Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Robert Every, Petitioner v. Department of Veterans Affairs, et al.

Supreme Court briefMar 5, 2018

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Text

No.

In The

Supreme Court of the United States

Petitioner

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS; U.S.

GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION; MICHAEL

MAYO-SMITH, DIRECTOR V.A.VISN 1; RYAN LILLY,

DIRECTOR OF TOGUS VA MEDICAL CENTER; KEITH

WAYE, SBA, SALVATORE VOTER, TOGUS VA

MEDICAL CENTER; EDWIN LEE, TOGUS VA MEDICAL

CENTER, JANE OR JOHN DOE

Respondents

On petition for a writ of Certiorari

To the First Circuit Court of Appeals

PETETION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Robert Every, pro se

561 Easton Valley Rd

Franconia NH 03580

Telephone (603) 616 4574

EFTHE LERK

U.S.

INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT

The case went to the District Court for the State of

New Hampshire where Judge Landya McCafferty did not

dismiss it for cause as the government requested. Her

Honor did say that the case should be brought in the Court

of Claims. The petitioner then brought only the issue of

venue to the Appellate Court for the First Circuit and First

Circuit affirmed the decision of the District Court as to

venue.

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

The question before the Court is one of jurisdictional

venue whether the case belongs in Federal District Court

for the State of New Hampshire or the Court of Appeals in

Washington D.C.

LIST OF PARTIES

All parties appear in the caption of the case on the cover

page

TABLE OF CONTENTS

OPINIONS BELOW .....................................

JURISDICTION

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS

INVOLVED .............................................

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ......................

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT ...............

CONCLUSION ........................................

INDEX TO APPENDICES

APPENDIX A ...........DECISION OF 1st CIRCUIT

COURT OF APPEALS

APPENDIX B ............DECISION OF DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

APPENDIX C ...........ARTICLE ON DOCTOR WILLIAM

WEEKS FROM THE SUN JOURNAL, LEWISTON, ME

111

Table of Authorities

Cases

Pages

Kingdomware Technologies v. United States,

579 U.S (2016) ........................................9

United States of America v.

William B. Weeks, M.D.

United States District Court for

the District of Vermont,

Case No. 109-CV-122 .................................10, 11

Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal

Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) .........14, 15, 16, 17

Gonzalez v. Velez, 16-1572

(July 24, 2017, First Circuit) .....................15, 16

Ziglar v. Abassi, 137 S. Ct 1843 (2017) .........16

Speilmán v. Genzyme Corp.,

251 F. 3d 1, 4, (First Circuit) ......................17, 19

St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S.

283, 289 (1938) ..........................................19

Statues

18 U.S.C. § 1621....................................3

38 U.S.C. § 8128.....................................7

28 U.S.C. § 1491 (b) (1).............................9, 11, 13. 14

28 U.S.C. § 1491 (a) (1) ...........................13

28 U.S.C. § 1491 (b) (3)............................16

Alternative Dispute Resolution Act ..........11, 14

Veterans Benefits, Health Care,

and Information Technology Act

of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-461 ...................4, 8, 10, 14, 17

Department of Veterans Affairs

Accountability and Whistleblower

Protection Act of 2017, PL 115-41 ...........10, 14

Civil Service Reform Act PL 95— 454.......15

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Petitioner respectfully prays that a writ of certiorari issue

to review the judgment below.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the United States First Circuit Court of

Appeals appears at Appendix A to the petition and is

unpublished.

No petition for rehearing was timely filed in this case.

The opinion of the United States District Court for the

District of New Hampshire appears at Appendix B to the

petition and is unpublished.

JURISDICTION

The date on which the United States First Circuit Court of

Appeals entered judgment was December 14th, 2017

No petition for rehearing was filed in this case.

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U. S. C.

Section 1254(1)

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS

INVOLVED

First Amendment: "Congress shall make no law

abridging the freedom of speech..."

Fifth Amendment: "No person shall.., be deprived of life,

liberty, or property, without due process of the law..."

18 U.S.C. § 1621: Whoever

In any declaration, certificate, verification, or statement

under the penalty of perjury as permitted under section

1746 of title 28 United States Code, willfully subscribes as

true any material matter which he does not believe to be

true;

Is guilty of perjury..."

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The question of venue revolves around several

important issues, and after a brief overview of the

background, each will be explored.

The background: The petitioner is a certified

service disabled veteran by virtue of a zero percent

disability rating for having his eardrums blown out in

Vietnam while ordnance officer of Navy Attack Squadron

147. The petitioner would also like to emphasize that's a

far cry from being a ground pounder when mortars are

raining down or pushing a stick forward to begin a bomb

run with multiple Surface to Air Missiles and heavy triple

A coming your way.

The petitioner is also president of Esterhill Boat

Service Corporation. (Esterhill) Esterhill owns an

architect designed, elevator serviced, medical building

across from Rumford Hospital in Rumford, Maine. The

Rumford VA clinic was across the street in an old former

nurse's dormitory that Rumford Hospital owned. When

the lease was coming up Esterhill tried to get Togus VA

Medical Center to look at its building and was stonewalled.

The VA extended the lease with the hospital for a year

rather than put it out to bid, and still wouldn't look at the

medical building owned by Esterhill. It was only when the

petitioner said he was a service connected veteran, and

asked where they were in relation to fulfilling their 3%

mandate in relation to the Veterans Act of 2006, that the

VA changed course.

Everyone liked the clinic, the providers and veterans

alike in fact, a contracting officer said the medical

building had the best record and lowest cost of all Togus

VA outpatient clinics.

Bearing in mind that Togus VA Medical Center is

the lowest ranked VA Medical Center in New England,

when the lease was expiring Togus called for the clinic to

be on one floor and disqualified us. In the Esterhill

medical building, (designed by Togus) primary care was on

the first floor and mental health on a different floor the

same as at Togus VA Medical Center. The mental health

provider said both he and his patients preferred that, and

he told that to the inspection team rating properties for the

new contract.

So what happened? Unknown to the petitioner,

there was political pressure put on Togus VA Medical

Center to locate the clinic in an old, dilapidated mill

building with punched out windows, no parking, a chemical

storage facility in one end, and a roof which later blew off

in a windstorm. The same building the Town of Rumford

had been given for a dollar to get rid of. The closest

parking was a dirt lot 500 feet away that didn't belong to

the building and miraculously, the bid specifications said

parking could be 500 feet away.

Have you ever seen an old vet with a cane in each

hand struggling to walk 25 feet in six inch steps? How

about 500 feet over ice and snow covered streets?

The petitioner raised the issue of parking along with

the general overall condition of the building. At that point,

the VA and its agents went after the petitioner the only

thing Togus VA Medical Center agents didn't do, was give

the petitioner a tee shirt with a bull's eye on the front and

back. As a result of the issues raised, the old mill building

didn't submit a bid and there was only one other bidder

beside Esterhill.

The other bidder had a long deserted building that

had flooded below the 100 year flood, but Togus VA Medical

Center administrators took that bid despite the fact it

was double Esterhill's bid. Then 10 weeks after the bid

was initially awarded, Togus VA Medical Center

administrators, without coming out with a new bid,

illegally doubled both the amount of money and length of

the bid in a sweetheart deal for that bidder. Even after all

this, the bidder defaulted on the contract. All of this was

done to hurt the petitioner for pointing out that what they

were doing, was not only wrong, but illegal.

Beyond this, members of the inspection team

skipped over a large portion of the rating sheets and

deliberately lowered the score of Esterhill. Esterhill would

have prevailed in the inspection if this hadn't happened.

The VA agents weren't mad at the business, just the

petitioner. In addition, the inspection team said they

discussed the mental health provider's preference for the

third floor and decided the petitioner (as an individual) had

rehearsed the mental health provider to make the mental

health provider say that he was better able to calm his

patients in the quietness of his own area and that his

patients preferred it. (The contracting officer actually

stated (under oath) in his official report to the GAO, that

the inspection team had discussed the mental health

provider's statements, and the contracting officer put in his

report to the GAO that the "... personnel on the inspection

team later said that they thought the doctor had been

rehearsed by Mr. Every."

The petitioner doesn't even know the mental health

provider. The VA scheduled the inspection visit as well as

the mental health provider's appointments. When the

inspection team walked by his office, his door was open and

he didn't have a patient something over which the

petitioner had no control.

When the contract was again put out to bid the

petitioner was told he was disqualified and couldn't bid

even as a service disabled veteran. This occurred despite

the clear intent of 38 U.S.C. Sec. 8128. (For some reason,

that bid was never awarded, and Esterhill has kept the

contract through a series of extensions.)

Since that time, the petitioner has been subjected to

even more egregious actions, designed to single out and

punish the petitioner, but these are beyond this brief

background.

The VA has been out to get the petitioner since then

the same as the shameful treatment of Doctor William

Weeks. (Attachment C) As you read about Doctor Weeks,

please bear in mind that Doctor Weeks was on the school

board, and was church treasurer, both usually unpaid and

time consuming not something a crook would ordinarily

do. The prosecution also took place in VISN 1 the same

VTSN headquarters for the actions in the present petition

before the Court. Lastly, when you set out to discredit and

destroy an individual a family and marriage can, and do,

become casualties. At that point, it's no longer a contract

dispute.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

The first issue is that of standing. Does the

petitioner have standing to go before the Court of Claims?

The petitioner maintains he does not. He does not hold a

contract with the VA.

The contract is held by Esterhill Boat Service

Corporation not the petitioner. Esterhill and the

petitioner are separate legal entities and there is a legal

wall of separation between the petitioner as an individual,

and Esterhill Boat Service Corporation. As such, the

petitioner believes the Court of Claims would rule that the

petitioner has no standing to bring this case before them as

a contract dispute because the petitioner doesn't hold the

contract. Furthermore the petitioner maintains, and the

VA's own records show it to be 'true, that the VA's actions

were directed against him as an individual. There is no

other venue for the plaintiff, as an individual, than District

Court.

The VA has used its leverage in the contract process

to punish the petitioner for speaking up and trying to

correct a process gone astray. The target is the petitioner

just as it was Doctor Weeks.

It is true Congress has given special emphasis to the

relationship between service disabled veterans, as well as

any business controlled by them, and the Department of

•

Veterans Affairs. This is clearly shown in the Veterans Act

of 2006. It is also true that the clear intent of

Congressional legislation is to give preference to service

disabled veterans, as seen in the Court's recent decision of

Kingdomware Technologies, Inc v. United States, 579 U.S.

(2016). However, that does not change the fact that the

target is the petitioner not Esterhill. Nor does it change

the fact the petitioner is a separate legal entity from

Esterhill.

When VA agents are unchecked in their behavior,

are willing to sell veterans down the road, lie under GAO

oath, and conduct illegal bids, the petitioner maintains that

crosses the line and becomes a tort. This case is not a case

about the per unit price of widgets, Rather, it's about an

attempt by agents of the VA to silence a critic of decisions

that are not only nonsensical but illegal. To punish the

petitioner they cheated in their evaluation of the bid, took a

bid double that of the petitioner's business, colluded

together about the mental health provider's statements to

the petitioner, lied under oath to the GAO about the

petitioner, and then doubled the length and time of a bid

without advertising only to have the bidder default just

to hurt the petitioner. This conduct crosses the line and

represents a carefully orchestrated attempt to inflict harm

a tort on the petitioner. 28 U.S.0 §1491 (a) (1)

specifically prevents the Court of Claims from hearing

cases "sounding in tort".

For an analogous situation, if a party tries to do

away with a person by running a loaded, forty ton dump

truck into their car and severely injures the individual, it

doesn't make it a motor vehicle violation. It is assault

because the person behind the wheel possessed both motive

and intent (Mens rea) to hurt someone. The actions of the

VA agents were directed with full knowledge of their

illegality. Their actions were designed to hurt and punish

the petitioner, as an individual, for exercising the right of

free speech to correct a course of action gone astray. There

are many other instances beyond the scope of this Petition,

and luckily, the VA does not have a forty ton dump truck.

The VA has a long history of punishing those who

draw attention to the repeated failures of some of its

administrators. These particular actions were directed

against the petitioner as an individual and for this reason

the petitioner maintains that District Court is the proper

venue. As any citizen, the petitioner possesses the

Constitutional safeguards affording the right of free

speech, due process, and equal protection, without the

specter of retaliatory action particularly that of a

governmental agency whose sole purpose is reflected in

Abraham Lincoln's mission, "To care for him who shall

have borne the battle and his widow and his orphan".

When VA agents ignore their sworn duty to the

government, their oath, their duty to taxpayers, and

finally, to veterans who were willing to sling a rifle over

their shoulder and do what any sane person would rather

avoid, they are, and should be, accountable.

Congressional and Executive intent in promoting

Lincoln's mission is reflected in such legislation, as the

Veterans Act of 2006, and the recent 2017 Department of

Veterans Affairs Accountability and Whistleblower

Protection Act. These measures were necessary, because a

long list of VA administrators think they are above the law.

Let's now look at another reason why proper venue

is District Court. To do this, let's turn to the case of Doctor

William Weeks a case brought by the Government in the

United States District Court for the District of Vermont.

(Case No. 1:09-CV-122)

Briefly, Dr Weeks, after writing a series of acclaimed

articles critical of the Department of Veterans Affairs over

mental health care, was charged by the United States

Department of Veterans Affairs and the Government, with

five misdemeanor criminal counts of violating Federal law

prohibiting conflict of interest in relation to a contract.

It is disingenuous for the Government to argue the

present case belongs in the Court of Claims when they

charged Doctor Weeks in United States District Court for

the District of Vermont. (Case No. 109-CV-122) (Both the

Tucker Act and the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act

("ADRA") were codified when it occurred. If it was a

contract dispute, as the Government argues in the present

case, it should have been brought in the Court of Claims. If

it was as a result of a tort, so too, is the present case. 28

U.S.C. § 1491 (a) (1) specifically excludes the Court of

Claims from hearing cases "sounding in tort".

Beyond the criminal case the Government filed in

the District Court, the Government also filed a civil case

against Doctor Weeks in the same Court on May 5, 2009.

(1:09-CV-122) (Document # 1) Again, after the

codification of the Tucker Act and the Alternative Dispute

Resolution Act which the Government maintains precludes

the petitioner from bringing this action in the district

court.) Doctor Weeks then brought a civil counter claim

against the VA and its administrators in the same Court.

.After Doctor Weeks was fully acquitted of all five counts by

a jury, the Government settled his civil claims but not

before ruining his life. These actions arose out of Doctor

Week's participation in contracts and were all brought in

the United States District Court for the State of Vermont.

Both this case and that of Doctor Weeks are the

same because both are the result of retaliatory action the

fact that the Government was the petitioner in one, and the

defendant in the other, does not allow the Government to

cherry pick the venue and say we can bring an action in

District Court, but the petitioner cannot. The Government

deliberately chose to bring both criminal and civil charges

in a contract dispute involving Dr Weeks in Federal

District Court. Why? The Government was doing its best

to silence an individual trying to focus attention on poor

mental health practices by VA administrators. In the

petition before you, the petitioner is trying to focus

attention on not only poor practices, but illegal behavior

that crosses the line to become tortuous behavior

The Government wants the case in the Court of

Claims because that venue is more favorable to the

Government, both as a venue and logistically. However,

what is fair for the Government is fair for the petitioner.

This Court is the only protection standing between the

petitioner and the treatment the VA gave Doctor Weeks.

The petitioner also realizes that while there may be

victors, there are no winners in a courtroom. Before

resorting to the Court, the petitioner initially, and as new

circumstances arose, respectfully contacted the contracting

officer, the head of Togus VA Medical Center, the Director

of VTSN 1 (in charge of the VA New England region) the

Secretary of the VA, and the VA Inspector General.

Nothing was ever done. Everything was referred back to

Togus VA Medical Center administrators the offenders

for review.

In fact, in response to the petitioner's letter to the

Inspector General concerning negative statements made

about him by contracting personnel at Togus VA Medical

Center, the petitioner received a form letter from the VA

Inspector General's Office, telling the petitioner if he

wasn't satisfied with his health care, he should take it up

with VJSN 1, the VA Regional District in charge of VA New

England healthcare. Nothing 'was done, and VA agents

only intensified their efforts against the petitioner. This is

particularly egregious when the VA Inspector General's

Office was in the forefront of leading the charge against

Doctor Weeks.

Let's now look at the First Circuit Court of Appeals

arguments for venue and the principal laws and cases cited

by that Court for venue. We will only look at cases cited by

the First Circuit because it is that Court for which the Writ

of Certiorari is sought.

The First Circuit Court in its decision cited only one

law. "See 28 USC § 1491 (b) (1), (vesting exclusive

jurisdiction over disputes regarding bid solicitations by

federal agencies in the Court of Federal Claims)"

28 U.S.C. §1491 (a) (1) specifically excludes the

Court of Claims from cases "sounding in tort". The

petitioner maintains that the present case represents

tortuous behavior on the part of the defendants just as

the government maintained with Doctor Weeks.

28 U.S.C. §1491 (b) (1) says: "Both the United States

Court of Federal claims, and the district courts of the

United States have jurisdiction to render judgment..." The

case of Doctor William Weeks in the United States District

Court for the State of Vermont is illustrative. The

petitioner maintains he has no standing before the court of

Claims because he is a separate legal entity from Esterhill,

does not hold the contract, is not bound by the Tucker Act

or ADRA, and that the actions of the defendants were

directed against the petitioner as an individual.

The petitioner's claims against the agents are not for

monetary gain (The action at this point seeks damages

of $1 against each of five agents for a total of $5.) The

petitioner brought the action because it's an affront to

every veteran to seek to locate a clinic in a dilapidated,

long abandoned building with no parking and a bulk

chemical storage facility in the other end, and then going

after the petitioner for trying to correct a course of action

gone astray. The petitioner maintains the VA agent's

behavior breached the threshold of tortuous conduct.

In Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents,

403 U.S. 388 (1971) government agents may well have been

acting in the belief what they were doing was right, given

the influence drugs have had on our society. In the present

case (one in which there were no exigent circumstances)

VA agents crossed over the center line of the law,

deliberately turning their dump truck into the petitioner's

lane. The agents, under the guise of contract actions,

sought retribution against the petitioner for speaking out.

The agents deliberately ignored the right of free speech,

due process, and equal protection in their attempt to inflict

tortuous harm on the petitioner.

Some VA agents have a long history of unchecked

abuse of power. The Veterans Act of 2006, as well as the

2017 Department of Veterans Affairs Accountability and

Whistleblower Protection Act are indicative of the need to

check the behavior of VA agents, something the Veterans

Affairs Agency has been unwilling or unable to do. In

Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S.

388 (1971) the Court said "... that power, once granted,

does not disappear like a magic gift when it is wrongfully

used. An agent acting albeit unconstitutionally in the

name of the United States possesses a far greater capacity

for harm than an individual trespasser exercising no

authority but his own"

Unlike the Bivens case, there were no exigent

circumstances. In the present case, the agents of the VA

were afforded many chances to alter course. Instead, they

became more dedicated to the task of punishing the

petitioner actions the petitioner maintains were done by

VA agents, in tort, to hurt the petitioner. Like the Bivens

case, both the District Court and Court of Appeals initially

denied the petitioner's claim.

Looking at Gonzalez v. Velez, 16-1572 (July 24,

2017, First Circuit), an extremely convoluted case, there is

a significant difference. Gonzalez was a government

employee and had standing under the Civil Service Reform

Act by virtue of being a government employee. The

petitioner in the present case is an individual who does not

hold a contract with the Department of Veterans Affairs

and is not subject to the Court of Claims.

While both Congressional and Executive laws clearly

recognize a favored relationship between a business owned

by a veteran and the veteran owning it there is a legal

wall of separation between the petitioner and Esterhill.

The actions of VA agents were directed against the

petitioner, and the petitioner maintains he does not have

standing before the Court of Claims.

Further, the First Circuit, in its Gonzalez decision,

cited as its basis, Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct 1843 (2017).

The petitioner would now like to now look at that case.

Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct 1843 (2017) is different

from that of the petitioner. First, the petitioners in that

case were not only illegally present aliens, but they were

suspected of possible terrorist affiliations detained in

response to the September 11th attacks on our nation. In

contrast, the petitioner is a veteran, who while not a hero,

was in Vietnam and worked and lived with many who

risked their lives on a daily basis.

The Court, in their decision, rightfully found that

Ziglar v. Abassi, 137 S. Ct 1843 (2017) bore little

resemblance to a Bivens claim. Even more telling is the

language of 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (b) (3), which says: "In

exercising jurisdiction under this subsection, the courts

shall give due regard to the interests of national defense

and national security and the need for expeditious

resolution of the action."

Ziglar v. Abassi, 137 S. Ct 1843 (2017) was about

national security. This case is not. In its essence it is

about Department of Veterans Affair's agents making their

own law while knowing what they were doing was wrong.

All of it was done to hurt the petitioner without any regard

to taxpayers or veterans. Even more galling, it was a

premeditated course of action, initiated and sustained over

a long period of time, and without any exigent

circumstances. Our sovereignty wasn't under attack, nor

had people senselessly died.

The Veterans Act of 2006 defines a special

relationship between veterans and the Department of

Veterans Affairs. It applies only to the Department of

Veterans Affairs. The reason for this is that many VA

agents and administrators have ignored not only Abraham

Lincoln's mission, but veterans and taxpayers, at the

expense of advancing their own agenda. VA agents are

subject to the same Constitutional privileges and restraints

as the petitioner when they go home at night. However,

when they report to work, some VA agents think they shed

the responsibility our Constitutional protections afford to

others, just as they shed their coats when they arrive in the

office.

Nevertheless, they are agents of the government,

and there are not two sets of Constitutional laws one for

agents of the VA and one for everyone else, particularly in

light of the Court's quote in Bivens v. Six Unknown

Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) "... that

power, once granted, does not disappear like a magic gift

when it is wrongfully used. An agent acting albeit

unconstitutionally in the name of the United States

possesses a far greater capacity for harm than an

individual trespasser exercising no authority but his own"

We'll now look at the final case cited by the First

Circuit in its decision, Spellman v. Genzyme Corp., 251

F.3d 1,4, (First Cir. 2001).

The Court said the case should not go forward

because the petitioner asked for only $1 against each of five

defendants, and that is below the Federal requirement to

bring the case before the Federal Court.

In the original complaint filed in the District Court

of New Hampshire, the petitioner asked for other relief

that wasn't of a monetary nature. In the petitioner's

amended complaint and its filings, the petitioner restated

the jurisdictional provisions of the initial complaint, and

focused on the behavior of the named agents, because, by

their actions, the agents have shown the desire to punish

the petitioner, or as in the case of Michael Mayo Smith

(The Director of VISN 1) have done nothing when such

conduct was brought to their attention. Without the case

going forward, the petitioner has no means of identifying

further misconduct or those involved in such conduct.

To illustrate this, during a later inspection of other

properties, (The one for which VA agents told the petitioner

he was pre disqualified.) the petitioner heard about

negative comments the VA inspection team made to

unrelated parties. When he requested the identity of the

inspection team, Togus VA Medical Center charged the

petitioner $181.67 for one page a fee the petitioner paid.

(They could have simply forwarded the email naming the

inspection team members.) To complete the request, the

Togus VA Medical Center wanted $7905, 79. (#5 amended

complaint.)

The law allows Federal Courts to hear any case

alleging a violation of Constitutional laws laws such as

due process and equal protection.

In addition, #7 of the amended complaint asks the

court for the ability to name additional defendants. Much

of what happened remains cloaked without the case going

forward.

Justice Owen Roberts, in St. Paul Mercury

Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 289 (1938)

said, "It must appear to a legal certainty that the claim is

really for less than the jurisdictional amount to justify

dismissal." The validity of the amount of damages claimed

is a threshold issue of law for the judge to decide at the

commencement of the case. The petitioner maintains the

VA obstructed his requests under FOIA, and the facts of

the case are not, and cannot be fully known without the

case going forward.

Having said that, this case is not about money but

changing behavior. We seem to have forgotten we are all

Americans. We seem fixated upon money being the cure

for all ills. It is not, and hopefully, we are better than that.

The petitioner realizes that while there are victors in

court there are no winners. The case was only brought

forward because the VA referred everything back to the

Togus VA Medical Center administrators. Unfortunately

some VA administrators have repeatedly put their own

agenda ahead of veterans. How can an agency that refers

complaints back to the perpetrators stop abuse?

The petitioner has the highest respect for the law

and this Court. If this Petition for Certiorari is granted,

the petitioner will engage an attorney for representation

before the Court.

The petitioner would like to close with a story that

bears on the final case cited by the First Circuit in their

decision, Spellman v. Enzyme Corp., 251 F.3d 1,4, (First

Cir. 2001). The story is quoted from the petitioner's

background statement in the original complaint.

"It was the early 70's and our squadron had just

returned from another combat deployment to

Vietnam. We were having a party as several of us

were either leaving the Navy or transferring to other

squadrons. I was talking to the Skipper. He had a

highball in his hand and then something happened

I've never forgotten. He studied me a second, shifted

the glass to his left hand, made the sign of the cross,

and said, "Bob, I'm not a brave man inbound to

target I do everything I can to dodge the triple A

(anti-aircraft fire) and SAMS (surface to air missiles)

I jink and dodge with the best of them."

"Then he hesitated and said, "I've taken a check

from Uncle for almost 20 years and during the final

seconds of bomb run I bore straight in," then added

in a lower voice, "I guess I owe the government that."

"He was lost the next deployment the last A-7

attack plane of the War."

If we think he did it for the money, we might as well

hang a "For Sale" sign on the Statue of Liberty.

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.

Very respectfully submitted,

Robert Every, pro se

Dated: March

2018

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.