Supplemental Brief — Airline Service Providers Association, et al., Petitioners v. Los Angeles World Airports, et al.
Supreme Court briefJun 3, 2019
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No. 17-1183
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
________________
AIRLINE SERVICE PROVIDERS ASSOCIATION; and AIR
TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, INC., d/b/a
AIRLINES FOR AMERICA,
Petitioners,
v.
LOS ANGELES WORLD AIRPORTS; and
CITY OF LOS ANGELES, CA,
Respondents.
________________
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
________________
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF FOR RESPONDENTS
________________
Richard G. McCracken
Paul L. More
MCCRACKEN,
STEMERMAN
& HOLSBERRY LLP
595 Market Street
Suite 800
San Francisco, CA 94105
Scott P. Lewis
Counsel of Record
David S. Mackey
ANDERSON & KREIGER LLP
50 Milk Street, 21st Floor
Boston, MA 02109
(617) 621-6560
slewis@andersonkreiger.com
Counsel for Respondents
i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ..................................... ii
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF FOR
RESPONDENTS ................................................ 1
CONCLUSION .......................................................... 9
ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
Cases
Am. Trucking Ass’n, Inc. v. City of L.A.,
569 U.S. 641 (2013) ................................................7
Bldg. & Const. Trades Council of Metro.
Dist. v. Associated Builders &
Contractors of Mass./R.I., Inc.,
507 U.S. 218 (1993) ................................................7
Cardinal Towing & Auto Repair, Inc. v.
City of Bedford,
180 F.3d 686 (5th Cir. 1999)..................................2
Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of
L.A.,
475 U.S. 608 (1986) ................................................7
Hotel Emps. & Rest. Emps. Union,
Local 57 v. Sage Hosp. Res., LLC,
390 F.3d 206 (3d Cir. 2004) ...................................3
Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness,
Inc. v. Lee,
505 U.S. 672 (1992) ................................................4
Mich. Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v.
Snyder,
729 F.3d 572 (6th Cir. 2013)..................................3
Sprint Spectrum L.P. v. Mills,
283 F.3d 404 (2d Cir. 2002) ...................................3
iii
Statutes & Rules
49 U.S.C. § 40117(b)(4) ...............................................5
49 U.S.C. § 47107(a)(13) .............................................6
Cal. Gov’t Code § 50474.21 .........................................5
S. Ct. R. 14(1)(a) ..........................................................1
Other Authorities
Los Angeles City Charter § 609 ..................................6
Los Angeles City Charter § 635 ..................................6
Series 2018DE Subordinate Bonds
Official Statement, LAWA (Oct. 31,
2018), https://tinyurl.com/y4lxptqx .......................5
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF FOR RESPONDENTS
1. The Government explains precisely why this
case is not cert-worthy: “The court of appeals … correctly rejected petitioners’ procuring-goods-or-services limitation on the market-participant exception
to NLRA preemption, and that ruling does not conflict
with any decision of this Court or another court of appeals.” U.S. Br. 10. As to the purported split, the Government’s review of the case law demonstrates that
Petitioners simply “misread” other circuits’ decisions.
U.S. Br. 17. As to the merits, the Government also
demonstrates that Petitioners are “incorrect” that
this Court’s precedents impose Petitioners’ rigid rule.
U.S. Br. 10. There is “no persuasive reason” for limiting the market-participant exception to instances
where a government is directly purchasing goods or
services. U.S. Br. 12-13. “A local government may act
in a proprietary capacity in other ways—for instance,
when it acts as a landlord or financier.” U.S. Br. 10.
The Government expresses certain concerns with
how the Court of Appeals wrote its opinion. U.S. Br.
23. Notably, the Government correctly recommends
that “[t]he petition for a writ of certiorari should be
denied” despite those qualms. U.S. Br. 24. And for
good reasons: First, this Court does not take cases to
address issues that a petition did not raise and that
are not properly developed on either side of the cert.
briefing. S. Ct. R. 14(1)(a). Not only did Petitioners
fail to reference those issues in their question presented, they failed to mention any of them anywhere
in their cert. papers. Second, there is no circuit conflict on any of these issues. And third, the issues are
neither important nor recurring. As explained infra
2
(at 8), there is no evidence that any ASP has ever been
affected by the provision at issue in this case.
Had Petitioners presented—or even mentioned—
any of the concerns the Government raises, we would
have addressed them fully. And we might well have
allayed those concerns. For now, we address just a few
points to reinforce the Government’s recommendation
of a denial.
2. The Government’s main concern is with an aspect of the Court of Appeals’ framing of the marketparticipant test. U.S. Br. 23. The overall framing is
uncontroversial. The court applied verbatim the market-participant test that the Fifth Circuit first articulated in Cardinal Towing & Auto Repair, Inc. v. City
of Bedford, 180 F.3d 686, 693 (5th Cir. 1999). Pet.
App. 8a. That test asks (1) whether the government is
pursuing its proprietary interests in a manner that is
typical of private parties in similar circumstances and
(2) whether the measure in question is narrowly tied
to a specific proprietary problem. Cardinal Towing,
180 F.3d at 693. As the Fifth Circuit has explained,
the two questions are two sides of the same coin; each
explores the same ultimate inquiry. Id. (“Both questions seek to isolate a class of government interactions with the market” where “a regulatory impulse
can be safely ruled out.”). Every circuit to consider the
market-participant exception in recent years—
3
whether the preemption challenge is mounted by a labor organization or an employer—has asked the same
two questions.1
The Court of Appeals held that Section 25 constitutes market participation under both of the Cardinal
Towing questions. Pet. App. 10a. The Government
does not take issue with the Court of Appeals’ analysis of the first question. As explained below (at 4-8),
the proprietary interests that LAWA is protecting
with Section 25 are the same sorts of interests that
private businesses routinely protect with exactly the
same sorts of labor peace agreements.
The Government expresses qualms only about the
Court of Appeals’ analysis of the second Cardinal
Towing question: “does the narrow scope of the challenged action defeat an inference that its primary goal
was to encourage a general policy rather than to address a specific proprietary problem?” Pet. App. 9a
(internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).
The Government reads the opinion below as holding
that “the narrow scope of governmental action” is “the
only relevant factor.” U.S. Br. 18-20. We do not read
it that way—and nor, evidently, do Petitioners. The
1 E.g., Mich. Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Snyder, 729
F.3d 572, 581-82 (6th Cir. 2013) (challenge by labor organization); Hotel Emps. & Rest. Emps. Union, Local 57 v. Sage Hosp.
Res., LLC, 390 F.3d 206, 215-16 (3d Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 544
U.S. 1010 (2005) (challenge by employer); see also Sprint Spectrum L.P. v. Mills, 283 F.3d 404, 420 (2d Cir. 2002) (upholding
school district’s requirement that cell phone tower operator leasing space on school building comply with the lease’s emissions
standard).
4
Court of Appeals asked whether the condition in question is “narrowly tied to a specific proprietary problem.” Pet. App. 13a (emphasis added) (quotation
marks omitted). The test thus requires a valid proprietary problem and a solution with a narrowly tailored
nexus to it. In assessing whether Section 25 meets
those requirements, the Court of Appeals considered
several factors, including those the Government
lists.2
3. One reason the Government finds it “questionable” (U.S. Br. 20) whether Section 25 is market participation is that the Government has only a partial
view of LAWA’s proprietary interests. That is a natural consequence of Petitioners’ decision not to address
the merits of LAWA’s interests beyond its proposed
2 For example, the court considered whether LAWA “attempted to regulate access to some public good (like infrastructure),” U.S. Br. 19, when it explained why operating an airport
is an “inherently competitive and commercial” enterprise and
how LAX was “participating in a private market,” Pet. App. 12a13a. See also Pet. App. 11a (citing Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 682 (1992) (“[A]irports are
commercial establishments ... [that] must provide services attractive to the marketplace.”)). The court similarly considered
“[w]hether [the government’s] conduct significantly advances
specific proprietary interests or more general public interests,”
U.S. Br. 19-20, when it relied on the narrow, tailored scope of
Section 25 and distinguished cases where governments pursued
policy goals untethered to a proprietary objective, see Pet. App.
14a-16a. Finally, because Section 25 plainly does not invoke
“mechanisms that are not available to private parties (like criminal sanctions),” U.S. Br. 19—Section 25 uses ordinary contract
remedies only, Pet. App. 92a-93a—there was no occasion for the
court to examine this factor.
5
procuring-goods-and-services limitation. Had Petitioners raised the matter, we would have explained
that LAWA is “the direct beneficiar[y] of the absence
of labor disruptions,” every bit as much as “the airlines and air travelers.” U.S. Br. 21.
The Government correctly describes part of that
benefit: “the absence of labor disruptions will make
LAX a more attractive airport.” U.S. Br. 22. Making
sure that ground crews continue working and refrain
from disrupting the flow of air traffic is, indeed, critical to “ensure that services provided at LAX meet the
City’s (and airlines’) needs and are attractive to the
marketplace.” U.S. Br. 21. But LAWA’s primary interest in smooth operations at LAX is not the psychic
benefit of happy passengers. LAWA has an immense
financial stake in the airport’s commercial success.
Each year, LAWA derives hundreds of millions of dollars from fees paid by airport concessions that serve
(and depend upon) the traveling public, such as parking garages, rental-car companies, duty-free shops,
and terminal restaurants. See Series 2018DE Subordinate Bonds Official Statement, LAWA 65 tbl. 11
(Oct. 31, 2018), https://tinyurl.com/y4lxptqx. In Fiscal
Year 2018 alone, LAWA collected $469 million in concession revenue at LAX. Id. LAWA also receives hundreds of millions of dollars a year—$227 million in
Fiscal Year 2018 alone, id.—in Passenger Facility
Charges imposed on “each paying passenger … boarding an aircraft” at LAX, 49 U.S.C. § 40117(b)(4), and
Customer Facility Charges collected from rental car
customers, see Cal. Gov’t Code § 50474.21. These
funds are earmarked by statute for important new facilities at LAX.
6
All of these revenue streams are tied directly to
the volume of passenger traffic at LAX. If baggage
handlers, aircraft cleaning crews, and other ground
personnel go on strike or picket at the entryway, disrupting airport operations, LAX will attract fewer
passengers and LAWA will lose the revenues those
passengers would generate. These revenues are critical to LAWA because LAWA has a federal obligation
to make LAX financially self-sustaining. 49 U.S.C.
§ 47107(a)(13). LAWA cannot depend upon the City’s
general fund to make up any revenue shortfalls, Los
Angeles City Charter §§ 609, 635, and relies upon the
revenue generated at LAX to keep the airport running
and cover its massive debt obligations as LAWA
strives to rebuild LAX and improve its competitive position.
By adopting Section 25, LAWA strives to prevent
costly disruptions before they cause significant financial harm—to LAWA itself, not just to airlines. And it
does so using a device that private enterprises frequently use as well. For example, in locales where unions are prevalent and active, it is common for private
commercial landlords to require tenants to have nostrike agreements with companies serving those tenants, like janitorial companies. They do it for the same
reason as LAWA: When unions strike or picket a
building, they affect all the tenants and jeopardize the
landlord’s commercial interests. Cf. IATA Amicus Br.
16 (“[N]o one disputes that if a private entity operated
a public venue like LAX, that entity would have a similar interest in labor peace, and perhaps could require
‘labor peace’ provisions across the board.”).
7
That makes this case very different from two
cases in which this Court found that the city was not
acting in a proprietary capacity. In American Trucking Association, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (ATA), the
Ninth Circuit had sustained as proprietary action the
use of “a tool … only a government can wield: the
hammer of the criminal law,” 569 U.S. 641, 651
(2013). As the Government notes, the Court “did not
purport to define proprietary actions if unaccompanied by criminal sanctions.” U.S. Br. 15. In this case,
by contrast, the decision below sustains LAWA’s contracting “in a way that the owner of an ordinary commercial enterprise could mimic.” ATA, 569 U.S. at
651.
Similarly, in Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of
Los Angeles, the city refused to grant a private taxi
company a license unless it ended a labor dispute. 475
U.S. 608, 609 (1986). The city was regulating a business in which it had no proprietary interest. Id. at
618. As this Court later observed, “a very different
case would have been presented had the City of Los
Angeles purchased taxi services from Golden State in
order to transport city employees.” Bldg. & Const.
Trades Council of Metro. Dist. v. Associated Builders
& Contractors of Mass./R.I., Inc., 507 U.S. 218, 227
(1993). That is the case here, since LAWA owns, operates, and finances LAX.
Understood this way, the decision’s narrow tailoring requirement does not create the slippery slope the
Government hypothesizes. U.S. Br. 22-23. The Government worries that the decision below invites governmental entities to adopt virtually any labor
requirement “on the theory that such provisions are
8
desirable to employees, more contented employees
will provide a better experience for passengers, and
LAX will thereby be more attractive in the marketplace.” Id. But Section 25 does not rely on an attenuated chain from contractual provision to contented
employee to happier passenger to better brand—a
chain that surely would not pass the Cardinal Towing
narrow-scope test. It targets only the labor disruptions that directly threaten LAWA’s proprietary interests in LAX’s operational and financial stability.
If a court ever distorts the market-participant exception to sustain labor-related policymaking divorced from a valid proprietary interest, this Court
could intervene then.
4. Because the Government recommended denying certiorari, it had no need to address a fatal vehicle
flaw: Petitioners’ lack of Article III standing. As our
brief explained (BIO 9-10), Petitioners do not allege—
and, indeed, they waived any claim—that Section 25
has ever been invoked to trigger negotiations with an
ASP; that any ASP has refused to sign a contract containing Section 25 or been threatened with loss of the
right to operate at LAX; or that any ASP has been deterred from operating at LAX due to Section 25. Nor
do Petitioners even attempt to defend A4A’s standing.
Compare BIO 13-14, with Reply 12-13. The same vehicle problems that would interfere with this Court’s
review of the actual question presented will also preclude this Court’s review of the concerns that the Government discusses.
9
CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.
Respectfully submitted,
Richard G. McCracken
Paul L. More
MCCRACKEN,
STEMERMAN
& HOLSBERRY LLP
595 Market Street,
Suite 800
San Francisco, CA
94105
June 3, 2019
Scott P. Lewis
Counsel of Record
David S. Mackey
ANDERSON & KREIGER LLP
50 Milk Street, 21st Floor
Boston, MA 02109
(617) 621-6560
slewis@andersonkreiger.com
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