UNITED STATES TAX COURT
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T.C. Memo. 2003-200
UNITED STATES TAX COURT
BREWER QUALITY HOMES, INC., Petitioner v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Docket No. 8222-99.
Filed July 10, 2003.
R disallowed deductions for portions of amounts P paid
to a shareholder-officer.
Held: (1) Maximum amounts of reasonable compensation
(less than amounts P deducted, but greater than amounts R
determined) are redetermined.
(2) The amounts so redetermined were paid as
compensation for personal services actually rendered and are
deductible. The amounts P paid in excess of the amounts so
redetermined are not deductible. Sec. 162(a)(1), I.R.C.
1986.
R. Cody Mayo, Jr., for petitioner.
Mary Beth Calkins and Joseph Ineich, for respondent.
- 2 MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION
CHABOT, Judge:
Respondent determined deficiencies in
Federal corporate income tax against petitioner as follows:
Year
Deficiency
1995
$123,602
1996
144,411
After concessions by respondent,1 the issue for decision is
the extent to which amounts that petitioner paid to Jack are
deductible as reasonable compensation under section 162(a)(1).2
1
In the notice of deficiency, respondent disallowed (1)
$338,941 of the $783,930 of officer compensation that petitioner
paid to Jack R. Brewer, Sr. (hereinafter sometimes referred to as
Jack), and Mary L. Brewer (hereinafter sometimes referred to as
Mary) in 1995, and (2) $397,759 of the $881,559 of officer
compensation that petitioner paid to Jack and Mary in 1996.
Respondent concedes that (1) all payments of officer
compensation to Mary are deductible, and (2) additional portions
of the payments to Jack are deductible. After respondent’s
concessions, there remain in dispute only $158,069 of the
original $338,941 disallowance for 1995, and only $337,593 of the
original $397,759 disallowance for 1996.
2
Unless indicated otherwise, all section references are to
sections of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 as in effect for
the taxable years in issue.
- 3 FINDINGS OF FACT3
Some of the facts have been stipulated; the stipulations and
the stipulated exhibits are incorporated herein by this
reference.
Petitioner was incorporated in Louisiana on August 1, 1977.
When its petition in the instant case was filed, petitioner’s
principal place of business was in Bossier City, Louisiana.
Bossier City is in northwest Louisiana, on the east side of the
Red River, across from Shreveport.
Petitioner is located on Rte.
US 80.
3
Respondent’s counsel complied with the detailed
requirements of Rule 151(e)(3) as to proposed findings of fact in
opening briefs; petitioner’s counsel did not. As a result,
respondent was deprived of the opportunity to explain why
petitioner’s views of the facts were incorrect. In our
determinations, we have taken the foregoing into account and have
resolved many otherwise uncertain matters in favor of
respondent’s view of the facts.
Petitioner’s counsel is put on notice that (1) the Rule is
designed both to facilitate the work of the Court and also to
provide a “level playing field” to the parties, and (2) the Court
will be inclined to impose formal sanctions in the event of
future similar violations.
Sec. 7491, which shifts the burden of proof to the
Commissioner if the taxpayer meets certain conditions, is
effective for court proceedings arising in connection with
examinations beginning after July 22, 1998. Internal Revenue
Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-206,
sec. 3001(a), 112 Stat. 726. Respondent began examining
petitioner’s 1995 and 1996 Federal corporate income tax returns
sometime in early 1997. Accordingly, sec. 7491 does not apply in
the instant case.
Unless indicated otherwise, all Rule references are to the
Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.
- 4 Petitioner is engaged in the business of retail selling of
manufactured homes, also known as mobile homes, trailers, or
trailer homes, hereinafter sometimes collectively referred to as
mobile homes.
At all relevant times, Jack and Mary each owned 50
percent of petitioner’s stock.
Petitioner’s stock was not
publicly traded.
A.
Jack’s Background
Jack served in the U.S. Marine Corps for 3 years.
In 1954,
he left the Marine Corps and moved to Dallas, Texas, where he
began a career in the automobile business.
Jack served as the
sales, finance, and insurance manager for several General Motors
dealerships.
In 1973, he left the automobile business to pursue
a career in the mobile home business.
B.
Petitioner’s Origin and Economic Development
Jack began his mobile home retailing business with capital
raised from the $8,000 of equity that he had in his home and a
$50,000 bank loan.
He used this capital to establish an
inventory of about six mobile homes.
Jack increased his
inventory by buying distressed merchandise at a discount--new
mobile homes that lenders had repurchased from retailers who were
going out of business.
He attributed the failures of other
retailers’ businesses to an economic downturn that began in 1973.
Jack did not employ anyone in his mobile home retailing
business during its first year.
- 5 During the 1980s, the mobile home retailing business in
petitioner’s region of the country (Texas, Louisiana, and
Oklahoma) endured another economic downturn, because of the oil
industry.
More than 45,000 mobile homes were repossessed in
Texas alone.
In petitioner’s basic trade area, 21 mobile home
retailers either went out of business or filed for bankruptcy.
Petitioner was one of only two mobile home retailers located
within 1 mile of petitioner that survived the 1980s’ economic
downturn.
During 1992 and 1993, the mobile home retailing business in
petitioner’s basic trade area endured another economic downturn.
Although petitioner survived this downturn, many other mobile
home retailers did not.
Nine of the mobile home retailers that
did not survive this downturn were located within 1 mile of
petitioner on the US 80 corridor.
Petitioner again took
advantage of the situation by buying at distress sale prices
mobile homes that lenders had repossessed and selling these
mobile homes at regular retail prices.
Petitioner had about 16 employees during the early 1990s.
In 1996, petitioner had 22 employees, 7 of whom were in sales.
Petitioner’s business was operated as a sole proprietorship
from 1973 until petitioner’s incorporation, in 1977.
Petitioner
elected S corporation status as of January 1, 1987.
Petitioner
was a C corporation for 1988.
Petitioner elected S corporation
- 6 status as of January 1, 1989, and remained in that status through
1993.
Petitioner was a C corporation for 1994 through 1996.
Petitioner reported gross sales, total income, and taxable
income for 1986 through 1996 as shown in table 1.
Table 1
Year
Gross Sales
Total Income1
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
$2,528,724
3,022,585
3,569,197
3,380,615
3,526,171
2,888,775
2,732,920
4,197,494
6,559,036
9,006,092
9,920,208
$530,635
657,051
843,645
771,252
884,275
716,812
728,845
1,015,976
1,383,467
2,029,979
2,326,709
Taxable Income(Loss)
$36,429
19,819
15,816
(18,214)
(1,791)
(6,976)
118,987
337,405
97,840
167,758
151,566
1
Total income includes gross profit, interest income, and
other income.
Jack and Mary personally guaranteed all loans by banks to
petitioner.
C.
Jack’s Duties
Jack exercised complete control over petitioner’s business
since it was founded (1973) and over petitioner since it was
incorporated (1977), including the years in issue.
He served as
petitioner’s president, chief financial officer, chief executive
officer, general manager, sales manager, loan officer, credit
manager, purchasing officer, personnel manager, advertising
manager, insurance agent, real estate manager, and corporate
legal affairs liaison.
With the exception of sales manager--Jack
- 7 promoted a sales administrator to sales manager in
mid-1996--
Jack has always held these positions.
In his capacity as general sales manager, Jack oversaw
petitioner’s daily sales operations, worked with salespeople on
all transactions, appraised trade-ins, negotiated with buyers,
and approved all closings.
In his capacity as advertising
manager, Jack directed petitioner’s advertising efforts:
He met
with all media, wrote ad copies for television, radio, and
newspaper advertisements, prepared the advertising budgets, and
approved all advertising costs.
In his capacity as loan officer,
Jack approved the underwriting for all in-house loans and
personally worked delinquent accounts.
In his capacity as
licensed general insurance agent, Jack was responsible for
petitioner’s book of insurance; petitioner had more than 400
insurance customers.
Petitioner insured 60 percent of its sales.
The commissions earned for Jack’s work as the licensed general
insurance agent went to petitioner and were reported on
petitioner’s tax return.
As the personnel manager, Jack was
responsible for hiring, firing, supervising, training, and
evaluating all of petitioner’s employees.
In his capacity as
purchasing officer, Jack ordered all of petitioner’s inventory,
lot supplies, and office supplies.
He also bought all company
vehicles and approved all invoices for payment.
In his capacity
- 8 as corporate legal affairs liaison, Jack reviewed legal contracts
between petitioner and third parties.
In addition to the foregoing, Jack supervised the in-house
bookkeeper; reviewed vendor invoices; maintained inventory
records; gathered the necessary information to prepare
petitioner’s financial statements and tax returns; planned and
monitored petitioner’s cashflow; signed checks; negotiated lines
of credit, advances, and loans; and directed the investment of
petitioner’s cash reserve.
Jack extensively reviewed
petitioner’s quarterly financial reports.
Jack brought enthusiasm, dedication, and energy to
petitioner.
He made a point of being willing to meet every
customer at some point in the sales process.
He worked 6 to 7
days per week, and often worked long into the night.
and closed the business each day.
He opened
If there were delinquent
accounts, then Jack went out at night and collected on them.
In
petitioner’s early years, Jack worked about 70 hours per week;
during the years in issue, Jack worked about 60 hours per week.
His duties also involved frequent travel.
At all times relevant to the instant case, Mary has been
either petitioner’s vice president, secretary, or secretarytreasurer.
- 9 D.
Compensation Practices
1.
General
Petitioner did not maintain a written salary policy or bonus
plan for its employees.
To attract “top-notch” people it paid
compensation that was equivalent to or greater than the
compensation paid by other mobile home retailers.
Since its
incorporation, petitioner has paid all the cost of health
insurance for all its employees.
It has also provided paid sick
and vacation leave for all its employees, except Jack (and,
presumably, Mary).
Although petitioner established a profit-
sharing plan with Commercial National Bank in January of 1985,
the plan was terminated in late 1987.
In addition, petitioner’s
resolution on February 5, 1996, to adopt a 401(k) retirement plan
was aborted on February 7, 1997, because of excessive
administrative costs.
Table 2 sets forth the compensation petitioner paid to its
key employees, other than Jack, for 1994, 1995, and 1996.
- 10 Table 2
Name
Position
1994
1995
1996
John Atkinson
Sales Person
$60,053
$75,407
$72,209
Garry Hood
Sales Person
NA
21,777
74,551
Kurt Ley
Sales Manager
NA
21,000
71,424
Patsy K. Watson
Bus. Manager
31,428
37,946
40,250
Larry Gill
Service Manager
51,161
56,827
62,523
Dale Hughes
Sales Person
26,823
45,210
27,635
Tony Lewis
Sales Person
42,763
55,434
41,445
Mary Brewer
Bookkeeper/Decorator
21,765
21,744
18,000
2.
Jack’s Compensation
During the years in issue, petitioner never had a
compensation, defined benefit, or profit-sharing plan for Jack.
Jack analogized petitioner’s compensation policy for him to that
of a farmer’s:
If petitioner had a good year, then Jack had a
good year; if petitioner had a bad year, then Jack took “minimum
wages.”
Table 3 shows, for each of the years 1986 through 1996, (1)
petitioner’s claimed compensation payment to Jack, (2) that
claimed compensation as a percentage of gross sales (supra table
1), and (3) that claimed compensation as a percentage of taxable
income before deduction of that claimed compensation, supra table
1 as adjusted by adding back the claimed compensation to Jack.
- 11 Table 3
Year
Claimed
compensation
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
$24,195
79,413
164,292
84,581
175,164
129,828
25,174
25,818
398,638
762,186
863,559
Claimed
compensation as
% of gross sales
Claimed compensation
as % of taxable income
before deduction of
Jack’s compensation
1.0
2.6
4.6
2.5
5.0
4.5
0.9
0.6
6.1
8.5
8.7
39.9
80.0
91.2
127.5
101.0
105.7
17.5
7.1
80.3
82.0
85.1
In 1995, petitioner paid $62,186 in salary to Jack over the
course of the year.
On December 31, 1995, petitioner paid an
additional $700,000 to him as a bonus.
In 1996, petitioner paid
$63,559 in salary to Jack over the course of the year.
On
December 31, 1996, petitioner paid an additional $800,000 to him
as a bonus.
Jack determined the amount of his bonus each year
after he and J. Michael Sledge (hereinafter sometimes referred to
as Sledge) examined petitioner’s financial situation.
Sledge, a
certified public accountant, has been petitioner’s accountant
since its incorporation and Jack’s accountant since 1975.
Sledge
prepared petitioner’s tax returns for both of the years in issue,
and signed those tax returns as paid preparer.
He represented
petitioner and Jack during the audit stage that led to the
instant case.
He met with Jack at least quarterly every year to
review the financial performance of the company and another 20-30
- 12 times a year on an ad hoc basis.
He has attended most of the
meetings of petitioner’s board of directors since 1977.
In determining the amount of a bonus for Jack, Jack and
Sledge considered petitioner’s profit situation and the amount of
retained earnings necessary to satisfy an investor in petitioner.
Jack discussed with Sledge the possibility that the amounts of
the 1995 and 1996 bonuses might be viewed as “unreasonable
compensation in eyes of the Commissioner” of Internal Revenue.
Jack was aware that there were risks involved with petitioner’s
payment of the bonuses on the last day of the year.
Petitioner’s corporate board minutes for 1995 and 1996 do
not reflect any intent to increase Jack’s compensation in those
years to make up for Jack’s earlier years’ undercompensated
services.
E.
Distribution and Dividend History
Petitioner distributed $116,100 in 1993, as an S
corporation.
Petitioner distributed $320,949 dividends in 1994,
as a C corporation.
recommendation.
This was done in accordance with Sledge’s
The 1993 and 1994 distributions are the only
ones petitioner ever made, through the end of 1996.
Petitioner
did not have any agreements with any banks or financial
institutions with which it dealt that prohibited it from
declaring dividends for the years in issue.
- 13 F.
Business Practices
1.
Products
Over the years, petitioner has been a dealer of about 20
different brands of mobile homes.
In 1995 and 1996, petitioner
carried the Fleetwood line of mobile homes as its primary product
offering.
Fleetwood manufactures price-competitive, high quality
mobile homes.
Fleetwood dealerships generally are very
successful.
During the years in issue, petitioner did not have a
franchise agreement with Fleetwood, nor did petitioner receive
any market protection from it.
Indeed, there was another
Fleetwood retailer located “almost next door” to petitioner.
For 1995-1996, petitioner was ranked number 36 of Fleetwood
retailers in the nation.
For 1996-1997, petitioner was ranked
(1) the top Fleetwood retailer in Louisiana, and (2) number 13 in
the nation.
2.
Financing
Since 1991, petitioner has offered financing to customers
who Jack describes as “people that do not conform to the average
lending institution.”
Jack managed this loan portfolio for
petitioner and also served as the underwriter for each of the
loans.
Petitioner has extended more than 200 loans as part of
its financing endeavors.
Of this number, only three failed, and
only one resulted in a loss to petitioner.
Petitioner’s mobile
- 14 home loan portfolio produced $87,974 interest for 1995 and
$89,357 interest for 1996.
3.
Insurance Underwriting
Before petitioner could install a mobile home on a buyer’s
location, the buyer had to insure the mobile home.
As a licensed
fire and casualty insurance agent, Jack wrote insurance policies
for 60 percent of petitioner’s sales.
These policies were then
attached to their corresponding notes, which were sold to banks.
The commissions earned from the insurance sales went to
petitioner.
Petitioner reported “Part. & Insurance Income” of
$58,019 and $44,566, respectively, on its 1995 and 1996 tax
returns.
G.
Conclusions
Table 4 sets forth the parties’ and the Court’s positions
with respect to claimed compensation payments by petitioner to
Jack for the years in issue.
Petitioner contends that all of the
amounts paid meet the requirements for deductibility, and that
greater payments, unspecified in amount, also would be
deductible.
Respondent’s determinations and contentions, and the
Court’s redeterminations, are in terms of the maximum amounts
that meet the requirements for deductibility.
- 15 Table 4
Petitioner: Paid, deducted, and
stands by tax returns
Respondent Allows:
Notice of deficiency
After concessions
1995
1996
$762,186
$863,559
1
2
423,245
3
604,117
Court Finds:
610,000
465,800
485,966
630,000
1
In the notice of deficiency, respondent allowed a
deduction of $444,989 of the amount petitioner paid to both Jack
and Mary. Because respondent concedes that the entire $21,744
paid to Mary is deductible, this leaves $423,245 as the amount
petitioner paid to Jack that respondent determined to be
deductible.
2
In the notice of deficiency, respondent allowed a
deduction of $483,800 of the amount petitioner paid to both Jack
and Mary. Because respondent concedes that the entire $18,000
paid to Mary is deductible, this leaves $465,800 as the amount
petitioner paid to Jack that respondent determined to be
deductible.
3
This is the sum of $599,117, derived by Hakala’s
formulaic approach, plus “additional compensation of $5,000.00 to
Mr. Brewer for providing his personal guarantee to secure a
short-term working capital line of credit in 1995.” Infra
OPINION, C. Analysis, 1. Reasonableness, (d) Amount of Reasonable
Compensation, (2) Loan Guarantee.
Petitioner did not intend in 1995 and did not intend in 1996
to compensate Jack for his earlier services to petitioner.
OPINION
A.
Parties’ Positions
Petitioner maintains that the amounts it paid to Jack as
compensation were reasonable in amount, within the meaning of
section 162(a)(1), and so these amounts are fully deductible.
- 16 Respondent “agrees that Mr. Brewer brought enthusiasm,
dedication[,] and energy to the Petitioner, and that the company
experienced great growth during the mid 1990s; however,”
respondent contends that any amounts paid to Jack in excess of
$604,117 for 1995 and $485,966 for 1996 were not intended as
payments purely for personal services,4 and even if they were so
4
On answering brief, petitioner contends as follows:
The Respondent contends that a portion of the payments
are disguised dividends. * * *
The issue as to whether the payment of compensation was
purely for services is not before the Court.
The Notice of Deficiency did not raise the issue of
disguised dividends or the compensatory nature of the
services, or assert that any portion of the payment was a
disguised dividend. * * * It is unfair to the Petitioner
after close of the trial to raise a new issue that being
that the payment received by Mr. Brewer was for something
other than the services he rendered. * * *
The Petitioner contends that only the amount of
compensation the Court may find is in excess of a reasonable
amount, if any, be declared to be a dividend, and that the
Respondent not be allowed to dispute the compensatory nature
of the payments to Mr. Brewer.
For the following reasons, we conclude that the issue of
whether any part of petitioner’s payments to Jack was disguised
dividends, rather than intended compensation for personal
services, is properly before the Court.
Firstly, the notice of deficiency explanation includes the
alternative that disallowed amounts were not “expended for the
purposes designated.”
Secondly, the first sentence of respondent’s opening
statement before the trial is as follows:
(continued...)
- 17 intended, they were unreasonable in amount for the services he
rendered.
Respondent argues that these excess amounts are not
deductible under section 162(a)(1).
B.
Summary; Conclusions
In determining the maximum reasonable compensation for
Jack’s services for the years in issue, we have considered the
relevant factors listed in Owensby & Kritikos, Inc.
v.
Commissioner, 819 F.2d 1315, 1323 (5th Cir. 1987), affg. T.C.
Memo. 1985-267.
Both parties presented expert witness reports
and testimony on the applicability of the relevant factors to the
instant case.
While we do not find the experts’ conclusions
4
(...continued)
OPENING STATEMENT BY COUNSEL ON BEHALF OF THE
RESPONDENT
MS. CALKINS: Your Honor, this case presents two
questions: whether a portion of payments made to Mr. Brewer
in 1995 and 1996 and deducted as officer’s compensation by
the Petitioner are actually disguised dividends. * * *
The second question, respondent stated, was whether the deducted
amounts “are reasonable in amount.” The final sentence of
respondent’s opening statement is as follows:
It is Respondent’s position that in spite of Mr.
Brewer’s contributions to Petitioner during the years at
issue, the payments to him over and above what Respondent
has allowed in the trial memorandum should be disallowed as
disguised dividends.
Thirdly, our search of the transcript shows that,
notwithstanding respondent’s clear statements at the start of the
trial, petitioner did not object, or otherwise comment on this
matter, at that time or at any other time during the 3-day trial.
- 18 particularly helpful, we do use some of the data and analyses
they provide in reaching our decision.
We first consider the Robert Morris Associates (hereinafter
sometimes referred to as RMA) report for the industry on
financial ratios, which provides data on, among other things,
executive compensation as a percentage of sales for companies
comparable to petitioner.
Based on petitioner’s and the mobile
home retail industry’s financial performances in 1995 and 1996,
we conclude that Jack’s compensation as a percentage of sales
should be compared to those of executives in comparable companies
at around the 90th percentile.
By multiplying petitioner’s sales
by the appropriate RMA factor for each year, we determine that
payments to Jack, as compensation for the services he performed
for petitioner, would have been about $520,000 in 1995 and
$600,000 in 1996.
We add $5,000 to the 1995 amount on account of
Jack’s guaranty of a bank loan to petitioner.
We also consider the fact that petitioner did not provide
Jack with retirement benefits.
Based on comments by respondent’s
expert, we conclude that an amount of about 5 percent of Jack’s
compensation would be sufficient to compensate him for the
absence of retirement benefits.
This brings reasonable
compensation to about $550,000 in 1995 and $630,000 in 1996.
- 19 In light of respondent’s willingness to allow what Hakala
recommends for 1995, plus correction of Hakala’s mathematical
errors, we round the 1995 amount to $610,000.
We conclude that all of the amounts that would have been
reasonable compensation to Jack were intended by petitioner to be
compensation and not dividends.
C.
Analysis
Section 162(a)(1)5 allows a deduction for the payment of
compensation, but only if the compensation is both (1) reasonable
in amount and (2) paid for personal services rendered.
Paula
Construction Co. v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 1055, 1058 (1972),
affd. without published opinion 474 F.2d 1345 (5th Cir. 1973);
sec. 1.162-7(a), Income Tax Regs.
The question of reasonableness
is one of fact which must be resolved on the basis of all the
facts and circumstances in the case.
Owensby & Kritikos, Inc.
v. Commissioner, 819 F.2d at 1323; Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of
Salina, Inc. v. Commissioner, 528 F.2d 176, 179 (10th Cir. 1975),
affg. 61 T.C. 564, 567 (1974); Estate of Wallace v. Commissioner,
5
SEC. 162.
TRADE OR BUSINESS EXPENSES.
(a) In General.–-There shall be allowed as a deduction
all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred
during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or
business, including-(1) a reasonable allowance for salaries or other
compensation for personal services actually
rendered * * *
- 20 95 T.C. 525, 553 (1990), affd. 965 F.2d 1038 (11th Cir. 1992);
Home Interiors & Gifts, Inc. v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 1142, 1155
(1980).
In addition to multifactor tests (see Owensby & Kritikos,
Inc. v. Commissioner, 819 F.2d at 1323), courts have also used
independent investor tests to determine whether payments to an
employee-shareholder exceeded reasonable compensation.
See,
e.g., Dexsil Corp. v. Commissioner, 147 F.3d 96, 100-101 (2d Cir.
1998), vacating and remanding T.C. Memo. 1995-135, on remand T.C.
Memo. 1999-155.
Generally, courts have described independent
investor tests as a lens through which the entire analysis should
be viewed.
Dexsil Corp. v. Commissioner, id. at 101.
In Owensby
& Kritikos, Inc. v. Commissioner, 819 F.2d at 1327, the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stated:
“The so-called independent
investor test is simply one of the factors a court should
consider, and in certain cases it may be a substantial factor.”
In discussing the significance of a corporation’s dividend
practices, that Court also stated:
“The prime indicator of the
return a corporation is earning for its investors is its return
on equity.”
Id. at 1326-1327.
Discerning the intent behind the payments also presents a
factual question to be resolved within the bounds of the
individual case.
Nor-Cal Adjusters v. Commissioner, 503 F.2d
- 21 359, 362 (9th Cir. 1974), affg. T.C. Memo. 1971-200; Paula
Construction Co. v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. at 1059.
Where officer-shareholders who are in control of a
corporation set their own compensation, careful scrutiny is
required to determine whether the alleged compensation is in fact
Rutter v. Commissioner, 853 F.2d
a distribution of profits.
1267, 1270-1271 (5th Cir. 1988), affg. T.C. Memo. 1986-407;
Owensby & Kritikos, Inc.
v. Commissioner, 819 F.2d at 1324;
Estate of Wallace v. Commissioner, 95 T.C. at 556; sec. 1.1627(b)(1), Income Tax Regs.
We will consider first whether (and, if so, then to what
extent) the payments to Jack exceeded reasonable compensation,
and then whether (and, if so, then to what extent) any part of
the payments that survive the first test should nevertheless be
nondeductible because they were not intended to be compensation.
Compare Owensby & Kritikos, Inc.
v. Commissioner, 819 F.2d at
1325 (payments made in the form of compensation), with Paula
Construction Co. v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. at 1057, 1059-1060
(payments made in the form of distributions), and King’s Court
Mobile Home Park v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. 511, 514-515 (1992)
(corporation’s unreported income diverted to shareholder).
1.
Reasonableness
Many factors are relevant in determining whether amounts
paid to a person were reasonable compensation, including the
- 22 following:
The person’s qualifications; the nature, extent, and
scope of the person’s work; the size and complexities of the
business; a comparison of salaries paid with gross income and net
income; the prevailing general economic conditions; a comparison
of salaries with distributions to stockholders; the prevailing
rates of compensation for comparable positions in comparable
concerns; the salary policy of the taxpayer as to all persons; in
the case of small corporations with a limited number of officers
the amount of compensation paid to the particular person in
previous years; and whether the corporation provided the person
with a pension or profit-sharing plan.
Owensby & Kritikos, Inc.
v. Commissioner, 819 F.2d at 1323, and cases there cited.
No
single factor is decisive; rather, we must consider and weigh the
totality of the facts and circumstances in arriving at our
decision.
Idem.
Before we apply the relevant factors to the instant case, we
note that petitioner presented evidence of three offers to buy
petitioner.
The parties devoted substantial efforts to analyze
the direct and indirect (i.e., regarding return on investment)
significance of these offers.
Indeed, respondent’s expert
opined: “The single best evidence of reasonable compensation can
be found in the three subsequent offers to acquire the assets and
business of [petitioner]”.
However, none of the offers is
sufficiently detailed to enable us to determine what Jack’s
- 23 services would be worth under that offer.
(Petitioner contends
that one offer would justify a 1996 compensation level higher
than petitioner paid, while respondent contends that, using the
same methodology that petitioner used, one of the other offers,
would lead to a conclusion that the maximum 1996 reasonable
compensation would be only $79,103.)
Also, the parties do not
assist us in deciding how to adjust for the difference in time
between the offers’ presentations and the years in issue.
Finally, we do not even know when one of the offers was made.
Under these circumstances, we conclude that the offers are not to
be given any weight in determining the amounts of reasonable
compensation for Jack’s services for the years in issue.
The following indicia of relatively high reasonable
compensation are present in the instant case:
(1) Jack has been involved in every aspect of petitioner
since its inception.
Through his enthusiasm, hard work, and
dedication, he built petitioner into a successful enterprise.
He
served as its president, chairman, chief executive officer,
general manager, chief financial officer, credit manager,
purchasing officer, personnel manager, advertising manager,
insurance agent, real estate manager, and corporate legal affairs
liaison.
He worked 60 hours per week, 6 to 7 days per week.
- 24 (2) Petitioner grew rapidly between 1991 and 1996.
In 1995,
it was ranked number 36 of Fleetwood mobile home retailers in the
nation; in 1996, it climbed to number 13 in the nation.
(3) Jack personally guaranteed the working capital lines of
credit of petitioner.
(4) Petitioner did not provide a defined benefit or profitsharing plan to Jack.
The only nonsalary benefit that petitioner
provided to Jack was health insurance; Jack (and, presumably,
Mary) was the only employee who did not receive paid sick and
vacation leave.
(5) Under Jack’s control, petitioner survived several
economic downturns when many other mobile home retailers went out
of business.
The following indicia of relatively low reasonable
compensation are present in the instant case:
(1) The claimed compensation petitioner paid to Jack in 1995
and 1996 constituted 8.5 percent and 8.7 percent, respectively,
of petitioner’s gross sales, and 82 percent and 85 percent,
respectively, of petitioner’s taxable income.
These percentages
exceed those of most similar companies.
(2) Petitioner did not maintain a compensation policy for
Jack.
Because Jack controlled the corporation, he was able to
set his own compensation.
- 25 (3) The bonus amounts were not set in accordance with any
formula or other detailed arrangement agreed upon in advance.
Rather, they were determined and paid at the end of the year,
when petitioner knew its profitability for that year.
Thus,
Jack’s compensation was set on an ad hoc basis.
(4) Petitioner did not pay dividends in 1995 or 1996, even
though it had made a distribution in 1993 and paid dividends in
1994, and profitability before officer’s compensation was greater
in 1995 and 1996 than it was in the two earlier years.
(5) Petitioner’s average return on equity, which measures
the percent of profit before taxes as a percentage of tangible
net worth, was below that of comparable companies for the years
in issue.
At trial, both parties presented the reports and testimony
of expert witnesses.
Petitioner’s experts were Sledge and Mae
Lon Ding, hereinafter sometimes referred to as Ding.
Respondent’s expert was Scott D. Hakala, hereinafter sometimes
referred to as Hakala.
Before admitting expert testimony into evidence, the trial
judge is charged with the gatekeeping obligation of ensuring that
the testimony is both relevant and reliable.
Kumho Tire Co. v.
Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147 (1999); Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993); Caracci v.
Commissioner, 118 T.C. 379, 393 (2002), on appeal (5th Cir. Oct.
- 26 15, 2002).
This gatekeeping obligation applies to all expert
testimony, including testimony based on technical and other
specialized knowledge.
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. at
141; see Fed. R. Evid. 702.
As trier of fact, we are not bound by the opinion of any
expert witness and will accept or reject expert testimony, in
whole or in part, in the exercise of sound judgment.
Lukens v.
Commissioner, 945 F.2d 92, 96 (5th Cir. 1991) (and cases there
cited), affg. T.C. Memo. 1990-87.
The three experts agree on some aspects of elements that
should be taken into account in determining what would be
reasonable compensation for Jack’s services to petitioner, but
even there they do not agree on what numbers those aspects should
lead us to.
Each expert does a much better job of explaining why
the other side is wrong than why his or her analysis is correct.
To that extent, each expert has been helpful.
To put it another
way, the experts have provided substantial assistance to the
trier of fact (Fed. R. Evid. 702) in identifying and winnowing
out the chaff; they have provided far less assistance in
identifying and keeping the wheat.
See United States v.
Mastropieri, 685 F.2d 776, 786 (2d Cir. 1982).
(a)
Hakala
Hakala is a principal in Business Valuation Services, Inc.
He had academic training in compensation theory and was awarded
- 27 the degree of Ph.D. in Economics by the University of Minnesota.
He has testified as an expert witness in reasonable compensation
cases.
Table 5 shows the amounts that Hakala concluded were maximum
reasonable compensation for Jack’s services to petitioner in
1994, 1995, and 1996, per Hakala’s expert witness report (Ex. 60R) and Hakala’s rebuttal expert witness report (Ex. 61-R).
Table 5
1994
1995
1996
Ex. 60-R
Ex. 61-R
$381,608
544,419
448,620
$410,626
599,117
485,966
The task of calculating a maximum amount of reasonable
compensation ordinarily, and in the instant case, involves
judgment calls, generalizations, and very rough approximations.
We are mindful of Judge Tannenwald’s observation that in
valuation disputes (and reasonable compensation disputes are
essentially a subset of valuation disputes) there is often “an
overzealous effort, during the course of the ensuing litigation,
to infuse a talismanic precision into an issue which should
frankly be recognized as inherently imprecise”.
Messing v.
Commissioner, 48 T.C. 502, 512 (1967); see Estate of Jung v.
Commissioner, 101 T.C. 412, 446 (1993).
Hakala acknowledges that the correction of but one set of
inconsistencies in his expert witness report assumptions results
- 28 in changes of 7 to 10 percent in his conclusions.
pp.6-7, IV-3.
Ex. 61-R,
We are struck by the fact that Hakala has so much
confidence in the combination of accuracy and precision of his
numbers and analysis that, even after the humbling exercise of
making the gross corrections he describes, he claims to be able
Supra table
to come to conclusions to six significant figures.
5.
Respondent urges us to follow in Hakala’s footsteps--to six
significant figures.
We respond that, neither Hakala’s nor
respondent’s continued presentation of six-significant-figure
conclusions causes us to have any confidence that the precision
of those conclusions is an indication that those conclusions are
accurate.6
Indeed, Hakala’s efforts to persuade us to walk that
road serve only to cause us to doubt his judgment.
When we doubt
the judgment of an expert witness on one point, we become
reluctant to accept that expert’s conclusions on other points.7
6
A quotation from Shakespeare is perhaps apt:
Glendower:
I can call spirits from the vasty deep.
Hotspur: Why, so can I, or so can any man;
come when you do call for them?
But will they
Henry IV, Part I, act 3, sc. 1.
7
For completeness, it should be noted that, when the Court
asked Hakala “why it is that you believe it is appropriate to
come up with a result to six significant figures”, he responded
that-no one in a real compensation would round to six significant
figures, that normally I would round to the nearest thousand
(continued...)
- 29 When the Court asked Hakala if he was “confident” in his
conclusion that reasonable compensation for 1996 should be
substantially below reasonable compensation for 1995 (see supra
tables 4 and 5), he responded as follows:
THE WITNESS: No, and I think they have a valid point
that there was more income, and what I missed was that in
the other income was the rebate from Fleetwood. When you
factor the rebate from Fleetwood in, the compensation for
‘96 should go up. If you do that, then you have to adjust
the compensation for ‘95 downward. So, you know, I would
agree that I think intuitively, ‘96 should probably be
higher than ‘95.
Notwithstanding this testimony, Hakala did not change his
report recommendations, and respondent’s posttrial briefs still
urge us to adopt Hakala’s report recommendations, with
substantially lower reasonable compensation for 1996 as compared
to 1995.8
7
(...continued)
or the nearest 5,000. In effect, if I was at 599, I’d round
up to 600,000. If it was at 485, I might round to 485.
However, notwithstanding Hakala’s concession that “no one”
in a real situation would determine reasonable compensation to
six significant figures, Hakala did not change his report
recommendation, and respondent’s posttrial briefs still urge us
to adopt Hakala’s six-significant-figure recommendations.
8
At trial, Hakala explained that, if he adjusted upward
the maximum reasonable compensation for Jack for 1996, then he
would have to make a corresponding downward adjustment for 1995.
Neither Hakala at trial nor respondent on brief has explained why
an upward adjustment for 1996 on account of the Fleetwood rebate
would require a downward adjustment for 1995, except that at
trial Hakala invoked the imagery of “squeezing on a balloon.”
- 30 (b)
Sledge
Sledge is a C.P.A. in private practice in his own firm.
He
was awarded the degree of B.S. in Industrial Psychology by
Louisiana State University and took postgraduate work to prepare
himself for the C.P.A. examination.
He has testified as an
expert witness in business valuation cases, and other matters
involving officer compensation issues.
Sledge did not determine what was maximum reasonable
compensation for Jack’s services to petitioner in the years in
issue, but concluded that “it is my opinion that the salary paid
to Mr. Brewer during 1995 and 1996 is reasonable.”
As a result,
we can agree with much of what Sledge says, and still have little
or no guidance from his expert witness report as to what numbers
to set for reasonable compensation.
Before the trial, respondent moved in limine to exclude
Sledge’s expert witness report and to not allow Sledge to testify
as an expert witness.
Respondent pointed to Sledge’s obvious
conflict of interest and contended that Sledge “is unable to
provide the degree of objectivity required of an expert witness.”
We concluded that, in the instant case, it was better to (1) take
Sledge’s conflict of interest into account in weighing his expert
witness report and expert testimony, and (2) not exclude Sledge
and his report.
In retrospect, we conclude that we made the
right decision on this matter; i.e., we conclude that Sledge’s
- 31 expert witness report, his rebuttal report, and his expert
witness testimony did assist us, as trier of fact, in
understanding concepts involved in determining reasonable
compensation, and in understanding matters raised by Hakala.
See
Koch Refining Co. v. Jennifer L. Boudreau MV, 85 F.3d 1178, 11821183 (5th Cir. 1996).
(c)
Ding
Ding is president of Personnel Systems Associates.
She was
awarded the degree of M.B.A. by the University of Southern
California, and the degree of B.A. in Industrial Psychology from
UCLA.
She has testified as an expert witness in reasonable
compensation cases.
Ding did not conclude what was maximum reasonable
compensation for Jack’s services to petitioner in the years in
issue, but she concluded that “Mr. Brewer was compensated at a
rate in 1995 and 1996, which we believe an investor in an arm’slength transaction would have thought to be reasonable”.
Nevertheless, Ding’s presentation of the data from RMA enables us
to make our own evaluation and to start the process of
redetermining reasonable compensation numbers for Jack’s
services.
- 32 (d)
Amount of Maximum Reasonable Compensation
(1)
RMA Ratios
Both Hakala and Ding direct our attention to RMA surveys of
companies that specialize in mobile home retailing.
None of the
expert witnesses was able to identify any published surveys of
the amounts of executive compensation for the mobile home
retailing industry.
However, it was noted that the RMA’s surveys
provided financial ratios, including a ratio for executive
compensation to company sales.
In her analysis of the RMA data, Ding stated that
petitioner’s-average compensation [total executive compensation,
including what petitioner paid to Mary] to sales ratio for
the period 1986-1996 was 4.6%, which was slightly above the
RMA 75th percentile of 4.2% and considerably below our
[i.e., Ding’s] projection of the 90th percentile average of
5.9% (Exhibit F).
Ding regarded the following considerations as being among those
leading to her conclusion that Jack “achieved exceptional
financial performance” at petitioner, “justifying a comparison of
compensation above the 75th percentile and as high as the 90th
percentile”:
Petitioner’s sales grew at an average annual rate of 17
percent while the industry grew at an average annual rate of
only 10.8 percent.
Petitioner’s inventory turnover rate, “a key measure of
efficient use of capital and inventory management”, was more
than one-third higher than the mobile home retail industry
as a whole.
- 33 Petitioner “has very high capitalization relative to
industry norms which reduce risk to the shareholder in the
event of a downturn in business, saves interest costs on
loans, enables faster growth, and causes ROE [returns on
equity] ratios to understate true profit performance.”
From the foregoing and other matters, Ding concluded as
follows:
When all the above factors are taken into consideration, it
is apparent that Brewer Quality Homes’ performance is among
the best in the industry. CEOs who achieve top performance
in their industry receive top pay, therefore it is
reasonable to expect that Jack Brewer would receive
compensation above the 75th percentile and as high as the
90th percentile.
Hakala, on the other hand, stated that for 1995 and 1996
Jack’s “compensation level * * * [as a percentage of sales] was
significantly higher than the third quartile levels of the RMA
comparable firms.”
He stated that this high compensation level
resulted in a drop in profitability which, together with an
elimination of dividends, provided “low returns to its
[petitioner’s] shareholder.”
In his rebuttal report, Hakala presented several criticisms
of Ding’s use of RMA data.
We consider these criticisms
seriatim.
Ding used average percentages over time, while Hakala
focused on year-by-year figures for 1994 through 1996.
Table 6
compares petitioner’s total officer compensation (Jack’s plus
Mary’s, in the case of petitioner) as a percentage of mobile home
- 34 sales, on the one hand, to Ding’s and Hakala’s different
approaches as to the RMA 75th percentile data.
Table 6
Petitioner
RMA--Ding
RMA--Hakala
6.4
8.7
8.9
4.2
4.2
4.4
5.4
5.4
3.4
4.6
8.0
8.0
4.2
4.3
--
--4.7
1994
1995
1996
Averages
Ding (1986-1996)
Ding (1994-1996)
Hakala (1994-1996)
Ding’s focus on 11-year averages led her to conclude that
petitioner’s 11-year average payment ratios are only a little
higher than the RMA 75th percentile ratios (4.6 percent to 4.2
percent) and much lower than the estimated RMA 90th percentile
ratios9 (4.6 percent to 5.9 percent).
Hakala, on the other hand,
concluded that petitioner’s 1-year payment ratios are much higher
than the RMA 75th percentile ratios (8.0 percent to 4.7 percent).
Supra table 6.
Hakala also criticized Ding’s analysis, as follows:
In the tax year 1986 through 1993, BQH [petitioner] elected
S Corporation status. The owner-officer of an S Corporation
has an incentive to minimize personal salary and bonus
compensation and to recognize greater taxable corporate
9
Hakala ignores Ding’s estimates of RMA 90th percentile
ratios; he neither disputes nor accepts the correctness of Ding’s
estimates. However, on brief, respondent accepts the correctness
of Ding’s estimates of RMA 90th percentile ratios, at least for
the purpose of pointing out that petitioner’s 1995 and 1996
ratios are far higher than the ratios that Ding applies.
- 35 income due to payroll taxes on reported compensation.[10]
This calls into question the appropriateness of an
undercompensation analysis in the years 1986 through 1993.
Firstly, for 2 of the 8 years Hakala refers to (1986 and
1988), petitioner was a C corporation, not an S corporation.
It
is not clear whether these mistakes were merely “harmless error”
or whether this affected Hakala’s conclusions.
Secondly, if Hakala’s thesis is correct, that this
“incentive” affected petitioner’s actions during the C
corporation years, then it becomes relevant to determine whether
(and to what extent) it also affected the similar-sized
businesses that provided the underlying data for the RMA ratios.
10
In general, an S corporation shareholder is taxed on the
shareholder’s pro rata share of the corporation’s income,
regardless of whether the shareholder actually receives a
distribution. Sec. 1366(a)(1). Where the shareholder is also an
employee of the corporation, there is an incentive both for the
corporation and for the employee-shareholder to characterize a
payment to the employee-shareholder as a distribution rather than
as compensation because only payments for compensation are
subject to Federal employment taxes. See secs. 3111, 3301. In
such instances, the Commissioner may recharacterize a
distribution as compensation in order to reflect the true nature
of the payment. See Rev. Rul. 74-44, 1974-1 C.B. 287
(“dividends” paid to S corporation shareholders treated as
reasonable compensation for services rendered and subjected to
Federal employment taxes); see also Veterinary Surgical
Consultants, P.C. v. Commissioner, 117 T.C. 141, 145-146 (2001),
affd. sub nom. Yeagle Drywall Co. v. Commissioner, 54 Fed. Appx.
100 (3d Cir. 2002).
Although Hakala argued that petitioner may have practiced
tax gamesmanship in one or more of the years before 1995, the
record does not disclose that respondent made a determination on
this matter, nor can we tell from the record whether petitioner
did distort the situation.
- 36 Until we know that, we do not know how to deal with the concern
that Hakala has described.
Thirdly, Hakala does not: (a) Point to any evidence that
would enable us to quantify the amount, if any, by which this
potential gamesmanship actually diminished the compensation that
petitioner paid to Jack in any year, (b) suggest any way of
adjusting the ratio for petitioner to compensate for this
potential gamesmanship, or (c) explain why petitioner and Jack
would shift payments from compensation in 1993 but not use that
device for 1989, 1990, and 1991, when presumably the same
“incentives” were in play and when petitioner and Jack had the
same tax adviser that they had in 1993.
Thus, Hakala’s speculation is interesting but we do not find
it helpful in analyzing the instant issue.
See infra (3)
Previous Underpayment.
Hakala also presents the following double-barreled attack on
Ding’s reliance on the RMA data:
The Robert Morris Associates (“RMA”) data requires more
analysis than was provided by Ms. Ding. First, we don’t
know exactly how many officers, directors and affiliates are
represented in the total officers’ compensation in the RMA
figures. For larger dealerships, our experience is that
more than one officer is included and sometimes three or
more persons may be represented in the total figures.
Second, we don’t know the extent to which the officers’
compensation is consistent with arm’s length practices. The
BVS Report summarized in Exhibits II-2 and II-3 [attachments
to Exh. 60-R, Hakala’s expert witness report] represents an
attempt to address these issues. The suggested total
compensation at the 75th percentile level is at most
$324,219 in 1995 and $224,858 in 1996 for a single officer
- 37 and $486,329 in 1995 and $337,287 in 1986 for two officers
or more executive officers of BQH based on this information.
As to the multiple-officer concern, we are satisfied that
Ding’s approach is useful, in the absence of anything better.
Ding determined appropriate total officer compensation,
subtracted the agreed-upon compensation to Mary, and concluded
that the remainder is appropriate compensation to Jack.
In the
material that Hakala cites, he assumed that, in a two-officer
arrangement, the second officer was compensated at half the rate
of the first officer, and concluded that the CEO’s compensation
was 67 percent of the total officer compensation.
We agree that
Hakala’s conclusions follow, arithmetically, from his
assumptions.
However, Hakala does not give us any reason to
conclude that Hakala’s “attempt to address these issues” is any
better than Ding’s approach.
In the absence of any hard
information as to businesses of petitioner’s size, other than the
evidence of petitioner’s own history, we are willing to follow
Ding’s approach.
Hakala’s concern that the underlying RMA data may not be
“consistent with arm’s length practices” is the more serious
attack.
However, Hakala does not provide anything to back up the
suspicion that he voices.
Also, the material to which Hakala
directs our attention does not appear to address this issue at
all.
Finally, the numbers that Hakala finally commends to us
- 38 ($599,117 for 1995, $485,966 for 1996, supra tables 4, 5) are
substantially greater than the numbers that Hakala tells us would
result from the RMA 75th percentile data that Hakala suggest are
too great.
Hakala does not direct our attention to any other data that
focus on the mobile homes retail sales industry.11
On this record, the RMA ratios leave much to be desired as a
foundation for decision-making.
We nevertheless use those ratios
as a starting point, because they are the only statistical
information we have that deals with mobile home retailers.
other words, the RMA ratios are “the only game in town”.
In
See,
e.g., United States v. Borum, 584 F.2d 424, 434 (D.C. Cir. 1978)
(MacKinnon, J., dissenting).
The years in issue, 1995 and 1996, were good years for the
mobile home retailing industry and even better years for
petitioner.12
11
In his rebuttal report, Hakala states as follows:
The single best evidence of reasonable compensation can be
found in the three subsequent offers to acquire the assets
and business of BQH [petitioner] found in the exhibits to
Ms. Ding’s report.
However, Hakala relies on these offers only to the extent of
contending that, in reality, the offers amount to less
compensation for Jack than the approach that Hakala uses. In
effect, then, Hakala rejects the lessons of the evidence that he
describes as “The single best evidence”.
12
Petitioner’s sales increased proportionately more than
(continued...)
- 39 Jack guided petitioner through the hard times when many of
petitioner’s competitors went out of business and into the
breakout years of 1995 and 1996.13
We are satisfied that Jack’s
long-term efforts leading up to 1995 and 1996, and Jack’s
spectacularly successful work in 1995 and 1996, justify ranking
Jack with the leaders of his field for the latter years.
To us,
this means that reasonable compensation for 1995 and 1996 is to
be determined by reference to the 90th percentile of officer
compensation payments.
12
(...continued)
the industry’s sales, as shown by the following table:
Year
Petitioner’s Sales
see supra Table 1
Industry Sales
Petitioner’s
Sales as a % of
Industry Sales
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
$2,528,724
3,022,585
3,569,197
3,380,615
3,526,171
2,888,775
2,732,920
4,197,494
6,559,036
9,006,092
9,920,208
$5,480,384,000
5,512,572,600
5,482,567,900
5,392,508,800
5,231,181,600
4,728,750,100
5,986,350,800
7,755,418,000
10,181,722,000
12,327,516,300
13,954,982,400
0.046
0.055
0.065
0.063
0.067
0.061
0.046
0.054
0.064
0.073
0.071
13
Hakala stated, in his rebuttal report:
BQH [petitioner] was a well run and successful dealership
with an established franchise and presence. Mr. Brewer
clearly deserves substantial credit for this success in 1995
and 1996.
- 40 We note that the RMA ratios fluctuate greatly from year to
year, and even the relative ratios (i.e., comparisons of the
ratios for smaller companies with the ratios for larger
companies) fluctuate greatly.
None of the experts discusses the
factors that led to the RMA ratio fluctuations.
to “smoothen” the relevant ratios.
percentile numbers.
Ding attempted
See supra table 6 for 75th
For 90th percentile numbers, Ding used 6.0
for 1995 and 6.3 for 1996.
Hakala did not discuss whether there
should be a different approach to the smoothening process or
whether the RMA ratio amounts should be used without any
smoothening.
In the absence of criticism by Hakala, we are
willing to follow Ding’s smoothening approach.
We apply the RMA
90th percentile ratios to petitioner’s 1995 and 1996 sales to
obtain total shareholder-employee reasonable compensation.
From
the totals thus obtained, we subtract the amounts petitioner paid
to Mary, which have been agreed to be reasonable compensation for
Mary’s services.
However, our willingness to follow Ding’s analysis regarding
Jack’s 90th-percentile status, at least for 1995 and 1996, does
not lead us to Ding’s conclusions that all of Jack’s compensation
is reasonable for each of these years.
As Ding acknowledged at
trial, the compensation that petitioner paid to Jack for each of
these years, as a percentage of petitioner’s sales, was
- 41 significantly higher than the 90th-percentile level shown by the
RMA data for the same years.
Our acceptance of Ding’s thesis, then, leads us to apply the
RMA 90th-percentile ratios to petitioner’s sales, which results
in reasonable compensation amounts significantly less than
petitioner’s actual payments to Jack.
This process leads us to
initial calculations of $520,000 for 1995 and $600,000 for 1996
as reasonable compensation amounts for Jack’s services.
(2)
Loan Guaranty
Hakala opined, in his expert witness report, that Jack was
entitled to an additional $5,000 reasonable compensation “for
providing his personal guarantee to secure a short-term working
capital line of credit in 1995".
Respondent has conceded the
allowability of this additional amount.
dispute this item; we accept it.
Petitioner does not
Owensby & Kritikos, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 819 F.2d at 1325 n.33.
Accordingly, we increase our 1995 reasonable compensation
determination to $525,000.
(3)
Previous Underpayment
Petitioner contends that Jack was underpaid in previous
years, particularly 1992 and 1993.
See supra table 3.
Petitioner argues as follows:
While there are no corporate minuets [sic] declaring
any part of Mr. Brewer’s compensation for 1995 and 1996 as
make up salary, a good faith argument for extension of
existing law can be made where it is apparent from the facts
- 42 because of the extreme disparity between Mr. Brewer’s
compensation in 1992 and 1993 and his compensation in both
previous and following years that the fact that he was being
compensated for past performance is plainly apparent.
Respondent’s rejoinder is twofold:
(1) There is no
indication of an intent to compensate Jack in 1995 or in 1996 on
account of past undercompensation, and (2) Hakala concluded that
Jack was adequately compensated for Jack’s services to petitioner
for 1986 through 1994.
Amounts paid in a later year for earlier years’ services may
be deducted when paid, if the services were undercompensated in
the earlier years.
Lucas v. Ox Fibre Brush Co., 281 U.S. 115,
119 (1930); Estate of Wallace v. Commissioner, 95 T.C. at 553;
Cropland Chemical Corp. v. Commissioner, 75 T.C. 288, 297-298
(1980), affd. without published opinion 665 F.2d 1050 (7th Cir.
1981); R.J. Nicoll Co. v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 37, 50-51 (1972).
In order to be allowed the deduction, the taxpayer must establish
(1) the amount of the undercompensation for the earlier years’
services and (2) that the payment in the later year is intended
as compensation for the earlier years’ services.
Pacific Grains,
Inc. v. Commissioner, 399 F.2d 603, 606 (9th Cir. 1968), affg.
T.C. Memo. 1967-7; Perlmutter v. Commissioner, 373 F.2d 45, 48
(10th Cir. 1967), affg. 44 T.C. 382, 403 (1965); Estate of
Wallace v. Commissioner, 95 T.C. at 553-554.
In the instant case, petitioner has presented us with little
more than the claim, and general conclusory testimony, that some
- 43 amount was intended as compensation for Jack’s earlier years’
services.
We are not told (1) how much of the 1995 payments or
the 1996 payments was so intended; (2) how the intent was arrived
at or formulated; or (3) what earlier years’ services were being
compensated for in 1995 or in 1996.
For all we can tell,
petitioner’s “theory of compensation for prior services was only
an afterthought developed at a time when the reasonableness of
the compensation was already under attack.”
Pacific Grains, Inc.
v. Commissioner, 399 F.2d at 606.
Petitioner’s plea that we overlook the absence of corporate
minutes runs into the concern that it is precisely in situations
such as the instant case, where one person’s “controlling
presence was on all sides of the negotiating table” (Kean,
Transferee v. Commissioner, 91 T.C. 575, 595 (1988)), that we
“must carefully scrutinize the payments to ensure that they are
not disguised dividends.”
Owensby & Kritikos, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 819 F.2d at 1324.
On the basis of Jack’s and Sledge’s testimony, as well as
petitioner’s failure to produce any relevant corporate minutes or
any other contemporaneous paper trail (see Wichita Terminal
Elevator Co. v. Commissioner, 6 T.C. 1158, 1165 (1946), affd.
162 F.2d 513 (10th Cir. 1947)), we conclude that it is more
likely than not that petitioner did not intend in 1995 and did
- 44 not intend in 1996 to compensate Jack for his earlier services to
petitioner.
We have so found.
Under these circumstances we need not, and we do not,
determine whether Jack was undercompensated for his earlier
services to petitioner.
(4)
Nonsalary Benefits
Ding stated that petitioner’s failure to provide nonsalary
benefits (other than health insurance) to its executives should
be taken into account in determining the maximum reasonable
compensation for Jack.
She regarded as particularly important
the lack of “a defined benefit plan or deferred compensation
plan.”
She relied on studies showing that (1) “Companies
typically provide their executives with benefits representing
24.4% of compensation” and (2) “Sixty-one percent of retail and
wholesale trade industries provide long-term incentive programs
for their top managers”.
In his rebuttal expert witness report, Hakala responded as
follows:
Compensation for Poor Benefits: This is an interesting
issue. It is difficult to quantify. BQH is not a large,
public company. Benefits are typically more limited for
officers of manufactured home dealerships. It is our
understanding that Mr. Brewer’s benefits were consistent
with the benefits realized by his top sales personnel. The
data relied upon by Ms. Ding is not applicable for a company
of the size and type of BQH. However, some elements for
benefits might be considered appropriate in a market
compensation analysis but not in the independent investor
returns analysis.
- 45 On opening brief, petitioner contends as follows:
Additionally, Mr. Brewer’s compensation lacked the
typical benefits package. Mr. Brewer’s compensation package
did not include, a retirement plan, a SEP, a 401(k), a
Profit-sharing plan, a Defined benefits plan, a 205 plan, a
125 plan, sick leave, or paid vacation. (Trial Trans. Vol.
1 page 38) These types of benefits were customary in the
industry and represent a substantial amount of money. This
lack of customary benefits package justifies a larger
salary. (Trial Trans. Vol. 2 pages 193-196) Typically,
companies provide their executives with benefits
representing 24.4% of compensation. (Exhibit 56-P page 7 and
Exhibit X therein) If Mr. Brewer would have had a typical
benefits package his cash compensation could have been 24%
less and he still had the same total compensation.
On answering brief, respondent replies as follows:
Petitioner’s argument that Jack Brewer’s compensation
in 1995 and 1996 made up for the lack of company provided
fringe benefits is unfounded. It was not necessary for Jack
Brewer to participate in a company sponsored profit sharing
plan because, in fact, Jack Brewer determined and allocated
substantially all company profits to himself on December 31
of each year.
We analyze this matter as follows:
Firstly, if petitioner means to say that courts apply the
reasonable compensation test to only “cash compensation”, then
petitioner is wrong.
It has long been settled law that-The sum of all compensation, deferred as well as direct,
must meet the requirement of §162 that it be reasonable in
amount. [Edwin’s, Inc. v. United States, 501 F.2d 675, 679
(7th Cir. 1974).]
To the same effect, see LaMastro v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 377,
381-382 (1979); Bianchi v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 324, 329-330
- 46 (1976), affd. without published opinion 553 F.2d 93 (2d Cir.
1977).
Secondly, the question of what courts do in fact requires an
understanding of the effect of the limits of what is in the
record before us.
For example, if we knew that (1) the
underlying data for the RMA ratios came from only those mobile
home retailers who provided nonsalary benefits to their
executives, (2) but this underlying data included only the cash
compensation paid to the executives and not the value of (or
current cost to buy) the nonsalary benefits, and (3) the value of
(or current cost to buy) these benefits was, as Ding stated, 24.4
percent of total compensation (i.e., cash compensation plus
nonsalary benefits), then we would adjust the cash compensation
amount upward by about 32.3 percent to arrive at total equivalent
compensation.14
However, the record before us does not include
any of the needed information as to the data underlying the RMA
ratios.
Also, the 24.4 percent in Ding’s analysis comes from a
report of a 1992 study of 297 employers.
The record does not
give us any characteristics of the participating employers that
would enable us to make a useful judgment as to how that sample
14
If nonsalary benefits are 24.4 percent of total
compensation, then cash compensation constitutes the remaining
75.6 percent of the total compensation. Thus, total compensation
is
of cash compensation, or l32.3 percent of cash
100 percent
75.6 percent
compensation.
- 47 related to the RMA samples for 1995 and 1996.
Petitioner’s brief
makes assumptions that are not stated in the brief and that
appear to be neither supported by nor contradicted by the record.
Respondent’s brief on this issue seems to be totally irrelevant
to a reasonable compensation analysis, even though it may be
significant to an analysis of petitioner’s intent.
We are left with Hakala’s observation that some adjustment
for nonsalary benefits “might be considered appropriate in a
market compensation analysis”.
Because of Hakala’s observation,
and in light of the lack of foundation for the use of 24.4
percent for mobile home retailers of petitioner’s size, we
conclude that we should adjust upward by some amount the
estimates derived from the RMA ratios.
See Kennedy v.
Commissioner, 671 F.2d 167, 175 (6th Cir. 1982), revg. 72 T.C.
793 (1979).
Doing the best we can with the record in the instant
case, we increase our 1995 reasonable compensation determination
to $550,000 and our 1996 reasonable compensation determination to
$630,000.
(5)
Independent Investor Returns
In reaching his reasonable compensation figures, Hakala
“relied primarily our [on ?] investor return analysis as an
indication of the upper bound on executive compensation such that
an arm’s-length investor in the Company is able to realize a fair
return on equity.”
- 48 a.
Fair Market Value Analysis
In the first part of his analysis, Hakala valued petitioner
based on two “rules of thumb”: (1) three times “owners’
discretionary cash flow” and (2) five times earnings before
interest (the net of interest income and interest expense) and
taxes (only Federal income taxes), or EBIT.
Owners’
discretionary cashflow is the sum of EBIT, Jack’s compensation,
and Mary’s compensation.
Hakala states that, because only the
owners’ discretionary cashflow measure is calculated before
deduction of officers’ compensation, the difference in value
between the two measures provides an implied amount of excess
compensation.
For 1995 and 1996, Hakala calculated implied
excess compensation of $356,942 and $412,625, respectively.
By
subtracting the amounts of implied excess compensation from the
amounts that petitioner paid to Jack, Hakala determined an
implied amount of reasonable compensation of $405,244 for 1995
and $450,934 for 1996.
In his expert witness reports, Hakala included tables
showing how his fair market value analysis would apply if
petitioner had paid to Jack only the amounts that Hakala
concluded would be reasonable compensation.
In his original
report, in which he concluded that maximum reasonable
- 49 compensation to Jack would be $544,419 for 199515 and $448,620
for 1996, Hakala’s fair market value analysis shows that, what
Hakala referred to as the implied amount of reasonable
compensation would be only $418,290 for 1995, but would be
$461,734 for 1996.
In his rebuttal report, in which he concluded
that maximum reasonable compensation to Jack would be $599,117
for 1995 (see supra note 15) and $485,966 for 1996, Hakala’s fair
market analysis shows that, what Hakala refers to as the implied
amount of reasonable compensation still would be only $418,290
for 1995, and $461,734 for 1996.
Hakala’s analysis seems to not make any further use of the
implied amounts of reasonable compensation that he thus
calculated.
As far as we can tell, Hakala uses the three times owners’
discretionary cashflow only in calculating “Operating return
[operating income] on FMV operating assets [which Hakala
apparently equates to three times owners’ discretionary
cashflow]” both in terms of what the ratios actually were and
what the ratios would have been under the method described infra
b.
Estimate of Petitioner’s Discount Rate.
As far as we can tell, Hakala uses the five times EBIT only
in one table, which appears twice in Hakala’s original report.
15
For these calculations, Hakala ignored, without
explanation, the additional $5,000 discussed supra (2) Loan
Guaranty.
- 50 In that table, Hakala uses interchangeably “5 times EBIT” and
“FMV of BQH [petitioner]”.
Hakala does not appear to use the
five times EBIT amount to derive anything.
Hakala has not explained, and we have not been able to
discern, any role that Hakala’s fair market value analysis played
in producing Hakala’s bottom-line reasonable compensation
conclusions.
Under these circumstances, we do not pause to
consider the appropriateness of Hakala’s choices of the three and
five multipliers (why not 2½ and 5½, or some other sets of
numbers), of Hakala’s choices of things to multiply (owners’
discretionary cashflow and EBIT), of Hakala’s choices of
equivalents (three times owners’ discretionary cashflow is
equivalent to the fair market value of petitioner’s operating
assets; five times EBIT is equivalent to the fair market value of
petitioner), and of Hakala’s method of deriving implied
reasonable compensation from these multiplier rules of thumb.
We have thought it appropriate to consider Hakala’s fair
market value analysis only because (1) Hakala presented it at the
head of his independent investor returns analysis, and (2) it
helps us in evaluating the complexities of the remaining portions
of Hakala’s independent investor returns analysis.16
However, we
16
In Gilbert and Sullivan’s “Patience”, the character
Bunthorne extols obscurity and complexity as the route to
creation of an impressive persona, as follows:
(continued...)
- 51 conclude that this fair market value analysis in Hakala’s expert
witness report does not lead us to any answer in our quest for
the maximum amount of reasonable compensation from petitioner to
Jack.
b.
Estimate of Petitioner’s Discount Rate
Hakala’s next step in his investor returns analysis was to
estimate the discount rate, or “cost of capital”.
As Hakala uses
the term, petitioner’s cost of capital is the rate of return that
an investor would expect to realize from an investment in a
16
(...continued)
If you’re anxious for to shine in the high aesthetic line as
a man of culture rare,
You must get up all the germs of the transcendental terms,
and plant them everywhere.
You must lie upon the daisies and discourse in novel
phrases of your complicated state of mind,
The meaning doesn’t matter if it’s only idle chatter of a
transcendental kind.
And every one will say,
As you walk your mystic way,
“If this young man expresses himself in terms too deep
for me,
Why, what a very singularly deep young man this deep
young man must be!”
“Patience”, The Complete Plays of Gilbert and Sullivan, pp. 199200 (New York: Modern Library).
Under Fed. R. Evid. 702, the justification for the expert
witness is that the expert witness “will assist the trier of fact
to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue”. It
is not enough that the expert can communicate with other experts.
The expert should be enough of a teacher or explainer so that the
nonexpert trier of fact can understand the steps in the expert’s
analysis. The nonexpert trier of fact should not have to be a
detective, discovering clues in odd places in the expert’s
report, in order to understand how the expert proceeded from one
step to the next.
- 52 company such as petitioner, taking into account the appropriate
risk and performance characteristics of petitioner.
From his pretax operating return on net operating assets
percentages, Hakala determined an adjusted average required rate
of return of 16.77 percent.
In so doing, he assumed “inflation
plus real growth will average approximately 4.0% per annum” and
grossed up for taxes.
Hakala then calculated reasonable
compensation numbers for Jack such that the average required rate
of return was 16.77 percent.
The values of the variables
(operating profit and three times owners’ discretionary cashflow)
that Hakala used to conclude that the average required rate of
return equaled 16.77 percent are pretax values.
The 16.77
percent, however, contemplates that the values will be after-tax
values.
Hakala chose to use the Capital Asset Pricing Model
(hereinafter sometimes referred to as CAPM) to estimate
petitioner’s cost of capital.
He states that CAPM is “A standard
method of estimating the cost of capital”.
Petitioner contends that CAPM “has no application to closely
held companies”, citing Furman v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1998157.
Neither Hakala nor respondent seeks to rebut petitioner’s
Furman contention.
Hakala did not tell us (1) whether there are
other standard methods, (2) whether CAPM has advantages over
- 53 other standard methods, nor (3) why Hakala chose to use CAPM in
this instance.
In Estate of Heck v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-34, we
commented as follows:
11
In recent cases, we have criticized the use of both
the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) and WACC as
analytical tools in valuing the stock of closely held
corporations. See Furman v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1998157. See also Estate of Maggos v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
2000-129, and Estate of Hendrickson v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 1999-278, which reaffirm that view, citing Furman, and
Estate of Klauss v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2000-191, where
we rejected an expert valuation utilizing CAPM in favor of
one utilizing the buildup method. In other recent cases,
however, we have adopted expert reports which valued closely
held corporations utilizing CAPM to derive an appropriate
cost of equity capital. See BTR Dunlop Holdings, Inc. v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1999-377; Gross v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 1999-254, affd. 272 F.3d 333 (6th Cir. 2001).
Because the parties have not developed this dispute and we
conclude infra that Hakala’s application of CAPM to petitioner in
the instant case has significant flaws, we do not determine in
the instant case the conceptual suitability of applying CAPM to
the valuation of closely held companies such as petitioner.
The first step in CAPM involves calculating the cost of
equity capital, which Hakala defined as “the expected (or
required) rate of return on the firm’s common stock” that an
investor would “expect to realize from an investment in a company
with the risk and performance characteristics” of petitioner.
Hakala estimated the cost of equity capital to be 15.06 percent
- 54 in 1995 and 15.75 percent in 1996.17
Hakala then estimated the
cost of debt, which he based on “the prevailing prime lending
rate plus 1.0%.”
For 1995 and 1996, the costs of debt were 9.50
percent and 9.25 percent, respectively.
Next, Hakala applied the values determined in the preceding
two steps to calculating the weighted average cost of capital,
sometimes hereinafter referred to as WACC.
Hakala determined
that the WACC was 14.16 percent for 1995 and 14.76 percent for
1996.
In his expert witness report, Hakala described this process
as “using weights reflecting the relative importance of debt and
equity in the typical firm’s capital structure.”
He multiplied
the cost of equity capital by a fraction derived from the
relative portion of total capital that consisted of equity; he
17
Hakala’s report shows the arithmetic as follows:
1995: “15.06% = 5.96% plus (7.40% times 1.09) plus 1.00%”
1996: “15.75% = 6.65% plus (7.40% times 1.09) plus 1.00%”
Sledge’s supplemental report adds the same components for
1995 as follows:
Long-Term Risk Less [sic] Rate
+ Market Risk x Beta 7.4 x 1.09 =
+ Non-systematic risk
= Required return on equity
5.96
8.07
1.00
15.06 rounded
Sledge then uses the 15.06 percent in his calculations.
When we perform the indicated arithmetic, we get 15.026,
rounded to 15.03 percent for 1995, and 15.716, rounded to 15.72
percent for 1996.
- 55 multiplied the cost of debt capital by a fraction derived from
the ratio of debt to equity (instead of the ratio of debt to
total capital); and he added the two products together to produce
his WACC amounts.
Sledge, in his rebuttal report, points out (correctly) that
Hakala’s debt multiplier should have been the ratio of debt to
total capital; that the sum of the debt multiplier and the equity
multiplier should be 1.000, while Hakala’s sum was 1.0123; and
that this error by Hakala resulted in Hakala’s overstating the
WACC and thereby understating the amount of reasonable
compensation.
(Sledge also has errors, discussed infra.)
Hakala has chosen to use 11.70 percent as the basic debtequity ratio.
From this, he derives the equity multiplier of
0.8953 (this is one, divided by 1.117).
It follows that the debt
multiplier should be 1.0 minus 0.8953, or 0.1047, and not the
0.117 that Hakala used.
If we correct this error and the above-
noted error of 15.06 percent rather than 15.03 percent for the
cost of equity capital, then Hakala’s CAPM approach should yield
a 1995 WACC of 14.08, instead of Hakala’s 14.16.
corrections would apply to the 1996 WACC.
Similar
Because a lower WACC
leads to higher reasonable compensation under Hakala’s approach,
these corrections in Hakala’s numbers would result in an increase
in the reasonable compensation numbers that Hakala recommends.
- 56 Hakala testified that correcting the WACC “caused the
numbers in both years to go up” and stated in his rebuttal report
that “The calculation of the weights for debt and equity in the
BVS report [Hakala’s expert witness report] was inconsistent with
the assumed weights in the original Exhibit IV-2.”
However, we are unable to determine exactly what corrections
Hakala made in his WACC calculations that led to the substantial
increases in his recommendations as to reasonable compensation.
As a result, we do not know whether Hakala has already corrected
for the above-noted errors.
In Sledge’s rebuttal report, he pointed out that the
combined debt and equity multipliers that Hakala used to
determine the cost of debt and the cost of equity exceeded 1.0.
He then proposed debt and equity multipliers that total 1.0, and
he demonstrated the effect of the change by calculating the WACC
for 1995, which he determined was 13.66 percent.
Sledge
presented this as follows:
3. This is the weighed [sic] average cost of capital, WACC,
and is calculated as shown below.
Cost of debt
9.50 x (1 -.38) =
This is the cost of
debt after taxes
Weighed [sic] cost of debt
5.89 x .1170
+
Weighed [sic] cost of equity
or,
= WACC
5.89
=
0.69
15.06 x (1/1 +.1170) =
15.06 x .8953
= 13.48
14.16 rounded
- 57 DR. HAKALA HAS MADE AN ERROR IN THE CALCULATIONS OF WACC
Refer to Exhibit Rebut-19.1 [an attachment in Sledge’s
rebuttal report] and you will see the correct formula for
WACC. While Dr. Hakala has correctly written the formula on
his p. 20, he does not compute it correctly.
CORRECT CALCULATIONS FOR WACC.
Cost of debt
9.50 x (1 - .38) = 5.89
This is the cost of
debt after taxes
Weighed [sic] cost of debt
5.89 x .0928 =
0.55
+
Weighed [sic] cost of equity
15.06 x .9072
= WACC
=
13.66
13.66
As this excerpt shows, Sledge failed to add together the
weighted cost of debt and the weighted cost of equity in his
calculation.
The corrected WACC, according to the values Sledge
proposed, is 14.21 percent for 1995 and 14.82 percent for 1996,
amounts greater than what Hakala had determined.
Thus, while
Sledge correctly noted one of Hakala’s mathematical errors,
Sledge’s proposed solution leads to (or would have led to, if
Sledge had carried the analysis out) reasonable compensation
conclusions that are less than Hakala’s conclusions.
As we noted supra, Hakala used 11.70 percent as the debtequity ratio in calculating the relative weights to be given to
debt capital and equity capital.
He did not give us any source
for his statement that this is “the relative importance of debt
and equity in the typical firm’s capital structure.”
(Emphasis
- 58 added.)
However, elsewhere in his report he indicated that 11.70
percent is the average debt-equity ratio of four named firms.
These four firms had debt-equity ratios ranging from 0.8
percent to 33.6 as of June 30, 1996.
We are not given any
information that would lead us to conclude that the average of
four firms’ widely disparate capital structures happens to be
precisely equal to “the typical firm’s” capital structure.
All four firms are publicly traded, while petitioner is not.
We do not find any information suggesting that this makes a
difference or does not make a difference in what a reasonable
independent investor would do with a firm like petitioner.
Hakala told us that “each of the four firms is a large
manufacturer of * * * [mobile] homes with a large retail
organization.”
Petitioner is entirely a retailer.
Hakala told us that the four firms had sales of $208 million
to $862 million a year for 1995 and 1996, while petitioner’s
sales were only $9-10 million.
Hakala described the four firms as “billion dollar
companies”, while he regarded petitioner as worth only a few
million dollars.
Hakala did not present to us any explanation (much less
evidence supporting any explanation) as to whether or not
adjustments should be made to this particular four-firm average
debt-equity ratio to arrive at a typical debt-equity ratio that
- 59 would be meaningful with regard to firms that are similar to
petitioner.
Because (1) Hakala’s CAPM analysis makes reasonable
compensation vary directly with the debt-equity ratio,18 and (2)
Hakala contends that his CAPM analysis enables him to determine
Jack’s maximum reasonable compensation to the dollar, it becomes
important for us to have confidence in the correctness of
Hakala’s determination of 11.70 percent as the debt-equity ratio
to use.
Because of the above-noted omissions, we have no idea what
debt-equity ratio is appropriate to use in a CAPM analysis.
This
makes us reluctant to rely on a CAPM analysis based on the record
in the instant case, whether or not CAPM analyses are viewed as
conceptually appropriate for firms such as petitioner.
Finally, we note that, in his expert witness report,
Hakala’s arithmetic was inconsistent with his narrative
description of the process of moving from WACC to pretax
operating return on net operating assets.
The arithmetic was
consistent with an assumed combined State and Federal tax rate of
about 41 percent, while the narrative states that Hakala used 38
percent.
18
In his rebuttal report, Sledge pointed out the error
Under Hakala’s approach, the cost of debt capital is
substantially less than the cost of equity capital. Thus, a
greater debt-equity ratio leads to a lesser weighted average cost
of capital (WACC). This means that under the CAPM, the greater
the debt-equity ratio, the less the net profit that an
independent investor would require, and so the independent
investor could afford to pay more compensation.
- 60 and stated that “Correction of this error in math will raise the
allowable compensation to Jack Brewer by about $94,000.”
In his
rebuttal report, Hakala appears to have corrected this error19
and has increased his recommended reasonable compensation amounts
by a total of $92,044 for 1995 and 1996.
We note that Hakala did not make any change to his original
WACC amounts, in correcting his expert witness report, and that
his “bottom-line” determinations changed by almost the same
amount that Sledge stated would be the case if Hakala were to
make the corrections.
Yet, when asked about this matter at
trial, Hakala testified that his error was in the weighting of
the two components of WACC, and not in the assumed tax rate.
We have described supra some mathematical errors that Hakala
made in his WACC calculations.
errors.
Hakala did not correct these
It appears that if these were corrected, then Hakala’s
“bottom-line” numbers would be greater, but we cannot tell by
what amounts.
c.
Determination of Compensation Formula
After Hakala determined a net required rate of return of
16.77 percent, he “conducted an analysis to determine a
compensation formula to arrive at a reasonable range for
19
We say “appears to”, because Hakala’s final numbers are
not precisely the same as Sledge’s numbers. We suspect that the
differences are due to rounding at earlier stages of the
computation, but we cannot be sure, because Hakala does not
present a clear explanation of what he did.
- 61 officer’s compensation such that an arm’s-length investor could
realize market rates of return on invested capital in * * *
[petitioner]”.20
Hakala calculated the “theoretically appropriate officers’
compensation” by starting with a base salary of $207,000.
He
determined this amount by multiplying by 1.5 the median base
salary shown in a survey for 1994 by Panel Publications of Aspen
Publishing, hereinafter sometimes referred to as Panel/Aspen.
Hakala did not explain why he multiplied the 1994 median base
salary by 1.5, or why he used 1994 as a base year when he
provided the data for 1995 and 1996--but not for 1994--in his
report.
Also, the data Hakala used was from both (1) the
fabricated metal and wood products industry group and (2) the
business services industry group.
We are unclear as to how these
industry groups are similar to petitioner.
Hakala admitted that
the comparability is somewhat limited and “not a very good fit”.
Nevertheless, he claimed that the data “provided information”.21
20
This 16.77 percent (18.18 percent in Hakala’s first
expert witness report) is determined as an average of the
information for 1995 and for 1996. Hakala has not explained how
there could be a plausible scenario in which an “arm’s-length
investor” would take into account 1996 information, including
1996 interest rates, in agreeing to compensation payments in
1995.
21
Hakala’s justification at trial for use of the
Panel/Aspen data from the “Fabricated Metal and Wood Products
Industry Group” and the “Business Services Industry Group” to
determine a base salary for Jack was as follows:
(continued...)
- 62 -
21
(...continued)
[Q. by Calkins, on direct] Now, Dr. Hakala, we’re
going to Exhibit 57-P, which is Ms. Ding’s rebuttal to your
report.
A
Okay
Q Ms. Ding assigns a number of errors in her report,
and we’ll briefly go through each of these errors.
At page 2, error number one, she addresses the use
of the Penell [Panel/Aspen] Publishing Survey, criticizing
the data and the size of the company.
Could you comment on that?
A There’s some validity to the limitations on the use
of the Penell, since I used fabricated metal wood products
and business services.
I did pick the right types of industries, but the
survey is too broad to probably be as applicable as I would
like.
It’s informative, but it’s certainly not
determinative of my ultimate opinion in the case.
Q
So, when she says this data is not valid--
A It’s valid. It’s used all the time in the real
world to sort of condition what you’d make in a small,
closely-held company, but the issue is that you have to sort
of condition the data for what industry and sector you’re
in, and that element of her criticism I think has some
validity, a lot of validity.
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
Q [By Mayo, on cross] Okay. The first thing you did
was you went to a survey called Pennell [Panel] Aspen
Publishing Survey.
A
Yes.
Q
And that was a survey of compensation of CEO’s.
(continued...)
- 63 -
21
(...continued)
A Yes.
Q And the first industry you looked at was wood
products manufacturing?
A
Fabricated metal and wood products.
Q Yeah, fabricated metal, that’s not really very
closely related to Mr. Brewer’s business, though, is it?
A It’s not a very good fit.
products that might --
It -- he’s selling
Q Small, low tech components, you know, pegs and
brackets and that kind of stuff.
A Not always.
anyway.
Exacto Spring fell in there, but
Q How about Business Services?
Services?
What was Business
A It’s so broad. It’s also not a very good fit.
think some are -- yeah, on page 13, I say thus, the
comparability is somewhat limited.
Q
Yeah, but that was what you used.
A
It provided information.
I
Q I want to point out to the Court that there are some
weaknesses in this analysis.
A
I agree.
Q
You agree that there are some weaknesses?
A Agree, and it provides some information, but the
analysis is limited.
Q Right, and there are some weak -- because it’s wood
products and business services, neither one are kind of
directly related to Mr. Brewer?
(continued...)
- 64 To determine the base salary for 1995 and 1996, Hakala
increased the 1994 theoretical base salary of $207,000 by 4
percent per year.
Thus, the base salary for 1995 and 1996 would
have been $215,280 (207,000 x 1.04) and $223,891 (215,280 x
1.04), respectively.
Hakala then determined the bonus amounts
based on a percentage of the operating income before officers’
compensation.
In his expert witness report, Hakala explains as
follows:
The bonus percentage is solved based on the projected 4% per
annum rate of growth, the expected operating expenses before
officers’ compensation in each future year and a required
average net operating return on operating assets of 18.18%.
Based on our analysis we calculate that the reasonable
compensation for Mr. Brewer to achieve a 18.18% investor
return is $544,419 in 1995 and $448,620 in 1996. This
corresponds to a bonus of $329,568 in 1995, which would be
65.8% of theoretical operating income, and a bonus of
$225,022 in 1996, which would be 31.9% of theoretical
operating income.
In his rebuttal report, Hakala noted that his revised
adjusted average required operating return on net operating
assets (16.77 percent, rather than 18.18 percent) resulted in his
increasing the recommended compensation level for each year, as
described supra.
However, he attributed this change entirely to
recalculation of the weights for debt and equity.
Hakala’s discussion of the Panel/Aspen data described supra
does not seem to affect his conclusions at all, except as to how
21
(...continued)
A. Correct.
- 65 much of Jack’s maximum reasonable compensation should be labeled
base pay and how much should be labeled bonus.
He apparently
regarded this as so inconsequential that, in his rebuttal report,
he did not bother to correct the bonus components when he revised
the total compensation amounts.
We cannot tell what function
Hakala’s discussion of base pay serves in Hakala’s reaching, or
explaining, his bottom-line conclusions.
Hakala’s discussions of other comparisons, although
eventually discarded, serve the appropriate function of
demonstrating that those comparisons would have resulted in lower
permissible amounts of reasonable compensation; they thereby make
the CAPM approach appear to be more generous to petitioner than
would be the case if the other methods had not been presented.
When “push came to shove”, Hakala’s conclusions rested
entirely on CAPM, and respondent followed Hakala’s conclusions to
the dollar.
(6)
Conclusion
Hakala has not presented us with a description of how his
various analyses fit together to lead to the final numbers he
reaches.
He has not specified what points in his analyses are
being corrected and how these corrections result in the changed
numbers between his original expert witness report and his
rebuttal report.
As to the many different variables in CAPM,
- 66 Hakala has not indicated why we should accept his choices in
values rather than other choices, such as Sledge’s.
Sledge, however, has not shown us how the changes in values
result in his conclusions.
Rather, he simply concludes that
changing one of the variables to a value that is more favorable
to petitioner results in a specified amount of greater maximum
compensation.
Without a thorough explanation or demonstration of
why his changes result in the numbers that he reaches, we do not
accept Sledge’s conclusions.
Further, we cannot tell from the
information included in the expert reports whether a variation in
any particular value is likely to cause a great or only slight
change in the bottom line, and often it is not apparent whether a
change is likely to increase the maximum amount of reasonable
compensation or decrease the maximum amount of reasonable
compensation.
In fact, Sledge conceded that it would be highly improbable
for all of his suggested revisions to Hakala’s CAPM numbers to be
operable together.
Adoption of some of his suggested revisions
very likely would require that some other suggested revisions
would have to be rejected, or might have to be revised in such a
way as to result in the latter revisions undoing the effect of
the former revisions.
We also note the paradox in Hakala’s approach that the more
successful Jack was in building up petitioner, the less the
- 67 amount Hakala would say would be reasonable compensation.
We
find it difficult to justify an analysis that leads to such a
counterintuitive result.
Under these circumstances, we conclude that (1) Hakala’s
application of CAPM on the record herein presents too many
difficulties to justify using CAPM in the calculation of
reasonable compensation for Jack, and (2) neither Hakala nor
Sledge has explained CAPM sufficiently for us to be able to
determine what would be the bottom-line effect of even correcting
the arithmetic errors we have described, except that we perceive
it is more likely than not that those corrections would produce
reasonable compensation numbers somewhat greater than those that
Hakala recommended.
However, it appears from respondent’s reactions on brief
that respondent is willing to accept Hakala’s recommendations
even when the amounts exceed what had been determined in the
notice of deficiency.
Accordingly, we conclude:
(1) Based on
the foregoing analysis of Hakala’s independent investor approach
and the correction of Hakala’s arithmetic errors (plus the
allowance for Jack’s loan guaranty), 1995 reasonable compensation
for Jack’s services is $610,000; and (2) based on the foregoing
analysis of the RMA data (plus an amount for nonsalary benefits),
1996 reasonable compensation for Jack’s services is $630,000.
- 68 2.
Intent
Because of the comparatively subjective nature of the
determination of a taxpayer’s intent in making a payment to a
shareholder-employee, courts have generally concentrated on the
reasonableness prong rather than the intent prong in section
162(a)(2) cases.
See, e.g., Elliotts Inc. v. Commissioner, 716
F.2d 1241, 1243 (9th Cir. 1983), revg. T.C. Memo. 1980-282.
However, it is clear that if a payment was not intended to be
compensation for personal services, then it will not be
deductible under section 162(a)(2) even if the payment did not
exceed reasonable compensation.
See King’s Court Mobile Home
Park v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. at 514-515; Paula Construction Co.
v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. at 1057, 1059-1060.
Having made determinations as to the maximum amounts of
petitioner’s payments to Jack that would be reasonable
compensation for Jack’s services, we now proceed to the second
prong--whether any portions of those reasonable amounts are
nevertheless not deductible by petitioner because they were not
intended as compensation.
Respondent contends “that part of the payments [to Jack]
deducted by petitioner are disguised dividends.”
In support of
this contention, respondent directs our attention to the
following:
(1) Jack’s testimony that if petitioner had a good
year, then Jack had a good year, (2) the yearend ad hoc
- 69 determination of Jack’s bonuses and absence of any compensation
plan for Jack are indicia of an intent to distribute earnings
rather than pay compensation for services, and (3) the incentive
to avoid one of the two layers of income taxation of dividends.
Petitioner contends that the issue is not properly before
the Court in the instant case (see supra note 4), and devotes its
efforts to the reasonable compensation prong.
We agree with respondent that (1) the issue is properly
before us and (2) the evidence to which respondent draws our
attention points toward an intent to distribute earnings.
However, in the instant case this agreement with
respondent’s position does not result in any disallowance of
otherwise reasonable compensation.
In each year before us, substantially all of petitioner’s
payments to Jack were made by way of a bonus at the end of the
year.
There is no testimony or other evidence that indicates
that the participants in the discussions--Jack and Sledge--had
one intention with regard to a portion of each bonus and a
different intention with regard to the remaining portion of each
bonus.
Thus, one might contend that a contaminating intention
should result in disallowance of deductions for the entirety of
each bonus, or alternatively that the contamination was not great
enough to require disallowance of deductions for any part of each
bonus.
- 70 Yet, from the notice of deficiency onward respondent clearly
has not taken the all-or-nothing approach.
Rather, even though
respondent seems to regard the intent prong as more important
than the reasonable amount prong, at each stage respondent has
applied the intent argument only to so much of petitioner’s
payments to Jack as exceeds reasonable compensation.22
On the basis of the record in the instant case, consistent
with the foregoing, we conclude that part of the amounts
petitioner paid to Jack in each of the years in issue was not
intended as compensation.
The part that was not intended as
compensation in each year is the amount by which the payments
exceeded the amounts that we have held to be reasonable
compensation.
See supra table 4.
22
For example, in the opening statement at trial,
respondent’s counsel described respondent’s position as follows:
It is Respondent’s position that in spite of Mr.
Brewer’s contributions to Petitioner during the years at
issue, the payments to him over and above what Respondent
has allowed in the trial memorandum should be disallowed as
disguised dividends.
The trial memorandum reference is as follows:
Respondent’s expert witness opinion (as modified by
revised Exhibit IV-3 in the rebuttal report) provides for
reasonable compensation for services rendered to petitioner
by Mr. Brewer of $599,117.00 for 1995 and $485,966 for 1996.
Further, the report allows additional compensation of
$5,000.00 to Mr. Brewer for providing his personal guarantee
to secure a short-term working capital line of credit in
1995. It is respondent’s position that the stated amounts
represent the reasonable compensation to Mr. Brewer and will
be sustained by the Court as such.
- 71 Thus, we hold, for petitioner, that all of the amounts
petitioner paid to Jack that would not exceed reasonable
compensation for Jack’s services were in fact paid as
compensation for Jack’s services.
To take account of the foregoing,
Decision will be entered
under Rule 155.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.