Supplemental Brief — Airline Service Providers Association, et al., Petitioners v. Los Angeles World Airports, et al.

Supreme Court briefJun 3, 2019

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

No. 17-1183

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

________________

AIRLINE SERVICE PROVIDERS ASSOCIATION; and AIR

TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, INC., d/b/a

AIRLINES FOR AMERICA,

Petitioners,

v.

LOS ANGELES WORLD AIRPORTS; and

CITY OF LOS ANGELES, CA,

Respondents.

________________

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

________________

SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF FOR RESPONDENTS

________________

Richard G. McCracken

Paul L. More

MCCRACKEN,

STEMERMAN

& HOLSBERRY LLP

595 Market Street

Suite 800

San Francisco, CA 94105

Scott P. Lewis

Counsel of Record

David S. Mackey

ANDERSON & KREIGER LLP

50 Milk Street, 21st Floor

Boston, MA 02109

(617) 621-6560

slewis@andersonkreiger.com

Counsel for Respondents

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ..................................... ii

SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF FOR

RESPONDENTS ................................................ 1

CONCLUSION .......................................................... 9

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

Cases

Am. Trucking Ass’n, Inc. v. City of L.A.,

569 U.S. 641 (2013) ................................................7

Bldg. & Const. Trades Council of Metro.

Dist. v. Associated Builders &

Contractors of Mass./R.I., Inc.,

507 U.S. 218 (1993) ................................................7

Cardinal Towing & Auto Repair, Inc. v.

City of Bedford,

180 F.3d 686 (5th Cir. 1999)..................................2

Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of

L.A.,

475 U.S. 608 (1986) ................................................7

Hotel Emps. & Rest. Emps. Union,

Local 57 v. Sage Hosp. Res., LLC,

390 F.3d 206 (3d Cir. 2004) ...................................3

Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness,

Inc. v. Lee,

505 U.S. 672 (1992) ................................................4

Mich. Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v.

Snyder,

729 F.3d 572 (6th Cir. 2013)..................................3

Sprint Spectrum L.P. v. Mills,

283 F.3d 404 (2d Cir. 2002) ...................................3

iii

Statutes & Rules

49 U.S.C. § 40117(b)(4) ...............................................5

49 U.S.C. § 47107(a)(13) .............................................6

Cal. Gov’t Code § 50474.21 .........................................5

S. Ct. R. 14(1)(a) ..........................................................1

Other Authorities

Los Angeles City Charter § 609 ..................................6

Los Angeles City Charter § 635 ..................................6

Series 2018DE Subordinate Bonds

Official Statement, LAWA (Oct. 31,

2018), https://tinyurl.com/y4lxptqx .......................5

SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF FOR RESPONDENTS

1. The Government explains precisely why this

case is not cert-worthy: “The court of appeals … correctly rejected petitioners’ procuring-goods-or-services limitation on the market-participant exception

to NLRA preemption, and that ruling does not conflict

with any decision of this Court or another court of appeals.” U.S. Br. 10. As to the purported split, the Government’s review of the case law demonstrates that

Petitioners simply “misread” other circuits’ decisions.

U.S. Br. 17. As to the merits, the Government also

demonstrates that Petitioners are “incorrect” that

this Court’s precedents impose Petitioners’ rigid rule.

U.S. Br. 10. There is “no persuasive reason” for limiting the market-participant exception to instances

where a government is directly purchasing goods or

services. U.S. Br. 12-13. “A local government may act

in a proprietary capacity in other ways—for instance,

when it acts as a landlord or financier.” U.S. Br. 10.

The Government expresses certain concerns with

how the Court of Appeals wrote its opinion. U.S. Br.

23. Notably, the Government correctly recommends

that “[t]he petition for a writ of certiorari should be

denied” despite those qualms. U.S. Br. 24. And for

good reasons: First, this Court does not take cases to

address issues that a petition did not raise and that

are not properly developed on either side of the cert.

briefing. S. Ct. R. 14(1)(a). Not only did Petitioners

fail to reference those issues in their question presented, they failed to mention any of them anywhere

in their cert. papers. Second, there is no circuit conflict on any of these issues. And third, the issues are

neither important nor recurring. As explained infra

2

(at 8), there is no evidence that any ASP has ever been

affected by the provision at issue in this case.

Had Petitioners presented—or even mentioned—

any of the concerns the Government raises, we would

have addressed them fully. And we might well have

allayed those concerns. For now, we address just a few

points to reinforce the Government’s recommendation

of a denial.

2. The Government’s main concern is with an aspect of the Court of Appeals’ framing of the marketparticipant test. U.S. Br. 23. The overall framing is

uncontroversial. The court applied verbatim the market-participant test that the Fifth Circuit first articulated in Cardinal Towing & Auto Repair, Inc. v. City

of Bedford, 180 F.3d 686, 693 (5th Cir. 1999). Pet.

App. 8a. That test asks (1) whether the government is

pursuing its proprietary interests in a manner that is

typical of private parties in similar circumstances and

(2) whether the measure in question is narrowly tied

to a specific proprietary problem. Cardinal Towing,

180 F.3d at 693. As the Fifth Circuit has explained,

the two questions are two sides of the same coin; each

explores the same ultimate inquiry. Id. (“Both questions seek to isolate a class of government interactions with the market” where “a regulatory impulse

can be safely ruled out.”). Every circuit to consider the

market-participant exception in recent years—

3

whether the preemption challenge is mounted by a labor organization or an employer—has asked the same

two questions.1

The Court of Appeals held that Section 25 constitutes market participation under both of the Cardinal

Towing questions. Pet. App. 10a. The Government

does not take issue with the Court of Appeals’ analysis of the first question. As explained below (at 4-8),

the proprietary interests that LAWA is protecting

with Section 25 are the same sorts of interests that

private businesses routinely protect with exactly the

same sorts of labor peace agreements.

The Government expresses qualms only about the

Court of Appeals’ analysis of the second Cardinal

Towing question: “does the narrow scope of the challenged action defeat an inference that its primary goal

was to encourage a general policy rather than to address a specific proprietary problem?” Pet. App. 9a

(internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).

The Government reads the opinion below as holding

that “the narrow scope of governmental action” is “the

only relevant factor.” U.S. Br. 18-20. We do not read

it that way—and nor, evidently, do Petitioners. The

1 E.g., Mich. Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Snyder, 729

F.3d 572, 581-82 (6th Cir. 2013) (challenge by labor organization); Hotel Emps. & Rest. Emps. Union, Local 57 v. Sage Hosp.

Res., LLC, 390 F.3d 206, 215-16 (3d Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 544

U.S. 1010 (2005) (challenge by employer); see also Sprint Spectrum L.P. v. Mills, 283 F.3d 404, 420 (2d Cir. 2002) (upholding

school district’s requirement that cell phone tower operator leasing space on school building comply with the lease’s emissions

standard).

4

Court of Appeals asked whether the condition in question is “narrowly tied to a specific proprietary problem.” Pet. App. 13a (emphasis added) (quotation

marks omitted). The test thus requires a valid proprietary problem and a solution with a narrowly tailored

nexus to it. In assessing whether Section 25 meets

those requirements, the Court of Appeals considered

several factors, including those the Government

lists.2

3. One reason the Government finds it “questionable” (U.S. Br. 20) whether Section 25 is market participation is that the Government has only a partial

view of LAWA’s proprietary interests. That is a natural consequence of Petitioners’ decision not to address

the merits of LAWA’s interests beyond its proposed

2 For example, the court considered whether LAWA “attempted to regulate access to some public good (like infrastructure),” U.S. Br. 19, when it explained why operating an airport

is an “inherently competitive and commercial” enterprise and

how LAX was “participating in a private market,” Pet. App. 12a13a. See also Pet. App. 11a (citing Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 682 (1992) (“[A]irports are

commercial establishments ... [that] must provide services attractive to the marketplace.”)). The court similarly considered

“[w]hether [the government’s] conduct significantly advances

specific proprietary interests or more general public interests,”

U.S. Br. 19-20, when it relied on the narrow, tailored scope of

Section 25 and distinguished cases where governments pursued

policy goals untethered to a proprietary objective, see Pet. App.

14a-16a. Finally, because Section 25 plainly does not invoke

“mechanisms that are not available to private parties (like criminal sanctions),” U.S. Br. 19—Section 25 uses ordinary contract

remedies only, Pet. App. 92a-93a—there was no occasion for the

court to examine this factor.

5

procuring-goods-and-services limitation. Had Petitioners raised the matter, we would have explained

that LAWA is “the direct beneficiar[y] of the absence

of labor disruptions,” every bit as much as “the airlines and air travelers.” U.S. Br. 21.

The Government correctly describes part of that

benefit: “the absence of labor disruptions will make

LAX a more attractive airport.” U.S. Br. 22. Making

sure that ground crews continue working and refrain

from disrupting the flow of air traffic is, indeed, critical to “ensure that services provided at LAX meet the

City’s (and airlines’) needs and are attractive to the

marketplace.” U.S. Br. 21. But LAWA’s primary interest in smooth operations at LAX is not the psychic

benefit of happy passengers. LAWA has an immense

financial stake in the airport’s commercial success.

Each year, LAWA derives hundreds of millions of dollars from fees paid by airport concessions that serve

(and depend upon) the traveling public, such as parking garages, rental-car companies, duty-free shops,

and terminal restaurants. See Series 2018DE Subordinate Bonds Official Statement, LAWA 65 tbl. 11

(Oct. 31, 2018), https://tinyurl.com/y4lxptqx. In Fiscal

Year 2018 alone, LAWA collected $469 million in concession revenue at LAX. Id. LAWA also receives hundreds of millions of dollars a year—$227 million in

Fiscal Year 2018 alone, id.—in Passenger Facility

Charges imposed on “each paying passenger … boarding an aircraft” at LAX, 49 U.S.C. § 40117(b)(4), and

Customer Facility Charges collected from rental car

customers, see Cal. Gov’t Code § 50474.21. These

funds are earmarked by statute for important new facilities at LAX.

6

All of these revenue streams are tied directly to

the volume of passenger traffic at LAX. If baggage

handlers, aircraft cleaning crews, and other ground

personnel go on strike or picket at the entryway, disrupting airport operations, LAX will attract fewer

passengers and LAWA will lose the revenues those

passengers would generate. These revenues are critical to LAWA because LAWA has a federal obligation

to make LAX financially self-sustaining. 49 U.S.C.

§ 47107(a)(13). LAWA cannot depend upon the City’s

general fund to make up any revenue shortfalls, Los

Angeles City Charter §§ 609, 635, and relies upon the

revenue generated at LAX to keep the airport running

and cover its massive debt obligations as LAWA

strives to rebuild LAX and improve its competitive position.

By adopting Section 25, LAWA strives to prevent

costly disruptions before they cause significant financial harm—to LAWA itself, not just to airlines. And it

does so using a device that private enterprises frequently use as well. For example, in locales where unions are prevalent and active, it is common for private

commercial landlords to require tenants to have nostrike agreements with companies serving those tenants, like janitorial companies. They do it for the same

reason as LAWA: When unions strike or picket a

building, they affect all the tenants and jeopardize the

landlord’s commercial interests. Cf. IATA Amicus Br.

16 (“[N]o one disputes that if a private entity operated

a public venue like LAX, that entity would have a similar interest in labor peace, and perhaps could require

‘labor peace’ provisions across the board.”).

7

That makes this case very different from two

cases in which this Court found that the city was not

acting in a proprietary capacity. In American Trucking Association, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (ATA), the

Ninth Circuit had sustained as proprietary action the

use of “a tool … only a government can wield: the

hammer of the criminal law,” 569 U.S. 641, 651

(2013). As the Government notes, the Court “did not

purport to define proprietary actions if unaccompanied by criminal sanctions.” U.S. Br. 15. In this case,

by contrast, the decision below sustains LAWA’s contracting “in a way that the owner of an ordinary commercial enterprise could mimic.” ATA, 569 U.S. at

651.

Similarly, in Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of

Los Angeles, the city refused to grant a private taxi

company a license unless it ended a labor dispute. 475

U.S. 608, 609 (1986). The city was regulating a business in which it had no proprietary interest. Id. at

618. As this Court later observed, “a very different

case would have been presented had the City of Los

Angeles purchased taxi services from Golden State in

order to transport city employees.” Bldg. & Const.

Trades Council of Metro. Dist. v. Associated Builders

& Contractors of Mass./R.I., Inc., 507 U.S. 218, 227

(1993). That is the case here, since LAWA owns, operates, and finances LAX.

Understood this way, the decision’s narrow tailoring requirement does not create the slippery slope the

Government hypothesizes. U.S. Br. 22-23. The Government worries that the decision below invites governmental entities to adopt virtually any labor

requirement “on the theory that such provisions are

8

desirable to employees, more contented employees

will provide a better experience for passengers, and

LAX will thereby be more attractive in the marketplace.” Id. But Section 25 does not rely on an attenuated chain from contractual provision to contented

employee to happier passenger to better brand—a

chain that surely would not pass the Cardinal Towing

narrow-scope test. It targets only the labor disruptions that directly threaten LAWA’s proprietary interests in LAX’s operational and financial stability.

If a court ever distorts the market-participant exception to sustain labor-related policymaking divorced from a valid proprietary interest, this Court

could intervene then.

4. Because the Government recommended denying certiorari, it had no need to address a fatal vehicle

flaw: Petitioners’ lack of Article III standing. As our

brief explained (BIO 9-10), Petitioners do not allege—

and, indeed, they waived any claim—that Section 25

has ever been invoked to trigger negotiations with an

ASP; that any ASP has refused to sign a contract containing Section 25 or been threatened with loss of the

right to operate at LAX; or that any ASP has been deterred from operating at LAX due to Section 25. Nor

do Petitioners even attempt to defend A4A’s standing.

Compare BIO 13-14, with Reply 12-13. The same vehicle problems that would interfere with this Court’s

review of the actual question presented will also preclude this Court’s review of the concerns that the Government discusses.

9

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

Richard G. McCracken

Paul L. More

MCCRACKEN,

STEMERMAN

& HOLSBERRY LLP

595 Market Street,

Suite 800

San Francisco, CA

94105

June 3, 2019

Scott P. Lewis

Counsel of Record

David S. Mackey

ANDERSON & KREIGER LLP

50 Milk Street, 21st Floor

Boston, MA 02109

(617) 621-6560

slewis@andersonkreiger.com

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.