UNITED STATES TAX COURT
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T.C. Memo. 1997-364
UNITED STATES TAX COURT
KATHIE J. SMEE, f.k.a. KATHIE J. ZAVITZ,
Petitioner v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Docket No. 15958-97.
Filed August 7, 1997.
Julie P. Gasper, for respondent.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
GOLDBERG, Special Trial Judge:
This case was heard pursuant
to section 7443A(b)(3) and Rules 180, 181, and 182.1
This matter
is before the Court on the motion to stay proceedings filed by
petitioner Kathy J. Smee, f.k.a. Kathie J. Zavitz and
1
Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to
the Internal Revenue Code in effect for the years in issue, and
all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and
Procedure.
2
respondent's Motion for Entry of Decision.
By notice of
deficiency dated August 8, 1989, respondent determined
deficiencies in Federal income taxes, additions to tax, and
additional interest as to petitioner and her former husband Keith
A. Zavitz as follows:
Year
Deficiency
Sec.
6653(a)
1979
1980
1981
$878
2,919
1,392
$44
146
n/a
1
Additions to Tax
Sec.
Sec.
6653(a)(1) 6653(a)(2)
n/a
n/a
$70
n/a
n/a
1
Sec.
6659
Additional Interest
Sec.
6621(c)
-0$846
418
n/a
2
2
50 percent of the interest due on the deficiency.
2
120 percent of the interest accruing after Dec. 31, 1984, under sec.
6601 with respect to any substantial underpayment attributable to taxmotivated transactions.
The underlying issue in this case arose from investment tax
credit carrybacks claimed by petitioner and Mr. Zavitz related to
their investment in the CPG Record Partnership.
CPG Record
Partnership leased a master recording from Encore Leasing Corp.
Respondent mailed a notice of deficiency to them on August 8,
1989.
Petitioner and Mr. Zavitz mailed a petition for
redetermination on November 6, 1989, which was filed with the Tax
Court on November 13, 1989, to begin a case at docket No. 2741689.
At the time their petition was filed, they resided in
California.
By Order dated July 29, 1997, the Court severed
petitioner from that case for purposes of considering
respondent’s motion for entry of decision.
3
Petitioner signed a Stipulation of Settlement for Tax
Shelter Adjustments of Petitioners (the Stipulation), filed with
the Court on January 14, 1991.
In the Stipulation, petitioner
agreed that all adjustments in the notice of deficiency related
to the Encore Leasing tax shelter, and petitioner agreed to have
all issues in her case resolved as if petitioner were the same as
the taxpayer in the controlling case, Wolf v. Commissioner,
docket No. 28585-86.
The Stipulation provided that a decision
would be submitted in her case when the decision in the
controlling case became final.
identical stipulation.
Keith A. Zavitz signed an
An opinion was entered in Wolf v.
Commissioner on May 15, 1991, T.C. Memo. 1991-212.
was affirmed.
This decision
Wolf v. Commissioner, 4 F.3d 709 (9th Cir. 1993).
No signed decision document has been submitted.
Petitioner and Mr. Zavitz are no longer married.
It is not
clear from the record when they separated or divorced.
On August 5, 1992, petitioner filed a petition with the U.S.
Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of California under
chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code (title 11, U.S.C.).
On December
9, 1993, petitioner was granted a discharge in bankruptcy.
The
Order provided that petitioner was released from all
dischargeable debts.
The Order further provided:
2.
Any judgment heretofore or hereafter obtained in any
court other than this court is null and void as a
determination of the personal liability of the debtor with
respect to any of the following:
4
(A)
Debts dischargeable under 11 U.S.C. sec. 523.
(B) Unless heretofore or hereafter determined by order
of this court to be nondischargeable, debts alleged to be
excepted from discharge under clauses (2), (4), and (6) of
11 U.S.C. sec. 523(A).
(C) Debts determined by this court to be discharged
under 11 U.S.C. sec. 523(d).
3.
All creditors whose debts are discharged by this order
and all creditors whose judgments are declared null and void
by paragraph 2 above are enjoined from commencing,
continuing or employing any action, process or act to
collect, recover or offset any such debt as a personal
liability of the debtor whether or not discharge of such
debt is waived.
In October 1994, Mr. Zavitz filed a petition in bankruptcy
under chapter 7.
He was granted a discharge on February 9, 1995.
Mr. Zavitz filed a Complaint to Determine Tax Liability with the
U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas.
The
complaint included the tax years at issue herein.
The case at docket No. 27416-89 was calendared for trial on
May 8, 1995, in Dallas, Texas.
Respondent's counsel moved for
entry of decision at that time.
No appearance was entered on
behalf of petitioner and Mr. Zavitz, although petitioner filed a
trial memorandum.
The Court took respondent's motion for entry
of decision under advisement and ordered respondent's counsel to
file a legal memorandum on the issue of whether the Court could
enter a decision while Mr. Zavitz’ complaint filed in the
Bankruptcy Court was pending.
5
No memorandum was filed because in a notice filed July 10,
1995, respondent notified the Court that on June 29, 1995, Mr.
Zavitz filed a petition under chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code
with the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of
Texas.
The proceedings at docket No. 27416-89 were automatically
stayed as to Mr. Zavitz.
The Court ordered the parties to file a
written report showing cause why the proceedings should not be
stayed as to petitioner as well.
On September 14, 1995, petitioner filed a request to stay
the proceedings at docket No. 27416-89.
On September 18, 1995,
respondent filed a notice of objection to that request.
By Order
dated April 2, 1996, the Court granted petitioner's request to
stay proceedings.
In addition, respondent's motion for entry of
decision filed May 8, 1995, was denied.
On July 1, 1996, Mr. Zavitz filed a status report notifying
the Court that his bankruptcy proceedings were ongoing.
On July
3, 1996, respondent filed a status report notifying the Court
that by Order dated September 1, 1995, the Bankruptcy Court
dismissed Mr. Zavitz’ case.
Respondent also notified the Court
that on November 6, 1995, Mr. Zavitz filed a chapter 13 petition.
By status report filed with the Court on September 30, 1996,
respondent notified the Court that this case was dismissed on
August 26, 1996.
6
The Court issued an Order dated October 7, 1996, lifting the
stay in the proceedings at docket No. 27416-89 and restoring the
case to the general docket for trial or other disposition.
However, by notice filed with the Court on January 17, 1997,
respondent notified the Court that Mr. Zavitz filed a petition
with the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas
on August 30, 1996, and all proceedings were automatically
stayed, pursuant to the provisions of 11 U.S.C. section 362(a)(8)
(1994).
Petitioner filed a status report with the Court on
January 17, 1997, requesting that the proceedings be stayed as to
her, as well, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. section 362(a)(8).
By Order
dated January 23, 1997, the Court ordered respondent to file any
objection to petitioner's request.
On January 28, 1997,
petitioner filed a motion to stay proceedings which was identical
to her status report filed earlier.
Respondent filed an
objection to petitioner's request to stay proceedings.
A hearing
on the motion was calendared for February 24, 1997, in Dallas,
Texas.
Petitioner made no appearance at the hearing.
Originally, petitioner and Mr. Zavitz were represented by
counsel, William J. Ruhe, Jr.
William J. Ruhe, Jr., subsequently
was withdrawn as counsel of record for Kathy J. Smee, f.k.a.
Kathie J. Zavitz, on August 25, 1995.
Respondent filed a motion
for entry of decision as to petitioner which the Court took under
advisement.
Subsequently, as previously stated, the Court
7
severed petitioner from the case at docket No. 27416-89 for
purposes of considering respondent’s motion.
In her motion, petitioner argues that rulings of the
Bankruptcy Court are binding on the Tax Court.
Petitioner
further contends that by order of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for
the Eastern District of California, she was released from all
dischargeable debts.
Respondent does not dispute that an order of the Bankruptcy
Court is binding.
Respondent argues, however, that petitioner
has not alleged that the Bankruptcy Court made a determination
with respect to her tax liability for the years in issue.
Respondent argues that the deficiencies in issue are not
dischargeable, citing 11 U.S.C. sections 523 and 507(a)(8)
(1994).
Moreover, respondent argues that this Court is without
jurisdiction to determine whether petitioner's tax liability was
discharged.
Finally, respondent argues that the proceedings
should not be stayed as to petitioner because she is a separate
taxpayer from Mr. Zavitz.
Generally, the filing of a petition in bankruptcy acts as an
automatic stay against, inter alia, the continuation of a
proceeding before the Tax Court concerning the debtor.
sec. 362(a)(8).
11 U.S.C.
An automatic stay continues until the case is
closed, the case is dismissed, or a discharge is granted,
whichever is earliest.
11 U.S.C. sec. 362(c)(2)(1994).
"After
8
the automatic stay has been removed there is no bar to this
Court's accepting jurisdiction or continuing a proceeding that
had been petitioned prior to the automatic stay."
Commissioner, 94 T.C. 1, 8 (1990).
Neilson v.
Where taxpayers file a joint
petition, the filing of a petition in bankruptcy by one taxpayer
individually does not affect the jurisdiction of the Tax Court to
redetermine the deficiency with respect to the other taxpayer.
See McClamma v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 754, 758 (1981); Baron v.
Commissioner, 71 T.C. 1028 (1979).
The Tax Court is a court of limited jurisdiction conferred
by statute.
See sec. 7442; Neilson v. Commissioner, supra at 9.
Generally, the Court's jurisdiction is dependent upon a notice of
deficiency and a timely filed petition.
Secs. 6212 and 6213.
The Court does not have jurisdiction to determine whether a
deficiency was discharged in a bankruptcy proceeding.
See
Neilson v. Commissioner, supra; Graham v. Commissioner, 75 T.C.
389, 399 (1980); Tortu v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1994-243.
Petitioner received a discharge in bankruptcy on December 9,
1993.
Thus, we are not barred from continuing these proceedings
as to petitioner.
Furthermore, we do not believe that there is
any reason to stay these proceedings with respect to petitioner
as a result of the automatic stay imposed with respect to Mr.
Zavitz.
9
Finally, we are without subject matter jurisdiction to
determine whether the deficiencies involved herein were
discharged by the Bankruptcy Court.
On the basis of the foregoing, Petitioner’s Motion to Stay
Proceedings filed January 28, 1997, will be denied, and
respondent’s Motion for Entry of Decision filed on February 24,
1997, will be granted.
To reflect the foregoing and the stipulation,
An appropriate order and
decision will be entered.
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