Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Blue Water Navy Vietnam Veterans Association, Inc., Petitioner v. Robert Wilkie, Secretary of Veterans Affairs

Supreme Court briefJun 18, 2018

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No.

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

BLUE WATER NAVY VIETNAM VETERANS

ASSOCIATION, INC., PETITIONER

v.

SECRETARY OF VETERANS AFFAIRS

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

JOHN B. WELLS

Counsel of Record

769 Robert Blvd.

Suite 201D

Slidell, LA 70458

985-641-1855

CURRY & TAYLOR  WASH D.C.  (202) 350-9073

i

QUESTION(S) PRESENTED

I.

Whether this Court Should Grant Certiorari to

Resolve an Important Point of Law and a Conflict

Between Circuits Concerning Judicial Review of an

Interpretative VA Regulation Under the

Administrative Procedures Act and Whether It

Should Be Foreclosed Under 38 U.S.C. § 502 When

the Veterans Judicial Reform Act Provides the Sole

Avenue for Review of the Secretary’s Decisions.

II.

Whether the Decision in the Court below Creates a

Conflict with the Court of Appeals for the District

of Columbia Circuit Case of Blue Water Navy

Vietnam Veterans Association, Inc. and MilitaryVeterans Advocacy, Inc. v. McDonald, 830 F.3d 570

(D.C. Cir. 2016).

ii

Rule 29.6

The Blue Water Navy Vietnam Veterans

Association, Inc., is a tax exempt non-profit corporation

pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 501( c)(3) and organized under the

laws of Colorado. There is no parent or publicly held

company owning 10% or more of the corporation’s stock.

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTION(S) PRESENTED ........................................................... i

RULE 29.6 ......................................................................................ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .............................................................v

OPINIONS BELOW ......................................................................... 1

JURISDICTION ............................................................................... 1

RELEVANT PROVISIONS INVOLVED ......................................... 1

STATEMENT................................................................................... 3

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION ................................. 6

I. Whether this Court Should Grant Certiorari to

Resolve an Important Point of Law and a

Conflict Between Circuits Concerning Judicial

Review of an Interpretative VA Regulation

Under the Administrative Procedures Act and

Whether It Should Be Foreclosed Under 38

U.S.C. § 502 When the Veterans Judicial Reform

Act Provides the Sole Avenue for Review of the

Secretary’s Decisions. ............................................................... 6

A. The Action of the Court Below Effectively

Denies Judicial Review of the Secretary’s

Decisions ...............................................................................6

B. The Court Below Erred in Finding That the

Secretary’s Regulation Did Not Come Within

the Scope of 38 U.S.C. § 502.............................................10

II. The Decision in the Court Below Creates a

Conflict with the Court of Appeals for the

District of Columbia’s Circuit Case of Blue Water

Navy Vietnam Veterans Association, Inc. and

iv

Military-Veterans Advocacy, Inc. v. McDonald,

830 F.3d 570 (D.C. Cir. 2016) ..................................................14

CONCLUSION............................................................................... 17

APPENDIX

Decision of the United States Court of Appeals for

the Federal Circuit Dismissing Petitioner’s 38

U.S.C. § 502 case for Lack of Jurisdiction ...............................1a

Decision of the United States Court of Appeals for

the Federal Circuit Denying the Petition for

Rehearing En Banc. .................................................................29a

Text of Pertinent Constitutional Provisions,

Treaties, Statutes, Ordinances ...............................................37a

v

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

CASES.

Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Quigg, 932 F.2d 920 (Fed.

Cir. 1991)........................................................................................13

Ass'n of Flight Attendants CWA, AFL-CIO v.

Huerta, 785 F.3d 710 (D.C. Cir. 2015).......................................14

Appalachian Power Co. v. Environmental

Protection Agency, 208 F.3d 1015 (D.C. Cir. 2000).................12

Aulenback, Inc. v. Fed. Highway Admin., 103 F.3d

156 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ......................................................................12

Barlow v. Collins 397 U.S. 159, 167, 90 S.Ct. 832

)1970) ................................................................................................9

Blue Water Navy Vietnam Veterans Association,

Inc. and Military-Veterans Advocacy, Inc. v.

McDonald, 830 F.3d 570 (D.C. Cir. 2016).................................16

Bowen v. Michigan Acad. of Family Physicians, 476

U.S. 667, 106 S. Ct. 2133 (1986) ....................................................9

Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.,

467 U.S. 837, (1984) ........................................................................4

Cmty. Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 818 F.2d 943 (D.C.

Cir.1987).........................................................................................14

Disabled Am. Veterans v. Sec’y of Veterans Affairs,

859 F.3d 1072 (Fed. Cir. 2017)...................................................10

Gray v. McDonald, 27 Vet.App. 313 (2015)...............................4, 5

Gray v. Sec'y of Veterans Affairs, 875 F.3d 1102

(Fed. Cir. 2017)...............................................................1, 8, 11, 12

Gray v. Sec'y of Veterans Affairs, 884 F.3d 1379

(Fed. Cir. 2018)...............................................................................1

Haas v. Peake, 525 F.3d 1168 (Fed. Cir. 2008) .............................4

Haas v. Peake, 544 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir 2008) ..............................4

Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 561 U.S.

428, 131 S.Ct. 1197 (2011) ..............................................................4

Linoz v. Heckler, 800 F.2d 871 (9th Cir. 1986)..............................12

LeFevre v. Secretary of Veterans Affairs, 66 F.3d

vi

1191 (Fed. Cir. 1995)....................................................................15

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cr.) 137 (1803)..............................7

Military Order of the Purple Heart of the USA v.

Sec'y of Veterans Affairs, 580 F.3d 1293

(Fed.Cir.2009)...............................................................................15

Morton v. West, 13 Vet. App. 205 (1999)......................................12

Nat'l Mining Ass'n v. McCarthy, 758 F.3d 243

(D.C.Cir. 2014)..............................................................................13

Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 643

F.3d 311 (D.C. Cir. 2011).............................................................12

Sackett v. E.P.A., 588 U.S. 120, 128-29, 132 S. Ct.

1367 (2012).......................................................................................9

Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 48, 51, 75 S.Ct. 591

(1955)................................................................................................9

Snyder v. Secretary of Veterans Affairs, 858 F.3d

1410 (Fed. Cir. 2017)....................................................................13

W. Coal Traffic League v. United States, 719 F.2d

772 (5th Cir. 1983) ........................................................................12

STATUTES.

5 U.S.C. § 552..........................................................................passim

5 U.S.C. § 553.........................................................................6, 10, 12

28 U.S.C. § 1254.................................................................................1

38 U.S.C § 502.........................................................................passim

RULES

Rule 10 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of the United

States ..................................................................................................1

Rule 13.1 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of the

United States ....................................................................................1

Rule 29.4 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of the

United States.....................................................................................1

OTHER.

H.R. Rep. No. 100–963 (1988) ..................................................... 3

1

OPINIONS BELOW

The Opinion of the Court of Appeals for the

Federal Circuit denying the petition for rehearing and

the petition for rehearing en banc is reported as Gray v.

Sec'y of Veterans Affairs, 884 F.3d 1379, 1380 (Fed. Cir.

2018) and as shown in Appendix 29a-35a. The Opinion of

the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is

dismissing the suit for lack of jurisdiction is reported at

Gray v. Sec'y of Veterans Affairs, 875 F.3d 1102 (Fed.

Cir. 2017) as shown in Appendix 1a-28a.

JURISDICTION

These issues are properly before the Supreme

Court of the United States pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1254

and Rule 10 of the Supreme Court rules. The final

judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the

Federal Circuit denying the petition for rehearing and

petition for rehearing en banc was entered on March 21,

2018. Appendix 29a-35a. The submission for filing is

within the 90 day requirement of Rule 13.1 of the

Supreme Court Rules.

This proceeding does not

question the constitutionality of any Act of Congress or

any State Legislature. Consequently, the provisions of

Rule 29.4(b) and ( c) do not apply.

RELEVANT PROVISIONS BELOW (see appendix)

Introduction

Considering the well settled presumption in favor

of judicial review it seems odd indeed to preclude

veterans from obtaining a review of arbitrary and

capricious administrative decisions. The decision of the

2

court below has deprived veterans, and only veterans, of

their right to seek their day in court to challenge the

actions of the Secretary of Veterans Affairs when he

promulgates regulations via his M21-1 Adjudication

Manual. This allows the Secretary to circumvent the

Congressionally mandated user friendly process to

obtain veterans’ benefits.

Congress and this Court have historically

required a neutral pathway for review of governmental

decisions. Judicial review supports the Constitutional

separation of powers doctrine by providing checks and

balances on the otherwise unchecked powers of the

Executive.

Since World War II, the United States has

promoted a special relationship with its veterans. In

enacting the Veteran’s Judicial Review Act and

Veterans' Benefits Improvement Act of 1988, the

legislative history noted:

Congress has designed and fully intends to

maintain a beneficial non-adversarial system of

veterans benefits. This is particularly true of

service-connected disability compensation where

the element of cause and effect has been totally

by-passed in favor of a simple temporal

relationship between the incurrence of the

disability and the period of active duty.

I[m]plicit in such a beneficial system has been an

evolution of a completely ex-parte system of

adjudication in which Congress expects [the

DVA] to fully and sympathetically develop the

veteran's claim to its optimum before deciding it

3

on the merits. Even then, [the DVA] is expected

to resolve all issues by giving the claimant the

benefit of any reasonable doubt. In such a

beneficial structure there is no room for such

adversarial concepts as cross examination, best

evidence rule, hearsay evidence exclusion, or

strict adherence to burden of proof. H.R. Rep. No.

100–963, at 13 (1988), reprinted in 1988

U.S.C.C.A.N. 5782, 5794–95 (emphasis added).

Here, the court below has taken an inelastic and

rigid approach to judicial review of the Secretary’s

decisions. Ignoring settled principles of administrative

law, and the pro-veteran canon of construction, the court

below has created a separate class of citizens, military

veterans, who must accept the dictates of the federal

bureaucracy without recourse.

This not only strips

veterans of meaningful review, but creates conflicts with

other Circuits. This Court’s review is warranted to

settle this important point of law and to resolve the

conflict between the Federal Circuit and other Circuit

Courts of Appeal.

STATEMENT

Since 2002, the VA has refused to grant the

presumption of exposure to “Blue Water Navy” veterans

who served in bays, harbors and the territorial seas of

the Republic of Vietnam.1

1

Previously the crews of ships operating within the

Vietnam Service Medal demarcation area, approximately 100

nautical miles from shore, were granted the presumption.

4

In a 2-1 decision in Haas v. Peake, 525F.3d 1168

(Fed. Cir. 2008) the court below applied Chevron2

deference to the VA’s decision to deny the presumption

of exposure to those who served off the coastline. On

rehearing, the Haas Court noted that they did not apply

the pro-veteran canon of construction required by

Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki 131 S.Ct.1197

(2011). Haas v. Peake, 544 F.3d 1306, 1308 (Fed. Cir

2008). Additionally, Haas only addressed areas off the

coast and did not include the bays and harbors of the

Republic of Vietnam.

In Gray v. McDonald, 27 Vet.App. 313 (2015), the

Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims distinguished

Haas by noting that the veteran served in Da Nang

Harbor, while Commander Haas did not enter any

harbor. The Gray court found that since the bays and

harbors were outside the scope of Haas, they were free

to review the VA policy. Noting that the rivers, which

are awarded the presumption of exposure under the VA

policy, discharge into the bays and harbors, the Gray

court confirmed that river water would mix with the

saltwater brought in via tidal surge from the South

China Sea. As the rivers were heavily sprayed with

Agent Orange their discharge “plume” would carry the

herbicide/petroleum mix for some distance into the

harbors, bays and the South China Sea.

2

The Chevron Court found that considerable weight should

be accorded to an executive department's construction of a statutory

scheme it is entrusted to administer, and the principle of deference to

administrative interpretations. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res.

Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).

5

The Gray court determined that the exclusion of Da

Nang Harbor from the "inland waterways" category did

not comply with the intent of the underlying statute and

regulation. Gray, 27 Vet. App. at 324-26. The Veterans

Court went on to explain that the intent of the statute

and regulation was "providing compensation to veterans

based on the likelihood of [their] exposure to herbicides."

Id. at 322.

The Gray Court declined to rewrite the regulation

but invited the VA to:

. . . reevaluate its definition of inland waterways--particularly as it applies to Da Nang Harbor---and

exercise its fair and considered judgment to

define inland waterways in a manner consistent

with the regulation's emphasis on the probability

of exposure.

Id. at 327. The Secretary did not appeal Gray and the

decision became final.

Instead of complying with the mandate of the Gray

court, the Secretary “doubled down” on his irrational

policy and on February 6, 2016 issued a change to his

M21-1 Manual which continued to use depth and ease of

entry, rather than the probability of exposure, as the

criteria for inclusion in their definition of “inland

waterways.” The new regulation actually tightens the

definition, removing "Qui Nhon Bay Harbor" and "Ganh

Rai Bay" from the inland waters list. No reason was

provided.

Petitioner filed a timely petition for judicial review

under 38 U.S.C. § 502. The court below dismissed the

6

petition along with the companion case of Gray v.

Secretary of Veterans Affairs, in a 2-1 decision, over a

strong dissent by Judge Dyk. Appendix 15a-28a. The

court below reasoned that the M21-1 Manual was an

interpretive rather than a substantive regulation and did

not meet the threshold criteria of 38 U.S.C. § 502. This

criteria required that the regulation be issued pursuant

to the rulemaking provisions of 5 U.S.C. § 553 or 5 U.S.C.

§ 552(a)(1). Instead the court below found that the

regulation was issued under 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2).

Appendix 11a.

A petition for reconsideration en banc was denied 73.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

I.

This Court Should Grant Certiorari to Resolve

an Important Point of Law and a Conflict

Between Circuits Concerning Judicial Review of

an Interpretative VA Regulation Under the

Administrative Procedures Act and Whether It

Should Be Foreclosed Under 38 U.S.C. § 502

When the Veterans Judicial Reform Act

Provides the Sole Avenue for Review of the

Secretary’s Decisions.

A. The Action of the Court Below Effectively

Denies Judicial Review of the Secretary’s

Decisions.

Barred from review in the federal district court by

the Veterans Judicial Reform Act and Blue Water Navy

Vietnam Veterans Association, Inc. and MilitaryVeterans Advocacy, Inc. v. McDonald, 830 F.3d 570 (D.C.

7

Cir. 2016), veterans are left powerless to challenge

irrational, arbitrary and capricious actions by the VA

without wading through the cumbersome and elongated

appeals system.

The actions of the court below go further than the

divesture of 90,000 Blue Water Navy veterans from

judicial review under the Administrative Procedures

Act, and may even survive the current controversy.3

They allow the Secretary of Veterans Affairs to bypass

judicial review in all cases involving benefits by merely

issuing regulatory changes via their M21-1 Manual. This

gives rise to an important point of law that can only be

settled by this Court. Since APA review of the actions of

the Secretary of Veterans Affairs originate in the court

below, this Court represents the only supervisory body

on matters dealing with 38 U.S.C. § 502 actions.

Chief Justice John Marshall’s historic opinion in

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cr.) 137 (1803) addressed

a fundamental question of remedies as follows:

If [a party] has a right, and that right has been

violated, do the laws of his country afford him a

remedy?

The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists

in the right of every individual to claim the

protection of the laws, whenever he receives an

injury. One of the first duties of government is to

afford that protection.

3

Congress is considering but has not adopted a bill to

extend the presumptions of exposure. Similar bills have been filed,

without success, in the previous three Congress’.

8

5 U.S. (1 Cr.) at 162-63.

The court below conceded that the impact of the VA

action was both real and far reaching. Despite this

finding, they declined to recognize a remedy to challenge

that action.

Gray, supra., 875 F.3d at 1107-08.

Appendix 10a.

Here the court below has carved a loophole in the

judicial review provisions of the Administrative

Procedures Act that allows the agency to promulgate

rules that are binding on agency employees without the

possibility of judicial review.

This represents an

important point of law within the scope of Rule 10( c)

that can only be addressed and should be addressed by

this Court.

Without judicial review under the Administrative

Procedures Act, a court will not have jurisdiction over

the Secretary’s M21-1 regulations until an appeal is ripe

for review. The court below noted that, in the instant

case, the deteriorating health needs of the veterans made

resolution critical. Gray, 875 F.3d at 1109. Appendix 13a.

They also conceded that these veterans are now forced to

undergo the years-long process for individual

applications and rulemaking petitions. Id.

Not only the Blue Water Navy veterans, but millions

of other veterans are having their medical and

compensation benefits stymied by agency use of

interpretive manuals to promulgate regulations.

Although not binding on the Board of Veterans Appeals,

Id. at 1108, Appendix 11a. there is no evidence to show

the Board is willing to ignore interpretive manuals such

as the M-21-1 Manual. At a minimum, these manuals are

9

considered persuasive authority. In addition, the M21-1

Manual is binding on Veterans Benefits Administration

employees.

This Court has repeatedly ruled that the APA

creates a presumption favoring judicial review of

administrative action,” Sackett v. E.P.A., 588 U.S. 120,

128-29, 132 S. Ct. 1367, 1373 (2012). This presumption

can only be overcome by “specific language or specific

legislative history that is a reliable indicator of

congressional intent,” or a specific congressional intent to

preclude judicial review that is “‘fairly discernible’ in the

detail of the legislative scheme.” Bowen v. Michigan

Acad. of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 673, 106 S. Ct.

2133, 2137 (1986).

It is well settled that the APA’s “generous review

provisions” must be given a “hospitable” interpretation.

Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 48, 51, 75 S.Ct. 591,

594 (1955). While the preclusion of judicial review may

be inferred from the statutory purpose, this can only be

done upon a showing of “‘clear and convincing evidence’

of a contrary legislative intent.” Barlow v. Collins 397

U.S. 159, 167, 90 S.Ct. 832, 838 (1970). No such clear and

convincing evidence was presented to the court below

and none was cited in the opinion.

What the court below has done is recognize an

agency created loophole for a class of citizens, in this case

veterans, that decisively pokes holes in their

Congressionally mandated judicial review safety net.

Contrary to Marbury the veterans are left without a real

remedy to resolve the arbitrary and capricious actions of

the Secretary.

10

Petitioners pray that this Court will grant certiorari.

This issue implicates an important point of law that

uniquely affects the nation’s 21 million veterans.

Accordingly it is obviously within the scope of Rule 10 (

c) that must be settled by this Court.

B. The Court Below Erred in Finding That the

Secretary’s Regulation Did Not Come Within

the Scope of 38 U.S.C. § 502.

The gravamen of the holding in the court below

was that they lacked jurisdiction because the regulation

in question was promulgated via the interpretive M21-1

Manual rather than through the substantive notice and

comment procedures of 5 U.S.C. § 553. Gray, 875 F.3d at

1111. Appendix 18a. The Court further found that the

M21-1 Manual was an administrative staff manual that

fell under the provisions of 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2) for which

there was no jurisdiction.4 Id at 1108. Appendix 11a.

While the case below was pending, a separate

panel of the court below decided Disabled Am. Veterans

v. Sec’y of Veterans Affairs, 859 F.3d 1072, 1074 (Fed.

Cir. 2017)(“DAV”), which also held that the court had no

jurisdiction to review regulations promulgated by the

Secretary via the M21-1 Manual.

In his dissent Judge Dyk wisely analyzed the

DAV decision and properly concluded that it was

wrongly decided. Like the case below, DAV held that

because the M21-1 Manual is an interpretive rather than

a substantive regulation, it did not trigger jurisdiction

4 38 U.S.C. § 502 grants jurisdiction for rulemaking brought

under 5 U.S.C. § 553 and 5 U.S.C. § 552(a).

11

under 38 U.S.C. § 502. The court below decided that

DAV compelled the same result in the instant case.

Gray, 875 F.3d at 1108. Appendix 11a.

To a large extent, the jurisdictional question turns

on how to classify the VA’s Manual under 5 U.S.C. §

552(a)(1) and/or 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2). The latter provision

provides in pertinent part:

Each agency, in accordance with published rules,

shall make available for public inspection in an

electronic format—

....

(B) those statements of policy and interpretations

which have been adopted by the agency and are

not published in the Federal Register; [and] ( C)

administrative staff manuals and instructions to

staff that affect a member of the public;

As they did in DAV decision the court below

held that the M21-1 Manual was an administrative staff

manual. Judge Dyk correctly pointed out that this

holding, as with the holding in DAV, was incorrect

because it conflicted with the precedent of other

Circuits and the previous precedent of the Federal

Circuit.

In contrast to the majority opinion, the veterans

and Judge Dyk argued that the Manual fell within the

scope of 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1)(D) as “statements of

general policy or interpretations of general applicability

formulated and adopted by the agency.” Gray, 875 F.3d

at 1111. Appendix 18a. In his excellent analysis, Judge

Dyk notes that the majority opinion and the reasoning

of DAV were erroneous and established a “substantial

12

and unnecessary burden on individual veterans,

requiring that they undergo protracted agency

adjudication in order to obtain pre-enforcement judicial

review of a purely legal question that is already ripe for

our review.” Gray, 875 F.3d at 1110 (Dyk, J dissenting).

Appendix 16a.

The M21-1Manual is binding on Veterans Benefits

Authority personnel. Although not strictly binding on

the Board of Veterans Appeals, it constitutes strong

persuasive authority and is often relied upon or cited by

the Board. Morton v. West, 13 Vet. App. 205 (1999)

([Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board or BVA) ] cannot

ignore provisions of the Manual M21–1).

The propriety of this type of interpretive

regulation has historically been considered reviewable

by other Circuits, even if not subject to the notice and

comment requirements of 5 U.S.C. § 553. Judge Dyk’s

dissent illustrated this trend when he referred to

Appalachian Power Co. v. Environmental Protection

Agency, 208 F.3d 1015, 1020-23 (D.C. Cir. 2000) which

dealt with review of EPA guidance issued, without

notice and comment, under the Clean Air Act. Other

EPA regulations as well as the interpretive guidance of

other regulations have been found to be reviewable. Nat.

Res. Def. Council v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 643 F.3d 311,

320 (D.C. Cir. 2011), Aulenback, Inc. v. Fed. Highway

Admin., 103 F.3d 156, 163-65 (D.C. Cir. 1997); W. Coal

Traffic League v. United States, 719 F.2d 772, 780 (5th

Cir. 1983) (en banc), Linoz v. Heckler, 800 F.2d 871, 878

n.11 (9th Cir. 1986).

Within

the

Federal

Circuit,

pre-DAV

jurisprudence also allowed judicial review of interpretive

13

manuals and even a general counsel’s opinion. Snyder v.

Secretary of Veterans Affairs, 858 F.3d 1410, 1413 (Fed.

Cir. 2017). The same holds true for a letter addressing

the procedures for benefit awards, because, as in this

case, it affected substantive as well as procedural rights.

Military Order of the Purple Heart supra., 580 F.3d at

1296 (Fed. Cir. 2009). See, also, Animal Legal Def. Fund

v. Quigg, 932 F.2d 920, 927 (Fed. Cir. 1991). Gray, 875

F.3d at 1115. (Dyk, J dissenting). Appendix 26a.

Here the Manual is more than a procedural

handbook, it has a clear and potentially devastating

impact upon the rights of veterans to obtain benefits

during the early days of the disability. Delays in service

connection leads to delays in medical treatment which is

often fatal. Not only is this Court’s intervention

necessary to resolve the conflict between Circuits, it also

represents and important question of the law which

should be adjudicated by this Court. Settling this

question could save the lives of countless veterans.

In another another agency, this regulation would

have been published in the Federal Register. The

regulation is a statement of the general course and

method by which its functions are channeled and

determined, constitutes a rule of procedure and is an

interpretation of general applicability formulated and

adopted by the agency. The Manual is also a policy

statement that “explains how the agency will enforce a

statute or regulation—in other words, how it will

exercise its broad enforcement discretion or permit

indiscretion under some extant statute or rule.” Nat'l

Mining Ass'n v. McCarthy, 758 F.3d 243, 252 (D.C.Cir.

2014). It serves to “appris[e] the regulated community of

the agency's intentions as well as informing the exercise

14

of discretion by agents and officers in the field.” Cmty.

Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 818 F.2d 943, 949 (D.C.

Cir.1987); Ass'n of Flight Attendants CWA, AFL-CIO v.

Huerta, 785 F.3d 710, 716 (D.C. Cir. 2015). Thus it should

be subject to review under the APA.

As Judge Dyk’s dissent pointed out, the language

of 38 U.S.C. § 502 did not require any restrictions on

judicial review of VA action. Gray, 875 F.3d at 1112.

Appendix 19a. The dissent reiterated the “well-settled

presumption that agency actions are reviewable,” unless

Congress clearly precludes such review. Gray, 875 at

1112. Appendix 19a. As discussed supra., this Court has

concurred in that view.

Accordingly, the majority and better view is that

the Federal Circuit has jurisdiction under 38 U.S.C. § 502

to review the M21-1 Manual in the instant and similar

cases. Judge Dyk’s analysis is the correct one and

petitioner Blue Water Navy Vietnam Veterans

Association prays that this Court resolve the Circuit

conflict and this important point of law by granting

certiorari.

II.

The Decision in the Court Below Creates a

Conflict with the Court of Appeals for the

District of Columbia Circuit Case of Blue

Water Navy Vietnam Veterans Association,

Inc. and Military-Veterans Advocacy, Inc. v.

McDonald, 830 F.3d 570 (D.C. Cir. 2016)

In Blue Water, the Secretary argued successfully

that the Veteran’s Judicial Reform Act vests

Administrative Procedures Act jurisdiction over the

Secretary’s actions solely in the Court of Appeals for the

15

Federal Circuit. Blue Water Navy Vietnam Veterans

Ass'n, supra, 830 F.3d at 577.

The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia

reasoned as follows:

Appellants [BWNVVA] say that this directreview exception extends only to VA regulations

and not to “interpretations” like the agency

actions they challenge. But Federal Circuit case

law makes clear that an agency policy need not

be promulgated as a regulation, via notice and

comment, to be reviewable under section 502. To

the contrary, the Federal Circuit has explained

that section 502 permits it to directly review a

wide range of “rules promulgated by the

Department of Veteran[s] Affairs, including

substantive rules of general applicability,

statements of general policy and interpretations

of general applicability.” LeFevre, 66 F.3d

[1191]at 1196 [Fed. Cir. 1995]; see also Military

Order of the Purple Heart of the USA v. Sec'y of

Veterans Affairs, 580 F.3d 1293, 1296

(Fed.Cir.2009) (holding that the VA's procedural

change, adopted in a letter and not via noticeand-comment rulemaking, was a “rule” subject to

review under section 502).

Blue Water Navy Vietnam Veterans Ass'n, Inc. v.

McDonald, 830 F.3d at 577.

In Blue Water, the Secretary argued as follows:

[V]eterans may bring an APA action challenging

the policy directly in the Federal Circuit. Given

16

these alternative avenues for judicial review, even

if the VJRA did not expressly preclude review of

Blue Water's claims, Blue Water would have an

adequate remedy in a court that would render a

cause of action under the APA unavailable.

Blue Water Navy Vietnam Veterans Ass'n, Inc. v.

McDonald, Brief for Defendant-Appellee., 2015 WL

7777567 (C.A.D.C.), 10-11.

The Secretary went on to argue:

The policy that Blue Water purports to challenge

constitutes an interpretation[] of general

applicability.

Id. at 22.

In an implicit recognition of Blue Water, the court

below did not invite the veterans to return to the federal

district court, or transfer the matter to the federal

district court. Instead they merely confirmed the

absence of a remedy for the veterans without explaining

why the presumption of judicial review did not apply.

This is a “Catch 22" with a vengeance.

The question remains whether the VA’s exclusion

policy via interpretative regulations are interpretations

of general applicability within the scope of 5 U.S.C. §

552(a)(1). The District of Columbia Circuit says yes, the

Federal Circuit says no.

This matter cries out for certiorari by this Court,

not only to resolve the conflict between Circuits

envisioned by Rule 10(a), but to resolve the conflicts

17

between the Secretary’s own position concerning

whether integrative manuals such as the M21-1 are

interpretations of general applicability reviewable under

5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1).

CONCLUSION

For the reasons delineated herein, petitioner

prays that a writ of certiorari be issued to the United

States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.

Respectfully Submitted,

John B. Wells

Counsel of Record

P. O. Box 5235

Slidell, LA 70469-5235

769 Robert Blvd. Suite 201D

Slidell, LA 70458

985-641-1855

985-649-1536 (fax)

JohnLawEsq@msn.com

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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