Respondents Brief — Luis A. Nieves, et al., Petitioners v. Russell P. Bartlett
Supreme Court briefOct 2, 2018
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No. 17-1174
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
Luts A. NIEVES, ET AL.,
Petitioners,
V.
RUSSELL P. BARTLETT,
Respondent.
On Writ of Certiorari
to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit
BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT
Jeffrey L. Fisher Zane D. Wilson
Pamela S. Karlan Counsel of Record
Leah M. Litman Tyler P. Broker
STANFORD LAW SCHOOL CSG, INC.
SUPREME COURT 714 Fourth Avenue
LITIGATION CLINIC Suite 200
559 Nathan Abbott Way Fairbanks, AK 99701
Stanford, CA 94305 (907) 452-1855
zane@alaskalaw.com
Kerri L. Barsh
GREENBERG TRAURIG
333 S.E. Second Avenue
Miami, FL 33131
il
TABLE OF CONTENTS
QUESTION PRESENTED 000. eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeees i
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES |... eeeeeeeeeeeees ill
BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT... eeneeeeeeeeees 1
INTRODUCTION 000. eeseececceennnceeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeees 1
STATEMENT OF THE CASED eeeereeeeeeeeees 2
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT... ee. 10
ARGUMENT oo ceecccceccecceceecceeeeceeeeeeeeeeeeeeeenes 13
I. Section 1983’s text does not support the rules
proposed by petitioners and the United
State ......ccccccesscccccceseeecceceseeecceceseeccesegeeecesaeeeeseseas 14
II. The common law background relevant to
Section 1983 does not support the rules
proposed by petitioners and the United
State ......ccccccesscccccceseeecceceseeecceceseeccesegeeecesaeeeeseseas 19
III. Compliance with the Fourth Amendment
cannot shield an _ arrest from _ First
Amendment SCrutiny...........cccceeccccsssceceeeeeceeeeeceees 27
IV. This Court’s decision in Hartman v. Moore
does not support injecting a no-probablecause element into Section 1983 damages
actions for retaliatory arrests ............ccccceseeeceeeees 34
V. Experience within the Ninth Circuit shows
that the Circuit’s rule works well..............000.... 42
VI. Alternative possibilities for addressing
retaliatory arrests cannot justify limiting
Section 1983.00... sseessseccecceesseeeseeececeeeeseeeeeeeeees 54
CONCLUSION ooo ceeeessecencnecceeeeceeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeees 56
fee ee
pence
2
of the officers’ action, Pet. App. 4, 6 (quoting Ford v.
City of Yakima, 706 F.3d 1188, 1193 (9th Cir. 2013)).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Petitioners and the United States recognize the
presence of numerous factual “disputes” concerning
the events at issue here. See, e.g., Petr. Br. 5, 7; U.S.
Br. 3, 4. Nevertheless, their statements of the case
ignore this Court’s repeated directive that at the
summary judgment stage, the facts must be viewed “in
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party’—in
this case, respondent. Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 8. Ct.
2012, 2017 (2014).
1. Arctic Man is a multiday snowmobile and ski
race event that occurs each spring in the Hoodoo
Mountains of Alaska. Respondent Russell Bartlett—
the son of a retired Alaska State Trooper—attended
the 2014 Arctic Man, along with more than 10,000
other spectators.
Alaska State Troopers patrol Arctic Man to ensure
public safety. Because of the remoteness of the event
and the relatively small patrol force, the commanding
officers “don’t encourage arrests.” J.A. 164. Rather,
they are expected to defuse problems they encounter.
Mr. Bartlett spent the event camping out with
friends. On the final night, he ate dinner and drank
two or three beers at his campsite before walking over
to a party at an adjacent campsite later in the evening.
J.A. 272, 431.)
1 Mr. Bartlett weighed approximately 235 pounds, J.A. 147,
so the beers he had consumed earlier in the evening did not make
him intoxicated during the relevant time period, id. 272.
4
and cameraman had been filming Sergeant Nieves all
evening.”
The enhanced version of the videotape shows that
as the sergeant approached, Trooper Weight looked
over, stepped forward, and shoved Mr. Bartlett. Pet.
App. 9; J.A. 370.
As Mr. Bartlett fell backwards, his arm went into
the air. Sergeant Nieves grabbed the arm and Trooper
Weight did a “leg sweep” that brought respondent
“down on one knee.” Pet. App. 12. Even after he was
on his hands and knees, petitioners “tried to force Mr.
Bartlett to the ground; he hesitated so as to not
aggravate an earlier back injury.” Id. 9. Petitioners
threatened to use a Taser on him. He then lay fully on
the snow with his hands behind his back. Id. 9-10.
Mr. Bartlett was placed in a trooper vehicle, and
Sergeant Nieves informed him that he was “going to
jail.” Pet. App. 10. He then remarked, “Bet you wish
you would have talked to me now.” Id.
The criminal complaints filed against Mr. Bartlett
by the State charged him with disorderly conduct and
resisting arrest, both misdemeanors under Alaska
law. See J.A. 21-26 (alleging violations of Alaska Stat.
Ann. §§ 11.61.110(a)(6) and 11.56.700(a)(1)).
? Most of the video was destroyed before respondent learned
of its existence. J.A. 82. The remaining video is in the record. The
district court observed that “[clertain aspects of the video are
indeed susceptible to more than one interpretation” given the
location from where it was shot, Pet. App. 11. A copy of the video
was lodged with the Court as Appendix 1 to respondent’s brief at
the certiorari stage. An enhanced version of the key interaction
was lodged with the Court as Appendix 2 to that brief.
7
uncritical, id. 382, the videotape showed him earlier
that evening declining to ticket a motorist for a moving
violation because the individual was “so polite,” id.
262. Mr. Bartlett argued that this contradiction—in
conjunction with the sergeant’s assertion that Mr.
Bartlett's initial refusal to speak with him was
“arguably disorderly conduct,” id. 144, and the
sergeant’s statement after the arrest that he “[blet”
Mr. Bartlett “wish[ed] you would have talked to me
now,” id. 376—could justify a jury’s finding retaliatory
animus.
Mr. Bartlett identified numerous ways in which
petitioners’ statements in their initial arrest reports
contradicted the later-discovered television station
videotape. See J.A. 260-72. This, he argued, reinforced
the conclusion that the arrest was pretextual.’
Finally, Mr. Bartlett presented an expert report
by a police practices consultant, who had served
decades as a Chief of Police, concluding that the arrest
“was more probably than not an example of what is
known in the police vernacular as “contempt of cop”
or “having failed the attitude test.” Opp. to Mot. for
3 At oral argument before the Ninth Circuit, a member of
the court characterized “the affidavit attached to the complaint
in this case [as] full of fabrications and facts—alleged facts—that
are plainly contradicted by the video that happened to have been
taken.” Petitioners’ counsel responded by admitting that it was
“certainly fair to say that the police reports have some
inaccuracies and inconsistencies.” See Oral Argument at 15:14-
16:12, Nieves v. Bartlett, 712 F. App’x 613 (9th Cir. 2017) (No.
16-35631),
https://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/media/view_video.php?pk_vid=000
0012294.
9
With respect to Mr. Bartlett’s First Amendment
retaliation claim, the district court did not address the
evidence of retaliatory motive. Instead, the district
court held that because the troopers had probable
cause to arrest Mr. Bartlett for harassment, his claim
would fail as a matter of law “even if’ his protected
speech “motivated the troopers’ actions.” Pet. App. 37.
4. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part,
reversed in part, and remanded the case for further
proceedings.
With respect to Mr. Bartlett’s Fourth Amendment
false-arrest claim, the Ninth Circuit did not hold that
probable cause existed for the arrest.4 Rather, it
affirmed the district court’s grant of summary
judgment solely “on the ground of qualified
immunity.” Pet. App. 2. It was “at least arguable” that
there was “probable cause to arrest Bartlett for
harassment.” Id. 2-3. And although the district court
had addressed only whether probable cause existed
with respect to the offense of harassment, the court of
appeals also stated, without explanation, that
petitioners were entitled to qualified immunity
because it was also “arguable” that petitioners had
probable cause to arrest respondent for disorderly
conduct, resisting arrest, or assault. Id. 3.
But the court of appeals reversed the district
court’s grant of summary judgment on the First
Amendment retaliation claim. It held that “the district
court [had] erred in concluding that Bartlett’s
retaliatory arrest claim fails simply because the
troopers had probable cause to arrest him.” Pet. App.
4 The Government’s statement to the contrary, U.S. Br. 15,
is simply incorrect.
14
ARGUMENT
There is “longstanding recognition that the
Government may not retaliate for exercising First
Amendment speech rights.” Wilkie v. Robbins, 551
U.S. 5387, 555 (2007). Thus when a police officer arrests
an individual whom he would not have arrested but
for his disapproval of that individual’s protected
expression, the officer has violated the First
Amendment. Neither petitioners nor the Government
dispute this point. Instead, they argue that 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 provides no remedy for this First Amendment
violation unless the plaintiff can show that the arrest
was without probable cause (or, for the Government,
pursuant to an official policy of retaliation). Their
arguments fly in the face of Section 1983’s plain
language, the historical backdrop, precedent, and
practical reality.
I. Section 1983’s text does not support the rules
proposed by petitioners and the United States.
It is unintentionally telling that petitioners omit
the plain language of Section 1983 from their list of
the “sources of authority that guide” this Court’s
inquiry into whether respondent can maintain his
suit. Petr. Br. 13. But this Court’s analysis must
“begin[], as always, with the statutory text.” United
States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 4 (1997). That
language, which petitioners never confront, supports
the conclusion that police officers who deprive
individuals of their First Amendment rights should be
amenable to suit.
1. Section 1983’s plain text is unequivocal: “Every
person” who “under color of” law subjects a citizen or a
person within the jurisdiction of the United States to
15
“the deprivation of any rights” which are “secured by
the Constitution” faces damages liability. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (emphasis added).
Police officers are undeniably “persons,” see 1
U.S.C. § 1, who act “under color of” law.
The First Amendment’s prohibition on official
retaliation is a right “secured by the Constitution.”
Indeed, “[t]he freedom of individuals verbally to
oppose or challenge police action without thereby
risking arrest is one of the principal characteristics by
which we distinguish a free nation from a police state,”
City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 462-63 (1987),
and is therefore “high in the hierarchy of First
Amendment values,” Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach,
138 S. Ct. 1945, 1955 (2018).°
Moreover, Section 1983 creates a damages cause
of action for the deprivation of “any” constitutional
right. That language provides no basis for requiring
that a plaintiff who has shown a violation of one
constitutional right—here, the First Amendment—
prove an additional element to recover under Section
1983. See U.S. Br. 830 (making this argument). Still
less does anything in the text of Section 1983
authorize this Court to inject an element—proof that
there was no probable cause for the arrest—that
amounts to requiring a Section 1983 plaintiff alleging
> Long ago this Court recognized that if “there is any fixed
star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high
or petty” can compel citizens to speak. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ.
v. Barnette 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943). Mr. Bartlett therefore had
a First Amendment right to decline to cooperate with the
sergeant’s investigation and to “go about his business,” Illinois v.
Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125 (2000).
16
a First Amendment violation to prove the equivalent
of a Fourth Amendment violation as well. See also
infra pages 27-34 (discussing why compliance with the
Fourth Amendment cannot shield an arrest from a
First Amendment claim).
Neither petitioners nor the Government provides
any support for the idea that this Court has the power
to “design the cause of action under 42 U.S.C. 1983,”
U.S. Br. 7, to circumvent the plain language. To the
contrary: this Court’s responsibility is to interpret the
text Congress provided and “not to make a
freewheeling policy choice.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S.
335, 342 (1986). And in Section 1983, Congress has
provided that when persons acting under color of law,
like police officers, deprive individuals of their
constitutional rights they “shall be liable to the person
injured in an action at law,” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This
provides a “directive” to courts that “is both mandatory
and comprehensive,” SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S.
Ct. 1348, 1354 (2018), to adjudicate those claims.®
The Government’s proposed rule—under which a
plaintiff can bring a Section 1983 damages action for
a retaliatory arrest even if there is probable cause so
long as the arrest is pursuant to official “policy,” see
U.S. Br. i, 1, 6—does additional violence to the plain
language of Section 1983. Recall where the “policy”
requirement in Section 1983 suits originated. In
6 When Congress wants to change Section 1983’s remedial
rules, it knows how to do so. For example, in 1996, it amended
Section 1983 to provide that courts cannot grant injunctive relief
against a judicial officer “unless a declaratory decree was violated
or declaratory relief was unavailable.” Federal Courts
Improvement Act of 1996, § 309(c), 110 Stat. 3847.
17
Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658
(1978), this Court held that Section 1983’s use of the
word “person” includes municipal corporations. It then
held that these persons, unlike natural persons, can
be held liable for damages only if “official municipal
policy of some nature caused [the] constitutional tort.”
Id. at 691.
By focusing on policy, the Government in essence
proposes a construction of Section 1983 under which
only municipalities would be liable for a category of
First Amendment violations (retaliatory arrests where
there is probable cause). But the idea that “the word
‘person’ may extend and be applied to bodies politic,”
Monell, 436 U.S. at 688 (quoting Act of Feb. 25, 1871,
§ 2, 16 Stat. 431) (emphasis added), hardly supports
withdrawing Section 1983’s application to “natural
persons” like petitioners, id. at 687.’
’ And the distinction between single acts and “policy” is
nowhere near as clean as the Government and petitioners try to
make it. A single act by a government official with final
decisionmaking authority in a particular area (a “policymaker”)
is sufficient to trigger municipal liability. See Pembaur v. City of
Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986). In Lozman, the plaintiffs claim
rested on this theory, rather than on a formal document or a
widespread practice. See Lozman, 138 S. Ct. at 1951.
There is an even more serious flaw in the Government’s
argument. Under the Government’s theory, a single retaliatory
arrest, even if effected or ordered by the chief of police, would be
not be actionable under Section 1983, unless the chief was a final
municipal policymaker. See McMillian v. Monroe County, 520
U.S. 781, 786 (1997) (holding that even when the county sheriff
directed the plaintiffs arrest, the county could not be sued
because the sheriff was a state-level policymaker, not a municipal
one). Indeed, even an explicit policy of retaliatory arrests ordered
18
As this Court explained in its foundational
decision in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961),
Congress intended “to enforce provisions of the
Fourteenth Amendment [and the _ incorporated
protections of the Bill of Rights] against those who
carry a badge of authority of a State and represent it
in some capacity, whether they act in accordance with
their authority or misuse it.” Id. at 171-72. That is
personal liability on the part of natural persons.®
2. To be sure, this Court has interpreted Section
1983 to exclude certain categories of natural persons
from damages liability altogether. But that exclusion
rests on the proposition that those persons were
entitled to absolute immunity at common law. Burns
v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 497 (1991) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part). That explains why officials performing judicial
or legislative functions cannot be sued for damages
under Section 1983. See Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523
U.S. 44 (1998); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349
(1978); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
But “[t]he common law has never granted police
officers an absolute and unqualified immunity” of the
by such an official would be insulated from Section 1983 damages
actions. The Government nowhere defends this result.
8 Monroe also provides a response to the Government’s
proposal for an official-policy element in retaliatory-arrest cases
where probable cause exists. Monroe held that police officers who
are actually acting in violation of official policy are nonetheless
acting “under color of” law for purposes of Section 1983. See
Monroe, 365 U.S. at 183-87. The Government provides no
argument for why “under color of law” means one thing for every
constitutional right other than the First Amendment, and
something different for First Amendment claims.
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