Amicus Curiae Brief — BNSF Railway Company, Petitioner v. Michael D. Loos
Supreme Court briefJul 27, 2018
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No. 17-1042
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
————
BNSF RAILWAY COMPANY,
Petitioner,
v.
MICHAEL D. LOOS,
Respondent.
————
On Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit
————
BRIEF OF THE ASSOCIATION OF
AMERICAN RAILROADS AS AMICUS CURIAE
IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER
————
KATHRYN D. KIRMAYER
DANIEL SAPHIRE
Counsel of Record
ASSOCIATION OF
AMERICAN RAILROADS
425 3rd Street, S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20024
(202) 639-2505
dsaphire@aar.org
Counsel for Amicus Curiae
Association of
American Railroads
July 27, 2018
WILSON-EPES PRINTING CO., INC. – (202) 789-0096 – WASHINGTON, D. C. 20002
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................
ii
STATEMENT OF INTEREST OF AMICUS
CURIAE............................................................
1
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ....................
2
ARGUMENT ........................................................
4
TIME-LOST FELA PAYMENTS ARE
COMPENSATION UNDER THE RRTA AND
ARE SUBJECT TO RRTA PAYROLL
TAXES ..............................................................
4
A. Railroad Workers Who Are Injured on
the Job May Collect Damages for Lost
Wages Under the Federal Employers’
Liability Act ..............................................
5
B. Railroad Employees are Eligible for
Railroad Retirement Benefits Which are
Funded by Payroll Taxes Levied on Their
Compensation Under the RRTA ..............
7
C. The Court Below Was Wrong When it
Held That FELA Time-Lost Awards Are
Not Subject to RRTA Taxes, as Were
Other Lower Courts Which Reached the
Same Result Using A Different Rationale
...................................................................
9
D. Railroad Employees’ RRA Benefits are
Enhanced By Their Receipt of Pay for
Time Lost and Therefore Railroad
Retirement Taxes Must Be Paid on TimeLost Awards ..............................................
13
CONCLUSION ....................................................
21
(i)
ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Page(s)
Cowden v. BNSF Ry. Co.,
2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91454
(E.D. Mo. 2014) ................................... 11, 12, 19
DeBiasio v. Illinois Cent. R.R.,
52 F.3d 678 (7th Cir. 1995) .......................
6
Florida E. Coast Ry. Co. v. United States,
470 F.2d 513 (Ct. Cl. 1972) .......................
14
Frazier v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co.,
996 F.2d 922 (7th Cir. 1993) .....................
5, 6
Galveston By Bd. of Trustees v. United States,
22 Cl. Ct. 600 (Cl. Ct. 1991)......................
14
Green v. Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R.,
59 F.3d 1029 (10th Cir. 1995) ...................
8
Hance v. Norfolk S. Ry Co.,
571 F.3d 511 (6th Cir. 2009) .....................
18
Heckman v. Burlington N. Santa Fe Ry. Co.,
837 N.W.2d 532 (Neb. 2013) .....................
13
Hisquardo v. Hisquardo,
439 U.S. 572 (1979) ...................................
18
Jacques v. R.R. Retirement Bd.,
736 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1984) ........................
16
Liberatore v. Monongahela Ry. Co.,
140 A.3d 16 (Pa. Super 2016) ............. 13, 16, 17
Loy v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co.,
2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48824
(N.D. Ind. 2016) ........................................ 11, 12
Marlin v. BNSF Ry. Co.,
163 F.Supp.3d 576 (S.D. Iowa 2016) ........ 11, 12
iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page(s)
Mickey v. BNSF Ry. Co.,
437 S.W.3d 207 (Mo. 2014) ................. 12, 17, 19
Munoz v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co.,
2018 Il. App. (1st) 171009
(Ill. App. 2018) ..........................................
12
New Orleans & N. E. R.R.,
247 U.S. 367 (1916) ...................................
5
Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Williams,
2018 Ala. Civ. App. LEXIS 101
(Ala. Civ. App. 2018) ................................. 13, 17
Norton v. R.R. Retirement Bd.,
69 F.3d 282 (8th Cir. 1995) .......................
18
Phillips v. Chicago Cent. & Pac. R.R.,
853 N.W.2d 636 (Iowa 2014) ....................
13
Redfield v. Insur. Co. of N. Am.,
940 F.2d 542 (9th Cir. 1991) .....................
12
Sloas v. CSX Transp., Inc.,
616 F.3d 380 (4th Cir. 2010) .....................
8
Standard Office Bldg. Corp., v. United States,
819 F.2d 1371 (7th Cir. 1987) ................... 12, 14
State of Calif. v. Cent. Pac. R.R.,
127 U.S. 1 (1888) .......................................
6
Southern Ry. v. Gray,
241 U.S. 333 (1916) ...................................
5
STATUTES
26 U.S.C. §74(c) ............................................
20
26 U.S.C. §104 .............................................. 13, 20
iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page(s)
26 U.S.C. §104(a)(2)................................ 12, 19, 20
26 U.S.C. §106(b) ..........................................
20
26 U.S.C. §106(d) ..........................................
20
26 U.S.C. §108(f)(4) ......................................
20
26 U.S.C. §117 ..............................................
20
26 U.S.C. §119 ..............................................
20
26 U.S.C. §127 ..............................................
20
26 U.S.C. §132 ..............................................
20
26 U.S.C. §422(b) ..........................................
20
26 U.S.C. §423(b) ..........................................
20
26 U.S.C. §§3101 et seq. ...............................
12
26 U.S.C. §§3201-3241 .................................
1
26 U.S.C. §3201(a) & (b) ...............................
8
26 U.S.C. §3202(a) ........................................
9
26 U.S.C. §3202(b) ........................................
9
26 U.S.C. §3221(a) & (b) ...............................
8
26 U.S.C. §3231(e)(1) .................................... 9, 15
26 U.S.C. §3231(e)(5) ....................................
20
26 U.S.C. §3231(e)(6) ....................................
20
26 U.S.C. §3231(e)(9) ....................................
20
26 U.S.C. §3231(e)(10) ..................................
20
26 U.S.C. §3231(e)(11) ..................................
20
26 U.S.C. §3231(e)(12) ..................................
20
v
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page(s)
42 U.S.C. §410(a)(9)......................................
7
45 U.S.C. §§51-60 .........................................
1
45 U.S.C. §51 ................................................
5
45 U.S.C. §56 ................................................
5
45 U.S.C. §§231–231v...................................
1
45 U.S.C. §231(f)(1) ......................................
15
45 U.S.C. §231(h)(1) & (2) ............................
15
45 U.S.C. §231a(a)(1)....................................
15
45 U.S.C. §231a(a)(1)(ii) ...............................
8
45 U.S.C. §231a(a)(1)(iv) ..............................
8
45 U.S. C. §231a(b) .......................................
15
45 U.S.C. §231f .............................................
2
46 U.S.C. §30104 ..........................................
5
Federal Railroad Safety Act, Pub. L.
No. 91-458, 84 Stat. 971 (1970) ................
6
Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, c.104, 24
Stat. 379 ....................................................
6
Railway Labor Act, c. 347, 44 Stat. 577
(1926) .........................................................
6
Safety Appliances Act of 1893, c. 196,
27 Stat. 531 ...............................................
6
REGULATIONS AND
ADMINISTRATIVE MATERIALS
20 C.F.R. §210.5(d) .......................................
15
vi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page(s)
20 C.F.R. §211.1 ...........................................
15
20 C.F.R. §211.2(b)(2) ...................................
15
20 C.F.R. §211.3(a) .......................................
15
26 C.F.R. §31.3202-1(a) ...............................
9
26 C.F.R. §31.3202-1(e) ................................
9
26 C.F.R. §31.3231(e)-1(a)(3)-(4) .................. 10, 15
IRS Rev. Rul. 61-1, 1961-1-C.B. 14, 1961
WL 12630 (1961) .......................................
18
IRS Rev. Rul. 85-97, 1985-2. C.B. 50, 1985
WL 287177 (1985) .....................................
19
IRS, Technical Advice Memorandum
8115012, 1980 WL 137627 (1980) ............
19
IRS, Technical Advice Memorandum
9322001, 1993 WL 187036 (1993) ............
19
OTHER AUTHORITIES
Gen. Accounting Office, Federal Employers’
Liability Act: Issues Associated with
Changing How Railroad Work-Related
Injuries Are Compensated (1996) .............
5
R.R. Ret. Bd., 2017 Annual Report ..............
8
R.R. Ret. Bd., Pay for Time Lost from
Regular Railroad Employment, Form 1B4, (06-95).................................................... 10, 16
R.R. Ret. Bd., Railroad Retirement
Handbook (2015) ................................. 7, 8, 9, 15
STATEMENT OF INTEREST OF
AMICUS CURIAE1
Amicus curiae Association of American Railroads
(AAR) is an incorporated, nonprofit trade association
representing the nation’s major freight railroads, many
smaller freight railroads, Amtrak, and some commuter
authorities. AAR’s members operate approximately
83 percent of the rail industry’s line haul mileage,
produce 97 percent of its freight revenues, and employ
95 percent of rail employees. In matters of significant
interest to its members, AAR frequently appears on
behalf of the railroad industry before Congress, the
courts and administrative agencies. AAR seeks to
participate as amicus curiae to represent the views of
its members when a case raises an issue of importance
to the railroad industry as a whole.
AAR is participating in this case as amicus curiae
because it involves two federal statutes that apply
uniquely to the railroad industry: the Federal Employers’
Liability Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C. §§51-60 and the Railroad
Retirement Tax Act (RRTA), 26 U.S.C. §§3201-3241.
These statutes affect all railroads, and involve the
expenditure of significant sums of money: the payment
of hundreds of millions of dollars in settlements and
verdicts under FELA, and the payment of billions of
dollars in taxes under the RRTA, which fund billions
of dollars in benefits provided under the Railroad
Retirement Act (RRA). 45 U.S.C. §§231–231v.
1
Both parties have consented to AAR’s filing of an amicus
brief. Pursuant to Rule 37.6, AAR states that no person or entity
other than AAR has made monetary contributions toward this
brief, and no counsel for any party authored this brief in whole or
in part.
2
AAR works closely with its members to ensure
consistent and correct application of FELA around the
country. Similarly, AAR works with its members and
the Railroad Retirement Board (RRB)—an independent agency in the executive branch of the federal
government charged with administering the RRA,
45 U.S.C. §231f—to ensure that the railroad retirement
system is administered in an equitable and efficient
manner, and in accordance with the requirements of
the law.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Eighth Circuit’s decision, which held that FELA
awards for lost wages are not subject to RRTA payroll
taxes, should be reversed. Railroad employees who
are injured on the job may bring negligence suits
against their employing railroad under FELA. Lost
wages often make up a significant portion of the
damages sought and recovered in those suits.
Railroad employees are also covered by a unique
retirement system under which they become eligible
for retirement, disability and other benefits based on
their years of service and creditable compensation.
The railroad retirement system is comparable to the
Social Security system in some ways, but differs in
others. RRA benefits are funded by payroll taxes
levied under the RRTA on the compensation received
by employees and paid by employers, which employers
must collect and pay to the IRS.
The Eighth Circuit held that damages for lost wages
(so-called “time-lost” awards) are not taxable because
they do not meet the definition of compensation under
the RRTA. Compensation is defined as “any form of
money remuneration paid to an individual for services
rendered as an employee to one of more employers.”
3
The Court held that such awards are not taxable
because they are not made for “services rendered,” but
instead are compensation for periods of time when “the
employee did not actually render any services.” This
unduly restrictive reading of the term “compensation”
would call into question not just the taxability of timelost awards, but also the taxability of other payments
made to employees for periods when they do not
actually perform services, such as vacation and sick
pay. Virtually every other lower court that has
addressed this issue has rejected this interpretation of
RRTA compensation.
However, a number of those courts have held that
even though time-lost awards are compensation, they
are not taxable under the RRTA because personal
injury damages are excluded from gross income under
section 104 of the Internal Revenue Code. Those courts
have reasoned that compensation is a subset of gross
income, and if time-lost awards are not gross income
they necessarily cannot be compensation. As did the
Eighth Circuit, those courts also have misread the law
and failed to account for the close connection between
“compensation” under the RRA and “compensation”
under the RRTA.
A proper reading of the RRTA—which takes into
account the purpose of RRTA payroll taxes—requires
that FELA time-lost awards be subject to RRTA taxes.
The railroad retirement system is an integrated statutory scheme under which benefits paid under the RRA
are funded by taxes levied under the RRTA. Both
eligibility for, and the level of, benefits payable to a
retired railroad employee under the RRA are based on
the employee’s years of services and the amount of
compensation with which the employee is credited. For
the purpose of calculating the benefits for which
4
a railroad worker will become eligible, payments
received for time lost (including pay received due to a
personal injury) are considered compensation and
included in determining both the employee’s “years of
service” and creditable compensation. As a result,
when a FELA award for lost wages is made, and
treated as a payment for time lost under the RRA, the
employee realizes a distinct benefit because such
treatment serves to increase the employee’s years of
service and creditable compensation. Because railroad
employees receive RRA credit for the time-lost FELA
awards they receive, those awards must be treated as
compensation that is subject to the payroll taxes that
support those RRA benefits.
ARGUMENT
TIME-LOST FELA PAYMENTS ARE
COMPENSATION UNDER THE RRTA AND
ARE SUBJECT TO RRTA PAYROLL TAXES.
This case concerns the interplay between two federal
statutes that are unique to the railroad industry:
FELA and the RRTA. FELA is a federal negligence law
that provides compensation to employees who are
injured on the job. The RRTA levies taxes that fund
benefits under the RRA, a statute which created and
governs the railroad retirement system. The court
below held that payments made to railroad employees
under FELA for wages lost as a result of an injury—
”time-lost” awards—are not subject to RRTA taxes.
Not only is the ruling below based on an incorrect
reading of the statute, it violates the Congressional
design because it exempts time-lost awards from the
taxes that are specifically earmarked to fund RRA
pension benefits, even while the payment of such
awards to employees serves to enhance the benefits
those employees receive.
5
A. Railroad Workers Who Are Injured on the
Job May Collect Damages for Lost Wages
Under the Federal Employers’ Liability
Act.
FELA was enacted over a century ago, predating the
modern no-fault workers’ compensation laws which
became universal for the rest of U.S. industry in the
decades after FELA’s enactment. See Gen. Accounting
Office, Federal Employers’ Liability Act: Issues Associated
With Changing How Railroad Work-Related Injuries
Are Compensated 15 (1996).2 Congress incorporated
into FELA the concept of common law negligence as
the basis for recovery. 45 U.S.C. §51; New Orleans &
N. E. R.R., 247 U.S. 367, 371 (1916) (“negligence is
essential to recovery”); Southern Ry. v. Gray, 241 U.S.
333, 339 (1916) (The rights and obligations under
FELA depend upon “applicable principles of common
law. . . . Negligence by the railway company is
essential to a recovery.”).
When a railroad employee is injured on the job,
unless the parties can reach a settlement the employee
must bring a lawsuit in state or federal court in order
to recover. 45 U.S.C. §56 (granting state and federal
courts concurrent jurisdiction in FELA cases). In these
FELA lawsuits, injured workers may seek both economic and noneconomic damages. See Frazier v. Norfolk
& W. Ry. Co., 996 F.2d 922, 925 (7th Cir. 1993).
Damage claims for past and future lost wages often
are a major component of a FELA suit. During the past
three years, railroads reported to the Federal Railroad
2
The maritime industry, by virtue of the Jones Act, also is
covered by the FELA. 46 U.S.C. §30104. Virtually all other
employers and employees in the United States are covered by a
state or federal no-fault workers’ compensation law.
6
Administration an annual average of 2,983 on-duty
injuries resulting in time away from the job.
http://safetydata.fra.gov/OfficeofSafety/publicsite/Que
ry/casemp.aspxQuery4.09WorkerSafetyReport. Not
surprisingly, many of the hundreds of FELA suits filed
against railroads each year seek recovery for wage loss
incurred when the employee was unable to work due
to the injury. Often such awards constitute a significant portion of the damages awarded. See e.g., DeBiasio
v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 52 F.3d 678, 687 (7th Cir. 1995)
(plaintiff awarded $51,000 for past lost earnings and
$1,150,000 for future lost earnings); Frazier, 996 F.2d
at 925 (plaintiff awarded $2.3 million had sought
$114,600 in past lost wages and $430,000 in future lost
earnings).
FELA is but one example of how Congress historically has singled out railroads for unique treatment,
motivated in part by the industry’s outsized role in the
national economy. See State of Calif. v. Cent. Pac. R.R.,
127 U.S. 1, 39-40 (1888) (describing efforts by Congress
to promote expansion of the railroad industry as a
means of promoting the country’s economic development). Given the pervasive role railroads played in
national commerce, Congress frequently focused first
on railroads as it extended its authority over industry
and the national economy. E.g., Interstate Commerce
Act of 1887, c.104, 24 Stat. 379 (economic regulation);
Safety Appliances Act of 1893, c. 196, 27 Stat. 531
(safety); Railway Labor Act, c. 347, 44 Stat. 577 (1926)
(labor relations); Federal Railroad Safety Act, Pub. L.
No. 91-458, 84 Stat. 971 (1970) (safety).
Today, railroads are just one of several transportation modes that play a major role in interstate, and
international, commerce. However, in the areas of
economic regulation, employer liability, safety, and
7
labor relations, railroads remain subject to unique
statutory schemes that operate parallel to (though at
times starkly differently from) the comparable laws
that govern most other industries. When applying
statutes to which railroads—and only railroads—are
subject, courts must be mindful of the specific goals
and purposes Congress intended to advance, and how
Congress intended those laws to interrelate.
B. Railroad Employees are Eligible for
Railroad Retirement Benefits Which are
Funded by Payroll Taxes Levied on Their
Compensation Under the RRTA.
As with compensation for work-related injuries,
railroads and their employees are treated differently
from other industries when it comes to retirement and
related benefits. They are not covered by the Social
Security system that covers virtually all other employers and employees (and self-employed individuals) in
the United States. See 42 U.S.C. §410(a)(9) (excluding
service performed by employees of carriers by railroad
from the definition of service under the Social Security
Act). Instead, they are covered by the RRA, a
retirement security system that was enacted around
the same time as Social Security. R.R. Ret. Bd.,
Railroad Retirement Handbook 1-2 (2015) (available
at https://www.rrb.gov/Sites/default/files/2017-04/RR
B%20Handbook%20%282015%29.pdf.). The RRA provides retirement and disability benefits to railroad
workers, their spouses and survivors.
The RRA provides two tiers of benefits: tier I
benefits are comparable to the benefits provided under
the Social Security system, but are based on railroad
retirement age and service requirements; tier II provides additional retirement benefits, above and beyond
what Social Security provides, that are comparable to
8
private multiemployer pension plans. Tier II also
provides other benefits not available under Social
Security. See e.g., 45 U.S.C. §231a(a)(1)(iv) (providing
an occupational disability benefit).3 Eligibility requirements under the RRA differ from Social Security, and
in some cases are more favorable to long–term railroad
employees. See e.g., 45 U.S.C. §231a(a)(1)(ii) (permitting workers aged 60 with at least 30 years of service
to retire with an unreduced benefit). See generally
Railroad Retirement Handbook at 15-20.
The substantial sums paid in railroad retirement
benefits each year require a reliable funding source.
At the end of fiscal 2016, 222,100 age and disability
annuities, 145,900 spousal annuities, and 116,800
survivor annuities were being paid. R.R. Ret. Bd., 2017
Annual Report at 4 (available at https://www.
rrb.gov/sites/default/files/2017-09/2017AnnualReport.
pdf). In fiscal year 2016, about $12.3 billion in
retirement benefits were paid to those beneficiaries.
Id. at 1, 15.
The “payroll taxes levied on covered employers and
their employees” under the RRTA are the “primary
source of income to the railroad retirement and survivor program.” 2017 Annual Report, at 7; Railroad
Retirement Handbook at 45. The RRTA imposes
separate payroll taxes on “compensation” paid by
railroad employers and received by railroad employees
to fund each tier of benefits. 26 U.S.C. §3201(a) & (b)
(imposing tier I and tier II payroll tax on compensation
received by employees); 26 U.S.C. §3221(a) & (b)
3
Some courts have permitted railroad employees to receive
both unreduced FELA awards and occupational disability
benefits for the same work-related injuries. E.g., Sloas v. CSX
Transp., Inc., 616 F.3d 380, 392 (4th Cir. 2010); Green v. Denver
& Rio Grande W. R.R., 59 F.3d 1029, 1032-33 (10th Cir. 1995).
9
(imposing tier I and tier II payroll tax on compensation
paid by employers). Compensation is defined as “any
form of money remuneration paid to an individual for
services rendered as an employee to one of more
employers.” 26 U.S.C. §3231(e)(1).
Tier I taxes are the equivalent of the Social Security
payroll taxes and fund Social Security-equivalent
benefits (as well as Medicare). Tier II payroll taxes
fund the benefits that are available to railroad
employees but not to Social Security beneficiaries. Tier
II taxes have a different earnings base (the maximum
amount of earnings that is subject to the tax each year)
than tier I taxes, and utilize a different rate for
employees and employers, which can fluctuate year to
year based on the “average account benefit ratio”—a
ratio of fund assets to benefits and expenses. Railroad
Retirement Handbook at 46.
The RRTA requires that railroad employers collect
the taxes owed by their employees by deducting the
proper amounts from the employee’s compensation
and paying those amounts to the IRS. 26 U.S.C.
§3202(a); 26 C.F.R. §31.3202-1(a). The law is clear that
the employer has an absolute obligation to pay the
taxes to the IRS and not to anyone else. 26 U.S.C.
§3202(b); 26 C.F.R. §31.3202-1(e).
C. The Court Below Was Wrong When it Held
That FELA Time-Lost Awards Are Not
Subject to RRTA Taxes, as Were Other
Lower Courts Which Reached the Same
Result Using A Different Rationale.
Following the law, in the case below petitioner
BNSF withheld, and paid to the IRS, an amount that
covered respondent Loos’ payroll tax obligation on the
portion of his FELA verdict that was attributable to
10
time lost. Pet. Br. at 11. This was consistent with the
long-standing views of both the RRB and the IRS. “All
compensation under the Railroad Retirement Tax Act
(RRTA) is subject to the Tier I and Tier II tax rates . . .
This is also true of pay for time lost.” R.R. Ret. Bd.,
Pay for Time Lost from Regular Railroad Employment,
Form 1B-4, at 8 (06-95). The RRB explains that “[p]ay
for time lost is compensation paid by a railroad
employer which is creditable under the [RRA] and
which is attributable to lost earnings for an identifiable period of absence from active service.” Id. at 1. In
addition, Treasury regulations interpret compensation under the RRTA to include time-lost payments. 26
C.F.R. §31.3231(e)-1(a)(3)-(4).4 Thus, both the IRS and
RRB take the position that time-lost payments
constitute compensation for the purpose of both calculating benefits and levying taxes, and that railroads
and their employees must pay RRTA payroll taxes on
time-lost payments made to employees, including
awards made under FELA.
The Eighth Circuit disagreed and held that RRTA
taxes are not owed on time-lost payments. Pet. App. 1a
– 24a. Reading the RRTA’s definition of compensation
narrowly, the court held that time-lost payments are
not taxable because they are not made for “services
rendered,” but instead are compensation for periods of
time when “the employee did not actually render any
services.” Pet App. 20a. This crabbed reading of the
definition of compensation has grave implications for
the railroad retirement system beyond the tax treatment of FELA time-lost awards. If FELA time-lost
4
The regulation states that “[t]he term compensation is not
confined to amounts paid for active service, but includes amounts
paid for an identifiable period during which the employee is
absent from the active service of the employer . . . .”
11
awards are not subject to RRTA taxes because they are
payments for time periods during which services were
not actually rendered by the employee, there is no
logical reason why other payments for time periods
during which services are not rendered—like vacation,
holiday, and sick pay—also would not be taxable.
Under the rationale of the court below there is no way
to distinguish those types of payments—also made
for periods when an employee does “not actually
render any services”—from time-lost awards. Thus,
the decision below calls into question whether large
sums of money regularly paid to railroad employees
are subject to RRTA taxes. Many millions of dollars in
payroll taxes, which heretofore have been levied
without controversy, would be at stake. Wage-related
data showing the magnitude of these payments
provided to the Surface Transportation Board by
railroads are available at https://www.stb.gov/eco
ndata.nsf/dc81d49e325f550a852566210062addf?Open
View&Start==1& Count=300&Expand=1#1.
Other courts have reached the same outcome as
the Eighth Circuit even while rejecting its reading of
the definition of compensation under the RRTA.
See Cowden v. BNSF Ry. Co., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
91454, at *23 (E.D. Mo. 2014) (“[T]he Court finds an
FELA award of lost pay falls within the definition of
‘compensation’ under the RRTA. Contrary to Plaintiff’s
arguments, Plaintiff’s verdict is not excluded from the
definition of ‘compensation’ under the RRTA merely
because personal injury prevented Plaintiff from performing his job duties.”); Marlin v. BNSF Ry. Co., 163
F.Supp.3d 576, 579 (S.D. Iowa 2016) (agreeing with
Cowden conclusion that FELA judgments for lost pay
fall within the definition of compensation for RRTA
purposes) Loy v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 2016 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 48824 (N.D. Ind. 2016) (same). See Pet. Br. at
12
18-22, and n. 20 (explaining why the narrow definition
of “compensation” adopted by the Eighth Circuit is
incorrect and listing cases that have rejected that
interpretation).5
However, those courts have offered an alternative,
equally erroneous, rationale for holding that time-lost
awards are not taxable under the RRTA. Despite
concluding that FELA time-lost awards are compensation under the RRTA, they have held that such awards
are not subject to RRTA taxes because they are
excluded from gross income under 26 U.S.C. §104(a)(2)
as “damages . . . received . . . on account of personal
physical injuries.” Cowden, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
91454, at *26-29; Marlin, 163 F.Supp.3d at 581-82;
Loy, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48824, at *11-14. The
Missouri Supreme Court also concluded that FELA
awards are not subject to RRTA payroll taxes because
personal injury awards are not subject to federal
income taxes pursuant to 26 U.S.C. §104(a)(2), nor to
payroll taxes under the Federal Insurance Contributions
Act (FICA), 26 U.S.C. §§3101 et seq., the statute which
funds Social Security benefits. Mickey v. BNSF Ry.
Co., 437 S.W.3d 207, 211-12 (Mo. 2014).6 But these courts
also have misread the statute and upset the symmetry
between the benefit and tax sides of the railroad
retirement coin. Standard Office Bldg. Corp., v. United
States, 819 F.2d 1371, 1373 (7th Cir. 1987) (The RRA
5
However, a recent Illinois appellate court adopted the
reasoning of the court below. Munoz v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 2018
Il. App. (1st) 171009 (Ill. App. 2018).
6
See Redfield v. Insur. Co. of N. Am., 940 F.2d 542, 548 (9th
Cir. 1991) (income excludable from income taxes under §104 also
is excluded from FICA payroll taxes).
13
is “the expenditure side of the coin” and the RRTA “is
the revenue side.”).
In contrast, other courts have correctly concluded
that time-lost payments are taxable compensation
for the purposes of the RRTA notwithstanding their
exclusion from gross income under 26 U.S.C. §104.
Phillips v. Chicago Cent. & Pac. R.R., 853 N.W.2d 636,
649 (Iowa 2014) (The RRA and RRTA are “inextricably
interconnected because the latter funds the former”
and it is “logical to read these two statutes in harmony
to conclude that compensation as used in the RRTA
implicitly includes time lost.”); Heckman v. Burlington
N. Santa Fe Ry, Co., 837 N.W.2d 532, 540 (Neb. 2013);
Liberatore v. Monongahela Ry. Co., 140 A.3d 16, 29
(Pa. Super 2016) (“Although the Mickey Court attempted
to disassociate the RRA and RRTA, we find the
statutes are inextricably intertwined, and must be
considered in pari materia. Indeed, without the benefits provided for in the RRA, there would be no need
for the taxing provisions of the RRTA.”); Norfolk S. Ry.
Co. v. Williams, 2018 Ala. Civ. App. LEXIS 101 (Ala.
Civ. App. 2018). These courts have focused on the
relationship between the RRTA and RRA—and the
connection between the taxes paid and benefits
received—in concluding that time-lost payments must
be treated similarly under both statutes.
D. Railroad Employees’ RRA Benefits are
Enhanced By Their Receipt of Pay for
Time Lost and Therefore Railroad Retirement Taxes Must Be Paid on Time-Lost
Awards.
The RRA, which is designed to provide specific
benefits to a specific class of beneficiaries, cannot be
considered as separate from and unconnected to the
RRTA, the statute that levies the taxes which fund
14
those benefits. Rather, these statutes must be seen
as inextricably interconnected, and payments that
are compensation under one must also be treated as
compensation under the other. As the Court explained
in Galveston By Bd. of Trustees v. United States, 22 Cl.
Ct. 600, 610 (Cl. Ct. 1991):
The taxes on employees and carriers under
RRTA . . . are earmarked to fund the
retirement, . . . and disability benefits payable
under the RRA . . . . The statutes that provide
the benefits to railroad employees and the
statutes that provide the supporting taxes are
parts of the same legislative scheme. They are
two sides of the same coin. Although the RRB
administers the employee benefits system,
and the IRS administers tax collections that
support the system, the statutory scheme is
highly integrated.
See also Standard Office Bldg. Corp., 819 F.2d at 1373
(The RRTA imposes “an employment or payroll tax on
both employer and employee, with the proceeds used
to pay pensions and other benefits.”); Florida E. Coast
Ry. Co. v. United States, 470 F.2d 513, 515 (Ct. Cl.
1972) (“The funding of [RRA] benefits . . . is provided
by an employment tax levied equally on the railroad
employers and their employees . . . .”). This close
connection between the two statutes should inform
this Court’s analysis.
The definition of compensation under the RRA is
highly relevant to the tax treatment of time-lost
awards, far more relevant than how such awards are
treated for income tax purposes, or how analogous
payments are treated under FICA. The RRA’s definition of “compensation” includes pay for “time lost,”
including pay for an “absence on account of personal
15
injury.” 45 U.S.C. §231(h)(1) & (2). While the definition
of compensation under the RRTA does not expressly
refer to time-lost payments, 26 U.S.C. §3231(e)(1), the
Treasury Department maintains the position that, as
it does under the RRA, compensation under the RRTA
includes “pay for time lost.” 26 C.F.R. §31.3231(e)1(a)(3)-(4). There is a sound reason for this.
Both eligibility for, and the level of, benefits payable
to a retired railroad employee under the RRA are
based on the employee’s years of service and the
amount of compensation with which the employee is
credited. 20 C.F.R. §211.1; Railroad Retirement
Handbook at 15 (“Benefits are based on earnings
credits and months of service.”). See 45 U.S.C.
§231a(a)(1) (describing eligibility for both retirement
and disability benefits); 45 U.S. C. §231a(b) (describing eligibility for supplemental retirement benefits).
And “[a]ny month or any part of a month during which
an employee performed no active service but received
pay for time lost as an employee is counted as a month
of service,” 20 C.F.R. §210.5(d), and is considered
“creditable compensation.” 20 C.F.R. §211.3(a). Thus,
for the purpose of calculating the benefits for which a
railroad worker will become eligible, payment received
for time lost (including pay received due to a personal
injury) is included in determining both the employee’s
“years of service,” 45 U.S.C. §231(f)(1), and “compensation.” 45 U.S.C. §231(h)(1)&(2); 20 C.F.R. §211.2(b)(2).
As a result, when a FELA award for lost wages is
made, and treated as a payment for time lost under
the RRA, the employee realizes a distinct benefit
because such treatment serves to increase the employee’s years of service and compensation. See Pet. Br. at
11, 26 (Mr. Loos received credit for four months of
service as a result of the time-lost payment received as
16
part of his FELA award). The rationale for this
treatment is that but for the injury which caused the
employee to miss work, he or she would have been
working for the railroad and earning compensation.
The RRB has explained that
[t]he intent behind the pay for time lost
concept is to treat an employee as if he or she
had actually performed compensated services
during an identifiable period of time. The
effect of pay for time lost upon eligibility and
benefits under the RRA [ ] is identical to the
effect of regular earnings for which service
and compensation credit are received.
Pay for Time Lost From Regular Railroad Employment
at 1; see Jacques v. R.R. Retirement Bd., 736 F.2d 34,
39-40 (2d Cir. 1984) (where the plaintiff’s FELA
complaint alleged loss of earnings due to the injury,
the settlement award entered into was considered to
be pay for time lost, resulting in the five months
missed from work being counted as creditable compensation, thereby qualifying the plaintiff for a
disability annuity under the RRA).
Because the employee receives RRA credit for the
time lost, there is no rationale for permitting the
employee to avoid the RRTA tax payment obligation.
Had the employee-FELA claimant been working, he or
she would have been paying railroad retirement taxes,
which the railroad employer would deduct automatically from the employee’s paycheck. As the court in
Liberatore explained:
[u]nder the RRA, a railroad employee receives
an increase in benefits based upon his
‘average monthly compensation.’ That ‘compensation’ includes pay for time lost ‘on
17
account of personal injury.’ Because an
employee’s RRA benefits increase based upon
‘time lost’ pay in a personal injury award, it
follows that the same ‘time lost’ award should
be taxed under RRTA to pay those benefits.
140 A.3d at 29. (citations omitted) (emphasis in the
original). See also Williams, 2018 Ala. Civ. App. 101,
at *31 (agreeing with the rationale of Liberatore).
That is why the non-taxability of personal injury
awards for income tax or FICA tax purposes has
nothing to do with the tax treatment of those awards
under the RRTA. A FELA award for time lost
enhances a railroad worker’s future railroad retirement benefits. In contrast, the receipt of a personal
injury award neither confers an additional governmental benefit funded out of general funds nor
enhances the plaintiff’s Social Security benefits.
[T]he SSA does not explicitly include an
employee’s pay for lost time due to personal
injury when calculating benefits. Therefore, it
follows that for purposes of collecting SSA
taxes, FICA also does not tax an award for
time lost due to personal injury.
Liberatore, 140 A. 3d at 30 (citation omitted).
Unpersuaded, the court below concluded that it
“should not read the RRTA and the RRA in pari
materia and that it is inappropriate to import the
RRA’s definition of ‘compensation’ into the RRTA.” Pet
App. 23a.7 In discounting the close interconnection
7
Similarly, Mickey explained that the RRA’s definition of
compensation is irrelevant because “[t]he RRA and RRTA are
separate statutes that are administered by separate agencies and
serve different purposes,” 437 S.W.3d at 214.
18
between the RRA and RRTA the Eighth Circuit noted
that the “taxes paid by and on behalf of an employee
[under the RRTA] do not necessarily correlate with
the benefits to which the employee may be entitled
under the RRA.” Pet. App. 23a (quoting Hisquardo v.
Hisquardo, 439 U.S. 572, 575 (1979) (internal quotation marks omitted)). That statement misses the
larger point. While there is not necessarily a dollarfor-dollar correlation between the taxes paid and the
benefits received, the taxes paid and hours of service
credited directly enhance the benefits for which the
employee ultimately will become eligible. See Hance v.
Norfolk S. Ry Co., 571 F.3d 511, 523 (6th Cir. 2009)
(when the railroad pays tier I and tier II taxes on an
employee’s back pay award, the employee “will receive
retirement credit for the time periods covered by the
back pay award, putting him in the position he would
have been in had he not been discharged.”); Norton v.
R.R. Retirement Bd., 69 F.3d 282, 283 (8th Cir. 1995)
(“‘time lost’ from active service counts toward an
employee’s total years of service if the employer
compensates the employee for the time lost”).
Recognizing the connection between the benefits
and tax sides of the railroad retirement system, for
more than a half-century the IRS has consistently
maintained the position that the income tax treatment
of personal injury awards under section 104 has no
bearing on the RRTA tax treatment of pay for time
lost. See IRS Rev. Rul. 61-1, 1961-1-C.B. 14, 1961 WL
12630 (1961) (ruling that payment received by a
railroad employee under a settlement agreement for
personal injuries was excluded from gross income for
income tax purposes even though that same amount
was taxable as pay for time lost under RRTA,
explaining that tax treatment of a payment under the
RRTA “is not controlling” for purposes of determining
19
the tax treatment for income tax purposes); IRS
Rev. Rul. 85-97, 1985-2.C.B. 50, 1985 WL 287177
(1985) (reaffirming after the 1975 and 1983 RRTA
amendments that a personal injury settlement was
excludable from gross income, notwithstanding its
treatment as taxable pay for time lost under the
RRTA); See also IRS, Technical Advice Memorandum
8115012, 1980 WL 137627 (1980) (“payments are
excludable from gross income under section 104(a)(2)
of the Code, but constitute compensation for purposes
of RRTA”); IRS, Technical Advice Memorandum
9322001, 1993 WL 187036 (1993) (explaining why
removal of the specific reference to time lost from the
RRTA’s definition of compensation does not mean that
time lost payments are excluded from taxable compensation under the RRTA); See also Pet Br. at 28-33
(explaining the purpose of the deletions of the references to time lost in the definition of compensation
under the RRTA, and why those deletions did not
change the meaning of compensation).
Some courts have reasoned that because wages
(compensation) paid to an employee are a subset of
gross income, if personal injury payments are excluded
from gross income they necessarily cannot be considered compensation. E.g., Cowden, 2014 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 91454, at *26-27; Mickey, 437 S.W. 3d at 212.
But the statute does not subscribe to that logic.
Personal injury damages is one of a number of items
the Internal Revenue Code expressly excludes from
gross income. The RRTA expressly incorporates some,
but not all, of those exclusions from gross income into
its definition of “compensation,” meaning they are also
20
not considered RRTA compensation.8 If all of the
exclusions from gross income were necessarily excluded
from compensation under the RRTA because compensation is a subset of gross income, there would be no
reason to specifically reference those exclusions in the
RRTA. That Congress did so confirms that it did not
intend to automatically import all of the income tax
code’s exclusions from gross income wholesale into the
RRTA. Indeed, while specifically incorporating many
of the exclusions from gross income, the RRTA does not
incorporate the exclusion of personal injury awards
under §104(a)(2).
* * *
The purpose of the unified railroad retirement
statutory scheme—to provide for and fund retirement
and other benefits for railroad retirees—is undermined if the definitions of compensation under the
RRA and RRTA are decoupled, or if the personal injury
exclusion of 26 U.S.C. §104 is applied to RRTA taxes.
Allowing railroad employees to receive credit for timelost payments that can serve to enhance the benefits
they will receive, or hasten their eligibility for those
8
See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. §3231(e)(5), incorporating exclusions
under 26 U.S.C. §74(c) (employee achievement awards), 26 U.S.C.
§108(f)(4) (amounts received under federal or state student loan
forgiveness programs), 26 U.S.C. 117 (qualified scholarships),
and 26 U.S.C. §132 (fringe benefits); 26 U.S.C. §3231(e)(6),
incorporating exclusion under 26 U.S.C. §127 (employer-provided
educational assistance); 26 U.S.C. §3231(e)(9), incorporating exclusion under 26 U.S.C. §119 (value of meals and lodging furnished
by employer); 26 U.S.C. §3231(e)(10), incorporating exclusion
under 26 U.S.C. §106(b) (medical savings account contributions);
26 U.S.C. §3231(e)(11), incorporating exclusion under 26 U.S.C.
§106(d) (employer contributions to health savings accounts);
26 U.S.C. §3231(e)(12), incorporating exclusions under 26 U.S.C.
§422(b) and §423(b) (qualified stock options).
21
benefits, while exempting those payments from the
very taxes which fund those benefits, is bad policy as
it undermines Congress’ carefully calibrated balance
between benefits and funding. Ultimately, such a
result would mean additional funding will be required
to keep the systems in financial balance. Absent some
clear indication from Congress that it intended that
there be a lack of balance between the calculation of
benefits on the one hand and the funding of those
benefits on the other, the statutes should not be read
to create such an imbalance.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons the ruling below should be
reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
KATHRYN D. KIRMAYER
DANIEL SAPHIRE
Counsel of Record
ASSOCIATION OF
AMERICAN RAILROADS
425 3rd Street, S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20024
(202) 639-2505
dsaphire@aar.org
Counsel for Amicus Curiae
Association of
American Railroads
July 27, 2018
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.