
MICHAEL J. SOLO
ANDREA E. HAYDEN
Of Counsel
DTE ENERGY COMPANY
One Energy Plaza
Detroit, MI 48226
November 15, 2017
Counsel for Petitioners
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