UNITED STATES TAX COURT

136 T.C. No.

15

UNITED STATES TAX COURT

GEORGE H. TEMPEL AND GEORGETTA TEMPEL, ,Petitioners v.

COMMISSIONER OF INTEPNAL REVENUE, Respondent

Docket No.

23689-08 .

Filed April 5,

2011.

In 2004 Ps donated a c ualified conservation

easement to a qualified charitable organization. As a

result, Ps received conservation easement income tax

credits from the State of Colorado. These credits were

transferable to other taxpayers. That same year Ps.

sold a portion of those cre its.

Ps reported short-term capital gains from the sales of

the State credits.

Ps clai ed an allocated portion of the

professional fees they incurred to complete the conservation

easement donation, as adjusted basis in the State tax

credits they sold.

R determined the State income tax credits that Ps

sold were not capital assetá and that Ps had no

adjusted basis in the credids. R filed a motion for

partial summary judgment anci Ps filed a cross--motion.

In their cross-motion, Ps also claim that proceeds from

their sales of State tax credits should have been

reported as long-term capit 1 gains.

- 2 -

Held:

assets.

The State tax credits Ps sold are capital

Held, further, Ps do not have any basis in their

State tax credits.

Held, further, Ps' holding period in their State

tax credits is insufficient to qualify for long-term

capital gains treatment.

James R. Walker and Christopher D. Freeman, for petitioners.

Tamara L. Kotzker and Sara J. Barkley, for respondent.

OPINION

WHERRY, Judge:

This case involves a petition for

redetermination of income tax deficiencies determined by

respondent for petitioners 2004 and 2005 tax years.

It is before

the Court on respondent' s August 3, 2009, motion for partial

summary judgment and petitioners' August 31, 2009, cross-motion

for partial summary judgment.

See Rule 121(a) .1

Respondent

argues that petitioners' gains from sales of their transferable

Colorado income tax credits (State tax credits) are not capital

gains and instead should be taxed as ordinary income.

Respondent

also argues in the alternative that petitioners do not have any

basis in their State tax credits.

I

Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and

Procedure. Unless otherwise noted, section references are to the

Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (Code), as amended and in effect

for the tax years at issue.

- 3 Petitioners filed a cross motion - for partial summary

judgment in which they, agree t at summary judgment is

appropriate.

Petitioners clai

that their gains from the sales

of their State tax credits, reported as short-term capital gains,

should have been reported as long-term capital gains.

They also

assert they are entitled to reduce those gains by their allocable

basis in the credits they sold.

For the reasons discussed below,

we agree with petitioners that the transferable State tax credits

at issue are capital assets, and -we agree with respondent that

petitioners had neither basis, nor a long-term holding period, in

their State tax credits.

Background

On December 17, 2004, petitioners, George and Georgetta

Tempel, husband and wife; donat d a qualified conservation

easement to the Greenlands Rese ve, a qualified organization, on

approximately 54 acres of petitioners' land in Colorado.

Petitioners claimed thé fair ma ket value of their donation was

$836,500.

They incurred $11,574.74 of expenses in connection

with the donation that primarily consisted of various

professional fees.

As a result of the donation petitioners

received $260, 000 of conservaticn easement income tax credits

from the State of Colorado.

Throughout 2004 Colorado granted its eligible residents

income tax credits for donating perpetual conservation easements.

- 4 Colo. Rev.

Stat.

sec. 39-22-522

(2010).

For 2004 the State

granted an income tax credit equal to 100 percent of the value of

such a donation up to $100,000.

Id. sec. 39-22-522(4) (a) (I).

To

the extent a donation's value exceeded $100,000, additional

credit was limited to 40 percent of the value in excess of

$100,000.

Id.

each donation.

The maximum allowable credit was $260,000 for

Id.

Colorado allowed conservation easement credit recipients to

use their credits to receive a limited refund provided that the

State had' exceeded constitutional tax collection limits commonly

known as "Amendment 1" or the "Douglas Bruce Amendment"

establishing the taxpayer bill of rights ("TABOR").

22-522(5) (b).

Id. sec. 39-

The refund in certain circumstances could reach a

maximum of $50,000.

Id.

Unused credits could be carried forward

for up to 20 tax years or transferred to certain eligible

taxpayers.

Id. sec. 39-22-522(5) (a),

(7).

Transferees may use

their credits only to offset a tax liability.

522(7).

Id. sec. 39-22-

Transferees are ineligible for a refund and may not

transfer their credits.

Id.

On December 22, 2004, with the assistance of brokers,

petitioners sold $40,500 of their State tax credits to an

unrelated third party for net proceeds of $30,375.2

On December

2The proceeds are net of $4,050 paid to the brokers.

I

- 5 -

31, 2004, with the assistance of brokers, petitioners sold an

additional $69,500 of their credits to another unrelated third

party for net proceeds of' $52,125.3

On December 31, 2004,

petitioners gave away $10,000 of their credits.

On their 2004 Form 1040, U.S. Individual Income Tax Return,

petitioners reported $77, 603 of short-term capital gains from the

sale of their State tax credits.

Schedule D, Capital Gains and

Losses, of their 2004 tax retu n reflects total proceeds from the

sales of the State tax credits of $82,500 and a basis of $4,897

in those credits.

.Petitioners reported their basis in the State

tax credits by allocating the $11, 574 . 7,4 of expenses they

incurred to make the donation .tb the portion of the credits they

sold (i.e., $110,000 of credits sold / $260,000 of total credits

x $11,574.74 = $4,897) .

On June 26, 2008, respondeilt issued a notice of deficiency

to petitioners for their 2004 and 2005 tax years.

Respondent

determined petitioners owed additional tax and penalties

partially arising from respondent's adjustments to petitioners'

reported gains from the sales of the State tax credits.

Respondent concluded that petitioners did not have any basis in

their State tax credits and that the gains were ordinary rather

than capital.

3The proceeds are net of $6 950 paid to the brokers.

I

- 6 -

Petitioners timely petitioned this Court.

At the time the

petition was filed, petitioners resided in Colorado.

moved for partial summary judgment.

Respondent

Petitioners also moved for

partial summary judgment.

Discussion

Respondent's motion for partial summary judgment and

petitioners' cross-motion dispute (i) whether petitioners' State

tax credits were capital assets,

(ii) whether the sales resulted

in long-term or short-term capital gains, and (iii) the amount of

basis, if any, petitioners had in those credits.

Respondent

contends and petitioners do not contend otherwise that

petitioners' receipt of State tax credits as a result of their

conservation easement contribution was neither a sale or exchange

of the easement nor a quid pro quo transaction.

For our

discussion we accept those deemed concessions.

I

A. Summary Judgment

Rule 121(a) allows a party to move "for a summary

adjudication in the moving party's favor upon all or any part of

the legal issues in controversy."

Summary judgment is

appropriate "if the pleadings, answers to interrogatories,

depositions, admissions, and any other acceptable materials,

together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact and that a decision may be

- 7 rendered as a matter of law."

Rule 121(b) .

Facts are viewed in

the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.

Commissioner, 85 T.C.

812, 821

Dahlstrom v.

(1985) .

The moving party bears the burden of demonstrating that no

genuine issue of material fact exists and that the moving party

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Commissioner, 98 T.C. 518, 520

Cir. 1994) .

Sundstrand Corp. v.

(1992), affd. 17 F.3d 965

(7th

The Court has considered the pleadings and other

materials of record and concludes that as to the points of law at

issue here there is no genuine issue of material fact.

Whether

petitioners' transferable State .tax credits are capital assets

and what basis, if any, and theiholding period petitioners have

in their State tax credits are novel legal questions appropriate

for decision by summary judgment-.

B.

Character of Gain

Capital gains are derived from the sale or exchange of

I

capital assets.

Sec. 1222.

Section 1221 defines "capital asset"

as property4 held by a taxpayer, except for eight categories of

4Respondent does not challenge that the State tax credits at

issue here are property., See also Va. Historic Tax Credit Fund

2001 LP, Va. Historic Tax Credit Fund 2001 LLC, Tax Matters

Partner v. Commissioner, Nos. 10-1333, 10-1334, 10-1336, 2011

U.S. App. LEXIS 6364, -2011 WL 1127056 -(Mar. 29,

2011)

that nontransferable State tax credits were property).

(concluding

- 8 -

property specifically excluded from the de'finition."

None of the

"Sec. 1221(a) provides in part as follows:

SEC. 1221.

CAPITAL ASSET DEFINED.

(a) In General.--For purposes of this subtitle, the term

"capital asset" means property held by the taxpayer (whether

or not connected with his trade or business), but does not

include-(1) stock in trade of the taxpayer or other property

of a kind which would properly be included in the

inventory of the taxpayer if on hand at the close of

the taxable year, or property held by the taxpayer

primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course

of his trade or business;

(2) property, used in his trade or business, of a

character which is subject to the allowance for

depreciation provided in section 167, or real property

used in his trade or business;

(3) a copyright, a literary, musical, or artistic

composition, a letter or memorandum, or similar

property, held by--

*

*

*

*

*

(4) accounts or notes receivable acquired in the

ordinary' course of trade or business for services

rendered or from the sale of property described in

paragraph (1);

(5) a publication of the United States Government

(including the Congressional Record) which is received

from the United States Government or any agency

thereof, other than by purchase at the price at which

it is offered for sale to the public, and which is held

by--

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

' (6) any commodities derivative financial instrument

held by a commodities derivatives dealer, unless-(continued...)

- 9 excluded categories is applicable to the State tax credits at

issue.

The purpose of capital gains treatment is to provide some

relief to taxpayers from the excessive burdens of taxation of an

entire gain in 1 year in those~ instances "typically involving the

realization of appreciation in value accrued over a substantial

period of time".

Commissioner v. Gillette Motor Transp., Inc.,

364 U.S.

(1960).

130,

134

Capital gains treatment also

alleviates the pernicious effects of inflation which creates

phantom profits and mitigates the deterrent effect taxation may

have on a taxpayer's decision to convert assets that have

appreciated.

Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103, 106 (1932); Snowa

v. Commissioner,

123 F.3d 190,

193

(4th Cir.

1997).

However, it

has also been acknowledged that section 1221 makes no mention of

.continued)

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

(7) any hedging transaction which is clearly

identified as such before the close of the day on which

it was acquired, originated, or entered into (or such

other time as the Secretary may by regulations

prescribe); or

(8) supplies of a type regularly used or consumed by

the taxpayer in the ordinary course of a trade or

business of the taxpayer.

'Respondent concedes that none of the eight categories

delineated in sec. 1221(a) is applicable to the State tax

credits. Neither party asserts the State tax credits petitioners

sold properly come within any other Internal Revenue Code section

determining the character of assets; e.g., sec. 1253 (specifying

the character of franchises, trademarks, and trade names).

- 10 -

these judicially perceived motivations for capital asset

treatment.

1962),

Commissioner v. Ferrer, 304 F.2d 125, 133

revg. and remanding 35 T.C.

617

(2d Cir.

(1961).

There is "no single definitive" definition of a capital

asset.

Gladden v. Commissioner, 112 T.C. 209, 218 (1999), revd.

on a different issue 262 F.3d 851 (9th Cir. 2001).. Instead, it

is a very broad term.

As the Supreme Court observed:

The body of § 1221 establishes a general definition of the

term "capital asset," and the phrase "does not include"

takes out of that broad definition only the classes of

property that are specifically mentioned.

Ark. Best Corp. v. Commissioner, 485 U.S. 212, 218 (1988).

While

Congress created a definition of capital asset under section 1221

that is inherently expansive, many courts, including the Supreme

Court, have recognized that the term is not without limits beyond

those imposed by statute.

Commissioner v. Gillette Motor

Transp., Inc., supra at 135; Womack v. Commissioner, 510 F.3d

1295, 1299

(11th Cir. 2007), affg. T.C. Memo. 2006-240; Watkins

v. Commissioner, 447 F.3d 1269, 1271 (10th Cir. 2006), affg. T.C.

Memo. 2004-244; Gladden v. Commissioner, supra at 218-220.

Faced with determining the character of assets that do not

fit any of the section 1221 exceptions to the definition of a

capital asset yet do not appear to properly fit that of a capital

asset, courts use the substitute for ordinary income doctrine to

exclude certain property.

See Lattera v. Commissioner, 437 F.3d

- 11 399, 402-403

(3d Cir. 2006), affg. T.C.. Memo. 2004-216.

this doctrine,

Under -

"capital; asset".does not include mere rights to

receive ordinary income.

U.S. 260, 265-266

Commissioner v. P.G. Lake, Inc.,. 356

(1958).

The practical effect of the substitute for ordinary income

doctrine is that the Supreme Cd'urt "has consistently construed

'capital asset' to exclude property representing income items or

accretions to the value of a capital asset themselves properly

attributable to income."

United States v. Midland-Ross Corp.,

381 U.S. 54, 57 (1965).

The doctrine has been applied by courts

directly and indirectly to exclude a variety of assets from the

breadth of section 1221.7

As we explained in Foy v.

Commissioner, 84 T.C. 50, 66 (1985),.the _substitute for ordinary

See, e.g., Watkins v. Commissioner, 447 F.3d 1269, 1273

(10th Cir. 2006) (treating the transfer of rights to lottery

payments as ordinary income), affg. T.C. Memo. 2004-244; Saviano

v. Commissioner, 765 F.2d 643,

653-654

(7th Cir. 1985)

(holding

that the ,sale of a "gold option", did not result in capital gains

when the option represented a right of first refusal to net

profits from mining), affg. 80 T.C. 955 (1983);..Freese v. United

States, 455 F.2d 1146, '1152

(10th Cir. 1972)

(determining that a

settlement payment was a substitute for the taxpayer's services

as an employee); Hallcraft Homes, Inc. v. Commissioner, 336 F.2d

701, 705 (9th Cir. 1964) (finding sale of water refund agreements

resulted in ordinary income), affg. 40 T.C. 199 (1963); BisbeeBaldwin Corp. v. Tomlinson, '320 F.2d 929,

936 (5th Cir. 1963)

(treating consideration for mortgage servicing contracts as a

substitute for commissions); Dyer,v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d 123,

126 (10th Cir. 1961) (finding sale of fractional interests in

mineral leaseholds was a substitute for future income), affg. 34

T.C. 513 (1960); Forrer v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1981-418

(concluding that assignment of rights to book royalties was a

transfer of an ordinary income asset).

- 12 -

income doctrine is an important court-imposed limitation on the

types "of property that will qualify as a capital asset."

It is

now clear that the substitute for ordinary income doctrine is the

only recognized judicial limit to the broad terms of section

,

1221., See Ark. Best Corp. v. Commissioner, supra at 217 n.5.

Consequently, when determining whether property is a capital

sIn Foy v.

Commissioner,

84 T.C.

50,

65-66

(1985),

the Court

acknowledged that there were two court-imposed limitations' on

what type of property qualifies for capital asset treatment, the

first being for assets that were held as an integral part of a

taxpayer's business as explained by the Supreme Court in Corn

Prods. Ref.

Co. v. Commissioner,

350 U.S. 46,

51

(1955), and- the

second being assets that were substitutes for ordinary income.

Since our decision in Fgy, the Supreme Court has clarified that

there is no separate rule for assets that are an integral part of

a taxpayer's business. 'Ark. Best Corp. v. Commissioner, 485 U.S.

212, 217, 221 (1988). Accordingly, there remains only one courtimposed limitation on what type of property qualifies for capital

asset treatment.

See FNMA v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. 541, 573

(1993).

We further acknowledged in Fgy that after the ordinary

income limitation was squarely established by the Supreme Court

in Commissioner v. P.G. Lake, Inc.,. 356 U.S. 260

(1958),

"subsequent decisions have attempted to clarify" this limitation.

Foy v. Commissioner, supra at 66. We then reviewed the cases

subsequent to P.G. Lake that have analyzed whether a transfer of

a contractual right constituted more than a mere right to receive

income. These cases applied the substitute for ordinary income

doctrine to the transfer of contractual rights by analyzing the

"entire economics of a transaction." Id. at 67. We noted there

are typically six factors courts will consider to determine

whether the substitute for ordinary income doctrine applies.

Therefore, the six-factor test originated and has been used as a

means of determining the character of gain or loss on the

transfer sof contractual rights that possess an element of income

where those rights may represent more than a mere right to

income. Accordingly, there must be contractual rights at issue

that convey rights to income in order for the factors specified

in Gladden v. Commissioner, 112 T.C. 209 (1999), revd. on a

different issue 262 F.3d 851 (9th Cir. 2001), to become the

appropriate analysis to apply.

- 13 asset under section 1221, unless- ones of the eight exceptions or

the substitute for ordinary income doctrine applies it is a

capital asset.

1.

Inapplicability of Gladden v. Commissioner

Respondent asserts that the appropriate. framework for

-determining the character of petitioners' gains is the analysis

the Court employed :'ua.Gladden v.. Commissioner, supra."

The

taxpayers in Gladden agreed to relinquish intangible water rights

in exchange for cash.

The Court applied contract analysis,

specifically a six-factor test (Gladden factors),".to determine

the character of the taxpayers' gain on the relinquishment of

those rights.

Id. at 221.

Respondent-argues the Gladden factors

point to ordinary income treatment for the proceeds of the State

tax credit sales.

We find that respondent's argument extends the Gladden

analysis beyond its historical use and the purpose it serves.

The Gladden factors arose from a judiciäl need to analyze the

underlying nature of contract rights.

This Court cannot conclude

that a government-granted tax credit is a contract right.

There

is nothing in the Colorado statutes granting the tax credits that

"The analysis was first discussed and applied by the Court

in Foy v. Commissioner, supra at 65-70.

"Despite the factors' origination in Foy v. Commissioner

supra, for convenience to the parties we refer to the analysis as

the Gladden factors.

- 14 could be understood to create a contract.

As the Supreme Court

stated in Natl. R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa

Fe R.

Co.,

470 U.S. 451,

465-466

(1985):

For many decades this Court has maintained that absent some

clear indication that the legislature intends to bind itself

contractually, the presumption is that "a law is not

intended to create private contractual or vested rights but

merely declares a policy to be pursued until the legislature

shall ordain otherwise." This well-established presumption

is grounded in the elementary proposition that the principal

function of a legislature is not to make contracts, but to

make laws that establish the policy of the state. Policies,

unlike contracts, are inherently subject to revision and

repeal, and to construe laws as contracts when the

obligation is not clearly and unequivocally expressed would

be to limit drastically the essential powers of a

legislative body. Indeed, "'[t]he continued existence of a

government would be of no great value, if by implications

and presumptions, it was disarmed of the powers necessary to

a-ccomplish the ends of its creation.'" Thus, the party

asserting the creation of a contract must overcome this

well-founded presumption, and we proceed cautiously both in

identifying a contract within the language of a regulatory

statute and in defining the contours of any contractual

obligation.

[Citations omitted.]

Here there is no clear indication that the Colorado

legislature intended to bind itself contractually.

The

presumption that Colorado's State tax credit has not created any

private contractual rights has not been overcome.

State tax credits, as respondent concedes, are not contract

rights.

Respondent has asserted no reason, nor can we think of

one, to expand the applicability of the Gladden analysis to the

State tax credits at issue.

- 15 -

2.

Inapplicability of the Substitute for Ordinary Income

Doctrine

Respondent also asserts that petitioners' gains from the

sales of their State tax credits are ordinary because they are

merely a substitute for ordinary income.

First, respondent

asserts that petitioners' proceeds from selling the State tax

credits are merely a substitute for a refund from Colorado that

would have been ordinary income.

Respondent's argument assumes

that a refundable credit would not be excluded from income."

Consequently, respondent's position is that the proceeds

petitioners received from the sales of their credits are a

substitute for the up to $50,000 tax refund that a Colorado

taxpayer could receive in a year the State incurs a budget

surplus."

Yet respondent also concedes that there was no

"Respondent's motion for summary judgment states that

"Generally, a payment from a state attributable to the portion of

a refundable credit that exceeds a taxpayer's liability would be

ordinary income". As support respondent cites Rev. Rul. 85-39,

1985-1 C.B. 21, amplified by Rev. Rul. 90-56, 1990-2 C.B. 102.

Neither revenue ruling addresses the Federal income tax

implications of a State tax refund attributable to State tax

credits.

Instead, the revenue rulings analyze whether

distributions from the State of Alaska's annual resident dividend

program are income or gifts to the State's residents. Respondent

does not provide any reason Colorado's refundable tax credit

program should be treated similarly for Federal tax purposes to

Alaska's dividend program rather than to the tax and deemed

refund programs implemented by the States of -Iowa and California.

See Rev. Rul. 79-315, 1979-2 C.B. 27 and Rev. Rul. 70-86, 1970-1

C.B. 23, respectively.

"A transferee of the State tax credits is never eligible

for a refund. Colo. Rev. Stat. sec. 39-22-522(7) (c).

- 16 -

opportunity for a refund from the State either during 2004 (the

year petitioners sold their credits) or in 2006 through 2010."

Petitioners sold $110,000 and gave away $10,000 of their

$260,000 of State tax credits, leaving them with $140,000 of

State tax credits to use.

There is no evidence and respondent

does not assert that petitioners sold credits they could have

otherwise used to receive a refund.

Therefore, petitioners'

proceeds from the sale of their credits are not a substitute for

a tax refund.

Second, respondent maintains that to the extent a taxpayer

could use a credit to reduce a State tax liability but instead

sells that credit, that taxpayer has the economic equivalent of

ordinary income.

Respondent appears to reason that if an

individual taxpayer who sells credits itemizes deductions

(ignoring phase-outs), that taxpayer's section 164 Federal income

tax deduction is greater than it: would have been had that

taxpayer retained and used the credits.

Therefore, the taxpayer

who sells credits has more Federal income tax deductions and owes

less Federal income tax.

Assuming arguendo that petitioners sold

credits that they could some day have used to offset a State tax

liability and that they could have deducted that liability for

Federal tax purposes were it not offset, respondent's argument

"Colorado taxpayers have been able to receive a.refund for

their conservation easement credits only in 2005.

l

- 17 -

still fails.

to wealth.

A reduction in a tax liability is not an accession

Consequently, a taxpayer who has more section 164

deductions has not received any income."

Having addressed respondent's arguments and finding them

unpersuasive, we turn to whether there is any reason the

substitute for ordinary income doctrine is applicable to the

sales of petitioners' State tax credits.

The parties and this

Court agree that the receipt of a State tax credit is not an

accession to wealth that results in income under section 61.

See

Browning v. Commissioner, 109 -T.C. 303, 324-325 (1997); Rev. Rul.

79-315, 1979-2 C.B 27.

We know of no authority, and respondent

has not cited any, for the proposit'ion that a State" income tax

credit results in ordinary income upon its later sale."

On the

contrary, courts and the Commissioner's rulings frequently treat

government-granted rights as capital assets."

"Even,respondent recognizes that a reduction in taxes does

not create income.

"The end result of the Act is the issuance by

the State of cash payments to all individual income taxpayers .

Thus, the Act is merely a means of effecting a statutory decrease

in the tax liability of each individual taxpayer". See Rev. Rul.

79-315, 1979-2 C.B. at 27.

"Carrying this propòsition through to its logical

conclusion would mean that inherited and gifted property, also

typically received tax free, should receive ordinary income

treatment when sold. See Lattera v. Commissioner, 437 F.3d 399,

405 (3d Cir. 2006) (discussing a similarly illogical result where

a taxpayer has not made any underlying investment in an asset),

affg. T.C. Memo. 2004-216.

"See Caboara v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1977-355 (deciding

(continued. . . )

- 18 -

It is also apparent that the transferred State tax credits

never represented a right to receive income from the state.

Instead, they merely represented the right to reduce a taxpayer's

State tax liability.

It is without question that a government's

decision to tax one taxpayer at a lower rate than another

taxpayer is not income to the taxpayer who pays lower taxes.

A

lesser tax detriment to a taxpayer is not an accession to wealth

and therefore does not give rise to income."

"(...continued)

a liquor license is a capital asset); Curtis v. United States,

72-1 USTC par. 9330, 29 AFTR 2d 72-924

(W.D. Wash.

1972)

(accepting the parties' characterization of government-allotted

milk base rights as capital assets and deciding whether those

rights were long-term or short-term capital assets); Rev. Rul.

70-644, 1970-2 C.B. 167 (treating milk allocation rights as

capital assets); Rev. Rul. 70-248, 1970-1 C.B. 172 (treating

liquor business license as a capital asset); Rev. Rul. 66-58,

1966-1 C.B. 186 (treating a cotton acreage allotments as capital

assets). Sec. 197 as contended by regulations may have the

effect of characterizing certain intangibles used in a trade or

business as sec. 1231 assets. Sec. 197(f) (7); sec. 1.1972(g) (8), Income Tax Regs.

"All "accessions to wealth, clearly realized, and over

which the taxpayers have complete dominion" are income.

Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co.,

348 U.S. 426,

431

(1955).

Some commentators have suggested a State's grant of State

income tax credits to taxpayers who make charitable donations of

qualified conservation easements should be treated as a

transaction that is in part a sale and in part a gift. The

Commissioner has eschewed this approach, and neither party has

advocated it here. See Chief Counsel Advice 201105010 (Feb. 4,

2011); see also Browning v. Commissioner, 109 T.C. 303 (1997).

We discern no reason to disturb this practice.

Credits do

not increase a donor's wealth, as long as they are used to offset

or reduce the donor's own State tax responsibility. A reduced

tax is not an accession to wealth.

It is only, as occurred in

the instant case, when the donor sells or exchanges a State tax

(continued...)

- 19 -

It follows that the taxpayer who is.able to claim a

deduction or credit has no more income by virtue of having that

right than the taxpayer who is unable to make such a claim."

Had petitioners used all of their credits to offset their State

tax liability, rather than selling them, it appears that

respondent would agree there would have been no income to

petitioners."

Using a tax credit to offset a tax liability is

not an accession to wealth.

Petitioners never possessed a right to income from the

receipt of the credits.

They did not sell a right either to

(...continued)

credit to a third party.for.consideration that an accession to

wealth has occurred. A lower tax is not the same as or

comparable with the State of Alaska's distribution of oil

revenues, derived from third parties, to its residents, which was

treated as income to them in Rev.-Rul. 85,39, supra.

"In a revenue ruling the Commissioner reasoned that a tax

rebate, applied in the form of a State income tax credit, was not

income because it was "merely a means of effecting a statutory

decrease in the tax liability" of those taxpayers. Rev. Rul. 79315,

1979-2 C.B. at 27.

"The Commissioner's longstanding administrative position

has been that the receipt and use of a State tax credit is not

income. Rev. Rul. 79-315, supra; Rev. Rul. 70-86, supra; Chief

Counsel Advice 200842002 (Oct. 17, 2008). The general exception

is that a refund of a tax claimed as a Federal income tax

deduction in a prior year is income. Sec. 111'.

Respondent does not assert, and there.is no evidence, that

petitioners sold credits that they could have claimed against a

State income tax liability. Therefore, whether a taxpayer who

sells credits at a discount that he could have used, pays his

State tax liability, and deducts that liability for Federal tax

purposes may receive capital gains treatment on the sale of those

credits is not at issue here.

- 20 earned income or to earn income.

Consequently, the sale proceeds

are not a substitute for rights to ordinary income."

3. Conclusion

The State tax credits petitioners sold do not represent a

right to income; therefore, the substitute for ordinary income

doctrine is inapplicable.

None of the categories of property in

section 1221 that Congress specifically excepted from the term

capital asset is applicable to the State tax credits.

Accordingly, we hold the State tax credits petitioners sold are

capital assets.

C.

Basis

Section 1012 sets forth the foundational principle that the

basis of property for tax purposes shall be the cost of the

property.

Cost, in turn, is defined by regulation as the amount

paid for the property in cash or other property.

Sec.

1.1012-1(a), Income Tax Regs.

Petitioners argue that they have a cost basis in their State

tax credits.

On their tax return they claimed a cost basis in

the credits based upon an allocation of $11,574.74 of

"Respondent's reliance upon the Gladden factors is

misplaced. We previously determined the State tax credits do not

represent contractual rights. We have also determined these

credits do not represent a right to income. Therefore, it is

inappropriate to apply the Gladden factors to the State tax

credits.

- 21 I

professional fees they incurred in connection with establishing and donating the conservation easement.21

In their cross-motion

for partial summary .judgment petitioners appear also to argue

some portion of their basis in their land should be allocable to

the State tax credits.22

We find neither-position tenable.

The first position assumes the expenses petitioners incurred

to donate the conservation easement are properly allocable in

their entirety to petitioners'' State tax credits .

However,

individual taxpayers may deduct ordinary and necessary expenses

incurred "in connection with the determination, collection, or

refund of any tax" as an itemized deduction.

Secs. 211 and 212.

Appraisal fees and other ordinary and necessary expenses to

determine a taxpayer' s tax liability as the result of a

charitable contribution may be deductible under section 212 (3) .

See Neelv v.

Commissioner,

85 T.C.

934,

950-951

(1985) ;, Robson v.

Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-176, affd. without published

opinion 172 F.3d 876 (9th Cir. 1999); Biaqiotti v. Commissioner,

T.C. Memo. 1986-460.

Expenses incurred to determine any State

tax, including State income tax credits, are also expenses that

21The fees consisted of accounting, appraisal, surveying,

and other professional services.

22While petitioners did not raise their position in their

pleadings, raising it in their motion has not prejudiced

respondent .

- 22 -

may fall within the ambit of section 212(3).

Sec. 1.212-1(1),

Income Tax Regs.

Section 212 aside, petitioners' argument also glosses over

section 1012.

Under section 1012, cost basis generally is what a

taxpayer paid to acquire an asset.

See Solitron Devices, Inc. v.

Commissioner, 80 T.C. 1, 16-17 (1983), affd. without published

opinion 744 F.2d 95 (11th Cir. 1984).

Petitioners paid

transaction fees to establish a conservation easement that they

donated to an unrelated third party.

Petitioners did not acquire

the State tax credits by purchase."

It was the State's

unilateral decision to grant petitioners the State tax credits as

a consequence of their ,compliance with certain State statutes.

Accordingly, petitioners easement costs are not allocable as cost

basis to their State tax credits.

Petitioners appear to take a second position in their motion

without fully articulating that position.

Petitioners cite

Fasken v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 650 (1979), for the proposition

that where a taxpayer sells a portion of property any gain or

loss is calculated separately for each part sold and the adjusted

basis of the entire property is allocated to the portion sold.

"This Court also notes that it has previously declined to

adopt the "unusual concept that cost basis can be allocated to

property other than * * * property purchased." Solitron Devices,

Inc. v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. 1, 17 (1988), affd. without

published opinion 744 F.2d 95 (11th Cir. 1984).

- 23 -

In Fasken the Court'decided whether the con^$ideration the

taxpayers received for easement grants should be applied against

their basis in all theiroland or applied to the portion of the

basis allocable to the acreage upon which the easements were

granted.

Id. at :655-660.

Unlike the taxpayers1in Fasken,

petitioners did -not sell an easement; they made a charitable

contribution.

Petitioners assert that the rationale of Fasken

should apply to their State tax credits.

They appear to contend

like the taxpayers in Fasken, that their State tax credits are

a

portion of their land and that, the basis in their land is

allocable to their credits

Colorado's grant of State tax credits creates cognizable property rights in those credits for the recipients of those

credits.

ICf. United States v. Griffin,' 324 F.3d 330., 353-355

(5th-Cir. 2003); Barrington Cove'Ltd. Pship. v. R.I. Hous.'&

Mortg. Fin. Corp.~, 246 F.3d 1, 5

(1st Cir. 2001)

(finding a

developer did not have a cognizable property interest in Federal

income tax credits for purposes of a sùbstantive due process'

claim where the developer had no entitlement to~credits and held

only a "unilateral expectation" and desire for the credits).

Upon petitioners' receipt of the credits,.their expectation

matured and they.then possessed ownership rights in their State .

tax credits.

However, these credits are not a right petitioners

possessed in their land.

Instead, their rights in the credits,

- 24 -

although achieved because of the property, arose on account of

the grant from the State.

Unlike the easement granted in Fasken

v. Commissioner, supra, the State tax credits are not a property

right in land that would necessitate the allocation of basis in

the land to the credits.

Therefore, Fasken does not control the

tax treatment of petitioners' charitable contribution.

Moreover, there.are rul'es for determining a donor's basis in

the context of a conservation easement.

The donor's entire basis

in the property is allocated to the conservation easement

according to the ratio that the- fair m'arket value of the easement

bears to the total pre-easement fair market value of the

property."

Sec. 170(e) (2); Hughes v..Commissioner, T.C. Memo.

2009-94;, sec. 1.170A--14(h) (3) (iii), Income Tax Regs.

The donor

reduces its basis in the retained property by the amount of basis

allocated to the conservation easement.

Sec. 170(e) (2); Hughes

v. Commissioner, supra; sec. 1.170A-14(h) (3) (iii), Income Tax

Regs.

These rules do not permit an allocation based upon the

value of a State tax credit, only on the value of the easement.

Therefore, it would be inconsistent with these rules to allocate

the donor's land basis to the value of a State tax credit.

There is nothing in the Code or the Commissioner's

-

regulations that justifies allocating petitioners' basis in their

land to the State tax credits. - Therefore, we conclude

petitioners do not have any basis in their State tax credits.

- 25 D.

.Holding Period

On their tax return petitioners reported a short-term

capital gain from the 'sale.of their State tax credits.

In their

cross-motion for partial summary judgment petitioners claim the

sale of their State tax credits resulted in long-term capital

gain."

The sale of capital asséts held for more "than 1 year

will result in long-term capital gain or loss.

Sec. 1222.

Petitioners assert that they held the land upon which they

donated the charitable conservation easement for more than 1 year

and that their holding period in the land is attributable to

their holding period in the State tax credits.

Assuming, without deciding, that petitioners have a holding

period in their land that was greater than 1 year, their argument

still fails.

Petitioners' reasoning, citing Fasken v.

Commissioner, supra, appears to be that their holding period in

their land and State tax credits are one in the same because they

are both part of the bundle of their real property rights.

As we explained supra pp. 23-24, a Colorado taxpayer had no

property rights in a conservation easement contribution State tax

credit until the donation was complete and the credits were

"Respondent filed a response to petitioners' assertion.

Therefore, petitioners' raising this issue in their motion has

not prejudiced respondent.

- 26 -

granted.

The credits never were, nor did they become, part of

petitioners' real property rights.

Instead, petitioners' holding period in their credits began

at the time the credits were granted and ended when petitioners

sold them.

Since petitioners sold their State tax credits in the

same month in which they received them, the capital gains from

the sale of the credits are short term.

E.

Conclusion

The State tax credits that petitioners sold are capital

assets.

Petitioners have no basis in their State tax credits.

Additionally, petitioners held their credits for less than 1

year; therefore, the gains arising from their disposition are

short-term capital gains.

To reflect the foregoing,

An appropriate order will

be issued granting in part and

1

denving in part respondent's

motion for partial summary

judgment and petitioners'

cross-motion for partial

summary judgment.