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T.C. Memo. 2025-37

JOANNE SALVI VANOVER,

Petitioner,

AND MICHAEL D. VANOVER,

Intervenor

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,

Respondent

__________

Docket No. 11047-22.

Filed April 22, 2025.

__________

Joanne Salvi Vanover, pro se.

Christopher L. Bourell and John Nevergall (student), for intervenor.

John D. Davis and Nancy P. Klingshirn, for respondent.

MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION

JONES, Judge: In this case petitioner, Joanne Salvi Vanover

(Ms. Salvi), 1 seeks relief from joint and several liability for federal

income tax obligations pursuant to section 6015. 2 Ms. Salvi seeks relief

from income tax obligations arising from returns she jointly filed with

her former spouse and intervenor in this case, Michael D. Vanover, for

taxable years 2017 and 2018 (taxable years at issue). For taxable year

1 At trial, petitioner requested that the Court address her as Ms. Salvi. Mindful

of this request, the Court will refer to petitioner as Ms. Salvi throughout this Opinion.

2 Unless otherwise indicated, statutory references are to the Internal Revenue

Code, Title 26 U.S.C., in effect at all relevant times, regulatory references are to the

Code of Federal Regulations, Title 26 (Treas. Reg.), in effect at all relevant times, and

Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure. All monetary

amounts are rounded to the nearest dollar.

Served 04/22/25

[*2] 2017, Ms. Salvi seeks relief under section 6015(f) from the

underpayment of tax shown as due on the joint return. For taxable year

2018, Ms. Salvi seeks relief under section 6015(b), (c), or (f) from a

deficiency in income tax attributable to the couple’s failure to report

various items of income on the return and relief under section 6015(f)

from an underpayment of tax shown as due on the joint return.

For the reasons discussed below, we will grant partial relief to

Ms. Salvi pursuant to section 6015(c) with respect to the

understatement items attributable to Mr. Vanover for taxable year

2018. But we will deny relief pursuant to section 6015(b), (c), and (f) for

all other items for the taxable years at issue.

FINDINGS OF FACT

Some of the facts are stipulated and are so found. The

Administrative Record and First Stipulation of Facts and the Exhibits

attached thereto are incorporated herein by this reference. Ms. Salvi

resided in Ohio when she timely filed her Petition. Mr. Vanover timely

filed a Notice of Intervention. See Rule 325.

Ms. Salvi, Mr. Vanover, and Their Marriage

Ms. Salvi has a bachelor’s degree in political science and a

master’s degree in human resource management. During the taxable

years at issue, and at the time of trial, Ms. Salvi was employed as a

human resource professional. At the time of trial, Ms. Salvi earned

approximately $85,000 per year. Mr. Vanover attended some university

classes, but he did not earn a college degree. During the taxable years

at issue, Mr. Vanover was employed as an information technology

consultant.

Ms. Salvi and Mr. Vanover were married on September 12, 2015.

From the date of their marriage until February 2020, Ms. Salvi and Mr.

Vanover resided at a home in Newbury, Ohio. Ms. Salvi was the sole

owner and mortgage holder of the Newbury home, which she has lived

in for approximately 20 years. Ms. Salvi has two children from a prior

relationship that lived with her and Mr. Vanover during the taxable

years at issue.

Financial Management

During the taxable years at issue, Ms. Salvi and Mr. Vanover did

not split household expenses equally. Because Ms. Salvi’s two children

[*3] also lived in the home, she paid two-thirds of the living expenses

and Mr. Vanover paid one-third. Mr. Vanover’s contribution to joint

household expenses included a monthly contribution to Ms. Salvi’s

mortgage. Ms. Salvi was primarily responsible for writing checks and

ensuring that the household bills were paid, but Mr. Vanover was

separately responsible for paying for his vehicle and car insurance, as

well as some medical expenses such as prescription medication.

Throughout their marriage, Ms. Salvi and Mr. Vanover each

individually maintained at least one separate bank account, and they

also maintained a joint bank account. Ms. Salvi’s and Mr. Vanover’s

respective salaries and other income were deposited into their separate

bank accounts. Each of them then transferred some of the amounts

deposited into their separate accounts into the joint account.

Payments for electric, gas, and cable bills and, as discussed

further below, an installment agreement relating to taxable year 2015,

were drafted from the joint bank account. Mr. Vanover knew that the

funds in the joint account were used for expenses. But he generally did

not know the precise nature or amounts of the expenses and he did not

spend any of the money in the joint account. The mortgage payments for

Ms. Salvi’s home were drafted out of her separate bank account.

Financial Issues

Ms. Salvi and Mr. Vanover each individually had financial

problems that affected their marriage to varying degrees. Ms. Salvi filed

for bankruptcy in 2016, although the details regarding the bankruptcy

are not set forth in the record. Mr. Vanover had numerous tax and other

financial problems before and during his marriage to Ms. Salvi.

Specifically, Mr. Vanover had outstanding debts to several

creditors, including the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), the State of

Ohio, former landlords, a utility company, a car dealership, and doctors.

He was also delinquent on child support payments. Mr. Vanover did not

file Forms 1040, U.S. Individual Income Tax Return, for taxable years

2004 through 2014. Ms. Salvi learned that Mr. Vanover struggled with

money management “[p]robably after we’d been married a couple years,”

i.e., 2017, “because [Mr. Vanover] would get a lot of phone calls for

collections” and he “couldn’t get credit cards.”

[*4] II.

Tax Filings and Liabilities

In the decades before her marriage, Ms. Salvi’s income tax

returns were prepared by her cousin, Patrick DiPietro, a certified public

accountant (CPA). After Ms. Salvi and Mr. Vanover were married, Mr.

DiPietro prepared joint returns for the couple. Ms. Salvi and Mr.

Vanover elected to file joint income tax returns for taxable years 2015,

2016, 2017, and 2018.

During their marriage Ms. Salvi played an important role in

facilitating the couple’s tax filings. It was “very difficult to get tax stuff

done with Mr. Vanover,” and Ms. Salvi “had to put [her] foot down and

say, we have to get these taxes done.” The returns for taxable years

2016, 2017, and 2018 were prepared by Mr. DiPietro once Mr. Vanover

“finally gave [Ms. Salvi] his W[–]2s . . . [after she had] begg[ed] for the

information.”

Although a request for relief from joint and several liability for

taxable year 2015 is not at issue, 3 the facts related to taxable year 2015

provide important insights into the instant case. Ms. Salvi and Mr.

Vanover filed a joint Form 1040 for taxable year 2015 (2015 joint return)

with a balance shown as due, but they did not pay the balance. The 2015

joint return was received by the IRS on October 17, 2016, and processed

on November 21, 2016.

Ms. Salvi and Mr. Vanover retained an attorney, Carol

Szczepanik, to assist them with matters related to their return and

unpaid tax liability for taxable year 2015. On April 6, 2017, Ms. Salvi

and Mr. Vanover entered an installment agreement with the IRS for the

taxable year 2015 liability. Ms. Salvi and Mr. Vanover each contributed

half of the $275 payment to their joint bank account, and the IRS

electronically debited the payment from that account.

While working with Ms. Szczepanik to procure an installment

agreement for taxable year 2015, Ms. Salvi “began to suspect problems”

when Ms. Szczepanik “discovered [that Mr. Vanover] ha[d] a lot of past

due taxes.” Ms. Salvi inquired about the amount of Mr. Vanover’s total

unpaid tax liability, although Ms. Szczepanik did not disclose that

3 By Order dated May 10, 2024, the Court granted respondent’s Motion to

Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction and to Strike with Respect to Claim for Relief from

Joint and Several Liability for the 2015 Tax Year (Doc. 46).

[*5] information. Sometime after filing for divorce, Mr. Vanover stopped

contributing his portion to the installment agreement.

Taxable Year 2017

Ms. Salvi and Mr. Vanover timely filed a joint request for an

extension of time to file their return for taxable year 2017, but they

failed to timely file a return by the extended deadline. On July 8, 2019,

Ms. Salvi and Mr. Vanover filed an untimely joint Form 1040 for taxable

year 2017 (2017 joint return). On the 2017 joint return, Ms. Salvi and

Mr. Vanover reported adjusted gross income totaling $155,623, total tax

liability of $22,432, and an amount due of $2,291. 4 Ms. Salvi and Mr.

Vanover did not pay the amount shown as due on the return for taxable

year 2017.

The parties have stipulated that during taxable year 2017, Ms.

Salvi had income of $89,280, comprising wages of $69,063, dividends of

$857, capital gains of $3,674, 5 and a taxable retirement account

distribution of $15,686. 6 The parties have also stipulated that Mr.

Vanover had income of $71,721, comprising wages of $70,384 and selfemployment income of $1,337. 7

On April 8, 2020, Ms. Salvi filed Form 1040–X, Amended U.S.

Individual Income Tax Return, using the same numbers as shown on

4 The parties stipulated that the “joint 2017 Form 1040 . . . reflected a balance

due of $3,17[8].” However, as previously stated, the amount shown as due on the Form

1040 for taxable year 2017 is $2,291. The parties’ stipulation appears to be inclusive

of penalties, additions to tax, and interest, totaling $887, which combined with the

amount due of $2,291, equals $3,178.

5 We further note that $857 of dividends, and the $3,674 of capital gain that

the parties stipulated was attributable to Ms. Salvi, were not reported on the 2017

joint return. Respondent did not issue a Notice of Deficiency for taxable year 2017.

6 The parties stipulated that the pension distribution of $15,686 for taxable

year 2017 was attributable to Ms. Salvi. We note that the Form 1099–R, Distributions

From Pensions, Annuities, Retirement or Profit-Sharing Plans, IRAs, Insurance

Contracts, etc., included in the record lists Mr. Vanover’s name, but the income is

reflected on Ms. Salvi’s tax account transcript and associated with her tax

identification number. Given this discrepancy, and in the absence of any contrary

evidence, we will defer to the Stipulation. See Freman v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.

2023-10, at *4 n.4. No evidence presented by the parties suggests any nominal

ownership issue exists in the present case.

7 We note that the amount of gross receipts reported on Schedule C, Profit or

Loss From Business, for taxable year 2017 totaled $1,338 (a discrepancy of $1), and

the net profit or loss reflected on the Schedule C, which was reported on line 12 of the

Form 1040, totaled $528.

[*6] the joint Form 1040 filed July 8, 2019, seeking to change her filing

status from joint to married filing separately. On April 9, 2020, Ms. Salvi

filed Form 8379, Injured Spouse Allocation, for taxable year 2017.

Taxable Year 2018

Ms. Salvi and Mr. Vanover did not file a joint request for an

extension of time to file their return for taxable year 2018, nor did they

timely file a joint Form 1040 for the taxable year. In or around July 2019

Mr. DiPietro prepared a joint Form 1040 for Ms. Salvi and Mr. Vanover

for taxable year 2018, showing an adjusted gross income totaling

$112,307, total tax liability of $11,140, and an amount due of $63. Ms.

Salvi and Mr. Vanover signed Form 8879, IRS e-file Signature

Authorization, which authorized Mr. DiPietro to file the return showing

an amount due of $63. However, this return failed to reflect some of Mr.

Vanover’s income reported on Form W–2, Wage and Tax Statement, for

taxable year 2018. Therefore, it was not filed with the IRS.

Mr. DiPietro prepared a revised joint return for taxable year 2018

that included all of Mr. Vanover’s Form W–2 income for taxable year

2018. On July 16, 2019, Mr. DiPietro submitted an original Form 1040

on behalf of Ms. Salvi and Mr. Vanover for taxable year 2018, which was

processed by the IRS on August 19, 2019. 8 The Form 1040 filed with the

IRS for taxable year 2018 shows a total tax due of $21,551. Ms. Salvi

and Mr. Vanover did not pay the amount shown as due on the return.

The IRS issued Ms. Salvi and Mr. Vanover a Notice of Deficiency,

dated April 5, 2021, determining a deficiency of $2,233 and a section

6651(a)(1) failure to file addition to tax of $446. Therein, the IRS

determined that Ms. Salvi and Mr. Vanover failed to report

nonemployee compensation of $850 received from A-Tek Computer

Services, Inc. (A-Tek); taxable dividend income of $1,001 received from

Fundamental Investors—An American Funds Service Company

(Fundamental Investors); and capital gains of $4,823 received from

Fundamental Investors. Respondent also determined an additional tax

of $396 on an early distribution from a qualified plan pursuant to section

72(t). Ms. Salvi and Mr. Vanover did not file a petition with this Court

seeking review of the Notice of Deficiency issued by the IRS.

The parties have stipulated that during taxable year 2018 Ms.

Salvi had income of $94,831, comprising wages of $70,715, dividends of

8 Ms. Salvi and Mr. Vanover did not file a request for an extension of time to

file their return for taxable year 2018.

[*7] $1,001, capital gains of $4,823, and a taxable retirement account

distribution of $18,292. The parties have also stipulated that Mr.

Vanover had income of $74,217, comprising wages of $69,410, selfemployment income of $850, and a taxable retirement account

distribution of $3,957. Mr. Vanover’s $3,957 taxable retirement account

distribution was reported on both the initial return prepared by Mr.

DiPietro for taxable year 2018 and the return that was actually filed

with the IRS for taxable year 2018.

On April 8, 2020, Ms. Salvi filed Form 1040–X for taxable year

2018, seeking to change her filing status from joint to married filing

separately for the August 19, 2019, return. On April 9, 2020, Ms. Salvi

filed Form 8379 for taxable year 2018.

III.

Marital Issues and Divorce

Ms. Salvi and Mr. Vanover had a number of problems that led to

the deterioration of their marriage. One arose in February 2020 when

Ms. Salvi and Mr. Vanover were involved in a physical altercation, the

impetus for which occurred months before. Around November 2019,

after growing discontent with Mr. Vanover’s financial management, Ms.

Salvi told Mr. Vanover that he had three months to leave her home.

Three months later, on the day of the physical altercation, Ms. Salvi and

Mr. Vanover were arguing about bills. Mr. Vanover attempted to leave

the residence to stay at a hotel for the night, but Ms. Salvi prevented

him from doing so. The verbal argument became physical when Ms.

Salvi attacked Mr. Vanover, attempting to take his cell phone, and while

doing so, she raked her nails down his arms leaving marks, bit him, and

punched his ribs. Mr. Vanover pushed Ms. Salvi and she fell to the

ground, sustaining bruises on her thigh.

After their physical altercation, Mr. Vanover left the Newbury

residence and called 911. The police arrived and, after an investigation,

arrested Ms. Salvi. Ms. Salvi was tried and found guilty of domestic

violence and disorderly conduct. After her sentencing, Ms. Salvi

appealed her conviction to the Court of Appeals of Ohio for the Eleventh

Appellate District, Geauga County. On September 13, 2021, the Court

of Appeals of Ohio affirmed the judgment of the trial court. 9 Ms. Salvi

9 At trial of this case Ms. Salvi stated that she was pursuing various options to

continue litigating the verdict of the Chardon Municipal Court that was affirmed in

the opinion of the Court of Appeals of Ohio, and that she secured representation from

a domestic violence advocacy group to assist her. This Court admitted the opinion of

[*8] appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio, but that court declined

jurisdiction over the appeal.

Following the altercation, Mr. Vanover moved out of Ms. Salvi’s

home. Or, as Ms. Salvi characterizes it, she “booted” Mr. Vanover out.

On June 20, 2020, Mr. Vanover filed a petition for divorce with the

Domestic Relations Division of the Court of Common Pleas, Cuyahoga

County, Ohio. Ms. Salvi and Mr. Vanover were declared divorced on

January 20, 2023. Pursuant to the divorce decree, Ms. Salvi retained

sole ownership of her residence. Further, the parties were ordered to

evenly divide the balances owed to the IRS for marital tax years 2015

through 2019, subject to modification by a ruling or order of this Court

and the IRS.

IV.

Ms. Salvi’s Request for Relief Under Section 6015 and Other

Filings

On March 31, 2021, Ms. Salvi filed Form 8857, Request for

Innocent Spouse Relief. Therein, Ms. Salvi requested relief for taxable

years 2015, 2016, 2017, and 2018.

On Form 8857, Ms. Salvi stated that she was unaware of Mr.

Vanover’s previous tax debts to the IRS, and that he “withheld his

W[–]2s for years which delayed our filing.” Ms. Salvi claimed that she

was not involved in preparing the returns, that she “did not know

anything was incorrect or missing,” and that she did not know all the

sources of income or earnings. However, Ms. Salvi also claimed that the

returns were prepared by a third party only “after [Mr. Vanover] finally

gave [her] his W[–]2s after filing extension and begging for the

information.”

On her Form 8857, Ms. Salvi stated that she began to suspect that

Mr. Vanover had financial problems in 2017. Ms. Salvi stated that she

and Mr. Vanover went to an attorney (i.e., Ms. Szczepanik) to explain

the past due amount and arrange for a payment plan with the IRS. 10 It

was at that point that Ms. Szczepanik discovered that Mr. Vanover

“ha[d] a lot of past due taxes,” although despite Ms. Salvi’s inquiries,

neither Ms. Szczepanik nor Mr. Vanover disclosed the exact amount of

the Court of Appeals of Ohio into evidence with this understanding and directed Ms.

Salvi to notify the Court of any subsequent filings relating to the matter in her briefing.

The Court notes that Ms. Salvi did not notify the Court of any subsequent

developments related to further appeal of her criminal conviction.

10 An installment agreement was entered for taxable year 2015.

[*9] past due taxes to Ms. Salvi. On the basis of Ms. Salvi’s own written

statements from her Form 8857, we find as fact that Ms. Salvi knew or

had reason to know of Mr. Vanover’s tax problems as early as 2017,

although she may not have known the precise amount due until a later

date.

Further, on Form 8857 Ms. Salvi claimed that Mr. Vanover “never

showed [her] his pay or account” and that he “gave [her] what he deemed

was appropriate” and that she “always had to beg for bill money.” Ms.

Salvi indicated that she had equity in assets, including her home, car,

and retirement account, of approximately $168,200, total monthly

income of $1,950, and monthly expenses of $4,100. Ms. Salvi also stated

that at the time she submitted her request for relief she was making

withdrawals from her retirement account to pay her monthly expenses.

According to Ms. Salvi, she had been able to find only part-time work

after she lost her previous full-time job on account of the COVID-19

pandemic.

Additionally, Ms. Salvi claimed that she was a victim of spousal

abuse or domestic violence either during the taxable years for which she

seeks relief or at the time when the returns were filed for those taxable

years. Ms. Salvi claims that Mr. Vanover sexually abused her, knocked

her into a wall and caused her injuries, verbally abused her, financially

abused her, and blamed her for causing him to have an affair. Ms. Salvi

also said that Mr. Vanover abused alcohol, caused her to fear for her

safety, and made most or all decisions for her, including financial

decisions. She further claims that Mr. Vanover lied to the sheriff about

abusing her and blamed her for everything.

On May 24, 2021, the IRS issued Ms. Salvi Letter 3659–C,

Requesting Spouse Initial Contact Letter. That same day, the IRS

issued Mr. Vanover Letter 3284–C, Non-Requesting Spouse Initial

Contact Letter. The IRS did not receive a response from Mr. Vanover,

and he did not participate during the administrative proceedings. On

October 26, 2021, the IRS assigned Ms. Salvi’s request to Tax Examiner

Peal (TE Peal) to examine the request and make a recommendation.

On November 2, 2021, the IRS issued a preliminary

determination denying relief for the taxable years at issue. In the

determination, TE Peal explained that for taxable year 2017 the couple

had filed a valid joint return and that the unpaid tax was attributable

to Ms. Salvi’s pension withdrawal. Because the liability was due to an

underpayment, relief was not available under section 6015(b) or (c), and

[*10] relief was not available under section 6015(f) because the liability

was attributable to her.

For taxable year 2018, TE Peal concluded that the couple filed a

valid joint return. With respect to the underpayment of tax, TE Peal

explained that Ms. Salvi was ineligible for relief under section 6015(b)

or (c) because she had actual knowledge of the understatement. Further,

with respect to the understatement and underpayment of tax for taxable

year 2018, TE Peal concluded that Ms. Salvi was ineligible for relief

under section 6015(f) because she had knowledge of the understatement

and was not in compliance with her filing obligation, with most other

factors being neutral. The preliminary determination also gave Ms.

Salvi 30 days from the date of the preliminary determination to appeal

the decision to the IRS Independent Office of Appeals.

In response Ms. Salvi submitted Form 12509, Statement of

Disagreement, dated December 11, 2021. In her statement, she asserted

that taxes and penalties were incurred because Mr. Vanover did not

provide her with the necessary documents to file on time. Further, she

stated that she would not have married Mr. Vanover had she known

about his financial situation and that Mr. Vanover physically and

financially abused her. Additionally, Ms. Salvi stated that she had lost

her job and was suffering financially because of the effects of COVID-19.

Ms. Salvi’s Statement of Disagreement was submitted more than 30

days after the date of the preliminary determination. Accordingly, on

January 25, 2022, the IRS issued two separate Final Determinations

denying relief under section 6015 for taxable years 2017 and 2018.

Ms. Salvi’s Tax Compliance

Since her separation from Mr. Vanover, Ms. Salvi has had varying

degrees of tax compliance. The record contains no evidence regarding

Ms. Salvi’s tax compliance for taxable year 2019 or 2020. With respect

to taxable year 2021, Ms. Salvi states that she “worked a small job

during 2021, so I don’t even believe I made enough to file, based on all

my deductions.” Ms. Salvi could not remember whether she filed her tax

return for taxable year 2021. With respect to taxable year 2022, Ms.

Salvi stated that she earned income and that she filed for an extension,

but as of the time of trial on April 15, 2024, she had not yet filed her

return for taxable year 2022 because she “keep[s] renewing” her

extension. The record does not contain any evidence regarding Ms.

Salvi’s tax compliance for taxable year 2023.

OPINION

[*11]

Jurisdiction

The Tax Court is a court of limited jurisdiction and can exercise

its jurisdiction only to the extent provided by Congress. § 7442; Judge v.

Commissioner, 88 T.C. 1175, 1180–81 (1987); Naftel v. Commissioner,

85 T.C. 527, 529 (1985); see also Rules 13(a) and (b), 320(b). Pursuant to

section 6015(e), as applicable in this case, this Court has jurisdiction to

review a stand-alone petition when the taxpayer files a petition no later

than the close of the 90th day after the Commissioner has issued a final

determination denying the requesting spouse’s claim for relief. See

§ 6015(e)(1)(A)(i)(I), (ii).

Ms. Salvi timely filed a stand-alone Petition with this Court on

May 6, 2022. Accordingly, this Court has jurisdiction under section

6015(e) to review the final determination denying Ms. Salvi’s request for

relief for the taxable years at issue. Additionally, pursuant to section

6015(e)(4) and Rule 325, on October 17, 2022, Mr. Vanover filed a Notice

of Intervention and became a party to this case, opposing relief.

II.

Scope and Standard of Review

We apply a de novo standard of review to any determination made

by the Commissioner under section 6015. § 6015(e)(7); see Porter v.

Commissioner, 132 T.C. 203, 210 (2009), superseded in part by statute,

Taxpayer First Act, Pub. L. No. 116-25, § 1203, 133 Stat. 981, 988 (2019).

Our scope of review is limited to the administrative record established

at the time of the Commissioner’s determination and any newly

discovered or previously unavailable evidence. § 6015(e)(7). The Court

will consider Ms. Salvi’s and Mr. Vanover’s testimony because it was

“unavailable evidence” at the time of the administrative proceeding. See

Thomas v. Commissioner, 162 T.C. 9, 20 (2024) (first citing Freman, T.C.

Memo. 2023-10, at *10; and then citing Sleeth v. Commissioner, T.C.

Memo. 2019-138, at *3, aff’d, 991 F.3d 1201 (11th Cir. 2021)). Ms. Salvi,

as the requesting spouse, generally bears the burden of proving that she

is entitled to relief. See Rule 142(a); Porter, 132 T.C. at 210

III.

Witness Credibility

In deciding whether a taxpayer has carried her burden of proof,

witness credibility is an important consideration. Ishizaki v.

Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2001-318, 2001 WL 1658189, at *7. “[T]he

distillation of truth from falsehood . . . is the daily grist of judicial life.”

[*12] Diaz v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 560, 564 (1972). “As a trier of fact,

it is our duty to listen to the testimony, observe the demeanor of the

witnesses, weigh the evidence, and determine what we believe.” Kropp

v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2000-148, 2000 WL 472840, at *3.

We found some of Ms. Salvi’s testimony credible, but we found

other parts of her testimony contradictory, self-serving, and lacking

credibility. Specifically, Ms. Salvi’s testimony that she did not know of

Mr. Vanover’s tax problems until 2019 conflicted with her own sworn

statements on her Form 8857 that she knew, and certainly had reason

to know, that Mr. Vanover had tax problems as early as 2017, although

she may not have known the precise amounts thereof until a later date.

Further, we found Ms. Salvi was not credible when discussing the

circumstances surrounding the filing of the 2018 joint return.

We found Mr. Vanover’s testimony to be credible. With respect to

his testimony about the February 2020 altercation with Ms. Salvi, we

thought Mr. Vanover was truthful and sincere. With respect to financial

matters, we thought his testimony was an honest recounting of the

occurrences during the taxable years at issue, which was also supported

by the record.

IV.

Section 6015, Relief from Joint and Several Liability

Married taxpayers may elect to file a joint federal income tax

return. § 6013(a). If a joint return is made, (1) the tax is computed on

the spouses’ aggregate income; (2) each spouse is fully responsible for

the accuracy of the return; and (3) each spouse is jointly and severally

liable for the entire amount of tax shown on the return or found to be

owing. § 6013(d)(3); Butler v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 276, 282 (2000).

Nevertheless, section 6015 provides three potential avenues and

procedures for relief from joint and several liability: (1) full or partial

relief for an understatement of tax under section 6015(b),

(2) proportionate relief for an understatement of tax under section

6015(c), and (3) full or partial relief for an understatement or

underpayment of tax under section 6015(f).

Ms. Salvi seeks relief from joint and several liability under section

6015(f) for the underpayments for taxable years 2017 and 2018, and

under sections 6015(b), (c), and (f) for the understatements for taxable

year 2018.

[*13] A.

Joint Return Requirement

The availability of each type of relief under section 6015 depends

upon the filing of a joint return. See § 6015(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), (c)(1); Treas.

Reg. §§ 1.6015-2(a)(1), 1.6015-3(a), 1.6015-4(a), (c); see also Rev. Proc.

2013-34, § 4.01, 2013-43 I.R.B. 397, 399. Whether a joint return was filed

is a question of fact, the resolution of which depends, inter alia, on the

intent of the parties. Okorogu v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2017-53,

at *19 (citing Heim v. Commissioner, 27 T.C. 270, 273–74 (1956), aff’d,

251 F.2d 44 (8th Cir. 1958)). To file jointly, both spouses must intend to

make a joint return. See Lane v. Commissioner, 26 T.C. 405, 408–09

(1956).

In evaluating intent, the Court has considered whether the

nonsigning spouse filed a separate return, whether the nonsigning

spouse objected to the filing of a joint return, and whether prior filing

history indicates an intent to file jointly. See, e.g., Estate of Campbell v.

Commissioner, 56 T.C. 1, 12–13 (1971); Heim, 27 T.C. at 274; Howell v.

Commissioner, 10 T.C. 859, 866 (1948), aff’d per curiam, 175 F.2d 240

(6th Cir. 1949). If intent to file a joint return otherwise exists, it is not

fatal that one spouse did not sign the return. Harrington v.

Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-285, at *8 (citing Hennen v.

Commissioner, 35 T.C. 747, 748 (1961)). If neither spouse signs the

purported return, there is no joint return. See Arnold v. Commissioner,

T.C. Memo. 2003-259, 2003 WL 22053838, at *2.

Ms. Salvi does not dispute that she filed a joint return for taxable

year 2017, but she alleges that she did not sign the purported joint

return filed for taxable year 2018 nor a Form 8879. But even if Ms. Salvi

did not sign the return for taxable year 2018, that does not necessarily

mean that the return for taxable year 2018 was not a joint return. See

Harris v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1961-324.

However, we need not resolve this question because we find the

parties’ stipulations foreclose Ms. Salvi’s argument, and on that basis

we conclude that Ms. Salvi and Mr. Vanover filed a joint return for

taxable year 2018. There are two stipulations relevant to this analysis.

First, the parties have stipulated that “[f]or tax[able] year[] . . . 2018,

petitioner and intervenor elected to file a joint personal income tax

return as a married couple.” Second, the parties have also stipulated

that “[o]n August 19, 2019, an original Form 1040 for tax year 2018 was

e-filed on behalf of Petitioner and Intervenor, showing total tax due of

$21,551.”

[*14] Rule 91(e) provides that “[a] stipulation will be treated, to the

extent of its terms, as a conclusive admission by the parties to the

stipulation, unless otherwise permitted by the Court or as agreed by

those parties.” (Emphasis added.) Rule 91(e) continues, providing that

“[t]he Court will not permit a party to a stipulation to qualify, change,

or contradict a stipulation in whole or in part, except that it may do so

if justice requires.”

Stipulations, like contracts, bind the parties to their terms. See

McGivney v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2000-224, 2000 WL 1036364,

at *1 (citing Stamos v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 1451, 1455 (1986)). The

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, to which this case is

presumptively appealable, see § 7482(b)(1)(F), has held that stipulations

will be treated as binding and conclusive, absent exceptional

circumstances, see Estate of Quirk v. Commissioner, 928 F.2d 751,

758–59 (6th Cir. 1991), aff’g in part, remanding in part T.C. Memo.

1988-286; see also, e.g., Gomez v. Rivera Rodriguez, 344 F.3d 103, 121

(1st Cir. 2003).

As applicable to this case, we find that the above-referenced

stipulations resolve the issue that Ms. Salvi now seeks to dispute. The

parties stipulated that a Form 1040 for taxable year 2018 was filed on

behalf of Ms. Salvi and Mr. Vanover. The record reflects that the return

for taxable year 2018 was filed on behalf of Ms. Salvi and Mr. Vanover

by a paid return preparer, Mr. DiPietro (who was also Ms. Savi’s cousin).

Further, the parties have also stipulated that for taxable year

2018 Ms. Salvi and Mr. Vanover elected to file a joint personal income

tax return. Pursuant to section 6013(a), a married couple may elect to

file a joint return. See Camara v. Commissioner, 149 T.C. 317, 320 (2017)

(referring to the section 6013(a) election to make a joint return in the

first instance); Treas. Reg. § 1.6013-1(a)(1); see also § 7701(a)(38) (“The

term ‘joint return’ means a single return made jointly under section

6013 by a husband and wife.”).

A married couple makes the election to file a joint return by

actually filing their joint return, see § 6013; see also, e.g., Casey v.

Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1988-170, 1988 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 198,

at *7 (citing Thompson v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 558, 561 (1982)), aff’d,

876 F.2d 899 (11th Cir. 1989) (unpublished table decision), and to make

such a valid election contemplates that, inter alia, the married couple

had the requisite intent to make a joint return, see Okorogu, T.C. Memo.

2017-53, at *19 (citing Heim, 27 T.C. at 273–74), and that at least one

[*15] spouse signed the return, Harrington, T.C. Memo. 2012-285, at *8

(citing Hennen, 35 T.C. at 748). The terms of the parties’ stipulations

are clear and foreclose Ms. Salvi’s contention that she did not sign the

return for taxable year 2018. 11 Accordingly, we will give effect to the

terms of the stipulations, which we treat as conclusive admissions. See

Rule 91(e); see also Franc v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2010-79, 2010

WL 1558333, at *1.

In any event, the evidence and the testimony in the record

support the conclusion that Ms. Salvi and Mr. Vanover filed a joint

return for taxable year 2018. The Court considers various factors when

considering whether a nonsigning spouse intended to file a joint return.

See, e.g., Estate of Campbell, 56 T.C. at 12–13; Heim, 27 T.C. at 274;

Howell, 10 T.C. at 866. The facts here militate in favor of the conclusion

that Ms. Salvi intended to file a joint return with Mr. Vanover for

taxable year 2018. When the return was filed for taxable year 2018, Ms.

Salvi and Mr. Vanover were in the process of filing their delinquent

returns. Ms. Salvi and Mr. Vanover filed their delinquent returns for

taxable years 2016 and 2017 on July 8, 2019, and in short succession, on

July 16, 2019, submitted their delinquent Form 1040 to the IRS for

taxable year 2018. 12 These facts, when combined with the fact that Ms.

Salvi and Mr. Vanover previously filed the 2015 joint return,

demonstrate that Ms. Salvi had a history of filing joint returns with Mr.

Vanover. See Heim, 27 T.C. at 274.

Further, at the time the joint return was filed, Ms. Salvi did not

file her own return for taxable year 2018. See Howell, 10 T.C. at 866.

Rather, it was only after the physical altercation occurred between Ms.

Salvi and Mr. Vanover—and Mr. Vanover vacated the marital

residence—that Ms. Salvi filed Forms 1040–X and Forms 8379 13 for

11 The parties stipulated the inclusion of an affidavit executed by Mr. DiPietro

concerning taxable year 2018, marked as Exhibit 25-J. Mr. DiPietro did not testify at

the trial in this case, and the affidavit seeks to speak to the circumstances of filing for

taxable year 2018. Although the affidavit is included in the record, we accord it no

weight.

12 On July 16, 2019, Mr. DiPietro submitted an original Form 1040 on behalf

of Ms. Salvi and Mr. Vanover for taxable year 2018, which was processed by the IRS

on August 19, 2019. The parties have stipulated that the return for taxable year 2018

was filed on August 19, 2019.

13 Injured spouse relief is different from innocent spouse relief pursuant to

section 6015. Injured spouse relief “involves obtaining a refund of a spouse’s interest

in an overpayment that has been offset pursuant to § 6402.” Lawrence A. Sannicandro,

Innocent Spouse Relief, 645-3rd Tax Mgmt. (BNA), at XI (comparing innocent spouse

and injured spouse relief).

[*16] taxable years 2016 through 2018. Again, this fact supports the

conclusion that Ms. Salvi intended to file a joint return with Mr.

Vanover for taxable year 2018.

Finally, Mr. DiPietro was Ms. Salvi’s tax preparer for decades

before the filing of the return for taxable year 2018. It strains credulity

to suggest that Mr. DiPietro—who is Ms. Salvi’s cousin and long-time

preparer—conspired with Mr. Vanover, who did not take an active role

in managing the couple’s finances, to file a joint return about which she

had no knowledge. We found Ms. Salvi’s testimony on this point wanting

for credibility.

Accordingly, on the basis of the stipulations, and as further

supported by the evidence in the record, we find that the joint return

requirement is satisfied for the taxable years at issue. See § 6015(a)(1),

(b)(1)(A), (c)(1); Rev. Proc. 2013-34, § 4.01.

Section 6015(b) Relief

Section 6015(b) Generally

Ms. Salvi seeks relief under section 6015(b) for the

understatement of tax for taxable year 2018. To qualify for relief under

section 6015(b), the requesting spouse must satisfy all of the following

conditions: (1) a joint return was filed for the taxable year; (2) there was

an understatement of tax attributable to erroneous items of the

nonrequesting spouse on the joint return; (3) the requesting spouse did

not know and had no reason to know of the understatement at the time

that the return was signed; (4) taking into account all of the facts and

circumstances, it is inequitable to hold the requesting spouse liable for

the deficiency in tax attributable to such understatement; and (5) the

requesting spouse made a timely election for relief under section

6015(b). See § 6015(b)(1). These conditions are stated in the conjunctive,

and thus a failure to meet any one of them precludes relief under section

6015(b). Alt v. Commissioner, 119 T.C. 306, 313 (2002), aff’d, 101

F. App’x 34 (6th Cir. 2004); Haltom v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2005209, 2005 WL 2132599, at *4. Ms. Salvi bears the burden of proving her

entitlement to relief under section 6015(b). See Alt, 119 T.C. at 311.

As discussed supra Part IV.A, we find that the joint return

requirement is satisfied. Further, Ms. Salvi filed her request for relief in

a timely manner. See § 6015(b)(1)(E). These requirements cannot

reasonably be disputed.

[*17]

Section 6015(b)(1)(B)—Understatement

Attributable to Nonrequesting Spouse

Tax

Section 6015(b)(1)(B) provides that a requesting spouse can be

relieved of joint and several liability if the requesting spouse shows that

there was an understatement of tax attributable to erroneous items of

the nonrequesting spouse.

First, as a starting point, there was an understatement of tax on

Ms. Salvi and Mr. Vanover’s return for taxable year 2018. Accordingly,

the IRS issued Ms. Salvi and Mr. Vanover a Notice of Deficiency, dated

April 5, 2021, determining a deficiency of $2,233 and a section 6651(a)(1)

failure to file addition to tax of $446. The Notice of Deficiency addressed

the following items: (1) unreported taxable dividends of $1,001 received

from Fundamental Investors; (2) unreported capital gains of $4,823

received from Fundamental Investors; and (3) unreported nonemployee

compensation of $850 received from A-Tek. Further, respondent also

determined, inter alia, an additional tax of $396 on an early distribution

from a qualified retirement plan pursuant to section 72(t).

The parties have stipulated that Mr. Vanover had $850 of selfemployment income for taxable year 2018 and that he had a taxable

retirement account distribution of $3,957 for taxable year 2018.

Therefore, we find that this self-employment income and the 10%

section 72(t) tax (additional tax of $396) are attributable to Mr. Vanover.

The parties have also stipulated that Ms. Salvi’s income included the

$1,001 of dividends and the $4,823 capital gain. Therefore, we find that

these amounts are properly attributable to Ms. Salvi. Accordingly, we

find that Ms. Salvi is not eligible for relief from the items that are

attributable to her. See, e.g., Wright v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2023153, at *7; see also Bartak v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004-83, 2004

WL 565455, at *9–10, aff’d, 158 F. App’x 43 (9th Cir. 2005); Ellison v.

Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004-57, 2004 WL 793183, at *8–9. Thus, we

will consider whether Ms. Salvi is eligible for relief from those items

attributable only to Mr. Vanover.

Section 6015(b)(1)(C)—Knowledge or Reason to

Know

We now turn to section 6015(b)(1)(C), which requires a requesting

spouse to establish that she did not know or have reason to know of the

understatement of tax attributable to erroneous items of the

nonrequesting spouse. A requesting spouse has knowledge or reason to

[*18] know of an understatement of tax if he or she actually knew of the

understatement or if a reasonable person in similar circumstances

would have known of the understatement. Jacobsen v. Commissioner,

T.C. Memo. 2018-115, at *11, *14 (citing Treas. Reg. § 1.6015-2(c)), aff’d,

950 F.3d 414 (7th Cir. 2020); see also Pietromonaco v. Commissioner,

3 F.3d 1342, 1345 (9th Cir. 1993), rev’g T.C. Memo. 1991-361.

Respondent asserts that Ms. Salvi had reason to know of the

erroneous items attributable to Mr. Vanover. First, respondent argues

that Ms. Salvi had reason to know of Mr. Vanover’s unreported

nonemployee compensation because she was aware that Mr. Vanover

was employed and earned income during taxable year 2018. Second,

respondent argues Ms. Salvi had reason to know of the part of the

understatement attributable to the failure to report the early

withdrawal additional tax under section 72(t) because Mr. Vanover’s

retirement account distribution for taxable year 2018 was reported on

the return.

We agree with respondent that Ms. Salvi had “reason to know” of

the understatement of tax attributable to Mr. Vanover. A requesting

spouse has reason to know of an understatement if a reasonably prudent

person could be expected to know of the understatement. See Treas. Reg.

§ 1.6015-2(c); see also Crouse v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2011-97,

2011 WL 164172, at *16 (citing Alt v. Commissioner, 101 F. App’x at 41).

This standard is not abstract, however, as the prudent taxpayer must

be placed in Ms. Salvi’s particular circumstances. See Resser v.

Commissioner, 74 F.3d 1528, 1536 (7th Cir. 1996), rev’g and remanding

T.C. Memo. 1994-241.

Further, a taxpayer who signs a return is generally charged with

constructive knowledge of its contents. See Hayman v. Commissioner,

992 F.2d 1256, 1262 (2d Cir. 1993), aff’g T.C. Memo. 1992-228. But, even

if a requesting spouse is not aware of sufficient facts to give her reason

to know of the understatement, she may nevertheless know enough facts

to impose a “duty of inquiry” that may put the requesting spouse on

notice that an understatement of tax exists. Price v. Commissioner, 887

F.2d 959, 963 n.9, 965 (9th Cir. 1989), rev’g T.C. Memo 1987-360. A

requesting spouse seeking to establish that she had no reason to know

of an understatement must show that she was unaware of the

circumstances that gave rise to the error and not merely unaware of the

tax consequences. See Richardson v. Commissioner, 509 F.3d 736,

745–46 (6th Cir. 2007), aff’g T.C. Memo. 2006-69; Purcell v.

Commissioner, 826 F.2d 470, 473–74 (6th Cir. 1987), aff’g 86 T.C. 228

[*19] (1986). When a duty to inquire exists and a requesting spouse fails

to fulfill that obligation, the requesting spouse is deemed to have

constructive knowledge. See Di Giorgio v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.

2023-44, at *31.

In considering whether a requesting spouse had reason to know

of an understatement, we consider various factors, including the

requesting spouse’s level of education, involvement in the family

finances, the presence of lavish or unusual expenditures, and the

nonrequesting spouse’s evasiveness or deceit about the family’s

finances. Price v. Commissioner, 887 F.2d at 965 (citing Stevens v.

Commissioner, 872 F.2d 1499, 1505 (11th Cir. 1989), aff’g T.C. Memo.

1988-63). Applying the foregoing, we find that Ms. Salvi had reason to

know of the erroneous items attributable to Mr. Vanover for taxable year

2018.

As an initial matter, respondent argues that Ms. Salvi had reason

to know of Mr. Vanover’s nonemployee compensation because she was

aware that Mr. Vanover was employed during taxable year 2018. While

the record supports respondent’s argument that Ms. Salvi knew of Mr.

Vanover’s Form W–2 employment, the record is silent as to Ms. Salvi’s

specific level of knowledge about Mr. Vanover’s work as an independent

contractor. Nevertheless, the surrounding facts and circumstances

support a conclusion that Ms. Salvi had, at a minimum, a duty to

investigate the veracity of the information presented on the return, a

duty she did not fulfill.

Ms. Salvi had known, at least since taxable year 2017, that Mr.

Vanover had money troubles, including the fact that he received a lot of

debt collection phone calls. Further, while working with Ms. Szczepanik,

Ms. Salvi “began to suspect” that there were problems when it was

discovered that Mr. Vanover had lots of past due taxes. Given Ms. Salvi’s

suspicions about Mr. Vanover’s tax delinquency, the facts support a

conclusion that Ms. Salvi had a heightened duty to inquire given that

Mr. Vanover struggled with financial management. See, e.g., Cotroneo

v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2024-70, at *17. Such a duty is even

clearer given that Mr. Vanover reported similar items of income on the

return filed for taxable year 2017. Ms. Salvi is highly educated, having

earned both a bachelor’s and a master’s degree. Further, Ms. Salvi took

a lead role in managing the finances and facilitating the couple’s tax

filings through her longtime CPA, her cousin. These facts strongly

support the conclusion that Ms. Salvi had reason to know, and that she

certainly had a duty of inquiry to investigate, the accuracy of the return

[*20] for taxable year 2018. A reasonably prudent person in Ms. Salvi’s

circumstances would inquire about the sufficiency and completeness of

the information in the return, rather than briefly looking at the amounts

on the return and then signing it, as occurred here. See Alt v.

Commissioner, 101 F. App’x at 41. Ms. Salvi did not satisfy her duty of

inquiry.

Furthermore, with respect to the part of the understatement

arising from the failure to report the section 72(t) additional tax on Mr.

Vanover’s taxable retirement account distribution, we also find that Ms.

Salvi had reason to know of this amount. Once again, a requesting

spouse has “reason to know” of the understatement of tax if she knew

every fact necessary to determine the legal consequences of the income

or if such facts are reasonably within her reach. See Richardson v.

Commissioner, 509 F.3d at 745–46; Purcell v. Commissioner, 826 F.2d

at 473–74. Both the initial return prepared by Mr. DiPietro for taxable

year 2018 and the return that was actually filed with the IRS for taxable

year 2018 included Mr. Vanover’s retirement account distribution of

$3,957. The inclusion of Mr. Vanover’s taxable retirement account

distribution on the return for taxable year 2018 means that Ms. Salvi

had reason to know of the unreported section 72(t) additional tax. See,

e.g., Porter, 132 T.C. at 212. Accordingly, because Ms. Salvi had

constructive knowledge of the erroneous items attributable to Mr.

Vanover, she is not eligible for relief under section 6015(b).

Because the requirements of section 6015(b) are conjunctive, we

decline to address section 6015(b)(1)(D), and we determine that Ms.

Salvi is not entitled to relief under this subsection. See Alt, 119 T.C.

at 313.

Section 6015(c) Relief

Next, Ms. Salvi seeks relief under section 6015(c) for the

understatement of tax for taxable year 2018. Section 6015(c) allows a

requesting spouse to elect to be liable only for the portion of the

deficiency on the joint return that is properly allocable to him or her as

provided by section 6015(d). See Cotroneo, T.C. Memo. 2024-70, at *18.

To qualify for relief under section 6015(c), the requesting spouse

must satisfy all of the following conditions: (1) a joint return was filed

for the taxable year; (2) at the time of the election, the requesting spouse

was separated or divorced from the nonrequesting spouse or was not a

member of the same household as the nonrequesting spouse at any time

[*21] during the 12-month period ending on the date of the request for

relief; and (3) the requesting spouse made a timely election for relief.

§ 6015(c)(1), (3). However, if the Commissioner demonstrates that, at

the time of signing the return, a requesting spouse had actual knowledge

of the item giving rise to the deficiency (or a portion thereof), the

requesting spouse shall be ineligible for relief under this section for the

deficiency (or portion thereof). § 6015(c)(2), (3)(C).

First, as discussed supra Part IV.A, we find that the joint return

requirement is satisfied. Second, we also find that Ms. Salvi satisfies the

separated, divorced, or living apart requirement set forth in section

6015(c)(3)(A)(i). Ms. Salvi and Mr. Vanover resided at the same

residence until approximately February 2020, shortly after the physical

altercation occurred. Ms. Salvi filed her request for innocent spouse

relief on March 31, 2021, approximately 13 months after she and Mr.

Vanover ceased living together. Accordingly, Ms. Salvi satisfies the

separated, divorced, or living apart requirement.

However, we find that Ms. Salvi is entitled to relief only to the

extent conceded by respondent. As discussed supra Part IV.B.2, the IRS

determined a deficiency for taxable year 2018, some items of which are

allocable to Ms. Salvi. In the Notice of Deficiency respondent determined

unreported income of $850 from A-Tek, which the parties have

stipulated is part of Mr. Vanover’s income, and $1,001 of unreported

taxable dividends and a $4,823 capital gain from Fundamental

Investors, which the parties have stipulated are part of Ms. Salvi’s

income. Additionally, respondent determined that Ms. Salvi and Mr.

Vanover were liable for the 10% additional tax of $396 on an early

retirement account withdrawal pursuant to section 72(t), and the

parties have stipulated that the underlying retirement account

withdrawal is part of Mr. Vanover’s income. Ms. Salvi is not eligible for

relief from the items that are allocable to her. See, e.g., Wright, T.C.

Memo. 2023-153, at *6 (citing Francel v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.

2019-35, at *45–46). Accordingly, we will consider her eligibility for

relief from those items allocable only to Mr. Vanover.

As to the items allocable to Mr. Vanover, the benefit of section

6015(c) is not available to an individual with actual knowledge of “any

item giving rise to a deficiency.” See § 6015(c)(3)(C). To preclude relief

under section 6015(c), the Commissioner must prove by a preponderance

of the evidence that the requesting spouse had actual knowledge of any

item giving rise to a deficiency. Culver v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 189,

[*22] 196 (2001); see also Cheshire v. Commissioner, 282 F.3d 326, 335

(5th Cir. 2002), aff’g 115 T.C. 183 (2000).

Respondent agrees that Ms. Salvi is eligible for relief for the items

giving rise to the deficiency that are allocable to Mr. Vanover.

Specifically, respondent states that there is no evidence that Ms. Salvi

had actual knowledge of the $850 Mr. Vanover earned from A-Tek or the

retirement account distribution, which required inclusion of the 10%

additional tax of $396 pursuant to section 72(t). In such situations where

the requesting spouse and the Commissioner agree to relief (or partial

relief), but the intervening spouse objects to relief, as is the case here,

whether the taxpayer had actual knowledge should be “established by a

preponderance of the evidence as presented by all three parties.” See

Young v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-255, at *10 (first citing

Pounds v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2011-202; and then citing Stergios

v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-15).

On the basis of the evidence presented by the parties, we agree

with Ms. Salvi and respondent that Ms. Salvi is eligible for relief from

the portion of the deficiency due to items allocable to Mr. Vanover. 14 Ms.

Salvi did not have actual knowledge of the items allocable to Mr.

Vanover. The parties’ stipulation that Ms. Salvi’s and Mr. Vanover’s

incomes were deposited in their respective separate bank accounts is

also supported by the broader record. We do not find any evidence in the

record to support the conclusion that Ms. Salvi had actual knowledge (in

whole or in part) of the specific amounts allocable to Mr. Vanover,

despite the fact that she may have had reason to know. See Treas. Reg.

§ 1.6015-3(c)(4) (example 2) (providing that a requesting spouse is

eligible for relief when the nonrequesting spouse deposited funds into a

separate bank account, despite the fact that the requesting spouse

generally knew about the circumstances the funds were derived from

because, for purposes of section 6015(c), the IRS may not infer actual

knowledge from a reason to know of the income). Because there is no

evidence that Ms. Salvi had actual knowledge of the amounts earned

from A-Tek or the amount of Mr. Vanover’s retirement account

distribution for taxable year 2018, 15 we find that Ms. Salvi is

14 In his Simultaneous Answering Brief (Doc. 64) Mr. Vanover argues that this

Court should “infer[] an equitable standard that would prevent an abusive spouse from

obtaining section 6015(c) relief.” We find no textual basis for this assertion, so we find

the argument unavailing.

15 The fact that Ms. Salvi compiled tax documents and signed the return

indicates constructive knowledge of the distribution, but it does not indicate actual

knowledge as is relevant for relief under section 6015(c).

[*23] eligible for proportional relief for these items pursuant to section

6015(c).

Section 6015(f) Relief

Finally, except to the extent stated above, because Ms. Salvi does

not qualify for relief under section 6015(b) or (c), she may seek relief

under section 6015(f) for the understatement of tax for taxable year

2018. Additionally, Ms. Salvi can seek relief only under section 6015(f)

for the underpayments of tax for taxable years 2017 and 2018. Section

6015(f) provides relief from joint and several liability if it is inequitable

to hold the requesting spouse liable for an unpaid tax or any deficiency

(or any portion thereof) after taking into account all the facts and

circumstances. § 6015(f)(1)(A); Porter, 132 T.C. at 206; Treas. Reg.

§ 1.6015-4(a).

Treasury Regulation § 1.6015-4(c) directs us to Revenue

Procedure 2013-34 for relevant guidance. 16 Revenue Procedure 2013-34

sets forth a three-step analysis for evaluating section 6015(f) claims for

relief: (1) the requesting spouse must satisfy the seven threshold

requirements, Rev. Proc. 2013-34, § 4.01; (2) the requesting spouse must

satisfy the three-part test for streamlined relief, id. § 4.02, 2013-43

I.R.B. at 400; or (3) if a requesting spouse does not satisfy the test for

streamlined relief, the requesting spouse may still qualify for relief from

joint and several liability if it would be inequitable to hold the spouse

liable in the light of the nonexclusive list of factors outlined in Revenue

Procedure 2013-34, § 4.03, 2013-43 I.R.B. at 400–403. Although the

Court considers those procedures when reviewing the Commissioner’s

determination, the Court is not bound by them. Leith v. Commissioner,

T.C. Memo. 2020-149, at *19.

Threshold Requirements

The requesting spouse must meet seven threshold requirements

to be considered for relief under section 6015(f). Rev. Proc. 2013-34,

§ 4.01. Those requirements are (a) the requesting spouse filed a joint

return for the taxable year for which relief is sought; (b) relief is not

available to the requesting spouse under section 6015(b) or (c); (c) the

claim for relief is timely filed; (d) no assets were transferred between the

spouses as part of a fraudulent scheme; (e) the nonrequesting spouse did

not transfer disqualified assets to the requesting spouse; (f) the

16 Rev. Proc. 2000-15, 2000-1 C.B. 447, superseded by Rev. Proc. 2003-61, 20032 C.B. 296, superseded by Rev. Proc. 2013-34, 2013-43 I.R.B. 397.

[*24] requesting spouse did not knowingly participate in the filing of a

fraudulent joint return; and (g) absent certain enumerated exceptions,

the tax liability from which the requesting spouse seeks relief is

attributable to an item of the nonrequesting spouse or an underpayment

resulting from the nonrequesting spouse’s income. Rev. Proc. 2013-34,

§ 4.01.

As discussed supra Part IV.A, the parties have stipulated that

Ms. Salvi and Mr. Vanover elected to file a joint return for the taxable

years at issue, a stipulation which is also supported by the broader

record. Next, with respect to the items attributable to Mr. Vanover for

taxable year 2018, the Court has granted Ms. Salvi relief under section

6015(c); therefore, she is not eligible for relief for those items pursuant

to 6015(f). Further, Ms. Salvi filed a timely claim for relief for the

taxable years at issue, and there is no evidence that Ms. Salvi and Mr.

Vanover transferred assets as part of a fraudulent scheme, that Mr.

Vanover transferred disqualified assets to Ms. Salvi, or that they

knowingly filed a fraudulent return. See Rev. Proc. 2013-34,

§ 4.01(1)–(6), 2013-43 I.R.B. at 399.

We now turn to the final threshold requirement, that to be eligible

for relief under section 6015(f) a requesting spouse, like Ms. Salvi, must

show that the income tax liability from which she seeks relief is

attributable (either in full or in part) to an item of the nonrequesting

spouse or an underpayment resulting from the nonrequesting spouse’s

income. See Rev. Proc. 2013-34, § 4.01(7), 2013-43 I.R.B. at 399–400.

This rule is subject to a number of exceptions, including in instances

where attribution is solely due to the operation of community property

laws, nominal ownership, misappropriation of funds, abuse, or fraud

committed by the nonrequesting spouse. 17 Id.

17 In his Simultaneous Opening Brief (Doc. 61) respondent states that Ms. Salvi

satisfies all seven threshold conditions for relief under section 6015(f). See Rev. Prov.

2013-34, § 4.01. But respondent also states that the entire underpayment for taxable

year 2017 was due to insufficient withholding by Ms. Salvi and that approximately

two-thirds of the underpayment for taxable year 2018 was due to insufficient

withholding by her. Respondent then continues, stating that Ms. Salvi’s Form W–2

income is attributable or partially attributable to Ms. Salvi because the nominal

ownership exception applies in this case. Respondent reasons that the nominal

ownership exception applies because the Form W–2 income was titled in Ms. Salvi’s

name.

Respondent misapplies the threshold attribution condition and the nominal

ownership exception. If the liability is wholly or partially attributable to the requesting

[*25] Respondent asserts that the entire underpayment for taxable

year 2017 was attributable to insufficient withholding by Ms. Salvi.

Further, respondent argues that approximately two-thirds of the

underpayment for taxable year 2018 is attributable to insufficient

withholding by Ms. Salvi. Ms. Salvi bears the burden of proving that she

is entitled to equitable relief under section 6015(f), see Porter, 132 T.C.

at 210, which includes showing that the income tax liabilities are

attributable to items of Mr. Vanover or his income, see Wang v.

Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2014-206. Ms. Salvi has not met her burden

of proving the proper allocation of items. See id. And in any event, even

assuming arguendo that Ms. Salvi had shown that the underpayments

were solely attributable to Mr. Vanover or his income, as discussed

further below, it would not change the outcome of this case.

With respect to the understatement for taxable year 2018, as

discussed above, the Court has already granted Ms. Salvi relief under

section 6015(c) for the items allocable to Mr. Vanover. With respect to

the remaining items for taxable year 2018, we find that such items are

attributable to Ms. Salvi and, because no exception is applicable, we

conclude that Ms. Salvi is not eligible for relief with respect to those

items. See Rev. Proc. 2013-34, § 4.01(7); see also, e.g., Phemister v.

Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-201, 2009 WL 2877907, at *16.

Accordingly, we need not address further the understatement for

taxable year 2018.

Streamlined Determination

Revenue Procedure 2013-34, § 4.02, sets forth circumstances

under which the Commissioner will make a streamlined determination

granting equitable relief to the requesting spouse. These include that

she establishes that she (a) is no longer married to the nonrequesting

spouse, (b) would suffer economic hardship if not granted relief

(economic hardship requirement), and (c) did not know or have reason

to know that there was an understatement or deficiency on the joint

income tax return or did not know or have reason to know that the

spouse, then the requesting spouse is generally not eligible for relief from those

amounts unless an exception applies. See id. § 4.01(7). As is the case here, Ms. Salvi’s

Form W–2 income is attributable to her, and she generally is ineligible for relief from

those items. See id. The nominal ownership exception would apply if the income items

were titled in Ms. Salvi’s name, but Mr. Vanover ultimately received or was the

beneficial owner of such items of income. See id.; see also, e.g., Robinson v.

Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2020-134, at *22–23. As that is not the case here, we do not

find that the nominal ownership exception applies.

[*26] nonrequesting spouse would not or could not pay the tax reported

on the joint income tax return. Id. The requesting spouse must establish

that she satisfies each of the three conditions to receive a streamlined

determination granting relief. Id. As relevant here, we find that Ms.

Salvi would not suffer economic hardship if relief were not granted;

therefore, not all the streamlined determination conditions are satisfied.

Specifically, the economic hardship condition is met when a

failure to grant relief from joint and several liability would cause the

requesting spouse to be unable to pay reasonable basic living expenses.

Id. § 4.02(2), 4.03(2)(b), 2013-43 I.R.B. at 400, 401. If denying relief

would not cause the requesting spouse economic hardship, this condition

for streamlined relief is not satisfied. Id. § 4.02(2). Generally, a

requesting spouse would suffer economic hardship if (1) the requesting

spouse’s income is less than 250% of the federal poverty guidelines or if

her monthly income exceeds her reasonable basic living expenses by

$300 or less and (2) the requesting spouse does not have assets from

which the requesting spouse can make payments towards the tax

liability and still meet reasonable basic living expenses. Id. § 4.02(2),

4.03(2)(b); see also Contreras v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2019-12,

at *16–17.

Additionally, if neither of the foregoing tests is met, then the

Court will also consider additional factors such as (1) the taxpayer’s age

and earning potential, (2) an amount reasonably necessary for food,

clothing, housing, medical expenses, and transportation, (3) the amount

of assets available to pay the taxpayer’s expenses, (4) the cost of living

in the geographical area in which the taxpayer lives, and (5) any other

factors bearing on economic hardship. Rev. Proc. 2013-34, § 4.02(2)

(citing id. § 4.03(2)(b) (“Whether the requesting spouse will suffer

economic hardship is determined based on rules similar to those

provided in Treas. Reg. § 301.6343-1(b)(4) . . . .”)).

This Court is tasked with evaluating Ms. Salvi’s economic

position at the time of trial on April 15, 2024. 18 See Pullins, 136 T.C. at

446–47. A hypothetical hardship is insufficient to justify relief, and a

taxpayer must demonstrate that imposing joint and several liability is

18 Because we must evaluate Ms. Salvi’s economic position as of the time of

trial, we do not find Ms. Salvi’s statements regarding her economic position on her

Form 8857 helpful in the instant analysis. See Pullins v. Commissioner, 136 T.C. 432,

446–47 (2011).

[*27] “inequitable in present terms.” Id. at 446 (quoting Von Kalinowski

v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2001-21, 2001 WL 77034, at *8).

At the time of trial, on April 15, 2024, Ms. Salvi testified that she

makes approximately $85,000 per year. The federal poverty guidelines

for taxable year 2024 provide that a household with three persons in the

contiguous 48 states has a poverty threshold of $25,820, see 42 U.S.C.

§ 9902(2); see also Annual Update of the HHS Poverty Guidelines, 89

Fed. Reg. 2961, 2962 (Jan. 17, 2024), 250% of which equals $64,550.

Accordingly, on the basis of the facts and circumstances, Ms. Salvi does

not meet the requirements to show economic hardship.

Further, considering the evidence before the Court, Ms. Salvi has

not established that she would face present hardship if she were not

granted relief. Ms. Salvi is highly educated, with both a bachelor’s and

a master’s degree. Ms. Salvi is currently employed as a human resource

professional and owns her home. These facts do not support a finding

that it would be inequitable to impose joint and several liability based

on Ms. Salvi’s economic position. See Pullins, 136 T.C. at 446 (citing Von

Kalinowski v. Commissioner, 2001 WL 77034, at *8). Accordingly, this

condition for streamlined relief is not satisfied.

Because the requirements of the streamlined determination are

conjunctive, and because Ms. Salvi fails to meet the economic hardship

requirement of the streamlined determination, she is not eligible for

streamlined relief, and we will proceed to the full equitable relief

analysis.

Full Equitable Relief Analysis

Under the full equitable relief analysis of section 6015(f), the

Court will consider the following list of nonexclusive factors: (a) current

marital status; (b) whether the requesting spouse would suffer economic

hardship if relief were not granted; (c) in understatement cases, whether

the requesting spouse knew or had reason to know of the

understatement, or in underpayment cases, whether the requesting

spouse knew or had reason to know that the nonrequesting spouse would

not or could not pay the tax liability, and in either case, the effect of any

spousal abuse or financial control; (d) whether either spouse has a legal

obligation to pay the outstanding federal income tax liability;

(e) whether the requesting spouse significantly benefited from the

understatement or underpayment; (f) whether the requesting spouse

has made a good faith effort to comply with the income tax laws in the

[*28] years following the tax years for which relief is sought; and

(g) whether the requesting spouse was in poor mental or physical health

at the time the joint return was filed. Rev. Proc. 2013-34, § 4.03(2). No

single factor is dispositive, and “[t]he degree of importance of each factor

varies depending on the requesting spouse’s facts and circumstances.”

See Rawat v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2024-56, at *7 (quoting Rev.

Proc. 2013-34, § 4.03(2)). The Court can also consider any other relevant

facts. Id.

Marital Status Factor

This condition is met if the requesting spouse is no longer married

to the nonrequesting spouse. Rev. Proc. 2013-34, § 4.03(2)(a), 2013-43

I.R.B. at 400. Ms. Salvi and Mr. Vanover stipulated that they were

divorced on January 20, 2023, which is supported by the accompanying

decree of divorce in the record. Accordingly, this factor favors relief.

Economic Hardship Factor

This factor weighs in favor of relief when a failure to grant relief

from joint and several liability would cause the requesting spouse to be

unable to pay reasonable basic living expenses. Id. § 4.03(2)(b), 2013-43

I.R.B. at 401. If denying relief would not cause the requesting spouse

economic hardship, this factor is neutral. Id. As discussed supra

Part IV.D.2, Ms. Salvi has not presented sufficient evidence to prove her

claim of economic hardship. Accordingly, this factor is neutral.

Lack of Knowledge Factor

The standard for the lack of knowledge factor with respect to an

underpayment of income tax, as occurred here for taxable years 2017

and 2018, weighs in favor of relief if the requesting spouse reasonably

expected the nonrequesting spouse to pay the tax liability reported on

the return. Rev. Proc. 2013-34, § 4.03(2)(c)(ii), 2013-43 I.R.B. at 401–02.

This factor weighs against relief if it was not reasonable for the

requesting spouse to believe that the nonrequesting spouse would or

could pay the tax liability reported on the return. Id. However,

knowledge may be mitigated in instances where there is abuse or

financial control by the nonrequesting spouse. See id. § 4.03(2)(c)(i)

and (ii).

Specifically, the requesting spouse must establish that (1) when

she signed the return she did not know and had no reason to know that

the tax reported on the return would not be paid and (2) it was

[*29] reasonable for the requesting spouse to believe that the

nonrequesting spouse would pay the tax shown due. Id. § 4.03(2)(c)(ii);

see Morello v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004-181, 2004 WL 1765148,

at *4.

At the time Ms. Salvi and Mr. Vanover filed the joint returns for

taxable years 2017 and 2018, Ms. Salvi had knowledge of, and certainly

had reason to know that tax reported on the returns would not be paid.

Furthermore, it was entirely unreasonable for Ms. Salvi to believe that

Mr. Vanover would pay the amounts due for the taxable years at issue.

The testimony and the documentary evidence in the record reflect

that Ms. Salvi was primarily responsible for managing the bills in the

household and that she took a primary role in gathering tax information

and communicating with Mr. DiPietro, her cousin and CPA, who

prepared joint returns for the taxable years at issue. Additionally, Ms.

Salvi knew that Mr. Vanover had financial problems “[p]robably after

we’d been married a couple years,” i.e., 2017, “because [Mr. Vanover]

would get a lot of phone calls for collections” and he “couldn’t get credit

cards.” This indicates that Ms. Salvi had reason to know that Mr.

Vanover would not pay the tax due and that any contrary belief was

unreasonable.

Furthermore, Ms. Salvi and Mr. Vanover had previously filed for

an extension for taxable year 2015, and they failed to pay the tax on the

2015 joint return. Accordingly, in 2017 Ms. Salvi and Mr. Vanover

retained a lawyer to help secure an installment agreement for the

outstanding liability for taxable year 2015. This fact alone is sufficient

to demonstrate that Ms. Salvi knew or should have known that Mr.

Vanover would not pay the tax shown as due on the return and that it

was unreasonable for her believe that Mr. Vanover would pay that tax.

See Rev. Proc. 2013-34, § 4.03(2)(c)(ii); see also Morello v. Commissioner,

2004 WL 1765148, at *4. Further, on her Form 8857 Ms. Salvi stated

that she “began to suspect problems” when Ms. Szczepanik “discovered

[that Mr. Vanover] ha[d] a lot of past due taxes.” This fact further

demonstrates that Ms. Salvi had reason to know that Mr. Vanover would

not pay the tax due and that any belief that he would pay the tax liability

was unreasonable.

Ms. Salvi makes various claims that she was subject to abuse or

financial control by Mr. Vanover. Knowledge may be negated if the

nonrequesting spouse abused the requesting spouse or maintained

control of the household finances by restricting the requesting spouse’s

[*30] access to financial information such that the nonrequesting

spouse’s actions prevented the requesting spouse from questioning or

challenging the understatement on the return or the underpayment of

the liability. Rev. Proc. 2013-34, § 4.02(3)(a), 4.03(2)(c)(i) and (ii). We

will discuss these items in turn.

Financial Control

Ms. Salvi claims that she was a victim of financial abuse.

However, considering the evidence in the record, we cannot agree. The

record reflects that Ms. Salvi was the spouse primarily responsible for

managing the finances of the household. Further, during the taxable

years at issue, the parties stipulated, and the record also supports, that

Mr. Vanover contributed funds to a joint bank account for various

household expenses, including Ms. Salvi’s mortgage. Ms. Salvi had

control of the joint funds to pay household expenses, including her

mortgage, and of her own funds deposited in her separate bank account.

At trial Ms. Salvi claimed that Mr. Vanover withheld funds on

occasion. However, Ms. Salvi has failed to carry her burden. Aside from

Ms. Salvi’s testimony, which we did not find credible and which

contradicts the parties’ stipulations, Ms. Salvi did not present any

evidence to support her uncorroborated testimony that Mr. Vanover did

not contribute to the household expenses while he lived at the marital

residence. This is despite the fact that Ms. Salvi claimed to have in her

control evidence showing that Mr. Vanover did not contribute to the

household expenses. Accordingly, we do not find evidence of financial

control sufficient to obviate Ms. Salvi’s knowledge for the taxable years

at issue.

ii.

Abuse

Finally, Ms. Salvi claims that she was a victim of abuse during

her relationship with Mr. Vanover. “Abuse comes in many forms and can

include physical, psychological, sexual, or emotional abuse, including

efforts to control, isolate, humiliate, and intimidate the requesting

spouse, or to undermine the requesting spouse’s ability to reason

independently and be able to do what is required under the tax laws.”

Id. § 4.03(2)(c)(iv), 2013-43 I.R.B. at 402; see, e.g., Leith, T.C. Memo.

2020-149, at *27. This Court takes all facts and circumstances into

account in determining the presence of abuse, and it requires—at a

minimum—specificity regarding allegations of abuse. Rev. Proc. 201334, § 4.01; see Nihiser v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2008-135, 2008

[*31] WL 2120983, at *10–11; see also Deihl v. Commissioner, 603

F. App’x 527, 529 n.4 (9th Cir. 2015), aff’g T.C. Memo. 2012-176.

A generalized claim of abuse is insufficient. See Thomassen v.

Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2011-88, 2011 WL 1518446, at *11–12, aff’d,

564 F. App’x 885 (9th Cir. 2014).

The Court takes claims of abuse seriously, but it is Ms. Salvi’s

burden to prove entitlement to relief. See Porter, 132 T.C. at 210.

Considering the facts and circumstances in the record, we do not find

that Ms. Salvi’s claims rise to a level that negates her knowledge. See

Freman, T.C. Memo. 2023-10, at *17. Generally, we found Ms. Salvi’s

claims of abuse too generalized to support a finding of abuse. See

Thomassen v. Commissioner, 2011 WL 1518446, at *11–12. At trial, Ms.

Salvi did not provide specific testimony regarding the physical

altercation between herself and Mr. Vanover in February 2020 or

regarding any other instances of physical abuse. Rather it was Mr.

Vanover who credibly testified that Ms. Salvi engaged in physical acts

of violence against him during the February 2020 altercation. We found

Mr. Vanover’s testimony on this point both sincere and candid. Further,

Ms. Salvi was convicted of domestic violence and disorderly conduct.

That conviction stemmed from the February 2020 incident and was

subsequently affirmed by the Court of Appeals of Ohio.

To the extent Ms. Salvi herself was a victim of spousal abuse in

February 2020, it does not warrant a different outcome. First, at trial

Ms. Salvi did not testify about the February 2020 altercation with Mr.

Vanover. To the extent that Ms. Salvi alleged abuse in her Forms 8857

and 12509, and attached thereto evidence in support of this contention,

we find that it occurred after the tax returns at issue were filed and is

therefore immaterial to the issues before us. See Welwood v.

Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2019-113, at *21 (“[W]e are unpersuaded

that any perceived abuse was material to the issues before us.”).

Accordingly, we find that Ms. Salvi had reason to know that the

tax on the return would not be paid, and therefore we find the knowledge

factor weighs against relief.

Legal Obligation Factor

This factor weighs in favor of relief when the nonrequesting

spouse, through a divorce decree or other legally binding agreement,

bears the sole legal obligation to pay the outstanding liability. Rev. Proc.

2013-34, § 4.03(2)(d), 2013-34 I.R.B. at 402. This factor weighs against

[*32] relief if the requesting spouse has the legal obligation to pay, and

it is neutral if the divorce decree is silent as to tax liabilities or the

spouses are not separated. Id. The divorce decree orders that “the

parties shall evenly divide the remaining balances owed to the [IRS] . . .

for the marital tax years of 2015 through 2019.” This militates against

relief. However, the divorce decree continues, and orders that “[t]he

equal division of these marital tax years is subject to modification upon

future ruling/order of the United States Tax Court and the IRS.”

Because the equal division of the tax liability remains subject to

modification by the Tax Court, this factor is neutral.

No Significant Benefit Factor

This factor weighs in favor of relief if the requesting spouse did

not receive a significant benefit, that is, a benefit in excess of normal

support, due to the understatement or underpayment of tax. 19 Soler v.

Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2022-78, at *12–13 (citing Butner v.

Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-136). This factor weighs against relief

if the requesting spouse received a significant benefit due to the

understatement or underpayment of tax. Rev. Proc. 2013-34,

§ 4.03(2)(e), 2013-34 I.R.B. at 402. Any amounts Ms. Salvi received from

Mr. Vanover constitute normal support, and we find that Ms. Salvi did

not receive any significant benefit because of the underpayment of tax

during the taxable years at issue. See Pullins, 136 T.C. at 452

(“Mortgage payments on a middle-class home constitute normal support

that is not considered to generate ‘significant benefit’.”). We find this

factor weighs in favor of relief.

Compliance Factor

This factor weighs in favor of relief if the requesting spouse is in

compliance with the tax laws for the tax years after being divorced from

the nonrequesting spouse. Rev. Proc. 2013-43, § 4.03(2)(f)(i), 2013-34

I.R.B. at 402. This factor weighs against relief if the requesting spouse

is not in compliance for the tax years after being divorced from the

nonrequesting spouse. Id. This factor is neutral if the requesting spouse

has made a good faith effort to comply with the tax laws but was unable

to fully comply. Id.

19 The Court treats this factor as favoring relief despite the fact that Revenue

Procedure 2013-34 treats this factor as neutral. Compare Robinson, T.C. Memo. 2020134, at *33–34, with Rev. Proc. 2013-36, § 4.03(2)(e).

[*33] Since her separation from Mr. Vanover, Ms. Salvi’s tax

compliance has varied. During the administrative proceeding the IRS

determined that the compliance factor weighed against relief because,

although Ms. Salvi filed separate tax returns after her separation from

Mr. Vanover, she was not in full compliance with federal tax laws. At

present, the record does not contain any evidence regarding Ms. Salvi’s

tax compliance for taxable year 2019 or 2020. As to taxable year 2021,

Ms. Salvi could not remember whether she had filed a return. For

taxable year 2022 Ms. Salvi stated that she had filed for an extension

that she “keep[s] renewing,” and that, as of the time of trial, she had not

yet filed that return. The record does not contain any evidence regarding

Ms. Salvi’s tax compliance for taxable year 2023. 20

With the exception of the return for taxable year 2023, since her

separation from Mr. Vanover in February 2020, Ms. Salvi has either not

filed a tax return or has failed to present any evidence to support the

contention that she has made a good faith effort to comply with the

income tax laws. Considering all the facts regarding her subsequent

compliance with the income tax laws, and particularly Ms. Salvi’s

testimony regarding her yet-to-be-filed return for taxable year 2022, we

find that this factor militates against relief.

Mental or Physical Health Factor

This factor weighs in favor of relief if the requesting spouse was

in poor physical or mental health at the time the returns from which she

seeks relief were filed, or at the time she requested relief. Id. § 4.03(2)(g),

2013-34 I.R.B. at 403. If the requesting spouse was in neither poor

mental nor physical health, this factor is neutral. Id. While Ms. Salvi

claimed that she was a victim of abuse at trial, she did not testify or

argue that she suffered emotional distress as a result of such abuse. On

brief, Ms. Salvi claims that she has suffered mental duress from the

abuse inflicted by Mr. Vanover. The Court is sympathetic to Ms. Salvi’s

claim of abuse and mental duress, but Ms. Salvi raised her argument

regarding mental duress for the first time in her Simultaneous

20 The record is void of evidence regarding Ms. Salvi’s tax compliance for

taxable year 2023. The filing deadline for returns for taxable year 2023 was on or before

the end of the day on April 15, 2024. I.R.S. News Release IR-2024-04 (Jan. 8, 2024);

see also § 6072(a) (providing that a person required to make a return of income under

section 6012 shall file such return on or before April 15). Trial in this case occurred

during the day on April 15, 2024, and thus Ms. Salvi had until the end of the day to

file her return. Accordingly, we find that the absence of this evidence is neutral. See

Freman, T.C. Memo. 2023-10, at *31.

[*34] Answering Brief (Doc. 67); consequently, she has waived the

argument. See Sehati v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2025-3, at *7.

Further, we find that any such claims are unsupported by the record.

Accordingly, we find that this factor is neutral.

Considering the foregoing factors, we conclude that it would not

be inequitable to hold Ms. Salvi liable for the underpayment amounts

for the taxable years at issue. Accordingly, we find that Ms. Salvi is not

eligible for relief pursuant to section 6015(f) for the taxable years at

issue.

Conclusion

We conclude that Ms. Salvi is eligible for partial relief pursuant

to section 6015(c) with respect to the understatement of tax attributable

to erroneous items of Mr. Vanover for taxable year 2018. However, we

conclude that it is not inequitable to hold Ms. Salvi liable for all

remaining amounts, and therefore we will deny relief pursuant to

section 6015(b), (c), and (f) for all other items for the taxable years at

issue.

The Court has considered all the other contentions of the parties

and, to the extent not discussed above, finds those arguments to be

irrelevant, moot, or without merit.

Decision will be entered under Rule 155.

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