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T.C. Memo. 1998-232
UNITED STATES TAX COURT
LAIDLAW TRANSPORTATION, INC. AND SUBSIDIARIES, Petitioners v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
LAIDLAW INDUSTRIES, INC. & SUBSIDIARIES, Petitioners v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Docket Nos. 9361-94, 9362-94.
Filed June 30, 1998.
Robert H. Aland, Gregg D. Lemein, Mark A. Oates, Jeffrey M.
O'Donnell, John D. McDonald, and Taylor S. Reid, for petitioners.
Thomas R. Lamons, C. Glenn McLoughlin, and Brigham J.L.
Sanders, for respondent.
MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION
COLVIN, Judge:
Respondent determined deficiencies in and
overpayments of petitioners' Federal income tax as follows:
- 2 Laidlaw Transportation, Inc. (LTI) and Subsidiaries
Year
Deficiency
Overpayment
1984
1985
1987
1988
$108,575
3,178,717
7,983,733
17,747,370
$8,333
0
0
181,801
Laidlaw Industries, Inc. (LII) and Subsidiaries
Year
1986
Aug. 1987
Dec. 1987
Deficiency
$96,383
19,746,061
6,828,291
Overpayment
-0-0-0-
Petitioners received $975,153,806 from a related Dutch
corporation, Laidlaw International Investments B.V. (LIIBV),
during the years in issue.
Petitioners transferred $133,515,4591
to LIIBV in payments denominated as interest2 during those years.
The issue for decision is whether the LIIBV advances to
petitioners were debt or equity, and thus whether petitioners may
deduct the $133,515,459 as interest for the years in issue.
We
1
The following payments from LTI's and LII's subsidiaries
to LIIBV are in dispute:
Tax Year
Aug. 31, 1986
Aug. 31, 1987
Dec. 31, 1987
Aug. 31, 1988
Total
2
Payments to LIIBV from -LTI's Subsidiaries
LII's Subsidiaries
$2,439,773
$753,698
17,199,562
28,590,158
--14,509,081
--70,023,187
89,662,522
43,852,937
Total
$3,193,471
45,789,720
14,509,081
70,023,187
133,515,459
Our use of terms such as "pay", "payment", "borrow",
"interest", "lend", and "loan" does not indicate our conclusion
about the substance of the transactions at issue.
- 3 hold that the LIIBV advances to petitioners were equity, and that
petitioners may not deduct the $133,515,459 as interest.3
We use the following abbreviations in this report:
BBC
Barclays Bank of Canada
LIIBV
Curacao
Laidlaw International
Investments B.V., Curacao
Branch
BFI
Browning-Ferris
Industries, Inc.
LIL
Laidlaw Investments Ltd.
Chase
Chase Lincoln First Bank
LTI
Laidlaw Transportation,
Inc.
CP
Canadian Pacific Ltd.
LTL
Laidlaw Transportation Ltd.
or Laidlaw, Inc.
FNBC
First National Bank of
Chicago
LWSI
Laidlaw Waste Systems, Inc.
GGCL
Grey Goose Corporation
Ltd.
LWSL
Laidlaw Waste Systems, Ltd.
Goose
Grey Goose Holdings, Inc.
Monroe
Monroe Tree and Lawntender,
Inc.
GSX
GSX Corporation
RBC
Royal Bank of Canada
LAC
Laidlaw Acquisition Corp.
TDB
Toronto Dominion Bank
LESCAL
Laidlaw Environmental
Services (California),
Inc.
Transit
Travelways, Inc., Laidlaw
Transit, Inc., or Laidlaw
Transit (West), Inc.
LESI
Laidlaw Environmental
Services, Inc.
Transit
Ltd.
Laidlaw Transit Ltd.
LHI
Laidlaw Holdings, Inc.
Tree
Laidlaw Tree Service, Inc.
LIBL
Laidlaw Investments
(Barbados) Ltd.
Waste
Quebec
Laidlaw Waste Systems
Quebec Ltd.
LII
Laidlaw Industries, Inc.
WMI
Waste Management, Inc.
LIIBV
Laidlaw International
Investments B.V.
3
In light of our decision, we need not decide whether, as
respondent contends, some of the payments at issue here are not
deductible because of sec. 267.
- 4 Unless otherwise indicated, section references are to the
Internal Revenue Code in effect for the years in issue and Rule
references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.
FINDINGS OF FACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
G.
H.
I.
J.
K.
II.
Petitioners . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
LTL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Growth of Petitioners and Their Subsidiaries . . . 11
LIIBV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
LTL's Purchase of GSX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
LTI's Centralized Cash Management Program (CCMP) . 24
The Advances at Issue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Petitioners' Financial Condition . . . . . . . . . 44
Bank Loans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
Comparison of Terms Governing Advances from LIIBV and
Bank Loans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
Audit of LTL by Canadian Tax Authorities. . . . . . 52
OPINION
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
52
Contentions of the Parties . . . . . . . . . . . .
Loans vs. Capital Contributions . . . . . . . . . .
Substance vs. Form . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Mixon Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Other Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
52
53
54
58
81
83
I.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Some of the facts have been stipulated and are so found.
A.
Petitioners
Petitioners LTI and LII are U.S. corporations the principal
places of business of which were in Hurst, Texas, when they filed
their petitions.
LTL, a Canadian corporation, owned all of the stock of LTI
during the years in issue.
LTI was a holding company for U.S.
- 5 companies in the passenger and school bus transportation
businesses.
LTI's consolidated group included Transit and Tree.
LTI owned 76 to 79 percent of the stock of LII during the
years in issue and before December 16, 1987.
The other LII stock
was publicly held.
LII bought the publicly held stock on
December 16, 1987.
After that date, LTI was the parent of the
U.S. consolidated group that included LII.
LII was a holding
company for U.S. companies in the solid and (after October 1986)
hazardous waste services business, including LWSI.
B.
LTL
1.
Michael George DeGroote (DeGroote)
DeGroote and his family moved from Belgium to Canada in 1948
when he was 14.
In the 1950's, DeGroote started a construction
business in Elliot Lake, Canada.
In 1959, he moved his business
to Sault Sainte Marie, Canada, and built sewers, roads, and
highways.
In 1959, DeGroote bought all of the stock of Laidlaw Motor
Sales, Ltd., an Ontario, Canada, trucking corporation; Laidlaw
Motors, a retail truck parts business; and Hepburn Transport
Ltd., a Canadian trucking company.
In 1966, Hepburn Transport
Ltd. merged with Laidlaw Motor Sales, Ltd., which later became
LTL.4
DeGroote was president and chairman of LTL from the time
it was formed until August 1, 1990.
4
On Jan. 1, 1990, LTL changed its name to Laidlaw Inc.
- 6 2.
Organization of the Laidlaw Entities in the Years in
Issue
As discussed in more detail in pars. I-B-3 and 4 and I-C,
below, LTL and its subsidiaries were organized as follows during
the years in issue:
- 7 a.
Laidlaw Entities Before December 16, 1987
LTL
(Canada)
100%
(95.6% direct;
4.4% indirect)5
100%
GGCL
(Canada)
LIL
(Canada)
100%
100%
Goose
(U.S.)
LIIBV
(Netherlands)
LTI
(U.S.)
PETITIONER
20%
80%
LHI
(U.S.)
Public
21%
100%
75%
100%
Transit
(U.S.)
4%
LII
(U.S.)
PETITIONER
100%
Tree
(U.S.)
100%
Other
U.S.
Operating
Subsidiaries
100%
LWSI
(U.S.)
LESI
and Other
U.S. Operating
Subsidiaries
5
GGCL owned all of Goose during the tax years ending Aug.
31, 1986, to Aug. 31, 1988. LTL owned 96 percent and Transit
Ltd. owned 4 percent of GGCL. LTL owned all of Transit Ltd., a
Canadian corporation. On July 4, 1988, Transit Ltd. merged with
Travelways Ltd., a Canadian corporation which was 100-percent
owned by LTL. The merged entity was Transit Ltd.
- 8 -
b.
Laidlaw Entities After December 16, 1987
LTL
(Canada)
100%
(95.6% direct;
4.4% indirect)
100%
GGLC
(Canada)
LIL
(Canada)
100%
100%
Goose
(U.S.)
100%
LTI
(U.S.)
PETITIONER
19%
81%
100%
LII
(U.S.)
PETITIONER
Transit
(U.S.)
100%
100%
LWSI
(U.S.)
100%
Other
U.S. Operating
Subsidiaries
Other
U.S. Operating
Subsidiaries
LIIBV
(Netherlands)
100%
Tree
(U.S.)
- 9 3.
Growth of LTL
From 1959 to 1969, LTL and its predecessors bought trucking
businesses in the United States and Canada.
Sanitation in 1969.
LTL bought Superior
LTL began to buy passenger bus service
businesses in Canada in 1973.
LTL's subsidiaries entered the
solid waste services business in the United States in January
1978.
LTL bought the largest operator of school buses in Canada
in 1979.
In October 1980, LTL bought all of the stock of Theta
Systems, Inc. (TSI), which operated solid waste services
businesses in Indiana, Illinois, and Ohio.
to LWSI.
TSI changed its name
LWSI had subsidiaries active in the solid waste
business in North America.
LTL's subsidiaries entered the passenger bus business in the
United States in September 1983.
in 1984.
LTL sold its trucking business
By the end of 1988, LTL and its subsidiaries were the
third largest solid and hazardous waste management services
company and the largest provider of school bus transportation
services in North America.
LTL financed its expansion in the United States by lending
money and contributing capital to its subsidiaries in the United
States.
Before 1969, LTL financed its growth primarily with its
own earnings and loans from banks and finance companies.
first made a public offering of its stock in 1969.
LTL
LTL raised
- 10 C$1.5 million6 in 1969, which it used to repay bank debts and buy
more businesses.
LTL stock was traded on stock exchanges in
Canada and the United States by August 31, 1988 (the end of LTL's
1988 tax year).
LTL and its subsidiaries grew rapidly before and during the
years in issue.
DeGroote acquired businesses that provided
trucking, solid waste services, and passenger and school bus
services.
These businesses used heavy vehicles to transport
materials or people and needed governmental licenses or permits
to operate.
DeGroote believed that the fastest way to expand in
these businesses was to buy small privately-held businesses which
had existing licenses and permits.
4.
LTL's Management Team
The core management team of the Laidlaw entities during the
years in issue consisted of DeGroote, Leslie W. Haworth
(Haworth), and Ivan R. Cairns (Cairns).
Haworth became LTL's
senior financial officer in 1972 and later became senior vice
president for finance.
Cairns became LTL's vice president,
general counsel, and secretary in 1981.
vice president.
He later became senior
Cairns and Haworth were DeGroote's two closest
advisors on acquisitions, financing, and other matters.
They
were directors and officers of LTL and all of its subsidiaries
relevant to these cases before and during the years in issue.
6
All references to "C$" are to Canadian dollars.
references to "$" are to U.S. dollars.
All
- 11 During the years in issue, DeGroote was chairman of all of
the Laidlaw companies.
DeGroote, Haworth, and Cairns were
directors and officers of LTL, LIL (LIIBV's parent which was
wholly owned by LTL), LIIBV, and petitioners.
5.
DeGroote's Sale of LTL Stock
DeGroote owned about 50.5 percent of the voting stock of LTL
during LTL's 1986 and 1987 tax years and until May 1988.
Ownership of LTL's other voting stock was widely dispersed.
In
May 1988, CP, a Canadian transportation conglomerate, bought 47.2
percent of the voting stock of LTL from DeGroote for C$499
million.
C.
Growth of Petitioners and Their Subsidiaries
DeGroote and his management team established LTL as the
controlling parent of several subsidiaries which included LIIBV,
LTI, LII, and their subsidiaries.
See pars. I-B-2, 3, and 4,
above.
1.
LTI and Its Subsidiaries
In 1977, LTL formed LTI (a petitioner in these cases) to be
a holding company for LTL's U.S. subsidiaries.
corporation, is an accrual basis taxpayer.
stock of LTI during the years in issue.
LTI, a Delaware
LTL owned all of the
LTI was the parent of an
affiliated group that filed consolidated returns during the years
in issue.
During the years in issue, DeGroote, Haworth, Ronald S.
Murray (Murray), and Douglas R. Gowland (Gowland) were the
- 12 directors of LTI.
DeGroote was president from November 20, 1984,
to December 10, 1987.
Murray was vice president from November
30, 1984, to January 9, 1986.
Haworth was vice president for
finance from November 30, 1984, to August 31, 1988.
Cairns was
secretary from November 30, 1984, to December 10, 1987.
Gowland
was senior vice president for solid waste services from December
11, 1986, to December 10, 1987.
DeGroote, Haworth, and Gowland were directors of Tree from
May 27, 1987, to August 31, 1988.
Officers of Tree from May 27,
1987, to August 31, 1988, included Gowland as chairman, Haworth
as vice president for finance, and Cairns as secretary.7
DeGroote, Haworth, and Victor A. Webster (Webster) were
Transit's directors from January 10, 1985, to August 31, 1988.
Transit's officers from January 10, 1985, to August 31, 1988,
included Webster as president, Haworth as vice president for
finance, and Cairns as secretary.
DeGroote was chief executive
officer from December 10, 1987, to August 31, 1988.
Through an acquisition company, on May 1, 1987, LTI paid $16
million to buy the stock of Monroe, a New York corporation, which
provided landscaping and tree services in New England.
Monroe
changed its name to Laidlaw Tree Services, Inc. (Tree), on April
28, 1988.
7
LTI sold all of the outstanding stock of Tree to an
unrelated buyer in October 1990 for $17.4 million.
- 13 On October 28, 1983, LTL formed Travelways, Inc.
(Travelways), a Delaware holding and operating corporation.
Before September 1, 1987, Travelways owned all of Transit, a
holding and operating corporation formed under California law on
June 26, 1961, and all of LTI's passenger services subsidiaries.
On September 1, 1987, Laidlaw Transit, Inc., changed its
name to Laidlaw Transit (West) Inc. (LTW).
On November 5, 1987,
Travelways changed its name to Laidlaw Transit, Inc. (Transit).8
After the name changes, most of the Laidlaw U.S. east coast
passenger services subsidiaries were merged into Transit, and
most of the Laidlaw U.S. west coast passenger services
subsidiaries were merged into LTW.
During the years in issue, Transit and its subsidiaries
provided passenger and school bus services in the United States.
LTL and its subsidiaries were the largest provider of school
transportation services in North America.
2.
LII and Its Subsidiaries
a.
LII
LTL formed LII (a petitioner in these cases) on March 24,
1981, as the holding company for LTL's U.S. and Canadian solid
waste services operations.
accrual basis taxpayer.
8
LII is a Delaware corporation and an
Before 1982, LTI owned 80 percent of the
Unless otherwise indicated, references to "Transit"
include references to Travelways, Laidlaw Transit, Inc., Laidlaw
Transit (West), Inc., and Transit.
- 14 stock of LII.
LTL owned all of the stock of GGCL, a subsidiary
of which owned the other 20 percent of LII stock.
On February 9, 1982, LTI and GGCL transferred their LII
stock to LHI, a Delaware corporation.
The stock of LII was
publicly traded on the NASDAQ from 1982 to 1987.
The public
owned 19 to 24 percent of the stock of LII from 1982 to 1987.
During the years in issue, DeGroote, Haworth, Gowland, and
Murray (and others) were directors of LII.
LII's presidents were
Murray from September 1 to October 8, 1985, and Gowland from
October 9, 1985, to August 31, 1988.
Haworth was vice president
for finance from September 1, 1987, to August 31, 1988.
Cairns
was secretary, vice president, and general counsel from September
1, 1985, to August 31, 1988.
Harve A. Ferrill (Ferrill) was a
director of LII from 1982 to 1987.
Ferrill had founded a waste
services company (TSI) that LTL bought in 1980.
When LII went
public in 1982, DeGroote asked Ferrill to be a director.
LHI merged into LII on December 31, 1987.
b.
LWSI
LII owned all of the stock of LWSI during the years in
issue.
During the years in issue, LWSI owned all of the common
stock of LWSL, a Canadian corporation.
LWSL owned all of the
common stock of Waste Quebec, a Canadian corporation.
LWSL and
Waste Quebec were in the solid waste services business in Canada.
- 15 LWSI's only directors from September 1, 1985, to August 31,
1988, were DeGroote, Gowland, and Haworth.
LWSI's officers
included Gowland as president from October 2, 1986, to January 5,
1987, Haworth as vice president for finance from October 2, 1986,
to August 31, 1988, and Cairns as secretary from September 1,
1985, to August 31, 1988.
D.
LIIBV
1.
Coopers & Lybrand's Plan
By the mid-1980's petitioners were competing intensely with
WMI and BFI to buy solid waste services businesses.
In the
summer of 1985, DeGroote, Cairns, and Haworth asked Coopers &
Lybrand to develop a tax strategy for LTL to help petitioners
compete with WMI and BFI in buying U.S. companies.
Coopers &
Lybrand also considered nontax factors.
Coopers & Lybrand recommended that LTL form LIL as a whollyowned Canadian subsidiary, and then form LIIBV, a Netherlands
subsidiary of LIL to be funded by capital contributions and noninterest-bearing debt.
plan:
Coopers & Lybrand said that under this
(a) LTL could deduct interest it paid on funds it borrowed
to invest in LIL; (b) LIL could lend funds interest free to
LIIBV, which could advance funds to Laidlaw's U.S. subsidiaries
as interest-bearing debt; (c) the U.S. subsidiaries could deduct
the interest with no withholding tax liability under a
U.S./Netherlands treaty; and (d) the Laidlaw group would have
what Coopers & Lybrand called a "double deduction" of interest
expense (interest deduction in both Canada and the U.S.), with
- 16 minimal income tax liabilities in The Netherlands, Canada, or the
United States.
2.
Formation of LIL and LIIBV; Dutch Tax Rulings
On September 25, 1985, LTL formed LIL, a Canadian
corporation.
LTL has always been the sole shareholder of LIL.9
LTL and its subsidiaries contributed equity to LIL which was its
sole source of funds during the years in issue.10
DeGroote, Haworth, and Cairns were directors of LIL from
September 25, 1985, to August 31, 1988.
From September 25, 1985,
to August 31, 1988, DeGroote was president and Haworth was vice
president for finance.
Cairns was vice president and secretary
from September 25, 1985, to December 10, 1987, and secretary from
December 10, 1987, to August 31, 1988.
Jerry Pekaruk (Pekaruk)
was controller from September 25, 1985, to December 10, 1987.
Robert E. Duncan (Duncan) was vice president from December 10,
1987, to August 31, 1988.
Haworth supervised Pekaruk and Duncan.
On December 2, 1985, Coopers & Lybrand received the first of
several Dutch tax rulings that LIL's interest-free loans to LIIBV
would be treated as capital contributions rather than profits for
purposes of Dutch income and withholding taxes.
On December 30, 1985, LIL formed LIIBV in The Netherlands as
a 100-percent owned subsidiary.
LIIBV was a corporation for U.S.
9
From the time LIL was formed, LIL owned all of the stock
of LIBL, a Barbados corporation.
10
LIL also received a dividend from LIIBV in February 1988.
- 17 Federal income tax purposes.11
In February 1986, LIIBV opened
accounts with ABN Bank, New York.
LIL owned all of the stock of LIIBV during the years in
issue.
DeGroote was a director of LIIBV during the years in
issue.
LIIBV had other directors, including Netherlands
residents.
Haworth became a director of LIIBV after the years in
issue.
On October 16, 1986, Haworth (using LTI letterhead) wrote
the following to Peter Deege, a director of LIIBV:
I should advise you that at our Monday meetings we
wish to do the following:
1.
Amend the loan agreements from B.V. to our U.S.
subsidiaries to provide with effect from September 1,
1986:
11
(a)
All sums to be due on demand at interest
rates equal to ABN New York prime plus 2
percent, payable on the last business days of
each fiscal quarter.
(b)
Remove all financial ratio covenants.
(c)
Remove the "ceilings" so that no limits will
exist. All loans will be provided as
requested but subjected to availabilities of
B.V.'s funds.
(d)
In the case of Laidlaw Transportation, Inc.'s
subsidiaries, there will be two loan accounts
established, one called principal account and
the other called reinvested interest account.
(e)
To facilitate the quarterly and other changes
in loan amounts, all increases/decreases
would be entered on a grid promissory note.
This system allows the lender to adjust the
promissory note automatically without issuing
During the taxable years in issue, LIIBV was a foreignrelated person with respect to Transit and LWSI within the
meaning of sec. 267(a)(3) and sec. 1.267(a)-3(b)(1), Income Tax
Regs.
- 18 a new note. It may not be available under
Dutch law in which case we shall amend to
suit your requirements.
I shall be bringing new loan agreements with me
prepared on the Grid Note Basis.
2.
Laidlaw Investments Limited ("LIL"), LIIBV's
parent, will sell a promissory note of U.S.
$124,812,613 payable by Laidlaw Waste Systems Inc. at
ABN prime plus 2 percent to LIIBV in exchange for a
combination of capital of LIIBV and an interest free
loan. The amount of capital that will be attributed to
one share has to be determined by you and Ron Unger
prior to Monday. This promissory note is dated October
14 and LIIBV will have to direct the borrower to pay
the interest accrued from October 14 to October 19 to
LIL.
Ron Unger may need to advise the Dutch tax
authorities of these transactions in advance. Please
confer with him.
LIIBV carried out the instructions in Haworth's letter at
its board meeting on October 20, 1986.
From February 4, 1986, to April 12, 1988, LIIBV's managing
directors met 12 times.
DeGroote was present at four of the
meetings and voted by proxy at eight.
Haworth was present at
three of those meetings and Cairns was present at two.
LIL owned 100 percent of LIIBV.
LIL's proxies at
shareholder meetings for LIIBV included specific instructions
about future transactions.
Cairns and Haworth signed all of the loan agreements,
promissory notes, and assignments of transactions between LIIBV
and petitioners on behalf of petitioners.
LTL significantly
influenced LIIBV's lending decisions and operations.
- 19 3.
LIIBV's Tax Status in The Netherlands
LIIBV kept books in The Netherlands in which it recorded its
lending and borrowing transactions, investments, capital
contributions, income, and expenses.
LIIBV reported the payments
on its loans to Transit, LWSI, and Tree as interest income
subject to The Netherlands' income tax.
LIIBV paid income tax to
The Netherlands in 1986, 1987, and 1988.
LIIBV could claim benefits under the Convention for the
Avoidance of Double Taxation, Apr. 29, 1948, U.S.-Netherlands,
art. VIII(1), 62 Stat. 1778, for all of the interest paid to it
by U.S. persons, including petitioners.
Neither LTL nor any of the other Laidlaw companies asked to
borrow money from any unrelated commercial lenders to replace the
money the Laidlaw companies received from LIIBV.
LTL did not
guarantee repayment of loans LIIBV made to petitioners or the
U.S. companies.
However, LTL guaranteed repayment of loans by
commercial lenders to petitioners and the U.S. companies.
4.
LIIBV Curaçao
In October 1987, LIIBV established a branch office in
Curaçao, Netherlands Antilles (LIIBV Curaçao), to reduce
Netherlands income tax on the interest payments that LIIBV
received from Transit, LWSI, and Tree.
LIIBV Curaçao kept a set
of its books and records in Netherlands Antilles.
On February 17, 1988, LIIBV Curaçao hired G.A.F. Schrils
(Schrils), a resident of Netherlands Antilles, as its branch
manager.
Schrils reported to LIIBV's directors in Amsterdam.
- 20 E.
LTL's Purchase of GSX
1.
The Agreement To Buy GSX
LTL bought the stock of GSX for $349,812,613 in 1986.12
DeGroote and Haworth asked three investment banks if they wanted
to provide long-term financing for LII to buy GSX.
Dean Witter,
Bear Stearns, and Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette each gave LII
tentative proposals.
Each investment bank said that the GSX
acquisition could be financed through a combination of equity (or
convertible debt), subordinated debt, and bank loans.
The
investment banks based their proposals in part on information
about GSX's finances that LTL later found to be unreliable.
Each
proposal would have required petitioners to publicly issue stock
or debt.
However, petitioners could not issue equity or debt
because GSX did not have separate audited financial statements.
Haworth opposed a public offering at that time.
LTL and LII rejected the investment banks' proposals
because:
(a) GSX did not have separate audited financial
statements; (b) equity or convertible debt would dilute LTI's
interests in LII; and (c) debt from commercial lenders could not
be secured on terms as favorable as debt from LIIBV.
Ferrill (identified at par. I-C-2-a, above) was a member of
a special committee for LII's board of directors which was
considering the investment banks' proposals.
He relied on
Haworth's judgment in deciding that LII should reject the
12
GSX's parent had agreed to reduce the price by
C$24,743,000 because Coopers & Lybrand identified problems with
GSX's operations.
- 21 investment banks' proposals and use funds from LIIBV to pay for
GSX.
LTL assigned its rights and obligations under the GSX
purchase agreement to LWSI before the closing date.
LTL and LTI
recorded the transaction on their books as an intercompany
receivable owed to LTL by LTI.
LTI recorded the transaction as
an intercompany receivable owed by LWSI.
LTL borrowed $349,812,613 from TDB on September 30, 1986,
and on October 10, 1986, deposited it in a GSX purchase escrow
account.
In a document entitled "Loan Agreement" signed by
Cairns and dated as of September 30, 1986, LTL agreed to many
conditions for the loan that typically accompany commercial
loans, including not to allow its ratio of current assets to
current liabilities to be less than 1 to 1, its debt to equity
ratio13 to be greater than 2.5 to 1, its cash-flow ratio14 to be
less than 1.25 to 1, and its net worth to be less than C$325
million.
On October 10, 1986, LWSI wrote promissory notes payable to
LTI on demand for $124,812,613, $125 million, and $100 million (a
total of $349,812,613).
Each promissory note required LWSI to
13
Debt to equity ratio is computed by dividing the debt of
a company by its shareholders' equity. The ratio indicates the
level of financing that is provided by the company's shareholders
and its creditors.
14
Cash-flow ratio is computed by dividing cash-flow by
anticipated debt payments.
- 22 pay LTI interest quarterly at a rate equal to ABN Bank's U.S.
prime rate plus 2 percent.
On October 14, 1986, LWSI bought all of the stock of GSX
from GSX's parent for $349,812,613.
On October 14, 1986, the GSX
purchase escrow disbursed $349,812,613 to GSX's parent and gave
the three LWSI promissory notes to LTI.
After the GSX sale, LTI
owed LTL $349,812,613 (which was unsecured) with interest at a
rate equal to the U.S. prime rate.
On October 20, 1986, LWSI's $124,812,613 promissory note was
assigned to LTL, then to Transit, then to LIL, and then to LIIBV.
In exchange for this assignment, LIIBV executed a promissory note
to LIL for an interest-free loan from LIL in the same amount as
the assigned note.
On November 10, 1986, LWSI's $125 million
promissory note was assigned to LIIBV.
Haworth and Cairns signed
the documents through which the notes were assigned.
On December 10, 1986, LWSI told LIIBV that LWSI could not
lower its debt to equity ratios to a level acceptable to ABN Bank
by issuing equity.
This was partly because the equity market was
weak at that time.
LIIBV transferred to LWSI $21 million on February 18, 1987,
and $79 million on June 15, 1987.
LWSI used these funds to repay
LTI for the $100 million promissory note.
Initially LTL, and later LIIBV, financed LWSI's acquisition
of GSX.
As part of that initial financing LTL and LIIBV required
LWSI to pay interest at a rate of 10.5 percent on the amount
- 23 LIIBV advanced to it.
LII's directors, including Ferrill,
approved the intercompany financing to buy GSX because the rates
and terms were more favorable to LII than those from commercial
lenders.
On July 7, 1987, LII and LWSI signed a new loan
agreement with LIIBV.
It included balances from previous
advances and kept the 10.5 percent interest rate.
LTL repaid its loan from TDB relating to the GSX acquisition
primarily with money that LTL raised in equity markets.
2.
Result of the GSX Purchase
The GSX purchase made LII the third largest solid waste
services business in the United States and the second or third
largest provider of hazardous waste disposal services in the
United States.
LII's credit lines from commercial lenders limited LII's
debt to equity ratio to no more than 2 to 1.
As a result, LII's
debt under these lines of credit could not exceed $247.8 million.
LII's debt after the GSX acquisition was $491.1 million.
If
LII's debt to equity ratio exceeded 2 to 1, it would be required
to renegotiate its commercial loans.
The debt from the GSX
acquisition made it harder for LII to meet the financial ratio
requirements established by credit agreements with its commercial
lenders.
Before acquiring GSX, LII's debt to equity ratio (based
on book value) was less than 1 to 1; after the acquisition, it
was almost 3.1 to 1.
LII's primary competitors in the U.S. solid
waste services industry had debt to equity ratios below 2 to 1.
- 24 3.
LESI
GSX changed its name to LESI.
LESI became an indirect
subsidiary of LWSI in October 1986.
LESI was the holding company
for the hazardous waste services operating subsidiaries of the
LII group.
On April 11, 1989, LESI and International Technologies
Corp., an unrelated U.S. corporation, formed LESCAL.
LESI owned
70 percent of LESCAL and International Technologies Corp. owned
30 percent.
On March 31, 1993, LESI bought International
Technologies Corp.'s stock in LESCAL.
F.
LTI's Centralized Cash Management Program (CCMP)
Before 1987, LTI had a program with its subsidiaries to
manage cash called the CCMP.
accounts.
The CCMP had the following
LTI had an account called a master concentration
account or first tier account.
Transit, Tree, and LWSI, LTI's
subsidiaries one level below LTI, had second tier concentration
accounts.
Regions of Transit, Tree, and LWSI had third tier
concentration accounts.
Operating companies in those regions had
fourth tier concentration accounts.
The CCMP accounts operated as follows.
At the end of each
day, each operating company netted the cash it received against
the cash it disbursed.
a general account.
The operating company netted the cash in
The operating company then transferred any
extra cash in the general account to the appropriate third tier
account.
If there was a cash shortage in the operating company's
- 25 general account, cash was transferred from the appropriate third
tier account to the operating company's fourth tier account.
All
fourth tier accounts were zeroed out at the end of the day.
Next, the same thing was done for third and then second tier
accounts.
Each second tier account was zeroed out with transfers
to or from the first tier master account.
The parties to the
CCMP accounted for the transfers between the accounts as
intercompany receivables or payables.
The parties to the CCMP
charged what they claim to be interest on all intercompany
payables established under the CCMP.
In July 1987, LTI, Transit, LWSI, and Tree established a
unified CCMP at FNBC.
In 1987 and 1988, LTI's CCMP overdraft
limit was between $25 and $30 million for its master
concentration account at FNBC.
LTL summarized the transfers of money to be made through
FNBC's accounts for FNBC officials in Canada.
At the end of each
day, LTL or its subsidiaries redeposited enough money in the FNBC
CCMP accounts to cover any overdrafts resulting from transfers.
LII had a separate CCMP with its subsidiaries.
G.
The Advances at Issue
1.
LIL, LIIBV, and LTL
In the years in issue, LIIBV's primary activity was to
receive funds from LIL and transfer them to petitioners,
generally on the same or next day.
LIIBV advanced funds only to
Laidlaw affiliates in the years in issue.
LIIBV's funds came
almost exclusively from LIL and from petitioners' payments to
LIIBV.
- 26 When a Laidlaw entity asked for an advance, LIIBV asked LIL
to provide funds for the transaction.
When LIL advanced those
funds to LIIBV, LIL told LIIBV to record the advance as an
interest-free loan and as a capital contribution, in proportions
designated by LIIBV and Coopers & Lybrand.
This was done in part
to comply with Dutch tax rulings.
Written agreements between LIL and LIIBV generally required
LIL to provide funds requested by LIIBV, as long as those amounts
were no more than amounts that LIIBV agreed to advance to
petitioners or their subsidiaries.
advances from LIL on demand.
LIIBV agreed to repay
LIIBV's managing directors issued
more stock to LIL as needed to make LIIBV's debt to equity ratio
comply with Dutch tax rulings.
2.
Advances at Issue
LIIBV transferred the following amounts of money to Transit,
LWSI, and Tree during the years in issue:
DATE
LIIBV Advances To -TRANSIT
LWSI
TREE
TOTAL
CUMULATIVE
BALANCE
12/18/85
$5,000,000
-0-
-0-
$5,000,000
$5,000,000
02/18/86
18,000,000
-0-
-0-
18,000,000
23,000,000
04/29/86
30,100,000
$29,000,000
-0-
59,100,000
82,100,000
05/29/86
9,588,797
-0-
-0-
9,588,797
91,688,797
08/06/86
54,000,000
-0-
-0-
54,000,000
145,688,797
08/28/86
2,204,674
-0-
-0-
2,204,674
147,893,471
Total FY1986
118,893,471
29,000,000
-0-
147,893,471
10/20/86
-0-
124,812,613
-0-
124,812,613
272,706,084
11/10/86
43,800,000
125,000,000
-0-
168,800,000
441,506,084
11/25/86
5,870,270
-0-
-0-
5,870,270
447,376,354
- 27 LIIBV Advances To -TRANSIT
LWSI
TREE
DATE
TOTAL
CUMULATIVE
BALANCE
02/18/87
-0-
21,000,000
-0-
21,000,000
468,376,354
02/25/87
11,535,627
-0-
-0-
11,535,627
479,911,981
05/28/87
12,468,151
6,400,000
$20,000,000
38,868,151
518,780,132
06/15/87
-0-
99,000,000
-0-
99,000,000
617,780,132
08/31/87
15,280,674
-0-
-0-
15,280,674
633,060,806
Total FY1987
88,954,722
376,212,613
20,000,000
485,167,335
11/30/87
16,700,000
-0-
-0-
16,700,000
649,760,806
12/16/87
-0-
60,900,000
-0-
60,900,000
710,660,806
02/08/88
45,000,000
-0-
-0-
45,000,000
755,660,806
02/29/88
-0-
90,448,000
-0-
90,448,000
846,108,806
04/18/88
17,000,000
11,000,000
-0-
28,000,000
874,108,806
04/29/88
-0-
10,000,000
-0-
10,000,000
884,108,806
05/31/88
-0-
21,045,000
-0-
21,045,000
905,153,806
08/08/88
31,000,000
17,000,000
-0-
48,000,000
953,153,806
08/31/88
-0-
22,000,000
-0-
22,000,000
975,153,806
Total FY1988
109,700,000
232,393,000
-0-
342,093,000
LIIBV continued to advance money to LTI, Transit, LWSI,
Tree, and other LTI subsidiaries after August 31, 1988.
December 31, 1994, LIIBV had advanced $1,393,383,974 to
petitioners.
By
- 28 3.
Typical Advances From LTL to LIIBV and From LIIBV to
Petitioners
a.
Typical Advance From LTL to LIIBV to Transit
LIIBV's February 18, 1986, advance to Transit typified how
LIIBV received funds from LIL and immediately advanced the funds
to one of the petitioners.
The steps for the February 18, 1986,
advance were as follows:
Steps for the February 18, 1986, Transfers
1.
2.
3.
4.
LTL received $18 million from its August 1985 issue of
preferred shares.
LTL transferred $18 million to LIL. LIL issued stock to
LTL.
LIL transferred $18 million to LIIBV.
LIIBV transferred $18 million to Transit.
b.
Transfers Between U.S. Subsidiaries and LIIBV
The following descriptions show in greater detail how
petitioners and LIIBV (including LIIBV Curaçao) transferred funds
during the years in issue:
August 28, 1986, Transfers
U.S. Subsidiaries to LIIBV
LII for LWSI
$573,958
Transit
1,630,716
Total
2,204,674
LIIBV to U.S. Subsidiaries
LWSI
-0Transit
$2,204,674
Total
2,204,674
Steps for the August 28, 1986, Transfers
1.
2.
3.
4.
LII borrowed $573,958 from RBC for LWSI.
LII transferred $573,958 to LIIBV for LWSI.
Transit transferred $1,630,716 to LIIBV.
LIIBV transferred $2,204,674 to Transit.
- 29 November 25, 1986, Transfers
U.S. Subsidiaries to LIIBV
Transit to LIIBV $3,097,820
LWSI to LIIBV
2,772,451
Total
5,870,271
LIIBV to U.S. Subsidiaries
LIIBV to Transit
$5,870,270
LIIBV to LWSI
-0Total
5,870,270
Steps for the November 25, 1986, Transfers
1.
2.
3.
LWSI transferred $2,772,451 to LIIBV.
Transit transferred $3,097,820 to LIIBV.
LIIBV transferred $5,870,270 to Transit.
February 24-25, 1987, Transfers
U.S. Subsidiaries to LIIBV
LWSI
$7,532,238
Transit
4,003,389
Total
11,535,627
LIIBV to U.S. Subsidiaries
LWSI
-0Transit
$11,535,627
Total
11,535,627
Steps for the February 24-25, 1987, Transfers
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
LTL authorized TDB to transfer $4,003,389 to Transit; the
funds were transferred to LTI.
LTI transferred $4,003,389 to Transit.
Transit transferred $4,003,389 to LIIBV.
LWSI received $7,532,238 from RBC.
LWSI transferred $7,532,238 to LIIBV.
LIIBV transferred $11,535,627 to Transit.
Transit transferred $10,000,000 to LTI.
May 28, 1987, Transfers
U.S. Subsidiaries to LIIBV
Transit
$4,479,972
LWSI
7,988,179
Total
12,468,151
LIIBV to U.S. Subsidiaries
Transit
$12,468,151
LWSI
-0Total
12,468,151
Steps for the May 28, 1987, Transfers--Transaction 1
1.
2.
3.
4.
LWSI received loan proceeds of $7,988,179 from RBC.
RBC wired the funds to LIIBV.
Transit transferred $4,479,972 to LIIBV.
LIIBV transferred $12,468,151 to Transit.
- 30 Steps for the May 28, 1987, Transfers--Transaction 2
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
LTL transferred $26,400,000 to LIL.
LIL transferred $26,400,000 to LIIBV.
LIIBV transferred $20,000,000 to LTI.
LIIBV transferred $6,400,000 to RBC on behalf of LWSI.
LTI transferred $20,200,000 to LWSI.
LWSI transferred $16,000,000 to Thomas Terry, Jr., to
acquire Tree.
LWSI transferred $4,200,000 to Tree.
August 31, 1987, Transfers
U.S. Subsidiaries to LIIBV
Transit
$5,071,716
LWSI
10,297,291
LTI for Tree
546,667
Total
15,915,674
LIIBV to U.S. Subsidiaries
Transit
$15,280,674
LWSI
-0LTI for Tree
-0Total
15,280,674
Steps for the August 31, 1987, Transfers
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
LWSI transferred $6,000,000 to LTI.
LTI transferred $3,663,625 to LWSI.
LTI transferred $546,667 on Tree's behalf to LIIBV.
Transit transferred $5,071,716 to LIIBV.
LIIBV transferred $15,280,674 to Transit.
LWSI transferred $10,297,291 to LIIBV.
LTI transferred $12,790,221 to LWSI.
Transit transferred $7,448,587 to LTI.
November 30, 1987, Transfers
U.S. Subsidiaries to LIIBV
LTI for Tree
$549,028
LTI for Transit 5,705,723
LTI for LWSI
10,597,883
Total
16,852,634
LIIBV to U.S. Subsidiaries
Tree
-0Transit
$16,700,000
LWSI
-0Total
16,700,000
Steps for the November 30, 1987, Transfers
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
On Tree's behalf, LTI transferred $549,028 to LIIBV.
On Transit's behalf, LTI transferred $5,705,723 to LIIBV.
On LWSI's behalf, LTI transferred $10,597,883 to LIIBV.
LIIBV transferred $16,700,000 to Transit.
LTI received $82,624,902, $49,819,429 of which was from
Transit.
LTI transferred $29,976,998 to LWSI.
LTI transferred $32,609,046 to Transit.
- 31 February 29, 1988, Transfers
U.S. Subsidiaries to LIIBV
LTI for LWSI
$11,991,976
LTI for Transit 6,346,874
Tree
539,583
Total
18,878,433
LIIBV to U.S. Subsidiaries
LWSI
$12,448,000
Transit
-0Tree
-0Total
12,448,000
Steps for the February 29, 1988, Transfers--Transaction 1
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
On behalf of LWSI, LTI transferred $11,991,976 to LIIBV.
On behalf of Transit, LTI transferred $4,591,927 to LIIBV.
On behalf of Transit, LTI transferred $1,754,947 to LIIBV
Curaçao.
Tree transferred $539,583 to LIIBV.
LIIBV transferred $10,728,000 to LIIBV Curaçao.
LIIBV Curaçao transferred $12,448,000 to LWSI.
LIIBV transferred $2,000,000 to LIL.
LTI transferred $654,473 to Tree.
LWSI transferred $12,448,000 to LTI.
Steps for the February 29, 1988, Transfers--Transaction 2
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
LTL received $13,000,000 from TDB.
RBC transferred $63,000,000 to LTL.
LTL transferred $78,000,000 to LIL.
LIL transferred $78,000,000 to LIIBV.
LIIBV transferred $78,000,000 to LWSI.
LTI transferred $15,096,068 to TDB.
LTI transferred $63,384,285 to RBC.
LWSI transferred $78,000,000 to LTI.
May 31, 1988, Transfers
U.S. Subsidiaries to
LIIBV and LIIBV Curaçao
Tree
$542,499
LWSI
15,015,471
Transit
7,534,621
Total
23,092,591
LIIBV and LIIBV Curaçao
to U.S. Subsidiaries
Tree
-0LWSI
$21,045,000
Transit
-0Total
21,045,000
Steps for the May 31, 1988, Transfers
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
LTI transferred $5,770,188 to Transit.
LTI transferred $14,677,818 to LWSI.
Tree transferred $542,499 to LIIBV.
LWSI transferred $14,677,818 to LIIBV.
LWSI transferred $337,653 to LIIBV Curaçao.
Transit transferred $5,770,188 to LIIBV.
Transit transferred $1,764,433 to LIIBV Curaçao.
- 32 8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
LIIBV transferred $18,985,000 to LIIBV Curaçao.
LIIBV Curaçao transferred $21,045,000 to LWSI.
LIIBV transferred $2,000,000 to LIL.
LIL transferred $2,000,000 to Transit and affiliates.
Transit and affiliates transferred $2,000,000 to LTL.
LTL repaid $2,000,000 in long-term debt.
LTI transferred $783,381 to Tree.
LWSI transferred $8,794,145 to LTI.
Transit transferred $981,987 to LTI.
August 31, 1988, Transfers
U.S. Subsidiaries to
LIIBV and LIIBV Curaçao
Transit
$8,580,485
LWSI
16,546,460
Tree
581,666
Total
25,708,611
LIIBV and LIIBV Curaçao
to U.S. Subsidiaries
Transit
-0LWSI
$22,000,000
Tree
-0Total
22,000,000
Steps for the August 31, 1988 Transfers
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
FNBC transferred $2,900,000 to LTI.
LTI received $19,617,722. Transit and LWSI transferred
funds to their respective general payables accounts with
FNBC. From these accounts, $19,617,722 was transferred to
LTI's FNBC master concentration account in an "Automatic
Clearing House" transaction.
LTI transferred $22,261,038 to LIIBV as follows: $6,688,667
on Transit's behalf and $15,572,371 on LWSI's behalf.
Tree transferred $581,666 to LIIBV.
Transit transferred $1,891,818 to LIIBV Curaçao.
LWSI transferred $974,089 to LIIBV Curaçao.
LIIBV transferred $19,134,704 to LIIBV Curaçao.
LIIBV Curaçao transferred $22,000,000 to LWSI.
LWSI transferred $22,000,000 to LTI.
LTI transferred $17,900,000 to LWSI.
LTI transferred $35,000,000 to LII.
LWSI transferred $40,993,136 to LTI.
LTI transferred $278,419 to Tree.
LTI transferred $6,651,824 to Transit.
c.
LTL's Description of an LIIBV Transfer
In 1986, RBC arranged for LTL to borrow funds for what RBC
described as a "'double dip' taxation driven transaction".
In
that transaction, RBC's loans were repaid in the United States
and new loans were made from Canada.
LTL summarized the
following steps of one of those fund transfers in a memorandum
- 33 relating to an advance on February 8, 1988, by LTL to LIIBV to
Transit:
1. LTL borrowed $45 million from TDB;
2. LTL lent the funds to Transit Ltd. at the prime rate;
3. Transit Ltd. contributed the funds to LIL for Class B
shares;
4. LIL advanced funds to LIIBV via ABN Bank (New York);
5. LIIBV advanced funds to Transit Ltd. at prime plus 2
percent;
6. Transit Ltd. paid down intercompany debt to LTI; and
7. LTI paid $45 million.
d.
Advances to Transit
On November 10, 1986, Transit signed a demand note payable
to LTI for $43.8 million.
Also on that day, the note was
assigned to LTL, then to Transit, then to LIL, and then to LIIBV.
Haworth and Cairns signed each assignment.
The $43.8 million was
incorporated into a loan agreement dated "as of September 1,
1986".
Transit acquired stock and assets of 44 companies in the
transportation industry for $50,744,478 in the year ending August
1986, $20,736,304 in the year ending August 1987, and $71,573,421
in the year ending August 1988.
Transit used $24,798,393 from
LIIBV for interest reinvestment loans.
e.
15
Advances to LWSI
LWSI used advances from LIIBV
as follows:15 $349,812,613 to buy GSX; $6.4
million to repay RBC loans; $60.9 million to
repurchase LII stock; and $43,553,907 to pay
interest to LIIBV (interest reinvestment loans).
LWSI transferred $29 million to its affiliate, Societe
Sanitaire, to buy preferred stock in Travelways, Ltd. However,
it is not clear whether it used the $29 million it borrowed for
that purpose.
- 34 LWSI bought stock and assets in 31 companies in the solid
waste services industry for $5,384,708 in the year ending August
1986, $373,534,605 in the year ending August 1987, and
$71,837,698 in the year ending August 1988, largely with advances
from LIIBV.
f.
Financing the LII Stock Repurchase
The public held 21 to 24 percent of LII's stock until
December 16, 1987.
In December 1987, LII began to buy those
publicly held shares through a tender offer totaling about $93
million ($22 per share).
Ferrill, a director of LII from 1982 to
1987, convinced DeGroote to increase the repurchase price for LII
stock from $17-18 per share to $22 per share.
was $15.50 per share on November 9, 1987.
repurchase on December 16, 1987.
The trading price
LII completed the
LII became wholly owned by
members of the LTL group.
On December 15, 1987, LTI signed a loan agreement with LIIBV
which had the same terms as those in LIIBV's May 27 and July 7,
1987, agreements with Transit, LWSI, and Tree.
On December 16,
1987, LTI used a $60.9 million advance from LIIBV to pay for LII
stock that LII had repurchased from the public.
On December 16,
1987, LWSI assumed LTI's obligations to LIIBV on the $60.9
million loan.
g.
Financing the Purchase of Monroe
LAC borrowed $20 million from LIIBV pursuant to a loan
agreement dated May 27, 1987.
LAC used the proceeds of the loan
to buy Monroe ($16 million) and to refinance third-party loans
- 35 relating to Monroe's purchase of rolling stock ($4 million).
In
October 1990, LTI sold Monroe, renamed Laidlaw Tree Services,
Inc., to an unrelated party for $17.4 million.
At that time, LTI
assumed Tree's obligation to repay $22.5 million to LIIBV, and
Tree agreed to pay $22.5 million to LTI.
4.
General Terms and Conditions of the LIIBV Agreements
LTL's counsel, Cairns, wrote the first draft of all of
the LIIBV loan agreements.
LIIBV and petitioners
revised some of the agreements.
The loan agreements and promissory notes between LIIBV,
Transit, LWSI, Tree, and LTI and LII as guarantors:
(a) Said
that the borrower unconditionally promised to repay advances on a
fixed date or on demand; (b) said that LTI guaranteed LIIBV that
Transit and Tree would repay the advances, and LII guaranteed
LIIBV that LWSI would repay the advances; (c) said that the
borrower must pay a fixed or determinable rate of interest
regardless of whether the borrower or guarantor had any income or
distributed dividends; (d) said that LIIBV could require the
borrower and the guarantor to pay principal and interest; (e)
said that LIIBV's rights were senior to the rights of the equity
holders of the nominal borrower and guarantor; (f) did not
authorize LIIBV to convert the obligations into stock of the
nominal borrower or the guarantor; (g) did not authorize LIIBV to
participate in the management of the nominal borrower or the
guarantor; (h) did not say that the nominal borrower's obligation
to repay LIIBV was contingent; and (i) said that LIIBV could
- 36 transfer the advances to any person without regard to any
transfer of stock of the borrower.
Petitioners and LIIBV treated the advances from LIIBV to
Transit, LWSI, and Tree as loans on their financial statements.
LIIBV could have sued, but did not, to enforce the agreements.
During the years in issue, LWSI and LWSL had credit lines
from RBC and BBC totaling about $250 million, which were senior
to LIIBV's and LTL's advances.
5.
Terms and Conditions of Specific LIIBV Agreements
a.
Transit and LWSI Loan Agreements
LIIBV advanced $5 million to Transit on open account on
December 18, 1985.
On February 4, 1986, Transit and its
subsidiaries, and LTI as guarantor, signed a loan agreement with
LIIBV which established a $50 million line of credit convertible
to a 5-year term loan due on September 1, 1988.16
Transit agreed
to pay interest quarterly beginning on May 31, 1986.
The
agreement included an acceleration clause (i.e., the full amount
advanced would be due if Transit defaulted).
Transit and LTI
agreed that they would each would maintain a long-term debt to
equity ratio of no more than 2 to 1 and a current assets to
current liabilities ratio of no less than 1 to 1.
The agreement did not require the directors of Transit or
LTI to adopt a resolution authorizing the guaranty or require the
16
Loans to Transit under the Feb. 4, 1986, agreement were
to mature on Sept. 1, 1988, unless the outstanding principal was
previously converted into a term loan to be repaid in 10
semiannual installments.
- 37 borrower or guarantor to obtain legal opinions concerning
enforceability of the guaranty.
The agreement did not require a
covenant that the guaranty would rank no lower than that of all
unsecured indebtedness of the guarantor.
The agreement required
Transit to provide financial information concerning the guarantor
only when requested.
On April 23, 1986, Transit and LTI as
guarantor amended the February 4, 1986, loan agreement with LIIBV
to increase the line of credit to $100 million and amended the
interest rate provisions from a variable rate equal to the prime
interest rate of the ABN Bank, New York, to a variable rate equal
to the lower of the prime interest rate of the ABN Bank, New
York, and the 60 day LIBOR interest rate plus ½ percent.
Also on April 23, 1986, LWSI and LII as guarantor signed a
loan agreement with LIIBV for $50 million.
The terms were
similar to the Transit agreement, as amended, but LWSI agreed to
limit its debt to equity ratio to no more than 2.5 to 1.
On May 26, 1986, before the May 31, 1986, interest payment
date, LIIBV amended its loan agreements with Transit and LWSI to
modify the interest rates.
On August 6, 1986, LIIBV advanced $54 million to Transit for
which Transit signed a demand note.
The loans to which LIIBV and petitioners agreed before
September 1, 1986, did not require the borrowers to make periodic
principal payments.
The agreements permitted Transit and LWSI to
convert the agreements to term loans on or before the maturity
date.
All of the pre-September 1986 LIIBV loans were payable on
- 38 September 1, 1988.
If Transit or LWSI chose to convert, the
loans from LIIBV would become fixed-term loans repayable in 10
equal semiannual installments.
However, LIIBV could demand
repayment at any time if it needed the funds.
After the GSX acquisition, LTI and LII did not comply with
leverage ratios to which they had agreed in the loan agreements
with TDB, RBC, and BBC.
On October 16, 1986, Haworth told LIIBV
that LII's repayment of its advances must be subordinated to
LII's commercial lenders.
Also on October 16, 1986, Haworth
asked LIIBV to amend petitioners' loan agreements to provide,
effective September 1, 1986, that (1) all sums would be due on
demand at interest rates equal to the prime rate at ABN Bank, New
York, plus 2 percent, (2) petitioners need not meet any financial
ratios, (3) petitioners no longer had restrictions as to the
maximum amount of funds they could seek and that LIIBV was to
provide on request, subject to availability of funds, and (4)
LIIBV would subordinate its advances to petitioners to their bank
loans.
On October 20, 1986, LIIBV's managing board unanimously
agreed to subordinate repayment of its advances to Transit's bank
loans.
Transit and LWSI made new loan agreements with LIIBV, dated
"as of September 1, 1986".
In the first of these agreements,
signed by Haworth for Transit, LIIBV subordinated Laidlaw's and
Transit's indebtedness to LIIBV to any amounts owed by Laidlaw to
TDB.
- 39 LTL entered into postponement agreements in favor of RBC and
BBC in November 1986.
RBC and BBC relied on the agreements.
The
agreements provided that Canadian law applied.
On December 11, 1986, LTL's board of directors agreed to
subordinate LII's debt to LTL to any loan from RBC to LII to
prevent default under the RBC loan agreement.
On the same day,
LTL's board signed a loan agreement with LII and LWSI in which
LTL lent LWSI $350 million to be due on October 14, 1989.
The
loan agreement required that, at LWSI's request, LWSI's
indebtedness to LTL would be subordinated to the indebtedness of
LWSI to RBC and BBC.
LTI and LTL signed a joint loan agreement with RBC in 1987,
under which LTL guaranteed RBC's advances to LTI.
LTL, LTI, and
LII signed subordination agreements with several commercial
banks, including RBC, BBC, and TDB in part because LTL and its
subsidiaries were highly leveraged after the GSX acquisition.
Petitioners and LIIBV gave each commercial bank priority over the
intercompany advances from LTL and its subsidiaries (including
LIIBV).
On February 13, 1987, Haworth told LIIBV that subordination
of the LIIBV advances to petitioners would no longer be
necessary.
On March 16, 1987, LIIBV's board voided the
subordination agreement in the first "as of September 1, 1986"
agreement.
A second "as of September 1, 1986" loan agreement,
signed by Haworth and Cairns for Transit, included the amendments
- 40 suggested by Haworth other than the provision to subordinate
loans.
It provided that LWSI or Transit would give LIIBV
promissory notes and that the advances, which those notes
represented, would be treated as if they had been made under the
loan agreement.
The second "as of September 1, 1986" agreement
substituted a demand feature for a fixed maturity date.
LIIBV
did not require Transit, Tree, and LWSI to have a reserve or
sinking fund to assure that they could repay the advances.
The
second "as of September 1, 1986" agreement governed all prior
advances by LIIBV to Transit or LWSI.
On July 7, 1987, LTI, Transit, LII, and LWSI signed new loan
agreements with LIIBV.
These agreements governed all advances
made by LIIBV to Transit and LWSI before July 7, 1987.
They
included the same terms as the "as of September 1, 1986"
agreements, except that (1) the July 7, 1987, agreements
eliminated the demand feature from the previous loan agreements
and established fixed terms with principal balances due September
1, 1989, unless the parties extended the due date by written
agreement, and (2) the parties added some enforcement provisions,
including an acceleration clause.
LIIBV did not require a
reserve or sinking fund to assure that petitioners would repay
the advances.
- 41 b.
Funds to Buy Tree and Advances to Tree
On May 25, 1987, LTL asked LIIBV to make a $20 million loan
to LAC on May 28, 1987.
As stated at par. I-C-1, above, LTL used
LAC to buy Monroe, which became Tree.
On May 27, 1987, LAC and
LTI signed loan agreements with LIIBV, which had the same terms
as LIIBV's July 7, 1987, agreements with LWSI and Transit.
LTI
guaranteed repayment of the LIIBV advances to Tree.
c.
LIIBV's September 12, 1988, Board Meeting
On September 12, 1988, the members of LIIBV's board of
directors discussed repayment by Transit, LWSI, and Tree of the
advances from LIIBV.
At that time, the advances were due to be
repaid on September 1, 1989.
repayment date.
The board decided to extend the
The minutes for that meeting stated that LIIBV's
management did not intend to request repayment.
6.
Repayment of Principal
Petitioners did not repay any principal to LIIBV from the
date of the initial advance in December 1985 to October 1989.
Petitioners repeatedly extended the due date for most of the
principal amounts that petitioners owed to LIIBV.
Up until the time of trial, petitioners and their
subsidiaries had not reduced the total unpaid balances that they
owed to LIIBV below the $975,153,806 which was outstanding as of
August 31, 1988.
- 42 7.
Payment of Interest
a.
Background
During the years in issue, on the same day that LIIBV
received payments from petitioners which petitioners and LIIBV
denominated as interest, LIIBV generally transferred that amount
of money to one or more petitioners in what petitioners called
interest reinvestment loans.
LIIBV, Transit, LWSI, and Tree did
this through a series of prearranged steps.
LTL and LIIBV
decided how much interest each petitioner would owe before each
interest payment was due.
LIIBV decided how much of the interest
payment to use to pay its costs of operations and to pay
dividends to LIL.
LTL decided which petitioner would ask for an
interest reinvestment loan from LIIBV.
On the day that petitioners made a payment denominated as
interest to LIIBV, LIIBV typically transferred to petitioners an
amount equal or close to the amount of the payment.
Petitioners
recorded these transactions in their books and records as
interest payments.
Transit or LWSI made a payment denominated as
interest to LIIBV each time they received an interest
reinvestment loan from LIIBV.
Many of the transactions described
in par. I-G-3, above, included interest reinvestment loans.
LIIBV transferred to Transit, LWSI, and Tree interest
reinvestment loans totaling more than 90 percent of what
petitioners contend are interest payments to LIIBV for the years
in issue.
- 43 Transit made no quarterly interest payments to LIIBV from
May 1986 to November 1987.
LWSI made no quarterly interest
payments to LIIBV from February to August 1988.
Instead, LIIBV
increased Transit's and LWSI's account balances to include the
interest payments due during that time.
During their 1989 taxable years, Transit, LWSI, and Tree
increased their account balances to include interest on the
interest reinvestment loans from LIIBV.
b.
Summary of Interest Payments and Interest
Reinvestment Loans in the Years in Issue
The following table shows interest reinvestment loans and
what petitioners contend are interest payments in the years in
issue:
Date
Interest
Reinvestment
Loan From
LIIBV
Claimed
Interest
Payment
From
Transit to
LIIBV
Claimed
Interest
Payment
From LWSI
to LIIBV
Claimed
Interest
Payment
From Tree
to LIIBV
5/29/86
$988,797*+
$809,057
$179,740
-
$988,797
8/28/86
2,204,674*
1,630,716
573,958
-
2,204,674
11/25/86
5,870,270*
3,097,820
2,772,450
-
5,870,270
2/25/87
11,535,627*
4,003,389
7,532,238
-
11,535,627
5/28/87
12,468,151*
4,479,972
7,988,179
-
12,468,151
8/31/87
15,280,674*
5,071,716
10,297,291
$546,667
15,915,674
11/30/87
16,700,000*
5,705,723
10,597,883
549,028
16,852,634
2/29/88
12,448,000**
6,346,874
11,991,976
539,583
18,878,433
5/31/88
21,045,000**
7,534,621
15,015,471
542,499
23,092,591
8/31/88
22,000,000**
8,580,485
16,546,460
581,666
25,708,611
Total
120,541,193
47,260,373
83,495,646
2,759,443
133,515,462
Total
Claimed
Interest
Payments to
LIIBV
- 44 * Advances to Transit; ** Advances to LWSI; + Included in
$9,588,797 transfer on May 28 to 30, 1987.
An example of how petitioners used an interest reinvestment
loan is the transaction on May 28 to 30, 1986, in which LIIBV
transferred $988,797 to U.S. subsidiaries and U.S. subsidiaries
claimed interest payments totaling $988,797.
May 28 to May 30, 1986, Transfers
U.S. Subsidiaries to LIIBV
LWSI
$179,740
Transit
809,057
Total
988,797
LIIBV to U.S. Subsidiaries
Transit
$8,600,000
Transit reinvest
988,797
Total
9,588,797
Steps for the May 28 to May 30, 1986, Transfers
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
LTL received $8.6 million from TDB on May 28.
LTL transferred $8.6 million to LIL on May 28.
LWSI transferred $179,740 to LIIBV on May 29.
Transit transferred $809,057 to LIIBV on May 29.
LIIBV transferred $9,588,797 to Transit on May 29. This
caused an $8,596,000 overdraft in LIIBV's ABN Bank NY
account.
LIIBV was credited with $8.6 million from LIL on May 30.
8.
LTI's Commercial Loans
During its taxable years ending from August 31, 1989, to
August 31, 1995, LTI frequently borrowed funds from commercial
lenders to help make petitioners' quarterly interest payments and
semiannual principal payments to LIIBV.
H.
Petitioners' Financial Condition
1.
Capitalization of Petitioners in the Years in Issue
The transportation and waste services industries are
capital-intensive.
Petitioners constantly needed to buy trucks
and buses and improve landfill sites.
Petitioners could not
eliminate or significantly reduce their capital spending for a
- 45 long period of time without hurting their business or possibly
going out of business.
Petitioners were thinly capitalized and heavily leveraged
during the years in issue largely because they borrowed large
amounts from LIIBV before and during the years in issue.
2.
Petitioners' Cash-Flow During the Years in Issue
Petitioners' free cash-flow (earnings before interest,
taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) - capital
expenditures (CAPEX)) for the years in issue17 was negative as
follows:
1986
LTI
LII
1987
($63,490,919)
($3,177,391)
1988
($351,973,233) ($109,555,409)
($294,312,141) ($67,858,322)
On August 31, 1988, petitioners did not have enough free
cash-flow to pay (a) principal and interest due on the LIIBV
advances unless petitioners stopped buying other companies and
reduced other capital expenses by 20 percent, and (b) principal
due over 7 years even if they stopped making all capital
expenditures.
Petitioners and their companies did not have enough cashflow during the years in issue to repay LIIBV's advances to them
that are at issue here.
LII had negative free cash-flows during
the years in issue largely because it and its subsidiaries were
expanding.
17
Petitioners could not repay in installments or pay
LII's free cash-flow was a positive $3,888,281 for its
1985 fiscal year.
- 46 the balloon payment due in 1989 as required by the agreements
between themselves and LIIBV.
3.
Petitioners' Tangible Net Worth and Financial Ratios
for the Years in Issue
LTI or LII guaranteed repayment of advances from LIIBV and
commercial banks to Transit, Tree, and LWSI.
Financial
statements for those companies for the years in issue (unaudited
for LII for the year ending August 1988) show the following:
LII
Tangible Net Worth
(000 omitted)
Quick Ratio1
Current Ratio1
Debt/Equity Ratio
Liabilities/Equity
Liab./Tang. N.W.
1985
57,022
1986
84,341
1987
42,659
1988
(22,630)
.93
1.33
.59
.87
1.38
1.12
1.62
.67
.89
1.31
1.30
1.62
3.54
4.05
13.35
1.17
1.32
8.43
9.42
N/A
1985
18,865
1986
28,400
1987
(33,204)
1988
(58,027)
.87
1.16
1.61
2.76
9.93
.76
1.36
2.26
3.26
12.02
.83
1.12
5.78
7.29
N/A
1.02
1.58
5.63
6.44
N/A
LTI
Tangible Net Worth
(000 omitted)
Quick Ratio
Current Ratio
Debt/Equity Ratio
Liabilities/Equity
Liab./Tang. N.W.
1
"Current ratio" is current assets (cash and
equivalents, receivables, and inventories) divided by
current liabilities. "Quick ratio" is cash and
equivalents and receivables, or current assets less
inventories, divided by current liabilities. See
Carmichael, et al., Accountant's Handbook, sec. 10.25,
at 10.22 (7th ed. 1991).
Petitioners' competitors in the waste services industry
during 1987 and 1988 generally had debt to equity ratios below 2
to 1.
- 47 LTI's long-term debt, equity, and debt to equity ratios for
years ending from August 1989 to August 1995 were as follows (in
thousands):
Year
Long-Term
Debt
Equity
Debt to
Equity Ratio
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
$1,788,165
2,008,141
1,989,926
1,770,805
1,741,133
1,620,623
2,249,500
$385,956
303,739
475,642
455,221
317,935
452,046
412,500
4.63
6.61
4.18
3.89
5.48
3.59
5.45
Financial ratios for Transit and Tree for the years in issue
were as follows:
Transit
1985
Tangible Net Worth (7,020)
(000 omitted)
Quick Ratio
.13
Current Ratio
.22
Debt/Equity Ratio
9.94
Liabilities/Equity 11.17
Liab./Tang. N.W.
N/A
1986
(18,734)
1987
(21,529)
1988
(56,284)
.40
.57
10.52
11.71
N/A
.77
1.13
9.43
10.66
N/A
.81
1.11
15.44
16.87
N/A
Tree
Tangible Net Worth
(000 omitted)
Quick Ratio
Current Ratio
Debt/Equity Ratio
Liabilities/Equity
Liab./Tang. N.W.
1985
-
1986
4,354
1987
(11,666)
1988
(5,711)
-
1.40
1.53
.87
1.54
1.55
1.16
1.23
95.86
109.84
N/A
1.47
1.61
3.09
3.43
N/A
Petitioners' ratios for earnings before taxes (EBIT) to
interest and EBITDA minus CAPEX to interest for the years in
issue (unaudited for LII for the year ending August 1988) are as
follows:
- 48 LII
EBIT/Interest
EBITDA minus
CAPEX/Interest
1985
1986
1987
1988
8.93
7.89
1.9
1.65
.94
(.77)
(7.81)
(1.16)
LTI
EBIT/Interest
EBITDA minus
CAPEX/Interest
1985
1986
1987
1988
7.14
3.38
1.82
1.50
(4.04)
(3.92)
(6.15)
(1.19)
The ratios of EBIT to interest for Transit and Tree for the
years in issue were as follows:
Transit
Tree
I.
1985
2.66
-
1986
1.98
8.30
1987
1.59
1.85
1988
1.06
1.00
Bank Loans
1.
Debt to Equity Ratios Required by Banks
Petitioners' ability to borrow from commercial lenders was
limited by leverage ratios and other covenants included in the
loan agreements.18
The maximum that petitioners could borrow
under all of their commercial loan agreements without special
approval by the bank was the amount of debt that would not
increase their debt to equity ratio to more than 2 to 1.
LTL,
LTI, LII, and LWSI had commercial loan agreements which required
them as the borrower or the guarantor to have debt to equity
ratios of 2.5 to 1 or less in the taxable years in issue.
The
GSX acquisition caused LII to be highly leveraged, which
18
The banks could waive the debt to equity ratio limit.
- 49 prevented LII from obtaining additional financing from commercial
lenders.
2.
Transit
Transit had no loans from unrelated lenders during the years
in issue.
3.
LWSI
During the years in issue, LWSI had a $20-$25 million
revolving loan agreement with RBC (Portland, Oregon branch).
On November 14, 1986, LWSI and LWSL agreed to a joint
revolving loan from RBC, which combined their existing credit
agreements and increased the credit line to $140 million and
later to $240 million.
LWSI's loan agreements with RBC included conventional
covenants, representations, warranties, and security provisions.
LII guaranteed the RBC loans to LWSI.
RBC required LII to have a
total debt to equity ratio of no greater than 2 to 1 and a
working capital ratio (current assets over current liabilities)
of no less than 1 to 1.
4.
Tree
Before LTI acquired Tree's stock, Tree (then Monroe) had a
term credit agreement with Chase for $3 to $5.5 million.
The
terms of Tree's loan agreement with Chase were considerably less
favorable than those with LIIBV.
Tree's loan agreement with
Chase included conventional covenants, representations,
warranties, and security provisions.
Chase secured the loan to
- 50 Tree with Tree's assets.
Tree agreed to maintain minimum
leverage ratios, current ratios, and interest coverage ratios19
and to meet minimum cash-flow requirements.
J.
Comparison of Terms Governing Advances from LIIBV and Bank
Loans
1.
Similarities Between Bank Loans and LIIBV Advances
The bank loans and LIIBV advances for the years in issue
were in writing.
All were for general corporate purposes or
acquisition of other businesses.
All had some representations
and warranties to the bank or LIIBV about financial conditions of
the recipient.
All required corporate existence and authority,
punctual payments, some type of periodic reporting, and notice of
default.
All imposed limitations on further encumbering any
security.
All treated nonpayment, incorrect or false
representations, noncompliance with material terms and
conditions, insolvency or bankruptcy, and other similar events as
a default.
clauses.
Most had cross-default clauses and acceleration
Most were guaranteed by a parent.
All allowed
prepayment without penalty.
2.
Differences Between Bank Loans and LIIBV Advances
Bank loans always had borrowing limits.
were generally not limited.
19
The LIIBV advances
Banks lent less than LIIBV advanced.
Interest coverage ratios relate the financial charges of
a firm to its ability to service them. An interest coverage
ratio is earnings before interest and taxes net of non-cash
expenses such as depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) divided
by interest expense. This ratio is one measure of a company's
ability to pay interest.
- 51 Half of the LIIBV advances were more than $100 million, but most
of the bank loans were substantially less than $100 million.
Bank loans were generally for a 5-year period, and no bank loan
had a demand feature.
LIIBV advances were generally not limited
to a fixed period and generally had demand features.
LIIBV
generally did not require petitioners to make quarterly or
semiannual payments of principal, but did allow balloon payments.
Banks required quarterly or semiannual payments of principal and
did not allow balloon payments.
Banks required minimum debt to
equity and current assets to current liabilities ratios.
LIIBV
generally did not.
The guaranties differed in that the banks required the
guarantors to post collateral and to meet financial requirements.
LIIBV did not.
Only bank loans had negative covenants that limited the use
of the borrowed funds, or placed limitations on a change of the
borrower's business or on asset dispositions.
not.
LIIBV advances did
Bank loans generally had more covenants and warranties
relating to the borrower's legal status and activities (e.g.,
compliance with ERISA and securities laws) than LIIBV advances.
Banks treated material adverse changes in the borrower's
operations or financial condition, certain judgments, and
liquidation, dissolution, or winding up of the borrower's
business as events of default.
LIIBV did not.
- 52 K.
Audit of LTL by Canadian Tax Authorities
Canadian income tax authorities audited LTL for 1987 and
1988.
LTL wrote that its U.S. subsidiaries used funds that it
advanced to them to provide capital and that those funds became
part of the permanent capital of the company.
LTL said that the
advances provided about 35 percent of the total capital of
Laidlaw in 1987 and 1988.
LTL said that if it were to incur a
loss on a loan to a subsidiary it would not be allowed to deduct
the loss as a bad debt.
LTL said:
3.
Laidlaw Inc. acts as a conduit in providing funds
for its operating subsidiaries. The funds are used by
the subsidiaries as working capital and for capital
acquisitions. Without these funds, the subsidiaries
would be seriously undercapitalized. The loans are in
the nature of capital contributions to the
subsidiaries.
II.
A.
OPINION
Contentions of the Parties
The sole issue for decision is whether payments totaling
$133,515,459 from petitioners' subsidiaries to LIIBV during the
years in issue are deductible as interest under sections 162 and
163(a).
Respondent determined and contends that petitioners may not
deduct the payments in dispute as interest because the LIIBV
advances to Transit, Tree, and LWSI were capital contributions
and not loans.
Petitioners contend that the amounts in dispute
are deductible as interest under sections 162 and 163(a) because
the LIIBV advances were debt and because the amounts at issue
- 53 were interest in substance and form.
Respondent's determination
is presumed to be correct, and petitioners bear the burden of
proof.
Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115
(1933).
B.
Loans vs. Capital Contributions
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, the circuit
to which these cases are appealable, has identified 13
nonexclusive factors to be considered in deciding whether
advances are debt or equity.
Estate of Mixon v. United States,
464 F.2d 394, 402 (5th Cir. 1972).
Those factors are: (1) the
name given to the certificate evidencing the indebtedness; (2)
the presence or absence of a fixed maturity date; (3) the source
of payments, i.e., whether the recipient of the funds can repay
the advance with reasonably anticipated cash-flow or liquid
assets; (4) whether the provider of the funds has the right to
enforce payment; (5) whether the provider of the advance gains an
increased right to participate in management; (6) the status of
the contribution in relation to regular creditors; (7) the intent
of the parties; (8) whether the recipient of the advance is
adequately capitalized; (9) whether there is an identity of
interest between the creditor and the shareholder; (10) source of
interest payments, i.e., whether the recipient of the funds pays
interest from earnings; (11) the ability of the corporation to
obtain loans from outside lending institutions; (12) the extent
to which the recipient used the advance to buy capital assets;
- 54 and (13) whether the recipient repaid the funds on the due date
(Mixon factors).
Id.; see also Texas Farm Bureau v. United
States, 725 F.2d 307, 311 (5th Cir. 1984); Slappey Drive Indus.
Park v. United States, 561 F.2d 572, 582 (5th Cir. 1977);
Plantation Patterns, Inc. v. Commissioner, 462 F.2d 712, 718-719
(5th Cir. 1972), affg. T.C. Memo. 1970-182; Tyler v. Tomlinson,
414 F.2d 844, 848 (5th Cir. 1969); Berkowitz v. United States,
411 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1969); Montclair, Inc. v. Commissioner,
318 F.2d 38, 40 (5th Cir. 1963), affg. T.C. Memo. 1962-10;
American Offshore, Inc. v. Commissioner, 97 T.C. 579, 602 (1991).
We decide how much weight to give to each of these factors
based on the facts and circumstances of each case.
Estate of
Mixon v. United States, supra; see John Kelley Co. v.
Commissioner, 326 U.S. 521, 530 (1946).
factors, but to evaluate them.
Our task is not to count
Slappey Drive Indus. Park v.
United States, supra at 581.
C.
Substance vs. Form
A payment for which a taxpayer seeks a deduction must have
economic substance.
Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935);
United States v. Wexler, 31 F.3d 117, 124 (3d Cir. 1994);
Krumhorn v. Commissioner, 103 T.C. 29, 48 (1994).
The substance of a transaction and not the form controls,
especially where the nominal debtor and the nominal creditor are
jointly controlled.
Road Materials, Inc. v. Commissioner, 407
F.2d 1121, 1124 (4th Cir. 1969), affg. on this issue, vacating
- 55 and remanding T.C. Memo. 1967-187.
If a transaction is
controlled by related entities, the form and labels used may not
signify much because the parties can mold the transaction to
their will.
See Anchor Natl. Life Ins. Co. v. Commissioner, 93
T.C. 382, 407 (1989).
Petitioners contend that the transactions at issue were
negotiated and executed at arm's length and that LTL and DeGroote
and his management team did not control LIIBV and petitioners.
We disagree that the transactions were at arm's length.
DeGroote
and his management team controlled all of the Laidlaw entities,
including petitioners and LIIBV.
Petitioners contend that LIIBV lent money to petitioners
that it had received as interest income under separately
negotiated arm's-length transactions.
We disagree.
management group controlled petitioners and LIIBV.
The LTL
The existence
of a common chair, directors, officers, and core management team,
and the fact that there were related entities with interlocking
directorates, all indicate that the transactions at issue were
not negotiated at arm's length.
DeGroote and his management team developed and implemented
an elaborate plan to transfer funds between the Laidlaw entities.
For example, by letter dated October 16, 1986, Haworth directed
LIIBV to change the terms governing the advances to U.S.
subsidiaries and make those changes effective "as of" September
1, 1986.
LIIBV did exactly what Haworth directed.
LIIBV could
- 56 have sued, but did not, to enforce the agreements.
repeatedly extended the due date for payments.
LIIBV
LIIBV returned
most of the money to petitioners on the same day that it received
payments from petitioners.
These facts show that LIIBV did what
LTL and DeGroote and his management team wanted, and did not deal
at arm's length.
Petitioners contend that the fact that the public owned 21
percent of the stock of LII shows that LII dealt at arm's length
with LIIBV.
We disagree.
The public owned 21 percent of LII
stock before December 16, 1987, but did not own any LII stock
thereafter.
DeGroote and his core management team controlled
petitioners throughout the years in issue.
Petitioners contend that DeGroote sought independent
directors and that Ferrill was independent.
Petitioners point
out that Ferrill convinced DeGroote to increase the repurchase
price of publicly-owned LII stock and that Ferrill was on a
special committee to review financing proposals to pay for the
GSX acquisition, which petitioners contend shows that Ferrill is
independent.
We disagree that these facts establish that the
Laidlaw entities dealt at arm's length.
DeGroote loyalists
controlled the Laidlaw entities, including boards of which
Ferrill was a member.
Petitioners point out that LIIBV had foreign directors.
This fact does not convince us that petitioners dealt with LIIBV
at arm's length.
Haworth's October 16, 1986, letter to LIIBV,
- 57 the October 20, 1986, minutes of LIIBV's board of directors, and
the entire record show that LIIBV followed DeGroote's and his
core management team's instructions.
Petitioners point out that the LIIBV board revised some of
the documents that Haworth and Cairns had authored.
For example,
Haworth changed the grid system promissory note required by his
October 16, 1986, letter to LIIBV.
Despite this, the foreign
directors were clearly subordinate to DeGroote and his management
team.
We conclude that petitioners, LIIBV, and LTL acted in
concert with DeGroote and his core management team and not at
arm's length.
The form and the labels used for the transaction
may signify little when the parties to the transaction are
related.
Calumet Indus. Inc. v. Commissioner, 95 T.C. 257, 286
(1990); Malone & Hyde, Inc. v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 575, 578
(1968).
The fact that the dealings between LTI, LII, and their
subsidiaries, and LIIBV were not at arm's length requires that we
give less weight to the Mixon factors relating to the form of the
transaction than to substance.
See Gregory v. Helvering, 293
U.S. 465 (1935); Texas Farm Bureau v. United States, 725 F.2d at
312; Estate of Mixon v. United States, supra at 407; Tyler v.
Tomlinson, supra at 850; Road Materials, Inc. v. Commissioner,
supra at 1124.
- 58 D.
The Mixon Factors
1.
The Name Given to the Certificates Evidencing the
Advances
The name given to the certificates evidencing the advances
suggests whether advances are debt or equity.
United States, supra at 402-403.
Estate of Mixon v.
The labels on the documents
evidencing the advances at issue say that they are debt.
However, an attempt to characterize a transaction by its labels
may not be well taken in light of the facts and circumstances of
the case.
Id. at 404.
Labels cannot change equity to debt.
Gregory v. Helvering, supra; Estate of Mixon v. United States,
supra.
This factor favors treating the LIIBV advances to
petitioners as debt but, as stated at par. II-C, above, we give
less weight here to the form than to the substance of the
transaction.
2.
The Presence or Absence of a Fixed Maturity Date
The presence of a fixed maturity date can indicate that an
advance was debt.
404-405.
Estate of Mixon v. United States, supra at
However, the right to enforce maturity dates may be
meaningless if the parties do not expect the recipient to repay.
Foresun, Inc. v. Commissioner, 41 T.C. 706, 717 (1964), affd. in
part, modified in part and remanded 348 F.2d 1006, 1009 (6th Cir.
1965); see Slappey Drive Indus. Park v. United States, 561 F.2d
at 583 & n.18; Harlan v. United States, 409 F.2d 904, 907 n.4
- 59 (5th Cir. 1969).
Postponing maturity dates for prolonged periods
suggests that the nominal lender does not intend to require
repayment and that the transfers are equity.
Slappey Drive
Indus. Park v. United States, supra; Harlan v. United States,
supra; Foresun, Inc. v. Commissioner, supra.
Most of the agreements had fixed maturity dates.20
LIIBV's directors did not intend to request repayment.
However,
LIIBV
continually extended and never enforced loan maturity dates.
The fixed maturity dates in the documents appear to be
window dressing to make the form of the transaction look like
debt.
We give more weight to the substance of the transactions
than to the fact that the documents provided for fixed maturity
dates.
Tyler v. Tomlinson, supra at 850.
We are not bound by
the language of an agreement if it is at odds with the substance
of the transaction.
Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S.
561, 573 (1978); Tyler v. Tomlinson, supra at 849.
The Laidlaw
entities, including LIIBV and petitioners, adhered to the form of
the contracts by postponing maturity dates, but did not adhere to
the maturity dates in substance.
The initial loan agreements with LIIBV provided for a fixed
maturity date of September 1, 1988.
The "as of" September 1,
1986, agreements changed the fixed maturity date to payment on
demand.
20
Provision for payment on demand without a fixed maturity
Some agreements were demand loans with no maturity dates.
- 60 date may indicate that an advance is equity.
Estate of Mixon v.
United States, supra at 405; Dillin v. United States, 433 F.2d
1097, 1101-1102 (5th Cir. 1970).
Petitioners contend that this factor should not weigh
against them merely because they refinanced the LIIBV loans.
Petitioners contend that refinancings are a common banking
practice.
Petitioners rely on Green Bay Structural Steel, Inc.
v. Commissioner, 53 T.C. 451, 457 (1969).
We disagree.
In Green
Bay Structural Steel, we decided that refinanced subordinated
notes were bona fide indebtedness for which the taxpayer could
deduct interest.
That is not the case here.
Also, there was no
evidence that there was a circular flow of funds in Green Bay
Structural Steel.
See par. II-D-10, below.
Petitioners contend that the payment on demand feature does
not suggest that the advances were equity here because the LIIBV
directors were independent from LTL, and they controlled whether
a demand for payment would be made.
par. II-C, above.
We disagree as discussed at
This factor supports treating the LIIBV
advances to petitioners as equity.
3.
The Source of Payments, i.e., Whether the Recipient of Funds
Can Repay the Advance With Reasonably Anticipated Cash-Flow
or Liquid Assets
An advance is more likely to be equity if the recipient does
not have liquid assets or reasonably anticipated cashflow from
- 61 which to repay.
Estate of Mixon v. United States, supra at 405;21
Segel v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 816, 830-831 (1987).
Petitioners contend that they had enough cash and liquid
assets to pay interest or principal on the $975,153,806 that they
owed to LIIBV on August 31, 1988, and to continue operations.
Petitioners contend that they had EBITDA of $2.87 billion and
capital contributions of $585 million, less interest payments to
LIIBV and banks of $1.3 billion, for a total cash-flow of $2.9
billion to repay the $975,153,806.
We disagree.
Petitioners' liquid assets and cash-flow were insufficient
to pay the interest or the principal balance.
LTI's and LII's
cash-flow ((EBITDA - CAPEX) and (EBITDA - CAPEX)/Interest)) for
each of the 3 years in issue were negative (from negative
$3,177,391 to negative $351,973,233).
Petitioners could not
repay the advances with their liquid assets.
Transit from 1985
to 1988 and Tree in 1987 and 1988 had negative tangible net
worth.
By the last year in issue, LII's tangible net worth was
negative $22,630,000, and LTI's tangible net worth was negative
$58,027,000.
Petitioners allege that use of EBITDA minus CAPEX as a
measure of available cash-flow is incorrect because petitioners
could defer spending capital.
21
We disagree.
To repay
This factor is somewhat anomalous because most loans are
repaid out of earnings. Estate of Mixon v. United States, 464
F.2d 394, 405 n. 15 (5th Cir. 1972).
- 62 $975,153,806 of principal from July 1987 to May 1994 and to pay
interest, petitioners would have had to stop buying companies and
capital assets.
It would be difficult or impossible for LTI or
LII to survive if they significantly reduced or eliminated their
capital spending.
Petitioners contend that they had many sources from which to
repay LIIBV.
Petitioners contend that they could have sold
tangible and intangible (e.g., licenses, permits, and goodwill)
assets, or refinanced the LIIBV loans with their operational
cash-flow.
This argument misconstrues this factor, which
requires that we consider whether petitioners could repay the
advances with reasonably anticipated cash-flow or liquid assets.
Petitioners sold their solid waste business in 1996 for $1.2
billion and bought a health transportation business.
Petitioners
contend that this sale shows that their intangible assets had
substantial value during the years in issue.
unconvincing.
This argument is
Even if petitioners' intangible assets had
substantial value during the years in issue, we doubt that
petitioners could have operated their business without those
assets.
Petitioners contend that they could have extended the due
dates for repaying the $975,153,806, and that they did not need
to repay that amount in 7 years.
Petitioners point out that
Robert T. Jacobs (Jacobs), their banking expert, testified that
it was not unusual during the 1980's to extend loans for 12-18
- 63 year terms for leveraged buyouts.
testimony.
We are not convinced by that
First, petitioners' commercial loans during the years
in issue were generally for 5 years.
Second, leveraged buyouts
typically require the borrower to provide a security interest in
its assets, and are subject to financial covenants which impose
severe restrictions unlike the LIIBV advances.
This factor supports treating the LIIBV advances to
petitioners as equity.
4.
Whether the Provider of the Funds Has the Right to
Enforce Payment of Principal and Interest
A definite obligation to repay an advance suggests that the
advance is a loan.
Estate of Mixon v. United States, supra; see
Campbell v. Carter Found. Prod. Co., 322 F.2d 827, 832 (5th Cir.
1963).
The documents evidencing the LIIBV advances showed that
LIIBV had a right to enforce payment of principal and interest.
Petitioners contend that these loan agreements are significant
because they were legally binding.
We disagree because LIIBV and
petitioners did not enforce any of the loan agreements.
The fact
that the agreements may have been legally binding counts for
little if, as here, the parties understood that they would never
be enforced.
As discussed at par. II-D-3, above, the right to
enforce payment may be meaningless if the parties do not expect
the recipient to repay.
This factor supports treating the LIIBV advances to
petitioners as equity.
- 64 5.
Whether the Provider of the Advance Gains an Increased
Right To Participate in Management
If, as a result of an advance of funds, the provider of the
funds has an increased right to participate in the management of
the recipient, then it is acting more like a shareholder than a
creditor.
Estate of Mixon v. United States, supra at 406.
The
documents evidencing the advances did not give LIIBV any right to
participate in the management of the borrowers or the guarantors.
However, this would have been unnecessary because LTL and its
core management team already controlled LIIBV and petitioners.
This factor is neutral.
6.
The Status of the Contribution in Relation to Regular
Creditors
Whether an advance is equal or subordinate to the claims of
regular corporate creditors affects whether the taxpayer was
dealing as a shareholder or creditor.
Estate of Mixon v. United
States, supra.
Petitioners point out that Haworth testified that LIIBV did
not subordinate or postpone petitioners' repayment to it.
Petitioners contend that the LIIBV loans to Transit and Tree
(guaranteed by LTI) were not subject to subordination or
postponement agreements.
Petitioners contend that, although LTL
entered into postponement agreements in favor of RBC and BBC in
November 1986, these agreements did not affect LIIBV's legal
rights under its loans to LWSI.
Petitioners contend that the
postponement agreements were not subordination agreements under
- 65 Canadian law because the intent of the parties in entering into
the agreements was not to subordinate LTL's rights to the rights
of RBC, BBC, or any other third-party creditor; LIIBV was not a
party to the postponement agreements; the parties did not intend
the agreements to be subordination agreements; and the
postponement agreements were not enforceable as unregistered
securities.
Petitioners' arguments do not convince us to disregard the
postponement agreements for purposes of applying this factor.
The postponement agreements were effective immediately and
provided that Canadian law applied.
LTL signed on behalf of its
subsidiaries and agreed to make transfers, deliver assignments
and documents, and do all acts necessary to implement the
agreements.
Petitioners' commercial banks relied on the
agreements.
Petitioners point out that E. Alan Peters (Peters),
petitioners' Canadian banking law expert, testified that the
postponement agreements were not subordination agreements under
Canadian law.
However, Peters also testified that the
postponement agreements were enforceable under Canadian law, and
that they subordinated one creditor's right to payment to that of
another creditor.
Petitioner contends that the postponement agreements had
less effect than inchoate subordination agreements.
Petitioners
make too much of this point because the postponement agreements,
- 66 even if inchoate, increased LIIBV's risk.
See United States v.
Snyder Bros. Co., 367 F.2d 980, 981, 984-985 (5th Cir. 1966).
Failure to demand timely repayment effectively subordinates
intercompany debt to the rights of other creditors who receive
payment in the interim.
American Offshore, Inc. v. Commissioner,
97 T.C. 579, 603 (1991); Inductotherm Indus., Inc. v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1984-281, affd. without published
opinion 770 F.2d 1071 (3d Cir. 1985).
LIIBV's postponement of
repayments by petitioners effectively subordinated what
petitioners contend is debt to LIIBV.
The question before us is whether the advance has a status
equal or inferior to the claims of a regular corporate creditor.
Estate of Mixon v. United States, supra.
We conclude that the
postponement agreements and the effective subordination as a
result of failing to demand repayment made the obligations to
repay LIIBV inferior to the claims of petitioners' regular
corporate creditors.
Thus, this factor supports treating the
LIIBV advances to petitioners as equity.
7.
Intent of the Parties
The intent of the parties is important in deciding whether
payments are debt or equity.
Petitioners contend that they
intended their payments to LIIBV to be interest.
Petitioners
rely primarily on the evidence showing the form they used for the
transactions at issue.
More weight is given to objective facts
- 67 than to stated intent.
1984).
In re Lane, 742 F.2d 1311 (11th Cir.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has said:
Primary reliance upon subjective indications of intent
is simply not an effective way of resolving * * * [the
debt versus equity] problem. In a land of hard
economic facts, we cannot root important decisions in
parties' pious declarations of intent. * * *
Texas Farm Bureau v. United States, 725 F.2d at 314.
Thus, to
reveal a taxpayer's intent, we must consider not only the
pronouncements of the parties, but also the circumstances
surrounding the transaction.
Tyler v. Tomlinson, 414 F.2d at
850.
Petitioners referred to the advances as loans, and surely
wanted the advances to be treated as loans; however, that is not
the same as intending the advances to be loans.
Despite
petitioners' worsening finances, LIIBV made large advances,
extended the terms for payment, and did not seek security in the
written agreements.
Petitioners did not intend in substance to
pay interest; they intended LIIBV to advance funds whenever
interest was due.
Petitioners intended LIIBV to continue to
advance funds with no expectation that petitioners would repay.
LTL represented to Canadian tax officials that the loans are "in
the nature of capital contributions".
This factor supports
treating the LIIBV advances to petitioners as equity.
- 68 8.
Whether the Recipient of the Advance Is Adequately
Capitalized
a.
Capitalization of Petitioners
Inadequate capitalization strongly suggests that an advance
is equity if:
(a) The debt to equity ratio was initially high,
(b) the parties realized that it would likely go higher, and (c)
the recipient of the funds used a substantial part of the funds
to buy capital assets and to meet expenses needed to begin
operations.
Estate of Mixon v. United States, supra at 408;
United States v. Henderson, 375 F.2d 36, 40 (5th Cir. 1967).
Courts generally consider a borrower's debt to equity ratio and
other financial data in deciding if it is thinly capitalized.
See, e.g., Tyler v. Tomlinson, supra at 848-849.
The GSX purchase made petitioners' debt to equity ratio high
during the first year in issue which ended August 31, 1986.
Petitioners contend that they were not thinly capitalized. They
contend that both their and respondent's experts testified that
they were not thinly capitalized and that their financial
condition was as good as their competitors.
We disagree.
Petitioners' debt to equity ratio worsened after buying GSX
because they continued to receive advances from LIIBV.
Petitioners used most of the advances from LIIBV to pay capital
expenses such as to acquire more businesses.
Theresa Poppei (Poppei), petitioners' expert, and David N.
Fuller (Fuller), respondent's expert, testified about
- 69 petitioners' value during the years in issue.
Petitioners' other
experts used Poppei's values and conclusions to evaluate
petitioners' financial condition, including capitalization.
Poppei testified that LII's financial performance was better than
WMI's and BFI's.
However, her peer group financial performance
charts show that WMI and BFI performed better financially than
petitioners did.
These charts are corroborated by petitioners'
credit analyst, Carol Verschell, who said in her expert report
that the debt to equity ratios for BFI and WMI were superior to
petitioners'.
b.
Use of Fair Market Values To Compute Debt to
Equity Ratios
Petitioners contend that we should use fair market values
and not book values to compute debt to equity ratios.
Petitioners point out that Jacobs testified that there is an
"increasing focus on market value of equity versus book equity in
analyzing capital structure" especially in the leveraged buyout
market, and that he concluded that petitioners were adequately
capitalized.
Jacobs also testified that investment bankers
provided funds for highly-leveraged transactions based on cashflow.
We disagree.
As discussed at pars. I-H-2 and II-D-3, above,
petitioners' cash-flow was poor.
The leverage ratios and
coverage ratios in petitioners' loan agreements were based on
book values.
None of the loan documents stated that the leverage
- 70 or coverage ratios were based on fair market values.
Banks which
made commercial loans to petitioners generally determined
financial ratio requirements by referring to the book values of
the Laidlaw borrowers and guarantors.
Petitioners contend that it is well established that a
borrower's debt to equity ratio is based on the fair market value
of its assets, citing Dillin v. United States, 433 F.2d 1097,
1102 (5th Cir. 1970).
Dillin.
We disagree with petitioners' reading of
In that case, the fund recipient's debt to equity ratio
was 800 to 1 based on book value and 2.5 to 1 based on fair
market value.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
affirmed the district court's decision that the advance was
equity.
Even if we considered fair market value debt to equity
ratios, petitioners fare no better because their debt to equity
ratios were worse than those of their competitors using either
book or fair market values.
See also Slappey Drive Indus. Park
v, United States, 561 F.2d at 579, 584-585 n.22 (discussing but
not deciding whether fair market values are relevant in deciding
whether capitalization is adequate).
c.
Whether To Consider Only Debt and Equity
Related to Capital Assets To Start Operations
Petitioners contend that, in applying this factor, Estate of
Mixon v. United States, supra at 408, requires that we consider
only debt and equity related to capital assets needed to start
operations.
We disagree.
Estate of Mixon v. United States,
- 71 supra, did not involve the start of an operation; it involved
advances to a bank that had suffered a large embezzlement loss.
Courts consider capital costs other than costs to start a
business in deciding whether a corporation is inadequately
capitalized.
E.g., Plantation Patterns, Inc. v. Commissioner,
462 F.2d at 722; Tyler v. Tomlinson, 414 F.2d at 848-850; C.M.
Gooch Lumber Sales Co. v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 649, 657 (1968);
Foresun, Inc. v. Commissioner, 41 T.C. at 717.
d.
Debt to Equity Ratios of LTI and LII as Guarantors
Petitioners contend that we should take into account LTI's
and LII's debt to equity ratios because they were guarantors.
Even if we agreed, it would not affect our analysis.
LTI's debt
to equity ratios were 2.26 for 1986, 5.78 for 1987, and 5.63 for
1988.
LTI's debt to equity ratio averaged 4.56 and exceeded 2 to
1 for each of the years in issue.
LII's debt to equity ratios
were .67 for 1986, 3.54 for 1987, and 8.43 for 1988.
LII's debt
to equity ratio averaged 4.21 and exceeded 2 to 1 for the last 2
of the 3 years in issue.
LTI's and LII's debt to equity ratios
generally worsened each year in issue.
Petitioners point out that Michael J. Kennelly (Kennelly),
petitioners' accounting expert, stated that LTI's and LII's debt
to equity ratios were acceptable.
However, he used incorrect
assumptions in his debt to equity ratio calculations.
relied on Poppei's conclusions of value.
Poppei's conclusions.
Kennelly
We are not persuaded by
Poppei unrealistically assumed that
- 72 petitioners would have zero capital expenditures for landfills
and buildings during the 10 years that she considered.
We
believe that assumption is unrealistic because waste companies
must incur a substantial amount of capital expenditures to
develop landfills and acquire other assets in the normal course
of operations.
Poppei's market value approach erroneously
assumed LII's invested capital would increase by 17.9 percent in
the year ending August 31, 1988, while the invested capital of
WMI decreased 2 percent and BFI decreased 4 percent.
Fuller's calculations were also incorrect because he should
have applied, but did not apply, a minority discount for LII's
minority interest (which Poppei properly did).
He did not
compute financial ratios for LII, and his ratios for LTI did not
include adjustments for the LII minority interest.
e.
Conclusion
We conclude that petitioners were thinly capitalized.
This
factor supports treating the LIIBV advances to petitioners as
equity.
9.
Identity of Interest Between Creditor and Shareholder
If advances by shareholders are proportionate to their stock
ownership, the advances are more likely to be equity.
Estate of
Mixon v. United States, supra at 409; Tomlinson v. 1661 Corp.,
377 F.2d 291 (5th Cir. 1967); Leach Corp. v. Commissioner; 30
T.C. 563, 579 (1958).
- 73 Petitioners contend that this factor supports treating the
LIIBV advances to them as debt because LIIBV did not own any
stock of petitioners.
We disagree.
The fact that LIIBV did not
own stock of petitioners is insignificant because LTL, through
DeGroote and his core management team, controlled petitioners and
LIIBV.
See Plantation Patterns, Inc. v. Commissioner, supra;
Foresun, Inc. v. Commissioner, supra.
Petitioners contend that the LIIBV advances were freely
transferable.
They rely on Tomlinson v. 1661 Corp., supra at
297, in which the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit said
that if a debenture is freely transferable, the proportional
participation and control factor does not apply.
Even if
petitioners were correct on this point, the result would be that
we would treat this factor as neutral.
Petitioners contend that this factor should be given little
weight with respect to LWSI before December 1987 because about
half of LII's shares were then publicly held.
We disagree that
the fact that some of LII's stock was publicly held helps
petitioners.
First, LII's directors had reason to approve the
LIIBV advances because LII could not get financing from
commercial lenders with terms more favorable to LWSI and LII than
they could get from LIIBV.
Second, LII's brief period with
minority shareholders and independent directors did not mean it
dealt with LIIBV at arm's length.
- 74 This factor is neutral.22
10.
Source of Interest Payments, i.e., Whether the
Recipient of the Funds Pays Interest From Earnings
Payment of interest by the recipient of an advance suggests
that a transfer is debt.
Estate of Mixon v. United States,
supra.
Petitioners contend that they paid all of the interest due
to LIIBV in the amounts and on the dates required by the loan
agreements and promissory notes, and that they paid the interest
at issue.
We disagree.
LIIBV usually paid one of the three
operating companies (Transit, Tree, and LWSI) on the same day and
often in the same amount of the payments that LIIBV had received
that day.
Petitioners' payments to LIIBV did not change
petitioners' financial position because LIIBV immediately
returned the vast majority of funds to petitioners as interest
reinvestment loans.
In substance, petitioners paid interest to
LIIBV at most sporadically because funds flowed in a carefully
orchestrated circle.23
22
We could also conclude that this factor supports treating
the LIIBV advances to petitioners as equity because LIIBV and
petitioners are indirectly held by LTL, and thus 100 percent of
the advances came from petitioners' 100-percent owners. This
suggests that LIIBV and petitioners had an identity of interest.
Harmont Plaza, Inc. v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 632, 645 (1975),
affd. 549 F.2d 414 (6th Cir. 1977); see Rickey v. United States,
592 F.2d 1251, 1257-1258 (5th Cir. 1979) (discussing attribution
rules of sec. 318).
23
Respondent relied on these facts in arguing that sec.
267(a)(3) applies. Petitioners did not dispute respondent's
contention that there was a circular flow of funds.
- 75 Transit's and LWSI's payments to LIIBV which they contend
are interest are similar to the payments in Merryman v.
Commissioner, 873 F.2d 879, 882 (5th Cir. 1989), affg. T.C. Memo.
1988-72; see also Bail Bonds by Marvin Nelson, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 820 F.2d 1543, 1549 (9th Cir. 1987), affg. T.C.
Memo. 1986-23; United States v. Clardy, 612 F.2d 1139, 1151-1152
(9th Cir. 1980); Zirker v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 970, 976 (1986);
Drobny v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 1326, 1343 (1986). affd. 113 F.3d
670 (7th Cir. 1997); Karme v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 1163,
1186-1187 (1980), affd. 673 F.2d 1062 (9th Cir. 1982), in that
the payments did not change petitioners' economic status.
Petitioners contend that these cases are indistinguishable
from Nestle Holdings, Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1995-441.
We disagree.
The taxpayer in that case paid interest and reduced
its overall indebtedness during the years in issue, and its
financial condition was improving.
Here, petitioners postponed
interest payments, used debt to finance interest payments, and
continued to increase their indebtedness.
In addition, the funds
recipient in Nestle, unlike petitioners, was not highly
leveraged, had reasonably anticipated significant cash-flows
adequate to pay interest and principal, and had liquid assets
which it would use to reduce its indebtedness.
Petitioners contend that their interest reinvestment loans
were merely a device to help LIIBV comply with Dutch tax rulings.
We disagree.
Whether or not the interest reinvestment loans had
- 76 that effect, they meant that, in substance, petitioners paid no
interest to LIIBV.
This factor supports treating the LIIBV advances to
petitioners as equity.
11.
Ability of the Corporation To Obtain Loans From Outside
Lending Institutions
If a corporation can borrow money from outside sources when
it receives a transfer of funds, the transfer is more likely to
be debt.
Estate of Mixon v. United States, supra at 410;
Tomlinson v. 1661 Corp., supra.
Petitioners contend that they could have borrowed
$975,153,806 from outside sources during the years in issue on
commercially reasonable terms.
To support their position,
petitioners cite the testimony of Jacobs, petitioners' expert
Hollis W. Rademacher (Rademacher), and three letters from
investment bankers.
Rademacher testified that a bank would not have required the
loans to be secured, but that a negative pledge or prohibition
against other indebtedness for borrowed money would have
sufficed.
In contrast, respondent's expert, Filmore G. Enger,
Jr. (Enger), testified that security would be very important for
loans of this magnitude.
realistic.
We think Enger's view was more
Generally speaking, creditors avoid subjecting funds
to the risk of the borrower's business as much as possible and
seek a reliable return, while shareholders take that risk and
hope for a return from the business' success.
Slappey Drive
- 77 Indus. Park v. United States, 561 F.2d at 581; Jewell Ridge Coal
Corp. v. Commissioner, 318 F.2d 695, 698 (4th Cir. 1963), affg.
T.C. Memo. 1962-194.
Rademacher's position would subject the
creditor to undue risk.
Jacobs testified that it would have been possible for
petitioners to get large loans.
However, he said that loans this
size would require security because petitioners were highly
leveraged.
He cited examples of large bank loans made to highly-
leveraged companies during the years in issue.
However, those
examples are not compelling here because those loans were to
companies that were much larger than petitioners, and they
included various security arrangements including guaranties, as
here.
Jacobs concluded that it was not clear that LTI and LII
could have borrowed as much from commercial banks as they
received from LIIBV.
He said they might have been able to borrow
large amounts if they first had a public offering of subordinated
debt.
Petitioners contend that Enger testified that petitioners
could have obtained bank financing in the amounts that LIIBV
advanced to petitioners.
We disagree.
Enger testified that
petitioners could not obtain bank financing from commercial
lenders on terms comparable to the LIIBV agreements, and could
obtain financing only by using equity and subordinated and senior
indebtedness.
Petitioners contend that the three investment bankers'
proposals show that they could have reasonably obtained
- 78 $975,153,806.
We disagree.
The investment bankers did not
propose to raise $975,153,806.
Dean Witter proposed to use
subordinated notes to raise $325 million.
Bear Stearns proposed
to raise $300 million ($100 million subordinated debt, $100
million stock sale, and $100 million convertible subordinated
debentures).
Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette proposed to raise up
to $350 ($80 million from common stock, $100 million from
convertible debentures, and $170 million from subordinated debt).
The investment bankers' proposals relied on equity financing
which petitioners could not do.
Petitioners contend that the debt to equity ratios in their
loan agreements with the banks were not important because they
were waivable.
We disagree.
Even if a term in the written
agreements could be waived, that does not make that term
unimportant.
Petitioners contend that RBC, TDB, and FNBC would have lent
them $975,153,806.
Petitioners rely on DeGroote's testimony that
he had good relations with those banks.
DeGroote testified that
commercial lenders inundated LTL with offers to lend petitioners
funds and that RBC, TDB, and FNBC had banking relationships with
LTL.
His general testimony on this point does not convince us
that they would have lent petitioners as much as LIIBV did.
Haworth testified that petitioners could have borrowed money
from commercial lenders based on petitioners' regular contacts
with LTL's banks.
Rademacher and Jacobs testified that they
would have lent as much money to petitioners as LIIBV did.
The
- 79 objective evidence does not corroborate their testimony on this
point.
Petitioners' loans from commercial banks totaled much
less than $975,153,806, and were on terms substantially less
favorable than the agreements accompanying petitioners' advances
from LIIBV.
Petitioners could have borrowed some money from outside
lenders.
However, we do not think that they could have borrowed
$975,153,806, or that they could have done so on terms close to
the favorable terms that they received from LIIBV.
This factor
supports treating the LIIBV advances to petitioners as equity.
12.
The Extent to Which the Recipient Used the Advance To
Acquire Capital Assets
A corporation's use of cash advances to acquire capital
assets suggests that an advance is equity.
United States, 464 F.2d at 410.
Estate of Mixon v.
Use of an advance by an ongoing
business to expand its operations, e.g., by acquiring an existing
business, suggests that the advance is equity.
Plantation
Patterns, Inc. v. United States, 462 F.2d. at 713-716, 722; Tyler
v. Tomlinson, 414 F.2d. at 846, 848-849.
Petitioners used most of the advances from LIIBV to expand
their operations, especially by acquiring other companies, e.g.,
GSX.
Petitioners told Canadian tax authorities that LTL's
advances to U.S. subsidiaries through LIIBV were capital
investments which formed a part of the subsidiaries' permanent
capital.
- 80 Petitioners contend that this factor applies only to capital
expenses for the initial operations of a business.
Petitioners
rely on Slappey Drive Indus. Park v. United States, supra at 583.
Most of the advances in that case were used to finance the
initial operations of a business.
Id.
However, the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit did not hold in that case that an
advance must be used to buy capital assets for a new business for
it to be treated as equity.
This factor supports treating the LIIBV advances to
petitioners as equity.
13.
Whether the Recipient Repaid the Funds on the Due Date
The failure of a corporation to repay principal amounts on
the due date indicates that advances were equity.
Estate of
Mixon v. United States, supra; see Slappey Drive Indus. Park v.
United States, supra at 582.
LIIBV repeatedly deferred and
extended the vast majority of principal payments.
Petitioners contend that extending the due date is the same
as repaying on the due date.
Petitioners cite Litton Bus. Sys.
Inc. v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 367 (1973), and C.M. Gooch Lumber
Sales Co. v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. at 657.
from the instant case.
Those cases differ
Litton Bus. Sys. Inc. v. Commissioner,
supra, differs because in that case the recipient of funds
continuously repaid principal which substantially reduced the net
debt.
Id. at 374-375, 380-381.
In Litton Bus. Sys., we found a
reasonable expectation of repayment not present in the instant
cases.
Petitioners' account balances increased throughout the
- 81 years in issue, and LIIBV continued to make advances to
petitioners despite their eroding financial conditions and their
inability to repay the advances outstanding within a reasonable
time period.
See Atlanta Biltmore Hotel Corp. v. Commissioner,
349 F.2d 677, 680 (5th Cir. 1965), modifying and affg. T.C. Memo.
1963-255; Diamond Bros. Co. v. Commissioner, 322 F.2d 725, 732
(3d Cir. 1963), affg. T.C. Memo. 1962-132; American-La FranceFoamite Corp. v. Commissioner, 284 F.2d 723, 724-725 & n.3 (2d
Cir. 1960), affg. T.C. Memo. 1959-101.
In C.M. Gooch Lumber Sales Co. v. Commissioner, supra at
657-659, the parties had an arrangement which provided for
mutually offsetting business dealings, but assured repayment of
principal.
We found that until June 1960 the advances were debt,
but after that date, repayment was unlikely and the advances were
equity.
Id.
Here, there was no assured repayment during the
years in issue.
This factor supports treating the LIIBV advances to
petitioners as equity.
E.
Other Factors
1.
Issuance of Debt for Cash
Petitioners contend that the fact that Transit, Tree, and
LWSI transferred cash to LIIBV instead of stock supports treating
the LIIBV advances to petitioners as debt.
Petitioners cite
Commissioner v. John Kelley Co., 146 F.2d 466, 469 (7th Cir.
1944) (debentures sold to shareholders in exchange for credit of
dividends paid were not debt), revg. 1 T.C. 457 (1943), revd. 326
- 82 U.S. 521 (1946).
We disagree.
The Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit held in Commissioner v. John Kelley Co., supra,
that the fact that the taxpayers did not exchange cash for
debentures is a factor indicating that an advance is equity.
at 467.
Id.
However, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
did not state that the converse is true; i.e., that if the
recipient of funds received any cash, the transaction is a loan.
The fact that LIIBV transferred cash to petitioners is not
convincing evidence that the advances were debt.
This factor is neutral.
2.
Reasonable Expectation of Repayment
A reasonable expectation of repayment by the provider of an
advance when the advance is made suggests that the advance is
debt.
Gilbert v. Commissioner, 248 F.2d 399, 406 (2d Cir. 1957),
remanding T.C. Memo. 1956-137; C.M. Gooch Lumber Sales Co. v.
Commissioner, supra at 656; Nestle Holdings, Inc. v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1995-441.
Petitioners contend that
LIIBV reasonably expected petitioners to repay all of the loans
based on their financial conditions.
We disagree.
LIIBV's
directors did not expect to be repaid or intend to request
repayment.
This factor suggests treating the LIIBV advances to
petitioners as equity.
3.
Absence of Conversion Rights
Petitioners point out that they had no right to convert the
creditor's loans to stock of the debtor, and contend that this
- 83 suggests that the advances were not equity, citing Rev. Rul. 8398, 1983-2 C.B. 40; Notice 94-47, 1994-1 C.B. 357; Notice 94-48,
1994-1 C.B. 357.
This factor is not significant because LTL
owned and controlled petitioners and LIIBV.
LTL had the power to
cause LIIBV to convert advances to petitioners to stock.
This factor is neutral.
F.
Conclusion
The factors that relate to the form of the transaction
support treating the LIIBV advances to petitioners as debt.
The
factors relating to substance support treating the LIIBV advances
to petitioners as equity.
The substance of the transactions is
revealed in the lack of arm's-length dealing between LIIBV and
petitioners, the circular flow of funds, and the conduct of the
parties by changing the terms of the agreements when needed to
avoid deadlines.
The Laidlaw entities' core management group
designed and implemented this elaborate system to create the
appearance that petitioners were paying interest, while in
substance they were not.
We conclude that, for Federal income tax purposes, the
advances from LIIBV to petitioners for which petitioners claim to
have paid the interest at issue are equity and not debt.
Thus,
petitioners may not deduct the interest at issue for 1986, 1987,
and 1988.
- 84 To reflect concessions and the foregoing,
Decisions will be
entered under Rule 155.
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