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T.C. Memo. 1997-262
UNITED STATES TAX COURT
ROBERT A. READ, Petitioner v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Docket No. 21250-94.
Filed June 11, 1997.
LeRoy Boyer, for petitioner.
Donald E. Edwards and Bruce K. Meneely, for respondent.
MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION
VASQUEZ, Judge:
Respondent determined a $173,098 deficiency
in petitioner's 1984 Federal income tax.
The issues in this case arise out of a claimed net operating
loss (NOL) carryback from 1986 to 1984.
The NOL carryback is
based on a bad debt deduction claimed by petitioner on his 1986
individual Federal income tax return.
Petitioner's 1986 bad debt
- 2 deduction is based upon the alleged worthlessness of his right of
subrogation which arose when petitioner was forced to honor a
guarantee of his partnership's debt.
Thus, resolution of the
1984 deficiency depends upon the validity of the claimed 1986 bad
debt deduction.1
Specifically, the issues for decision are:
(1)
Whether petitioner “paid” a debt from VIP Investors to
Security Bank in his capacity as a guarantor during the 1986
taxable year; and, if so
(2)
whether an alleged debt from VIP Investors to
petitioner, created by the right of subrogation, became worthless
during the 1986 taxable year; and, if so
(3) whether the debt which arose by right of subrogation was
a business or a nonbusiness bad debt.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Some of the facts have been stipulated and are so found.
The stipulation of facts and attached exhibits are incorporated
herein by this reference.
Petitioner, Robert A. Read, resided in
Tulsa, Oklahoma, at the time he filed his petition.
1
It is well settled that this Court may determine the
correct amount of a NOL for a year not in issue as a preliminary
step in making determinations for the taxable year or years at
issue. Sec. 6214(b); Lone Manor Farms, Inc. v. Commissioner, 61
T.C. 436, 440 (1974), affd. without published opinion 510 F.2d
970 (3d Cir. 1975); ABKCO Indus., Inc. v. Commissioner, 56 T.C.
1083, 1088-1089 (1971), affd. on other issue 482 F.2d 150 (3d
Cir. 1973), and cases cited therein.
- 3 For the taxable year 1984, petitioner timely filed an
individual Federal income tax return.
He also filed two amended
1984 Federal income tax returns dated November 25, 1991, and May
11, 1992.
For the taxable year 1986, petitioner timely filed an
individual Federal income tax return.
On his 1986 return,
petitioner claimed a business bad debt deduction of $874,177.
Because of the bad debt deduction and other losses not at issue
in this case, petitioner claimed a NOL carryback from 1986 to
1984 in the amount of $868,612, as set forth on his second
amended 1984 return.
Respondent disallowed the 1986 bad debt
deduction and the resulting NOL carryback.
1982 $1 Million Loan from Guaranty National Bank
On August 20, 1982, VIP Investors (VIP), an Oklahoma limited
partnership, was formed to buy a Sheraton Hotel in Oklahoma City,
Oklahoma.
On that date, a limited partnership agreement was
signed by the general partner, Terminal Drive Corp. (Terminal),
and by the 10 limited partners, one of whom was petitioner.
At
that time, Terminal owned 10 percent of VIP, petitioner owned 45
percent, and the other limited partners together owned the
remaining 45 percent of VIP.
Also on that date, VIP borrowed $1
million from Guaranty National Bank (Guaranty) in order to
purchase the Sheraton Hotel.
1984 Loan From Security Bank
On August 1, 1984, Terminal sold its 10-percent interest to
petitioner and assigned him its general partnership interest.
- 4 Petitioner became the general partner and 55-percent owner of
VIP.
On October 12, 1984, VIP borrowed $900,000 from Security
Bank (Security) and used the proceeds to satisfy the Guaranty
loan.
A promissory note (the Security note) was signed by
petitioner as general partner of VIP.
The original maturity date
of the Security note was November 15, 1984.
At the same time and
as part of the loan transaction with Security, petitioner pledged
to Security his own certificate of deposit in the amount of
$1,025,000 as collateral.
1985 Sale to Michael Grossman
On December 31, 1985, over 1 year after the original
maturity date of the Security note, VIP sold the Sheraton Hotel
to Michael Grossman.
Without assuming the Security note, Mr.
Grossman gave VIP a promissory note (the Grossman note) dated
December 31, 1985, for $708,000, maturing on May 1, 1986.
Also
on December 31, 1985, Mr. Grossman gave VIP a Replacement
Promissory Note (the replacement note) dated December 31, 1985,
for $700,000, maturing on September 15, 1986, which he signed as
“Michael Grossman, Trustee.”
The replacement note was given in
“renewal + extension” of the Grossman note.
Note Renewal, Default, and Offset by Security Bank
After the original maturity date on the Security note
passed, Security and VIP executed a “Deferral Agreement” several
times, extending the maturity date to later dates and providing
that the "Lender/Secured Party by acceptance of the interest
- 5 payment shown below agrees to extend the Maturity and the Due
Date of the Final Payment as follows."
Although it is unclear
that the following deferral agreements represent a complete
record, each one extended the maturity date of the note as
follows:
Deferral Agreement Dated
Note Extended To
January 15, 1985
October 28, 1986
March 12, 1987
January 13, 1988
March 15, 1985
December 15, 1986
May 8, 1987
March 4, 1988
Similarly, Security sent a “Note Notice” to VIP several times
after the original maturity date of November 15, 1984, calling
for interest payments.
Although it is unclear that the following
note notices represent a complete record, each one provided a new
“Due Date” in response to which petitioner made interest payments
as follows:
New Due Date
June 6, 1986
July 6, 1986
February 2, 1987
May 8, 1987
June 5, 1987
September 1, 1987
November 2, 1987
March 4, 1988
Interest Paid
$6,503.43
6,028.76
8,880.40
11,959.76
5,278.32
17,356.19
12,443.66
12,538.85
Each interest payment resulted in the renewal and deferral of the
due date of the Security note.
All of the payments made by
petitioner to Security prior to 1989 were for interest only.
Petitioner could not have retrieved his pledged certificate
of deposit from Security because the certificate of deposit was
- 6 collateral for the loan.
On February 27, 1989, Security informed
petitioner by letter that on February 2, 1989, the Security loan
had matured and the bank was unable to further extend it.
The
letter stated that the Security loan had not been paid, requested
payment, and stated that if payment was not made, the bank would
“be compelled to pay off the loans out of the various
certificates of deposit which are pledged to secure the loans.”
Security used the certificate of deposit to pay off the Security
note sometime after February 27, 1989.
Guaranty Agreement
After the transfer of its interest in the Sheraton Hotel to
Mr. Grossman, VIP had no assets other than the replacement note.
VIP would not have been able to secure the Security loan without
posting adequate collateral.
Petitioner's certificate of deposit
was taken to pay not only the Security note but also two other
loans, that of petitioner and of Gemini Management.
Worthlessness:
Year and Existence
Petitioner expected that payments from the replacement note
would allow him to pay off the Security note.
Although the
maturity date of the replacement note was September 15, 1986,
petitioner believed that Mr. Grossman was going to pay it within
30 days of the issuance date, in January of 1986.
In January of
1986, Security told petitioner that the Security note had not
been paid.
During 1986, petitioner pursued Mr. Grossman on a
regular basis to pay the replacement note; he called Mr. Grossman
- 7 and his lawyers, sent Mr. Grossman demand letters, and finally
sued Mr. Grossman in March of 1987.
No evidence was presented
regarding the financial condition of Mr. Grossman except
petitioner's oral testimony that Mr. Grossman had no assets and
had filed for bankruptcy.
The limited partners of VIP believed
that Mr. Grossman had assets worth pursuing.
Petitioner, as
general partner of VIP, attempted to collect on the replacement
note through legal action during the year 1986.
On June 22, 1986, petitioner, as general partner of VIP,
sent a written notice of default and demand for payment in full
of the Grossman note to Mr. Grossman but not on the replacement
note.
On March 6, 1987, VIP filed a petition in the Oklahoma
County (State of Oklahoma) District Court suing Mr. Grossman on
the replacement note.
On May 26, 1987, Mr. Grossman filed an
amended answer alleging, inter alia, that he signed the
replacement note to VIP “in his capacity as Trustee, not in a
personal capacity, and, if obligated at all, can only be
obligated in that capacity.”
On May 28, 1987, VIP sent Mr.
Grossman a request for admissions and interrogatories, and, in
his answer, Mr. Grossman stated that he signed the replacement
note only in his capacity as trustee for the “Oklahoma City Hotel
Joint Venture” (the joint venture).
The joint venture was composed of M&G Financial Corp., Inc.
(M&G) and MBG Financial Corp., Inc. (MBG).
On September 18,
1987, VIP filed an amended petition to join as codefendants M&G
- 8 and MBG.
On November 5, 1987, VIP obtained a default judgement
against M&G and MBG in the amount of $709,660 plus interest.
On
January 9, 1989, VIP filed an affidavit of judgment in the case.
The record, however, is devoid of any evidence regarding the
financial condition of either M&G or MBG.
There was no evidence
that those entities were insolvent or without assets from which
to collect at any time, much less in 1986, the claimed loss year.
OPINION
The issue is whether petitioner is entitled to a NOL
carryback from 1986 to 1984.
The answer to this question depends
upon whether petitioner is entitled to a business bad debt
deduction in 1986 under section 166(a).
That bad debt deduction
stems from petitioner's alleged payment of the Security note that
he guaranteed.
Petitioner claims that he paid the Security note
in 1986 and therefore is entitled to a business bad debt
deduction in 1986.
Petitioner contends, and respondent concedes,
that if petitioner is entitled to a business bad debt deduction
in 1986, then he is entitled to carryback the resulting NOL
pursuant to section 172 to the taxable year 1984, the year in
issue.
Respondent disallowed petitioner's bad debt deduction and
argues that (1) any debt which may have been owed by VIP to
petitioner, due to petitioner's right of subrogation arising from
his guarantee of the Security note,2 did not become worthless in
2
Although not explicitly stated in any documents in the
(continued...)
- 9 the year claimed by petitioner; and (2) petitioner, as guarantor,
did not pay the Security note in the year claimed by petitioner,
and therefore petitioner is not entitled to a bad debt deduction
in 1986.
Because we find that the issue of worthlessness is
determinative of petitioner's right to a bad debt deduction in
the instant case, we shall address that issue first.
Section 166(a) provides that a taxpayer may deduct any debt
that becomes wholly or partially worthless within the taxable
year.
Under section 166, worthless business bad debts are fully
deductible from ordinary income.
The parties do not dispute the
existence of a bona fide debt between VIP and Security; the
parties do dispute whether petitioner “paid” VIP's debt as
guarantor, and, if so, whether petitioner incurred a debt that
became worthless during the 1986 taxable year.3
Petitioner bears the burden of proving that the debt became
worthless in the year in which it was claimed, that such
worthlessness resulted in a NOL, and that the NOL is eligible to
be carried back to the 1984 taxable year.
Rule 142(a).
There is
2
(...continued)
record, under Oklahoma State law petitioner would have an
equitable right of subrogation if he paid the VIP note in his
capacity as guarantor. Moore v. White, 603 P.2d 1119 (Okla.
1979).
3
Additionally, if we find that petitioner did pay VIP's
debt as guarantor and that the debt became worthless in 1986,
respondent argues that such loss is a nonbusiness bad debt, and
therefore the loss is a short-term capital loss which does not
give rise to a NOL carryback. See sec. 166(d)(1)(B).
- 10 no standard test or formula for determining worthlessness within
a given taxable year.
(1981).
Crown v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 582, 598
Worthlessness is a question of fact.
Income Tax Regs.
Sec. 1.166-2(a),
A debt becomes worthless in the year in which
identifiable events clearly mark the futility of any hope of
further recovery.
James A. Messer Co. v. Commissioner, 57 T.C.
848, 861 (1972).
In order for us to find that petitioner qualified for a bad
debt deduction, petitioner must prove that his right of
subrogation against VIP became worthless in 1986, the year in
which it is claimed as a deduction.
Putnam v. Commissioner, 352
U.S. 82, 85 (1956); Intergraph Corp. v. Commissioner, 106 T.C.
312, 324 (1996); sec. 1.166-9(e)(2), Income Tax Regs.
Petitioner
has not shown the futility of any hope of recovery under his
right of subrogation.
After the sale to Mr. Grossman, VIP still
had one asset, namely the replacement note.
In March 1987,
petitioner, after many attempts at collection, had VIP initiate
suit against Mr. Grossman in order to collect on the replacement
note.
In September 1987, VIP amended its petition against Mr.
Grossman to include M&G and MBG as defendants.
In November 1987,
the district court for Oklahoma County decreed that petitioner
was entitled to a judgment, jointly and severally, against M&G
and MBG in the amount of $709,6604 plus interest and attorneys
4
Although this amount is less than the amount of the debt
(continued...)
- 11 fees.
Additionally, in January 1989, VIP filed an affidavit of
judgment against M&G and MBG.
Petitioner offered no evidence of
the financial condition of either M&G or MBG.
Recovery of any
portion of the $709,660 judgment would have dramatically improved
VIP's financial condition.
Given these facts, we cannot conclude
that petitioner's right of subrogation was worthless.
Accordingly, petitioner has not carried his burden of showing
that he had a debt which was worthless at the end of 1986.
To reflect the foregoing,
Decision will be
entered for respondent.
4
(...continued)
petitioner claims became worthless, petitioner did not argue, and
we need not decide, that the debt was partially worthless.
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