Respondents Brief — Luis A. Nieves, et al., Petitioners v. Russell P. Bartlett

Supreme Court briefOct 2, 2018

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No. 17-1174

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

Luts A. NIEVES, ET AL.,

Petitioners,

V.

RUSSELL P. BARTLETT,

Respondent.

On Writ of Certiorari

to the United States Court of Appeals

for the Ninth Circuit

BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT

Jeffrey L. Fisher Zane D. Wilson

Pamela S. Karlan Counsel of Record

Leah M. Litman Tyler P. Broker

STANFORD LAW SCHOOL CSG, INC.

SUPREME COURT 714 Fourth Avenue

LITIGATION CLINIC Suite 200

559 Nathan Abbott Way Fairbanks, AK 99701

Stanford, CA 94305 (907) 452-1855

zane@alaskalaw.com

Kerri L. Barsh

GREENBERG TRAURIG

333 S.E. Second Avenue

Miami, FL 33131

il

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTION PRESENTED 000. eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeees i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES |... eeeeeeeeeeeees ill

BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT... eeneeeeeeeeees 1

INTRODUCTION 000. eeseececceennnceeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeees 1

STATEMENT OF THE CASED eeeereeeeeeeeees 2

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT... ee. 10

ARGUMENT oo ceecccceccecceceecceeeeceeeeeeeeeeeeeeeenes 13

I. Section 1983’s text does not support the rules

proposed by petitioners and the United

State ......ccccccesscccccceseeecceceseeecceceseeccesegeeecesaeeeeseseas 14

II. The common law background relevant to

Section 1983 does not support the rules

proposed by petitioners and the United

State ......ccccccesscccccceseeecceceseeecceceseeccesegeeecesaeeeeseseas 19

III. Compliance with the Fourth Amendment

cannot shield an _ arrest from _ First

Amendment SCrutiny...........cccceeccccsssceceeeeeceeeeeceees 27

IV. This Court’s decision in Hartman v. Moore

does not support injecting a no-probablecause element into Section 1983 damages

actions for retaliatory arrests ............ccccceseeeceeeees 34

V. Experience within the Ninth Circuit shows

that the Circuit’s rule works well..............000.... 42

VI. Alternative possibilities for addressing

retaliatory arrests cannot justify limiting

Section 1983.00... sseessseccecceesseeeseeececeeeeseeeeeeeeees 54

CONCLUSION ooo ceeeessecencnecceeeeceeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeees 56

fee ee

pence

2

of the officers’ action, Pet. App. 4, 6 (quoting Ford v.

City of Yakima, 706 F.3d 1188, 1193 (9th Cir. 2013)).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Petitioners and the United States recognize the

presence of numerous factual “disputes” concerning

the events at issue here. See, e.g., Petr. Br. 5, 7; U.S.

Br. 3, 4. Nevertheless, their statements of the case

ignore this Court’s repeated directive that at the

summary judgment stage, the facts must be viewed “in

the light most favorable to the nonmoving party’—in

this case, respondent. Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 8. Ct.

2012, 2017 (2014).

1. Arctic Man is a multiday snowmobile and ski

race event that occurs each spring in the Hoodoo

Mountains of Alaska. Respondent Russell Bartlett—

the son of a retired Alaska State Trooper—attended

the 2014 Arctic Man, along with more than 10,000

other spectators.

Alaska State Troopers patrol Arctic Man to ensure

public safety. Because of the remoteness of the event

and the relatively small patrol force, the commanding

officers “don’t encourage arrests.” J.A. 164. Rather,

they are expected to defuse problems they encounter.

Mr. Bartlett spent the event camping out with

friends. On the final night, he ate dinner and drank

two or three beers at his campsite before walking over

to a party at an adjacent campsite later in the evening.

J.A. 272, 431.)

1 Mr. Bartlett weighed approximately 235 pounds, J.A. 147,

so the beers he had consumed earlier in the evening did not make

him intoxicated during the relevant time period, id. 272.

4

and cameraman had been filming Sergeant Nieves all

evening.”

The enhanced version of the videotape shows that

as the sergeant approached, Trooper Weight looked

over, stepped forward, and shoved Mr. Bartlett. Pet.

App. 9; J.A. 370.

As Mr. Bartlett fell backwards, his arm went into

the air. Sergeant Nieves grabbed the arm and Trooper

Weight did a “leg sweep” that brought respondent

“down on one knee.” Pet. App. 12. Even after he was

on his hands and knees, petitioners “tried to force Mr.

Bartlett to the ground; he hesitated so as to not

aggravate an earlier back injury.” Id. 9. Petitioners

threatened to use a Taser on him. He then lay fully on

the snow with his hands behind his back. Id. 9-10.

Mr. Bartlett was placed in a trooper vehicle, and

Sergeant Nieves informed him that he was “going to

jail.” Pet. App. 10. He then remarked, “Bet you wish

you would have talked to me now.” Id.

The criminal complaints filed against Mr. Bartlett

by the State charged him with disorderly conduct and

resisting arrest, both misdemeanors under Alaska

law. See J.A. 21-26 (alleging violations of Alaska Stat.

Ann. §§ 11.61.110(a)(6) and 11.56.700(a)(1)).

? Most of the video was destroyed before respondent learned

of its existence. J.A. 82. The remaining video is in the record. The

district court observed that “[clertain aspects of the video are

indeed susceptible to more than one interpretation” given the

location from where it was shot, Pet. App. 11. A copy of the video

was lodged with the Court as Appendix 1 to respondent’s brief at

the certiorari stage. An enhanced version of the key interaction

was lodged with the Court as Appendix 2 to that brief.

7

uncritical, id. 382, the videotape showed him earlier

that evening declining to ticket a motorist for a moving

violation because the individual was “so polite,” id.

262. Mr. Bartlett argued that this contradiction—in

conjunction with the sergeant’s assertion that Mr.

Bartlett's initial refusal to speak with him was

“arguably disorderly conduct,” id. 144, and the

sergeant’s statement after the arrest that he “[blet”

Mr. Bartlett “wish[ed] you would have talked to me

now,” id. 376—could justify a jury’s finding retaliatory

animus.

Mr. Bartlett identified numerous ways in which

petitioners’ statements in their initial arrest reports

contradicted the later-discovered television station

videotape. See J.A. 260-72. This, he argued, reinforced

the conclusion that the arrest was pretextual.’

Finally, Mr. Bartlett presented an expert report

by a police practices consultant, who had served

decades as a Chief of Police, concluding that the arrest

“was more probably than not an example of what is

known in the police vernacular as “contempt of cop”

or “having failed the attitude test.” Opp. to Mot. for

3 At oral argument before the Ninth Circuit, a member of

the court characterized “the affidavit attached to the complaint

in this case [as] full of fabrications and facts—alleged facts—that

are plainly contradicted by the video that happened to have been

taken.” Petitioners’ counsel responded by admitting that it was

“certainly fair to say that the police reports have some

inaccuracies and inconsistencies.” See Oral Argument at 15:14-

16:12, Nieves v. Bartlett, 712 F. App’x 613 (9th Cir. 2017) (No.

16-35631),

https://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/media/view_video.php?pk_vid=000

0012294.

9

With respect to Mr. Bartlett’s First Amendment

retaliation claim, the district court did not address the

evidence of retaliatory motive. Instead, the district

court held that because the troopers had probable

cause to arrest Mr. Bartlett for harassment, his claim

would fail as a matter of law “even if’ his protected

speech “motivated the troopers’ actions.” Pet. App. 37.

4. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part,

reversed in part, and remanded the case for further

proceedings.

With respect to Mr. Bartlett’s Fourth Amendment

false-arrest claim, the Ninth Circuit did not hold that

probable cause existed for the arrest.4 Rather, it

affirmed the district court’s grant of summary

judgment solely “on the ground of qualified

immunity.” Pet. App. 2. It was “at least arguable” that

there was “probable cause to arrest Bartlett for

harassment.” Id. 2-3. And although the district court

had addressed only whether probable cause existed

with respect to the offense of harassment, the court of

appeals also stated, without explanation, that

petitioners were entitled to qualified immunity

because it was also “arguable” that petitioners had

probable cause to arrest respondent for disorderly

conduct, resisting arrest, or assault. Id. 3.

But the court of appeals reversed the district

court’s grant of summary judgment on the First

Amendment retaliation claim. It held that “the district

court [had] erred in concluding that Bartlett’s

retaliatory arrest claim fails simply because the

troopers had probable cause to arrest him.” Pet. App.

4 The Government’s statement to the contrary, U.S. Br. 15,

is simply incorrect.

14

ARGUMENT

There is “longstanding recognition that the

Government may not retaliate for exercising First

Amendment speech rights.” Wilkie v. Robbins, 551

U.S. 5387, 555 (2007). Thus when a police officer arrests

an individual whom he would not have arrested but

for his disapproval of that individual’s protected

expression, the officer has violated the First

Amendment. Neither petitioners nor the Government

dispute this point. Instead, they argue that 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 provides no remedy for this First Amendment

violation unless the plaintiff can show that the arrest

was without probable cause (or, for the Government,

pursuant to an official policy of retaliation). Their

arguments fly in the face of Section 1983’s plain

language, the historical backdrop, precedent, and

practical reality.

I. Section 1983’s text does not support the rules

proposed by petitioners and the United States.

It is unintentionally telling that petitioners omit

the plain language of Section 1983 from their list of

the “sources of authority that guide” this Court’s

inquiry into whether respondent can maintain his

suit. Petr. Br. 13. But this Court’s analysis must

“begin[], as always, with the statutory text.” United

States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 4 (1997). That

language, which petitioners never confront, supports

the conclusion that police officers who deprive

individuals of their First Amendment rights should be

amenable to suit.

1. Section 1983’s plain text is unequivocal: “Every

person” who “under color of” law subjects a citizen or a

person within the jurisdiction of the United States to

15

“the deprivation of any rights” which are “secured by

the Constitution” faces damages liability. 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 (emphasis added).

Police officers are undeniably “persons,” see 1

U.S.C. § 1, who act “under color of” law.

The First Amendment’s prohibition on official

retaliation is a right “secured by the Constitution.”

Indeed, “[t]he freedom of individuals verbally to

oppose or challenge police action without thereby

risking arrest is one of the principal characteristics by

which we distinguish a free nation from a police state,”

City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 462-63 (1987),

and is therefore “high in the hierarchy of First

Amendment values,” Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach,

138 S. Ct. 1945, 1955 (2018).°

Moreover, Section 1983 creates a damages cause

of action for the deprivation of “any” constitutional

right. That language provides no basis for requiring

that a plaintiff who has shown a violation of one

constitutional right—here, the First Amendment—

prove an additional element to recover under Section

1983. See U.S. Br. 830 (making this argument). Still

less does anything in the text of Section 1983

authorize this Court to inject an element—proof that

there was no probable cause for the arrest—that

amounts to requiring a Section 1983 plaintiff alleging

> Long ago this Court recognized that if “there is any fixed

star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high

or petty” can compel citizens to speak. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ.

v. Barnette 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943). Mr. Bartlett therefore had

a First Amendment right to decline to cooperate with the

sergeant’s investigation and to “go about his business,” Illinois v.

Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125 (2000).

16

a First Amendment violation to prove the equivalent

of a Fourth Amendment violation as well. See also

infra pages 27-34 (discussing why compliance with the

Fourth Amendment cannot shield an arrest from a

First Amendment claim).

Neither petitioners nor the Government provides

any support for the idea that this Court has the power

to “design the cause of action under 42 U.S.C. 1983,”

U.S. Br. 7, to circumvent the plain language. To the

contrary: this Court’s responsibility is to interpret the

text Congress provided and “not to make a

freewheeling policy choice.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S.

335, 342 (1986). And in Section 1983, Congress has

provided that when persons acting under color of law,

like police officers, deprive individuals of their

constitutional rights they “shall be liable to the person

injured in an action at law,” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This

provides a “directive” to courts that “is both mandatory

and comprehensive,” SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S.

Ct. 1348, 1354 (2018), to adjudicate those claims.®

The Government’s proposed rule—under which a

plaintiff can bring a Section 1983 damages action for

a retaliatory arrest even if there is probable cause so

long as the arrest is pursuant to official “policy,” see

U.S. Br. i, 1, 6—does additional violence to the plain

language of Section 1983. Recall where the “policy”

requirement in Section 1983 suits originated. In

6 When Congress wants to change Section 1983’s remedial

rules, it knows how to do so. For example, in 1996, it amended

Section 1983 to provide that courts cannot grant injunctive relief

against a judicial officer “unless a declaratory decree was violated

or declaratory relief was unavailable.” Federal Courts

Improvement Act of 1996, § 309(c), 110 Stat. 3847.

17

Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658

(1978), this Court held that Section 1983’s use of the

word “person” includes municipal corporations. It then

held that these persons, unlike natural persons, can

be held liable for damages only if “official municipal

policy of some nature caused [the] constitutional tort.”

Id. at 691.

By focusing on policy, the Government in essence

proposes a construction of Section 1983 under which

only municipalities would be liable for a category of

First Amendment violations (retaliatory arrests where

there is probable cause). But the idea that “the word

‘person’ may extend and be applied to bodies politic,”

Monell, 436 U.S. at 688 (quoting Act of Feb. 25, 1871,

§ 2, 16 Stat. 431) (emphasis added), hardly supports

withdrawing Section 1983’s application to “natural

persons” like petitioners, id. at 687.’

’ And the distinction between single acts and “policy” is

nowhere near as clean as the Government and petitioners try to

make it. A single act by a government official with final

decisionmaking authority in a particular area (a “policymaker”)

is sufficient to trigger municipal liability. See Pembaur v. City of

Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986). In Lozman, the plaintiffs claim

rested on this theory, rather than on a formal document or a

widespread practice. See Lozman, 138 S. Ct. at 1951.

There is an even more serious flaw in the Government’s

argument. Under the Government’s theory, a single retaliatory

arrest, even if effected or ordered by the chief of police, would be

not be actionable under Section 1983, unless the chief was a final

municipal policymaker. See McMillian v. Monroe County, 520

U.S. 781, 786 (1997) (holding that even when the county sheriff

directed the plaintiffs arrest, the county could not be sued

because the sheriff was a state-level policymaker, not a municipal

one). Indeed, even an explicit policy of retaliatory arrests ordered

18

As this Court explained in its foundational

decision in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961),

Congress intended “to enforce provisions of the

Fourteenth Amendment [and the _ incorporated

protections of the Bill of Rights] against those who

carry a badge of authority of a State and represent it

in some capacity, whether they act in accordance with

their authority or misuse it.” Id. at 171-72. That is

personal liability on the part of natural persons.®

2. To be sure, this Court has interpreted Section

1983 to exclude certain categories of natural persons

from damages liability altogether. But that exclusion

rests on the proposition that those persons were

entitled to absolute immunity at common law. Burns

v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 497 (1991) (Scalia, J.,

concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in

part). That explains why officials performing judicial

or legislative functions cannot be sued for damages

under Section 1983. See Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523

U.S. 44 (1998); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349

(1978); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951).

But “[t]he common law has never granted police

officers an absolute and unqualified immunity” of the

by such an official would be insulated from Section 1983 damages

actions. The Government nowhere defends this result.

8 Monroe also provides a response to the Government’s

proposal for an official-policy element in retaliatory-arrest cases

where probable cause exists. Monroe held that police officers who

are actually acting in violation of official policy are nonetheless

acting “under color of” law for purposes of Section 1983. See

Monroe, 365 U.S. at 183-87. The Government provides no

argument for why “under color of law” means one thing for every

constitutional right other than the First Amendment, and

something different for First Amendment claims.

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