Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Blue Water Navy Vietnam Veterans Association, Inc., Petitioner v. Robert Wilkie, Secretary of Veterans Affairs
Supreme Court briefJun 18, 2018
Ask Donna
What actually matters in this document.
Text
No.
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
BLUE WATER NAVY VIETNAM VETERANS
ASSOCIATION, INC., PETITIONER
v.
SECRETARY OF VETERANS AFFAIRS
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
JOHN B. WELLS
Counsel of Record
769 Robert Blvd.
Suite 201D
Slidell, LA 70458
985-641-1855
CURRY & TAYLOR WASH D.C. (202) 350-9073
i
QUESTION(S) PRESENTED
I.
Whether this Court Should Grant Certiorari to
Resolve an Important Point of Law and a Conflict
Between Circuits Concerning Judicial Review of an
Interpretative VA Regulation Under the
Administrative Procedures Act and Whether It
Should Be Foreclosed Under 38 U.S.C. § 502 When
the Veterans Judicial Reform Act Provides the Sole
Avenue for Review of the Secretary’s Decisions.
II.
Whether the Decision in the Court below Creates a
Conflict with the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit Case of Blue Water Navy
Vietnam Veterans Association, Inc. and MilitaryVeterans Advocacy, Inc. v. McDonald, 830 F.3d 570
(D.C. Cir. 2016).
ii
Rule 29.6
The Blue Water Navy Vietnam Veterans
Association, Inc., is a tax exempt non-profit corporation
pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 501( c)(3) and organized under the
laws of Colorado. There is no parent or publicly held
company owning 10% or more of the corporation’s stock.
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
QUESTION(S) PRESENTED ........................................................... i
RULE 29.6 ......................................................................................ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .............................................................v
OPINIONS BELOW ......................................................................... 1
JURISDICTION ............................................................................... 1
RELEVANT PROVISIONS INVOLVED ......................................... 1
STATEMENT................................................................................... 3
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION ................................. 6
I. Whether this Court Should Grant Certiorari to
Resolve an Important Point of Law and a
Conflict Between Circuits Concerning Judicial
Review of an Interpretative VA Regulation
Under the Administrative Procedures Act and
Whether It Should Be Foreclosed Under 38
U.S.C. § 502 When the Veterans Judicial Reform
Act Provides the Sole Avenue for Review of the
Secretary’s Decisions. ............................................................... 6
A. The Action of the Court Below Effectively
Denies Judicial Review of the Secretary’s
Decisions ...............................................................................6
B. The Court Below Erred in Finding That the
Secretary’s Regulation Did Not Come Within
the Scope of 38 U.S.C. § 502.............................................10
II. The Decision in the Court Below Creates a
Conflict with the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia’s Circuit Case of Blue Water
Navy Vietnam Veterans Association, Inc. and
iv
Military-Veterans Advocacy, Inc. v. McDonald,
830 F.3d 570 (D.C. Cir. 2016) ..................................................14
CONCLUSION............................................................................... 17
APPENDIX
Decision of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit Dismissing Petitioner’s 38
U.S.C. § 502 case for Lack of Jurisdiction ...............................1a
Decision of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit Denying the Petition for
Rehearing En Banc. .................................................................29a
Text of Pertinent Constitutional Provisions,
Treaties, Statutes, Ordinances ...............................................37a
v
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
CASES.
Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Quigg, 932 F.2d 920 (Fed.
Cir. 1991)........................................................................................13
Ass'n of Flight Attendants CWA, AFL-CIO v.
Huerta, 785 F.3d 710 (D.C. Cir. 2015).......................................14
Appalachian Power Co. v. Environmental
Protection Agency, 208 F.3d 1015 (D.C. Cir. 2000).................12
Aulenback, Inc. v. Fed. Highway Admin., 103 F.3d
156 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ......................................................................12
Barlow v. Collins 397 U.S. 159, 167, 90 S.Ct. 832
)1970) ................................................................................................9
Blue Water Navy Vietnam Veterans Association,
Inc. and Military-Veterans Advocacy, Inc. v.
McDonald, 830 F.3d 570 (D.C. Cir. 2016).................................16
Bowen v. Michigan Acad. of Family Physicians, 476
U.S. 667, 106 S. Ct. 2133 (1986) ....................................................9
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837, (1984) ........................................................................4
Cmty. Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 818 F.2d 943 (D.C.
Cir.1987).........................................................................................14
Disabled Am. Veterans v. Sec’y of Veterans Affairs,
859 F.3d 1072 (Fed. Cir. 2017)...................................................10
Gray v. McDonald, 27 Vet.App. 313 (2015)...............................4, 5
Gray v. Sec'y of Veterans Affairs, 875 F.3d 1102
(Fed. Cir. 2017)...............................................................1, 8, 11, 12
Gray v. Sec'y of Veterans Affairs, 884 F.3d 1379
(Fed. Cir. 2018)...............................................................................1
Haas v. Peake, 525 F.3d 1168 (Fed. Cir. 2008) .............................4
Haas v. Peake, 544 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir 2008) ..............................4
Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 561 U.S.
428, 131 S.Ct. 1197 (2011) ..............................................................4
Linoz v. Heckler, 800 F.2d 871 (9th Cir. 1986)..............................12
LeFevre v. Secretary of Veterans Affairs, 66 F.3d
vi
1191 (Fed. Cir. 1995)....................................................................15
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cr.) 137 (1803)..............................7
Military Order of the Purple Heart of the USA v.
Sec'y of Veterans Affairs, 580 F.3d 1293
(Fed.Cir.2009)...............................................................................15
Morton v. West, 13 Vet. App. 205 (1999)......................................12
Nat'l Mining Ass'n v. McCarthy, 758 F.3d 243
(D.C.Cir. 2014)..............................................................................13
Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 643
F.3d 311 (D.C. Cir. 2011).............................................................12
Sackett v. E.P.A., 588 U.S. 120, 128-29, 132 S. Ct.
1367 (2012).......................................................................................9
Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 48, 51, 75 S.Ct. 591
(1955)................................................................................................9
Snyder v. Secretary of Veterans Affairs, 858 F.3d
1410 (Fed. Cir. 2017)....................................................................13
W. Coal Traffic League v. United States, 719 F.2d
772 (5th Cir. 1983) ........................................................................12
STATUTES.
5 U.S.C. § 552..........................................................................passim
5 U.S.C. § 553.........................................................................6, 10, 12
28 U.S.C. § 1254.................................................................................1
38 U.S.C § 502.........................................................................passim
RULES
Rule 10 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of the United
States ..................................................................................................1
Rule 13.1 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of the
United States ....................................................................................1
Rule 29.4 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of the
United States.....................................................................................1
OTHER.
H.R. Rep. No. 100–963 (1988) ..................................................... 3
1
OPINIONS BELOW
The Opinion of the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit denying the petition for rehearing and
the petition for rehearing en banc is reported as Gray v.
Sec'y of Veterans Affairs, 884 F.3d 1379, 1380 (Fed. Cir.
2018) and as shown in Appendix 29a-35a. The Opinion of
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is
dismissing the suit for lack of jurisdiction is reported at
Gray v. Sec'y of Veterans Affairs, 875 F.3d 1102 (Fed.
Cir. 2017) as shown in Appendix 1a-28a.
JURISDICTION
These issues are properly before the Supreme
Court of the United States pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1254
and Rule 10 of the Supreme Court rules. The final
judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit denying the petition for rehearing and
petition for rehearing en banc was entered on March 21,
2018. Appendix 29a-35a. The submission for filing is
within the 90 day requirement of Rule 13.1 of the
Supreme Court Rules.
This proceeding does not
question the constitutionality of any Act of Congress or
any State Legislature. Consequently, the provisions of
Rule 29.4(b) and ( c) do not apply.
RELEVANT PROVISIONS BELOW (see appendix)
Introduction
Considering the well settled presumption in favor
of judicial review it seems odd indeed to preclude
veterans from obtaining a review of arbitrary and
capricious administrative decisions. The decision of the
2
court below has deprived veterans, and only veterans, of
their right to seek their day in court to challenge the
actions of the Secretary of Veterans Affairs when he
promulgates regulations via his M21-1 Adjudication
Manual. This allows the Secretary to circumvent the
Congressionally mandated user friendly process to
obtain veterans’ benefits.
Congress and this Court have historically
required a neutral pathway for review of governmental
decisions. Judicial review supports the Constitutional
separation of powers doctrine by providing checks and
balances on the otherwise unchecked powers of the
Executive.
Since World War II, the United States has
promoted a special relationship with its veterans. In
enacting the Veteran’s Judicial Review Act and
Veterans' Benefits Improvement Act of 1988, the
legislative history noted:
Congress has designed and fully intends to
maintain a beneficial non-adversarial system of
veterans benefits. This is particularly true of
service-connected disability compensation where
the element of cause and effect has been totally
by-passed in favor of a simple temporal
relationship between the incurrence of the
disability and the period of active duty.
I[m]plicit in such a beneficial system has been an
evolution of a completely ex-parte system of
adjudication in which Congress expects [the
DVA] to fully and sympathetically develop the
veteran's claim to its optimum before deciding it
3
on the merits. Even then, [the DVA] is expected
to resolve all issues by giving the claimant the
benefit of any reasonable doubt. In such a
beneficial structure there is no room for such
adversarial concepts as cross examination, best
evidence rule, hearsay evidence exclusion, or
strict adherence to burden of proof. H.R. Rep. No.
100–963, at 13 (1988), reprinted in 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5782, 5794–95 (emphasis added).
Here, the court below has taken an inelastic and
rigid approach to judicial review of the Secretary’s
decisions. Ignoring settled principles of administrative
law, and the pro-veteran canon of construction, the court
below has created a separate class of citizens, military
veterans, who must accept the dictates of the federal
bureaucracy without recourse.
This not only strips
veterans of meaningful review, but creates conflicts with
other Circuits. This Court’s review is warranted to
settle this important point of law and to resolve the
conflict between the Federal Circuit and other Circuit
Courts of Appeal.
STATEMENT
Since 2002, the VA has refused to grant the
presumption of exposure to “Blue Water Navy” veterans
who served in bays, harbors and the territorial seas of
the Republic of Vietnam.1
1
Previously the crews of ships operating within the
Vietnam Service Medal demarcation area, approximately 100
nautical miles from shore, were granted the presumption.
4
In a 2-1 decision in Haas v. Peake, 525F.3d 1168
(Fed. Cir. 2008) the court below applied Chevron2
deference to the VA’s decision to deny the presumption
of exposure to those who served off the coastline. On
rehearing, the Haas Court noted that they did not apply
the pro-veteran canon of construction required by
Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki 131 S.Ct.1197
(2011). Haas v. Peake, 544 F.3d 1306, 1308 (Fed. Cir
2008). Additionally, Haas only addressed areas off the
coast and did not include the bays and harbors of the
Republic of Vietnam.
In Gray v. McDonald, 27 Vet.App. 313 (2015), the
Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims distinguished
Haas by noting that the veteran served in Da Nang
Harbor, while Commander Haas did not enter any
harbor. The Gray court found that since the bays and
harbors were outside the scope of Haas, they were free
to review the VA policy. Noting that the rivers, which
are awarded the presumption of exposure under the VA
policy, discharge into the bays and harbors, the Gray
court confirmed that river water would mix with the
saltwater brought in via tidal surge from the South
China Sea. As the rivers were heavily sprayed with
Agent Orange their discharge “plume” would carry the
herbicide/petroleum mix for some distance into the
harbors, bays and the South China Sea.
2
The Chevron Court found that considerable weight should
be accorded to an executive department's construction of a statutory
scheme it is entrusted to administer, and the principle of deference to
administrative interpretations. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res.
Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).
5
The Gray court determined that the exclusion of Da
Nang Harbor from the "inland waterways" category did
not comply with the intent of the underlying statute and
regulation. Gray, 27 Vet. App. at 324-26. The Veterans
Court went on to explain that the intent of the statute
and regulation was "providing compensation to veterans
based on the likelihood of [their] exposure to herbicides."
Id. at 322.
The Gray Court declined to rewrite the regulation
but invited the VA to:
. . . reevaluate its definition of inland waterways--particularly as it applies to Da Nang Harbor---and
exercise its fair and considered judgment to
define inland waterways in a manner consistent
with the regulation's emphasis on the probability
of exposure.
Id. at 327. The Secretary did not appeal Gray and the
decision became final.
Instead of complying with the mandate of the Gray
court, the Secretary “doubled down” on his irrational
policy and on February 6, 2016 issued a change to his
M21-1 Manual which continued to use depth and ease of
entry, rather than the probability of exposure, as the
criteria for inclusion in their definition of “inland
waterways.” The new regulation actually tightens the
definition, removing "Qui Nhon Bay Harbor" and "Ganh
Rai Bay" from the inland waters list. No reason was
provided.
Petitioner filed a timely petition for judicial review
under 38 U.S.C. § 502. The court below dismissed the
6
petition along with the companion case of Gray v.
Secretary of Veterans Affairs, in a 2-1 decision, over a
strong dissent by Judge Dyk. Appendix 15a-28a. The
court below reasoned that the M21-1 Manual was an
interpretive rather than a substantive regulation and did
not meet the threshold criteria of 38 U.S.C. § 502. This
criteria required that the regulation be issued pursuant
to the rulemaking provisions of 5 U.S.C. § 553 or 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(a)(1). Instead the court below found that the
regulation was issued under 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2).
Appendix 11a.
A petition for reconsideration en banc was denied 73.
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION
I.
This Court Should Grant Certiorari to Resolve
an Important Point of Law and a Conflict
Between Circuits Concerning Judicial Review of
an Interpretative VA Regulation Under the
Administrative Procedures Act and Whether It
Should Be Foreclosed Under 38 U.S.C. § 502
When the Veterans Judicial Reform Act
Provides the Sole Avenue for Review of the
Secretary’s Decisions.
A. The Action of the Court Below Effectively
Denies Judicial Review of the Secretary’s
Decisions.
Barred from review in the federal district court by
the Veterans Judicial Reform Act and Blue Water Navy
Vietnam Veterans Association, Inc. and MilitaryVeterans Advocacy, Inc. v. McDonald, 830 F.3d 570 (D.C.
7
Cir. 2016), veterans are left powerless to challenge
irrational, arbitrary and capricious actions by the VA
without wading through the cumbersome and elongated
appeals system.
The actions of the court below go further than the
divesture of 90,000 Blue Water Navy veterans from
judicial review under the Administrative Procedures
Act, and may even survive the current controversy.3
They allow the Secretary of Veterans Affairs to bypass
judicial review in all cases involving benefits by merely
issuing regulatory changes via their M21-1 Manual. This
gives rise to an important point of law that can only be
settled by this Court. Since APA review of the actions of
the Secretary of Veterans Affairs originate in the court
below, this Court represents the only supervisory body
on matters dealing with 38 U.S.C. § 502 actions.
Chief Justice John Marshall’s historic opinion in
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cr.) 137 (1803) addressed
a fundamental question of remedies as follows:
If [a party] has a right, and that right has been
violated, do the laws of his country afford him a
remedy?
The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists
in the right of every individual to claim the
protection of the laws, whenever he receives an
injury. One of the first duties of government is to
afford that protection.
3
Congress is considering but has not adopted a bill to
extend the presumptions of exposure. Similar bills have been filed,
without success, in the previous three Congress’.
8
5 U.S. (1 Cr.) at 162-63.
The court below conceded that the impact of the VA
action was both real and far reaching. Despite this
finding, they declined to recognize a remedy to challenge
that action.
Gray, supra., 875 F.3d at 1107-08.
Appendix 10a.
Here the court below has carved a loophole in the
judicial review provisions of the Administrative
Procedures Act that allows the agency to promulgate
rules that are binding on agency employees without the
possibility of judicial review.
This represents an
important point of law within the scope of Rule 10( c)
that can only be addressed and should be addressed by
this Court.
Without judicial review under the Administrative
Procedures Act, a court will not have jurisdiction over
the Secretary’s M21-1 regulations until an appeal is ripe
for review. The court below noted that, in the instant
case, the deteriorating health needs of the veterans made
resolution critical. Gray, 875 F.3d at 1109. Appendix 13a.
They also conceded that these veterans are now forced to
undergo the years-long process for individual
applications and rulemaking petitions. Id.
Not only the Blue Water Navy veterans, but millions
of other veterans are having their medical and
compensation benefits stymied by agency use of
interpretive manuals to promulgate regulations.
Although not binding on the Board of Veterans Appeals,
Id. at 1108, Appendix 11a. there is no evidence to show
the Board is willing to ignore interpretive manuals such
as the M-21-1 Manual. At a minimum, these manuals are
9
considered persuasive authority. In addition, the M21-1
Manual is binding on Veterans Benefits Administration
employees.
This Court has repeatedly ruled that the APA
creates a presumption favoring judicial review of
administrative action,” Sackett v. E.P.A., 588 U.S. 120,
128-29, 132 S. Ct. 1367, 1373 (2012). This presumption
can only be overcome by “specific language or specific
legislative history that is a reliable indicator of
congressional intent,” or a specific congressional intent to
preclude judicial review that is “‘fairly discernible’ in the
detail of the legislative scheme.” Bowen v. Michigan
Acad. of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 673, 106 S. Ct.
2133, 2137 (1986).
It is well settled that the APA’s “generous review
provisions” must be given a “hospitable” interpretation.
Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 48, 51, 75 S.Ct. 591,
594 (1955). While the preclusion of judicial review may
be inferred from the statutory purpose, this can only be
done upon a showing of “‘clear and convincing evidence’
of a contrary legislative intent.” Barlow v. Collins 397
U.S. 159, 167, 90 S.Ct. 832, 838 (1970). No such clear and
convincing evidence was presented to the court below
and none was cited in the opinion.
What the court below has done is recognize an
agency created loophole for a class of citizens, in this case
veterans, that decisively pokes holes in their
Congressionally mandated judicial review safety net.
Contrary to Marbury the veterans are left without a real
remedy to resolve the arbitrary and capricious actions of
the Secretary.
10
Petitioners pray that this Court will grant certiorari.
This issue implicates an important point of law that
uniquely affects the nation’s 21 million veterans.
Accordingly it is obviously within the scope of Rule 10 (
c) that must be settled by this Court.
B. The Court Below Erred in Finding That the
Secretary’s Regulation Did Not Come Within
the Scope of 38 U.S.C. § 502.
The gravamen of the holding in the court below
was that they lacked jurisdiction because the regulation
in question was promulgated via the interpretive M21-1
Manual rather than through the substantive notice and
comment procedures of 5 U.S.C. § 553. Gray, 875 F.3d at
1111. Appendix 18a. The Court further found that the
M21-1 Manual was an administrative staff manual that
fell under the provisions of 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2) for which
there was no jurisdiction.4 Id at 1108. Appendix 11a.
While the case below was pending, a separate
panel of the court below decided Disabled Am. Veterans
v. Sec’y of Veterans Affairs, 859 F.3d 1072, 1074 (Fed.
Cir. 2017)(“DAV”), which also held that the court had no
jurisdiction to review regulations promulgated by the
Secretary via the M21-1 Manual.
In his dissent Judge Dyk wisely analyzed the
DAV decision and properly concluded that it was
wrongly decided. Like the case below, DAV held that
because the M21-1 Manual is an interpretive rather than
a substantive regulation, it did not trigger jurisdiction
4 38 U.S.C. § 502 grants jurisdiction for rulemaking brought
under 5 U.S.C. § 553 and 5 U.S.C. § 552(a).
11
under 38 U.S.C. § 502. The court below decided that
DAV compelled the same result in the instant case.
Gray, 875 F.3d at 1108. Appendix 11a.
To a large extent, the jurisdictional question turns
on how to classify the VA’s Manual under 5 U.S.C. §
552(a)(1) and/or 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2). The latter provision
provides in pertinent part:
Each agency, in accordance with published rules,
shall make available for public inspection in an
electronic format—
....
(B) those statements of policy and interpretations
which have been adopted by the agency and are
not published in the Federal Register; [and] ( C)
administrative staff manuals and instructions to
staff that affect a member of the public;
As they did in DAV decision the court below
held that the M21-1 Manual was an administrative staff
manual. Judge Dyk correctly pointed out that this
holding, as with the holding in DAV, was incorrect
because it conflicted with the precedent of other
Circuits and the previous precedent of the Federal
Circuit.
In contrast to the majority opinion, the veterans
and Judge Dyk argued that the Manual fell within the
scope of 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1)(D) as “statements of
general policy or interpretations of general applicability
formulated and adopted by the agency.” Gray, 875 F.3d
at 1111. Appendix 18a. In his excellent analysis, Judge
Dyk notes that the majority opinion and the reasoning
of DAV were erroneous and established a “substantial
12
and unnecessary burden on individual veterans,
requiring that they undergo protracted agency
adjudication in order to obtain pre-enforcement judicial
review of a purely legal question that is already ripe for
our review.” Gray, 875 F.3d at 1110 (Dyk, J dissenting).
Appendix 16a.
The M21-1Manual is binding on Veterans Benefits
Authority personnel. Although not strictly binding on
the Board of Veterans Appeals, it constitutes strong
persuasive authority and is often relied upon or cited by
the Board. Morton v. West, 13 Vet. App. 205 (1999)
([Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board or BVA) ] cannot
ignore provisions of the Manual M21–1).
The propriety of this type of interpretive
regulation has historically been considered reviewable
by other Circuits, even if not subject to the notice and
comment requirements of 5 U.S.C. § 553. Judge Dyk’s
dissent illustrated this trend when he referred to
Appalachian Power Co. v. Environmental Protection
Agency, 208 F.3d 1015, 1020-23 (D.C. Cir. 2000) which
dealt with review of EPA guidance issued, without
notice and comment, under the Clean Air Act. Other
EPA regulations as well as the interpretive guidance of
other regulations have been found to be reviewable. Nat.
Res. Def. Council v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 643 F.3d 311,
320 (D.C. Cir. 2011), Aulenback, Inc. v. Fed. Highway
Admin., 103 F.3d 156, 163-65 (D.C. Cir. 1997); W. Coal
Traffic League v. United States, 719 F.2d 772, 780 (5th
Cir. 1983) (en banc), Linoz v. Heckler, 800 F.2d 871, 878
n.11 (9th Cir. 1986).
Within
the
Federal
Circuit,
pre-DAV
jurisprudence also allowed judicial review of interpretive
13
manuals and even a general counsel’s opinion. Snyder v.
Secretary of Veterans Affairs, 858 F.3d 1410, 1413 (Fed.
Cir. 2017). The same holds true for a letter addressing
the procedures for benefit awards, because, as in this
case, it affected substantive as well as procedural rights.
Military Order of the Purple Heart supra., 580 F.3d at
1296 (Fed. Cir. 2009). See, also, Animal Legal Def. Fund
v. Quigg, 932 F.2d 920, 927 (Fed. Cir. 1991). Gray, 875
F.3d at 1115. (Dyk, J dissenting). Appendix 26a.
Here the Manual is more than a procedural
handbook, it has a clear and potentially devastating
impact upon the rights of veterans to obtain benefits
during the early days of the disability. Delays in service
connection leads to delays in medical treatment which is
often fatal. Not only is this Court’s intervention
necessary to resolve the conflict between Circuits, it also
represents and important question of the law which
should be adjudicated by this Court. Settling this
question could save the lives of countless veterans.
In another another agency, this regulation would
have been published in the Federal Register. The
regulation is a statement of the general course and
method by which its functions are channeled and
determined, constitutes a rule of procedure and is an
interpretation of general applicability formulated and
adopted by the agency. The Manual is also a policy
statement that “explains how the agency will enforce a
statute or regulation—in other words, how it will
exercise its broad enforcement discretion or permit
indiscretion under some extant statute or rule.” Nat'l
Mining Ass'n v. McCarthy, 758 F.3d 243, 252 (D.C.Cir.
2014). It serves to “appris[e] the regulated community of
the agency's intentions as well as informing the exercise
14
of discretion by agents and officers in the field.” Cmty.
Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 818 F.2d 943, 949 (D.C.
Cir.1987); Ass'n of Flight Attendants CWA, AFL-CIO v.
Huerta, 785 F.3d 710, 716 (D.C. Cir. 2015). Thus it should
be subject to review under the APA.
As Judge Dyk’s dissent pointed out, the language
of 38 U.S.C. § 502 did not require any restrictions on
judicial review of VA action. Gray, 875 F.3d at 1112.
Appendix 19a. The dissent reiterated the “well-settled
presumption that agency actions are reviewable,” unless
Congress clearly precludes such review. Gray, 875 at
1112. Appendix 19a. As discussed supra., this Court has
concurred in that view.
Accordingly, the majority and better view is that
the Federal Circuit has jurisdiction under 38 U.S.C. § 502
to review the M21-1 Manual in the instant and similar
cases. Judge Dyk’s analysis is the correct one and
petitioner Blue Water Navy Vietnam Veterans
Association prays that this Court resolve the Circuit
conflict and this important point of law by granting
certiorari.
II.
The Decision in the Court Below Creates a
Conflict with the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit Case of Blue
Water Navy Vietnam Veterans Association,
Inc. and Military-Veterans Advocacy, Inc. v.
McDonald, 830 F.3d 570 (D.C. Cir. 2016)
In Blue Water, the Secretary argued successfully
that the Veteran’s Judicial Reform Act vests
Administrative Procedures Act jurisdiction over the
Secretary’s actions solely in the Court of Appeals for the
15
Federal Circuit. Blue Water Navy Vietnam Veterans
Ass'n, supra, 830 F.3d at 577.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
reasoned as follows:
Appellants [BWNVVA] say that this directreview exception extends only to VA regulations
and not to “interpretations” like the agency
actions they challenge. But Federal Circuit case
law makes clear that an agency policy need not
be promulgated as a regulation, via notice and
comment, to be reviewable under section 502. To
the contrary, the Federal Circuit has explained
that section 502 permits it to directly review a
wide range of “rules promulgated by the
Department of Veteran[s] Affairs, including
substantive rules of general applicability,
statements of general policy and interpretations
of general applicability.” LeFevre, 66 F.3d
[1191]at 1196 [Fed. Cir. 1995]; see also Military
Order of the Purple Heart of the USA v. Sec'y of
Veterans Affairs, 580 F.3d 1293, 1296
(Fed.Cir.2009) (holding that the VA's procedural
change, adopted in a letter and not via noticeand-comment rulemaking, was a “rule” subject to
review under section 502).
Blue Water Navy Vietnam Veterans Ass'n, Inc. v.
McDonald, 830 F.3d at 577.
In Blue Water, the Secretary argued as follows:
[V]eterans may bring an APA action challenging
the policy directly in the Federal Circuit. Given
16
these alternative avenues for judicial review, even
if the VJRA did not expressly preclude review of
Blue Water's claims, Blue Water would have an
adequate remedy in a court that would render a
cause of action under the APA unavailable.
Blue Water Navy Vietnam Veterans Ass'n, Inc. v.
McDonald, Brief for Defendant-Appellee., 2015 WL
7777567 (C.A.D.C.), 10-11.
The Secretary went on to argue:
The policy that Blue Water purports to challenge
constitutes an interpretation[] of general
applicability.
Id. at 22.
In an implicit recognition of Blue Water, the court
below did not invite the veterans to return to the federal
district court, or transfer the matter to the federal
district court. Instead they merely confirmed the
absence of a remedy for the veterans without explaining
why the presumption of judicial review did not apply.
This is a “Catch 22" with a vengeance.
The question remains whether the VA’s exclusion
policy via interpretative regulations are interpretations
of general applicability within the scope of 5 U.S.C. §
552(a)(1). The District of Columbia Circuit says yes, the
Federal Circuit says no.
This matter cries out for certiorari by this Court,
not only to resolve the conflict between Circuits
envisioned by Rule 10(a), but to resolve the conflicts
17
between the Secretary’s own position concerning
whether integrative manuals such as the M21-1 are
interpretations of general applicability reviewable under
5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons delineated herein, petitioner
prays that a writ of certiorari be issued to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
Respectfully Submitted,
John B. Wells
Counsel of Record
P. O. Box 5235
Slidell, LA 70469-5235
769 Robert Blvd. Suite 201D
Slidell, LA 70458
985-641-1855
985-649-1536 (fax)
JohnLawEsq@msn.com
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.