Oral argument — United States v. Fatih Sonmez

May it please the court, my name is Hassan Ahmed. I represent the appellant Mr. Fatih Sonmez in this case, and I'm here to argue that the district court committed a reversible error when it gave jury instructions that effectively steered the jury's attention away from a paramount and extremely important, and as I will argue, an element of the statute, this consideration, and that is whether the defendant intended to establish a life together with his U.S. citizen wife. Let me ask you, did the district court just parroted the statute in instructing the jury, right? The district court followed the letter of the statute and really followed... My question is, did the district court just parrot the statute in instructing the jury? Yes it did, your honor. And that was not error to do that, was it? I believe it was, your honor. So why aren't you asking that an added element be added to the crime? It seems to me that whether the parties intended to establish a life together may be relevant to the issue of whether they had the purpose of evading the immigration laws in entering into the marriage, but that to elevate it to the status of significance that you're suggesting would essentially make it another element that's not included in the statute as written. And in the four circuits that, your honors, know that follow the establish a life test, it is, in fact, an element in the statute of 1325C, and even in three out of the four circuits that have published decisions on following the evade the law test, even there, establishment of a life together is considered a relevant factor for the jury to consider. It's a relevant factor, but the question is not whether this was a sham marriage. The question in this case is whether the marriage was entered into for the purpose of evading the law. And the district court chose not to get into the issue whether it's a sham marriage or not. The question is whether the marriage was entered into for the purpose, whatever marriage was entered into for the purpose of evading the law. And that's what the statute prohibits, right? It does prohibit that, your honor. But we have to look and deter and punish marriage fraud. No, I know, but marriage fraud is defined by the statute to be a marriage entered into for the purpose. And it doesn't evaluate whether the marriage ends up being a life together or whether they have 20 kids thereafter. If the purpose of entering into that marriage was to evade the law, that's the violation, isn't it? Only under the only published decision that states that. No, no, I'm saying the statute. Let's We can't do that? In order to look at what the statute means, the way it has to be interpreted. That's the crux of our argument. It's the crux of our appeal, your honor. I understand, but I'm suggesting to you, it's a little bit along the lines of Judge Keenan is asking, you want to keep putting before the jury whether this was a legitimate marriage. And the statute doesn't care about that. The statute cares about why the marriage was entered into. Reading the statute that way, your honor, is problematic for a number of reasons. Let me ask you just to take the words. Knowingly enters into a marriage for the purpose of evading immigration laws. And how that's the whole violation entered into for the purpose of evading. And evasion of the immigration law is defined, is understood, and is only going to be able to be proven by being able to show that the parties did not intend to establish a life together. Otherwise, it doesn't follow necessarily. It may be evidence of it. And it is a the issue is still going to be for the jury is why did they marry? Not whether the marriage was a good one or they loved each other. Whether they intended to live one week or 20 years. It says what the purpose of the marriage. Isn't that the word that statute uses? The purpose. It does say the purpose. Right. And it says the purpose and that's another issue that we had. Well, let's stick with the one first. You're objecting to them, the court not instructing the jury on the quality of the marriage. And I'm suggesting to you, it's sort of irrelevant under the statute. This the only court that has taken that strict of a reading of the statutory language is the United States versus Darif in the Seventh Circuit. The other circuits, including the ones that have been cited to in the unpublished opinions by this court, U.S. v. Borodniak and Dugaev and U.S. v. Calaf and Provatka, I believe it is. These are the four unpublished decisions in the Fourth Circuit, all cite to the Sixth and the Tenth Circuit decisions, U.S. versus Islam and U.S. And those cases all state that establishment of a life together is a consideration for the jury. That may be and the other courts may have it wrong. But let's look at what you're asking us to do in this case. In this case, and I think it's already been established by way of answers to questions, the district court essentially read in this charge, read the statute, correct? It on the face and the words of the statute, correct? A literal reading of it, correct, Your Honor? Well, then the answer would be yes. Yes. And so then you're asking us to say to the district court, you read the statute correctly, but you got it wrong. How in the world do we do that? By adding something to it that's not on the face of the statute. Because if you don't add that to this real-world situation. If you don't add anything to it, then you apply the law exactly as Congress wrote it, don't you? And what did Congress mean when it passed this statute? Well, you know, by virtue of the words they used. That's correct, Your Honor. Which was for the purpose of evading immigration law. And when you evade the immigration law, that has to be proven. The factor of this analysis. You're entitled to prove that. You could argue it to a jury. But Congress didn't require that to be shown. And in this case, that's exactly what was done, Your Honor. There was plentiful evidence. You got your day in court, but the instruction's not erroneous. But the instruction steers, and we would submit, Your Honor, with respect, that the instruction was erroneous. It steers them right into Congress's teeth. It steers attention away from the trial. Maybe you should be presenting this testimony to a Congressional committee. I mean, you may have a valid point about it, but you want the statute to read differently than it does. But even as the elements of the statute, as I still point out, it would be something odd about us saying to a district court, you read the statute exactly as it's written, but that's not the law. But you could, under this, couldn't you argue what you wanted to argue? Couldn't you argue to the jury and offer evidence that it wasn't for the purpose of evading the law, the immigration law? You just, we love each other, and we just, I don't, we don't care what the law is. We love each other, and we get married. Can't you, did anybody preclude you from presenting the evidence? That's the best defense you could put on, right? And that's what, that's exactly the defense that was put on. But the jury instruction, the jury attention away from any and all evidence of the establishment of a life test, or evidence of establishment of a life together. It focused on the words, the purpose. And at the time the marriage was entered into, correct? Right, for the purpose, and that's the whole violation, nothing more. And the only court that has read it that way is the U.S. v. DeReef. Even the court- Well, how can you read it any other way? Give me a way that you read that statute differently. The First Circuit, the Second Circuit- No, no, I want you to tell me, don't give me another court. Tell me how do you read this statute differently? I read it by saying that the purpose of the bill of the Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments Act in 1986, and I've got the House and Senate reports here, was to deter immigration-related marriage fraud. Okay? Marriage fraud is defined- What words would you put into this statute to make it clearer? I would, I would, I would model it based on the proposed jury instruction to say that it is, it is necessary for the government to prove that there was no intent to establish a life together. The sham, the fraud, fraudulent nature of a marriage for immigration purposes- And that changes the statute, doesn't it? When you enter into a marriage with no intent to live together, that's different than entering into a marriage for the purpose of evading laws. That is a factor, and it's a, the, the, the factor that was intended by Congress to be submitted. And that's exactly the same, the same consideration that is given under the, under the agency regulations. When the Department of Homeland Security or USCIS is adjudicating these petitions for marriage, they always look to see whether or not the party's intended to establish a life together and cannot- Well, that focuses on, you know, the statute looks affirmatively to the purpose of evading the law. Now, if you want to defend the statute and say, we didn't enter into a marriage for the purpose of proving the opposite, we entered in the marriage because we loved each other or we wanted to live forever together, that would tend to prove you didn't enter into for the purpose. It doesn't necessarily resolve it, but it could be. But to charge the jury with the affirmative statement that Congress imposed and not to say how you're going to disprove the case, you could argue that. And I gather you did argue that, right? I did, Your Honor. Yeah. I did. Yeah. But the problem with reading it that strictly, Your Honor, again- It's not reading it strictly. It's just telling the jury what the law is. According to the United States v. DeReef, the Seventh Circuit, that's the only court that's read it that way. Every other court, including the ones that say that it's not necessarily an element of the statute, and that's the Sixth Circuit and the Tenth Circuit and the- You need to be a little bit careful about that argument, I think. When I was a district judge, one time somebody argued a motion to me, a very complicated motion, on mail fraud, and I ruled against the defense attorney. And he went, Your Honor, no judge in the country has ever ruled that way. And I went, well, now one has. And so to say all the other circuits, there's only one that's ruled this way, that doesn't really carry a lot of weight, unless their rationale, in light of those words, that's what would carry weight. Does it? Does it not always come down in a case like yours as to the purpose of the marriage? And how can- I would agree. And the word, the purpose, is not defined anywhere in the statute. And so wouldn't that be the basis, then, to offer up all the evidence you had, and then to make the argument? It may have been that it helps us get past immigration laws. That's not why we did it. Why we did it? We did it because we can't stand to be apart. In these cases that cite the language you're talking about, none of them added it as an element. They basically- the Ninth Circuit did, but the others didn't. And they basically said it's a consideration you can look at. But the court doesn't have to lay out all the considerations the jury has to look at, especially when you're arguing it and you're free to argue it. The court didn't tell you you couldn't argue that. But look at the jury instruction that was given did not tell the jury they could even consider it. It said that the crime was complete if there was proof of evasion of the immigration law. It just said, jury, decide whether this marriage was entered into for the purpose of evading the law. And it didn't- And the jury answered that question. And you go to the jury and you say, we did not enter into this marriage for the purpose of evading the law. We entered in this marriage for the purpose of living together because we loved each other. And you could argue that and did argue it. And the jury didn't buy it. I see my time is up, your honor. I can respond. You do have rebuttal. I do have rebuttal. Yeah, all right. We'll see. We'll hear from you then. Mr. Cunningham. Good morning, your honors. And may it please the court, Michael Cunningham for appellee of the United States. Your honors, the United States contends that the district court properly instructed the jury as to the elements of the offense. As the court has recognized, the district court essentially instructed- It just read the statute. Excuse me, your honor? It just read the statute. It didn't add anything to it or that was it. That's correct, your honor. It did elaborate in terms of instructing the jury as to what constituted knowingly for purposes of reaching that conclusion and gave them some additional information as to how they could examine what goes to intent. But it did not specifically adopt the recommended or proposed instructions of the defendant in this case that included essentially two separate components, as you have recognized. One was the notion that the government had to prove that the defendant did not intend to establish a life. And the second component, and there was not discussion about this point, but it is raised in this appeal, and I'd like to address it, is that the purpose, the sole purpose for the marriage had to be for the intention- Honestly, I do not understand, because you just haven't read it enough, the President's order on the state of immigration in the country. I'm just not quite clear what that is. But is it the position of the government that there are some people who in fact broke the law to be present, and they've been present for five years or some such number, and therefore they will not be deported? Is that generally right? Is that generally right? Your Honor, I'm quite anxious to comment on what the President's position is. I haven't- No, I didn't ask that. I'm just trying to understand it, not if you think it's- But isn't that right? It seems to me that that is right. You may not want to say that. Your Honor, I agree that I believe that there are some individuals under the President's position who, notwithstanding a period of time that they've been present here without authority, will be entitled to stay. So that they broke the law, but that's fine. They're still allowed to stay, correct? Is there something a little bit odd in that being the case, and somebody who gets married in perhaps less than perfect circumstances has to leave? Does that just strike you as odd? Your Honor, I think the whole subject of the immigration laws and enforcement- Justice is pressing on a case like this and other cases that we see. Well, Your Honor, I think that there is one distinction. First of all, with respect to this particular defendant, Mr. Samez, the question of whether or not he violated the law by engaging in marriage fraud subjects him to a criminal proceeding for which, in this case, he was convicted and punished. It doesn't necessarily mean that he'll be deported. But the Justice Department didn't have to bring the prosecution. No, Your Honor. Because I suspect there are prosecutions that can be brought on some of those people who will be allowed to stay that just- I'm not faulting, but for prosecutorial discretion, they just aren't being brought. They won't be brought. I would agree, Your Honor. There is- So see, there's kind of a circuit argument to go, well, no, this person violated the law and got prosecuted for it, but it's the same Justice Department that's deciding to prosecute or not to prosecute, and they enforce the law. It just seems to me- I hate to use the word, but it seems a little perverse. And just let me say, and I'll let you answer. But part of the problem is I understand that with people who are here, I say illegally. I don't know what the word is. Maybe it's against not following procedures. Because they are under the radar. They're under the radar. They don't come forward. They don't do things to make them part and get in- sort of taken into the operation of the country. But to get married, don't you have to go and get a marriage license? Yes. Don't you put your name? You make yourself obvious? You- anybody- you at least announce your presence, but somehow that person gets deported. Yes, Your Honor. I- but I would draw your attention to one distinction. To the extent that there is a prosecution proceeding, that is the Department of Justice. With regard to the processing of immigrants for remove- who are removable and to be deported, that comes under the Department of Homeland Security. Yeah. And I would- That's why they're all the same administration, no matter what it is, honestly. Yes, Your Honor. I- I don't- And I- by the way, this is- I'm not making a specific attack on any particular President Obama. I'm not doing that. I'm just sort of blending this together because I see it in other- in other cases. I- I just- it's just interesting to me. I guess maybe it's just making its way through the system to see how all that shakes out, I guess. Well, yes, Your Honor. And as an aside, obviously the proceeding of the defendant in this case as to whether he's removable and whether he will be removed is collateral to the criminal proceeding. The conviction is certainly relevant in that context, but it is a separate proceeding. To come back to the- the subject of the established-to-life test, I would submit to the Court that contrary to appellant's suggestion, the Courts have actually- the Courts that have published on this and have decided on this have actually fallen out much more strongly in rejecting that proposition. In addition to Dareef, for example, the Fifth Circuit in Ortiz-Mendez specifically rejected the proposition. It actually reflected on the circuits that had made the decision at that point in time, suggesting actually that the Eighth Circuit in the Yang decision adopted and established a life test. I- I would respectfully defy the Court to find that in the Yang decision and suggest that the Eighth Circuit, like the Eleventh Circuit, have all rather specifically rejected and established a life test as an element of the offense and adopted the evade-the-law test, which is reflected in the District Court's instructions in this case. But they aren't completely parallel propositions. You certainly agree that whether the person intended to establish a life with another person can be relevant. Yes, ma'am. Whether there was an intent to break the law. Absolutely. You're just saying it can't be elevated to the status of an element of the crime. That's correct, Your Honor. And indeed, as you identified during Appellant's argument, the Appellant in this case was not in any way precluded from presenting that very theory of his defense, if you will. The defendant testified- testified in stark contrast to the woman he married, who basically testified having already pled guilty herself to marriage fraud. She testified, I'd met him a few weeks before we got married. It was arranged. There was a financial arrangement undertaken. I married him. We took the pretense. We took the pictures. We did things with the expectation that we would voice this upon immigration as a legitimate marriage. And I undertook to fulfill that responsibility. But at the time they got married, she certainly knew that it was for purposes of him getting a green card, and she hoped to get some remunerative benefit to her. The establish a life test that the defendant- the Appellant would ask you to adopt as an element in this case is really way too ambiguous. While we don't dispute that if a party presents evidence that they intended to live together, establish a life, that that certainly would have relevance and bearing on the question of whether they intended to evade immigration laws, it is very ambiguous. And I- without trying to sound trite and bring up something that would be ludicrous, today what constitutes a married life? The defendant cited to a 1953 Supreme Court decision in which the court then reflected on the conventional standards of what marriage is. And I'm sure this court has heard cases and acknowledges that the standard or that what constitutes conventional marriage is- has evolved in the last 60 years and most significantly in the last several years. In many jurisdictions, the definition of what is a marriage has changed. But- but if you were to say, for example, one spouse decided to live on the west coast, one spouse decided to live on the east coast, they would never meet. They might communicate via Skype once a month, no conjugal or intimate relations, but they decided that that was their concept of a married life. How can that be simply because they say that's their married life? I- I offer that rather extreme example because I think it suggests that using establish a life or adopting establish a life as an element, a standard, is very ambiguous and would be an unfair application. Another- the second component to the appellant's argument- And also probably, if you brought it into the instructions, it probably focuses the jury's effort on the quality of the marriage and the nature of the marriage, which the statute really doesn't do. They basically say if you use any form of marriage for the purpose of evading and getting the benefit of the immigration adjustment of status, then you violate the law. And it doesn't matter what the nature of the marriage is, it matters why it was entered into. And if it's in the purposes to evade the law and theoretically could get an adjustment status that you say we're married under whatever definition you use, that violates the law. Yes, your honor. And in fact, another circuit has actually reflected on the fact that a party could actually enter into what they- a marriage that had anticipated as going forward, which would presumably satisfy the establish a life test, but with that very purpose of evading the law that you could essentially have both of those particular things met. I would agree that- To be of equal dignity? Well- In other words, can any ancillary purpose of evading the immigration laws satisfy for purposes of criminal intent as long as the people had the intent to establish a life together? What troubles me about this statute is that it talks about the purpose. And a purpose can be very minor and can be overwhelmed by another purpose. Purposes aren't mutually exclusive, certainly. And you can have an infinite number of purposes. So how does a person seeking to abide by the law know what is intended by the statutory language? When I look at this and I'm really marrying because I want to be with this person, what does the purpose mean to the person who's trying to comply with the law? Your honor, I believe in the context that you described, the purpose would be where an individual who is otherwise not legally entitled to remain in the country or in trying to adjust his or her status goes to a marriage with the intent to skirt the country. I acknowledge the point that you make- But what if all that's true? But he still loves the person he's going to marry. And he's very happy to be able to stay in the country, but he is really, really happy with who his wife's going to be. That's the point. I agree, your honor. And I think in that context, and this comes back to the point you raised earlier as to the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. In a footnote in the government's brief, I pointed out that an alien who was legitimately in the country and was of marrying age and decided that he or she was looking for a spouse and decided that their focus would be on US citizens only. Because if they found someone, they wanted to be able to remain here and proceed- If the result of the marriage would be to evade the law, is that enough? Your honor, in that context- Not in any context, it's just I'm asking. Better say no. No, your honor. I appreciate it. That's one of the best answers you've had so far. If I could come back to the issue, though, of the sole purpose test. The court has actually reflected in one of the decisions of this court, one of the unpublished decisions of this court, the court actually acknowledged that a purpose might be that if somebody wanted to engage in consensual sex and at the same time skirt the immigration laws that would bring about their imminent removability or deportation, that those could be not in competition with each other, but it wouldn't defeat the illegality of the marriage. I would also suggest that the reason that the sole purpose test shouldn't be adopted and that element shouldn't be grafted on to this particular statute is that it too would work in essentially an unfair and unworkable and unprovable burden, unsustainable burden, if you will, on the government. For example, and trying to stay away from the salacious, there might be an alien who is 30 years old and has never been married and his mother in the old country is nagging him constantly about, why aren't you married? Why aren't you married? And he's about to be deported. He goes and gets into an arranged marriage, but in the back of his mind, wow, this is a good thing too. I'm going to get my mother off my back and I'm not going to have to listen to the harangue about being married. Would we say, would we adopt it? Well, that's a purpose in addition to the purpose of evading the immigration laws that would obviate the impact of this law. And I would submit that it does not. I would like to- Well, in this case, the woman, I guess the jury believed her and her testimony basically was that was the only reason that they got together, that she was solicited with the offer of money to enter into marriage so that he could stay. That's correct, your honor. So I don't know why we have to resolve questions that go to the margins when the evidence on the purpose, whether it has to be sole purpose or a substantial purpose or contributing purpose. In this case, if you believed him, it would not be for the purpose of evading the law. It was a relationship that grew naturally. If you believe her, it was for the purpose of evading the law and only that purpose basically, because the scenario she talked about was she was approached, offered money to get married with him and did get married for that purpose. Yes, your honor. And to the extent- Is that principle then that if you enter into a marriage, which marriage has the result of you being allowed to stay in the country, you better go to every end to keep your spouse happy? Of course, that probably helps in any circumstance, but- Well, your honor, the law examines the marriage at the time of the marriage. So frankly, while one would hope that- I don't think the statute requires that. It does not examine the marriage at the time of the marriage. It examines the purpose of conduct. And to me, that is the point I was trying to make to your colleague, that I think Congress was focusing on the reason for entering into whatever this thing is called as a marriage. They're going to proffer that relationship to stay in the country, whether it's a good marriage, bad marriage, loving, ranged, fraudulent, whatever. They're going to proffer that. If that marriage was entered into for the purpose of evading the law, then it's illegal. Yes, your honor. And so it's the entering into, I think the word enters. Mr. Kuttenkamp, let me ask you a question of statutory interpretation. When you look at subsection C, the statute talks about the purpose of evading, okay? It doesn't say if any person knowingly enters into a marriage intending to evade, okay? It says the purpose as opposed to a purpose. And we have lots of case law that says that the use of the word the, where a could be used, tends to suggest a singular purpose. In other words, a singular purpose in this case, rather than for any purpose, including the intent to evade. How would you answer that? I understand the statutory construction and would agree that, and I think the focus should be that the purpose, as one of the questions posed was, if the principle motivating factor is... So if you were writing the opinion of the court then, how would you describe what the purpose of evading means? Would you say it's for the principal purpose or simply a purpose? Any purpose, whether principal or ancillary? If you're the judge writing the opinion, how would you write it? I would write it the way the statute does construct it, your honor, that the purpose was to... You have to tell the litigants what that means. What does the purpose mean? Does it mean the principal purpose? Does it mean any purpose? Any purpose of, you know, if it's 5% of the reason, is that good enough? See, I'm struggling with it. You know, your answer suggests a model of clarity under the statute, but when it comes to explaining it, it gets a little more dicey. Yes, your honor, and perhaps... So how would you write that? Your honor, the Congress, I think, would have to rewrite the statute in order to invite... I'm asking you how you would write the opinion. I would say then that the purpose and the jury has to decide, was this entered for wrongful reasons? Did the parties essentially know? As this court instructed the jury in that... No, no, no. The question, though, the answer to her, I don't think that answers her question. The question is, would you read that as the and carried in sole purpose, or would you read that as the indicating which purpose? The purpose of evading so that if a purpose is present to evade, then the purpose to evade is present. Isn't that how you have to look at it? Your honor, I see my time has expired. Well, you'd answer that for us, though. I do believe you have to look at it that way. Which way? It essentially... The... Do you say that the, in this sentence, doesn't indicate sole? It is not the sole purpose, your honor. Thank you, your honor. Okay. Mr. Armitage, if you don't mind. I think Judge Keenan really, really touched on the crux of our appeal here. A purpose versus the purpose. Judge Niemeyer, you asked me before that, didn't the judge in this case just read the statute and instruct the jury on the statute? And my response to that was that there needs to be at least some sort of instruction to the jury in a case like this, that establishment of a life or evidence of the establishment of a life is there. Do you agree in this case, based on the evidence, that if the jury believed your client that the court or the jury would have had no trouble with whether it's the sole purpose or the purpose, basically your client testified it wasn't involved at all in that purpose, that relationship grew up naturally and they got married out of a natural relationship of loving each other and they get married. And if the jury believed the woman, then it didn't matter either because the way she testified, she said, I met him a couple weeks before, I was given money and that's why I've entered into the relationship. So that it really doesn't turn, this case doesn't turn on trying to parrot out what the purpose means. I would suggest if I were trying to figure out what Congress said, I would think that they are not looking at a quantum of purpose but an effective purpose. In other words, the sentence is driven by the word enters. And so if you enter in the marriage for the purpose of evading, the direct object is evadings, with the idea that it could be accomplished that way, whether it's the only purpose doesn't matter. It's got to be a potentially ineffective purpose. But regardless, in this case, does it make any difference? I think it does, Your Honor. I think it makes all the difference in the world. When you're talking about a purpose of, and any two people getting married can marry for a multitude of purposes. You're giving me a hypothetical. Stick with the evidence in this case. Why does the evidence in this case present the need to explain that? Because the way the jury was instructed, what it would have allowed is that even if the jury believed that and considered all of this establishment of a life evidence, that they still could have convicted him. Because they still believe that- If they believed him, they could have never convicted him. If they believed him, if we take a strict reading of the statute, saying that any intent, whether it's 1% or 0.5%, whatever- He said, I knew her for two years. We were dating. It grew into a nice relationship. We decided to get married. And they still could if the attention of the jury was steered directly into one consideration, one consideration only, and that was whether there was an intent to evade the immigration law. My submission to Your Honors is, is that you can't determine whether the immigration law has been evaded without necessarily considering establishment of a life together. It is part and parcel of it. It is inextricable. If you look back to the congressional record when this statute was passed, the Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments of 1986, they talked about two different examples of what they considered to be marriage fraud. One was the business transaction and one was the- You actually have slipped back into the other element. I thought we were talking about trying to tickle out what the word the modifying purpose meant. It is. I will get there. My suggestion to you was based on the evidence, if they believed your client, there was never any purpose of evading the law. And if they believed her, it was basically the only purpose. It is not an all or nothing thing, Your Honor. Why isn't it under the facts of this case? Right. Not generally under the facts of this case. Why does that question just go unanswered? Because didn't she present evidence which, if believed by the jury, would make out a violation under any way you read the statute? She actually testified afterward, Your Honor, in this case that they did establish a life together. They did move in together. She fell- No, no, no. She testified that she fell for him. Stay with the purpose. We're sticking at- You argued that you should have gotten the sole purpose. Or at least the primary. Right. Let's stick with that issue. And that issue is whether we need to interpret what the purpose means. And my question to you was simply that it's irrelevant to give that instruction based on the facts presented. Because under any definition of a purpose, the purpose, whatever, if the jury believed her, even a sole purpose, she testified basically to the sole purpose. And if you believed him, it didn't play a role at all. I don't think it was that simple, Your Honor, because she actually did testify that they established a life together. Not when they entered it. No, that wasn't that later. It within- Wasn't that later? Immediately afterward. Immediately afterward. As soon as they got married, they moved in. She said she was approached and offered to pay money to marry this guy so he could stay in the country. And she has asked a few questions and then agreed to do that. And they went down and And if the jury was instructed that they could consider the establishment of a life that happened afterward as a way to determine whether there was an intent to evade the immigration law on November 18th, 2008, when the parties got married, then the result might have been different. And that's the reason why you can't get away, Your Honor, from the presentment or consideration of establishment of a life together. You can't get away from it because it's part and parcel. That's how you determine whether the immigration law has been evaded. That is defined nowhere in the act. And the other last thing I'll say is trying to keep the establishment of a life evidence out of the statutory analysis when you're trying to look at 1325C creates a railroading situation because the agency, USCIS, considers establishment of a life evidence. We cannot have a situation where a marriage that could not be administratively punished under 204C... Did the District Court at any point rule out and preclude you from putting that evidence on in order to establish... I was allowed to put it on, but the instruction said no. The instruction said it was irrelevant, as Your Honor is saying. The instruction didn't say that. The instruction just read the statute. And directed, steered the jury's attention away from consideration of that. He didn't say you couldn't consider the evidence that you put on? Even then, you're looking at the... And I see my time has expired. You can answer that, sure. I'm sorry. Can you repeat the question one more time? My question was, do you agree that the District Court did not preclude you from arguing that the purpose of their marriage was to establish a life together? That is correct, Your Honor. The District Court did not preclude me from arguing that. Our issue is with the jury instruction and the way the jury's attention was steered. Thank you. Okay, we'll come down and greet counsel. Thank you. And go on to the next...