Summary Opinion 2011-8
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T.C.
Summary Opinion 2011-8
UNITED STATES TAX COURT
RODGER L. GAMBLIN AND KATHLEEN J. BURCH, Petitioners v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Docket No.
21480-09S.
Filed January 31,
2011.
Rodger L. Gamblin and Kathleen J. Burch, pro sese.
Archana Ravindranath,
for respondent.
DEAN, Special Trial Judge:
This case was heard pursuant to
the.provisions of section 7463 of the Internal Revenue Code in
effect when the petition was filed.
Pursuant to section 7463(b),
the decision to be entered is not reviewable by any other court,
and thise opinion shall not be treated as precedent for any other
case.
Unless otherwise indicated, subsequentesection references
are to the Internal Revenue Code in effect for the years at
SERVED JAN 31 2011
- 2 issue, and Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice
and Procedure .
Respondent .determined def iciencies in - petitioners'
Federal
income taxes of $15, 221 for 2004', $12, 886 for 2005, and $3, 859
for 2006.
Respondent also determined that petitioners are liable
for accuracy-related penalties under section 6662(a) of $3,044.20
for 2004 and $2,577.20 for 2005.
The parties agree that during the years 2004, 2005, and
2006, Rodger L. Gamblin (Dr. Gamblin) received gross Social
Security benefits of $16,663,
respectively.
$17,108,
and $17,809,
The parties also- agree that petitioners are not
entitled to deduct:
(1) The $3, 764 advertising expense claimed
on Kathleen J. Burch's (Dr. Burch) Schedule C, Profit or Loss
From Business, for 2004;
(2) Dr. Gamblin's Sâhedule' C legal and
professional expenses of $1,077 for 2004;
(3) Schedule C office
expenses for Dr. Gamblin for 2004 in excess of those respondent
allowed; and (4) Schedule C other expenses for Dr. Burch for 2004
and 2006 in excess of those respondent allowed.
Petitioners offered no evidence and made no argument~with
respect to deductions claimed on their Schedules A,
Deductions, and Schedules C for:
Itemized
(a) Dr. Burch's legal and
Adjustments to the taxable amount of Dr. Gamblin' s Social
Security benefits and to petitioners' itemized deductions, selfemployment tax deductions, and self-employment taxes -are
computational and will be resolved consistent with the Court' s
deciéion.
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3
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professional services expense for 2006
and (b) self-employed
health insurance expenses for 2004 and 2006.
Petitioners also
failed to offer anya evidence or argument to contest respondent's
determination that Dr. Gamblinshad no gross receipts or sales for
2006.
Thus, petitioners are deemed to have conceded these
issues.
See, e.g., Bradley v
Commiss'ioner, 100 T.C. 367, 370
(1993) ; Sundstrand Corp. Ee Subs.cv. Commissioner,
344
(1991); Rybak v.
Money v.
Commissioner,
Commissioner,
Commissioner,
87 T.C.
89 T.C.
56,
73-74
91 T.C.
46, 48
524,
96 T.C. 226, .
566 n.19
(1988);
(1987);. Leahy v.
(1986).
The parties further agree that petitioners are entitled to
deduct on Dr. Burch's Schedule C:
$3,439.83 of expenses for
legal and professional services for 2004, and an additional $739
for 2004 over the amount respondent allowed for insurance
(other
than health).
The issues remaining for decision are whether petitioners
are entitledato deduct on their respective Schedules:C amounts in
addition to those "respondent allowed,' and whether petitioners are
liable for accuracy-related penalties for 2004 and 2Ó05.
Some of the facts have been stipulated and are so found.
The stipulation of facts, supplemental stipulation of.facts, and
the exhibits received in evidence are incorporated herein by
reference.
filed.
Petitioners resided in Ohio when the petition was
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Background
Dr. Gamblin.is, and*was, during the years at issue, an
inventor and "tinkerer" who holds 36 U.S. patents.
Dr. Gamblin
is -currently working on a printing process involving "publication
gravure inks".
This printing process uses a special ink which is
designed for use in a high-speed and high-quality printing
process and is especially suited for printing large squantities of
the same item.
Dr. Gamblin is working on a formulation of this
special ink that is both biodegradable and cheaper to use than
current ink types.
»In the 1990s Dr. Gamblin developed a device called a
"cyclobelt" or "cyclomill", which is a grindingedevice that is.
unique in that a relatively cheap grinding medium rather than the
machine itself is degraded during the grinding sprocess.
The
cyclomill is also capable of grinding things that are "very
hard"; like diamonds, and it tgrinds them to "lower levels" than
can be-reached by other means.
According to*Dr. Gamblin,
however, -the Russians developed a-process that "was a lot
cheaper" tñan his process, ,and his "business kind of dried up."
Dr. Gamblin was able to rent a cyclomill to a company in
Fairfield, Ohio,* afor $5, 000 contingent on a ireviews of its patent
status:
Dr." Gamblin retained a Cincinnati -law firmy Wood,
Herridg, and Evans, to prepare a patent opinion document for the
company's review.
He received a rental payment of $5,000 in,
-
2004~.
5
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Petitioners, however, failed to report the $5, 000 rental
payment on their Federal income tax return for 2004.
- During the years at issue Dr. Gamblin worked primarily on
the gravure'printing and other 'ink types.
He also developed a
häir shampoo which is a isôap rather than a~detergent so it will
not dryeout hair.
Bécause soaps do not work well in hard water,
Dr. Gamblin added a chemical agent to remove calcium from hard
water.
Dr. Burch holds a Ph.D. in clinical psychology and was a
sole practitioner from 1989 until her retirement in 2005.
Burch practiced psychotherapy
Dr.
but her main focus was
psychologicál and neuropsychological assessment.
She did a- lots
äf work for defense attorneys and has taught eneuropsychology at
the University of Daytön.
Dr. Burch maintained, for seeing
-
patients, an office suite separate from her home cons.isting of
two looms, a waitiñg-room and a "consulting room" that contained:
(1) Two upholstered chairs;
set;
(4)
(2) one sofa;
coffee and end tables;
(3) a desk and chair
(5) a smallabookcase; -and (6)
a
ámall filing cabinet for current.patient clinical files.
Dry Burch san@atients at her office suite because she
perceived it to be too dangerous to see patients in her home.
However,
she did all of her administrative work,
insurance claim
filing, billing, and report writing at home on weekends.. The
- 6 psychological assessments she prepared required lots of- paperwork
and references.
Dri Gamblin and Dr. Burch used overlapping portions of the
home for :their respective businesses.
were used for business.
Two bedrooms of the home
The bedroom on-the third floor contained
a bed, but the bed was used for laying out in-process insurance
forms for Dr. Burch's practice; it,also contained a computer.
Outside of the third-floor bedroom in the hall were filing
cabinets full of f iles .
which had no bed
In the "big" room on the second f loor , 2
was Dr a Gamblin' s "mail place" for his
business,' where there were a fax machine, a copier,
lots of books
and catalogs for his supplies, and references, as iwell as Dr.
Burchys technical-books.
In addition, «there were stacks of boxes
f illed with insurance f,iles and f iling cabinets containing
professional literature .
There .was also a garage apartment where Dr . Burch wrote her
reports and kept a technical library.
The garage apartment was
about 21 by 17sfeet-and contained a computer and a "big plotter"
that Dr . Gamblin used in his engineering pursuits . . The basement
was used as Dr. Gamblin's "laboratory".
It hadca microscope, a
2While Dr.-Gamblin testified that the "big" bedroom was oh
the second floor, Dr. Burch inconsistently testified that the big
bedroom they used was on the third floor.
The Court will treat
Dr. Burch's testimony as having been given mistakenly.
- 7
"K-proofer"
(a machin'e used to stest prints) ,: b'ottles of dyes,- 2.
colorants, i-eagents? and more boxes of files.
. Petitioners eaåh filed Schedules Cowith their Federal income
tax retuins fons2004
2005, and 2006.
Dr. Gamblin filed a
Schedule C for sthe "Dayton Tinker Company" and Dr. Burch filed
her Schedule C a's -"Kathleen J. Burch, Psy. D. "
Discussion
Geñeñálly, the Commissioner' si determinations in a notice dfr
deficiency are presumed correct; and the taxpayer has"the burden
of prövincj that those determinations are erroneous .
142 (a) ; "Welch -v
Helvering,
290 U.:S.
111,
115
(1933)
See Rule
a
In some
cases the burden of proof with respect to relevant'factual issues
maÿ shift to the Commissioner under section 749I(à).
Petitioners
did -not 'argue ór present evidence that they sati'sfied the;
requirements of'section 7491(a).
Therefore, the-burden of proof
does not' shif t toerespondent .
Other Inconie
Section 6001 requirés a taxpayer to maintain sufficient
a ,
records to allow for the determination of the taxpayer's cörrect
tax liability.
(1989) .
Petzoldt v. Commissioner," 92 T.C. 661, 686
If a taxpayer fails 'to 'maintain or «does not produce
adequate books and records, the Commissioner is authorized to
reconstruct the taxpayer's income.
Commissioner; supra at 686-687.
Sec. 446(b); Petzoldt v.
Indirect methods may be used for
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this purpose. --Holland v. United States; 348 U.S. 121
(1954-).
The Commissioner's reconstruction need only -be reasonable in
light of all the ,surrounding facts and circumstances.
Petzoldt
v. Commissioner, supra at 687; Giddio v. Commissioner, 54 T.C.
1530, 41533
(1970).
Respondent determined through a bank deposits analysis that
petitioners had unreported income for 2004 of $8,405 and for 2006
of $3,774-.
income.
Bank.deposits constitute prima facie evidence of
Tokarski v. Commissioner, 87-T.C. 74, 77
(1986).
The
bank deposits method of determining :income assumes that all the
money deposited into a taxpayer's bank account during a specific
period constitutes taxable income.
Fr2d 671,
677
(5th Cire 1964).
Price v. United states, 335
The Commissioner,-however, must
take into account any nontaxable source or deductible expense of
which he has knowledge.
Id.
The method employed.is-not
invalidated even if the calculations of the Commissioner are not
completely correct.
(1991)., affd.
DiLeo v. Commissioner,
959 F.2d 16
(2d Cir.
96 T.C. 858, 868
,
1992).
Dr. Gamblin testified that he rented a cyclomill to a
company in.Fairfield, Ohio, for $5,000 contingent on a review of
its patent status.
Dr. Gamblin testified that he received.his
$5,000 payment in -2004.
Petitioners, however, failed to report
the rental earnings on their return for 2004.
Dr. Gamblin testified that "if yourtake that five thousand
dollars out"",rand-"dependingson' which day:you ,closed it out * * *
it is- going to vary from year to year by two or .three thousand
dollars."
Regarding 2005, Dr. Gamblin explained that "you know,
there was more money that came outaof the account ethan went in,
the whole thing-over the three yearaperiod- pretty much balances.
out."
Petitioners, however,3offered the Courtañosother evidence:
to :show that respondent' s bank deposits analysis is incorrect .
Respondent's determination on this issue is sustained.
Trade ór Business Expenses
i
Section 162 generally allows a ideduction for ordinary and
necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in
carrying on a trade or business.
Generally, no deduction is
allowed for personal, living, or family;expenses
See sec. 262.e
The tixpayer must therefore show that any claimed business
expenses were incurred primarily for business rather than
personal reasons.
T . C. 433, '4137
See Rule 142(a); Walliser v. Commissioner, 72
(1979)
sTo show that Ethe: expense was not personal, the taxpayer must
establish that the expense was incurred primarily to benefit his
business, 'and there must have been a proximate relationship .
between the claimedgexpensetand the business.
Commissioner, supra at 437.
See Walliser v:
Taxpayers are required to maintain
sufficient records to establish the-amounts of their income and
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deductions.
Sec.
6001; Higbee v. Commissioner,
(2001) ; sec .
1. 6001-1 (a) , a Income Tax Regs .
116 T..C.
438,
440
Petitioners,
therefore, must produce evidence that they are entitled to the
-
deductions they claim.
Where,a taxpayer has established-that he has incurred a
trade or business expense,
failure to prove the exact amount of;
the otherwise deductible item may, not always rule out a
deduction.
. Generally, unless precluded by section 274, we may
estimate the amount of such an expense and allow the deduction to
that extent.
Cir.
1958),
F.2d 540,
See Finley v. Commissioner, 255 F.2d 128,
affg.
544
133
(10th
27 T.C.9413
(1956.)2; Cohan v: Commissioner,
(2d Cir. s1930) .
We cannot, however, -estimate
39
deductible expenses unless the taxpayer presents evidence
sufficient to provide some rational basis upon which estimates
may be made.
See Vanicek v. Commissioner, 85.T.C., 731., 742-743
(1985) .
Office Expenses for Dr. Gamblin
Dr. Gamblin testified that he "didn't have receipts for
every little thi-ng" making up his office expenses.:. Dr. Gamblin
supplied respondent with canceled checks, Quicken sheets, and
credit card billing records showing various expenditures .
He
offered, however, no receipts to show that the expenditures" were
his office expenses for either 2004" or 2005.
-- 11
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Because there is insufficient evidence on which to base an
estimate of Dr. Gamblin's office expenses, respondent's
determination on this issue is sustained.
Of fice Expenses "for Dr . Burch
a
Dr.E Burch deducted on Schedule C $3,467 for 2004,' $3,341 for
2005, and $4,066 for 2006 as office expenses for-her psychology
practice.
2004,
Of those deductions respondent disallowed $488 for
$784 for 2005,* and $2,460 for 2006.
Petitioners provided
canceled checks drawn to various payees but did not-offer any
evidence other than their own testimony that they are entitled to
office expense deductions in excess of those respondent allowed.
Expenses for Supplies for 2004 and 2006
Dr. Gamblin deducted $2, 945 as expenses for supplies on his
2004 Schedule C of which respondent disallowed $788.
For 2006,
Dr. Gamblin deducted supplies expenses of $4,528 of which
respondent disallowed $73.
Dr. Burch deducted expenses for
supplies of $4, 866 on her 2006 Schedule C all of which respondent
disallowed.
Petitioners offered as evidence their own testimony
and canceled checks payable to credit card companies, MBNA, GE
Money Bank Credit Card, and Discovery.
Petitioners have not
shown that they are entitled to deduct expenses for supplies in
excess of those respondent allowed.
- 12 -
Expenses for Insurance (Other Than Health)
Dr. Burch deducted $3,358 of expenses forginsurance (other
than health) on her 2004 Schedule C.
$2,860 of the deduction.
.Respondent disallowed
Petitioners provided canceled checks,
bank statements, and withdrawals for multiple lines of insurance
totaling $3,357.88.4
Petitioners, :however,
copies of the insurance policies.
failed to provide «
Respondent -agrees.that
petitioners are entitled to an additional-deduction of $739 for
2004.
Petitioners have not shown thatsthey are entitled to
deduct insurance (other than health) expenses in excess of the.
amount respondent agreed to.
"Contract Labor" Expenses of Dr. Burch Treated as Schedule C
"Income" of Dr. Gamblin
Dr. Burch deducted on her 2005 Schedule C $67,000 of
"contract labor" expenses from her $82,479 gross income.
Dr.
Gamblin reported on his Schedule C'for 2005 gross receipts and
gross income of $67,000.
Respondent adjusted petitioners'
tax
return, disallowing the deduction on Dr. Burch's Schedule C and
removing the income in the same amount from Dr. Gamblin's
Schedule C.
Petitioners callege that Dr. Burch paid Dr. Gamblin for
performing administrative duties for her business.
Dr. Gamblin
testified that the payment was related to his research and
development for his inventions because he "would not be able to
carry on except for the amount of money that was being furnished
- 13 -
by Dr. Burch's practice;
I mean, she financed my'operations".
Dr. Burch testified -that "we do work together.
I work for Roger-
-well, r was a partner -in'his business, and he works for me."
There was no written contract for services between
petitioners.
Dr. Gamblin'helped Dr. Burch"witheadministrative
duties in 2004 and assisted with "a few little things" -in 2006
but did not report gross income for those years from Dr. Burch,
nor did she claim deductions.
Petitioners kept no records of the
work that Dr. Gamblin performedifor Dr
Burch, and'Dr? Burch
could not recall therrate at which she paid her husband.
She was
vague in her testimony as to how she determined the total amount
to be paid to him.
Petitioners offered no.documentary evidence
that Dr. Burch paid Dr. Gamblin $67,000 in 2005 or, if she did,
that the amount-was compensation for Dr
Gamblin's services.
On the other hand,- Dr. Gamblin's testimony that he received
money from his- wife related to his tresearchiand development and
that she "financed" his operations and Dr. Burch's testimony that
she was "a partner in his business" leads the Court to conclude
that any payments Dr. GBurch may have made to Dr. Gamblin in 2005
were in the nature of capital expenditures rather than
compensation for services.
Generally, no deduction is allowed
for capital expenditures.
Sec. 263(a)
the costs of creating an intangible,
. Taxpayers may not deduct
like a patent or trademark,
or of acquiring an interest in a partnership unläs.s sbme
- 14 exception applies . - Sec .
(d) (1) ,
(2) ,
263 (a) (1) (B) ; sec .
(5) , Income Tax Regs . 3
1.,263 (a) -4 (b) ,
"Capital expenditures are
subsequently recovered through.depreciation, amortization, cost
of goods sold, as an adjustment to basis, or otherwise, at such
time as the property to which the amount relates", is used, sold,
or disposed of by the taxpayer.
Sec. 1.263 (a)-1(b) , ,Income Tax
Regs.
Because petitioners have not shown -that the contested
$67,000 was
aid, was paid as compensation to Dr. Gamblin,- or was
expended for Dr. Gamblin's business, .respondent's determinations
on these issues are sustained.
-Home Of f ice Expenses i
Drs. Gamblin and Burch each filed Forms 88290 Expenses for Business Use of -Your Home, and claimed on their respective
Schedules C home office expense deductions for all 3 years at
issue . - Respondent edisallowed all of the home of f ice .expenses
deducted by Dr. «Gamblin and almost all of the home office
expenses deducted-by Dr. Burch.
Generally, section 280A(a) sprohibits a taxpayer from
deducting expenses for the ,userof a dwelling unit that is the
3Sed. 174 (a) (1) Allows a taxpayer to dèdudt certain research
and experimental expenditures without consent of the Secretary
for his first taxáble year beginning aftEi- Dec. 31, 1953, and
ending after Aug.,16, 1954, or at any time with consent of the
Secretary.
Sec-. 174 (a) (2) ". ' Petitioners' expehditures do not .
qualify for deduction under either provision.
- 15 taxpayer's residence. "But the prohibition--on deductions does not
apply sto an item of expense allocable to a portion of the dwelling that is used "exclusively" and -"on a regular basis" as
the principal place 'of business of the taxpayer'-s trade or
business
Sec.
280A (c) (1) (A) .
Assuming that à taxpayer has a qualifying trade or business,
allowable home office deductions are strictly limited under the
statute.
Home office expense deddctions are limi-ted to the
amount of gross 'income from the use 'of-therdwelling for a trade
or business, reduced by the sum of the.deductions allocablecto
the dwelling regardless of its use as-the -location of-a trade or
business and the allocable business expense deductions not
related ato the use of the dwe:lling itsel'f.
See sec. 280A(c).(5).
Amounts not allowable on'account of the slimitation may be carried
over to the succeeding taxable5year subject to the alimitation of
that taxable year.
Id.
Dr. Gamblin
The "Court has sustained respondent!s determination that Dr.
Gamblin did not-receive ýross:income -from his inventing activity
reportable on Schedule- C forS2005, and he is deemed to have
conceded that hechad norScheduleaC gross income for 2006.
Because Dr. Gamblin had no gross income from business in 2005 and
2006, his'home office expenge deduction for each of'those years
is zero.
See id.
- 16
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Although-Dr. Gamblin reported no gross income on.Schedule C
for 2004, the- Court has found that he received-gross income from
businêss of $5,000 for the rental of his cyclomill.
But
respondent-has allowed him as business ,deductions:
(1)
truck expenses of $1,280
$2,410);
(2)
($3,690 deducted less aan adjustment of
office expenses of $3,663
adjustmènt óf .$640) ;
Car and
($4,303 deducted less an
(3) expenses for the rent sor lease of other
business property sof .$3, 430 ,($3, 130 deducted plus an adjustment
of $300);
(4)
supplies expensestof $2,157
an adjustment of $788);
($2,945 deducted less
(5)ttravel expenses of $L,724
($2,650
deducted less an adjustment of $926); and (6) meals and
entertainment expenses of $140
After.reduction of Dr. Gamblin's
gross ,income of $5,0004 for Schedule C expenses described in
-section 280A(c) (5) (B)i,his allowable home office expense
deduction is zero, ;and the Court ,so holds.
Respondent s
a
determination on this issue is sustained..
Dr. Burch
Dr. Burch deducted as home,office expenses on her Schedule C
$44c,514 for 2004,
$2,'798.for-2005 and $11,3103 for 2006.
Respondent disallowed $44,097 for 2004, $2,211 for 2005, and
$10,286 foi-2006.
Respondent,"by allowing Dr.. Burch a portione
4Although respondent determined that petitioners had
unreported incoèè of $8,405 för 2004 as determined by à bank
deposits analysis, there is no evidence that all of it was earned
by Dr. Gamblin.
In any event, the total of Dr. Gamblin's sec.
280A(c) (5) (B) (ii) expenses alone exceeds $12,000.
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17~
albeït- small, òf the home office expenses that she>dedudted, has
tacitly adm'itted that .she qúalifies for the deduction under
section 280A and thit sonly the ainòunt is in question.
s -
The Colirt finds thatt Dr. Burch's Förms 8829 overstate -the
home of fice 'ekpense dedûcti'ons to which sheris entitled
«Some of
thesmofesprominent reasons"include her calculation, of home office
ežpenåes - for -2004 to -include a $28, 346 "Carryover of operating
4
experises"from 2003" for which she offered no evidence. »Dr.
Gamblin testified ,that when he entéred Dr. Burch's home office
e
exp'enses for 200-4 into the t'ax return preparation softwarei,a thesoftware "immediitely took the accumulated back charges", and gave
them to her . " ~ " Dr . Burch also inc luded in her cal culat ionsa
$13,223 for "CarryoierMfaexcess dasualty-losses and depteciation
froni'2003" for which she offered no evidence
Dr . Burch' s claimed deduction 4 of $67, O O O of contract labor
expenses for 2005 was disallòeediby-respondent,' and the
disallowànce is suàtiained by thetCoùrt.
She' will therefore have
no careyover lof òperating expenses ffom 2005 to -2006
Pétitiòners used oveflapping pontions of -theit home for théir redpectiver businesses .' aAnd 'bothtDr . Burch and Dr . - Gamblin
deducted home officë expensesuori their Schedules C, claiming a
combined use of 27.85 percent of their 6,570-square-foot home, or
1,83.0 square feet, for t heir respective businesses for 2004 2005,
and 2006.
Petitioners, as support for, their deduct-ions,
-.18
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submittediphotographs of the.interior of their home (including
the garage apartment), a diagram of the basement without
dimensions, and diagrams with dimensions of the garagesapartment
and the first, second, and thirc1 floors pf thei
home.
There is no evidence from which the Court can determine the
areaN of the basement, most of which seems to have been used by
Dr. Gamblin.
feet.
The area of the third-floor bedroom -is 104 square
The Court ;has no.evidence on which to base a determination
of the square footage of the hallway outside the third-floor
bedroom that was used for file storage.4 According to the diagram
that petitioners submitted, the area of the garage apartment is
367.5 square feet, and the area of.the large bedroom on the
second.floorris 264 square feet.
The total area of the three
rooms used by both petitioners for business for which the Court
I
has dimensions .is :735.5 square feet.
Dr. Burch, however, used only a portion of..each.of the.rooms
for her business.
Petitioners did not provide the Court with
evidence sufficient to determine the area of their respective
portions of, the rooms used -for their businesses
The ,Court will
estimate that Dr. Burch used 50 percent of the garage apartment
and the two bedrooms, or 367.75 square feet for her business.
*Expenses attributable to use of a home office in conducting
two or more separate businesses may be deductible where they each
meet the requirements of sec. 280A(c) (i). Hamacher v. Commissioner,
94 T.C.
348
(1990).
- 19 See Cohan v. -Commissioner, 39 F.2d at 544..
the estimate b
Any finexactitude in -
he tourt is öf petitioners' own making and due
to their failure tò2maintain proper búsieness records. - See id.
As 367 . 75 square f eët 'repre sent s' 367 75[6 , 57 0 , or about 6 per cent
of t e total a'rëa of the home," Dr. Buráh is entitled to 6 percent
of her allo'wâble sexpenses :allócable td her use of a portion of
hâr4hoine assanaöffice.'aSee seco 28ÓÄ(c) (1); see also Culp v.
Commissioner, T.C. "Memö. 1993-290F Hefti v. -Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. "1988-22, affd. without published opinion 894 F.,2d 1340 a(8th
Cir .
1989) .
Cardnd Trtick- Expenses and Travel
Expenses
Meals
and Entertainment
Certain business deductions described in section 274 are
subject to strict rules of substantiation that supersede the
doctrine in Cohan v. Commissioner, supra at 543-544.
1.274-5T(c), Temporary Income Tax Regs.,
6, 1985) .
See sec;
50 Fed. Reg. 46016
(Nov. -
Section 274 (d) provides that no deduction shall be
allowed with respect to:
(a) Any traveling expense,
meals and lodging away from home;
including
(b) any item related to an
activity of a type considered to be entertainment, amusement, or
recreation; or (c) the use of any "listed property", defined in
'It appears respondent' s adjustments to increase
petitioners' "home interest experise" deduction for each year will
result in an increase in Dr. Burch's allowable home office
expense deductions for each year. The Court will leave the exact
calculation, for the Rule 155 computation.
-
20
-
section 280F (d) (4) (A) (i) to include , any passengers automobile ,
unless the taxpayer substantiates certain elements
For an expense described in one of thesabovescategories, the
taxpayer must substantiate by adequate records -or sufficient
evidence to corroborate the taxpayer' s own testimony
amount of the expenditure or use;
expenditure or use;
.
(1) The
(2) ,the time and place sof the
(3) the business purpose of ythesexpenditure
or muse; and in the-case of entertainment, (4) the businessa
relationship to the taxpayer of each expenditure orruse.
sec.
See
274(d).
To meet the adequate .records requirements: of .section 274, a
taxpayer must maintain some form of records as well as
documentary evidence that in combination are sufficient to
establish each element of an expenditure or use .
See sec . 1 . 274 -
ST(c) (2), Temporary Income Tax Regs., 50 Fed. Reg. 46017
1985) .
(Nov. 6,
"Documentary evidence" includes receipts, paid bills, - or
similar evidence.
Sec.
1.274-5(c) (2) (iii),
Income Tax Regs.
A
contemporaneous log is not required, but corroborative evidence
to support a taxpayer's reconstruction of the elements of
expenditure or use must have "a high degree of þrobative value to
elevate such statement" to the level of credibility of a
contemporaneous record supported by sufficient .documentary
evidence .
Sec . 1. 274 -5T (c ) (1) , Temporary Income Tax Regs . , 50
Fed. Reg. 46Ò16-46017
(Nov.
6,
1985) .
21 -
Dr. Gamblin's car and truck,- traver, meal, and entertainment
expense deductions
indlüding meals and lodging away from-home,
are subject to section 274(d) and the regulations thereunder.
The Court allowed petitioners to confer with respondent after
trial in order to present any additional dócumentary evidence
they might-haúè that would betsusceptible to stipulation.
- Dr. Ganiblin, iri prepa'ration afor thë posttrial meeting with
respondént, created a travel log for this car and truck expenses
and a log·for hisstravel, meal,. andsentertainment expenses-that
herdeducted on~his ScheduÍes C for 2004,
2·005,
and 2006.
Dr.
Gamblin têsdïfied*at trial that he did not keep a 'logsof each
individual±tripebudainstead at the end of the year he "would go
off and check the mileage, and:write it down on a slip of paper
in the glove dox."
Nevertheless, the travel'log lists apparent
depatture dates, destinàtions, a very brief "purpose of trip" and
"nights" and "days", apparently away from- home.
Drt. Gamblin's
log of travel, nealj and entertainment exèenses lists -an alleged
check number and theccösts of three instances of -"air travel" and
calculateå per diem~amounts based on the travel log.
Petitióners failed to provide copies of receipts, paid
bilis, or"simialar evidence.
The Court finds that petitioners,did
not offër corroborative evidence to support their reconstruction
of the elements of expeniliture or use häving "a high degree of probativeavalue to elevate- such*statement"*ofeeventse that
e
- 22 -
happened in 2004, 2005, ande2006 to the level of credibility of a
contemporaneousi record supported - by suf f icient documentary
evidencea 'Respondent'sædetermination on these issues is
sustained.
Accuracy-Related Penalties
Section3491(c)
imposes on -the Commissioner the bur en of
production in any court proceeding?with respect t örthe' liability
of any individual for penalties and additi-ons to tax.
>Iigbee v
Cóniniisuioner, 116 T.C. ata446; Tronbridge v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memos12003:164.
Iri order to meet the burden of production sunder
section 7491(c), the Commissionereneéd,only make a prima facie
case that imposition of ithe penalty-orythe addji.tion to i ax is
appropriate . i GHighee av.: Commissioner,« supra sat 446
Respondent determined that for eboth 2004 ande2005
pettitioners'-:underpayments of portions < of their income taxes were
due'to 'negligence or intentional disregard of rulessor
regulátions . i SSections6662 (a) imposes a 20 -percent penalty on; the
portiori of an underpayment óf tax;attributable toyany one of
various -factors
including anegligence ore disregard of rules,or
regulátions and a substantial understatement- of income t ax.
sec .- 66629(b) (1) and (2) .
See
"Negligence" . includes any, failure to
make"a reasonable- áttempt to comply with the provisions of the
Internal Revenué Code-, including any failure to-keepeadequates
books and records- or to substantiate items- properly.
See sec.o
- 23 6662 (c )-; sec .
1. 6662-3 (b) (1) ,
Income Tax Regs .
A "substantial
understatement" includes an understatement of tax that exceedse
the greater of 10 percent 'of the tar required to be shown on the
return or- $5, 00 0 .
See sec . 6662 (d) (1-) (A) ; sec . 1. 6662 -4 (b) -(1) , a
Inc ome Tax Regs .
Section 6664*(c);(1) provides that the penalty under section a
6662 (a) shall not apply to any portion of an underpayment- if its
is shown that there was reasonable cause for the. taxpayer' s
position and thate the taxpayer acted ins good faith with respect
to that-portion
The determination of whether a taxpayer acted
with reasonable cause and in good faith is made on atcaserby-case
basis, taking into account all the -pertinent facts and
circumstances .
Sec . 1 . 6664 -4 (b)s(1) ,-Incòme «Tax Regs .
The mostr
important factor is the extent of the taxpayer's effort to assess
his »proper tax liability for the:year.
Id.
Petitionefs tappear to haveusubstantial understatements ofe
incomertax for 2005 and 2006 since theaunderstatement amounts
wiill exceed the greater of 10apercent of the tax required4to be
shown on the return or $5,000.
Petitioners also. failedeto keep
adequate books and records or to substantiate items properly,
claimed itemizedadeductions and business expenses to which they
were not entitled;
and: failed to report portions of their income .
The Court concludes that respondent has produced sufficient
- 24 -
evidence t·o shod that the máccuracy-related penalties under
sectionM6662 are appropriateafor both years
The raccuracy-related penalties - will apply unless spetitioners
demoristrate that there was deasonable cause sfor the underpayments
and thatt they acted in good faith with respect to t-he
un~dàì aymen s.
Tax à ga.
See sec
6664 (c) .
Section 1.6664 4t(b) (1) ,
specifically provides:
"Circumstances that may
ncome
indicate3reasonabFe cause-ánd góodafaith include arishonest
mi'sunderstanding of fact or law thatcis.reasonable in lightsof
ala of the «facts and circumstances, including -the experience
knowledge and education of; the taxpayer "
Petitioners, both -of àhom are hiejhly educated, did not show
thatatheir underrepärting of sincome and claiming of deductions a
were-actions .taken twith reasonable cause and in goodifaith. 6
Respondent' s determinations- of the accuracy-felated penalties - e
underesection 6662(a)
for 2004 and 2005 are sustained.
, ThedCourt has considered the-other arguments of the parties
and they areseither without merit or not necessary in viewoof our
resolútion of- the issues infthis case
To reflect the foregoing,
Decision ,wil
under Rule 155.
be entered
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