T.C. Summary Opinion 2021-34

T.C. Summary Opinion 2021-34

UNITED STATES TAX COURT

MARIA ISABEL GOODE, Petitioner, AND JAMES T. GOODE, JR., Intervenor

v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent

Docket No. 14832-18S.

Filed September 23, 2021.

Maria Isabel Goode, pro se.

James T. Goode, Jr., pro se.

Brooke N. Stan and Sheila R. Pattison, for respondent.

SUMMARY OPINION

VASQUEZ, Judge: This case was heard pursuant to the provisions of

section 7463 of the Internal Revenue Code in effect when the petition was filed. 1

Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to the Internal

Revenue Code in effect at all relevant times, and all Rule references are to the Tax

1

Served 09/23/21

-2Pursuant to section 7463(b), the decision to be entered is not reviewable by any

other court, and this opinion shall not be treated as precedent for any other case.

Petitioner seeks review under section 6015(e)(1) of respondent’s

determination that she is not entitled to relief from joint and several liability with

respect to a joint Federal income tax return that she filed with her former spouse,

intervenor, for taxable year 2010. The issue for decision is whether petitioner

qualifies for relief from her 2010 Federal income tax liability under section

6015(f).

Background

Petitioner, intervenor, and respondent stipulated some of the facts in this

case, and those facts are so found. The stipulation of facts, supplemental

stipulation of facts, and accompanying exhibits are incorporated herein by this

reference. Petitioner resided in Texas when she filed her petition.

Petitioner and intervenor married in 2000 and have two children who were

19 and 13 at the time of trial. Between 1990 and 2010 petitioner worked as an

engineer for the Department of Defense (DOD), first in New Mexico and then in

Arizona. Intervenor also worked for the DOD during some of those years

Court Rules of Practice and Procedure. We round all monetary amounts to the

nearest dollar.

-3including 2010. Petitioner and intervenor filed a joint tax return for every year

between 2000 and 2010.

In 2006 intervenor applied for and received a loan from his Thrift Savings

Plan (TSP), a retirement plan for Federal Government employees. See sec.

7701(j); Ryan v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2011-139, 2011 Tax Ct. Memo

LEXIS 138, at *15, aff’d, 482 F. App’x 881 (5th Cir. 2012). Petitioner consented

to the loan by signing the loan agreement, which required intervenor to make 130

payments over five years.

In 2010 intervenor became ill, prompting him and petitioner to resign from

their DOD jobs in Arizona and move to Florida to be closer to intervenor’s family.

Before resigning from her job that year, petitioner applied for and received a loan

from her TSP. Intervenor also borrowed an additional amount from his TSP, and

petitioner consented to this loan. Petitioner and intervenor used the loan proceeds

to cover their living expenses while they looked for new jobs in Florida.

Unfortunately, petitioner and intervenor were unable to find work that paid

salaries commensurate with the jobs they had left in Arizona. Financial difficulties

followed, causing petitioner and intervenor to default on their TSP loans. As a

result, TSP issued petitioner Form 1099-R, Distributions From Pensions,

Annuities, Retirement or Profit-Sharing Plans, IRAs, Insurance Contracts, etc.,

-4reporting a deemed distribution of $90,359 and Federal income tax withholding of

$5,760. TSP also issued intervenor a Form 1099-R reporting a deemed distribution

of $56,691 and Federal income tax withholding of $5,000.

Petitioner and intervenor timely filed a joint Form 1040, U.S. Individual

Income Tax Return, for 2010. On the return they reported, among other things, the

above-described deemed distributions. They reported total tax of $63,858 and total

payments of $27,966, leaving them with a tax liability of $35,892, which they did

not remit with their return. Petitioner and respondent agree that 78.5% of the

liability is attributable to petitioner and that 21.5% is attributable to intervenor.

Shirley Douglas, intervenor’s mother, prepared the 2010 return. Petitioner

provided documents to Ms. Douglas and signed the return after it was prepared.

Petitioner knew at that time that there was a balance due that she and intervenor

were unable to pay.

In August 2011 petitioner separated from intervenor and moved with her two

children to El Paso, Texas. From August 2011 through 2014 petitioner had no

contact with intervenor. She was unable to return to Federal service during that

time and worked several low-paying jobs.

In 2015 intervenor moved to El Paso and briefly reconciled with petitioner.

At that time they established a payment plan with respondent that required monthly

-5payments of $140 for the first year and $590 thereafter. Petitioner was the sole

source of the monthly payments made under the plan. Respondent also applied

overpayments for 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, and 2016 against the joint tax

liability for 2010. 2

Petitioner returned to Federal service in February 2016. Two months later

she and intervenor separated. On April 28, 2017, the District Court of El Paso

County, Texas, issued petitioner and intervenor a Final Decree of Divorce (Final

Decree). The Final Decree included an order that petitioner and intervenor were

each liable for one-half of the “Debt owed to the Internal Revenue Service” for

2010.

In 2017 petitioner stopped making installment payments to respondent. On

June 13, 2017, petitioner filed Form 8857, Request for Innocent Spouse Relief.

Thereon petitioner reported monthly income of $8,363 and monthly expenses of

$8,257. However, in an attachment to her Form 8857, petitioner disclosed that her

gross annual income was $104,896, which would give her a gross monthly income

of $8,741.

The record includes an account transcript for 2010 reflecting a balance of

$9,629 at the time of trial.

2

-6Petitioner also checked a box on the Form 8857 indicating that she was a

victim of spousal abuse or domestic violence. In an attached statement, petitioner

alleged that intervenor had become abusive after developing a drinking problem in

2010. She further alleged that intervenor had pulled her hair and shoved her son

during an altercation in 2015, prompting her to file for a protective order.

Petitioner attached a copy of the protective order to her Form 8857.

On May 2, 2018, respondent issued petitioner a final notice of determination

denying her request for innocent spouse relief. Petitioner timely filed a petition

with this Court seeking review of respondent’s determination. Pursuant to section

6015(e)(4) and Rule 325, intervenor subsequently became a party to this case,

opposing relief. Trial was held in El Paso, Texas.

Discussion

Generally, married taxpayers may elect to file a joint Federal income tax

return. Sec. 6013(a). If a joint return is made, the tax is computed on the spouses’

aggregate income, and each spouse is fully responsible for the accuracy of the

return and is jointly and severally liable for the entire amount of tax shown on the

return or found to be owing. Sec. 6013(d)(3); Butler v. Commissioner, 114 T.C.

276, 282 (2000). Nevertheless, under certain circumstances, a spouse who has

made a joint return may seek relief from joint and several liability under

-7procedures set forth in section 6015. Section 6015 provides a spouse with three

alternatives: (1) full or partial relief under subsection (b), (2) proportionate relief

under subsection (c), and (3) if relief is not available under subsection (b) or (c),

equitable relief under subsection (f).

Petitioner does not contend that she is entitled to relief under section 6015(b)

or (c). Furthermore, subsections (b) and (c) do not apply where, as here, the

liability stems from an underpayment reported on a joint return. See sec.

6015(b)(1)(B), (c)(1); Hopkins v. Commissioner, 121 T.C. 73, 88 (2003); see also

Block v. Commissioner, 120 T.C. 62, 66 (2003); Leith v. Commissioner, T.C.

Memo. 2020-149, at *18. We therefore address whether petitioner is entitled to

relief under section 6015(f).

I.

Standard and Scope of Review

In determining whether a taxpayer is entitled to equitable relief under section

6015(f), we apply a de novo standard and scope of review. 3 Porter v.

Commissioner, 132 T.C. 203, 210 (2009). Petitioner generally bears the burden of

proving that she is entitled to equitable relief under section 6015(f). See id.; see

also Rule 142(a)(1).

Because petitioner filed her petition before July 1, 2019, sec. 6015(e)(7)

does not apply to this case. See Sutherland v. Commissioner, 155 T.C. 95, 104

(2020).

3

-8II.

Section 6015(f) Relief

As directed by section 6015(f), the Commissioner has prescribed procedures

to determine whether a requesting spouse is entitled to equitable relief from joint

and several liability. Those procedures are set forth in Rev. Proc. 2013-34, sec. 4,

2013-43 I.R.B. 397, 399-403. Although the Court considers those procedures

when reviewing the Commissioner’s determination, the Court is not bound by

them. See Pullins v. Commissioner, 136 T.C. 432, 438-439 (2011); Rogers v.

Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2018-53, at *112. The Court’s determination

ultimately rests on an evaluation of all the facts and circumstances. Porter v.

Commissioner, 132 T.C. at 210.

Pursuant to the revenue procedure, the Commissioner conducts a multistep

analysis when determining whether a requesting spouse is entitled to equitable

relief under section 6015(f). See Rev. Proc. 2013-34, sec. 4. The requirements for

relief under the revenue procedure are categorized as threshold or mandatory

requirements, streamlined elements, and equitable factors. A requesting spouse

must satisfy each threshold requirement to be considered for relief. See id. sec.

4.01, 2013-43 I.R.B. at 399-400. If the requesting spouse meets the threshold

requirements, the Commissioner will grant equitable relief if the requesting spouse

meets each streamlined element. See id. sec. 4.02, 2013-43 I.R.B. at 400.

-9Otherwise, the Commissioner will determine whether equitable relief is

appropriate by evaluating the equitable factors. See id. sec. 4.03, 2013-43 I.R.B. at

400-403.

A.

Threshold Requirements

The requesting spouse must meet seven threshold requirements to be

considered for relief under section 6015(f). Rev. Proc. 2013-34, sec. 4.01. Those

requirements are: (1) the requesting spouse filed a joint return for the taxable year

for which relief is sought, (2) relief is not available to the requesting spouse under

section 6015(b) or (c), (3) the claim for relief is timely filed, (4) no assets were

transferred between the spouses as part of a fraudulent scheme, (5) the

nonrequesting spouse did not transfer disqualified assets to the requesting spouse,

(6) the requesting spouse did not knowingly participate in the filing of a fraudulent

joint return, and (7) absent certain enumerated exceptions, the tax liability from

which the requesting spouse seeks relief is attributable to an item of the

nonrequesting spouse. Id.

Petitioner concedes that, if she is entitled to any relief, it is limited to 21.5%

of the underpayment--i.e., the amount attributable to intervenor. With respect to

that portion of the liability, respondent concedes that petitioner has met the

- 10 threshold requirements for relief. Intervenor has provided no credible evidence to

the contrary.

B.

Streamlined Determination

For the portion of the 2010 liability for which petitioner is eligible for relief

under section 6015(f), Rev. Proc. 2013-34, sec. 4.02, sets forth circumstances

under which the Commissioner will make a streamlined determination granting

equitable relief to the requesting spouse. The requesting spouse is eligible for a

streamlined determination by the Commissioner only in cases in which the

requesting spouse establishes that she (1) is no longer married to the nonrequesting

spouse, (2) would suffer economic hardship if not granted relief (economic

hardship requirement), and (3) did not know or have reason to know that the

nonrequesting spouse would not or could not pay the underpayment of tax reported

on the joint income tax return, or did not know or have reason to know that there

was an understatement or deficiency on the joint income tax return. Id. The

requesting spouse must establish that she satisfies each of the three elements to

receive a streamlined determination granting relief. Id.

We first address the economic hardship requirement. Economic hardship

exists if satisfaction of the tax liability, in whole or in part, would result in the

requesting spouse’s being unable to meet her reasonable basic living expenses.

- 11 Rev. Proc. 2013-34, sec. 4.03(2)(b), 2013-43 I.R.B. at 401. The requesting spouse

would suffer economic hardship if two tests are met: (1) either (a) the requesting

spouse’s income is below 250% of the Federal poverty level or (b) the requesting

spouse’s monthly income exceeds her reasonable basic monthly living expenses by

$300 or less, and (2) the requesting spouse does not have assets from which she

can make payments toward the tax liability and still meet reasonable basic living

expenses. Id. If these tests are not satisfied, the Commissioner will consider all

facts and circumstances in determining whether the requesting spouse would suffer

economic hardship if relief was not granted. Id.

Petitioner does not contend that her monthly income is below 250% of the

Federal poverty level, and her reported monthly income of $8,741 exceeds her

reported monthly expenses of $8,257 by more than $300. At trial she offered no

evidence that she would suffer economic hardship if relief was not granted. We

therefore conclude that petitioner does not satisfy the economic hardship

requirement and that she is not entitled to a streamlined determination under Rev.

Proc. 2013-34, sec. 4.02. Because petitioner does not meet the economic hardship

requirement, the Court need not consider whether she meets the other two

requirements for a streamlined determination.

- 12 C.

Rev. Proc. 2013-34: Equitable Factors

If a requesting spouse is not entitled to a streamlined determination because

the requesting spouse does not satisfy all the elements in Rev. Proc. 2013-34, sec.

4.02, the requesting spouse’s request for relief may be considered using the

equitable relief factors in Rev. Proc. 2013-34, sec. 4.03.

Rev. Proc. 2013-34, sec. 4.03(2), 2013-43 I.R.B. at 400-403, lists the

following seven nonexclusive factors to be considered in determining whether,

taking into account all the facts and circumstances, equitable relief under section

6015(f) should be granted: (1) the current marital status of the spouses,

(2) whether the requesting spouse will suffer any economic hardship if relief is not

granted, (3) whether the requesting spouse knew or had reason to know of the item

giving rise to the underpayment, (4) whether either spouse has a legal obligation to

pay the outstanding Federal income tax liability, (5) whether the requesting spouse

significantly benefited from the underpayment, (6) whether the requesting spouse

has made a good faith effort to comply with income tax laws in the years following

the years for which relief is sought, and (7) whether the requesting spouse was in

poor mental or physical health when the return in issue was filed, when the request

for relief was made, or at the time of trial. See Pullins v. Commissioner, 136 T.C.

at 448.

- 13 In making a determination under section 6015(f), the Court considers the

enumerated factors as well as any other relevant factors. No single factor is

dispositive, and “[t]he degree of importance of each factor varies depending on the

requesting spouse’s facts and circumstances.” Rev. Proc. 2013-34, sec. 4.03(2);

see Pullins v. Commissioner, 136 T.C. at 448; Hall v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.

2014-171, at *38.

1.

Marital Status

If the requesting spouse is no longer married to the nonrequesting spouse,

this factor will weigh in favor of granting relief. See Rev. Proc. 2013-34, sec.

4.03(2)(a), 2013-43 I.R.B. at 400. If the requesting spouse is still married to the

nonrequesting spouse, this factor is neutral. Id. Petitioner and intervenor divorced

in 2017. This factor weighs in favor of relief.

2.

Economic Hardship

Economic hardship exists if satisfaction of the tax liability, in whole or in

part, would result in the requesting spouse’s being unable to meet her reasonable

basic living expenses. Id. sec. 4.03(2)(b). If denying relief from joint and several

liability will not cause the requesting spouse to suffer economic hardship, this

factor will be neutral. Id. For the reasons set forth above we find that petitioner

would not face economic hardship if she was denied relief. This factor is neutral.

- 14 3.

Knowledge

In an underpayment case relief is favored if the requesting spouse reasonably

expected the nonrequesting spouse to pay the tax liability reported on the return.

Id. sec. 4.03(2)(c)(ii), 2013-43 I.R.B. at 401. This factor will weigh against relief

if, on the basis of the facts and circumstances, it was not reasonable for the

requesting spouse to believe the nonrequesting spouse would or could pay the tax

liability reported on the return. Id.

Notwithstanding the requesting spouse’s knowledge or beliefs, that

knowledge may be negated if the nonrequesting spouse abused the requesting

spouse or maintained control of the household finances by restricting the

requesting spouse’s access to financial information such that the nonrequesting

spouse’s actions prevented the requesting spouse from questioning or challenging

payment of the liability. Id. sec. 4.02(3)(a), 4.03(2)(c)(ii). “Abuse comes in many

forms and can include physical, psychological, sexual, or emotional abuse,

including efforts to control, isolate, humiliate, and intimidate the requesting

spouse, or to undermine the requesting spouse’s ability to reason independently

and be able to do what is required under the tax laws.” Id. sec. 4.03(2)(c)(iv),

2013-43 I.R.B. at 402; see, e.g., Stephenson v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.

2011-16. This Court takes all facts and circumstances into account in determining

- 15 the presence of abuse, see Rev. Proc. 2013-34, sec. 4.01, and requires

substantiation, or at a minimum, specificity, with regard to allegations of abuse,

see Nihiser v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2008-135, 2008 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS

139, at *29. A generalized claim of abuse is insufficient. See Thomassen v.

Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2011-88, aff’d, 564 F. App’x 885 (9th Cir. 2014);

Knorr v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004-212.

Petitioner consented to intervenor’s TSP loans when she signed the loan

paperwork as intervenor’s spouse. The liability attributable to intervenor arose

partially from the default on those loans. At trial petitioner acknowledged that she

was aware of her and intervenor’s inability to pay their tax liability for 2010 when

she signed the joint return.

On her Form 8857 petitioner alleged that she was a victim of abuse.

However, petitioner did not testify about her allegations at trial or explain why she

was unable to question or challenge payment of the 2010 tax liability. Although

the record includes a copy of a 2016 protective order against intervenor, that

document was issued many years after the year for which petitioner seeks relief.

While the Court takes allegations of abuse seriously, the record does not support a

finding that intervenor’s abuse prevented petitioner from questioning or

- 16 challenging payment of the 2010 tax liability. We therefore conclude that

petitioner’s knowledge of the underpayment weighs against relief.

4.

Legal Obligation

This factor favors relief where the nonrequesting spouse has the sole

obligation to pay an outstanding Federal tax liability under a binding divorce

decree or other legally binding agreement. Rev. Proc. 2013-34, sec. 4.03(2)(d),

2013-43 I.R.B. at 402. This factor is neutral where both spouses have such an

obligation or the divorce decree or agreement is silent as to any such obligation.

Id. The Final Decree allocated one-half of the underpayment of tax to each of

petitioner and intervenor. Because both spouses have a legal obligation pursuant to

a divorce decree, this factor is neutral.

5.

Significant Benefit

This factor calls for an evaluation of whether petitioner received a

significant benefit, beyond normal support, such as the “benefits of a lavish

lifestyle,” from the underpayment of tax. See id. sec. 4.03(2)(e), 2013-43 I.R.B. at

402; see also sec. 1.6015-2(d), Income Tax Regs. If so, this factor will weigh

against relief. Normal support is measured by the circumstances of the particular

parties. Porter v. Commissioner, 132 T.C. at 212. If the unpaid tax is small such

that neither spouse received a significant benefit from its nonpayment, then this

factor is neutral under the terms of Rev. Proc. 2013-34, sec. 4.03(2)(e). However,

- 17 this Court treats the lack of a significant benefit as a factor favoring relief. See

Boyle v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2016-87, at *16; Wang v. Commissioner,

T.C. Memo. 2014-206, at *40.

Respondent concedes that petitioner did not receive any significant benefit

from the underpayment of tax. Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of relief.

6.

Compliance With Income Tax Laws

This factor weighs in favor of relief if the requesting spouse is in compliance

with the income tax laws for taxable years after being divorced from the

nonrequesting spouse. If the requesting spouse is not in compliance, then this

factor will weigh against relief. Rev. Proc. 2013-34, sec. 4.03(2)(f)(i), 2013-43

I.R.B. at 402. Respondent concedes that petitioner has complied with the income

tax laws for the years following petitioner and intervenor’s divorce. This factor

weighs in favor of relief.

7.

Health

This factor may weigh in favor of relief if the requesting spouse was in poor

mental or physical health when the tax return in issue was filed, when the request

for relief was made, or at the time of trial. Id. sec. 4.03(2)(g), 2013-43 I.R.B. at

403; see also Pullins v. Commissioner, 136 T.C. at 454. If the requesting spouse

was in neither poor physical nor poor mental health, this factor is neutral. Rev.

- 18 Proc. 2013-34, sec. 4.03(2)(g). The record does not establish that petitioner was in

poor physical or mental health at any time. Accordingly, this factor is neutral.

8.

Conclusion

After evaluating the factors, we find that three of the seven factors weigh in

favor of relief, one factor weighs against relief, and the remaining factors are

neutral. In section 6015(f) cases, however, we do not simply count factors. We

evaluate all of the relevant facts and circumstances to reach a conclusion. See

Pullins v. Commissioner, 136 T.C. at 448; Rev. Proc. 2013-34, secs. 3.05, 4.03(2),

2013-43 I.R.B. at 398, 400.

In evaluating the relevant factors we conclude that the knowledge factor

weighs too heavily against relief for petitioner. The 2010 tax liability attributable

to intervenor partially arose from defaulted TSP loans to which petitioner had

consented. She knew the liability would not be paid when she signed the return.

Given these facts, we find that it would not be inequitable to hold her responsible

for the underpayment for 2010.

We have considered all of the arguments made by the parties and, to the

extent they are not addressed herein, we find them to be moot, irrelevant, or

without merit.

- 19 To reflect the foregoing,

Decision will be entered

for respondent.