United States Tax Court

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159 T.C. No. 6

HALLMARK RESEARCH COLLECTIVE,

Petitioner

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,

Respondent

—————

Docket No. 21284-21.

Filed November 29, 2022.

—————

The Tax Court previously ordered dismissal of this

deficiency case for lack of jurisdiction because P’s Petition

was filed late, for purposes of I.R.C. § 6213(a)—i.e., not 90

but 91 days after the IRS mailed its notice of deficiency.

After the Supreme Court decided Boechler, P.C. v.

Commissioner, 142 S. Ct. 1493 (2022), P moved to vacate

our dismissal on the grounds that the deadline to file a

deficiency case is a non-jurisdictional statute of limitations

subject to equitable tolling. P requests that this case be

reopened to give P an opportunity to show cause for

equitable tolling of the limitations period.

Held: The “text, context, and relevant historical

treatment”, Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154,

166 (2010), of I.R.C. § 6213(a) confirm Congress’s intention

that the deadline to file a deficiency case be jurisdictional.

Held, further, because the deadline of I.R.C.

§ 6213(a) is jurisdictional, it cannot be equitably tolled.

Held, further, this case was properly dismissed for

lack of jurisdiction, and we will not vacate the dismissal.

—————

Served 12/05/22

Christopher Reed Haunschild and James Brooks Mann, for petitioner.

Yervant P. Hagopian, Whitney N. Moore Warren, and Michael K. Park,

for respondent.

OPINION

GUSTAFSON, Judge: Before the Court is “Petitioner’s Motion to

Vacate Order of Dismissal for Lack of Jurisdiction”, in which Hallmark

Research Collective (“Hallmark”) cites the Supreme Court’s recent

decision in Boechler, P.C. v. Commissioner, 142 S. Ct. 1493 (2022), and

asks us to vacate our order of dismissal because it wrongly treats the

90-day 1 deadline of section 6213(a)2 as jurisdictional. The issue for

decision is whether section 6213(a) limits the Tax Court’s jurisdiction to

deficiency petitions filed on or before that deadline. We hold that the

timely filing of a deficiency petition is a jurisdictional requirement, and

we will accordingly deny Hallmark’s motion to vacate.

Background

Hallmark Research Collective

Hallmark is evidently a corporation with its principal place of

business in California. 3 Hallmark filed its 2015 return untimely, and it

did not file its 2016 return. Pursuant to section 6020(b), the Internal

Revenue Service (“IRS”) prepared for 2016 a substitute for return.

Pursuant to section 6212, the IRS sent a statutory notice of

deficiency (“NOD”) to Hallmark’s last known address, by certified mail,

1 The filing deadline is 90 days for Hallmark and most other taxpayers and is

150 days when the deficiency notice is addressed to a taxpayer outside the United

States. In this opinion we use the phrase “90-day deadline” as shorthand.

2 Unless otherwise indicated, statutory references are to the Internal Revenue

Code (“the Code”, Title 26 of the United States Code) as in effect at the relevant times;

and references to Rules are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure. A

citation of a “Doc.” in this Opinion refers to a document so numbered in the Tax Court

docket record of this case, and a pinpoint citation therein refers to the pagination as

generated in the PDF file.

3 Hallmark has a California address and states in its memorandum that “its

principal place of business [is] in the Ninth Circuit”, and the Commissioner does not

say otherwise. Thus, venue for an appeal in this case would evidently be the U.S.

Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. See § 7482(b).

on June 3, 2021. The NOD determined deficiencies, additions to tax,

and penalties against Hallmark for the years 2015 and 2016 and further

advised Hallmark of the following:

If you disagree with the Notice of Deficiency

If you want to contest our final determination, you have 90

days from the date of this letter (150 days if addressed to

you outside of the United States) to file a petition with the

United States Tax Court.

How to file your petition

You can get a petition form and the rules for filing from the

Tax Court’s website at www.ustaxcourt.gov, by contacting

the Office of the Clerk at the address below, or by calling

202-521-0700. Send your completed petition form, a copy

of this letter, and copies of all statements and schedules

you received with this letter to the address below.

United States Tax Court

400 Second Street, NW

Washington, DC 20217

....

Time limits on filing a petition

The court can’t consider your case if you file the petition

late.

•

A petition is considered timely filed if the Tax Court

receives it within:

- 90 days from the date this letter was mailed to you,

- 150 days from the date this letter was mailed to you

if this letter is addressed to you outside of the

United States.

A petition is also generally considered timely if the

United States Postal Service postmark date is

within the 90 or 150-day period and the envelope

containing the petition is properly addressed with

the correct postage. The postmark rule doesn’t apply

if mailed from a foreign country.

....

•

The time you have to file a petition with the Tax

Court is set by law and can’t be extended or

suspended, even for reasonable cause. We can’t

change the allowable time for filing a petition with

the Tax Court.

....

If we don’t hear from you

If you . . . don’t file a timely petition with the Tax Court,

we’ll assess and bill you for the deficiency (and applicable

penalties and interest) after 90 days from the date of this

letter (150 days if this letter is addressed to you outside the

United States).

The NOD included on its front page the caption:

Last day to file petition with US tax court:

SEP 01 2021

Hallmark’s petition

Using the “e-filing” procedure provided on the Tax Court’s

website, Hallmark electronically filed its petition for redetermination of

the deficiencies at 9:36 p.m. on September 2, 2021—one day late. In its

petition Hallmark stated: “My CPA . . . contracted COVID/DELTA over

the last 40 days and kindly requests additional time to respond.” For

purposes of this Opinion, we assume that Hallmark was not to blame for

the late filing and that equitable considerations, if taken into account,

might excuse the untimeliness.

Order to Show Cause and the parties’ responses

On November 17, 2021, we issued an Order to Show Cause

(Doc. 6), wherein we

ORDERED that, on or before December 15, 2021,

petitioner and respondent each shall file a response to this

Order, showing cause, in writing, why the Court, on its own

motion, should not dismiss this case for lack of jurisdiction

on the ground that the petition was not timely filed.

Hallmark filed its response, in which it requested that we defer

ruling until the Supreme Court issued its decision in Boechler (in which

the Court had granted a petition for a writ of certiorari). Hallmark

argued that the deadline to file a deficiency petition in section 6213(a)

“is functionally the same as the deadline[] in [section] 6330(d)(1) (at

issue in Boechler . . .)”. Hallmark further argued that its “circumstances

are compelling and an objective review would clearly result in equitable

tolling of the filing deadline for the single day required.”

In his response the Commissioner asserted that “there is no cause

as to why the Court should not, on its own motion, dismiss this case for

lack of jurisdiction on the ground that the petition was not timely filed.”

Order of dismissal for lack of jurisdiction

We did not defer ruling. On April 1, 2022, we entered an Order

of Dismissal for Lack of Jurisdiction (Doc. 18), in which we followed

longstanding precedent, held that the 90-day deadline of section 6213(a)

for deficiency cases is jurisdictional, and dismissed Hallmark’s

deficiency petition for lack of jurisdiction.

Boechler, P.C. v. Commissioner

On April 21, 2022, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in

Boechler, holding that “[s]ection 6330(d)(1)’s 30-day time limit to file a

petition for review of a collection due process determination is an

ordinary, nonjurisdictional deadline subject to equitable tolling.”

Boechler, P.C. v. Commissioner, 142 S. Ct. at 1501.

Hallmark’s motion to vacate our order of dismissal

On May 2, 2022, Hallmark timely filed its motion to vacate

(Doc. 21) and its memorandum of law in support thereof (Doc. 22). The

motion principally argues that

the [Supreme] Court’s reasoning in Boechler compels the

conclusion that the 90-day filing deadline in section

6213(a) for deficiency cases is not jurisdictional, and thus

is subject to equitable tolling. This Court should . . . apply[]

the Boechler analysis to the filing deadline set forth in

section 6213([a]), vacat[e] the Order, and request[]

submissions from Petitioner and Respondent concerning

the potential application of equitable tolling to the facts

surrounding Petitioner’s submission.

The Commissioner filed his response (Doc. 29) on June 22, 2022,

and Hallmark filed its reply (Doc. 31) on July 15, 2022.

Discussion

As we and other courts have often held: “It is well settled that in

order to maintain an action in this Court there must be [1] a valid notice

of deficiency [issued by the Commissioner] and [2] a timely filed

petition”. Abeles v. Commissioner, 91 T.C. 1019, 1025 (1988). 4 Hallmark

argues that two jurisdictional prerequisites 5 for a deficiency case are at

least one too many. Hallmark contends we should not follow prior

precedents holding the 90-day deadline to be jurisdictional, because

“Boechler undercut the theory and reasoning underlying” those

precedents, so that “[t]he cases are now clearly irreconcilable”, and that

“efficient and harmonious judicial administration here would seem to

require this Court to review the Supreme Court’s Boechler opinion and

issue a new precedent on the section 6213(a) filing deadline.” We now

undertake such a review, and we conclude that the Supreme Court’s

reasoning in Boechler does not apply to the 90-day deadline of section

6213(a).

4 See, e.g., Elings v. Commissioner, 324 F.3d 1110, 1112 (9th Cir. 2003) (“The

tax court has jurisdiction only if two requirements are met: (1) the IRS issued a valid

notice of deficiency, and (2) the [taxpayer] filed a timely petition”); Portillo v.

Commissioner, 932 F.2d 1128, 1132 (5th Cir. 1991) (“Therefore, the Tax Court only has

jurisdiction when the Commissioner issues a valid deficiency notice and the taxpayer

files a timely petition for redetermination”), aff’g in part, rev’g in part T.C. Memo.

1990-68; Commissioner v. Rosenheim, 132 F.2d 677, 679–80 (3d Cir. 1942) (“The

sending of the appropriate notice in this case by registered mail and the transferee’s

petition for a redetermination of the liability within ninety days of the date of the notice

supplied the requirements of Section 272(a) [predecessor to section 6213(a)] so far as

the Board’s jurisdiction to hear and determine the matter was concerned”), rev’g and

remanding on other grounds 45 B.T.A. 1018 (1941).

5 In contrast, for tax refund suits one can count five jurisdictional prerequisites:

(1) full payment of the tax, see Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145 (1960); (2) a proper

administrative refund claim, see § 7422(a); (3) a timely administrative refund claim,

see § 6511; (4) disallowance of the claim, or the passage of 6 months, see § 6532; and

(5) the timely filing of the refund suit, see § 6532.

The Supreme Court has articulated a “clear statement” standard

for discerning jurisdictional rules.

“Jurisdictional” rules are different from “claim-processing”

rules.

Where a federal court’s subject-matter jurisdiction depends on a

timely filing, “a litigant’s failure to comply with the bar deprives a court

of all authority to hear a case”. United States v. Kwai Fun Wong, 575

U.S. 402, 408–09 (2015). Courts must enforce the deadline sua sponte;

the deadline cannot be tolled or waived; and there is no room for

equitable exceptions to be made on account of the specific facts of a case.

Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006). Late-filed cases in

such instances must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Id.

Claim-processing rules, on the other hand, are those that “seek to

promote the orderly progress of litigation by requiring that the parties

take certain procedural steps at certain specified times”, Henderson ex

rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 435 (2011), “but do not deprive

a court of authority to hear a case”, Kwai Fun Wong, 575 U.S. at 410.

“Filing deadlines . . . are quintessential claim-processing rules”,

Henderson, 562 U.S. at 435, and “ordinarily are not jurisdictional”,

Sebelius v. Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr., 568 U.S. 145, 154 (2013). This is

true “even when the time limit is important . . . and even when it is

framed in mandatory terms”. Kwai Fun Wong, 575 U.S. at 410.

Deadlines that are claim-processing rules are subject to the rebuttable

presumption that they may be equitably tolled upon the particular facts

of a case. Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95–96 (1990).

But see id. at 96 (“Because the time limits imposed by Congress in a suit

against the Government involve a waiver of sovereign immunity, it is

evident that no more favorable tolling doctrine may be employed against

the Government than is employed in suits between private litigants. . . .

But the principles of equitable tolling described above do not extend to

what is at best a garden variety claim of excusable neglect”). A litigant’s

failure to meet the deadline risks dismissal for failure to state a claim,

see Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 511–13, but the statute of limitations defense

must be raised in the answer (or amended answer); otherwise, the issue

is waived, and the case may proceed, see Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443,

459 (2004).

Perceiving a problem with “drive-by jurisdictional rulings”, see

Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 511 (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t,

523 U.S. 83, 91 (1998)), the Supreme Court has endeavored to “bring

some discipline” to the use of the jurisdictional label, see Henderson, 562

U.S. at 435. The Court has instructed that “[c]larity would be facilitated

if courts and litigants used the label ‘jurisdictional’ not for claimprocessing rules, but only for prescriptions delineating the classes of

cases (subject-matter jurisdiction) and the persons (personal

jurisdiction) falling within a court’s adjudicatory authority.” Kontrick,

540 U.S. at 455.

For a deadline to be considered jurisdictional, an analysis

employing the principles of statutory construction must

show that the rule “clearly states” it is jurisdictional.

“Only Congress may determine a lower federal court’s subjectmatter jurisdiction.” Id. at 452 (citing U.S. Const. art. III, § 1). “Because

Congress decides whether federal courts can hear cases at all, it can also

determine when, and under what conditions, federal courts can hear

them.” Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 212–13 (2007). “Congress is free

to attach the conditions that go with the jurisdictional label to . . . a

claim-processing rule”, Henderson, 562 U.S. at 435, and “it is no less

‘jurisdictional’ when Congress prohibits federal courts from adjudicating

an otherwise legitimate ‘class of cases’ after a certain period has

elapsed”, Bowles, 551 U.S. at 213.

However, Congress must “clearly state[]” that a filing deadline is

jurisdictional; and absent such a clear statement, “courts should treat

the restriction as nonjurisdictional in character.” Arbaugh, 546 U.S.

at 515–16. “Congress must do something special, beyond setting an

exception-free deadline, to tag a statute of limitations as jurisdictional

and so prohibit a court from tolling it.” Kwai Fun Wong, 575 U.S. at 410.

Congress “need not use magic words”, Henderson, 562 U.S. at 436, and

a statutory deadline may be jurisdictional even without the word

“jurisdiction”, see, e.g., Bowles, 551 U.S. at 208–10 (holding 28 U.S.C.

§ 2107(a) and (c) to be jurisdictional); United States v. Brockamp, 519

U.S. 347, 350–51 (1997) (holding section 6511 to be jurisdictional); but

the “traditional tools of statutory construction must plainly show that

Congress imbued a procedural bar with jurisdictional consequences”,

Kwai Fun Wong, 575 U.S. at 410.

“To determine whether Congress has made the necessary clear

statement, we examine the ‘text, context, and relevant historical

treatment’ of the provision at issue.” Musacchio v. United States, 577

U.S. 237, 246 (2016) (quoting Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S.

154, 166 (2010)). Statutes that meet this standard share several

qualities: They speak of a court’s power “in jurisdictional terms or refer

in any way to the jurisdiction” of the court. Zipes v. Trans World

Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393–94 (1982). They “define a federal court’s

jurisdiction . . . , address its authority to hear untimely suits, [and] cabin

its usual equitable powers.” Kwai Fun Wong, 575 U.S. at 411. Their

context, such as placement within their statutory regime, history of

reenactments, or a long-standing judicial interpretation, reflects that

Congress imbued a deadline with “jurisdictional consequences”.

See, e.g., Kwai Fun Wong, 575 U.S. at 410; Henderson, 562 U.S. at 439;

Bowles, 551 U.S. at 209–13; Zipes, 455 U.S. at 394.

With these principles in mind, we now examine the 90-day

deadline that Congress provided in section 6213(a).

II.

Section 6213(a) clearly states that its 90-day deadline for filing a

deficiency case is jurisdictional.

The Tax Court is the exclusive forum for deficiency cases.

Deficiency procedures defer assessment of income tax.

The Constitution confers on Congress the “Power To lay and

collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises”. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.

The Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution, ratified in 1913,

authorizes Congress to impose a federal income tax without

apportionment among the States. Congress promptly enacted the

Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114. Under our income tax system,

taxpayers are required to file annual returns reporting their income and

claiming entitlement to certain deductions and credits enumerated in

the Code. §§ 6001, 6012. The IRS is authorized to examine those

returns, § 7602, and to determine that additional tax may be owed,

§ 6212. Any additional tax determined to be owed that is greater than

the amount shown by the taxpayer on his return is referred to as the

“deficiency”. § 6211.

Before the IRS may forcibly collect the deficiency, it must first

“assess” that deficiency 6 by recording the liability on the Treasury’s tax

rolls, see § 6203, and then the IRS may make notice and demand, see

§ 6303, and collect by lien or levy, see §§ 6321, 6331. To protect the

rights of taxpayers, Congress has established deficiency proceedings as

a remedy for challenging the IRS’s determination before the tax is

6 Not relevant here is the Government’s filing a collection suit, under section

7403(a), “without assessment”. § 6501(a).

collected. This pre-payment remedy is not required by the Constitution.

Rather, the minimum requirements of constitutional due process are

satisfied by the taxpayer’s right to sue for a refund of overpaid tax after

paying it. Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589, 595–99 (1931). But

Congress created an additional remedy, in the predecessor to section

6213(a), by which a taxpayer may seek de novo pre-payment review of a

determination by the IRS that he is liable for a deficiency in tax.

Congress created the Tax Court’s predecessor, the Board of Tax Appeals,

specifically to give taxpayers this opportunity. Deficiency jurisdiction is

the principal purpose for this Court’s existence.

Under the deficiency procedures that Congress established,

specific steps must be taken before the IRS may assess a deficiency.

See generally §§ 6211–6216. First, the IRS must notify the taxpayer

that a deficiency has been determined against him for a particular year.

§ 6212. Second, the taxpayer has an opportunity to challenge the IRS’s

deficiency determination.

In 1919 Congress authorized the

Commissioner to establish rules and procedures for taxpayers to make

an administrative appeal of a deficiency determination, see Revenue Act

of 1918, ch. 18, § 228, 40 Stat. 1057, 1075; and in 1921 Congress

established the administrative deficiency appeal procedures by statute,

see Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 250(d), 42 Stat. 227, 266.

Pre-assessment judicial review of IRS deficiency

determinations is assigned to the Tax Court.

Congress was soon unsatisfied with a lone administrative remedy

for pre-payment review of deficiency determinations, and in the

Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 900, 43 Stat. 253, 336, it established the

Board of Tax Appeals (“BTA”) as an independent executive agency to be

the unique forum for hearing and resolving deficiency disputes. In 1942

Congress renamed the BTA the Tax Court of the United States

(“TCUS”), but Congress left the TCUS as an independent agency within

the executive branch. Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, § 504, 56 Stat. 798,

957. Then in 1969 Congress “established, under article I of the

Constitution of the United States, a court of record to be known as the

United States Tax Court.” Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172,

§ 951, 83 Stat. 487, 730 (codified as amended at § 7441). 7 Congress

intentionally designed the Tax Court, like its predecessors the BTA and

the TCUS, to be the exclusive forum for pre-payment review of

7 As amended in 2015, section 7441 adds: “The Tax Court is not an agency of,

and shall be independent of, the executive branch of the Government.”

deficiencies. The effect of a “decision of the Tax Court which has become

final” is that the redetermined deficiency “shall be assessed and shall be

paid upon notice and demand”. § 6215(a).

Section 6213(a) is the jurisdictional grant to the Tax Court

for deficiency cases.

The Tax Court may exercise jurisdiction only to the extent

expressly provided by statute. Breman v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 61, 66

(1976).

A general description of the Tax Court’s jurisdiction

appears in section 7442.

Congress has described the jurisdiction of the Tax Court in

section 7442, which provides:

Sec. 7442. Jurisdiction.

The Tax Court and its divisions shall have such

jurisdiction as is conferred on them by this title, by

chapters 1, 2, 3, and 4 of the Internal Revenue Code of

1939, by title II and title III of the Revenue Act of 1926 (44

Stat. 10-87), or by laws enacted subsequent to February 26,

1926.

A careful reading of section 7442 shows that it does not itself confer

jurisdiction but states the truism that the Tax Court “shall have such

jurisdiction” as is “conferred” by other provisions elsewhere in the Code

and other revenue laws. In the absence of any other such provisions,

section 7442 by itself would not vest the Tax Court with any jurisdiction;

and in the absence of section 7442, the Tax Court would nonetheless

possess the jurisdiction that had been “conferred on [it] by this title”.

This general jurisdictional description in section 7442 has its

origin in an equivalent provision enacted in 1926. Section 1000 of the

Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, 44 Stat. 9, 105, added section 904 to the

Revenue Act of 1924; and section 904 provided: “The Board and its

divisions shall have such jurisdiction as is conferred on them by Title II

[income tax] and Title III [estate tax] of the Revenue Act of 1926 or by

subsequent laws.” When the BTA was first established, the Revenue

Act of 1924 made no mention of the BTA’s “jurisdiction”. Rather, section

900(e), 43 Stat. at 337, provided that “[t]he Board and its divisions shall

hear and determine appeals filed under sections 274, 279, 308, and 312”,

and section 274(a), 43 Stat. at 297 (the predecessor statute of section

6213(a)), provided that “[w]ithin 60 days after such notice [of deficiency]

is mailed the taxpayer may file an appeal with the Board of Tax

Appeals”.

Two years later the general provision addressing

“jurisdiction” was enacted as section 904 (now section 7442) and thus

clarified what had already been true: Congress gave the BTA

jurisdiction over deficiency cases not by announcing that the Board of

Tax Appeals shall have “jurisdiction” over deficiency cases but simply by

providing in section 274(a) that “the taxpayer may file” a deficiency case

“with the Board of Tax Appeals” and providing in section 900(e) that “the

Board . . . shall hear” those deficiency cases.

The current general description in section 7442 thus confirms for

the Tax Court (as former section 904 confirmed for the BTA) that the

Court does have “jurisdiction” as is elsewhere conferred by “this title”

(Title 26 of the United States Code).

The particular grant of the Tax Court’s deficiency

jurisdiction appears in section 6213(a).

The particular provision in Title 26 that does confer jurisdiction

over deficiency cases is section 6213(a). 8 We print it here in its entirety

(with bracketed numbering of the sentences inserted):

Sec. 6213. Restrictions applicable to deficiencies; petition

to Tax Court

(a) Time for filing petition and restriction on

assessment.—[1] Within 90 days, or 150 days if the notice

is addressed to a person outside the United States, after

the notice of deficiency authorized in section 6212 is mailed

(not counting Saturday, Sunday, or a legal holiday in the

District of Columbia as the last day), the taxpayer may file

a petition with the Tax Court for a redetermination of the

deficiency. [2] Except as otherwise provided in section

6851, 6852, or 6861 no assessment of a deficiency in respect

of any tax imposed by subtitle A, or B, chapter 41, 42, 43,

or 44 and no levy or proceeding in court for its collection

shall be made, begun, or prosecuted until such notice has

been mailed to the taxpayer, nor until the expiration of

8 We discuss below in Part III.A Hallmark’s contention that deficiency

jurisdiction is conferred by section 6214.

such 90-day or 150-day period, as the case may be, nor, if a

petition has been filed with the Tax Court, until the

decision of the Tax Court has become final. [3]

Notwithstanding the provisions of section 7421(a), the

making of such assessment or the beginning of such

proceeding or levy during the time such prohibition is in

force may be enjoined by a proceeding in the proper court,

including the Tax Court, and a refund may be ordered by

such court of any amount collected within the period during

which the Secretary is prohibited from collecting by levy or

through a proceeding in court under the provisions of this

subsection. [4] The Tax Court shall have no jurisdiction to

enjoin any action or proceeding or order any refund under

this subsection unless a timely petition for a

redetermination of the deficiency has been filed and then

only in respect of the deficiency that is the subject of such

petition. [5] Any petition filed with the Tax Court on or

before the last date specified for filing such petition by the

Secretary in the notice of deficiency shall be treated as

timely filed. [Emphasis added.]

Section 6213 is not a court-promulgated rule; 9 rather, it is

Congress’s mandate of the Tax Court’s deficiency authority and of its

place within the federal tax system, 10 and we must follow its directive.

Breman, 66 T.C. at 66. Therefore, we “attempt to ascertain Congress’

intent regarding the particular type of review at issue in this case”,

Henderson, 562 U.S. at 437–38; and to do so we first examine the text of

section 6213(a).

9 Cf. Kontrick, 540 U.S. at 453–54 (“The provision conferring jurisdiction over

objections to discharge, however, contains no timeliness condition. [28 U.S.C. §]

157(b)(2)(J) instructs only that ‘objections to discharges’ are ‘[c]ore proceedings’ within

the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts. The time constraints applicable to objections

to discharge are contained in Bankruptcy Rules prescribed by this Court for ‘the

practice and procedure in cases under title 11.’ 28 U.S.C. § 2075; cf. § 2072 (similarly

providing for Court-prescribed ‘rules of practice and procedure’ for cases in the federal

district courts and courts of appeals). ‘[I]t is axiomatic’ that such rules ‘do not create

or withdraw federal jurisdiction.’ Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S.

365, 370 (1978)”).

10 The Supreme Court acknowledged in Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868,

891 (1991), that “[t]he Tax Court’s function and role in the federal judicial scheme

closely resemble those of the federal district courts”.

The placement and context of the 90-day deadline in section

6213(a) show it is jurisdictional.

Section 6213(a) states two prerequisites for a

deficiency case.

Section 6213(a) authorizes the taxpayer to postpone the IRS’s

assessment of a deficiency it has determined by filing a deficiency

petition in the Tax Court within the 90-day period, and it thereby gives

the Tax Court jurisdiction to adjudicate that petition. By the first

sentence of section 6213(a), Congress created a class of cases—deficiency

cases—and specified the time period within which to file them. See

Bowles, 551 U.S. at 212–13 (“Because Congress decides whether federal

courts can hear cases at all, it can also determine when, and under what

conditions, federal courts can hear them.”). No court has ever

questioned whether the Tax Court has deficiency jurisdiction, and no

court has ever held that the basis for that jurisdiction is any statute

other than section 6213(a).

As we stated above, the prerequisites for a Tax Court deficiency

case are (1) a valid notice of deficiency issued by the Commissioner and

(2) a petition timely filed by the taxpayer. See supra note 4 and

accompanying text. Each of these prerequisites has a clear basis in the

statutory text, and as we will show, both are jurisdictional.

The IRS must issue a valid notice of

deficiency.

Under section 6213(a), a deficiency petition may be filed only

“after the notice of deficiency authorized in section 6212 is mailed”.

According to section 6212, such a notice (1) must determine a deficiency,

(2) must be sent by certified or registered mail, and (3) must be sent to

the taxpayer’s last-known address.

The notice of deficiency is known as the “ticket” to Tax Court. A

defect in its fulfillment of those requirements of section 6212 may cause

a misfire in the deficiency procedure and may deprive us of authority to

hear a deficiency case. See, e.g., Scar v. Commissioner, 814 F.2d 1363

(9th Cir. 1987), rev’g 81 T.C. 855 (1983). The requirements of section

6212 that define an NOD are essential to the Tax Court’s authority over

a deficiency case because they are incorporated by reference into section

6213(a).

In this case there is no dispute about the first of the two

prerequisites of section 6213(a)—the validity of the NOD that the IRS

issued to Hallmark. However, we pause to note that the unanimously

acknowledged jurisdictional necessity of the issuance of the NOD arises

from section 6213(a)—the same statute that (we hold here) makes

jurisdiction also depend on a timely petition. If a taxpayer files a

petition in the Tax Court attempting to dispute the existence of a

deficiency before the IRS has issued an NOD, then the petition will be

dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court has so held. See

Laing v. United States, 423 U.S. 161, 165 n.4 (1976) (“A deficiency notice

is of import primarily because it is a jurisdictional prerequisite to a

taxpayer’s suit in the Tax Court for redetermination of his tax liability.”

(Emphasis added.)). 11 Or, as the Tax Court put it: “It is elemental that

the Tax Court does not have jurisdiction where the Commissioner has

not determined a deficiency and a statutory notice of deficiency has not

been sent to the taxpayer-petitioner.” Johnston v. Commissioner, 52

T.C. 792, 793–94 (1969), aff’d, 429 F.2d 804 (6th Cir. 1970). But this

“elemental” proposition is based on the jurisdictional character of the

first sentence of section 6213(a). The requirement of a valid NOD and

the 90-day deadline are inseparably linked in that sentence. If, as

Hallmark contends, the 90-day deadline were not jurisdictional, then we

do not see how the requirement of a valid NOD could (as the Supreme

Court has held) be jurisdictional. Rather, both prerequisites would then

have to be treated as mere claim-processing rules, which might be

waived and which, if invoked, would result in dismissal not for lack of

jurisdiction but for failure to state a claim—i.e., a merits determination.

But that is a thought experiment. No court has ever denied (and

Hallmark does not dispute) that the Tax Court’s jurisdiction over a

deficiency case depends on the issuance of the NOD.

The taxpayer must file a timely petition.

Section 6213(a) creates a window of opportunity for the taxpayer:

“Within 90 days . . . the taxpayer may file a petition with the Tax Court

11 See also Abrams v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. 1308, 1310 (1985) (“The PFN [prefiling notification] letters do not satisfy these requirements. They do not rise to the

level of notices of deficiencies. They do not state that they are notices of deficiencies.

They do not state that a determination has been made”), aff’d, 787 F.2d 939 (4th Cir.

1986), and aff’d, 814 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1987), and aff’d sub nom. Spector v.

Commissioner, 790 F.2d 51 (8th Cir. 1986), and aff’d sub nom. Donley v. Commissioner,

791 F.2d 383 (5th Cir. 1986), and aff’d sub nom. Becker v. Commissioner, 799 F.2d 753

(7th Cir. 1986), and aff’d sub nom. Alford v. Commissioner, 800 F.2d 987 (10th Cir.

1986), and aff’d sub nom. Gaska v. Commissioner, 800 F.2d 633 (6th Cir. 1986).

for a redetermination of the deficiency.” Under the plain meaning of this

provision, the grant to the taxpayer of the right to file a deficiency

petition is constrained by the time in which to do so, and only a petition

meeting that deadline can be said (in the words of Kontrick, 540 U.S.

at 455) to “fall[] within . . . [the Tax C]ourt’s adjudicatory authority”.

The 90-day deadline is embedded

jurisdictional grant in sentence 1.

the

The 90-day deadline is imposed in the jurisdictional statute,

section 6213(a).

Admittedly, a requirement “does not become

jurisdictional simply because it is placed in a section of a statute that

also contains jurisdictional provisions”. Auburn, 568 U.S. at 155. On

the other hand, “Congress’s separation of a filing deadline from a

jurisdictional grant often indicates that the deadline is not

jurisdictional”, Kwai Fun Wong, 575 U.S. at 403; whereas the 90-day

deadline at issue here is not just “in a section of” the jurisdictional

statute but is in the same sentence as, and is embedded in, the

jurisdictional grant: “Within 90 days . . . the taxpayer may file a petition

with the Tax Court for a redetermination of the deficiency.” We

therefore construe the placement of the deadline in the jurisdictional

statute as some indication that the 90-day deadline may be

jurisdictional, and we continue our analysis.

The injunction provision in sentence 4 of section

6213(a) suggests that “jurisdiction” depends on

timeliness.

Section 6213(a) must be construed as a whole, 12 and sentence 4

clarifies that deficiency “jurisdiction” (conferred in sentence 1) depends

on a petition’s timeliness, and implies the jurisdictional character of the

deadline provided in sentence 1. Cf. Zipes, 455 U.S. at 393–94 (“The

provision granting district courts jurisdiction under Title VII, 42 U.S.C.

§§ 2000e–5(e) and (f), [unlike section 6213(a),] does not limit jurisdiction

to those cases in which there has been a timely filing with the EEOC. It

contains no reference to the timely-filing requirement. The provision

specifying the time for filing charges with the EEOC appears as an

entirely separate provision, and it does not speak in jurisdictional terms

or refer in any way to the jurisdiction of the district courts” (footnote

12 See K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988) (“In ascertaining

the plain meaning of the statute, the court must look to the particular statutory

language at issue, as well as the language and design of the statute as a whole”).

omitted)). The only mention of “jurisdiction” in subsection (a) itself is

that fourth sentence, which makes provision as to when the Tax Court

has “jurisdiction to enjoin . . . or order any refund”. This statement

indirectly indicates that deficiency jurisdiction depends on a timely

petition by precluding injunction or refund “unless a timely petition for

a redetermination of the deficiency has been filed and then only in

respect of the deficiency that is the subject of such petition”. That is, the

statute says there may be supplemental injunction or refund

“jurisdiction” where a deficiency petition is before the Court, but only if

the petition was “timely”. Section 6213(a) therefore speaks to both the

petition’s timeliness and the Tax Court’s injunctive power. Cf Kwai Fun

Wong, 575 U.S. at 411 (“[Title 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b)] does not define a

federal court’s jurisdiction over tort claims generally, address its

authority to hear untimely suits, or in any way cabin its usual equitable

powers”).

If timeliness were a jurisdictional prerequisite for the

supplemental injunction or refund but not for the predicate deficiency

case, then an oddity might result: Where a deficiency case was filed

untimely, the Court might nonetheless have deficiency jurisdiction via

equitable tolling, but by the statute it could not have jurisdiction over

any related injunction or refund claim. The traditional tools of statutory

construction encourage us to view the statutory text as a whole and to

prefer to avoid this anomaly by recognizing “timely petition” to be a

jurisdictional prerequisite for both the injunction power and the

underlying deficiency case.

It must be borne in mind, however, that this observation is

analogous to one that did not carry the day in Boechler, where the

Commissioner had argued that “[i]t would be strange . . . to make the

deadline a jurisdictional requirement for a particular remedy (an

injunction) [i.e., enjoining a lien or levy], but not for the underlying

merits proceeding itself [there, a collection due process hearing under

section 6330(d)(1); here, a deficiency case under section 6213(a)].”

Boechler, P.C. v. Commissioner, 142 S. Ct. at 1499. The Supreme Court

held, however, that this potential anomaly “might strengthen the

Commissioner’s argument that his interpretation is superior” but held

that an interpretation that a timely filing requirement is jurisdictional

“must be not only better, but also clear”. Id. Consequently, at this point

in the analysis we posit simply that the explicit “jurisdiction” provision

in the fourth sentence of section 6213(a) that invokes the time limit of

the first sentence “strengthen[s]” (but does not clinch) the argument that

the 90-day deadline of the first sentence is jurisdictional.

Congress’s amendments adjusting the deadline show

that the deadline is fixed.

From time to time, Congress has marginally extended the

deadline of section 6213(a) to accommodate a variety of potentially

sympathetic situations. In 1926 Congress provided that if the deadline

(then the 60th day) fell on a Sunday (as it had in Appeal of Satovsky,

1 B.T.A. 22, 24 (1924)), then that Sunday would not count as the 60th

day, because Sunday was not a business day and papers could not be

filed. 13 In 1934 Congress extended the deadline to 90 days and excluded

any holiday as the 90th day. 14 In 1942 Congress extended the deadline

to 150 days for persons abroad. 15 In 1945 Congress excluded Saturday

as the 90th day. 16 And most recently, in 1998, in order to help prevent

taxpayers from miscalculating the 90-day deadline, Congress passed a

provision (not codified in 26 U.S.C.) mandating that the Commissioner

include on the notice of deficiency a statement of the last date to file a

petition and then made a corresponding amendment to section 6213(a)

making that stated date a safe harbor. 17 Each of these modifications to

the deadline for filing a deficiency petition was made to address a

scenario that the Tax Court could have addressed with equitable tolling

if it had such power. But Congress recognized that the Tax Court does

not have the power to extend the jurisdictional deadline imposed by

section 6213. Thus, Congress, in the course of its amendments, has

treated the deadline of section 6213(a) (and its predecessor statutes) as

a jurisdictional deadline that the Tax Court cannot alter or toll.

13 See Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 274, 44 Stat. 9, 55.

14 See Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, § 272, 48 Stat. 680, 741.

15 See Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, § 168, 56 Stat. 798, 876.

16 See International Organizations Immunities Act of 1945, ch. 652, § 203, 59

Stat. 669, 673 (excluding Saturdays as the 90th day).

17 See Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998,

Pub. L. No. 105-206, § 3463, 112 Stat. 685, 767.

Section 7459(d) confirms the jurisdictional nature of the

90-day deadline of section 6213(a).

Section 7459(d) provides a general rule that

dismissal of a deficiency case sustains the IRS’s

deficiency determination.

The Code indicates that when the Tax Court dismisses an

untimely petition, it does so “for lack of jurisdiction”. Section 7459(d)

provides as follows:

(d) Effect of decision dismissing petition.—If a

petition for a redetermination of a deficiency has been filed

by the taxpayer, a decision of the Tax Court dismissing the

proceeding shall be considered as its decision that the

deficiency is the amount determined by the Secretary. An

order specifying such amount shall be entered in the

records of the Tax Court unless the Tax Court cannot

determine such amount from the record in the proceeding,

or unless the dismissal is for lack of jurisdiction.

[Emphasis added.]

This statute thus addresses situations where (1) there has been a

“deficiency . . . determined by the Secretary”; (2) there has been a

“petition . . . filed by the taxpayer” in the Tax Court; and (3) the “amount”

of the deficiency is “determine[able] . . . from the record”. When those

conditions are met and a deficiency petition is dismissed, the statute

provides that some such cases are thereby resolved on their merits and

some are not. The general rule of section 7459(d) is that dismissal of a

deficiency petition is the functional equivalent of a merits decision

sustaining the determination of the deficiency; consequently, the

deficiency “shall be assessed and shall be paid upon notice and demand”.

See § 6215(a). This general rule precludes a taxpayer from using a

deficiency case to bar indefinitely the assessment of tax. When he files

his petition, he does halt the assessment process until the Tax Court

enters its decision; but he cannot then contrive to have his case

dismissed (whether by agreement, or for failure to prosecute, or for any

other reason), thereby forestalling assessment by keeping the Tax Court

from entering decision. Rather, under section 7459(d), dismissal will

generally be tantamount to the taxpayer’s losing on the merits, and an

adverse decision will be entered.

Section 7459(d) provides an exception, even though

the IRS determined a deficiency and the taxpayer

filed a petition, when a dismissal is “for lack of

jurisdiction”.

Section 7459(d) makes specific an exception for circumstances

where “the dismissal is for lack of jurisdiction”. We stress the truism

that this exception can apply only if the general rule of section 7459(d)

would otherwise apply—that is, only where the IRS has determined a

deficiency and where the taxpayer has filed a petition. The general rule

of section 7459(d) could not apply (and decision would not be entered) if

there is no “deficiency . . . determined by the Secretary”, or if there is no

“petition . . . filed by the taxpayer”. The exception in section 7459(d)

therefore makes provision for a dismissal without adverse decision in

the circumstance where there has been a notice of deficiency issued by

the IRS and there has been a taxpayer-filed petition but there is

nonetheless a “lack of jurisdiction”. This prompts the question of what

sort of “jurisdictional” defect might be possible where there was a

deficiency determination and a filed petition.

The easy answer to the question is that jurisdiction might be

lacking (and the Court should dismiss without entering decision) either

when the notice of deficiency is defective under section 6212 or when the

petition is untimely. The jurisprudence of the Tax Court (and its

predecessors) has long held that either of those two defects in

compliance with section 6213(a) calls for dismissal for lack of

jurisdiction without a decision as to the amount of the deficiency.

One who insists that section 6213(a) does not state

“jurisdictional” prerequisites must conclude that neither invalidity of

the notice nor untimeliness of the petition could cause “lack of

jurisdiction” over a deficiency case, and he must then explain what

“jurisdictional” circumstances Congress meant to except when it

provided in section 7459(d) that there can be “lack of jurisdiction” even

where there has been a deficiency determination and the filing of a

petition. This non-jurisdictional reading of section 6213(a) and its

prerequisites is untenable for two reasons that we now discuss.

Non-jurisdictional dismissals of cases with untimely

petitions would produce incongruous results.

When a deficiency case is dismissed because it is untimely under

the first sentence of section 6213(a) or its predecessor statutes, the

unvarying practice of the Tax Court and its predecessors for almost 100

years has been to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction and therefore

(consistent with section 7459(d) and its predecessor statutes) not to

enter decision as to an amount of a deficiency. This dismissal leaves the

IRS free to assess the deficiency (because no timely petition was filed to

halt assessment pursuant to the second sentence of section 6213(a) and

its predecessor statutes); but because there has been no adjudication of

the liability that could give rise to res judicata, this dismissal also leaves

the taxpayer free to pay the tax and then pursue his refund remedies.

If the jurisprudence had been wrong, if the 90-day deadline were

a claim-processing rule, and if the dismissal of an untimely petition were

not jurisdictional but rather “for failure to state a claim”, 18 then section

7459(d) would call for a different treatment. It would call for dismissal

of the untimely petition with an order “that the deficiency is the amount

determined” in the NOD. This surprising outcome counsels against the

non-jurisdictional construction of section 6213(a) not because it

provokes sympathy for a taxpayer 19 for whom this would be an

unfavorable result but because it puts section 6213(a) and section

7459(d) at odds with each other and with the manifest purpose of the

statutory regime.

18 See Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 399 n.3 (1981) (“The

dismissal for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is

a ‘judgment on the merits’”); Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682 (1946) (“If the court does

later exercise its jurisdiction to determine that the allegations in the complaint do not

state a ground for relief, then dismissal of the case would be on the merits, not for want

of jurisdiction.”); Stewart v. U.S. Bancorp, 297 F.3d 953, 957 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[A]

dismissal for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) is a ‘judgment on the merits’

to which res judicata applies” (quoting Moitie, 452 U.S. at 399 n.3)).

19 In fact, sometimes a non-jurisdictional dismissal would be an unfavorable

result for the Commissioner. Sometimes the Commissioner uses the deficiency case as

an occasion to assert liabilities in addition to those in the NOD (as section 6214(a)

permits him to do); but res judicata arising from a merits decision issued pursuant to

section 7459(d) upon a (supposedly) non-jurisdictional dismissal of an untimely

petition would slam the door on any further litigation of the tax year at issue (at least

in the absence of fraud, see Zackim v. Commissioner, 887 F.2d 455 (3d Cir. 1989)

(construing § 6212(c)), rev’g in part 91 T.C. 1001 (1988)). On the other hand, when a

taxpayer’s deficiency petition is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction (and there is no

outcome that is res judicata), then the taxpayer remains free to request audit

reconsideration, see Tucker v. Commissioner, 135 T.C. 114, 148 (2010), aff’d, 676 F.3d

1129 (D.C. Cir. 2012), or await IRS collection and attempt a “collection due process”

hearing under section 6330 (or an equivalent hearing before the IRS’s Independent

Office of Appeals), or he may pay the tax, request a refund, and, if his claim is not

allowed, sue for refund under section 7422.

Rightly construed, the two statutes work harmoniously in

tandem. Section 6213(a) gives the taxpayer the unilateral power,

merely by filing a timely petition, to halt the deficiency assessment

process until the Tax Court enters decision; and section 7459(d) assures

that the taxpayer cannot then avoid the conclusion of that deficiency

process by contriving a dismissal of his case before the Tax Court does

so. Section 7459(d) prevents that abuse by requiring that the Tax Court

will enter decision in every case in which it has been given the power to

do so—but not in cases (such as those with untimely petitions) as to

which Congress expressly withheld that power from the Tax Court. A

non-jurisdictional reading of section 6213(a) might allow equitable

tolling, but it would, in conjunction with the operation of section 7459(d),

require the Tax Court to exercise power over untimely cases by entering

decisions sustaining the deficiencies determined in the NOD. But

whatever “90 days” means in section 6213(a) (i.e., whether a literal 90

days, or a 90 days plus equitable tolling where applicable), it certainly

means that the Tax Court cannot redetermine the deficiency where the

petition was not filed “[w]ithin 90 days”; yet Hallmark’s nonjurisdictional construction of section 6213(a) would have us do just that.

It is no answer to this anomaly to point out (as Hallmark does)

that “if this unfortunate res judicata result were to happen, it would be

a matter for Congress to consider altering by legislation”. It is certainly

correct that courts must not choose an interpretation because it brings

about a desired outcome, and it is true that defects in a statute are for

Congress to fix, not the courts. But choosing desired outcomes is not the

same thing as following the principles of statutory construction that

counsel against choosing an interpretation that creates a conflict in the

legislative regime (and that therefore would require Congress to then

address the conflict by corrective legislation). See USA Gymnastics v.

Liberty Ins. Underwriters, Inc., 27 F.4th 499, 516 (7th Cir. 2022) (“[T]he

harmonious-reading canon [instructs that] ‘[t]he provisions of a text

should be interpreted in a way that renders them compatible’” (quoting

Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of

Legal Texts 180 (2012))).

This consequence of Hallmark’s position—requiring the Tax

Court to enter decision where Congress plainly withheld power to do

so—demonstrates the error of that position and the distortions that

would result from adopting it.

Applying section 7459(d) only to dismissals other

than those called for by section 6213(a) would

contradict the actual history and intent of section

7459(d).

Since Hallmark argues that untimely petitions are not dismissed

“for lack of jurisdiction” for purposes of section 7459(d), Hallmark must

posit the petitions that are dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Hallmark

points to five situations (which it states concisely and on which we

comment in footnotes) in which “a petition is dismissed for lack of

jurisdiction because [1] the notice of deficiency was invalid because not

sent to the taxpayer’s last known address[,][20] [2] the petition is barred

by the automatic stay in bankruptcy,[21] [3] a corporation lacks capacity

to file the petition at the time[,][22] [4] the filing fee has not been

paid[,][23] and [5] the taxes have been paid[24] before the notice of

deficiency was issued.” Hallmark’s list does not account for section

7459(d) nor explain the actual history of its adoption. To make

Hallmark’s point (that the “lack of jurisdiction” exception in section

7459(d) addresses defects other than those in section 6213(a)), it is thus

necessary to show that Congress added the exception not to address

circumstances of invalid NODs or untimely petitions (as in section

6213(a)) but instead to address other jurisdictional circumstances

Hallmark has identified. Such a showing cannot be made.

Hallmark is correct that the “lack of jurisdiction” provision now

in section 7459(d) was added by section 601 of the Revenue Act of 1928,

20 The last-known-address provision first appeared as section 272(k) of the

Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, § 272(k), 45 Stat. 791, 854, the same Revenue Act in

which the predecessor to section 7459(d) was enacted. As Hallmark’s description

admits, this last-known-address defect is simply one instance of the NOD being

“invalid”; that is, the case is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because one of the two

prerequisites of section 6213(a) was not met.

21 The automatic stay provision in its current form was not enacted until the

Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549. “[T]he Revenue Act

of 1924 [was] silent as to the Board’s jurisdiction in the event of bankruptcy”, but

“section 282(a) of the Revenue Act of 1926[, 44 Stat. at 62] . . . says: ‘No petition for

any such redetermination shall be filed with the Board after the adjudication of

bankruptcy or the appointment of the receiver.’” Plains Buying & Selling Ass’n v.

Commissioner, 5 B.T.A. 1147, 1150, 1153 (1927). For purposes of this Opinion, it is

sufficient to observe that before 1928, as now, a pending bankruptcy might call for

dismissal of a deficiency case for lack of jurisdiction. See Thompson v. Commissioner,

84 T.C. 645, 648 (1985). Cases involving section 282(a) first appeared on the BTA

45 Stat. at 871, and that “[t]he legislative history of the Revenue Act of

1928 contains no discussion of the reason for the addition”. We have

found no congressional report explaining the addition, but it is not

reports’ list of cases dismissed for “Want of Jurisdiction” in 1926. See 4 B.T.A. 1303,

1307 (1926).

22 Rule 60(c) currently provides that “[t]he capacity of a corporation to engage

in such litigation shall be determined by the law under which it was organized”; but

there seems to have been no such provision in the Rules of the BTA in 1928. See 7

B.T.A. 1357–71. We are unable to find any opinion of the BTA that discusses the

capacity of a corporation to file a petition, nor any dismissal on the grounds of a

corporation’s lack of capacity. Other similar Rule 60 issues (not mentioned by

Hallmark) that involve capacity or “proper party” might result in dismissal for lack of

jurisdiction; but we find no reason to suppose that the Congress enacting section

7459(d) had in mind those relatively uncommon issues when the frequently recurring

issue of the untimely petition was staring it in the face.

23 The BTA was first “authorized to impose a fee in an amount not in excess of

$10 to be fixed by the Board for the filing of any petition” in section 1000 of the Revenue

Act of 1926, 44 Stat. at 106 (adding section 904 to the Revenue Act of 1924); and BTA

Rule 8 thereafter provided: “A fee of $10 is hereby imposed for the filing . . . of any

petition. No such petition may be filed until such fee is paid to the Board, nor will the

filing of any petition be antedated to a time prior to the payment of such fee.” 7 B.T.A.

1360. (Current Rule 20(d) includes no such provision as to “antedat[ing]”.) After the

imposition of the filing fee, the BTA did not characterize non-payment of the filing fee

as a “Want of Jurisdiction” issue on its lists of dismissed cases but rather presumably

included such cases in the general category of “Appeals Dismissed for Failure to File

Petition in Accordance with Rules of Practice” that had appeared at the beginning. See

1 B.T.A. 1267, 1275. Similar to section 904 as added in 1926, modern section 7451(a)

“authorize[s]” the Tax Court “to impose a fee” but does not require it, so the Court’s

acceptance of late payment is within its discretion.

24 Hallmark refers here to the circumstance, as in Anderson v. Commissioner,

11 T.C. 841, 843 (1948), in which

on the date of the mailing of the letter purporting to be a notice of

deficiency, it appears that the tax there involved had already been

paid, it must be held that the letter was not a valid notice of deficiency

within the definition of the Internal Revenue Code. The inescapable

prerequisite of our jurisdiction is consequently lacking. Accordingly,

. . . this [p]roceeding is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

(Citation omitted.) Congress later clarified that this jurisdictional problem does not

exist where the tax is paid after the notice of deficiency is issued, when it provided in

section 6213(b)(4): “In any case where such amount is paid after the mailing of a notice

of deficiency under section 6212, such payment shall not deprive the Tax Court of

jurisdiction over such deficiency . . . .” This provision expressly presumes that, by the

prior operation of section 6213(a), the Tax Court has “jurisdiction over such deficiency”

and provides that any payment will not “deprive the Tax Court of jurisdiction”; and

the enactment of this provision as a subsection of section 6213 confirms that

jurisdiction is established there.

difficult to reconstruct the relevant history. In 1924 the BTA began

resolving cases, and it construed its deficiency statute—“Within 60 days

after such notice [of deficiency] is mailed the taxpayer may file an appeal

with the Board of Tax Appeals”, section 274(a)—to require dismissal, for

lack of jurisdiction, of an untimely petition:

[I]nasmuch as the Revenue Act of 1924 contains no

indication that Congress had any intention of permitting

any extension of the 60 days within which to file an appeal,

this Board is without power to grant an extension of the

time. The language of the Act is inflexible and upon it

depends the jurisdiction of the Board.

Satovsky, 1 B.T.A. at 24. The point here is not that the BTA’s opinion

was correct (we believe it was) but simply that this was the announced

view of the BTA. That view was announced repeatedly over the ensuing

years in opinions, see infra Appendix, and also in orders of dismissal:

Starting with the first volume, the United States Board of Tax

Appeals Reports included at the back an appendix listing “Appeals

Dismissed or Otherwise Disposed of”, in which the first category was

cases dismissed for “Want of Jurisdiction”.

Four jurisdictional

subcategories were listed: “(A) Appeals Not Based Upon Statutory

Determination by Commissioner”, “(B) Appeals Not Filed Within

Statutory Period”, “(C) Appeals Involving Taxes Paid”, and “(D) Appeals

Involving Taxes Not Within Jurisdiction”. 25 That is, from the very

beginning, the BTA dismissed for lack of “jurisdiction” cases that lacked

a valid NOD (its subcategories (A) and (C)) or lacked a timely petition

(its subcategory (B)).

Beginning with 4 B.T.A., an additional

jurisdictional subcategory was added: “Appeals Dismissed under Section

282(a), Revenue Act of 1926” (a bankruptcy provision). That was the

BTA’s situation in 1926 when Congress added to the Revenue Act of

1924 the first predecessor of section 7459(d) as then-section 906(c), see

Revenue Act of 1926, § 1000, 44 Stat. at 107, which provided:

has been filed by the taxpayer, a decision of the Board

dismissing the proceeding shall, for the purposes of this

25 See 1 B.T.A. 1267–71; see also 2 B.T.A. 1333–35; 3 B.T.A. 1367–74; 4 B.T.A.

1303–07; 5 B.T.A. 1297–301; 6 B.T.A. 1385–87; 7 B.T.A. 1333–35; 8 B.T.A. 1303–04; 9

B.T.A. 1419–20; 10 B.T.A. 1417–18; 11 B.T.A. 1433–35; 12 B.T.A. 1445–47; 13 B.T.A.

1391–93. Beginning with 5 B.T.A., the word “Appeals” in the subcategories was

changed to “Proceedings”.

title and of the Revenue Act of 1926, be considered as its

decision that the deficiency is the amount determined by

the Commissioner. An order specifying such amount shall

be entered in the records of the Board unless the Board can

not determine such amount from the pleadings.

This provision required merits determinations for dismissals (and did

not include the exception “or unless the dismissal is for lack of

jurisdiction”). As we would apply section 7459(d) today, the BTA applied

section 906(c) after its initial enactment, as illustrated in Appeal of

Pennock, 4 B.T.A. 1271, 1271 (1926), where no jurisdictional defect was

alleged: “In view of the lack of evidence to support the petitioner’s

allegations, we must dismiss the appeal under the provisions of section

906(c) of the Revenue Act of 1924, as amended by section 1000 of the

Revenue Act of 1926.” Presumably, the “decision” document in Pennock

sustained the amount set out in the notice of deficiency.

However, a wrinkle arising from section 906(c) had appeared in

Appeal of United Paper Co., 4 B.T.A. 257 (1926), in which the taxpayer

had filed before 1926 an untimely petition that had not yet been

dismissed at the time section 906(c) was enacted. The taxpayer cited

section 906(c) to argue that, even if its not-yet-dismissed petition was

untimely and must now be dismissed, “the Board must, under section

906(c) . . . , enter an order specifying the deficiency to be the amount

determined by the Commissioner.” Id. at 258. United Paper was

therefore an occasion for the BTA to remark on the form that dismissals

take, and on the distinction that ought to be made between dismissals

where an amount of deficiency should or should not be stated:

The petition not having been filed within the time

prescribed by subdivision (a) of section 274 of the Revenue

Act of 1924, it seems clear that there has been no appeal,

taken under that section. At the time the petition was filed

the Board had no jurisdiction to hear and determine any

issue, and without such jurisdiction the filing of the

petition can not constitute an appeal to the Board. An act

has been performed which has no validity or significance.

....

. . . Necessarily the Board has the power to

determine whether jurisdiction exists and, if not, to make

an appropriate record of its determination. This has

customarily taken the form of an order. While in form a

dismissal, the order is in effect a determination that no

appeal has been taken, and there can be no jurisdiction

even to dismiss the appeal in the sense in which dismissal

is used in the statute [i.e., in section 906(c), now section

7459(d)]. In those cases where the Board determines that it

has no jurisdiction of the appeal, it does not provide in its

order that the deficiency is the amount determined by the

Commissioner.

United Paper, 4 B.T.A. at 258 (emphasis added).

That is,

notwithstanding section 906(c), the BTA continued to follow its practice

as to untimely petitions—dismissing them for lack of jurisdiction and

without a statement of a deficiency amount—though that practice was

not explicitly warranted in section 906(c) as originally enacted.

In conformity with the BTA’s practice described in United Paper,

Congress amended the statute in 1928 by adding to section 906(c) (now

section 7459(d)) the now-familiar phrase:

has been filed by the taxpayer, a decision of the Board

dismissing the proceeding shall be considered as its

decision that the deficiency is the amount determined by

the Commissioner. An order specifying such amount shall

be entered in the records of the Board unless the Board can

not determine such amount from the record in the

proceeding, or unless the dismissal is for lack of

jurisdiction.

Revenue Act of 1928, § 601, 45 Stat. at 871–72 (emphasis added). To

construe the phrase “for lack of jurisdiction”, we need to know: What

“jurisdiction[al]” circumstances did Congress address in making this

amendment in 1928? The obvious answer is that Congress addressed

the very circumstance that the BTA had described in United Paper—i.e.,

“the Board determines that it has no jurisdiction” because “[t]he petition

[was] not . . . filed within the time prescribed”. We find no BTA opinion

discussing the issue of sustaining a deficiency in a jurisdictional

dismissal in connection with any jurisdictional issue other than the

untimeliness of a petition (as in United Paper). With reasonable

confidence we also impute to Congress the knowledge that, as the BTA

had reported since 1924, it was dismissing for “want of jurisdiction”

where there was no valid NOD. We see no reason to suppose that

Congress ignored the actual activity of the BTA, left unsolved the

timeliness-related conundrum described in United Paper, and instead

amended the statute to address as-yet-unrealized difficulties in future

cases that might involve lack of corporate capacity. We do see, in the

BTA’s appendices, dismissals for lack of jurisdiction because of pending

bankruptcies and because taxes not assigned to the BTA were

petitioned, and those dismissals, too, would fall within the “lack of

jurisdiction” exception of section 906(c). That these, too, involve “lack of

jurisdiction” does not at all undermine the obvious congressional intent

to address, as cases involving “lack of jurisdiction”, those that were being

dismissed because they lacked the prerequisites of section 274(c) (now

section 6213(a)), i.e., a valid NOD and—as in United Paper—a timely

petition.

Section 906(c) was reenacted in 1939, 1954, and 1986. Congress

took this repeated action against the backdrop of caselaw uniformly

interpreting the deadline to file a deficiency petition to be jurisdictional,

as we now show.

The historical treatment of section 6213 by Congress and

the circuit courts of appeals further indicates that the

deadline for filing a deficiency case is jurisdictional.

According to the Supreme Court, “[w]hen ‘a long line of this

Court’s decisions left undisturbed by Congress,’ . . . has treated a similar

requirement as ‘jurisdictional,’ we will presume that Congress intended

to follow that course.” Henderson, 562 U.S. at 436 (quoting Union Pac.

R.R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng’rs & Trainmen Gen. Comm.

of Adjustment, Cent. Region, 558 U.S. 67, 82 (2009)). This statement

describes the traditional tool of statutory construction known as the

“prior-construction canon.” 26 If a statute is reenacted using words or

phrases that have already received authoritative construction by the

highest court in a jurisdiction, or have been uniformly construed by

26 See generally Scalia & Garner, supra, at 325 (“The criterion ought to be

whether the uniform weight of authority is significant enough that the bar can

justifiably regard the point as settled law”.). But see id. at 326 (“[W]e emphasize that

this canon applies only to presumed legislative approval of prior judicial or

administrative interpretations in statutes adopted after those interpretations. The

mere failure of a legislature to correct extant lower-court, intermediate-court, or

agency interpretations is not, in our view, a sound basis for believing that the

legislature has ‘adopted’ them. The bar may well have relied on those interpretations,

but until they have been approved by the jurisdiction’s highest court or implicitly

adopted in a subsequent statute, they are not the law” (footnotes omitted)).

inferior courts or the responsible agency, then the later version of that

statute preserving the wording is presumed to carry forward that

interpretation, and they are to be understood according to that

construction. See, e.g., Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 645 (1998)

(citing an “unwavering line of administrative and judicial

interpretation” that included no Supreme Court opinions, and holding,

“[w]hen administrative and judicial interpretations have settled the

meaning of an existing statutory provision, repetition of the same

language in a new statute indicates, as a general matter, the intent to

incorporate its administrative and judicial interpretations as well”);

Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 16 (1948) (“In adopting the

language used in the earlier act, Congress ‘must be considered to have

adopted also the construction given by this Court to such language, and

made it part of the enactment’” (quoting Hecht v. Malley, 265 U.S. 144,

153 (1924))).

Over nearly a hundred years of reenactments and amendments of

section 6213(a), Congress has left substantially unchanged the wording

of its jurisdictional grant, and Congress’s additions to section 6213(a)

have clarified that its deadline is jurisdictional. The deadline to file a

deficiency case has been uniformly construed as jurisdictional not only

by the Tax Court and its predecessors but also by the circuit courts of

appeals. The appendix attached to this Opinion includes a chronological

listing of each enactment, reenactment, and amendment, relevant

legislative history, and citations of caselaw, in order to demonstrate the

volume of uniform, uncontradicted authority. We begin at the origin of

deficiency litigation in the BTA.

The Revenue Act of 1924

The predecessor to section 6213 is section 274 of the Revenue Act

of 1924, § 274, 43 Stat. at 297, which provided:

Sec. 274. (a) If, in the case of any taxpayer, the

Commissioner determines that there is a deficiency in

respect of the tax imposed by this title [i.e., Title II.—

Income Tax], the taxpayer, except as provided in

subdivision (d) [regarding jeopardy assessment and

collection], shall be notified of such deficiency by registered

mail, but such deficiency shall be assessed only as

hereinafter provided. Within 60 days after such notice is

mailed the taxpayer may file an appeal with the Board of

Tax Appeals established by section 900.

....

Board within the time prescribed in subdivision (a) of this

section [i.e., 60 days], the deficiency of which the taxpayer

has been notified shall be assessed, and shall be paid upon

notice and demand from the collector.

(Emphasis added.) Thereafter the inaugural BTA decisions interpreted

this provision as requiring a taxpayer to timely file a petition in order to

confer upon the BTA jurisdiction over that case. See Satovsky, 1 B.T.A.

at 24 (“[W]e are of the opinion that, inasmuch as the Revenue Act of

1924 contains no indication that Congress had any intention of

permitting any extension of the 60 days within which to file an appeal,

this Board is without power to grant an extension of the time. The

language of the Act is inflexible and upon it depends the jurisdiction of

the Board” (emphasis added)); see also Appeal of Hatch & Bailey Co.,

1 B.T.A. 25, 26 (1924); Appeal of William Frantze & Co., 1 B.T.A. 26

(1924); Appeal of Hurst, Anthony & Watkins, 1 B.T.A. 26, 27 (1924);

Appeal of Strutwear Knitting Co., 1 B.T.A. 41, 41 (1924); Appeal of B.B.

Davis & Co., 1 B.T.A. 587, 587 (1925); Appeal of Matteson Co., 1 B.T.A.

905, 905–06 (1925); Appeal of Eastman Gardiner Naval Stores Co.,

4 B.T.A. 242, 245 (1926).

The Revenue Act of 1926

Against the backdrop of that caselaw, Congress enacted the

Revenue Act of 1926, § 274(c), 44 Stat. at 55–56, which amended section

274 by adding “(not counting Sunday as the sixtieth day)”, thereby

giving taxpayers marginal protection at the deadline by exempting

Sunday from being the final day. This amendment shows Congress’s

intention that the expiration of the deadline to file a deficiency petition

continue to be significant, because it left unchanged subsection (c),

providing that “[i]f the taxpayer does not file a petition with the Board

within the time prescribed in subdivision (a) of this section [i.e., 60

days], the deficiency, notice of which has been mailed to the taxpayer,

shall be assessed”.

The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit was the

first circuit court of appeals to decide whether the deadline to file a

deficiency case is jurisdictional. In Lewis-Hall Iron Works v. Blair, 23

F.2d 972, 974 (D.C. Cir. 1928), cert. denied, 277 U.S. 592, the D.C.

Circuit held:

[T]he Board’s decision dismissing the petition was correct,

for the requirement that such petitions shall be filed within

60 days after the mailing of notice of the deficiency, is

statutory and jurisdictional and is not merely procedural.

Revenue Act of 1926, Sec. 274(a). The Board, therefore,

was without jurisdiction to hear the petition.

See also Chambers v. Lucas, 41 F.2d 299, 300 (D.C. Cir. 1930).

The Revenue Act of 1934

By 1934, the BTA was 10 years old, and at that time (as

thereafter) the jurisprudence was unanimous that the deficiency case

deadline is jurisdictional. Section 274 was renumbered section 272 in

the Revenue Act of 1934, § 272, 48 Stat. 680, 741, wherein Congress

extended the filing deadline in subsection (a) from 60 days to “[w]ithin

90 days after such notice is mailed (not counting Sunday or a legal

holiday in the District of Columbia as the ninetieth day)”. Congress

therefore sought to give taxpayers more time within which to file a

deficiency petition, and it provided an additional marginal extension of

the deadline by exempting Sundays and federal holidays from being the

final day. But despite the enhanced protections granted to taxpayers in

subsection (a), Congress did not amend subsection (c), which still

provided that “[i]f the taxpayer does not file a petition with the Board

within the time prescribed in subsection (a) of this section, the

deficiency, notice of which has been mailed to the taxpayer, shall be

assessed”.

Thereafter, the Fifth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits joined the D.C.

Circuit and the BTA in holding the timely filing of a deficiency petition

to be a jurisdictional requirement. See Poyner v. Commissioner, 81 F.2d

521, 522 (5th Cir. 1936); Cont’l Petroleum Co. v. United States, 87 F.2d

91, 94 (10th Cir. 1936); Edward Barron Estate Co. v. Commissioner, 93

F.2d 751, 753 (9th Cir. 1937).

The Internal Revenue Code of 1939

Congress’s enactment of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, ch. 2,

§ 272, 53 Stat. 1, 82, was a milestone for the U.S. tax system. The 1939

Code retained the text of section 272 verbatim. And thereafter the

Tenth and D.C. Circuits followed their precedents and continued to

interpret the deficiency case deadline to be a jurisdictional requirement.

See Ryan v. Alexander, 118 F.2d 744, 750 (10th Cir. 1941); Stebbins’

Estate v. Helvering, 121 F.2d 892, 894 (D.C. Cir. 1941), aff’g 40 B.T.A.

613 (1939).

The Revenue Act of 1942

In the Revenue Act of 1942, §§ 168, 504, 56 Stat. 798, 876, 957,

Congress renamed the BTA as the Tax Court of the United States and

again modified the deficiency case deadline—but otherwise left section

272 unchanged. The Act added the following to section 272: “If the

notice is addressed to a person outside the States of the Union and the

District of Columbia, the period specified in this paragraph shall be one

hundred and fifty days in lieu of ninety days.” Congress thus granted to

a specific class of taxpayers—i.e., those outside of the country—

additional time to file a deficiency petition to ensure those taxpayers had

adequate time in which to do so. Congress did not amend subsection (c),

which continued to provide that a deficiency would be assessed “[i]f the

taxpayer does not file a petition with the Board within the time

prescribed”.

Thereafter, the Third and Sixth Circuits joined the Fifth, Ninth,

Tenth, and D.C. Circuits (as well as the BTA) in holding that the timely

filing of a petition is a jurisdictional requirement. See Commissioner v.

Rosenheim, 132 F.2d at 679–80; Worthington v. Commissioner, 211 F.2d

131, 131–32 (6th Cir. 1954) (per curiam).

The 1945 International Organizations Immunities

Act

In 1945, after more than 20 years of deficiency litigation,

Congress amended section 272(a)(1) to include Saturday in the days

exempt from being “the ninetieth day”. International Organizations

Immunities Act of 1945, § 203, 59 Stat. at 673. Once again, Congress

marginally extended the taxpayers’ deadline but otherwise left

subsections (a) and (c) unchanged.

Thereafter, the Second Circuit joined the Third, Fifth, Sixth,

Ninth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits (as well as the BTA) in holding that the

timely filing of a deficiency petition is a jurisdictional requirement. See

Mindell v. Commissioner, 200 F.2d 38, 39 (2d Cir. 1952). And the Third,

Sixth, and Ninth Circuits followed their precedents in continuing to

construe the deficiency case deadline as jurisdictional. See Di Prospero

v. Commissioner, 176 F.2d 76, 77 (9th Cir. 1949), Cent. Paper Co. v.

Commissioner, 199 F.2d 902, 903 (6th Cir. 1952), Drouin v.

Commissioner, 203 F.2d 953 (3d Cir. 1953) (per curiam).

The Internal Revenue Code of 1954

The enactment of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, ch. 736,

§ 6213, 68A Stat. 3, 771, was another major development in U.S. tax

law. Congress renumbered section 272 as section 6213, with revisions

not material to our subject (which numbering persists today). Section

6213 provided:

Sec. 6213. Restrictions Applicable to Deficiencies; Petition

to Tax Court.

(a) Time for filing petition and restriction on

assessment.—Within 90 days, or 150 days if the notice is

addressed to a person outside the States of the Union and

the District of Columbia, after the notice of deficiency

authorized in section 6212 is mailed (not counting

Saturday, Sunday, or a legal holiday in the District of

Columbia as the last day), the taxpayer may file a petition

with the Tax Court for a redetermination of the

deficiency. . . .

....

file a petition with the Tax Court within the time

prescribed in subsection (a), the deficiency, notice of which

has been mailed to the taxpayer, shall be assessed, and

shall be paid upon notice and demand from the Secretary

or his delegate.

That is, Congress substantially retained the statutory text—“Within 90

days . . . after the notice of deficiency authorized in section 6212 is

mailed . . . , the taxpayer may file a petition with the Tax Court”—that

for three decades had been construed as jurisdictional. Thereafter the

Second, Third, Fifth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits followed and affirmed

their precedents interpreting the deadline for filing a deficiency petition

to be a requirement to confer jurisdiction on the Tax Court. See

Underwriters, Inc. v. Commissioner, 215 F.2d 953, 954 (3d Cir. 1954)

(per curiam); Galvin v. Commissioner, 239 F.2d 166, 166 (2d Cir. 1956)

(per curiam); Rich v. Commissioner, 250 F.2d 170, 175 (5th Cir. 1957)

(Johnsen, J., concurring in part); Teel v. Commissioner, 248 F.2d 749,

751 (10th Cir. 1957), aff’g 27 T.C. 375 (1956); DeWelles v. United States,

378 F.2d 37, 39 (9th Cir. 1967).

The Tax Reform Act of 1969

When Congress established the Tax Court as an Article I court in

1969, it did not amend section 6213. Thereafter, the Tax Court

promulgated Rule 13 of its Rules of Practice and Procedure—

“Jurisdiction”—providing that “[i]n all cases, the jurisdiction of the

Court also depends on the timely filing of a petition. See Code Sections

6213, 7502.” Rule 13(b), 60 T.C. 1057, 1072. This rule followed the

uniform body of precedent since 1924.

Thereafter, the Eighth and Eleventh 27 Circuits joined the Second,

Third, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits, as well as the BTA

and the Tax Court, in holding the timely filing of a deficiency petition to

be a jurisdictional requirement. See Andrews v. Commissioner, 563 F.2d

365, 366 (8th Cir. 1977); Pugsley v. Commissioner, 749 F.2d 691, 692

(11th Cir. 1985). And the Second, Fifth, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits

followed their precedents to the same effect.

See DiViaio v.

Commissioner, 539 F.2d 231, 234 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Shipley v.

Commissioner, 572 F.2d 212, 213 (9th Cir. 1977), aff’g T.C. Memo.

1976-383; Johnson v. Commissioner, 611 F.2d 1015, 1018 (5th Cir.

1980), rev’g T.C. Memo. 1977-382; Tadros v. Commissioner, 763 F.2d 89,

91 (2d Cir. 1985).

The Tax Reform Act of 1986

When Congress passed significant amendments to the Code

resulting in the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, it reenacted section

6213 as it had appeared in the 1954 Code, without amendment. The

Second, Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits continued to hold that the

timely filing of a deficiency case is a jurisdictional requirement. See

Mulder v. Commissioner, 855 F.2d 208, 210–11 (5th Cir. 1988), rev’g T.C.

Memo. 1987-363; Hoffenberg v. Commissioner, 905 F.2d 665, 666 (2d Cir.

1990) (per curiam), aff’g T.C. Memo. 1989-676; Patmon & Young Prof.

Corp. v. Commissioner, 55 F.3d 216, 217 (6th Cir. 1995), aff’g T.C. Memo.

1993-143; Correia v. Commissioner, 58 F.3d 468, 469 (9th Cir. 1995) (per

curiam).

27 On October 14, 1981, the Fifth Circuit was divided into the Fifth Circuit and

newly formed Eleventh Circuit. See Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization Act

of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-452, 94 Stat. 1994.

10.

The Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and

Reform Act of 1998

The most recent amendment to section 6213(a) was in 1998, when

Congress directed that “[t]he Secretary of the Treasury or the

Secretary’s delegate shall include on each notice of deficiency under

section 6212 . . . the date determined by such Secretary (or delegate) as

the last day on which the taxpayer may file a petition with the Tax

Court”, and amended section 6213(a) “by adding at the end the following

new sentence: ‘Any petition filed with the Tax Court on or before the last

date specified for filing such petition by the Secretary in the notice of

deficiency shall be treated as timely filed.’” Internal Revenue Service

Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, § 3463, 112 Stat. at 767. This

amendment of section 6213(a) is particularly telling of Congress’s

intention that the Tax Court not have jurisdiction over late-filed

deficiency petitions. Congress left unchanged the text that had been

construed as jurisdictional, ensured by its amendment that the taxpayer

would be made aware of the date of expiration of the deadline for filing

a deficiency case, and clarified that a petition filed on that stated date

would be timely.

The legislative history 28 of this amendment gives useful

information about Congress’s awareness and understanding of the state

of the law on the issue of the 90-day rule as jurisdictional. The

conference report gave the following explanation:

Present Law

Taxpayers must file a petition with the Tax Court

within 90 days after the deficiency notice is mailed (150

days if the person is outside the United States) (sec. 6213).

28 As we noted above, the Supreme Court held in Henderson, 562 U.S. at 436

(quoting Union Pac. R.R. Co., 558 U.S. at 82), that “[w]hen ‘a long line of this Court’s

decisions left undisturbed by Congress,’ . . . has treated a similar requirement as

‘jurisdictional,’ we will presume that Congress intended to follow that course.”

(Emphasis added.) We consult the legislative history of the 1998 amendment, quoted

in text above, because it enables us to presume not carelessly but reasonably that

Congress intended to leave undisturbed the courts’ unanimous consensus that “[i]f the

petition is not filed within that time period, the Tax Court does not have jurisdiction

to consider the petition.” H.R. Rep. 105-599, at 289 (1998) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in

1998-3 C.B. 747, 1043; H.R. Rep. 105-364, pt.1, at 71 (1997), as reprinted in 1998-3

C.B. 373, 443.

If the petition is not filed within that time period, the Tax

Court does not have jurisdiction to consider the petition.

H.R. Rep. No. 105-599, at 289 (emphasis added); H.R. Rep. No. 105-364,

pt. 1, at 71 (emphasis added). By this amendment to section 6213(a),

Congress communicated to taxpayers that the last day to file a

deficiency petition is indeed the last day, thereby indicating—against

the backdrop of explicitly observed “Present Law”—that the deadline is

imbued with jurisdictional significance and is exempt from equitable

exceptions.

Since then, the Seventh Circuit (applying the Supreme Court’s

clear-statement rule) has joined the Second, Third, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth,

Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits, as well as the BTA and the

Tax Court, in holding the timely filing of a deficiency petition to be a

jurisdictional requirement. See Tilden v. Commissioner, 846 F.3d 882,

886–87 (7th Cir. 2017), rev’g and remanding T.C. Memo. 2015-188. And

the Fifth, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits continued to so hold. See Rochelle v.

Commissioner, 293 F.3d 740, 741 (5th Cir. 2002) (per curiam), aff’g 116

T.C. 356 (2001); Edwards v. Commissioner, 791 F.3d 1, 4 (D.C. Cir.

2015); Elings v. Commissioner, 324 F.3d at 1112; see also Organic

Cannabis Found., LLC v. Commissioner, 962 F.3d 1082, 1092–93 (9th

Cir. 2020) (applying the clear statement rule to section 6213(a) and

concluding that its deadline is jurisdictional).

11.

Summary

This history of reenactments of and amendments to section

6213(a) demonstrates that Congress’s intention is to provide an

adequate but strict timeframe within which a taxpayer may file a

deficiency petition in the Tax Court. Congress has given taxpayers

certain liberalizing adjustments to the last day of the deadline but has

also made clear the deadline’s finality. Furthermore, section 6213(c),

providing that “[i]f the taxpayer does not file a petition with the Tax

Court within the time prescribed in subsection (a), the deficiency . . .

shall be assessed, and shall be paid upon notice and demand”, has

remained constant. 29 This historical treatment of section 6213 reflects

29 In balancing the rights of taxpayers and the interests of the Government in

revenue, Congress designed the taxpayer’s opportunity for filing a deficiency petition

to close, after which the Tax Court cannot take jurisdiction over the deficiency. Section

6213(c) thus explicitly incorporates the deadline of subsection (a) and provides for the

mandatory assessment of the deficiency by operation of statute. The taxpayer’s

an intention of Congress, remarkably persistent over the past century,

that, in balancing the rights of the taxpayer and the interests of the

Government, the deficiency assessment regime give the taxpayer an

adequate time within which to file a deficiency petition, but that (1) a

taxpayer’s failure to do so within the prescribed time will foreclose the

opportunity to litigate his deficiency before the Tax Court, (2) the

deficiency not timely petitioned will be assessed so that the IRS may

begin collection, and (3) the taxpayer’s remaining remedy is to pay the

assessment and sue for a refund. 30

Consistent with that regime, the Tax Court and the circuit courts

of appeals 31 have expressly and uniformly treated the deadline of section

6213 as jurisdictional.

Congress—presumptively aware of this

treatment by the courts—has preserved the operative text in section

6213 through every reenactment and amendment, thereby carrying

forward that interpretation. The 90-day deadline of section 6213(a) is

therefore, as in Bowles, a limitation imposed by Congress for access to

courts which has been uniformly construed and enforced as such for a

“century’s worth of precedent and practice in American courts.” Bowles,

551 U.S. at 209 n.2; see also John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States,

552 U.S. 130, 139 (2008) (“[S]tare decisis in respect to statutory

opportunity ends because the deficiency “shall be assessed”. It becomes no longer a

deficiency but now a liability for which the IRS may issue notice and demand for

payment. Section 6213(c) reflects Congress’s decision that the IRS must be able to

reliably discern when the legal requirements for assessment have been met and

collection may begin. Accord Robinson v. United States, 920 F.2d 1157, 1158 (3d Cir.

1990); Abrams v. Commissioner, 787 F.2d at 942.

Because the assessment procedure was created to advance the critical

interests of the Government in collecting the tax revenue, it follows “that Congress

decided to pay the price of occasional unfairness in individual cases (penalizing a

taxpayer whose claim is unavoidably delayed) in order to maintain a more workable

tax enforcement system.” See Brockamp, 519 U.S. at 352–53 (construing as

jurisdictional the refund limitations of section 6511).

31 The First and Fourth Circuits have not so held in published, precedential

opinions, but both have acquiesced in unpublished decisions. See, e.g., Hansen v.

Commissioner, 201 F.3d 427 (1st Cir. 1998) (unpublished table decision) (per curiam);

Thomas v. Commissioner, 194 F.3d 1305 (unpublished table decision) (4th Cir. 1999);

Briley v. Commissioner, 622 F. App’x 305 (4th Cir. 2015) (per curiam). The Supreme

Court has not addressed the issue but has denied a writ of certiorari in (by our count)

five cases presenting the issue. See, e.g., Lewis-Hall Iron Works, 23 F.2d 972, cert.

denied, 277 U.S. 592 (1928); Cont’l Petroleum Co., 87 F.2d 91, cert. denied, 300 U.S.

679 (1937); Ryan, 118 F.2d 744, cert. denied, 314 U.S. 622 (1941); Delman v.

Commissioner, 384 F.2d 929 (3d Cir. 1967), aff’g T.C. Memo. 1966-59, cert. denied, 390

U.S. 952 (1968); Organic Cannabis Found., LLC v. Commissioner, 962 F.3d 1082, cert.

denied, 141 S. Ct. 2596 (2021).

interpretation has ‘special force,’ for ‘Congress remains free to alter

what we have done.’ Additionally, Congress has long acquiesced in the

interpretation we have given” (quoting Patterson v. McLean Credit

Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989)) (citations omitted)); cf. Boechler, P.C. v.

Commissioner, 142 S. Ct. at 1500 (“[N]o such long line of authority exists

here” (quoting Fort Bend Cnty. v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 1843, 1849 (2019))).

III.

Hallmark’s remaining arguments that the deadline of section 6213

is non-jurisdictional are unavailing.

Section 6214(a) does not confer deficiency jurisdiction but

rather supplements the jurisdiction conferred by section

6213(a).

Hallmark argues that “[t]he jurisdictional grant for deficiency

suits is in section 6214(a).” If correct, this would locate the grant of

jurisdiction in a statute different from the statute that sets the 90-day

deadline, making it easier to argue that the deadline itself is not

jurisdictional. Section 6214 provides (in part):

Sec. 6214.

Determinations by Tax Court.

(a) Jurisdiction as to increase of deficiency,

additional amounts, or additions to the tax.—Except as

provided by section 7463, the Tax Court shall have

jurisdiction to redetermine the correct amount of the

deficiency even if the amount so redetermined is greater

than the amount of the deficiency, notice of which has been

mailed to the taxpayer, and to determine whether any

additional amount, or any addition to the tax should be

assessed, if claim therefor is asserted by the Secretary at

or before the hearing or a rehearing.

(b) Jurisdiction over other years and quarters.—The

Tax Court in redetermining a deficiency of income tax for

any taxable year or of gift tax for any calendar year or

calendar quarter shall consider such facts with relation to

the taxes for other years or calendar quarters as may be

necessary correctly to redetermine the amount of such

deficiency, but in so doing shall have no jurisdiction to

determine whether or not the tax for any other year or

calendar quarter has been overpaid or underpaid.

Notwithstanding the preceding sentence, the Tax Court

may apply the doctrine of equitable recoupment to the

same extent that it is available in civil tax cases before the

district courts of the United States and the United States

Court of Federal Claims.

(Emphasis added.) According to Hallmark, “[s]ection 6214(a) derives

from language originally appearing in section[] 274(a) [sic] (for income

tax) . . . of the Revenue Act of 1926”, and “[i]t was in 1926 that Congress

first used the word ‘jurisdiction’ in connection with the Board of Tax

Appeals.” Hallmark argues that section 6214(a), rather than section

6213(a), is the jurisdictional grant to the Tax Court over deficiency cases

because it explicitly mentions jurisdiction, whereas “[s]ection 6213(a)’s

first sentence (which contains the filing deadline) does not even use the

word ‘jurisdiction’.” Hallmark reasons that, because section 6214(a) is

the jurisdictional grant for deficiency cases, and because it does not

“refer to the 90-day deadline or to section 6213(a)”, then the deadline of

section 6213(a) is not jurisdictional because “[t]he remaining sentences

in section 6213(a) do nothing to ‘connect’ this 90-day filing period to the

jurisdictional grant contained in section 6214.”

We do not agree. Hallmark’s interpretation is both historically

and contextually inaccurate. Hallmark is correct in observing that the

origins of section 6214(a) trace back to section 274 of the Revenue Act of

1926, 44 Stat. at 56, though the predecessor is subsection (e) (rather

than subsection (a)), which provided:

(e) The Board shall have jurisdiction to redetermine

the correct amount of the deficiency even if the amount so

redetermined is greater than the amount of the deficiency,

notice of which has been mailed to the taxpayer, and to

determine whether any penalty, additional amount or

addition to the tax should be assessed, if claim therefor is

asserted by the Commissioner at or before the hearing or a

rehearing.

To resolve the relationship of section 6213(a) (former section 274(a)) to

section 6214(a) (former section 274(e)), we previously considered the

history of these statutes in Estate of Young v. Commissioner, 81 T.C.

879, 884–86 (1983), and we concluded as follows:

The origin of this Court lies in the Revenue Act of 1924,

which established the Board of Tax Appeals. That act gave

the Board jurisdiction to redetermine deficiencies

determined by the Commissioner in a statutory notice.

However, it did not give the Board jurisdiction to

redetermine a deficiency greater than that determined by

the Commissioner in the statutory notice.

Such

jurisdiction was given to the Board by section 274(e) of the

Revenue Act of 1926 [now section 6214(a)] . . . . We think it

is clear that section 274(e) [now section 6214(a)] was

intended to cure a previous defect in this Court’s

jurisdiction so that the Commissioner’s ultimate

determination of a deficiency in such tax and additions to

tax as were the proper subjects of a statutory notice could

be resolved in one proceeding before this Court without the

need for the issuance of an additional notice. . . .

In view of the foregoing, we think that the

jurisdiction conferred by section 6214(a) is merely

complementary to the jurisdiction conferred by section

6213. . . .

Our conclusion that section 6214(a) does not provide

an independent basis for the exercise of jurisdiction . . . is

also supported by the fact that section 274(e) of the

Revenue Act of 1926 was enacted two years after the Board

of Tax Appeals was created. As previously stated, section

900(e) of the Revenue Act of 1924 gave the Board

jurisdiction to redetermine a deficiency determined by the

Commissioner in a statutory notice. . . . Thus, if section

274(e) of the Revenue Act of 1926 were viewed as providing

an independent basis for the exercise of jurisdiction, it

would be mere surplusage because such jurisdiction had

already been granted by section [274(a)] of the Revenue Act

of 1924.

(Citations and footnote omitted.) Former section 274(e) (now section

6214(a)) was enacted to supplement the jurisdictional grant in former

section 274(a) (now section 6213(a)) by specifying that the Tax Court, in

exercise of its de novo redetermination of a deficiency for a particular

year, may redetermine an amount greater than what is asserted in the

notice of deficiency. The fundamental grant of deficiency jurisdiction is

in section 6213(a).

The courts that have considered our deficiency jurisdiction have

been correct in holding that it is derived from section 6213(a), not section

6214.

Section 6213(a) does not “closely resemble” section

6330(d)(1).

In Boechler the Supreme Court rejected the analogy

of section 6330(d)(1) to section 6213(a).

Hallmark argues that “the [Supreme] Court’s reasoning in

Boechler compels the conclusion that the 90-day filing deadline in

section 6213(a) for deficiency cases is not jurisdictional, and thus is

subject to equitable tolling” because “the Boechler opinion’s analysis of

Section 6330(d)(1), a provision that closely resembles section 6213(a),

undermines the Organic Cannabis interpretation of section 6213(a).”

However, just as the Commissioner failed in his argument for a

jurisdictional reading of section 6330(d)(1) by way of its supposed

similarities to section 6213(a) in Boechler, P.C. v. Commissioner, 142

S. Ct. at 1500, so Hallmark cannot here succeed in arguing for a nonjurisdictional reading of section 6213(a) based on its supposed

similarities to section 6330(d)(1). Boechler emphatically teaches that

these are different sections. Each must be analyzed in light of its own

text, context, and history. Under the “clear statement” rule, the

Supreme Court in Boechler analyzed the 30-day deadline for a CDP

petition under section 6330(d)(1) and held it non-jurisdictional. Under

the same rule, we have analyzed in this Opinion the 90-day deadline for

a deficiency petition under section 6213(a), and we hold it to be

jurisdictional.

The 30-day deadline of section 6330(d)(1) lacks a

history of prior judicial construction of its being

jurisdictional and lacks congressional ratification of

that construction in reenactments.

We set out in detail (in Part II.E above and in the attached

Appendix) the impressive history—almost a century long—of judicial

construction of the 90-day deadline as jurisdictional and of Congress’s

repeated perpetuation of that construction by its amendments,

reenactments, and codifications. No such history can be mustered for

the asserted jurisdictional character of the 30-day deadline in section

6330(d)(1) (a provision which has existed in the Code only since 1998,

see Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998,

§ 3401(b), 112 Stat. at 749). As the Supreme Court said, “no such ‘long

line’ of authority exists here” in connection with section 6330(d)(1).

Boechler, P.C. v. Commissioner, 142 S. Ct. at 1500.

IV.

Conclusion

Section 6213(a) clearly states that its 90-day deadline is

jurisdictional, as indicated by its text, context, and uniform treatment

during its long history. Congress has limited the Tax Court’s deficiency

jurisdiction to only those cases in which a petition is timely filed, and we

do not have authority to extend the deadline in section 6213(a) by

equitable tolling. Late-filed deficiency petitions must therefore be

dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

An appropriate order will be issued.

Reviewed by the Court.

KERRIGAN, FOLEY, GALE, PARIS, MORRISON, BUCH,

NEGA, PUGH, ASHFORD, URDA, COPELAND, JONES, TORO,

GREAVES, MARSHALL, and WEILER, JJ., agree with this opinion of

the Court.

APPENDIX

Chronological listing of

enactments, amendments, and codifications of

statutes creating deficiency procedures,

with intervening opinions of the courts,

and selected legislative history

and Rules of Practice and Procedure of the U.S. Tax Court

(with boldface added for emphasis)

Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, §§ 273(1), 274(a)–(c), 900(e), (k), 43 Stat. 253, 296, 297,

337, 338 (enacting deficiency procedures with a 60–day deadline):

Sec. 273. As used in this title the term “deficiency” means—

(1) The amount by which the tax imposed by this title [i.e., Title II.—Income

Tax] exceeds the amount shown as the tax by the taxpayer upon his return . . . .

Sec. 274. (a) If, in the case of any taxpayer, the Commissioner determines that

there is a deficiency in respect of the tax imposed by this title [i.e., Title II.—Income

Tax], the taxpayer, except as provided in subdivision (d) [regarding jeopardy

assessment and collection], shall be notified of such deficiency by registered mail, but

such deficiency shall be assessed only as hereinafter provided. Within 60 days after

such notice is mailed the taxpayer may file an appeal with the Board of Tax

Appeals established by section 900.

(b) If the Board determines that there is a deficiency, the amount so

determined shall be assessed and shall be paid upon notice and demand from the

collector. No part of the amount determined as a deficiency by the Commissioner but

disallowed as such by the Board shall be assessed, but a proceeding in court may be

begun, without assessment, for the collection of any part of the amount so

disallowed. . . .

time prescribed in subdivision (a) of this section [i.e., 60 days], the deficiency

of which the taxpayer has been notified shall be assessed, and shall be paid

upon notice and demand from the collector.

Sec. 900.

....

(e) The Board and its divisions shall hear and determine appeals filed under

sections 274, 279, 308, and 312. . . .

....

(k) . . . The Board shall be an independent agency in the executive branch of

the Government.

Subsequent Caselaw:

Appeal of Satovsky, 1 B.T.A. 22, 24 (1924) (“[I]nasmuch as the Revenue Act of 1924

contains no indication that Congress had any intention of permitting any

extension of the 60 days within which to file an appeal, this Board is without

power to grant an extension of the time. The language of the Act is inflexible

and upon it depends the jurisdiction of the Board”).

Appeal of Hatch & Bailey Co., 1 B.T.A. 25, 26 (1924) (“The power of the Board to

assume jurisdiction in a case such as this [i.e., where the petition is not filed

within 60 days] has been fully discussed in the Appeal of Sam Satovsky,

1 B.T.A., 22, and, on the authority of that case, the appeal is dismissed”).

Appeal of William Frantze & Co., 1 B.T.A. 26, 26 (1924) (“The Commissioner has moved

to dismiss the appeal in this case on the ground that it was not filed within 60

days after the mailing of the Commissioner’s notice of deficiency and that,

therefore, the Board is without jurisdiction. . . . This case comes within

the rule laid down by this Board in its decisions in the Appeal of Satovsky,

1 B.T.A., 22, and the Appeal of Hatch & Bailey Co., 1 B.T.A., 25, and on the

authority of those cases the appeal is dismissed”).

Appeal of Hurst, Anthony & Watkins, 1 B.T.A. 26, 27 (1924) (“[T]he appeal was not

filed until the sixty-first day after the notice was mailed. This, therefore,

obliges us to dismiss the appeal, upon the authority of the Appeal of Sam

Satovsky, 1 B.T.A., 22, Appeal of Hatch & Bailey Co., 1 B.T.A., 25, and Appeal

of William Frantze & Co., Inc., 1 B.T.A., 26”).

Appeal of Strutwear Knitting Co., 1 B.T.A. 41, 41 (1924) (“The petition . . . was not

received at the office of the Board of Tax Appeals in Washington until . . . 61

days after the mailing of the deficiency letter. . . . The appeal is dismissed, on

the authority of Appeal of Sam Satovsky, 1 B.T.A., 22.”).

Appeal of B. B. Davis & Co., 1 B.T.A. 587, 587 (1925) (“[T]he decision of this Board in

Satovsky’s Appeal, 1 B. T. A. 22, . . . is controlling on this point.”).

Appeal of Matteson Co., 1 B.T.A. 905, 905–06 (1925) (“[A] petition must be deposited

in the office of the Board within the time required by law in order to give the

Board jurisdiction thereof. . . . The Board has no authority to extend the period

provided by statute for the filing of an appeal whatever the equities of a

particular case may be and regardless of the cause for its not being filed within

the period required. . . . The Board, therefore, is without jurisdiction to

hear and determine the appeal . . . .”).

Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, §§ 274, 1000, 44 Stat. 9, 55–56, 105–06 (excluding

Sunday as the 60th day and enacting the predecessor of section 6214(a)):

Sec. 274. (a) If in the case of any taxpayer, the Commissioner determines that

there is a deficiency in respect of the tax imposed by this title [i.e., Title II.—Income

Tax], the Commissioner is authorized to send notice of such deficiency to the taxpayer

by registered mail. Within 60 days after such notice is mailed (not counting

Sunday as the sixtieth day), the taxpayer may file a petition with the Board

of Tax Appeals for a redetermination of the deficiency. Except as otherwise

provided in subdivision (d) or (f) of this section or in section 279, 282, or 1001, no

assessment of a deficiency in respect of the tax imposed by this title and no distraint

or proceeding in court for its collection shall be made, begun, or prosecuted until such

notice has been mailed to the taxpayer, nor until the expiration of such 60-day period,

nor, if a petition has been filed with the Board, until the decision of the Board has

become final. Notwithstanding the provisions of section 3224 of the Revised Statutes

the making of such assessment or the beginning of such proceeding or distraint during

the time such prohibition is in force may be enjoined by a proceeding in the proper

court.

(b) If the taxpayer files a petition with the Board, the entire amount

redetermined as the deficiency by the decision of the Board which has become final

shall be assessed and shall be paid upon notice and demand from the collector. No

part of the amount determined as a deficiency by the Commissioner but disallowed as

such by the decision of the Board which has become final shall be assessed or be

collected by distraint or by proceeding in court with or without assessment.

time prescribed in subdivision (a) of this section [i.e., 60 days], the deficiency,

notice of which has been mailed to the taxpayer, shall be assessed, and shall

be paid upon notice and demand from the collector.

....

(e) The Board shall have jurisdiction to redetermine the correct amount of the

deficiency even if the amount so redetermined is greater than the amount of the

deficiency, notice of which has been mailed to the taxpayer, and to determine whether

any penalty, additional amount or addition to the tax should be assessed, if claim

therefor is asserted by the Commissioner at or before the hearing or a rehearing.

Sec. 1000. Title IX of the Revenue Act of 1924 is amended to read as follows:

....

“Sec. 900. The Board of Tax Appeals (hereinafter referred to

as the ‘Board’) is hereby continued as an independent agency in the

Executive Branch of the Government. . . .”

....

“Sec. 904. The Board and its divisions shall have such

jurisdiction as is conferred on them by Title II [income tax] and

Title III [estate tax] of the Revenue Act of 1926 or by subsequent

laws. . . .”

Subsequent Caselaw:

Lewis-Hall Iron Works v. Blair, 23 F.2d 972, 974 (D.C. Cir. 1928) (citing Satovsky,

1 B.T.A. 22) (“[T]he requirement that such petitions shall be filed within 60

days after the mailing of notice of the deficiency, is statutory and

jurisdictional and is not merely procedural. Revenue Act of 1926, Sec.

274(a). The Board, therefore, was without jurisdiction to hear the petition”),

cert. denied, 277 U.S. 592 (1928).

Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, § 601, 45 Stat. 791, 871–72 (amending the predecessor

of section 7459(d) to provide for dismissals for lack of jurisdiction):

Sec. 601. Board of Tax Appeals—Procedure.

Section[] 906 . . . of the Revenue Act of 1924, as amended, [is] further amended

to read as follows:

“Sec. 906. . . .

....

taxpayer, a decision of the Board dismissing the proceeding shall be considered as its

decision that the deficiency is the amount determined by the Commissioner. An order

specifying such amount shall be entered in the records of the Board unless the Board

can not determine such amount from the record in the proceeding, or unless the

dismissal is for lack of jurisdiction.[”]

Subsequent Caselaw:

Chambers v. Lucas, 41 F.2d 299, 300 (D.C. Cir. 1930) (“The provision of the statute

here under consideration [i.e., Revenue Act of 1926 § 274(a)] is in the nature of

a limitation upon the right of the taxpayer to avail himself of the right of

appeal, and there must be a strict compliance with its provisions”).

Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, § 272, 48 Stat. 680, 741 (extending the deadline to 90

days, excluding holidays as the 90th day, and making other changes):

Sec. 272. Procedure in General.

(a) Petition to Board of Tax Appeals.—If in the case of any taxpayer, the

Commissioner determines that there is a deficiency in respect of the tax imposed by

this title [Title I.—Income Tax], the Commissioner is authorized to send notice of such

deficiency to the taxpayer by registered mail. Within 90 days after such notice is

mailed (not counting Sunday or a legal holiday in the District of Columbia as

the ninetieth day), the taxpayer may file a petition with the Board of Tax

Appeals for a redetermination of the deficiency. No assessment of a deficiency

in respect of the tax imposed by this title and no distraint or proceeding in court for its

collection shall be made, begun, or prosecuted until such notice has been mailed to the

taxpayer, nor until the expiration of such 90-day period, nor, if a petition has been filed

with the Board, until the decision of the Board has become final. Notwithstanding the

provisions of section 3224 of the Revised Statutes the making of such assessment or

the beginning of such proceeding or distraint during the time such prohibition is in

force may be enjoined by a proceeding in the proper court.

....

(b) Collection of Deficiency Found by Board.—If the taxpayer files a petition

with the Board, the entire amount redetermined as the deficiency by the decision of

the Board which has become final shall be assessed and shall be paid upon notice and

demand from the collector. No part of the amount determined as a deficiency by the

Commissioner but disallowed as such by the decision of the Board which has become

final shall be assessed or be collected by distraint or by proceeding in court with or

without assessment.

the Board within the time prescribed in subsection (a) of this section, the

deficiency, notice of which has been mailed to the taxpayer, shall be assessed,

and shall be paid upon notice and demand from the collector.

Legislative History:

H.R. Rep. No. 73-704, at 34 (1934), as reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. (Part 2) 554, 580 (“The

present law allows the taxpayer in case of a deficiency a period of 60 days within

which to file an appeal with the United States Board of Tax Appeals. Experience

has shown this is not sufficient time in case of involved assessments, or in case

of taxpayers living a very great distance from Washington. It is believed that

lengthening this period to 90 days will not slow up collection of revenue, but will

facilitate the closing of cases without the necessity of litigation. Moreover, the

additional time allowed may give sufficient time for the Commissioner and the

taxpayer to reconcile their differences, and thus eliminate in such cases the

necessity for filing a petition before the Board”).

S. Rep. No. 73-558, at 42–43 (1934), as reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. (Part 2) 586, 619 (“The

present law allows the taxpayer in case of a deficiency a period of 60 days within

which to file an appeal with the United States Board of Tax Appeals. Experience

has shown this is not sufficient time in case of involved assessments, or in case

of taxpayers living at a great distance from Washington. In the House bill the

period for filing appeals was increased to 90 days. Your committee recommends

the adoption of this section of the House bill with a slight change so that a legal

holiday in the District of Columbia will not be counted as the ninetieth day”).

Subsequent Caselaw:

Poyner v. Commissioner, 81 F.2d 521, 522 (5th Cir. 1936) (“[I]f the taxpayer does not

file such petition with the Board of Tax Appeals within the time prescribed,

that Board is required to assess the deficiency . . . . Those provisions negative

the conclusion that the Board of Tax Appeals has the right or power to

consider a petition for a redetermination of a deficiency where such petition is

filed with it after the expiration of the prescribed period”).

Cont’l Petroleum Co. v. United States, 87 F.2d 91, 94 (10th Cir. 1936) (“The filing of a

petition within the fixed time is essential to the jurisdiction of the Board of

the subject matter. The statute requiring that it be filed within such time has

that effect.”), cert. denied, 300 U.S. 679 (1937).

Edward Barron Estate Co. v. Commissioner, 93 F.2d 751, 753 (9th Cir. 1937) (“If the

taxpayer filed a petition . . . within the period limited by the act, supra, then

the Board had jurisdiction to consider the petition. If such petition was not

so filed within the time limited by the act, the Board was without

jurisdiction to consider the matter. The requirement that petitions for

redeterminations be filed within a specified period after the mailing of the

deficiency notice ‘is statutory and jurisdictional and is not merely

procedural.’” (quoting Lewis-Hall Iron Works, 23 F.2d at 974).

Internal Revenue Code of 1939, ch. 2, §§ 272, 1101, 53 Stat. 1, 82–83, 158

(re-enacting and codifying the deficiency procedures):

Sec. 272. Procedure in General.

(a)(1) Petition to Board of Tax Appeals.—If in the case of any taxpayer, the

Commissioner determines that there is a deficiency in respect of the tax imposed by

this chapter [Chapter I.—Income Tax], the Commissioner is authorized to send notice

of such deficiency to the taxpayer by registered mail. Within ninety days after such

notice is mailed (not counting Sunday or a legal holiday in the District of

Columbia as the ninetieth day), the taxpayer may file a petition with the

Board of Tax Appeals for a redetermination of the deficiency. No assessment

of a deficiency in respect of the tax imposed by this chapter and no distraint or

proceeding in court for its collection shall be made, begun, or prosecuted until such

notice has been mailed to the taxpayer, nor until the expiration of such ninety-day

period, nor, if a petition has been filed with the Board, until the decision of the Board

has become final. Notwithstanding the provisions of section 3653(a) the making of

such assessment or the beginning of such proceeding or distraint during the time such

prohibition is in force may be enjoined by a proceeding in the proper court. . . .

....

(b) Collection of Deficiency Found by Board.—If the taxpayer files a petition

with the Board, the entire amount redetermined as the deficiency by the decision of

the Board which has become final shall be assessed and shall be paid upon notice and

demand from the collector. No part of the amount determined as a deficiency by the

Commissioner but disallowed as such by the decision of the Board which has become

final shall be assessed or be collected by distraint or by proceeding in court with or

without assessment.

the Board within the time prescribed in subsection (a) of this section, the

deficiency, notice of which has been mailed to the taxpayer, shall be assessed,

and shall be paid upon notice and demand from the collector.

Sec. 1101. Jurisdiction.

The Board and its divisions shall have such jurisdiction as is conferred on them

by chapters 1, 2, 3, and 4 of this title, by Title II and Title III of the Revenue Act of

1926, 44 Stat. 9, or by laws enacted subsequent to February 26, 1926.

Subsequent Caselaw:

Ryan v. Alexander, 118 F.2d 744, 750 (10th Cir. 1941) (“Filing of the petition for appeal

within the 60-day period was a jurisdictional requirement”), cert. denied,

314 U.S. 622 (1941).

Stebbins’ Estate v. Helvering, 121 F.2d 892, 893–94 (D.C. Cir. 1941) (“But, as we think,

the matter is beyond our control, for it has been decided time and again that

the statutory period is jurisdictional, and the duty to dismiss on failure to

comply is mandatory”), aff’g 40 B.T.A. 613 (1939).

Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, §§ 168, 504, 56 Stat. 798, 876, 957 (extending the

90-day period to 150 days for foreign taxpayers and renaming the BTA as the Tax

Court of the United States):

Sec. 168. Period for Filing Petition Extended in Certain Cases.

(a) Period Extended.—Section 272(a)(1) (relating to period for filing petition

with Board of Tax Appeals) is amended by inserting at the end thereof the following

new sentence: “If the notice is addressed to a person outside the States of the Union

and the District of Columbia, the period specified in this paragraph shall be one

hundred and fifty days in lieu of ninety days.”

Sec. 504. Change of Name of Board of Tax Appeals.

(a) The Tax Court of the United States.—Effective on the day after the date of

enactment of this Act, section 1100 (relating to status of Board of Tax Appeals) is

amended by inserting at the end thereof the following new sentence: “The Board shall

be known as The Tax Court of the United States and the members thereof shall be

known as the presiding judge and the judges of The Tax Court of the United States.”

(b) Powers, Tenure, Etc., Unchanged.—The jurisdiction, powers, and duties

of The Tax Court of the United States, its divisions and its officers and employees,

and their appointment, including the designation of its officers, and the immunities,

tenure of office, powers, duties, rights, and privileges of the presiding judge and judges

of The Tax Court of the United States shall be the same as by existing law

provided in the case of the Board of Tax Appeals. The Commissioner shall

continue to be represented by the same counsel in the same manner before the Court

as he has heretofore been represented in proceedings before the Board of Tax Appeals

and the taxpayer shall continue to be represented in accordance with rules of practice

prescribed by the Court. . . .

Subsequent Caselaw:

Commissioner v. Rosenheim, 132 F.2d 677, 679–80 (3d Cir. 1942) (“The sending of the

appropriate notice in this case by registered mail and the transferee's petition

for a redetermination of the liability within ninety days of the date of the notice

supplied the requirements of Section 272(a) so far as the Board’s

jurisdiction to hear and determine the matter was concerned”), rev’g and

remanding on other grounds, 45 B.T.A. 1018.

International Organizations Immunities Act of 1945, ch. 652, § 203, 59 Stat. 669,

673 (excluding Saturday as the 90th day):

Sec. 203. Petition to the Tax Court of the United States.

(a) Time for Filing Petition.—The second sentence[] of section[] 272(a)(1) . . . of

the Internal Revenue Code [is] amended by striking out the parenthetical expressions

appearing therein and inserting in lieu thereof the following: “(not counting Saturday,

Sunday, or a legal holiday in the District of Columbia as the ninetieth day)”.

Subsequent Caselaw:

Di Prospero v. Commissioner, 176 F.2d 76, 77 (9th Cir. 1949) (“There is, at this late

date, little doubt that the 90 day requirement is jurisdictional”).

Cent. Paper Co. v. Commissioner, 199 F.2d 902, 903 (6th Cir. 1952) (“In support of The

Tax Court’s ruling, the Commissioner contends that the time limitation for

filing the petition is statutory and jurisdictional, and that failure on the

part of the taxpayer to file such a petition with the Tax Court within the 90-day

period provided is a bar to its consideration. Such is the well established

rule, which is not challenged by the taxpayer”).

Mindell v. Commissioner, 200 F.2d 38, 39 (2d Cir. 1952) (“We agree that the filing of a

timely petition for redetermination is jurisdictional”).

Drouin v. Commissioner, 203 F.2d 953, 953 (3d Cir. 1953) (per curiam) (“This is an

appeal by a taxpayer from a decision of the Tax Court which dismissed his case

there for want of jurisdiction. The lack of jurisdiction was found in the

taxpayer's failure to follow the statute with regard to time for proceedings in

the Tax Court. The Tax Court’s action was correct”).

Internal Revenue Code of 1954, ch. 736, §§ 6213, 7442, 68A Stat. 3, 771, 879

(re-enacting and re-codifying the deficiency procedures):

Sec. 6213. Restrictions Applicable to Deficiencies; Petition to Tax Court.

(a) Time for Filing Petition and Restriction on Assessment.—Within 90 days,

or 150 days if the notice is addressed to a person outside the States of the

Union and the District of Columbia, after the notice of deficiency authorized

in section 6212 is mailed (not counting Saturday, Sunday, or a legal holiday

in the District of Columbia as the last day), the taxpayer may file a petition

with the Tax Court for a redetermination of the deficiency. Except as otherwise

provided in section 6861 [jeopardy assessments] no assessment of a deficiency in

respect of any tax imposed by subtitle A [income tax], or B [estate and gift tax] and no

levy or proceeding in court for its collection shall be made, begun, or prosecuted until

such notice has been mailed to the taxpayer, nor until expiration of such 90–day or

150–day period, as the case may be, nor, if a petition has been filed with the Tax Court,

until the decision of the Tax Court has become final. Notwithstanding the provisions

of section 7421(a) [prohibition of suits to restrain assessment or collection], the making

of such assessment or the beginning of such proceeding or levy during the time such

prohibition is in force may be enjoined by a proceeding in the proper court.

....

the Tax Court within the time prescribed in subsection (a), the deficiency,

notice of which has been mailed to the taxpayer, shall be assessed, and shall

be paid upon notice and demand from the Secretary or his delegate.

Sec. 7442. Jurisdiction.

The Tax Court and its divisions shall have such jurisdiction as is

conferred on them by this title [26 U.S.C.], by chapters 1, 2, 3, and 4 of the Internal

Revenue Code of 1939, by title II and title III of the Revenue Act of 1926 (44 Stat. 10–

87), or by laws enacted subsequent to February 26, 1926.

Subsequent Caselaw:

Underwriters, Inc. v. Commissioner, 215 F.2d 953, 954 (3d Cir. 1954) (per curiam)

(“[T]he petition was filed with the Tax Court . . . 91 days [after the notice of

deficiency was mailed]. It was, therefore, filed out of time and conferred no

jurisdiction on the court”).

Worthington v. Commissioner, 211 F.2d 131, 132 (6th Cir. 1954) (per curiam) (“The Tax

Court properly held that it had no jurisdiction, for the reason that the

required petitions for redetermination to be filed by the taxpayers were not

filed within ninety days after the mailing of the notices of deficiency, as

provided in section 272(a) of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C.A.”).

Galvin v. Commissioner, 239 F.2d 166, 166 (2d Cir. 1956) (per curiam) (“[T]he court

correctly held it had no jurisdiction of the petition, since it was not filed

within the 90 days”).

Rich v. Commissioner, 250 F.2d 170, 175 (5th Cir. 1957) (Johnsen, J., concurring in

part) (stating, where a prisoner arranged for his petition to be mailed but the

prison mail room held it for one month, thereby causing it to be filed late, that

“[t]his is a hard case presenting a grossly inequitable situation, but neither the

Tax Court nor this Court has any authority to relieve the taxpayer from the

clear jurisdictional requirements of the law”).

Jorgensen v. Commissioner, 246 F.2d 536, 537 (9th Cir. 1957) (per curiam) (“[T]he

90-day requirement prescribed by the Tax Court is jurisdictional”).

Teel v. Commissioner, 248 F.2d 749, 750–51 (10th Cir. 1957) (“The courts have

generally held that the filing of the petition is jurisdictional, and that a failure

to file the petition within the 90 day period is a bar to consideration by the

Tax Court. . . . The petition not having been filed within 90 days after such

notice was mailed, the Tax Court was without jurisdiction to consider the

same and it was properly dismissed”), aff’g 27 T.C. 375 (1956).

Bloch v. Commissioner, 254 F.2d 277, 278 (9th Cir. 1958) (“The great weight of

authority is to the effect that the 90–day requirement is jurisdictional”).

Pfeffer v. Commissioner, 272 F.2d 383, 384 (2d Cir. 1959) (per curiam) (“[S]ince timely

filing is made jurisdictional, the Tax Court correctly held that it could not

hear the petition”).

Vibro Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 312 F.2d 253, 254 (2d Cir. 1963) (per curiam) (“Section

6213(a) clearly provides that the petition for redetermination of tax deficiency

must be filed within 90 days of the date of mailing of the notice of

deficiency. . . . The Tax Court’s dismissal for lack of jurisdiction was

therefore appropriate”).

Skolski v. Commissioner, 351 F.2d 485, 488 (3d Cir. 1965) (“[I]t will be for the Tax

Court upon remand to . . . make such finding upon this jurisdictional

question [i.e., the timeliness of the petition] as the evidence warrants”).

Healy v. Commissioner, 351 F.2d 602, 603 (9th Cir. 1965) (“The requirement of filing

the petition with the Tax Court within 90 days after the certified or registered

notice of deficiency is mailed to the correct address of the taxpayer is

jurisdictional, and no matter how allegedly inequitable the situation, there

is no authority ‘to relieve the taxpayer from the clear jurisdictional

requirements of the law’” (citations omitted)).

Delman v. Commissioner, 384 F.2d 929, 934 (3d Cir. 1967) (“Taxpayers’ petition was

out of time and the Tax Court correctly dismissed the petition for this reason.”

(citations omitted)), aff’g T.C. Memo. 1966-59, 25 T.C.M. (CCH) 328, 333

(“[T]he petition was filed late, and for that reason this Court lacks

jurisdiction to do anything more than dismiss it”), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 952

(1968).

DeWelles v. United States, 378 F.2d 37, 39 (9th Cir. 1967) (“If . . . the notice [of

deficiency] is properly sent, the taxpayer is bound to petition the Tax Court

within 90 days, and even a showing that he did not receive the notice at the

last known address will not excuse the taxpayer. If the taxpayer does not act

in time no court may entertain his suit to restrain the assessment”

(citations omitted)).

Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 951, 83 Stat. 487, 730 (establishment

of the U.S. Tax Court):

Sec. 951. Status of the Tax Court.

follows:

Section 7441 (relating to the status of the Tax Court) is amended to read as

“SEC. 7441. STATUS.

“There is hereby established, under article I of the Constitution

of the United States, a court of record to be known as the United States

Tax Court. The members of the Tax Court shall be the chief judge and

the judges of the Tax Court.”

Legislative History:

S. Rep. No. 91-552, at 302 (1969), as reprinted in 1969-3 C.B. 423, 614 (“Since the Tax

Court has only judicial duties, the committee believes it is anomalous to continue

to classify it with quasi-judicial executive agencies that have rulemaking and

investigatory functions. The status of the Tax Court and the respect accorded to

its decisions are high among those familiar with its work. However, its

constitutional status as an executive agency, no matter how independent, raises

questions in the minds of some as to whether it is appropriate for one executive

agency to be sitting in judgment on the determinations of another executive

agency”).

Subsequent Rule:

RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE UNITED STATES TAX COURT,

60 T.C. 1057, 1072 (1973):

RULE 13. JURISDICTION

(a) Notice of Deficiency or of Transferee or Fiduciary Liability

Required: In a case commenced in the Court by a taxpayer, the

jurisdiction of the Court depends upon the issuance by the

Commissioner of a notice of deficiency in income, gift, or estate tax or

in the taxes imposed on private foundations under Code Sections 4940

through 4945. In a case commenced in the Court by a transferee or

fiduciary, the jurisdiction of the Court depends upon the issuance by

the Commissioner of a notice of liability to the transferee or fiduciary.

See Code Sections 6212, 6213, 6901.

(b) Timely Petition Required: In all cases, the jurisdiction

of the Court also depends on the timely filing of a petition. See

Code Sections 6213, 7502.

Note

There is no counterpart to this rule in the present T.C. Rules.

Pars. (a) and (b) concern the two fundamental requirements for

the Court’s jurisdiction, [1] the issuance of a notice of

deficiency or a notice of liability, and [2] the filing of a timely

petition with the Court. Their basic importance requires expression

in the rules for the guidance of parties and practitioners.

Subsequent Caselaw:

Foster v. Commissioner, 445 F.2d 799, 800 (10th Cir. 1971) (“In Teel v. Commissioner

of Internal Revenue, 248 F.2d 749 (10th Cir. 1957), we held that the filing of

the petition is jurisdictional and that a failure to file the petition within the

ninety (90) day period is a bar to consideration by the Tax Court”).

DiViaio v. Commissioner, 539 F.2d 231, 234 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (“As this court stated in

Stebbins’ Estate v. Helvering, 74 U.S.App.D.C. 21, 121 F.2d 892, 893 (1941), ‘it

has been decided time and time again that the statutory period is

jurisdictional, and the duty to dismiss on failure to comply is mandatory’”).

Andrews v. Commissioner, 563 F.2d 365, 366 (8th Cir. 1977) (“The law is clear that the

Tax Court does not have jurisdiction over an untimely petition”).

Shipley v. Commissioner, 572 F.2d 212, 213 (9th Cir. 1977) (“Timely filing of the

petition is jurisdictional”), aff’g T.C. Memo. 1976-383.

Johnson v. Commissioner, 611 F.2d 1015, 1018 (5th Cir. 1980) (“It cannot now be

seriously questioned that the timely filing of the petition for redetermination

is jurisdictional”), rev’g T.C. Memo. 1977-382.

Tadros v. Commissioner, 763 F.2d 89, 91 (2d Cir. 1985) (“Since the 90-day period of

§ 6213(a) is a jurisdictional requirement, failure to file within that time

period requires dismissal of the petition” (citations omitted)).

Pugsley v. Commissioner, 749 F.2d 691, 692 (11th Cir. 1985) (“[T]imely filing of such a

petition is a jurisdictional prerequisite for a suit in the tax court”).

Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 2, 100 Stat. 2085, 2095 (re-enacting

and re-codifying the deficiency procedures):

Sec. 2. Internal Revenue Code of 1986.

(a) Redesignation of 1954 Code.—The Internal Revenue Title enacted August

16, 1954, as heretofore, hereby, or hereafter amended, may be cited as the “Internal

Revenue Code of 1986”.

(b) References in Laws, etc.—Except when inappropriate, any reference in any

law, Executive order, or other document—

(1) to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 shall include a reference to

the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, and

(2) to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 shall include a reference to

the provisions of law formerly known as the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.

26 U.S.C. §§ 6213, 7442 (1986):

Sec. 6213. Restrictions Applicable to Deficiencies; Petition to Tax Court.

(a) Time for Filing Petition and Restriction on Assessment.—Within 90 days,

or 150 days if the notice is addressed to a person outside the United States,

after the notice of deficiency authorized in section 6212 is mailed (not

counting Saturday, Sunday, or a legal holiday in the District of Columbia as

the last day), the taxpayer may file a petition with the Tax Court for a

redetermination of the deficiency. Except as otherwise provided in section 6851

[termination assessments], 6852, or 6861 [jeopardy assessments] no assessment of a

deficiency in respect of any tax imposed by subtitle A [income tax], or B [estate and gift

tax], chapter 41, 42, 43, 44, or 45 and no levy or proceeding in court for its collection

shall be made, begun, or prosecuted until such notice has been mailed to the taxpayer,

nor until the expiration of such 90-day or 150-day period, as the case may be, nor, if a

petition has been filed with the Tax Court, until the decision of the Tax Court has

become final. Notwithstanding the provisions of section 7421(a) [prohibition of suits

to restrain assessment or collection], the making of such assessment or the beginning

of such proceeding or levy during the time such prohibition is in force may be enjoined

by a proceeding in the proper court.

....

the Tax Court within the time prescribed in subsection (a), the deficiency,

notice of which has been mailed to the taxpayer, shall be assessed, and shall

be paid upon notice and demand from the Secretary.

Sec. 7442. Jurisdiction.

The Tax Court and its divisions shall have such jurisdiction as is conferred on

them by this title [26 U.S.C.], by chapters 1, 2, 3, and 4 of the Internal Revenue Code

of 1939, by title II and title III of the Revenue Act of 1926 (44 Stat. 10–87), or by laws

enacted subsequent to February 26, 1926.

Subsequent Caselaw:

Scar v. Commissioner, 814 F.2d 1363, 1366 (9th Cir. 1987) (“The Tax Court has

jurisdiction only when the Commissioner issues a valid deficiency notice, and

the taxpayer files a timely petition for redetermination”), rev’g 81 T.C. 855

(1983).

Keado v. United States, 853 F.2d 1209, 1212 (5th Cir. 1988) (“If the taxpayer fails to

file a Tax Court petition during this ninety day period, the Tax Court lacks

jurisdiction to consider the deficiency”).

Mulder v. Commissioner, 855 F.2d 208, 211 (5th Cir. 1988) (“[T]he taxpayer must file

a petition within 90 days of this mailing [of the notice of deficiency]. Otherwise,

the Tax Court lacks jurisdiction”), rev’g T.C. Memo. 1987-363.

Hoffenberg v. Commissioner, 905 F.2d 665, 666 (2d Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (“A late

petition will be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction”), aff’g T.C. Memo.

1989-676 (“[T]he petition will have to be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction”).

Ward v. Commissioner, 907 F.2d 517, 521 (5th Cir. 1990) (“In order for the Tax Court

to have jurisdiction over a petition for redetermination, the taxpayer must

file the petition within 90 days after ‘the notice of deficiency authorized in

§ 6212 is mailed.’ 26 U.S.C. § 6213”), rev’g 92 T.C. 949 (1989).

Sealy Power, Ltd. v. Commissioner, 46 F.3d 382, 387 (5th Cir. 1995) (“Sections 6212(a)

and 6213(a) of the Internal Revenue Code provide that the Tax Court only has

jurisdiction when the Commissioner issues a valid deficiency notice and the

taxpayer files a petition for redetermination”), aff’g in part, rev’g in part T.C.

Memo. 1992-168.

Patmon & Young Pro. Corp. v. Commissioner, 55 F.3d 216, 217 (6th Cir. 1995) (“In

order to invoke the jurisdiction of the Tax Court, a taxpayer must file a

petition within 90 days after the mailing of the notice of deficiency”), aff’g T.C.

Memo. 1993-143.

Correia v. Commissioner, 58 F.3d 468, 469 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (“The timely

filing of a petition for redetermination is a jurisdictional requirement”).

Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No.

105-206, § 3463, 112 Stat. 685, 767 (adding a sentence to section 6213(a)):

Sec. 3463. Notice of Deficiency to Specify Deadlines for Filing Tax Court Petition.

(a) In General.—The Secretary of the Treasury or the Secretary’s delegate shall

include on each notice of deficiency under section 6212 of the Internal Revenue Code

of 1986 the date determined by such Secretary (or delegate) as the last day on which

the taxpayer may file a petition with the Tax Court.

(b) Later Filing Deadlines Specified on Notice of Deficiency to be Binding.—

Subsection (a) of section 6213 (relating to restrictions applicable to deficiencies;

petition to Tax Court) is amended by adding at the end the following new sentence:

“Any petition filed with the Tax Court on or before the last date specified for filing such

petition by the Secretary in the notice of deficiency shall be treated as timely filed.”

Legislative History:

H.R. Rep. No. 105-599, at 289 (1998) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1998-3 C.B. 747, 1043

(“Taxpayers must file a petition with the Tax Court within 90 days after the

deficiency notice is mailed (150 days if the person is outside the United States)

(sec. 6213). If the petition is not filed within that time period, the Tax

Court does not have jurisdiction to consider the petition”).

H.R. Rep. No. 105-364, pt. 1, at 71 (1997), as reprinted in 1998-3 C.B. 373, 443

(identical language).

Subsequent Caselaw:

Rochelle v. Commissioner, 293 F.3d 740, 741 (5th Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (“[T]he

Commissioner moved to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction . . . on the

basis that the petition was not filed within the ninety-day period prescribed by

I.R.C. § 6213(a) (1994). The Tax Court, in a reviewed opinion, granted the

Commissioner’s motion to dismiss and denied the taxpayer's motion. We agree

with the Tax Court for the reasons set out in Judge Vasquez’s excellent opinion

(concurred in by nine other judges), which we adopt” (citations omitted)), aff’g

116 T.C. 356, 364 (2001) (“[The taxpayer] failed to file a timely petition with

this Court. Accordingly, . . . [the Commissioner’s] motion to dismiss for lack of

jurisdiction will be granted”).

Elings v. Commissioner, 324 F.3d 1110, 1112 (9th Cir. 2003) (“The tax court has

jurisdiction only if two requirements are met: (1) the IRS issued a valid

notice of deficiency, and (2) the petitioner filed a timely petition”).

Edwards v. Commissioner, 791 F.3d 1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (“The tax court also lacks

jurisdiction if the taxpayer’s petition is not timely filed”).

Tilden v. Commissioner, 846 F.3d 882, 887 (7th Cir. 2017) (“[W]e . . . treat the statutory

filing deadline as a jurisdictional one”), rev’g and remanding T.C. Memo.

2015-188.

Organic Cannabis Found., LLC v. Commissioner, 962 F.3d 1082, 1092 (9th Cir. 2020)

(“[W]e agree with the Tax Court that § 6213(a)’s time limits are

jurisdictional”), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 2596 (2021), and cert. denied

sub. nom. N. Cal. Small Bus. Assistants, Inc. v. Commissioner, 1415 S. Ct. 2598

(2021).

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.