T .C . Memo . 2009-12 1
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T .C . Memo . 2009-12 1
UNITED STATES TAX'-COUR T
TIGERS EYE TRADING, LLC, SENTINEL ADVISORS, LLC,
TAX MATTERS PARTNER, Petitioner v .
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Responden t
Docket No . 14.510-05 .
Filed May 27, 2009 . :
In a notice of final partnership administrative'
adjustment (FPAA) issued to TET regarding a transaction
of the type the IRS determined in Notice 2000-44, 20002 C .B . 255, is a "listed transaction", R determined
inter alia that TET was not a partnership, had no
business purpose other than tax avoidance, lacked
economic substance, and was an economic sham for
Federal . income tax purposes . In the FPAA R determined
that amounts reported on,the 1999 partnership return
for contributions, distributions, other deductions, and
other losses were reduced to zero, that TET's partners'
outside bases in their partnership interests were zero,
and that accuracy-related penalties determined at the
partnership level should be imposed at the partner,
level .
L and one of the three grantor trusts (PP) L used` .
to engage in the transaction challenge the proposed
adjustments in the FPAA and wish in this partnership.level proceeding to raise L's reasonable cause defenses
-2to accuracy-related penalties applicable to any
deficiency resulting from the FPAA adjustments to
partnership items . L claims that, in reporting losses
from the transaction on his return, he relied on the
advice of professionals, including two attorneys and a
C .. .P .A ., and a written legal opinion of CM to'L and the
three grantor trusts on the tax consequences of the'
transaction .
PP has filed a motion for partial summary judgment
to declare invalid sec . 301 .6221-1T(c) and (d),
Temporary Proced . & Admin . Regs ., 64 Fed . Reg . 3838
(Jan . 26, 1999) (the temporary regulation), on th e
,aground that it would prevent PP and L from raising in
this partnership-level proceeding partner-level
reasonable cause defenses to accuracy-related penalties
applicable to any deficiency of L resulting from the
FPAA adjustments to partnership items .
R has filed a motion in limine to exclude from
evidence PP's expert report prepared by SS that the
legal opinion of CM on the tax consequences of the
transaction was of such quality and character that PP
".an'd L could reasonably, rely on the opinion in .preparing
,their income tax returns . R argues that the report
should be excluded on the alternative grounds that it
relates solely to PP's partner-level defenses and that
it expresses legal conclusions . Alternatively, R
asserts that portions of the report should be excluded
because they constitute advocacy . R is also asserting
that CM was a promoter of TET and the transaction, that
L and his grantor trusts could not reasonably rely ;on
the opinion of a promoter, and that the status of CM as
a promoter should be determined in this partnershiplevel proceeding .
Held : Following New Millennium Trading, LLC v .
Commissioner , 131 T .C . (2008), the temporary
regulation .is valid and potentially applicable in the
case at hand, so that, .should the Court sustain R's
determinations .in .the FPAA that TET or PP's
transactions with TET should be disregarded and tha,t_
all other requirements for application of the accuracyrelated penalties have been . satisfied, PP may no t
assert in this partnership-level proceeding any
partner-level defenses to,application of the penalties ;PP's motion for partial summary judgment will be
denied .
Held , further : We have jurisdiction in this
partnership-level proceeding to decide whether CM was a
promoter .
.
Held , further : If the Court should decide that CM
is not a promoter of the-transactions at issue, the
reasonableness of L's reliance on the CM opinion, as
well as his reliance on the advice of his personal
attorneys and C .P .A ., would bea partner-level defense
as defined in the temporary regulation that would not
be assertable in this partnership-level proceeding
because it would require the Court to consider factors,
that are personal to L, such as his education and
business experience and the nature and length of his
relationship with the adviser, and would require the
production of evidence unrelated to the underlying
adjustments in the FPAA .
Held , further : PP's expert report consists of
legal discussion and argument ; R's motion in limine
will be granted and the expert's report excluded from
evidence, irrespective of whether CM is determined to
be a promoter .
16
Felix B . Laughlin and Mark D . Allison , for petitioner,
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Sentinel Advisors, LLC, tax matters partner .
David De Coursey Aughtry ,
Hale E . Sheppard , and William E .
Buchanan , for, A . Scott Logan, Trustee, A ~ Scott Logan Grantor's
Retained Interest Annuity Trust I, a partner other than the~ta x
matters partner .
James E . Gray ,
David B . Flassing,
William Bogardus ,
for respondent .
Timothy B . Heavner , and
-4CONTENT S
Background
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Discussion
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I . TEFRA Procedures and Partnership Items
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A.
Partnership
Items
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B . Affected Items
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C . Penalties and Defenses to Penalties
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D . Exceptions to Application of TEFRA Procedures . . . 2 6
II . Petitioner's Motion To Invalidate Temporary Regulation
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III . Respondent's Motion in Limine
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A . Reasonable Cause Defense to Accuracy-Relate d
Penalties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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B . Respondent's Position in Motion in Limine .
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C . Status as Promoter of Partnership Determined i n
Partnership-Level Proceeding
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D . Tax Court's Jurisdiction To Decide Defenses to
Applicability of Penalty That Are Not PartnerLevel Defenses Defined by Temporary Regulation 43
E . Partner-Level Defense : Definition . . . . .
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1 . Personal to the Partner 46
2 . Depends on Partner's Separate Return 48
3 . Cannot Be Determined at Partnership Level 50
4 . If Curtis Mallet Was a Promoter
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5 . If Curtis Mallet Was Not a Promoter
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6 . Conclusion . . . . . . . . . .
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F . Legal Conclusions and Advocacy of Mr . Logan' s
Position in the Smith Report
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Afterword
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MEMORANDUM OPINIO N
BEGHE,
Judge : This proceeding to determine the validity .of
respondent's notice of final partnership administrative
adjustment (FPAA) is before the Court on two interrelated
V
-5
motions : Motion for partial summary judgment filed under Rule
1211 on behalf of participating partner ; and motion in limine
filed under Rules 50~and 143(f) by respondent .
By the partial summary judgment motion, A . Scott Logan (Mr .
Logan) as Trustee for A . Scott .Logan Grantor Trust I (Logan .Trust.
I or participating partner), a partner other than the tax matter s
.partner, asks us to declare invalid section 301 .6221'-lT(c) a n
(d), Temporary Proced . & Admin . Regs ., 64 Fed . Reg . 3838 (Jan .
26, 1999.) (sometimes the temporary regulation), implementin g
section 6221 as amended by the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 (TR A
1997), Pub . L . 105-34, sec .. 1238(aa), 111 Stat . 1026, because it
would prevent participating partner and Mr . Logan from
interposing partner-level defenses to accuracy-related penaltie s
in this partnership-level proceeding .2 For convenience and
simplicity, we sometimes refer to participating partner as Mr .
Logan .
'Unless otherwise indicated, all Rule references are to the
Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure, and all section
references are to the Internal Revenue Code .in effect for 1999,
the year at. issue .
2Participating partner also filed a motion for partial
summary judgment "regarding confirmation of Code and caselaw as
to contingent obligations"', seeking"a ruling that-Helmer v .,
Commissioner , T .C . Memo . 1975-160, requires a holding that "a
contingent obligation such as the Sold Euro Option each of the
Logan . Trusts sold to AIG falls short of a fixed 'liability'cfor`
section 752 and other federal income tax purposes" . By order
dated'Aug . 5, 20 .08, we denied the motion for a variety of
reasons .
-6By the motion in limine respondent asks us to exclude fro m
evidence an expert report and testimony that a legal opinion on
the tax consequences of the transactions at issue was of'such
quality and character that Mr . Logan could reasonably rely on it
in preparing his income tax returns . By respondent's response to
Mr . Logan's motion, . Mr . Logan Is reply to that response, Mr .
Logan'.s,opposition to respondent's .moti .on, respondent's reply to
that opposition, and respondent's supplement to respondent's
motion,, the parties have joined issue on the subjects of the
motions .
Petitioner, Sentinel Advisors, LLC (Sentinel), the tax
matters-partner of Tigers Eye Trading, LLC (Tigers Eye), has no
direct financial interest in the outcome of this case . Thus, Mr .
Logan, as trustee of Logan . Trust I, is wielding the laboring oar
in this proceeding .
In his motion for partial summary judgment Mr . Logan asserts
that in preparing his income tax returns he reasonably relied on
the opinions of personal advisers--attorneys and his accountant-as well,}as an opinion letter and memorandum of the law firm
of
Curtis, Mallet-Prevost, Colt & Mosle LLP (Curtis Mallet) on the
income tax consequences of the transactions at issue . Mr . Logan
submitted to the Court a notice of expert witness in which he
identified Attorney Stuart A . Smith (Mr . Smith) as a witness wh o
may aid`the Court in evaluating whether the Curtis Mallet opinion
V
-7opinion was of such quality and character that Mr . Logan and
Logan Trust I could reasonably rely on it in preparing their .
income tax returns .
By the motion in limine respondent asks us to exclude from
evidence Mr . Smith's expert report and testimony on the
alternative grounds that the report : (1) Pertains exclusively to
Mr . Logan's partner-level defenses, an issue not properly before
the Court, pursuant to the'temporary regulation ; (2) consists of
legal conclusions ; and (3) contains advocacy .
F
Respondent indicated, in respondent's response to Mr .
Logan's motion for partial summary judgment, that respondent is
asserting in this proceeding that Curtis Mallet was a promoter o f
the transactions in issue . Respondent asserts that no
participating partner of,Tigers Eye could reasonably rely on an'
opinion issued by a promoter and that the status of Curtis Mallet
as a promoter of Tigers Eye should be determined in this
partnership-level proceeding .
Following New Millennium Trading, LLC v . Commissioner , 131
T .C . (2008) (upholding the validity and applicability of the
temporary regulation), we will deny Mr . Logan's motion fo r
partial summary judgment . Thus, should we sustain respondent's
determinations in the FPAA that Tigers Eye or the Logan Trusts'
transactions with Tigers Eye should be disregarded and that the
accuracy-related penalties otherwise apply, Mr . Logan's partner-
-8level defenses to those penalties will not be assertable in this
partnership-level proceeding .
We conclude that whether Curtis Mallet was a promoter of the
transactions in issue is to be decided in this partnership-level
proceeding . We also conclude that, if we should determine that
Curtis Mallet was a promoter of the transactions at issue,
reliance on the Curtis Mallet opinion would not be a defense to
the penalties . Moreover, Mr . Logan's reliance on the advice of
his personal advisers is a partner-level defense that is not
assertable in this partnership-level proceeding . See . New
Millennium Trading, LLC v . Commissioner ,
supra . Similarly, if we
should decide that Curtis Mallet was not a promoter, Mr . Logan's
reliance on the Curtis Mallet opinion would be a partner-leve l
defense not assertable in this proceeding .
Since there are unresolved issues whether reliance on and
the reliability of the Curtis Mallet opinion are partner-level
defenses, respondent's motion in limine cannot be granted on that
ground . However, we will grant respondent's motion to exclude
Mr . Smith's expert report and testimony because the report
consists of legal discussion and argument .
.,An,Afterword notes that TRA 1997, as implemented by the
temporary regulation, has created problems of judicial
administration in the case at hand and . similar pending cases that
will~not be resolved by recently proposed regulations .
-9Background
The facts recited in this statement are based on th e
parties' first and second stipulations of fact and accompanying
exhibits and on matters admitted in the pleadings or in the
motion papers or set forth in affidavits submitted by the parties
or in judicially noticed records of the Court . For the purposeof deciding these motions, 'we view the facts in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party ; the facts recited have not been,
found to be true after a trial .
The case at hand is one of many .Son-of-BOSS cases pending in
this Court .3 It is one of a subset of such . cases of transactions
promoted by Sentinel that used a limited liability compan y
(treated as a partnership for income tax purposes) to enable an
investor (Mr . Logan in the case at hand) to claim losses that
substantially offset millions of dollars of long-term capital
gain realized on the sale of a business interest .
Mr . Logan was a cofounder of Wood Logan Associates, Inc ..
(WLA), a . wholesale marketing and sales organization that
distributed variable annuities . WLA was wholly owned by
Manufacturers Life Wood Logan (MLWL), a holding company . Unti l
early 1999 Mr . Logan owned 53,690 shares of MLWL directly an d
3"BOSS" is an acronym for "Bond and Option Sales Strategy",
which the Commissioner regards as an abusive tax shelter . See
Notice 2000-44, 2000-2 C .B . 255, 256 ; see also Kligfeld Holdings
v . Commissioner , 128 T .C . 192 (2007) .
-10240,000 shares of MLWL through a family limited partnership
(SKL) . Mr . Logan, directly and through three grantor trusts,
Logan, .Trust I .and two other such trusts (collectively the Logan
Trusts), held a more-than-99-percent interest in SKL .
In early 1999 Mr . Logan sold all the MLWL .shares he owned,
directly and indirectly, to a-large . Canadian life insurance
company for $94 per share, resulting in proceeds of $22,560,000
to SKL and direct proceeds of $5,046,860 to Mr . Logan . The
shares of MLWL had an average basis in the hands of SKL~and Mr .
Logan of approximately $1 per share . Mr . Logan reported total
long-term capital gain of $27,438, 5 37 on his and the Logan
Trusts' sales of the MLWL shares .
During the taxable year ended December 31, 1999, Tigers Eye
was a limited liability company organized under Delaware law,
formed not earlier than September 21, 1999 . Sentinel was the ta x
matters partner of Tigers Eye . Banque Safra, a nominee partner
for Brazilian investors, obtained a 7 .5-percent capital :-.and
profits interest, in Tigers Eye for a cash contribution of
$58,000, and New Vista, an entity owned by Sentinel and its legal
adviser, obtained a 0 .5-percent profits interest in Tigers Eye
for a cash contribution of $3,000 .
On October 1, 1999, each of the three Logan Trusts bought
from and sold to American International Group (AIG)'a pair of
substantially similar options on the euro--an option to .,bu y
I
At , 1:
-11E184,537,700
from AIG (the purchased option) and an option to
sell €184,537,700, to AIG (the sold option) . The terms of the
purchased options were identical to the terms of the sold options
with respect to the number of euro, the exercise and expiration
date (October 3, 2000), and counterparty (AIG) . The exercise
prices and premiums of the purchased and sold options differed
slightly as shown-below :
Exercise Pric e
Gros s
Premium
per Euro
Euro
Exercise Pric e
Sold
$9,405,027
$1 .092
E184,537,700
$201,515,168 .4 0
Purchased
9,500,030
1 .091
184,537,700
201,330,630 .7 0
Option
95,003
Net
184,537 .7 0
The $95,003 difference in the, premiums payable on each pair of
options amounted to 1 percent of the higher premium on the
purchased option . The difference in . the exercise prices of the
purchased and sold options . amounted to one-tenth of .1 cent pe r
euro ;
the $184,537 .70 gross difference in the exercise prices o f
the purchased and sold, opt-ions amounted-to
.0009155,
or less than
one-tenth of l .percent of the higher exercise prices of the sold
options .
Because AIG was the counterparty on both options, each of
the Logan Trusts did not actually pay $9,500,030 of its own funds
to AIG for the purchased option, nor did it receive $9,405,027
from AIG for the sold option . Instead the Logan Trusts andAIG
netted their respective payment obligations with respect to'the
-12option premiums, and each Logan Trust paid the net $95,003 to AIG .
with respect to each pair of purchased and sold options : . '
,_ ! On or about October 9, 1999,,
in exchange for a partnership, .
interest in Tigers Eye, each of-the Logan Trusts contributed its
purchased option and assigned its obligations under the sol d
option ., ;to Tigers .Eye, along with $40,600 cash (a tota l
$121,800 for the three trusts) . Tigers Eye recorded that each
trust contributed $133,743 to capital (total $401,229) .
On December 15, 1999, about 65 days after the Logan Trusts
had contributed and assigned their interests and obligations in
the options to Tigers Eye, Tigers Eye distributed to the Logan
Trusts 'in liquidation of their partnership interests euro5 and
10,419 shares of Xerox Corp ., having a combined value o f
$229,992 .42 . In computing the net amounts the Logan Trusts . were
entitled to and did receive in liquidation of their interests in
Tigers Eye, the obligations of Tigers Eye to deliver euro if AIG
should exercise the sold options were netted and offset against
the rights of Tigers Eye to demand and receive euro if it should
exercise the purchased options . SKL received the 10,419 share s
.'This statement disregards other payments by .or on behalf of
Mr . Logan to AIG and others to enable the Logan Trusts to
participate in the transactions .at issue .
'Although the first stipulation of facts that has been
lodged does not specify the exact number of euro distributed to
the Logan Trusts, it appears that the dollar value of the
distributed euro and their proceeds of sale realized onbehalf of
Mr . Logan before yearend 1999 amounted to less than $14,000 .
-13of Xerox Corp . from the Logan Trusts and sold those shares on
December 31, 1999, for $227,447 .36 .
The Batts Group LTD (The Batts Group), another partner
I
in
Tigers Eye unrelated to Mr . Logan, entered into and carried out
transactions in a pair of euro options with AIG and Tigers Eye
that were similar to the transactions of the Logan Trusts .
Curtis Mallet issued a 16-page opinion letter (the first
letter) and 122-page legal memorandum, both dated March 31, 2000,
to Mr Logan individually and as trustee of the Logan Trusts .
Curtis Mallet issued a separate 10-page opinion letter, also
dated March 31, 2000, on the subject of penalties, to Mr . Logan
and the Trusts .
By fax,'dated April 7, 2000, and letter, dated
November 6, 2000, Curtis . Mallet revised and supplemented the
first letter and the legal memorandum . In Mr . Logan's opposition
to respondent's motion in limine, Mr . Logan's counsel asserts
that Curtis Mallet provided the same analysis in two opinion
letters and a 122-page memorandum to all Tigers Eye partners "wh o
reported basis/`partnership item' and who face the 40 percen t
penalty" .
Mr . Logan and the Logan Trusts claimed an aggregate basis in
the Xerox Corp . shares of more than $27 million . This resulted
in a claimed aggregate loss on the sale of the shares of more
than $26 million, which Mr . Logan reported on his 1999 Federa l
income tax return as short-term capital losses, offsetting the
-14bulk of the long-term capital gains he reported on his same-year
direct and indirect sales of MLWL stock .
Respoadent timely sent Tigers Eye the FPAA in issue,
comprising (1) Letter 1830, Notice,of Final Partnership`
Administrative Adjustment, (2),Form 870-PT, Agreement for
Partnership Items and Partnership Level Determinations as to
Penalties, Additions to, Tax, and Additional Amounts, including a
Schedule of Adjustments, and (3) an exhibit A setting forth
respondent's various determinations . The schedule of adjustments
adjusted to zero the following five items :
A . Capital contributions (Sched . M-2, line 2)
.B . Distributions of property other'tha n
money (Sched . M-2, line 6b)
C.
Outside
partnership
D . Other deductions (Sched .
E.
basis
K,
line
.$698,595
$365,446
$24,500,059
11)
(11,314)
Other income (loss) (Sched . K, line 7) (242,186)
Unlike items A, B, D, and E, each of which is identified a s
the adjustment of a line item on the Tigers Eye 1999 Form 1065,
U .S . Partnership Return of Income, the item C amount (Outside
partnership basis) does not appear on the partnership return, no r
can we trace it .to any entry on the Schedules K-1, Partner's
Share of Income, Credits, Deductions, etc ., to the partners, and
it does not tie into or relate to any item on the partnership
-15return of which we have been apprised .6 Items A and B are the
sums of the net amounts of property initially contributed and
later received as liquidating distributions by The Batts Group
and the Logan Trusts . It appears that the option premiums on the
purchased (long) options were netted against the option premiums
on the sold (short) options in arriving at the .gross amounts
shown on-the 1999 partnership return as having been contributed
by and distributed to The Batts Group and the Logan Trusts .
In exhibit A, respondent determined that :
1 . Neither Tigers Eye nor its purported partners
established its existence as a partnership as a matter of fact ;
2 . even if Tigers Eye existed as a partnership, it had no
business purpose other than tax avoidance, lacked economic
substance, and constitutes an economic sham for Federal income
tax purposes, so that the partnership and the transactions are
disregarded in full and any purported losses resulting from'the
transactions are not allowable as deductions and are not allowed
for Federal income tax purposes ;
3 . under section 1 .701-2, Income-Tax Regs ., Tigers Eye was
formed and availed of in connection with a transaction or
transactions in taxable year 1999, a principal purpose of whic h
6In a supplement to respondent's response to Mr . Logan's
motion, respondent asserts : "All partnership items that feed
into the Tigers Eye participants' outside bases in Tigers Eye ar e
properly raised by this line item
-16was to .reduce the present value of its partners' aggregate
Federal tax liability in a manner that is inconsistent with the
intentk'of subchapter K of the Internal Revenue Code ;
4 . the purported partners of Tigers Eye did not enter into
the option positions and Tigers Eye did not purchase the foreign
currency or stock with a profit motive for purposes of sectio n
165(c) (2) ;
5 ., even if the foreign currency options are treated .a s
having been contributed to Tigers Eye, the amount treated as
contributed by the partners under section 722 with respect to the
purchased options is reduced by the amounts received by the
contributing partners from the contemporaneous sales ofthe sold
options to the same counterparty, thus reducing the basis of the
contributed options in the hands of both Tigers Eye and the
contributing partners, so that any corresponding claimed, increases
in the outside bases in : Tigers Eye resulting . from the
contributions of the sold options are disallowed ;
6 . the adjusted bases of the purchased options .and other
property'purportedly contributed by the partners to Tigers Eye
have not been established under section 723 so that-the partners
of Tigers Eye have not established adjusted bases in thei r
respective partnership interests in an amount greater than zero ;
7 . in the case of a sale, exchange, or liquidation o f
Tigers Eye partners' partnership interests, neither the purported
-17partnership nor its purported partners have established . that the
bases of the partners '
partnership interests were greater than
zero for the purpose of determining gain or loss to such partners
from the sale ,
exchange ,
or liquidation of the partnership
interest ;
8 . accuracy - related penalties are determined at th e
partnership level and will ; be imposed at the partner level .
Sentinel, the tax matters partner, filed a petition durin g
the time it was entitled to do so as a notice partner . See
a
Barbados #6 Ltd . v . Commissioner , 85 T .C . 900, 903-905 (1985) .
Sentinel's petition assigned error to all of respondent's
determinations set forth in the FPAA . Respondent's answer
categorically denied all the assignments of error ; by amendmen t
to answer respondent advanced two additional theories, under
section 465(b)(4) and section 1 .988-2(f), Income Tax Regs .
The Court granted Mr . Logan, as trustee of Logan Trust I,
leave to file a notice to'participate in this proceeding . Banque
Safra, as well as Sentinel, has no stake in the outcome of this
proceeding . . The Batts Group settled its case with the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) arising from the FPAA in'the case at hand
and also has no stake in the outcome .
Mr . Logan asserts that in reporting losses from th e
transactions at issue on his return, he relied on the advice o f
professionals, including two attorneys and a certified public
-18accountant, as well as the Curtis Mallet opinion . He wishes to
raise his reliance on that advice as adefense to the application
of accuracy-related penalties if we should sustain respondent's
determinations in the FPAA that either Tigers Eye or the Logan
Trusts' transactions with Tigers Eye should be disregarded so
that the accuracy-related penalties would otherwise apply .
Mr . Logan submitted to the Court and served on Sentinel and
respondent, .a notice of expert witness in which he identified Mr .
Smith as a witness who may aid the Court in evaluating whether
the Curtis Mallet opinion "i .s of the quality and character upon
which the Logan Trust could reasonably rely in preparing its-tax
returns" . A copy of "Petitioner's Expert Report of Stuart A .
Smith",(the Smith report) was attached to Mr . Logan's notice .
Mr . Logan would have the Smith report entered into evidence to
support his claim that his reliance on the Curtis Mallet opinion
was-reasonable .
On May 20, 2008, the first stipulation of facts, with
exhibits, was lodged with the Court . Included among those
exhibits were Exhibits 125-J, 126-J, 127-J, 128-J, and 130-J,
comprising copies of the Curtis Mallet opinion, as revised and
supplemented, and the 122-page .legal memorandum .
On September 26, 2008, the second stipulation of facts, with
exhibits, was lodged with the Court . Included among those
exhibits are copies of communications among representatives of
-19Sentinel and BDO Seidman and attorneys at Curtis Mallet that
would indicate that Curtis Mallet played a role in the
preparation of the forms of documents used to implement the,
transactions at issue . Mr . Logan asserts that he did not receiv e
a copy of any such communications included among such exhibits
before this litigation commenced .
Neither the first stipulation of facts nor the second
stipulation of facts nor any .document yet lodged or filed in thi s
proceeding refers to or includes a copy of any retainer agreemen t
between Mr . Logan and Curtis Mallet or to any Curtis Mallet..
opinion to The Batts Group nor to whether, when, and in what
circumstances Tigers Eye disposed of its interests an d
obligations in the paired options contributed and assigned to .
Tigers Eye by the Logan Trusts .
{
Discussio n
I .
TEFRA Procedures and Partnership Item s
The unified partnership audit and litigation procedures set
forth in sections 6221 through 6234 were originally enacted by
the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA ),'
Pub . L . 97-248, sec . 402(a), 96 Stat . 648 . TEFRA provisions
divide disputes arising from "partnership items"' from thos e
7Sec . 6231(a)(3) defines "partnership item" as :
with respect to a partnership, any item required to be!
taken into account for the partnership's taxable yea r
(continued . . .)
-20arising from "nonpartnership items" .'
Maxwell v . Commissioner ,
87 T .C . 783, 787 (1986) (citing section 6231(a)(3) and (4)) . If
the tax treatment of a partnership item is at issue, the statute
requires the matter to be resolved at the partnership level .
Sec . 6221 ;
A.
Maxwell v . Commissioner ,
supra at 787-788 .
Partnership Item s
In a partnership-level proceeding the Court has jurisdiction
determine "all partnership items of . the partnership for th e
partnership taxable year to which the notice of final partnership
administrative adjustment relates, the proper allocation of such
items among the .partners ., and the applicability of any penalty,
addition to tax, or additional amount which relates to an
adjustment to a partnership item ." Sec . 6226(f) . "While TEFRA
defines a `partnership item' in technical terms, the provision
generally encompasses items `more appropriately determined at the
partnership level than .at the partner level"' .
States , 389 F .3d 152,
Weiner v . United
154 (5th Cir . 2004) .(quoting section
6231(a),(3)) . . The determination of partnership itemsin, ;a
partnership-level proceeding is binding on the partners and ma y
. . .continued)
under any provision of subtitle A to the extent
regulations prescribed by the Secretary provide that,
for purposes of this subtitle, such item is more
appropriately determined at the partnership level than
at the partner level .
8Sec . 6231(a)(4) defines the term "nonpartnership item" as
"an item which is .(or is treated as) not a partnership item ."
-21not be challenged i•n a later partner-level proceeding . Secs .
6230 (c) (4) , 7422 (h )
B.
Affected Item s
The term "affected item " means
"any item to the extent such
item is affected by a partnership item ." Sec . 6231(a)(5) . An! .
affected item is by definition not a partnership item .
Dial USA ;
Inc . v . Commissioner , 95 T .C . 1, 5 (1990) . An affected item,"
rather than being universally applicable to every partner, is
peculiar to a particular partner's tax position .
Commissioner ,
Maxwell :v .
supra at 790 .
Affected items have two essential aspects . The first
involves a partnership issue and the second involves a
nonpartnership issue ; i .e ., the partner's personal items .
Partners must raise any partnership item that "affects" thei r
personal items at the partnership-level proceeding . See, e .g .,
GAF Corp . & Subs . v . Commissioner , 114 T .C . 519, 528 (2000) ;
Dubin v . Commissioner , 99 T .C . 325, 328 (1992) ;
Commissioner ,
supra
at
792-793 .
Maxwell v .
If a partner does not pursue his
rights in a partnership-level proceeding, he may not later seek a
redetermination of partnership items as .they relate to his
affected item in a later partner-level proceeding . See, e .g .,
GAF Corp . & Subs . v . Commissioner ,
supra at
526-527 .
After the partnership-level proceeding is concluded and the
partnership administrative adjustments have become final, the
-22Commissioner makes a "computational adjustment", a change in the
tax liability of a partner that .properly reflects the treatment
of a partnership item . See sec . 6231(a)(6) . If a computational
adjustment results in a deficiency in a partner's tax stemming
from an affected item that requires a factual determination at
the partner level, the normal deficiency procedures outlined in
sections 6212 and 6213 apply . Sec . 6230(a) ; sec . 301 .6231(a)(6) .
1T(a) . .(2), Temporary Proced . & Admin . Regs ., 64 Fed . Reg .-3840
(Jan . 26, 1999) .9 On the other hand, . if the computational .
adjustment of a partner's tax liability . can be made without
making any additional partner-level determinations, the
Commissioner may . directly assess . the change without issuing a
notice of deficiency . Sec . 6231(a)(6), (c) ;
N .C .F . Energy
Partners v . Commissioner , 89 T .C ., 741, 744 (1987) ; sec .
;
301 .6231(a)(6)-1T(a)(l), Temporary Proced . & Admin . Regs ., 64
Fed . Reg . 3840 (Jan . 26, 1999) . If the partner believes that the
computational adjustment was erroneous,'he may file a claim for
refund,after"payment, sec . 6230(c), .and, upon its denial, sue for
the refund in a District Court or the Court of Federal Claims .
C .
Penalties and Defenses to Penaltie s
Any penalty, addition : to tax, or additional, amount,:
(collectively penalty) related to adjustments stemming from a n
9With the exception of penalties . See infra pt' .
-immediately following .
-23adjustment to partnership items has generally been treated as an
affected item that often requires a factual determination at the
partner level . See N .C .F . Energy Partners v . Commissioner ,
supra
at 744 ; sec . 301 .6231(a)(5)-1T(d), Temporary Proced . & Admin
Regs ., 52 Fed . Reg . 6790 (Mar . . 5, 1987) . Before Congress enacte d
TRA 1997 the Court did not, have jurisdiction in a partnershiplevel proceeding to decide the applicability of partnership-ite m
penalties .10 See N .C . F . . Energy Partners v . Commissioner ,
supra ;
Crystal Beach Dev . of Destin Ltd . ., v . Commissioner , T .C . Memo .
2000-170 . Rather, partnership-item penalties were determined at
the partner level as affected items in a deficiency proceeding
after the related partnership-level proceeding had been
completed .
TRA 1997 section 1238(a) amended section 6221 to provide .,
that "the applicability of any penalty, addition to tax, or
additional amount which relates to an adjustment to a partnershi p
10The Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 (TRA 1997), Pub . L .
105-34, sec . 1238, 111 Stat . 1026, amended the partnership
procedures regarding penalties by (1) amending sec . 6221 to
require the applicability of any partnership-item penalty to be
determined at the partnership level, (2) amending sec .
6230(a)(2)(A)(i) to exclude partnership-item penalties fromithe
deficiency proceeding, and (3) amending sec . 6230(c)(4) making
conclusive the partnership level determination regarding the
applicability of any partnership-item penalty but allowing the
partner to assert in a refund claim any "partner-level" defenses .
-24item"-be determined at the partnership level ." Although the
applicability of a penalty usually requires consideration of any
defenses to the penalty, section 301 .6221-1T(c) and (d),
Temporary Proced . & Admin . Regs ., 64 Fed . Reg . 3838 (Jan . 26,
1999), prohibits "partner level defenses" to any partnership-item
penalty from being litigated in the partnership-level proceeding
and allows such a penalty attributable to the treatment of
partnership items to be assessed as a computational adjustment
irrespective of whether partner-level determinations are
required . A partner who wishes to assert a partner-level defense
to such a penalty must do so in a separate refund action
following assessment and payment . Sec . 6230(c) ; sec . 301 .62211T(d), Temporary Proced . & Admin . Regs .,
supra .12 Althoug h
"In its report underlying the amendments, the House
Committee on Ways and Means explained that it had proposed the
amendment because :
Many penalties are based upon the conduct of the
taxpayer . With respect to partnerships, the relevant
conduct often occurs at the partnership level . In
addition, applying penalties at the partner level
.through the deficiency procedures following the
conclusion of the unified proceeding at the partnership
level increases the administrative burden on the IRS
and can significantly increase the Tax Court's
inventory . [H . Rept . 105-148, at 594 (1997), 1997-4`
C .B . (Vol . 1) 319, 916 . ]
12The temporary regulation is consistent with the
legislative history . The House committee report explained that
the proposed amendment "provides that the partnership-level
proceeding is to include a determination of the applicability of
penalties at the partnership level . . However, the provisio n
(continued . . .
-25partner-level defenses maybe raised only in a refund action,
defenses to any penalty that are not partner-level defense's must .
be determined in the partnership-level proceeding . See, e .g . ,
Klamath Strategic Inv . Fund, LLC v . United States ,
F .3d .
(5th Cir ., May 15, 2009) (slip op . at 14-16) (considering
reasonable cause and good faith defenses at partnership level by
looking to actions of managing member), affg . in part, vacating
in part, and remanding 472 F . Supp . 2d 885, 902-904 (E .D . Tex .
2007) ;
Whitehouse Hotel Ltd . Pship . v . Commissioner , 131 T .C .
(2008) (reasonable cause exception for qualified appraisal in
section 6664(c)(1) is a partnership-level defense) ;
Pictures, LLC v . Commissioner , T .C .
Santa Monic a
Memo . 2005-104 (looking t
actions of partnership through managing member in considering
partnership ' s reasonable cause and good faith defenses ) ;
Creek Invs ., LLC v .
United States ,
82 Fed .
Stobie
C1 . .636 (2008)
(partnership - level reasonable cause defense to any of the
penalties under section 6664 ( c)) ;
States , 80 Fed .
Cl .
Jade Trading , LLC v .
Unite d
11, 60 (2005) (partnership's reasonable cause
defenses were not raised and, therefore, were not considered by
the court) ;
Long Term Capital Holdings v . United States , 330 F .
Supp . 2d 122, 205-212 (D . Conn . 2004) (considering partnership' s
12 ( .
. .continued)
.
allows partners to raise any partner-level defenses in a refund
forum ." H . Rept . 105-148, at 594 (1997), 1997-4 C .B . (Vol . 1)
319, 916 .
-26reasonable cause and good faith defenses at partnership level by
looking to actions of general partner), affd . 150 Fed . Appx . 40
(2d Cir ; . 2005) ; see also sec . 301 .6221-1T(c), Temporary Proced . &
Admin .Regs .,
supra
(partnership=level determinations include all
legal and factual determinations underlying the determination of
partnership-level penalties, including partnership-level-defense s
but not partner-level defenses) .
D. .
Exceptions to Application of TEFRA Procedures "
For completeness and to prepare for concluding observations
in the Afterword about problems of judicial administration
created by TRA 1997 and the temporary regulation, we note two
circumstances under section 6231 in which what would have
otherwise been partnership items may be treated as nonpartnership
items . In these circumstances, application of the TEFRA
procedures may be avoided so that the traditional deficiency and
assessment procedures will apply to both deficiencies and
penalties .
Under section 6231(a)(1)(B), there is an exception for small
partnerships (having fewer than .10 partners, each of whom is a
U .S . resident individual, C corporation, or estate of adecedent
partner) . Although Tigers Eye had fewer than 10 partners, it was
purportedly owned by a number of passthrough entities, and so it
did not qualify for the exception and remained subject to TEFRA .
See Primco Mgmt . Co . v . Commissioner , T .C . Memo . 1997-332 ; Rev .
-27Rul . 2004-88, 2004-2 C .B . 165 . Son-of-BOSS partnerships with
fewer than 10 .par .tners, for, the most part, but not invariably,
see New Phoenix Sunrise Corp . & Subs . v . Commissioner , 132 T .C .
(2009), do not qualify for the small partnership exception
because individuals participating in the transaction use
disqualified entities such as grantor trusts and LLCs to hold
their interests and other disqualified persons such as foreign .
individuals or entities are partners . As we observed in New 'Phoenix Sunrise Corp . & Subs . v . Commissioner ,
supra at
n .3
(slip op . at 20) (quoting Wadsworth-v- .- Commissioner , T .C . Memo .
2007-46), "'The small partnership exception permits this Court t o
review in a deficiency suit items that otherwise would be subject
to . partnership-level proceedings'" . .
Under section 6231(c) the Secretary is authorized to
promulgate regulations with respect to special enforcement areas .
Partnership items may be treated as nonpartnership items under
section 6231(c) if by such regulations the Secretary determines ,
and provides that to treat such items as partnership items will
interfere with the effective and efficient enforcement of the
revenue laws . Special enforcement areas mentioned in section
6231(c)(1) include (A) termination and jeopardy assessments, (B)
criminal investigations, (C) indirect methods of proof of income,
(D) foreign partnerships, and (E) "other areas that the Secretary
determines by regulation" . Among such areas that have been
-28designated by regulation, in addition to those specified in
section 6231(c)(1),13 are bankruptcy and . receivership, sec .
301 .62.31(c) .-7, Proced . & Admin . Regs ., and requests for ;prompt
assessment, sec . 301 .6231(c)-8, .Proced . & Admin . Regs .
The following comment appears in 1 . McKee et al ., Federal
Taxation of Partners and Partnerships, par . 10 .02[4], at 10-16
(4th ed . 2007) :
Converting partnership items to nonpartnership
items may have the salutary effect of freeing the
Service and the partnership from the potentially
cumbersome procedures of the partnership audit rules in
. .appropriate cases . * * *
February 12, 2009, the Secretary proposed regulation s
that would determine that treating items related to listed
transactions within the meaning of section 1 .6011-4(b)(2), Income
Tax Regs ., as partnership items "interferes with the effective
and efficient enforcement of the internal revenue laws" . Notice
of proposed rule making, 74 Fed ."Reg . 7206 (Feb . 13, 2009) . In
Notice 2000-44,
supra , 2000-2 C .B . at 256, the IRS had announced
that Son-of-BOSS transactions using the paired-option partnership
contribution/disposition arrangement are "listed transactions" .
However, the proposed regulations would not become effective
until adopted as final regulations, applicable to partner taxable
years ending on or after the date of-publication of the propose d
13No such'designation has been made by regulation with
respect to foreign partnerships .
-29_
regulations in the Federal Register . Sec . 301 .6231(c)-9(c),,
Proposed Proced . .& Admin . Regs ., 74 Fed . Reg . 7208 (Feb . 13, :
2009) . Under the proposed regulations, as under the current
regulations related to designated enforcement areas, the
conversion of partnership items to nonpartnership items would
occur only if the Commissioner sent a written notice to that
effect to a partner before issuing an FPAA . A hearing was set
for June 4, 2009, and comments were requested by May 14 .
II .
Petitioner's Motion To Invalidate Temporary Regulation
We now turn to Mr . Logan's motion for partial summary
judgment that section 301 .6221-1T(c) and (d), Temporary Proced . &
Admin . Regs .,
supra,
is invalid because it would prevent him from
interposing his partner-level defenses to accuracy-related
penalties in this partnership-level proceeding .
The issue is important . It not only has implications for
taxpayer rights ; it has practical consequences for judicial
administration generally and the conduct of the trial in the case
at hand, . and also--as we shall see--for resolution of
respondent's motion in limine .
Mr . Logan's counsel represented the taxpayer in Jad e
Trading
.LLC v . United States , 80 Fed . Cl . 11 (2007) on appeal
(Fed . Cir ., Feb . 25, 2008),19 another Son-of-BOSS case o f
"In Evergreen Trading, LLC v . United States , Fed . Cl .
06-123T, involving another Sentinel-promoted Son-of-BOS S
(continued . . .
-30transactions promoted by Sentinel that appears to follow the same
format as New Millennium Trading, LLC v . Commissioner , 131 T .C . _
(2008), and the case at hand . In Jade Trading , there was a 3week trial that was devoted in large part to the introduction of
evidence of the participating partners' alleged due diligence and
good faith reliance .on financial and tax advisers .
In Jade Trading , Judge Williams first held, on the'merits,
that the paired-option transactions lacked economic reality,
notwithstanding her view, under Helmer v . Commissioner , T .C .
Memo . 1975-160, and its offspring, that the obligations to
satisfy the sold call options assigned to and assumed by the
partnership would not be considered liabilities under section
752 .15
Second, Judge Williams determined that the partnership-level
elements for the application of the 40-percent gross valuation
misstatement penalty and other accuracy-related penalties had all
been satisfied because the transaction was an abusive ta x
14( . . .continued)
partnership, Judge .Allegra, in an order dated Sept . 23, 2008, has
stayed all further proceedings pending final resolution on appeal
of Jade Trading, LLC v . United States , 80 Fed . Cl . 11 (2 007) .,
Previously, Judge Allegra had issued Evergreen Trading, LLC v .
United States , 80 Fed . Cl . 122 (2007), a detailed and
comprehensive opinion (21 single-spaced pages and 20-pag .e
appendix), granting in part and denying in part the Government's
motion to compel production of more than 140 documents that
plaintiff had withheld from discovery . See also Nussdorf v .
Commissioner , 129 T .C . 30 (2007) .
15See
supra note 2 .
-31shelter .
In Jade Trading , LLC v .
176 (2008 ),
United States ,
81 Fed . Cl . . 173,
denying Sentinel ' s motion for reconsideration, Judge
Williams stated that the penalties that the Court had determined
clearly related t o
the inflated basis [that] the spread transaction in the
partnership generated on the * * * [partners']
individual returns * * *
* * * it was only the construct of forming the partnership_
and contributing the .spread to the partnership that i
,permitted the tax losses to be realized . Had th e
* * * [partners] simply done the spread transactions on
their own without contributing them to * * * [the
partnership] there would have been no substantial losses .
As the Court recognized : " packaging the investment in the
partnership, vehicle was an absolute necessity for securing
Jade [Trading ], 80 Fed . Cl . at 14 .
the tax benefits . "
[Emphasis supplied . ]
Third, Judge Williams . . upheld the validity of the temporary
.regulation . Notwithstanding that a .substantial part of the, Jade
Trading trial had been devoted to the introduction of evidence to
support the participating partners' defenses to the penalties,
Judge Williams held that the temporary regulation was valid~iand
prevented the Court from considering those defenses . As a
result, if Jade Trading should be affirmed on the pending appeal
to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the Commissioner
will be able to assess by 'computational adjustments not only the
deficiencies (only some part of which has already been paid) bu t
also the 40-percent penalties, and the participating partners
will be required to file claims and suits for refund in order to
obtain judicial review of their partner-level defenses/claims for
-32refund of the penalties . To similar effect is
Invs .,'LLC .v . United States , 82 Fed .
Cl .
Stobie Creek
636 (2008) (Court of
Federal :'',Claims held partnership, through its managing partner,
did not act with reasonable cause and good faith in regard to tax
underpayment so as to preclude accuracy-related penalties) on .
appeal (Fed . Cir ., Sept . 29, 2008) . But compare Klamat h
Strategic Inv . Fund , LLC v .
United States ,
F .3d at
(slip op . at 21-23) (Court of Appeals affirmed District Court's
holding that penalties did not apply because managers of
partnership reasonably relied on advice of professionals, but
reversed District Court's ordering a refund because District
Court did not have jurisdiction to grant refund in partnershiplevel proceeding) .
In New Millennium Trading, LLC v . Commissioner ,
supra , thi s
Court, on the participating-partner-tax-matters-partner's motion
for partial summary judgment, has held that the temporary
regulation is valid and applicable to prevent the participating
partner from interposing his partner-level defenses in the
partnership-level proceeding if the Court should sustain th e
Commissioner's FPAA determinations that the partnership or the
participating partner's transactions with the partnership shoul d
be disregarded . We are bound to follow New Millennium Trading ;
we shall therefore deny Mr . Logan's motion for partial summary
judgment .
sy
-33III .
Respondent's Motion in Limine ,
Mr . Logan asserts that he and the Logan Trusts reasonably
relied on the Curtis Mallet.,opinion in taking their return
positions that (1) their obligations under the sold options did
not reduce the bases of their partnership interests in Tigers Eye .
and (2) in the liquidation of their partnership interests they
received high-basis assets whose sales created capital losses
that offset the long-term capital gains Mr . Logan realized
earlier in 1999 on the sales of MLWL shares .
A.
Reasonable Cause Defense to Accuracy-Related Penalties .
Section 6664(c)(1) provides a reasonable cause defense to
application of accuracy-related penalties . Pursuant to section
6664(c)(1), the accuracy-related penalty under section 6662(a)
does not apply to any portion of an underpayment if the taxpaye r
shows that there was reasonable cause for, and that he acted i n
good faith with respect to, such portion . See Higbee v .
Commissioner , 116 T .C . 438,- 448-449 (2001) ; sec . 1 .6664-4(a),
Income Tax Regs . The determination of whether the taxpayer acted
with reasonable cause and in good . faith depends on the pertinent
facts and circumstances . Sec . 1 .6664-4(b)(1), Income TaxRegs .
"Generally, the most important factor is the extent of the
taxpayer's effort to assess the taxpayer's proper tax liability .
Circumstances that may indicate reasonable cause and good faith
-34include * * * the experience, knowledge, and education of . th e
taxpayer."
Id .
Under some circumstances, a taxpayer may avoid liability for
the accuracy-related penalty by showing reasonable reliance on a
competent professional adviser . See United States v . Boyle , 469
U .S . 241, 250-251 (1985) ;
Freytaq v . Commissioner , 89 T .C . 849,
888 (1987), affd . 904 F .2d 1011 (5th Cir . 1990), affd . .501 U .S .
868 (1991) . For reliance on professional advice to excuse a
taxpayer-from negligence, the taxpayer must show that the
professional had the requisite expertise, as well as knowledge of
the pertinent facts, to provide informed advice on the subject
matter .--See David v . Commissioner , 43 F,3d 788, 789-790
1995), affg . T .C . Memo . 1993-621 ;
Freytaq v . Commissioner ,
(2d Cir .
supra
at 888 . The validity of the reliance turns on "the quality and
objectivity of professional advice which they obtained" .
Swayze
v . United States , 785 F .2d 715, 719 (9th Cir . 1986) .
"In order for reliance on professional tax advice to be
reasonable, however, the advice must generally be from a
competent and independent advisor unburdened with a conflict of
interest and-not from promoters of the investment ."
Mortensen v .
Commissioner , 440 F .3d 375, 387 .(6th Cir . 2006), affg . T .C . Memo .
2004-279 . Courts have routinely-held that taxpayers could not
reasonably rely on the advice of promoters or other advisers with
an inherent conflict of interest such as one who financially
-35benefits from the transaction . See, e .g .,
Goldman v .
Commissioner , 39 F .3d 402, 408 (2d Cir . 1994) (taxpayer could not
reasonably rely on professional advice of someone known to be
burdened with an inherent conflict of interest--a sales
representative of transaction), affg . T .C . Memo . 1993-480 ;
Pasternak v . Commissioner , 990 F .2d 893, 903 (6th Cir .
1993)
(reliance on promoters or their agents is unreasonable . because
such persons-are not independent of the investment), affg . T .C .
Memo . 1991-181 ;
Illes v . Commissioner , 982 F .2d 163, 166 (6th
Cir . 1992) (finding negligence where taxpayer relied on person
with financial interest in the venture), affg . T .C . Memo .
1991-449 ; see also Hansen v . Commissioner , 471 F .3d 1021, 1031
(9th Cir . 2006) ("a taxpayer cannot negate the negligence penalty
through reliance on a transaction's promoters or on other
advisors who have a conflict of interest"), affg . T .C . Memo .
2004-269 ;
Van Scoten V . Commissioner , 439 F .3d 1243, 1253 (10th
Cir . 2006) ("To be reasonable, the professional adviser cannot be
directly affiliated with the promoter ; instead, he must be more
independent"), affg . T .C . Memo . 2004-275 ;
Barlow v . Commissioner ,
301 F .3d 714, 723 (6th Cir . .2002) (noting "that courts have foun d
that a taxpayer is negligent if he puts his faith in a schem e
that,'on its face, offers improbably high tax advantages, withou t
obtaining an objective, independent opinion on its validity"),
-36affg . T .C . Memo . 2000-339 . A promoter's self-interest makes such
."advice" inherently unreliable .
B. .
Respondent's Position in Motion in Limin g
Mr . Logan . identified Mr . Smith as a witness whose testimony
and expert ; report might aid the Court in evaluating whether the
Curtis Mallet opinion "is of the quality and character upon which
the Logan Trust could reasonably . rely in preparing its tax
returns" . Respondent filed respondent's motion in limine .to
exclude . the Smith report and filed a supplement to the motion .
Respondent advances two alternative,g .rounds for excluding
the Smith report from evidence in its entirety : (1) The Smith
report relates solely to Mr .,Logan's partner-level defenses that
cannot not be raised in this partnership-level proceeding under
section 301.6221-1T(c) and (d), Temporary Proced . & Admin .- Regs .,
sura ; and .,(2) the Smith report expresses legal conclusions . If
we should reject both alternatives,, respondent asserts that
portions of the Smith report'should be excluded because they
constitute advocacy 1 6
16 .With respect to respondent's argument about advocacy, we
observe that Mr . Smith successfully represented the plaintiffs in
a partner-level'proceeding, Allison v . United States , 80 Fed . Cl .
568 (2008), in establishing their rights to refunds of negligence
penalties assessed against them because of deductions and credits
they claimed from their participation in a plastics recycling
partnership that had been determined in a partnership-level
proceeding to be an abusive tax shelter .
-37Respondent has also taken the position that Curtis Mallet .
was a promoter of the transactions in issue=and that the status
of Curtis Mallet as a promoter of Tigers Eye should be determined
in this partnership-level proceeding .17 Mr . Logan filed an
opposition to respondent's motion in limine, and respondent filed
a reply to the opposition by Mr . Logan to respondent's motion in
limine as supplemented .
There seems to be incongruity between respondent's positio n
that Mr . Logan's alleged reliance on the Curtis Mallet opinion i s
a partner-level defense over which we lack jurisdiction in thi s
partnership-level proceeding and respondent's assertion that in
this same proceeding . we should determine that Curtis Mallet was
one of the promoters of the transactions in .issue on whos e
opinion Mr . Logan was not .entitled to rely . We therefore
consider whether we have jurisdiction in this partnership-level
proceeding to decide whether Curtis Mallet was a promoter because
it relates to the issue of raising defenses to partnership-ite m
penalties in this proceeding .
"Respondent served notice (in n .7 of respondent's response
to Mr . Logan's motion for partial summary judgment to declare the
temporary regulation invalid) that respondent asserts that (1)
Curtis Mallet was one of the promoters of the transactions in,
issue ; (2) as a matter of law, citing sec . 6664(d), a partner,
cannot reasonably rely on the opinion issued by a promoter, and
(3) we should address the status of Curtis Mallet as a promoter
in this partnership-level proceeding .
-38Status as-Promoter of Partnershilp .De.termined-in
Partnership-Level' Proceedin g
.In the FPAA respondent determined, inter alia, that Tigers
Eye should be disregarded for Federal income tax purposes because
it "had no business purpose other than tax avoidance, lacked
economic substance, and constitutes an economic sham for Federal
income tax purposes" . A "partnership item" includes "the legal
and factual determinations that underlie the determination of th e
amount, timing, and characterization of items of income, credit ,
gain, loss, deduction, etc ." Sec . 301 .6231(a)(3)-l(b),'Proced .
& Admin. Regs . Among such determinations are whether partnership
activities have been engaged in with the intent to make a profit
for purposes of section 183 .
Id . 18 The characterization of
a
partnership as a sham or as lacking economic substance is a lega l
determination .that directly bears on the amount an d
characterization of items of income, credit, gain, loss,
deduction, etc . and falls within the definition of partnershi p
item .
Petaluma FX Partners , LLC v .
(2008 ) ;
see also RJT Invs .
Commissioner , 131 T .C . _
X v . Commissioner ,
491 F .3d 732, 737
(8th Cir . 2007) .
1EWe also note that par . 4 of exhibit A to the FPAA asserts
.that the "purported partners of-Tigers Eye . did not enter into the
option : positions - and Tigers Eye did not , purchase the foreign
currency or stock with a profit motive for purposes of-section
165(c ) .( 2)" . . Notice 2000 - 44, 2000-2 C . . B . 255 , 255, cites, Fox'v. .
Commissioner , 82 T .C . 1001 (1 .984) , for . the proposition that "i n
the case, of individuals,, these .[paired-option ] transactions ma y
.be subject to challenge under § 165 (c)(2)" .
-39To prove that Tigers Eye engaged in the transactions a t
issue for profit, Sentinel 'and participating partner must show
that the activity . was undertaken with an actual and hones t
objective of making a profit . While a reasonable expectation of
profit is not . required, there must be a bona fide objective o f
making an economic profit,, independent of tax savings .
Taube v .
Commissioner , 88 T .C . 464, 478-479 (1987) (and . cases cited
thereat) ;
Beck v . Commissioner , 85 T .C . 557, 569-570 (1985) (and
cases cited thereat) .
The analysis of profit objective must be made at the
partnership level .
States ,
Klamath Strategic Inv . Fund, LLC v . United
F .3d at (slip op . at 19) ;
Polakof V .
Commissioner , 820 F .2d 321, 323 (9th Cir . 1987), affg . T .C . Memo .
1985-197 ;
Hulter v . Commissioner , 91 T .C . 371, 393 (1988) ;
Brannen v . Commissioner , 78 T .C . 471, 502-505 (1982), affd . 722
F .2d 695 (11th Cir . 1984) . The proper focus is on the activities
and intent of the general managers and promoters who effectively
organize and operate the partnership .
Fund, LLC v . United States ,
Klamath Strategic Inv .
supra at (slip op . at 19) (citing
Agro Science Co . v . Commissioner , 934 F .2d 573, 576 (5th Cir .
1991), affg . T .C . Memo . 1989-687) ; . Surloff v . Commissioner , 81
T .C . 210, 233 (1983) ;
Kelley v . Commissioner , T .C . Memo .
1993-495 . . In determining whether the partnership engaged in the
activity for profit, we must take into account all of the facts
-40and circumstances with respect,to the activity . Some courts have
held that evidence concerning other investor transactions
involving the same tax shelter product or program is relevant . .
See,,e .g .,
Sochin v . Commissioner , 843 F .2d 351, 355 & n .8 (9th
Cir . 1988).
.(and cases cited at-n .8), affg .
Brown v . Commissioner ,
85 T .C ., .968 (1985) ; ; . Jade Trading, .LLC .v . United States , .65 Fed .
Cl . 188,191-1 :92
(2005) .
"A consideration of the entire
investment program directly relates, to the analysis of Taxpayers
probable economic benefits ."
Sochin v . Commissioner , supra at
355 .
Mr . Logan's counsel states in-the opposition to respondent's
motion in limine that the universe of partners in Tigers Eye who
face ,the accuracy-related penalties received two .opinions .and a
122-page memorandum of law .from Curtis Mallet and that
While it is absolutely true that Mr . Smith states .his
analysis in terms of whether the Curtis Mallet opinion
was of .the type-on which .Mr- . .Logan could•reasonablyi
.rely, that reality is true for the universe of those
partners who reported the basis/" .par.tnershipiitem" and
who face the 40 percent penalty asserted by the .FPAA
because they all received the same type of analysis ;
from Curtis Mallet . [Emphasis added . ]
It appears to the Court that Curtis Mallet may have provide d
substantially identical tax opinions to investors in othe r
Sentinel-promoted Son-of-BOSS transactions and that, like Mr .
Logan, each investor was required to pay $100,000 to obtain a
Curtis Mallet opinion .
See, e .g .,
Jade Trading, LLC v . United
-41States,
80 Fed . Cl . at 14 n .3 .19 The Government is also arguing
on the appeal of Jade Trading that there is evidence'in th e
record of that-case that Mr . Bricker (the Curtis Mallet'partner
responsible for the opinion therein and the subject opinion,in
the case at 'hand) understood that prospective clients would!
retain : . Curtis . Mallet only if it rendered a favorable tax opinion . .
There are also indications in the Exhibits to the Second .
Stipulation of Facts that has been lodged with the Court that
Curtis Mallet attorneys may have played a role in preparing the .
forms of documents that were used to implement . the transactions
{
in issue in this and other cases .
Whether Curtis Mallet was a promoter of the transactions-a t
issue such that no investor could reasonably rely on the . Curtis
Mallet opinion requires factual findings properly determined in a
partnership - level proceeding ,, similar to factual findings
necessary to determine that a partner has no basis in his
partnership interest because the partnership is a sham or lacks
economic substance .
Commissioner , 131 T .C .
See Petaluma FX Partners, LLC v .
(2008) . .
19See also Carlisle v . Curtis, . Mallet-Prevost, Colt & Mosle, . .
.
LLP , 521 .F .3d 597, 599 (6th Cir' . 2008) (plaintiffs, who
participated' in a tax shelter promoted by Arthur Andersen LLP and
others, had signed individual, retainer agreements with Curtis
Mallet for a fee of $100,000 each), reed . and remanded sub nom . .
Arthur Andersen LLP v . Carlisle , 556 U .S . 77 U .S .L .W . 4474,
(May 4, 2009) .
-42If, as respondent contends, Curtis Mallet was a promoter o f
Tigers Eye, our focus in deciding whether Tigers Eye engaged in
the activities for profit must include the activities and intent
of Curtis Mallet . Whether Curtis Mallet was a promoter is a
partnership-level issue to be determined in this proceeding as
part of our review of the issues raised by the FPAA concerning
the creation and operation of the partnership and the means and
manner by which it and participating interests in it were created
and sold . Therefore the Curtis Mallet opinion, and the
circumstances in which it-was arranged and provided for, prepare d
,and produced, and obtained, received, and paid for by Mr . Logan,
are properly the subject of evidence in this proceeding .20
Although respondent has taken-the position that Curti s
Mallet was a promoter of the transactions at issue, respondent
asserts that Mr . Logan's claim that he and the Logan Trusts
reasonably relied on the Curtis Mallet opinion is a partner-leve l
20In this regard, any similar evidence of Curtis Mallet
opinions to The Batts Group and to participating partners in
other Sentinel-promoted Son-of-BOSS transactions would be
relevant to establishing a pattern of activity of Curtis Mallet
.in concert with Sentinel and any other alleged promoter or
promoters that would tend to support respondent's contention that
Curtis Mallet acted as a promoter in the case, at hand . See,
e .g .., Sochin v . Commissioner , : 843 F .2d 351, 355 (9th Cir . 1988 .)
(Tax,Court properly admitted evidence of transactions of other
investors in the promoter's program who were not before the Court
as relevant to the sham determination), affg . Brown v .
Commissioner , 85 T .C . 968 (1985) .
-43defense that cannot be raised in this partnership-level
proceeding under the temporary regulation . Respondent asserts
that the Smith report relates solely to Mr . Logan's partner-level
defenses and asks the Court to exclude the Smith report from
evidence in this partnership-level proceeding . We disagree ; . the
analysis that follows shows that the definition of partner-level
defense in the temporary regulation does .not necessarily
encompass Mr . Logan's and the Logan Trusts' reliance on the
Curtis Mallet opinion .
D.
Tax Court's Jurisdiction To Decide Defenses to
Applicability of Penalty That Are Not Partner-Level
Defenses Defined by Temporary Regulatio n
Section 6226(f), as amended by TRA 1997 section 1238(b), 111
Stat . 1026, gives this Court jurisdiction to decide the
applicability of any partnership-item penalty, and generally, the
applicability of a .penalty depends on the absence or existence of
a valid defense to its application . Section 6226(f) neither
specifically permits nor prohibits the Court's consideration of
the partnership's or partners' defenses to partnership-item
penalties in the partnership-level proceeding . However, the
temporary regulation prohibits partner-level defenses to any
partnership-item penalty from being asserted in the partnershiplevel proceeding but allows them to be asserted in a separate
refund proceeding as permitted in section 6230(c)(4) . Although
section 6230(c)(1) and (4) and the temporary regulation make
-44clear that partner-level, defenses cannot'be decided at the
partnership level, by implication . all . other defenses may-be
determined at the partnership level .
The temporary regulation~,specifically .limits=partner-level
.defenses to those defenses "that . are personal to the partner or
are dependent upon .the partner's'separate return, and cannot b e
determined at the partnership level ." Sec . -301 .6221-1T(d),
Temporary Proced . & Admin . Regs .,
supra' .
Examples of
partner-level defenses include "whether any applicable threshol d
underpayment of tax ha_s been met with respect to the partner or
whether the partner has .met the criteria ofrsection 6664(b)
(penalties applicable only where return is filed) ; or section
6664(c)(1) (reasonable cause exception)
Id . .
A'defense based on the reasonable causeexception under
section .6664(c),(1), including reasonable reliance on the opinion
of a professional, may be raised in a . partnership-leve l
proceeding if it-is not a partner-level defense . 'See, e . .g .,
Santa-Monica Pictures, LLC v . Commissioner , T .C . Memo . .2'005-104
(Court considered substantial authority'-standard as defense to
application of understatement penalty, reasonable reliance by tax'
matters partner on opinion of a professional, and reasonable
cause exception) . Respondent has taken the position that,'in'
deciding whether the section 6664(c)(1) reasonable cause defense'
applies, the Court may consider only, whether . the partnership had
-45reasonable cause . That position, however, is more restrictive
and gives a broader definition to partner-level defenses than the
temporary regulation .
E.
Partner-Level Defense : Definitio n
In section 6231(a)(3) Congress vested the Secretary with
authority to ascertain whi .ch items are more appropriately
determined at the partnership level than at the partner level .
See RJT Invs . X v . Commissioner , 491 F .3d at 738 n .8 ("Congress .
vested in the Secretary of the Treasury, not in the federal ,
courts, the authority to weigh and decide what items are mos t
suitably ascertained at the partnership level") . In the
temporary regulation the Secretary has determined that the only
defenses that are not suitably ascertainable at the partnership
level are defenses that are "personal to the partner or are
dependant upon the partner's separate return and cannot be
determined at the partnership-level . Sec . 301 .6221-1T(d), .
Temporary Proced . & Admin . Regs .,
supra . All defenses that are
neither personal to the partner nor dependent on the partner's
separate return are suitably ascertainable at the partnership
level . In a partnership-level proceeding, the Court has
jurisdiction to decide the applicability of a'penalty including'
any defenses to the penalty that are
suitably determined atthe
. partnership level ; i .e ., all defenses that are neither personal
-46to the partner nor dependent upon the partner's separate return
and can be determined at the partnership level .
Mr . Logan's and the Logan Trusts' reasonable cause defense
to partnership-item penalties, their reliance on the Curtis .
Mallet opinion, is not a partner-level defense if it is personal
neither to Mr . Logan nor to the Logan Trusts, does not depend on
their separate returns, and-can be determined at the partnershi p
level .
1.
Personal to the Partne r
The term "personal "
particular person :
individuals :
is defined as "l : of or relating to a
affecting one individual or each of many
peculiar or proper to private concerns . :
or general * * *
not public
6 : exclusively for a given individual" .
Webster ' s Third New International , Dictionary 1686 ( 2002 ) .
In the
context of a partnership, a defense is personal to a partner when
it relates exclusively to that partner and requires the Court to
consider facts that are unique to that partner .
Partner - level defenses include only those defenses that are
personal or unique to a particular partner ;
i .e ., only those
defenses that require factual , findings that are generally
unrelated to the promotion of . the transaction or 'formation of the
partnership that would be relevant to-all partners -- factual
findings unique to the relationship between .a particular partner
and the adviser on whose advice he claims to rely . .
Partnership-
-47level defenses are not limited to defenses of the partnership .
Rather they include all defenses that require factual findings
that are generally relevant to all partners or a class of
partners and not unique to any particular partner ..
There are situations, . as in this case, where the
participating partner asserts reasonable reliance on materials
and opinions provided to all participating partners (as well as
investors in other partnerships promoted by the same persons) by
persons who may have been promoters of the transaction . Reliance ,
on such opinions would not be personal to a particular partner .
The determination of whether a taxpayer acted with
reasonable cause and in good faith with respect to an
underpayment that is related to a partnership item is made on . the
basis of all pertinent facts and circumstances . Sec .
1 .6664-4(b)(1), Income Tax Regs . "Circumstances that may
indicate reasonable cause and good faith include * * * the
experience, knowledge, and education of the taxpayer ."
Id .
"In
order for reliance on professional tax advice to . be reasonable,
however, the advice must generally be from a competent and
independent advisor unburdened with a conflict of-interest and
not from promoters of the-investment ."
Mortensen v .
Commissioner , 440 F .3d at 3 87 . Taxpayers cannot reasonablycrely
on the advice of promoters or other advisers with an inherent
conflict of interest such as one who financially benefits from
-48the transaction . See, e .g .,
Goldman v . Commissioner , 39 F .3d at
408 . A promoter's self-interest. makes such "advice" inherently
unreliable .
If a partner's defense is reliance on expert or legal advic e
from an adviser who is unrelated to, and has no interest in, the
transaction, that defense requires factual findings unique to the
relationship between that partner and that adviser, and the Court
has no jurisdiction in a,partnership-level .proceeding to decid e
the applicability of the defense .
the other hand, if a
partner's . defense is reliance on advice from an adviser who
participated in structuring the transaction or is otherwise
related to, has an interest in, or profits .from the transaction ,
i .e ., is considered a "promoter" of the transaction, that defense
requires factual findings that would be generally relevant to all
similarly situated partners and not unique to that particula r
partner . A defense that relates to all such partners and is an
integral part of the investment program is not personal to, a
particular partner . The Court has,jurisdiction in a partnershiplevel proceeding to decide the applicability of that defense .
2.
Depends on Partner's Separate Retur n
A defense to a partnership-item penalty is a partner-level
defense,if it depends on the partner's separate return . A
defense, depends on the partner's separate return if relevant
facts can be established only by examination of or reference to
-49the partner's separate return . An example of a defense that
depends on the partner's separate return is the adequate
disclosure exception to the accuracy-related penalty for a
substantial understatement of income tax under section
6662(d)(2)(B) .21 Deciding whether the relevant facts affecting
the partnership item's tax treatment were adequately disclosed in
the partner's separate return or in a statement attached to .that
return requires an examination of the return and is a partnerlevel defense that cannot be asserted in the partnership-leve l
proceeding . Another example would be a claim by a partner that
the penalty for substantial understatement of tax does not apply
because the tax reported on his return is not a substantia l
understatement of the correct tax owed . These defenses require
an examination of the . partner's separate return .
21Generally, there is a substantial understatement of income
tax for any taxable year if the amount of the understatement
exceeds the greater of 10 percent .of the tax required to be shown
on the return for the taxable year or $5,000 ($10,000 in the case
of a corporation other than an S corporation or a personal
holding company) . Sec . 6662(d)(1) . In this context, the term
"understatement" is defined as the excess of the amount of the
tax required to be shown on the return over the amount of the tax
imposed which is shown on the return, reduced by any reba-te .
Sec . 6662(d)(2)(A) . In determining whether an understatement of
income tax is substantial, the amount of, the understatement,is
reduced by any portion attributable to an item if there is or was
substantial authority for the taxpayer's treatment of the item,
or if the relevant facts affecting the item's tax treatment are
adequately disclosed in the return or in a statement attached
thereto . Sec . 6662(d)(2)(B) .
-50By contrast, deciding whether a particular partne r
reasonably relied on the advice,of a competent tax adviser
generally would . not require the Court to examine that partner's
return . Deciding .whether Mr . Logan and the Logan Trusts--and The
Batts Group, if it also received a Curtis Mallet opinion--were
entitled to, rely on the Curtis Mallet opinion would not require
an examination of their separate returns ; the facts necessary t o
,prove they were entitled to rely on the Curtis Mallet .op.inion and
that such reliance was reasonable to support .a reasonable cause
defense to partnership-item penalties would not depend on thei r
separate returns .
3.
Cannot Be Determined at Partnership Level ' .
A partner-level defense is a defense that cannot bedetermined at the partnership level . . Defenses that are personal
to the partner or depend on the partner's separate return cannot
be decided at the partnership level because the Court is unable
to decide on the basis of the evidence necessary and relevant to
deciding the underlying adjustments in the FPAA whether 'the
defense applies .
The temporary regulation provides examples of partner-level
defenses that cannot be raised in the partnership-level
proceeding including, inter alia, whether the partner has
satisfied the criteria of the reasonable cause exception under
section 6664(c)(1) subject to partnership-level determinations as
-51to the applicability of section 6664(c)(2) .22 The example is
appropriate and applies to situations where the partner claims
reasonable cause and good faith on the basis of opinions and,
actions by advisers unrelated to the transaction . This is
because the validity of the defense cannot be decided on the
basis of the-evidence necessary and relevant to deciding the
underlying adjustments in the FPAA .
On the other hand, the nature and character of a
partnership's transactions are more appropriately determined a t
the partnership level than at the partner level . They are within
the Court's scope of review in a partnership-level proceeding and
the Court has jurisdiction to make findings concerning the .
character of the partnership's transactions . See River City
Ranches #1 Ltd . v . Commissioner , 401 F .3d 1136, 1144 (9th Cir .
2005), affg . in part and revg . in part T .C . Memo . 2003-150 . The
status of an adviser as a promoter is a partnership-level : issue
when it is relevant to issues raised by the FPAA concerning the
creation and operation of 'the partnership and the means an d
22In Stobie Creek Invs ., LLC v . United States , 82 Fed . Cl .
636, 703-704 (2008), the Court of Federal Claims held that the
example in the temporary regulation did, not permit the partners
to raise similar defenses in the partnership-level proceeding .
The Court of Federal Claims applied the example in the temporary
regulation without considering the fact that the temporary
regulation limits partner-level defenses to those defenses "`that
are personal to the partner or are dependent upon the partner's
separate return and cannot be determined at the partnership
level .'"
Id . at 703 (quoting sec . 301 .6221-1T(d), Temporary
Proced . & Admin . Regs ., supra )- .
-52manner by which the partnership and partnership interests wer e
created and sold . . The opinion provided by a promoter t
investors in-the transactions and the circumstances in which the
opinion was arranged for and provided to the investors are
relevant to the underlying adjustments in the FPAA and are
properly the subject of evidence in the partnership-level
proceeding . Such matters are within the Court's scope of review
in a partnership-level proceeding, as in the case at hand, and
the Court has, jurisdiction' to make findings concerning th e
relationships of the putative promoter to the partnership .
Whether the adviser upon whose opinion the partner claims to
have relied is a .promoter of the transactions and, if so, whether
the adviser's opinion is inherently unreliable can be decided on
the basis of the evidence necessary and relevant to deciding the
underlying adjustments in the FPAA ; they would be mor e
appropriately determined at the partnership level .
4 .
If Curtis Mallet-Was a Promote r
We have held that whether Curtis Mallet was a promoter of
the transactions at issue is to be decided in this partnershiplevel . proceeding'. Curtis Mallet may have provided opinions to
The Batts Group substantially similar to its opinions to"Mr .
Logan and the Logan Trusts . Indeed, respondent may prove that
Curtis Mallet, provided substantially identical opinions to all,
most, many, or some of the other investors who participated in
-53Sentinel-promoted paired-option partnership transactions . In
that event, the Curtis Mallet opinion and the circumstances in
which it was arranged, provided for, prepared, and produced by
Curtis Mallet and obtained, received, and paid for by Mr . Logan,
the Logan Trusts, The Batts Group, and other investors' who
participated in similar Sentinel-promoted paired-option
partnership transactions would be proper subjects of evidence in
this proceeding . See supra note 20 . In considering that
evidence, the Court has jurisdiction to decide whether Curtis
Mallet was a promoter and whether the circumstances in which the
Curtis Mallet opinion was arranged for and provided to investors
.in the paired-option partnership transactions promoted by
Sentinel prove that the opinion is inherently unreliable . If the
Court should decide that Curtis Mallet was a promoter of the
transactions at issue and that the Curtis Mallet opinion was
inherently unreliable, reliance on the opinion would not be a
partner-level defense . In that event, the Court would have
jurisdiction to decide whether Mr . Logan and the Logan Trusts
could reasonably rely on the Curtis Mallet opinion .
By contrast, Mr . Logan might well have partner-level
defenses to the partnership-item penalties on the basis of advice
he may have received and relied on from other tax, legal,
financial, and accounting advisers, defenses that the temporary
-54regulation prevents him from raising in this partnership-level
proceeding .
5 .
If Curtis Mallet Was Not a Promote r
If .=we should decide in this partnership-level proceeding
that Curtis Mallet was not a promoter, deciding whether Mr . Logan
and the Logan Trusts reasonably relied on the Curtis Mallet
opinion,would require an examination of facts personal to Mr .
Logan and the trusts, including Mr . Logan's education and
business experience and the nature and extent of his relationship
with .Curtis Mallet . It would be a partner-level defense as
defined by the temporary, regulation that we would not have
jurisdiction to decide in this partnership-level proceeding .
6 .
Conclusio n
If we should sustain the FPAA determinations that .Tigers Eye
or Mr . Logan's transactions with Tigers Eye must be disregarded
and that the accuracy-related penalties otherwise apply, reliance
on the Curtis Mallet . opinion by Mr . Logan and the Logan Trusts
would be assertable and decided in this partnership-level
proceeding only if the Court should decide that Curtis Mallet was
a promoter and that the Curtis Mallet opinion was inherently
unreliable . If we should hold that Curtis Mallet was-not a
promoter, Mr . Logan's and the Logan Trusts' reliance-on the
Curtis Mallet opinion would be a partner-level defense that could
not be decided in this partnership-level proceeding . Since
-55reliance on the Curtis Mallet opinion would not be a partnerlevel defense should we decide that Curtis Mallet was a promoter ,
at this time we cannot . conclude that Mr . Smith's report must be
excluded on jurisdictional grounds .
F.
Legal Conclusions and Advocacy of Mr . Logan's Position
in the Smith Repor t
Respondent next argues that the Smith report should be'
excluded because it consists of legal conclusions . We agree .
Proceedings in this Court are conducted in accordance wit h
the Federal Rules of Evidence . Pursuant to Rule 143(a) expert
testimony is admissible under rule 70223 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence if it assists the . Court to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact .in issue .
Sunoco, Inc . & Subs . v . Commissioner ,
118 T .C . 181, 183 (2002) . Expert opinion about what the law . is
or how to apply law to facts does not "assist the trier of fact
to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue" . Se e
Fed . R . Evid . 702 . "Each courtroom comes equipped with a `lega l
23Fed . R . Evid . 702 states :
.If scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand
the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education, may testify thereto in the form
of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is
based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony
is the product of reliable principles and methods, and
(3) the witness has applied the principles and methods
reliably to the facts of the case . ,
-56expert,' called ajudge" .
Burkhart v . Wash . Metro . Area :Transit
Auth . , 112 F .3d 1207, 1213 (D .C . Cir .'1997) ; see also
Specht V .
Jensen , 853 F .2d 805, .807 (10th•Cir . 1988) .("`There being only
one applicable legal rule for each .dispute or issue, it requires
only one spokesman of the law, who of course is the judge"'
(quoting Stoebuck, "Opinions on Ultimate Facts : Status, Trends,
and a Note of Caution", 41 Denv . L . Ctr . J . 226, 237 (1964))) .
"This holds just as true when the finder of fact is the court, if
not more so ; the court is well equipped to instruct itself on the
law ."
Stobie Creek Invs ., LLC v . United States , 81 Fed . Cl . 358,
360-361 (2008) . Courts routinely exclude expert opinion on legal
issues . See, e .g .,
Nieves-Villanueva v . Soto-Rivera , 133 F .3d
92, 100 (1st Cir . 1997) (ruling inadmissible expert testimony
regarding holdings of cases on statutory categorization of public
employees, but upholding trial verdict as product of harmless
error) ;
1213
Burkhart v . Wash . Metro . Area Transit Auth . ,
supra at
(reversing trial court's admission of expert testimony on
legal issues at trial whether legal standards of Americans with
Disabilities Act satisfied) ;
Peterson v . City of Plymouth , 60
F .3d 469, 475 (8th Cir . 1995) (finding reversible error in trial
court's admission of expert testimony on whether police conduct
violated fourth amendment standards) ;' United States v . Leo ,'941
F .2d 181, 196 (3d Cir . 1991) (upholding trial court's limiting of
expert testimony regarding credibility and stating that "While it
-57is not permissible for a witness to testify as to the governing
law", trial court did not abuse discretion in allowing expert to
testify on relevant industry practice) ;
Montgomery v . Aetna Casa
& Sur . Co . , 898 F . .2d 1537, 1541 (11th Cir . 1990) (finding abuse
of discretion where trial court allowed expert testimony on legal
duty to hire tax counsel) ; Adalman v . Baker, Watts & Co . , 807
F .2d
359,
365-368 (4th Cir .1986) (reversing and 'remanding trial
court's admission of expert testimony on meaning and
applicability of securities laws), abrogated on other ground's by
Pinter v . Dahl , 486 U .S . 622, 650 (1988)) ;
Vreeken , 803 F .2d 1085,
1091
United States v .
(10th Cir . 1986) (ruling trial court
properly excluded expert testimony of complexity of tax and
banking. law) ; United States v . Curtis , 782 F .2d 593, 599 (6th
Cir . 1986) (affirming lower court's grant of motion in limine to
exclude expert testimony on unsettled nature of tax law regarding
willfulness) ;
Owen v . Kerr-McGee Corp . , 698 F .2d 236, 240 (5th
Cir . 1983) (affirming trial court for properly overruling'
objection to expert's testimony on factual cause of accident and
admitting testimony which did not concern legal cause of
accident) ;
Ward v . Westland Plastics, Inc . , 651 F .2d 1266, 1270
(9th Cir . 1980) (holding trial court judge correctly exclude d
expert testimony that plaintiff was discriminated against on
account of sex) ;
Marx & Co . v . Diners' Club, Inc .-,
550 F .2d 505,
509-510 (2d Cir . 1977) (reversing and remanding trial court's
-58admission of expert testimony concerning legal obligations of
parties .to contract) ;
Loeb v . Hammond , 407 F .2d 779, 781' (7th
Cir, . J969) (finding no error in trial court's exclusion of expert
testimony on legal significance- of documents, a matter of
contract interpretation) .
In support of .the second ground for complete exclusion,
respondent's supplement cites Judge Miller's Memorandum Opinion
and Order in Stobie Creek Invs ., LLC v . United States , "81 Fed .
Cl .
358 3 (2008), excluding the testimony of Mr . Smith and
Professor Ira, B . Shepard offered in"the partnership-level
challenge to, the FPAA in that Son-of-BOSS case . .29 Judge Mille r
2'Recently, in an unpublished opinion of the U .S . Court of
Federal Claims, Murfam Farms, LLC v . United States , No . 1 :06-cv00245 (Sept . 19, 2008), then Chief Judge Damich in a partnershiplevel proceeding granted in part and denied in part the
Government's motion to exclude an expert report of Mr . Smith that
opinions provided to the taxpayers by the Proskauer Rose'law firm
"were of the type, character, and quality upon which a taxpayer
could reasonably rely" . Chief Judge Damich allowed the bulk of
Mr . Smith's report to be introduced into evidence on the ground
that it "merely analyzes whether the Proskauer Rose opinions
contain enough factual information and legal analysis such that a
taxpayer could rely upon it [sic]," but excluded two selected
passages of the report as containing unhelpful legal analysis and
advocacy . The Murfam Farms opinion did not address the
possibility that the report should be . excluded as being . proffered
in aid of partner-level defenses to penalties that the Court of
Federal Claims lacked jurisdiction to consider in the pending
proceeding . Soon thereafter, however, on Oct . 31, 2008, Judge
Damich issued an order in the Murfam Farms case denying the
plaintiffs' :motion to confirm jurisdiction to hear their
reasonable cause, defenses to the accuracy-related penalties
determined in the FPAA . The ground of the motion was that each
plaintiff was the managing partner of his respective partnership
and thus would be mounting a partnership-level defense to th e
(continued . . .)
-59found that the plaintiff's-legal experts, including Mr . Smith ;
whose report was similar in many respects to the Smith report in
the case at hand, were in effect applying law to the facts and,
in expressing legal conclusions, purporting to tell the trier of
fact .how it should decide a disputed issue . Therefore Judge
Miller held that the reports did not "assist" the trier of fact
in the manner contemplated,by rule 702 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence and were inadmissible .
In the case at hand the Smith report analyzes how the Curtis
Mallet opinion fulfills the requirements of Treasury Departmen t
Circular No . 230, 31 C .F .R . secs . 10 .0-10 .93, and concludes that
the Curtis Mallet opinionifor Mr . Logan and the Logan Trusts is
of the quality and character upon which taxpayers such as they
could reasonably rely in preparing their tax returns . The Smith
report does not assist the Court in understanding the evidence or
determining a fact in issue . It merely advocates Mr . Logan's
position and is not admissible for such purposes .
Subs . v . Commissioner , 118 T .C . at 1.83-184 ;
Sunoco, Inc . &
Alumax, Inc . v .
Commissioner , 109 T .C .. 133 (1997), affd . 165 F .3d 822 (llth~Cir .
21( . . .continued_)
penalties determined against him . Judge Damich was not willing
to accept at face value the characterization in the governing
agreements that every member partner was a manager ; Judge Damich
concluded that each partner's involvement in and knowledge of the
transactions conducted by the partnerships should be explored at
trial . Judge Damich found that there was a genuine issue of
material fact as to the identity of the managing member partners
and therefore denied plaintiffs' motion .
-601999) ; . Hosp . Corp . of Am .
V.
Commissioner , 109 T .C . 21 (1997) ;
Snap-Drape, Inc . v . Commissioner , 105 T .C . 16, 20 ( .1995), affd .
98 F .3d 194 (5th Cir . 1996) ;
T .C . 570, .577 (1990) ;
(1989) ;
Estate of Halas v . Commissioner , 94
Laureys v . Commissioner , 92 T .C . 101, 129
Estate of Carpenter v . Commissioner , T .C . Memo . 1993-97 .
We conclude that the Smith report does not assist the .Court in
understanding the factual questions in issue and is not
admissible . Accordingly, we shall grant respondent's motion in
limine .
Afterword
In addition to deciding the issues directly raised by th e
parties' motions, we have held that we have jurisdiction in this
partnership-level proceeding to decide whether the Curtis Mallet
firm .was a promoter of the transactions in issue . Our decision
on the promoter issue will have an impact on whether reliance on
the Curtis Mallet opinion by Mr . Logan and the Logan Trusts is a
partnership-level defense (over which we have jurisdiction) or a
partner-level defense (over which we lack jurisdiction) . We have
also recognized that Mr . Logan may have other partner-level
.defenses to the partnership-item penalties on the basis of advice
he may have received and reasonably relied on from other tax,
legal, financial, and accounting advisers that he could raise
only in a refund action . See sec . 301 .6221-1T(c) and (d),
Temporary Proced . & Admin . Regs ., su ra .
-61Against the background of our holdings and thei r
implications, it bears noting that TRA 1997 has created problems
of judicial administration that Congress may not have
anticipated ." The problem faced by Mr . Logan and other
investors who participated in Sentinel-promoted transactions or
other Son-of-BOSS transactions is not the temporary regulation
(now permanent)--which gives effect to what would appear to'be
the legislative intent . . Rather, it is TRA 1997, which, for the
first time since 1924, denies taxpayers a prepayment forum for
the determination of penalties on income tax deficiencies .2 6
Although deficiency procedures continue to apply to other
affected items, deficiency procedures do not apply to,
partnership-item penalties regardless of whether further
partner-level determinations are required . Sec .
6230(a)(2)(A)(i) ;
Domulewicz v . Commissioner , 129 T .C . 11, 23
(2007) ; see also Fears v . Commissioner , 129 T .C . 8 (2007) .
.
Consequently, although the Court has jurisdiction in a
partnership-level proceeding to decide whether a partnership-item
penalty applies and in a partner-level proceeding to decide the
amount of the deficiency to which a partnership-item penalt y
25See comments in a somewhat similar vein in the concluding
paragraphs of Domulewicz v . Commissioner , 129 T .C . 11, 23-24,'
(2007) .
26See Pisem , "What Happened to My Prepayment Forum? The
Penalty Problem in TEFRA Partnership Audit Cases", 108 J . Tax .
269 (May 2008) .
-62applies, it does not have jurisdiction to decide the amount of
the penalty or to consider any partner-level defenses inseither
proceeding .
Domulewicz .v . Commissioner ,
supra . The Commissioner
may assess a partnership-item penalty before the deficiency to
which the penalty relates is adjudicated,
id .
at 23 ; the partner
must . pay the assessed penalty-and raise his partner-level
defenses in a refund proceeding, sec . 6230(c)(4) ; sec . 301 .62211T(c) and(d), Temporary Proced . & Admin .-Regs ., su ra .
As observed supra Part II, this splitting of the procedure
for determining penalties not only has implications for taxpayer
rights ; it also has practical consequences for .judicial
administration generally and the conduct of the trial in the case
at hand .
The original purpose of TEFRA was "to promote increased
compliance :and .more efficient .administration of the tax laws ."
H . Conf . Rept . 97-760, at 600 (1982), 1982-2 C .B . 600, 662 . To
that end, TEFRA provided a procedure making it unnecessary for
the Commissioner to initiate multiple proceedings against all th e
.partners of a partnership . Instead, by means of the FPAA, he
could determine in one proceeding at_the partnership level the
income tax consequences to the partners of the actions of-the
partnership . In TEFRA title IV, Congress provided that the tax
treatment of any "partnership item" of certain partnerships
should'be decided at the partnership level . Sec . 6221 . After
-63the partnership-level proceedings had been completed, the
Co mmissioner would be able . to assess and collect against the
partners directly deficiencies attributable to computationa l
items based on adjustments of partnership items .
Commissioner was required ,
including penalties ,
partner ,
But the
with respect to affected items,
to issue a notice of deficiency to each .
thereby giving the partner the right to file a'Tax Court
( and perhaps avoid )
petition and to postpone
assessment and
collection of the deficiency and penalties until the Tax Court
should decide those aspects of the case at the partner level .
See sec .
6230 ( a)(2) ; sec .
& Admin .
Regs .,
52 Fed .
301 .6231 ( a)(5)-1T ( c), Temporary Proced .
Reg . 6790
( Mar . 5 , 1987) .
J
Even if a petition challenging the FPAA were filed i n
court other than the tax Court ,
with the effect that any tax
deficiency attributable to the FPAA adjustments could be assessed
without further judicial review ,
penalties attributable to
partnership items still required application of the deficiency
procedures after completion of partnership - level proceedings .
TRA 1997 represents a partial return to the Revenue Act of
1924 ,
which created the Board of Tax Appeals .
Act of 1924 ,
Under the Revenue
if the Government prevailed'before the Board, the
deficiency could be immediately assessed and collected . Although
the taxpayer could not directly appeal the Board ' s decision to a
higher court, the taxpayer could file a claim for refund with the
-64predecessor of the IRS and, upon denial of the claim, bring a
refund .action .in a District Court or the Court of Claims . See
Dubroff, The United State Tax .Court--An .Historical Analysis 77-78
(1979) . This approach was promptly repealed by the Revenue Act
of 1926, which provided for Court of Appeals review and finality
of Board decisions .
Id .
at 118 . The approach adopted by the
Revenue~Act of 1926 has continued to, apply to the Tax Court to
the present day, with the exception carved out by TRA 1997 with
respect to penalties in TEFRA cases .
TRA 1997 and the regulations promulgated thereunder give the
Tax Court the task of determining in a partnership-level
challenge to an FPAA whether penalties .apply to any deficiency
that would result from a decision in favor of the Government on
the merits and then provide for the .assessment against and
collection of both the deficiency and the penalties from ; each
partner . Only thereafter do they allow a partner to assert his
individual partner-level reasonable cause defenses to the
penalties in a refund action in a District Court or the Court of
Federal Claims . TRA 1997 and the regulations thereby result in
"splitting a cause of action" with respect to penalties in TEFRA
proceedings . As defined in Black's Law Dictionary 1937 (8th ed .
2004), "splitting a cause of action" is : "Separating parts of a
demand and pursuing it piecemeal ; presenting only a part-of a
-65claim in one lawsuit, leaving the rest for a second suit . Thi s
practice has long been considered procedurally impermissible ."
The prohibition against splitting a cause of action is ,
common law doctrine .
Magnolia Petroleum Co . v .'Hunt , 320 U .S :
430, 460-461 (1943) (Black, J ., dissenting) . Congress, of
course, has the .power to'define and restrict the jurisdiction of
the Federal courts,
Stoneridge Inv . Partners, LLC v .
Scientific-Atlanta, Inc . . , 552 U .S . . , 128 S . Ct . 761, 77 3
(2008) ("The decision to extend the cause of .action is for
Congress, not for us .") ;
Wilder v . Va . Hosp . Association , 496
U .S . 498, 509, n .9 (1990) (requirement of congressional intent
"reflects a concern, grounded in separation of powers, that'
Congress rather than the courts controls the availability of
remedies for violations of statutes"), particularly a statutory
court such as the Tax Court, sec . 7442 ("The Tax Cour t
shall have such jurisdiction as-is conferred on * * * [it] by
this title") ;
Estate of Smith v . Commissioner , 429 F .3d 533, 537
(5th Cir . 2005) ("The Tax Court may exercise jurisdiction only to
the extent that jurisdiction has been conferred upon it by
Congress ." (citing Commissioner v . McCoy , 484 U .S . 3, 7 (1987))),
vacating 123 T .C . 15 (2004) .
The TRA 1997 rationale to add penalty determinations to
partnership-level proceedings and . to split them from the partner-'
level defenses to the penalties was stated as follows :-
-66"applying penalties at the partner level through the deficiency
procedures-following the conclusion of the unified proceeding at
the partnership level increases the administrative burden on the
IRS and can significantly increase the Tax Court's•inventory .
H . Rept . 105-148, at 594 (1997), 1997-4 C .B . (Vol . 1) 319, 916 .
This rationale obviously applies to "middle class" tax
shelter partnerships with scores of partners, such as the Hoyt
cattle and sheep-breeding partnerships . See, e .g .,
River City
Ranches #1 Ltd . v . Commissioner , 401 F .3d 1136 (9th Cir . 2005) ;
see also Durham Farms #1, J .V . v . Commissioner , T .C . Memo . 2000159, affd . 59 Fed . Appx . 952 (9th Cir . 2003) ;
River City Ranches
#4, J .V . v . Commissioner , T .C . Memo . 1999-209, affd . 23 Fed .
Appx . 744 (9 .th Cir . 2001) ; cf :
Ertz v . Commissioner , T .C . Memo .,
2007-15 . Although the tax deficiencies implicating ..accuracyrelated penalties were attributable to events at the partnership
level, the Hoyt partnerships have required multiple affected
items partner-level proceedings to address the penalty
determinations against individual partners .
Commissioner , 471 F .3d at 1028-1033 ;
440 F .3d 375 (6th Cir . 2006) ;
F .3d 1243 (10th Cir . 2006) ;
See, e .g .,
Hansen v .
Mortensen v . Commissioner ,
Van Scoten v . Commissioner , 439
Sanders v . Commissioner , T .C . Memo .
2005-163 .2 '
27Another type of tax shelter antedating TRA 1997 that has
spawned numerous affected items proceedings to determin e
(continued . . .)
-67The TRA 1997 rationale makes less sense in Son-of-BOS S
transactions and other tax shelters sold to multimillionaires,
where each partnership usually has no more than one or . two
individuals or family groups as participants . The new procedure
under TRA 1997 makes it necessary, in cases in which the
partnership-level determinations are sustained, to educate two
different courts (or at least two different judges) in the
operation of the-same complex set of transactions . One court has
the task of determining the validity of the, FPAA determinations'
which, if sustained, will lead to deficiency and penalty
assessments by way of computational adjustments . Another court, .
in a refund suit to recover the penalties, must determine the
validity of the participating partner's partner-level defenses to
those penalties . If the partnership-level adjustments should
require an affected items partner-level proceeding to determin e
27( . . .continued)
additions to tax have been the jojoba tax shelter TEFRA
partnerships . See Utah Jojoba I Research v . Commissioner , T .C .
Memo . 1998-6 (partnership-level proceeding sustaining FPAA
adjustments) ; see also Altman v . Commissioner , T .C . Memo . 2008290 ; Watson v . Commissioner , T .C . Memo . 2008-276 ; Helbia v .
Commissioner , T .C . Memo . 2008-243 ; Bass v . Commissioner , T .C .
Memo . 2007-361, affd . without published opinion 2009-1 USTC par .
50,332, 103 AFTR 2d 2009-1624 (11th Cir . 2009) ; Finazzo v .
Commissioner , T .C . Memo,. 2002-56 ; Welch v . Commissioner , T .C .
Memo . 2002-39 ; Christensen v . Commissioner , T .C . Memo . 2001-185 ;
Serfustini v . Commissioner , T .C . Memo . 2001-183 ; Carmena v .
Commissioner , T .C . Memo . 2001-177 ; Nilsen v . Commissioner , T .C .
Memo 2001-163 (affected items proceedings sustaining additions to
tax arising from failed investments in jojoba tax-shelter
partnerships) . But see Swanson v . Commissioner , T .C . Memo . 200931 .
-68the deficiencies and penalties, three proceedings would be
required, because the partner-level-defenses to the penalties
could not be raised,in the affected-items deficiency proceeding . .
The new procedure also creates complex logistical problems
in the conduct of trials by the first court in the FPAA
proceeding . . Particularly where .a participating partner acted as
the managing partner or tax matters partner, the new procedure
aggravates the problem of deciding whether each item of-that
partner's proffered testimony relates to . partnership-level or
partner-level matters and defenses . Cf .
Oct . 3.1, 2008,
Murfam Farms order of
supra note 24 . Rather than promote efficiency and
economical use of judicial, party, and attorney resources, the
new regime would appear-to have increased substantially the
burdens on . the judicial branch and costs and delay to ,
litigants . 28
It might be objected that a similar splitting of deficiency
determinations obtains under the original TEFRA procedures :
between the partnership-level proceeding to determine the
validity of the FPAA adjustments and the partner-level affecte d
2NNotwithstanding that taxpayers have no constitutional
right to a prepayment forum, see Phillips . v . Commissioner ., 283
U .S . 589, 596-59 .7 (1931), the availability of the Tax Court as
the prepayment forum to redetermine liabilities for Federal
income taxes and associated penalties, although it originated in
an act of legislative grace, has acquired--over the more than 70year period since its inception--the status of a prescriptive
right in the minds of tax practitioners . and members of the
public . See supra note 26 .
-69items proceeding that may be needed .to determine the deficiencies
and the penalties of the individual partners . But at least under
the original TEFRA procedure both the legal and factual
requirements for the imposition of the accuracy-related penalties
and the partner's . defenses to those penalties were considered in
the same proceeding in one court . It also bears observing that
the original TEPRA procedures were the product of a legislative
judgment that the benefits of having partnership-level
adjustments made by the FPAA apply across the board to multiple
partners outweighed the problems that might be encountered in
applying these adjustments 'to the individual partners in multiple
affected items proceedings .
The foregoing observations lead to the question whether any
technique might be available under which "one-stop shopping"
could be made available in partnership cases in which the
partnership has no more than a handful of participating partners .
"One-stop shopping" in the case at hand would mean that all
issues relating to the tax and penalty liabilities of
a
participating partner or partners could be decided in one court
in one proceeding . One example, of course, is where the small
partnership exception of section 6231(a)(1)(B) applies .
New
Phoenix Sunrise Corp . & Subs . v . Commissioner , 132 T .C .
(2009), exemplifies the efficiencies of one-stop shopping where
the small partnership exception applies ; both the .deficiency.and
the penalties were redetermined in one proceeding in this Court .
-70These musings have been cut short by the realization tha t
the Secretary appears to have recently recognized and responded
to the observed problems . The Secretary has proposed regulations
that would enable the Commissioner to convert partnership items
to nonpartnership items in the case of listed transactions and
thereby_provide for "one-stop shopping" through application of
the traditional deficiency procedures to such-transactions . See
supra Part I .D . It is regrettable that the proposed regulations
would not provide relief in the case at hand or the myriad of
other pending Son-of-BOSS cases subject to the TEFRA procedures
as amended by TRA 1997 and implemented by the regulations,
currently in effect . "
On the basis of the rulings in the foregoing discussion ,
Appropriate orders will b e
issued, denying participating
partner's motion for partial
summary Judgment and granting
respondent's motion in limine .
"Timely application of the procedures provided by the
proposed ; regulations might also reduce opportunities for gaming
the statutes of limitations where multiple passthrough entities
have interests in what would-otherwise remain a TEFRA
partnership . Cf ., e .g ., JTUSA, LP . v . Commissioner , 131 T .C .
(2008)' .
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.