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T.C. Memo. 2011-225
UNITED STATES TAX COURT
ROVAKAT,
LLC, A PARTNERSHIP, SHANT S. HOVNANIAN,
TAX MATTERS PARTNER, Petitioner v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, R spondent
Docket No.
3251-09.
Filed Se tember 20,
2011.
William R. Rankin, for petitioner.
Laurie A. Nasky and Justin D. Scheid, for respondent.
MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION
LARO, Judge:
This case is a partnership-level proceeding
subject to the unified audit and litigation prócedures of the Tax
Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. 97-248,
sec. 402, 96 Stat. 648.
Shant S. Hovnanian (Mr. Hovnanian), as
the tax matters partner of Rovakat, LLC (Rovak t) , petitioned the
i SERVED £EP 2 0 2011
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Court to readjust partnership items that respondent adjusted for
Rovakat's 2002 through 2004 taxable years.
See sec. 6226(a).1
Respondent's principal adjustment was to disallow Rovakat's claim
to section 988 ordinary losses of $130,766 for 2002, $890,485 for
2003, and $2,479,991 for 2004.
These losses stem from Rovakat's
receipt of $34,185 in Swiss francs (francs) that, Mr. Hovnanian
claimed, carried with them a $5,805,000 tax basis.
Respondent
determined that the claimed losses are not allowed because Mr.
Hovnanian failed to establish Rovakat's basis in the francs.
Respondent determined alternatively that the claimed losses are
not allowed because the transaction underlying Rovakat's receipt
of the francs
(francs transaction) lacked economic substance.
We
agree with respondent on both points.2
We also decide the following secondary issues:
(1) Whether
Rovakat omitted income of $650,000 and $90,443 for 2002 and 2003,
respectively.
We hold it omitted income of $593,125 for 2002;
(2) whether the period of limitations for assessment has expired
as to Rovakat's 2002 taxable year.
We hold it has not;
(3) whether $593,125 and $943,192 of Rovakat's income for 2002
and 2003, respectively, is self-employment income.
We hold it
1Unless otherwise indicated, section references are to the
applicable versions of the Internal Revenue Code (Code), and Rule
references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.
Some dollar amounts are rounded.
2Respondent also determined that the losses were not allowed
for other reasons. We do not address any of those reasons.
-3is;
(4) whether Rovakat may deduct "other expenses" of $63,964
and $352,663 for 2003 and 2004, respectively.
not;
We hold it may
(5) whether the 40-percent accuracy-related penalty ·under
section 6662(a) and (h) for gross valuation misstatement applies
to any underpayment of tax attributable to the reporting of the
losses of $130,766 for 2002,
for 2004.
$890,485 for 2003,
and $2,479,991
We hold it does; and (6) whether a 20-percent
accuracy-related penalty under section 6662(a) and (b) (1),
(2),
or (3) for negligence or disregard of rules or regulations,
substantial understatement of income tax, or substantial
valuation misstatement, respectively, applies to any underpayment
of tax attributable to the omitted income for 2002 and the
disallowed deductions for 2003 andv2004.
We hold it does.
FINDINGS OF FACT
I.
Preliminaries
The parties filed with the Court numerous stipulations of
fact and accompanying exhibits.
The Court also deemed some facts
and accompanying exhibits stipulated pursuant to Rule 91(f).3
The stipulated facts, including those deemed established, and the
accompanying exhibits are incorporated herein by this reference.
We find the stipulated facts accordingly.
*We concluded that the deemed facts and documents were
relevant to this case, and Mr. Hovnanian failéd to show why the
matters therein should not be deemed admitted.
See Rule 91(f).
-4II.
Mr. Valdez
A.
Background
Lance O. Valdez (Mr. Valdez) is a tax attorney who practiced
law through his wholly owned professional corporation, Lance O.
Valdez & Associates, P.C.
(LOVA).
He also is a financial adviser
who provided investment advisory services primarily through two
other entities that he controlled, LVCM, Ltd.
(Limited), and
Lance Valdez Tax Management.
As part of his investment advisory services, Mr. Valdez
structured and marketed tax-shelter transactions which generated
for U.S. taxpayers superficial Federal income tax losses greatly
disproportionate to economic outlay in the activities underlying
those losses.
For the most part, Mr. Valdez designed and
implemented these transactions, and he created the transaction
documents effecting their implementation.
The documents were
generally the same as to each transaction, except for the names
of the parties to the transaction and the amounts involved.
B.
Transactions Promoted
Mr. Valdez promoted his transactions as "investments".
While the transactions varied according to the entities,
taxpayers, and assets involved, the transactions generally
involved foreign property with significant built-in losses
incurred by a foreign person not subject to U.S. tax, and used
the same three steps.
As the first step in the transaction, a foreign entity,
pursuant to an agreement with Mr. Valdez in which he agreed to
pay the foreign entity a fee, transferred the built-in loss
property with its purportedly high basis and
low fair market
value (distressed assets) to a,domestic partnership in exchange
for an interest in the partnership.
Second, the foreign entity
sold a significant portion of its interest in the partnership to
a U. S . taxpayer who was one of Mr . Valde z' s " ..nve s tors" .
Third,
the partnership disposed of the -distressed assets to formally
trigger the built-in losses claimed to continue to inhere in the
distressed assets, with those "losses" alloca ed to the U. S.
taxpayer to of f set the taxpayer' s unrelated income otherwise
subject to Federal income tax.
In total, Mr. Valdez's transactions caused over $147 million
in "losses" to be allocate
among his "investors" who did not
actually realize economic losses of anywhere near the amounts
allocated and who had minimal economic outlays in relation to the
allocated "losses" .
C.
IRS Investigates Mr. Valdez
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) investigated Mr. Valdez,
LOVA, and Lance Valdez Tax Management as organizers, sellers, or
promoters of potentially abusive tax shelters.
That
investigation led the IRS to examine Rovakat' s 2002 through 2004
Forms 1065, U.S.. Return of Partnership Income (2002 return, 2003
return, and 2004 return, respectively).
III.
Rovakat
A.
Formation of Rovakat
International Capital Partners, LP (ICP), and International
Strategic Partners, LLC (ISP), .formed Rovakat on June 6, 2002, as
a Delaware limited liability company.'
Rovakat uses the cash
receipts and disbursements method of accounting for Federal tax
purposes, and Rovakat reports its income and expenses on the
basis of the calendar year.
Rovakat's mailing address and
registered office were in the third judicial circuit of the
United States when the petition was filed.
B.
ICP
1.
Overview
Mosafa, Ltd.
(Mosafa), and Credicom.N.V.
(CNV)
a Cayman Islands limited partnership on May 7, 2001.
formed ICP as
.ICP
conducted its activities and maintained its books and records in
U.S. dollars.
2.
Mr. Valdez controlled ICP at all relevant times.
Mosafa
Mosafa is a Cayman Islands company.
As part of ICP's
formation, Mosafa transferred $1,000 to ICP in exchange for a 2percent general partnership interest.
4Rovakat was originally named Radio & Wireless Software
Development, LLC (Radio & Wireless).
We henceforth refer to
Radio & Wireless as Rovakat.
3.
CNV
CNV is a Belgian company that is a subsi iary of Immobilière
Hôtelière, S.A.
conglomerate.
(Immobiliere), a French real
state and hotel
CNV conducted its activities and maintained its
books and records on the basis of the Belgian franc (Belgian
franc).
CNV's managing ·director was Henri Van Zeveren (Mr. Van
Zeveren), a Belgian citizen and resident.
As part of ICP's
formation, CNV contributed $49,000 to ICP in exchange for a
98-percent limited partnership interest.
4.
Investment Advisory Agreement
LVCM, LLC (LVCM), is a Delaware limited liability company
whose managing member was Mr. Valdez.
LVCM and ICP entered into
an investment advisory agreement under which LVCM agreed to
provide investment advisory and management se vices to ICP from
May 10,
2001,
through December 31,
2015,
in exchange for a
management fee and an allocation of ICP's profits.
The agreement
appointed LVCM as ICP's manager, agent, and attorney-in-fact, and
the agreement authorized LVCM to bind ICP with respect to, among
other things, asset transfers, bank accounts, and transactions.
C.
ISP
Limited formed ISP on January 23, 2001, as a Delaware
limited liability company.
During March 2002, Mr. Hovnanian
purchased a 93.9-percent interest in ISP; he did not conduct any
due diligence regarding that purchase.
ISP's remaining 6.1-
-8percent interest was owned by ICP and by Mr. Valdez's wholly
owned corporation Horizon Capital Holdings Corp.
Mr. Valdez
controlled ISP at all relevant times.
IV.
Mr. Hovnanian and Related Entities
A.
Mr. Hovnanian
Mr. Hovnanian is the managing member of Rovakat and its tax
matters partner.
He earned a bachelor of science degree in
economics from the University of Pennsylvania, and he has over 20
years of experience in the computer, software, and wireless
telecommunications industries.
He has invested in real estate,
startup companies, and financial instruments such as foreign
currency contracts, hedging contracts, and the buying and selling
of stock (including short selling).
He is a wealthy individual,
and he is a high-income taxpayer.
B.
VSHG
Mr. Hovnanian was the executive vice president of V.S.
Hovnanian Group (VSHG) from June 1980 until January 1991.
VSHG
was a holding company, and its subsidiaries engaged in
construction, development, and utilities.
At all relevant times,
Mr. Hovnanian owned 25 percent of VSHG, and three members of his
family equally owned the remaining 75 percent.
Hovbilt, Inc.
subsidiaries.
(Hovbilt), a C corporation, was one of VSHG's
VSHG owned 99 percent of Hovbilt, and Mr.
Hovnanian owned the other 1 percent.
C.
Speedus
Speedus Corp.
(Speedus) is a publicly traded company that
specializes in information technology and medïcal devices.5
Since 1991, Mr. Hovnanian has been its president, chief executive
officer, and chairman of its board of directors.
Mr. Hovnanian
also was an employee of Speedus at all releva t times.
V.
Jacques Vabre Transactions
Immobiliere and its subsidiaries (collectively, Immobiliere
group) owned various assets which had lost much of their value by
February 2001.
Mr. Valdez and the Immobiliere group discussed
Immobiliere's transferring of these distressed assets to entities
controlled by Mr. Valdez.
Mr. Valdez and the Immobilier.e group
referred to these transactions as Jacques Vabre transactions,
with an understanding that "Jacques Vabre" waM Mr. Valdez's
nickname .
The Immobiliere group participated in four Jacques Vabre
transactions.
Each transaction involved the equity interests of
a single entity; namely, Credicom Asia, Limited (Credicom Asia),
Kislev Partners, L.P.
S.A.
(Kislev Partners), Silvecom S.A., or Todor,
The Immobiliere group earned between $7 million and $10
million in fees by participating in these transactions.
The fee
for each transaction was set at.a percent (ranging from 2 to 2.5
sSpeedus was formerly known as Suite 12 Group, Highcrest
Management, and Cellular Vision. We refer to he precursors of
Speedus as Speedus .
-10-
percent of 90 percent) of the distressed assets' Federal income
tax basis that was claimed to be obtained from the Immobiliere
group as part of the transaction.
VI.
Transaction Involving Credicom Asia
A.
Overview
The Jacques Vabre transaction at issue was essentially a
four-step transaction involving Credicom Asia.
First, Credicom
Asia redeemed its worthless class A common stock (class A stock)
from CNV for 1,718,116 francs and $303,375.
Second, CNV
transferred the francs to ICP in exchange for an increased
interest in ICP.
Third, ICP transferred to Rovakat 50,000 of the
francs with an aggregate fair market value of $34,185.
Fourth,
ICP sold 90 percent of its interest in Rovakat to Mr. Hovnanian.
One day after the fourth step, Rovakat sold its 50,000 francs to
a third party at their fair market value of $35,268.
B.
History of Credicom Asia
Credicom Asia is a subsidiary of CNV and a member of the.
Immobiliere group.
Credicom Asia was formed as a British Virgin
Islands company on June 18, 1992, under the name Pacific Eagle
Corporation Limited, and subsequently changed its name to
Credicom Asia.
On or about September 13, 1996, Credicom Asia was
registered to do business in the Cayman Islands.
Credicom Asia
primarily conducted its activities and maintained its books and
records in U.S. dollars.
-11-
Credicom Asia had two classes of common stock outstanding as
of December 2, 1996.
The first class, class A stock, was
initially owned entirely by CNV and represented 70 percent of the
equity interests in Credicom Asia.
The second class, class B
common stock (class B stock), was initially owned entirely by
Colony Credicom, L.P., and Colorado Credicom, LLC (collectively,
C&C), and represented the remaining 30 percen
equity interests
in Credicom Asia.
C.
Liquidation Preference of Credicom Asia
In a Restated Memorandum of Association dated September 13,
1996, Credicom Asia provided that holders of its common stock
were entitled to apportion any assets that remained after the
preference rights of the preferred shareholders were satisfied as
follows:
First, to the holders of the * * * [class B stock], an
amount that would cause [them] to receiv an 18% per
annum (compounded annually and computed from the date
of the issuance thereof) internal rate o return.on
[their] original principal investment af er taking into
account * * * all dividends and distribu ions from
[Credicom Asia] in respect of the * * * [class B stock]
* * *·,
* * * Second, to the holders of the * * * [class A
stock], an amount that would cause [them] to receive an
18% per annum (compounded annually and computed from
the date of issuance) internal rate of re urn on
[their] original principal investment aft r taking into
account * * * all dividends and distribut ons from
* * * [Credicom Asia] in respect of the * * * [class A
stock]
* * *;
* * * Third, to the holders of the * * * [class B
stock], an amount equal to the product of (A) that
-12-
percentage which the * * * [class B stock] represents
of all the outstanding common stock, times (B) the
ratio of 25/35 times (C) the remaining amount of
proceeds to be distributed in respect of a liquidation;
and * * *
* * * [Fourth,] * * * the remaining amount to the
holders of the * * * [class A stock] * * *.
C&C paid $55 million for the class B stock and as of
December 2, 1996, was entitled upon the liquidation of Credicom
Asia to a priority distribution of $55 million plus an 18-percent
cumulative annual return before any distributions were made to
CNV.
CNV, the holder of the class A stock, was entitled to
receive a portion of the liquidated assets after payment of the
priority distribution.'
D.
Credicom Asia's Holdings
1.
Overview
As of January 1, 1997, Credicom Asia's assets consisted of:
(1) 100 percent of the stock of Golf de Ramatuelle, S.A.
Ramatuelle), a French société anonyme;
(Golf de
(2) 100 percent of the
stock of Lahotel Corporation (Lahotel), a British Virgin Islands
company;
(3) 91.3 percent of the stock of Argent Holdings, Ltd.
(Argent), a British Virgin Islands company; and (4) an
unspecified interest in Kislev Partners, a Cayman Islands
partnership.
'On Mar. 26, 2001, Credicom Asia executed a Restated
Memorandum of Association, which sought to eliminate the
liquidation preference retroactively.
-132.
Golf de Ramatuelle
.
As of January 1, 1997, Golf de Ramatuell
was engaged in the
attempted development of land (Golf property) in the Commune of
Ramatuelle in the Canton of Saint-Tropez, France.
Golf de
Ramatuelle's principal assets were direct and indirect ownership
interests in the Golf property.
Golf de Ramatuelle's liabilities
totaled $10,524,301 as of December 2, 1996, and approximately $7
million on June 7,.2001.
The Golf property consists of approximately 321 acres of
land.
The land is principally forest land, with a portion that
may be used for agriculture, and is in an area subject to a high
risk of fire.
The land lacks adequate water, sewer, and power
supply to support extensive development.
The Golf property was
not zoned for commercial.development, and.Golf de Ramatuelle's
attempts to develop the property for nonagricultural uses were
unsuccessful throughout the years.
3.
Lahotel
As of January 1, 1997, Lahotel owned L'Ermitage Hotel
(L'Ermitage), a luxury hotel in Beverly Hills, California.
Built
in 1976, L'Ermitage was closed for renovations from September
1993 until June 1998.
L'Ermitage's liabilities were $9,347,765
as of December 31, 1996.
In 1998, L'Ermitage was assessed at
$13,185,232 for property tax purposes.
-14-
4.
Argent
As of January 1, 1997, Argent owned an interest in the
Amanresorts hotel chain, through a 60.97-percent interest in
Silverlink Holdings, Ltd.
(Silverlink).
Amanresorts and the nine
Aman operating assets, partially or wholly owned by Silverlink,
are widely viewed as an innovative upscale hotel group.
Aman was
recapitalized in 1993 with Immobiliere, through Argent, acquiring
control of the company.
Silverlink's current liabilities
exceeded its current assets on December 31,
5.
1995 and 1996.
Kislev Partners
As of January 1, 1997, Kislev Partners, through a wholly
owned subsidiary, owned approximately 60 percent of Financiere
Saresco (Saresco).
Saresco was founded in 1976 by Air France
Group and Aeroports de Paris to operate duty-free stores in Paris
airports.
Saresco, through its various subsidiaries, operated
duty-free retail stores which sold perfumes, cosmetics, spirits,
tobacco, and fashion accessories.
Substantially all of these
retail stores sold goods free of duty and of tax.
Over 80
percent of the sales in the duty-free division were from
Saresco's stores in two terminals in Paris Charles de Gaulle
Airport at Roissy.
-15E.
Buyout of the Class B Stock
By 1998, C&C had become increasingly unhappy with their
investment in the. Class B stock.
On February 15, 1999, C&C
petitioned the High Court of Justice, British Virgin Islands, to
order the winding up of Credicom Asia.
At that time, Credicom
Asia was unable to pay its debts, and C&C ownëd 36.62 percent of
Credicom Asia through ownership of the class B stock and a
partial interest in Kislev Partners.
Credicom Asia also owed C&C
approximately $22 million.
During August 2000, Immobiliere disposed of substantially
all of Saresco's assets in exchange for the cancellation of debt.
Shortly thereafter, on September 1, 2000, Cre icom Asia, CNV, and
C&C entered into a settlement agreement in li u of the winding up
of Credicom Asia.
Under that agreement, C&C
ranted CNV an
option to pay $118 million to acquire the following assets
(optioned assets):
C&C;
(1) 45,834 shares of class B stock owned by
(2) the Kislev partnership interest owned by C&C;
(3) debts
which Credicom Asia owed to C&C; and (4) a mortgage on Lahotel's
assets.
In return, C&C agreed to dismiss the winding up petition
upon CNV's exercise of the option.
Mr. Valdez received a copy of
this settlement agreement.
CNV exercised its option and purchased.the optioned assets
on September 18, 2000.
By October 5, 2000, Credicom Asia's
-16-
remaining assets were its interests in Golf de Ramatuelle and in
Saresco.
Credidev, Ltd.
(Credidev), a British Virgin Islands entity,
was formed as a wholly owned subsidiary of CNV to receive C&C's
class B stock.
The class B stock was transferred to Credidev on
October 5, 2000.
F.
CNV retained its interest in the class A stock.
March 14, 2001, Meeting of the Board of Directors
CNV had no source of revenue other than fees generated from
the Jacques Vabre transactions.
During a meeting of CNV's board
of directors on March 14, 2001, the board of directors "ordered"
that CNV reduce its interest in Credicom Asia.
Mr. Van Zeveren, in his capacity as CNV's managing director,
worried that CNV's directors could be faulted for failing to call
for the cessation of CNV's activities.
Specifically, he was
concerned that CNV's directors might be reproached because CNV
had consistently generated losses since 1991 and all of its fixed
assets, with the exception of Golf de Ramatuelle and shares in
shell companies, were sold.
Mr. Van Zeveren reasoned that CNV's
interests in the shell companies had "residual value" in that the
companies could generate fees from Mr. Valdez by participating in
his transactions.
Immobiliere, in its capacity as CNV's majority
shareholder, contemplated using any such fees to pay CNV's
arrears, to cover its operating expenses for 1 to 2 years, and if
necessary, to pay for an amicable liquidation of CNV.
-17-
G.
ICM's Purchase of Class A Stock
International Capital Management, LLC (ICM) , is a Delaware
limited liability company that Mr. Valdez controlled as its
managing member.
On March 26,
2001,. ICM purc ased (1)
1,586.5
shares of class A stock from CNV for $26,503; and (2)
2,291.7
shares of class B stock from Credidev for $38 913..
The purchased
class A stock represented a 2-percent interest in Credicom Asia,
and the purchased class B stock represented a 5-percent interest
in Credicom Asia.
H.
Redemption of Class A Stock
Mr. Valdez was named Credicom Asia's president sometime
before June 7,
2001.
On April 25 and May 8,
2001, Mr. Valdez
transferred a total of $1,325,126 to a UBS AG (UBS) bank account
held by Credicom Asia.
On May 14, 2001, Credicom Asia purchased
1,718,116 francs through its UBS bank account for $1,021,751.
These francs were transferred to a UBS bank account held by CNV.
On June 7, 2001, Credicom Asia redeemed from CNV all of its
class A stock for 1,718,116 francs and $303,375.
The redemption
was entered into by Mr. Van Zeveren in his capacity as CNV' s
.
managing director and by Mr. Valdez in his capacity- as Credicom
Asia's president.
Also on June 7,
2001, CNV transferred the
1,718,116 francs to ICP in return for an increased limited
partnership interest in ICP.
-18Mr. Valdez wired the $303,375 to CNV from Credicom Asia's
UBS bank account.
account.
CNV then wired the $303,375 to ICP's UBS bank
No further activity in Credicom Asia's UBS account
occurred until August 24, 2005, when Mr. Valdez closed both the
Credicom Asia and ICP UBS bank accounts.
I.
Participation Fees
CNV's claimed basis in the class A stock was approximately
$184 million, and CNV expected to receive approximately
$4,140,000 from Mr. Valdez in exchange for its participation in
the Credicom Asia transaction.
tranches.
These fees were payable in two
The first tranche related to $100 million of CNV's
claimed basis in the class A stock and generated $2.2 million in
fees for CNV.7
The second tranche related to $84 million of
CNV's claimed basis in the class A stock and generated $1,940,000
in fees for CNV.
CNV used the fees from the first tranche to
purchase bonds issued by Immobiliere in 2001.
CNV (or
Immobiliere) intended to use the fees generated from the second
tranche to pay its arrears, to continue its operations long
enough to allow for the sale of CNV's remaining assets, and "to
pick the bones clean".
44r. Valdez initially agreed to pay CNV a $2,250,000 fee
related to the first tranche.
That fee was reduced, however,
following Mr. Valdez's agreement to accelerate payments due under
the first tranche.
VII.
Francs Transaction
-19-
During November 2002, ICP transferred to Rovakat 50,000
francs with a fair market value of $34,185.
Immediately
thereafter, Rovakat's owners were ISP (approximately 75-percent
owner) and ICP (approximately 25-percent owner).
On December 26,
2002, Mr. Hovnanian purchased 90 percent of ICP's interest in
Rovakat for $30,776.
Immediately after, Rovakat's owners (with
their approximate ownership interests) were ISP (approximately
75-percent owner), ICP (approximately 2-percent owner), and Mr.
Hovnanian (approximately 23-percent owner).
On December 27,
2002, Rovakat sold the 50,000 francs to a
third party for $35,468.
Rovakat reported on its 2002 return
that its tax basis in the francs was $5,805,000 and that it
realized a $5,769,532 loss on the sale
($35,468 - $5,805,000).
Rovakat lacked sufficient income to apply all of the reported
loss to 2002, and it reported that it was sus ending the unused
portion of the reported loss.
VIII.
Payment of Fees to Mr. Valdez
A.
Overview
From 2002 through 2004, Rovakat directly or indirectly paid
fees of at least $147,318 to Mr. Valdez.
Rovakat paid these fees
through an intermediary entity, Wireless Audience Survey, Inc.
(WASI).
Manuel Asensio, a close personal friend and business
acquaintance of Mr. Hovnanian, controlled WASI and authorized the
-20fee payments.
Limited.
WASI,
in turn, paid the fees to Mr. Valdez through
Additional fees of $234,835 were paid to another entity
controlled by Mr. Valdez.
B.
2002 Payments
Limited issued WASI an October 30, 2002, invoice in the
amount of $650,000 for "advisory services in connection with
software licensing and code development".
Limited received
$650,000 from WASI on November 22, ·2002.
Rovakat issued Limited a December 26, 2002, invoice in the
amount of $593,125 for "consulting" services.
One day later,
Rovakat issued Limited an invoice in the amount of $593,125 as a
"refundable prepaid deposit" for "consulting" services.
Limited
transferred $593,125 to Rovakat on December 31, 2002.
Rovakat did not report on its 2002 return that any portion
of either the $650,000 or the $593,125 was includable in income.
C.
2003 Payments
.
Limited issued WASI a February 27, 2003, invoice for
$1,033,635 of "advisory services in connection with software
licensing and code development rendered in 2002".
received $1,033,635 from WASI on March 24,
Limited
2003.
Rovakat issued Limited a March 25, 2003, invoice for
$943,192 of "consulting" serv1ces.
transferred $943,192 to Rovakat.
On March 25, 2003, Limited
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Rovakat did not report on its 2003 retur
that any portion
of either the $1,033,635 or the $943,192 was includable in
income.
IX.
WIC Lawsuit and Mr. Hovnanian's Bonus
A.
Overview
Speedus filed a lawsuit (WIC lawsuit) against Western
International Communications (WIC) on or befo e April 25, 2002.
Speedus agreed in an employment agreement with Mr. Hovnanian to
pay him a bonus (bonus) of 20 percent of any net proceeds
received by Speedus from the WIC lawsuit.
When that agreement
was executed, Mr. Hovnanian was Speedus'. chief executive officer,
and he was paid in that capacity an annual salary of at least
$250,000.
He also was entitled to recelve relmbursement for
"reasonable business related expenses" incurred as Speedus' chief
executive officer.
B.
Mr. Hovnanian Assigns Bonus to Rovakat
On July 10, 2002, Mr. Hovnanian assigned his rights to the
bonus to Rovakat.
Mr: Hovnanian did so without receiving a
membership interest in Rovakat commensurate with the value of the
rights.
The assignment agreement stated that Mr. Hovnanian
assigned his rights to the bonus to Rovakat because Rovakat "has
members who can confidentially assist and adv se the pursuit of
the interest in the
[WIC lawsuit]."
Under the assignment
agreement, Mr. Hovnanian permitted Rovakat to assign the bonus to
-22subsidiaries or partnerships in which Rovakat held a majority
interest.
C.
Settlement of WIC Lawsuit
In late 2003 or early 2004, Speedus and WIC settled the WIC
lawsuit for $15 million.
Of that amount, Speedus was entitled to
receive $14,232,280 in net proceeds.
paying the $2,846,456 bonus
Speedus was amenable to
(20 percent x $14,232,280)
to Mr.
Hovnanian as he directed.
D.
Sunshower
Mr. Hovnanian, on behalf of Rovakat, formed Sunshower LLC
(Sunshower) as a Delaware limited liability company on February
4, 2004.
Sunshower is a disregarded entity for Federal income
tax purposes.
On February 20, 2004, Speedus transferred
$2,846,456 to Sunshower's bank account.
In correspondence with
Rovakat's accountant, Mr. Hovnanian designated these proceeds as
"consulting income"..
On February 27, 2004, Mr. Hovnanian caused $234,835 to be
transferred from Sunshower to Sterling Capital Management,
Ltd.
(Sterling), an entity controlled by Mr. Valdez.
Mr.
Hovnanian noted that this payment represented "fees paid to
* * *
[Mr. Valdez's]
entity".
Speedus did not reimburse Mr.
Hovnanian for the $234,835 paid to Mr. Valdez.
-23-
X.
Similar Transactions in Which Mr. Hovnanian Participated
Mr. Hovnanian participated in two additional transactions
involving purportedly high-basis francs and the reporting of
ordinary losses.
The first transaction involved the transfer of
francs with a fair market value of approximately $60,000 and a
purported basis of $11,698,313.
Hovbilt used the resulting
claimed loss to offset income that VSHG earned.
The second
transaction involved the transfer of francs with a fair market
value of approximately $59,920 and a,purported basis of
$11,847,499.
ISP used-the resulting claimed loss to offset
income that Mr. Hovnanian earned from unrelated sources.
XI.
Rovakat's Federal Partnership Tax Returns
A.
Preparer of the Returns
Harvey Weinreb (Mr. Weinreb) prepared Royakat's 2002, 2003,
and 2004 returns.
Mr. Hovnanian retained Mr. Weinreb for that
purpose at the suggestion of Mr. Valdez.
B.
2002 Return
Rovakat filed its 2002 return on October 23, 2003.
return reported no gross receipts and no income.
The 2002
Rovakat
reported that it was entitled to recognize $130,766 as a loss on
the francs transaction and that another $5,63Å,765 from the
transaction was a "suspended loss".
-24C.
2003 Return
Rovakat filed its 2003 return on April 7, 2005.
The 2003
return reported no gross receipts, no ordinary business income or
loss, and "other fees income" of $943,192.
Rovakat recognized
$890,485 of the suspended loss and reported that $4,335,154
remained "suspended".8
Rovakat also reported a charitable
contribution deduction of $6,224.
D.
2004 Return
Rovakat filed the 2004 return on February 13, 2006.
The
2004 return reported total income of $2,846,456, which apparently
was the bonus from Speedus.
Rovakat recognized $2,479,991 of the
suspended loss as a "prior year suspended loss" and reported that
$1,855,163 remained "suspended".
Rovakat also reported a
charitable contribution deduction of $60,350.
E.
Expenses Reported on 2003 and 2004 Returns
Rovakat reported the following expenses as deductions on its
2003 and 2004 returns:
Expense
2003
2004
Bank fee
Consulting
Filing fees
$332
22,000
546
-0$56,154
2,418
Finance charge
58
-0-
Office
861
-0-
Postage and delivery
14
-0-
8The amount of the remaining "suspended loss" appears to
have been reported incorrectly ($5,769,532 claimed loss $130,766 loss reported on the 2002 return - $890,485 loss
reported on the 2003 return = $4,748,281).
-25Professional fees
Legal and accounting fees
Miscellaneous
13,000
-0-0-
Auto
Computer
Meal and entertainment
Total
7,659
. 198
19,296
63,964
XII.
-0250,410
65
1,408
-0142,208
352,663
Tax Advice and Opinions
A.
KPMG Facsimile
On March 1, 2001,. KPMG sent to Mr. Van Zaveren a one-page
facsimile which stated that the "evolution of the purchase value"
of the class A stock as recorded in CNV's books was $184,955,349.
KPMG apparently did not attach the source documents for this
conclusion to its facsimile, and the memorandum does not define
"purchase value".
B.
Sidley Austin Opinion
Before ·July 31, 2001, Mr. Valdez hired Sidley, Austin,
Brown, and Wood LLP (Sidley Austin) to render an opinion (Sidley
Austin opinion) for Federal tax purposes on the bases of various
assets transferred in connection with Credico
of its class A stock.
Asia's redemption
In rendering its opini n, Sidley Austin
reportedly "relied on audited financial statements, accounting
records, third party appraisals, and certain dther factual,
financial, and numerical information that * * *
relevant."
[it] deemed
In addition, the Sidley Austin opinion noted that
Sidley Austin relied on at least 25 assumptions and 13 factual
representations.
-26-
The Sidley Austin opinion concluded that (1) the basis of
CNV's interest in the class A stock as of June 7, 2001, was
$207,093,834;
(2)
CNV's basis in the 1,718,116 francs and the
$303,375 received from the redemption of the class A stock
totaled $207,093,834;
of June 8,
2001,
(3)
the basis of CNV's interest in ICP as
was $207,093,834; and (4)
ICP's basis in the
1,718,116 francs which ICP received from CNV was $206,790,459.
Mr. Hovnanian first received a copy of the Sidley Austin opinion
in 2008.
C.
De Castro Opinions
Mr. Hovnanian, at the suggestion of Mr. Valdez, hired the
law firm of De Castro, West, Chodorow, Glickfield & Nass, Inc.
(De Castro), to render a tax opinion redarding the tax
consequences of the francs transactions (Rovakat opinion).
cost of the Rovakat opinion was $13,000.
The
Mr. Hovnanian relied on
Mr. Valdez to serve as an intermediary between Mr. Hovnanian and
De Castro.
The Rovakat opinion concluded that "there is a
greater than 50% likelihood that the tax treatment of the * * *
[francs transaction] would be upheld if challenged by the IRS."
In rendering that opinion, De Castro "assumed * * * the accuracy
of the factual matters" represented in the Sidley Austin opinion,
including ICP's basis in the francs, and did not review "any
transactional documents".
-27-
Mr. Hovnanian also procured an opinion from De Castro on the
tax consequences associated with ISP's investment in francs (ISP
opinion).
The Rovakat and ISP opinions are identical in most
material regards.
In total, De Castro wrote nine opinions for Mr. Valdez and
for individuals who invested in his transacti ns.
De Castro made
thousands of dollars on referrals from Mr. Valdez and at least $2
million from writing opinions on other similar transactions.
Menasche Nass, a partner of De Castro, invest d in a "distressed
debt transaction".
XIII.
FPAAs
On November 13,
2008, respondent issued to Rovakat a
separate notice of final partnership administrative adjustment
(FPAA) for each of Rovakat's 2002, 2003, and
004 taxable years.
The FPAAs determined that Rovakat had not established its basis
in the francs.
The FPAAs determined alternatively that the
francs transaction lacked economic substance.
XIV.
Trial of This Case
A.
Overview
A trial was held in New York, New York,
through December 17,
2010.
crom December 14
The evidence consists of the
uncontested pleadings, the trial testimony of 7 lay and 3 expert
witnesses, over 700 stipulated facts, and ove
600 exhibits.
-28-
B.
Expert Witnesses
1.
Dr. LaRue
Respondent offered, and the Court recognized, David W.
LaRue, Ph.D.
accounting,
(Dr. LaRue), as an expert in financial and tax
finance, and economics.
Dr. LaRue is a professor
emeritus at the University of Virginia, and he holds a Ph.D. in
.accounting, taxation, and economics and a master's degree in
accounting and taxation.
From 2000 through 2005 he was the
director of the graduate accounting program at the University of
Virginia.
He has over 30 years of teaching experience in the
fields of taxation, accounting, and finance.
He has testified
before this and other Courts on many previous occasions as an
expert in financial and tax accounting, finance, and/or
economics.
2.
Dr. Friedman
Respondent offered, and the Court recognized, Jack P.
Friedman, Ph.D.
(Dr. Friedman), as an expert on fair market value
as it.relates to real estate and business valuation.
Dr.
Friedman holds a Ph.D. in business administration with a focus in
real estate and urban affairs, a master's degree in business
administration, and a bachelor's degree in business
administration.
Dr. Friedman is published and holds the
following professional certifications:
Certified public
accountant (C.P.A.), member of the Appraisal Institute, senior
-29-
real estate analyst, senior member of the American Society of
Appraisers, and fellow of the Royal Institute of Chartered
Surveyors.
Dr. Friedman has taught real estate appraisal courses
for 19 years, and he has developed courses fo
various
professional associations.
3.
Mr. Bernatowicz
Mr. Hovnanian called Frank A. Bernatowicz (Mr. Bernatowicz)
as his expert, and the Court recognized Mr. Bernatowicz as an
expert in financial accounting.
Mr. Bernatowicz is a C.P.A. and
a member of the American Institute of C.P.A.s
the Illinois
C.P.A. Society, and the National Society of Professional
Engineers .
He holds a bachelor of science degree in electrical
engineering and a master' s degree in business administration in
finance.
He was a partner with Ernst and Whinney (now Ernst and
Young), and he directed the firm's Midwest Region Litigation
Services and Real Estate Advisory Services práctices .
He was a
managing principal of Alix & Associate's Chicago office, a
managing partner of the Midwest Region Intellectual Property
Practice of PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, and a managing partner of
BDO Seidman's Specialized Services practice.
C.
Special Procedure as to Expert Testimony
With the agreement of the parties, we di ected the experts
to testify concurrently.
To implement the concurrent testimony,
the Court sat at a large table in the middle of the courtroom
-30-
with all three experts, each of whom was under oath.
parties' counsel sat a few feet away.
The
The Court then engaged the
experts in a three-way conversation about ultimate issues of
fact.
Counsel could, but did not, object to any of the experts'
testimony.
When necessary, the Court directed the discussion and
focused on matters that the Court considered important to
resolve.
By engaging in this conversational testimony, the
experts were able and allowed to speak to each other, to ask
questions, and to probe weaknesses in any other expert's
testimony.
The discussion that followed was highly focused,
highly structured, and directed by the Court.'
OPINION
I.
Burden of Proof
Taxpayers generally bear the burden of proof in a
partnership-level proceeding such as this, see Rule 142(a), and
Mr. Hovnanian concedes that this general rule applies with
respect to the adjustments in the FPAAs.
Respondent bears the
burden of proving the allegation in his amendment to answer that
Rovakat earned unreported income of $650,000 in 2002.
See id.
'The U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts
has apparently used concurrent witness testimony in a number of
nonjury cases in recent years. See Wood, "Experts in the Tub",
21 Antitrust 95,
97
(2007).
-31-
II.
Rovakat's Claimed Loss
A.
Overview
We first decide whether Rovakat may recognize its claimed
losses of $130,766 for 2002,
for 2004.
$890,485 for 2003,
and $2,479,991
Mr. Hovnanian contends that these losses are allowed
on account of Rovakat's sale of the francs.
s Mr. Hovnanian
sees it, CNV was a partnership that had a $182,068,631 basis in
its class A stock (which Mr. Hovnanian considers to be a
partnership interest), and that basis was transferred to the
1,781,116 francs that CNV received upon the redemption of the
class A stock.
Then, Mr.. Hovnanian reasons, ÍCP received that
basis upon its receipt of the francs, and Rovakat received a pro
rata share of the basis upon Rovakat's receipt of 50,000 of the
francs.
Mr. Hovnanian concludes that Rovakat s sale of the
50,000 francs on December 27, 2002, triggered the basis, which in
turn resulted in an approximately $5 million
.oss allocable to
its partners (principally, Mr. Hovnanian).
Respondent argues that Rovakat may not recognize its claimed
losses because Mr..Hovnanian has failed to es ablish Rovakat's
basis in the francs.
In addition, respondent argues, Rovakat may
not recognize its claimed losses because the transfers of the
francs lacked economic substance in that the francs transaction
was effected solely to.generate an artificial loss.
-32-
We agree with respondent that Rovakat may not recognize its
claimed losses.
As we find, Mr. Valdez orchestrated a series of
transactions through which CNV, a corporation, sold its built-in
loss in its class A stock to either Mr. Valdez or to ICP, and the
transactions resulting in that sale were intended solely.to
disguise the sale as a tax loss that could ultimately shelter Mr.
Hovnanian's ordinary income from U.S. taxes.
B.
Basis in the Francs
Mr. Hovnanian bears the burden of establishing Rovakat's
basis in the francs, and that burden includes establishing ICP's
basis in the francs upon their transfer.
Mr. Hovnanian strives
to meet this burden by focusing on the general rules of
partnership taxation.
Under those rules, which apply even where
the contributor is a foreign entity, see Gutwirth v.
Commissioner,
40 T.C.
666,
678-679
(1963),
a partner's
contribution of property to a partnership in exchange for a
partnership interest is generally a tax-free transaction, see
sec. 721(a).
In addition, the partner's basis in the partnership
interest.received generally equals the partner's adjusted basis
in the contributed property plus, where applicable, the amount of
any money the partner also contributed.
Sec. 722.
In addition,
the partnership's basis in the contributed property generally is
a substitute basis that equals the partner's adjusted basis in
that property at the time of contribution.
Sec. 723.
-33-
These general rules do not apply, however, where, as here,
the facts establish that one or more of the r levant transactions
is not in substance a contribution to a partnership as it
purports to be.
The substance of the transactions at hand, as we
find on the basis of the credible evidence in the record, is that
Mr. Valdez, in his individual capacity or on behalf of ICP,
bought the class A stock from CNV, a corporation, at an amount
drastically in excess of the stock's fair market value, and he
did so with an understanding that CNV would cooperate in
structuring the sale to appear to be a nontaxable transfer.
For
obvious reasons, the parties to the agreement could not
memorialize in the transaction documents the true terms of the
transaction as a sale because a sale would negate any claims of a
substitute basis in the francs under the partdership rules
applicable to contributions of property.
Whe
viewed in total,
however, the record leads us to conclude that either Mr. Valdez
engaged in an actual purchase of the class A
tock or ICP engaged
in a disguised purchase of the class A stock, which in either
case sets the basis in the francs at their cost.
See sec. 1012;
see also sec. 1.707-3(a) (2), Income Tax Regs.
To be sure, Mr. Valdez structured the transactions using
entities he controlled, aiming to manipulate the rules applicable
to partnership taxation so that he could sell to his U.S.
"investors" foreign built-in losses that they could personally
-34-
apply as ordinary losses.
stock to be "redeemed".
He provided the money for the class A
He converted the stock to francs so he
could use a currency which was CNV's nonfunctional currency.
He
caused CNV to transfer the francs to ICP, an entity he controlled
and which he claimed was a partnership, so he could claim a
substitute basis in the francs.
The fact that Mr. Valdez wanted
directly or indirectly to purchase the class A stock with its
built-in loss re_tained for use by Mr. Hovnanian cannot reasonably
be denied.
Nor has Mr. Hovnanian established (as he asserts)
that ICP
was a partnership entitled to a substitute basis in the francs.
A partnership exists for Federal income tax purposes only when
"persons join together their money, goods, labor, or skill for
the purpose of carrying on a trade, profession, or business and
when there is community of interest in the profits and losses."
Commissioner v. Tower,
327 U.S.
280,
286
(1946).
Facts relevant
to this determination include the conduct of the parties,
particularly their due diligence (or lack thereof) and
negotiations (or lack thereof), the relationship of the parties,
and the control of income and the purposes for which it is used.
See Commissioner v. Culbertson,
337 U.S.
733,
742
(1949).
The
absence of a nontax business purpose is fatal to the validity of
a partnership.
F.3d 505,
See ASA Investerings Pship, v. Commissioner, 201
512-513
(D.C. Cir. 2000), affg. T.C. Memo. 1998-305.
-35-
The record does not suggest, and we do not find, that ICP's
listed partners intended to join together to carry on a trade or
business.
The record does not establish the intent of each of
ICP's "partners", but we find as to Mr. Valde 576
and CNV, ICP's
primary "partners", that they had their own agendas.
CNV was in
financial trouble, and it and Immobiliere desired to obtain
liquidity primarily by selling alleged tax bauis in what was
otherwise a worthless shell entity, Credicom Asia.
CNV's and
Immobiliere's due diligence was focused on how many Jacques Vabre
transactions could be put together with Mr. V ldez and how fast
payment could be made.
CNV and Immobiliere expected to be paid
approximately $4 million for their part, far in excess of the
approximately $1.3 million actually exchanged for the redemption
of the class A stock.
Because Mr. Hovnanian has failed to prove
that ICP was a partnership for Federal income tax purposes (and
the record establishes that it was not), ICP had a cost basis in
thévfrancs, see sec. 1012, rather than the su stitute basis that
Rovakat reported."
"Nor does the record establish, as Mr. Hovnanian asserts,
that Credicom Asia was a partnership.
Credic m Asia had two
classes of common stock, and its ownership wa represented by
"shares" owned by "shareholders". The record also lacks a
partnership agreement entered into between th purported partners
of Credicom Asia. While the Sidley Austin op nion states that
Credicom Asia amended its articles to reflect the characteristics
of a partnership on Dec. 2, 1996, that statement is unsupported
by the record.
In addition to our discussion set forth above in
this footnote, Credicom Asia did not file a Fo m 1065 until 2001,
(continued...)
-36-
C.
Economic Substance
1.
Guiding Legal Principles
Mr. Hovnanian stated at trial that an appeal in this case
would lie in the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, and
respondent agreed.
247-248
In ACM Pship. v. Commissioner, 157 F.3d 231,
(3d Cir. 1998), affg. in part and revg. in part on an
issue not relevant here T.C. Memo. 1997-115, the Court of Appeals
for·the Third Circuit articulated a two-factor inquiry to decide
whether a transaction or series of transactions had sufficient
economic substance to be respected for Federal tax purposes."
The first factor requires an objective inquiry as to whether the
transaction had practical economic effect apart from ·tax savings.
The second factor requires a subjective inquiry into whether the
taxpayer participated in the transaction for a valid nontax
business purpose.
See id.
These factors are interrelated and
1°(...continued)
and we do not find that any of Credicom Asia's shareholders as of
the time of the stated conversion reported the deemed liquidation
and distribution that would have occurred on such a conversion.
See sec. 301.7701-3(g) (1) (ii), Proced.
Rev. Rul. 63-107, 1963-1 C.B. 71.
& Admin.
Regs.; see also
"Congress codified the economic substance doctrine mostly
as articulated by the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in
ACM Pship. v. Commissioner,
157 F.3d 231,
247-248
(3d Cir.
1998),
affg. in part and revg. in part on an issue not relevant here
T.C. Memo. 1997-115.
See sec. 7701(o), as added to the Code by
the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L.
111-152,
sec.
1409,
124 Stat.
1067; see also H. Rept. 111-443
(I), at 291-299 (2010) (discussing the reasons for codification
of the economic substance doctrine). This codified doctrine does
not apply to this case pursuant to its effective date.
-37-
are not simply "discrete prongs of a 'rigid two-step analysis.'"
Id. at 247
(quoting Casebeer v. Commissioner,
909 F. 2d 1360,
1363
(9th Cir. 1990), affg. Sturm v. Commissioner,. T.C..Memo. 1987-
625).
In applying these factors, all stages of the transaction
must be scrutinized to determine whether the taxpayer' s
beneficial interest was affected in a meaningful nontax way.
Knetsch v. United States,
2.
364 U.S.
361,
366
( 960).
Objective Inquiry
a.
Overview
We first examine whether the francs tran action had
practical economic effect other than the creation of a tax loss.
We conclude it did not .
When viewed according to their objective
economic effect, Credicom Asia's redemption of the class A stock
from CNV partially for francs, CNV' s transfer of the francs to
ICP, ICP's transfer of a portion of the francs to Rovakat, CNV's
sale of 90 percent of its interest in Rovakat to Mr. Hovnanian,
and Rovakat's sale of the francs were, economically speaking,
negligible events.
The francs transaction as a whole, when
viewed in the light of its individual steps, had no economic
significance other than to serve as a means fo
Mr. Hovnanian's
attempt to purchase and use CNV's built-in loss.
The following
factors further support our conclusion that the objective
economic effect of the francs transaction is not consistent with
Rovakat' s reporting of that transaction.
-38-
b.
Lack of Pretax Profit Potential
In general, a transaction has economic substance and will be
respected for Federal tax purposes where the transaction offers a
reasonable opportunity for profit independent of tax savings.
Gefen v.
Commissioner,
87 T.C.
1471,
1490
(1986).
A reasonable
opportunity for profit will ordinarily be found only if there was
a legitimate expectation that the nontax benefits would be at
least commensurate with the associated transaction costs.
ACM
Pship. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-115; see also Salina
Pship. L.P. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2000-352.
Deliberately
incurring expenses in excess of appreciable gain is "the
antithesis of profit-motivated behavior".
861 F.2d 494, 498
87 T.C.
1087
(7th Cir.
1988),
Yosha v. Commissioner,
affg. Glass v. Commissioner,
(1986).
The francs transaction did not present Rovakat with a
reasonable opportunity for profit independent of tax savings.
Rovakat incurred at least $395,153 in transaction costs related
to the francs transaction.
These costs included at least
$382,153 in fees paid to Mr. Valdez and $13,000 paid to De Castro
for the Rovakat opinion."
The sole economic gain that Rovakat
could realize on the francs transaction was attributable to
exchange rate fluctuations between the franc and the U.S. dollar.
"The $382,153 consists of the $56,875 and $90,443 that
Rovakat paid in 2002 and 2003, respectively, and the $234,835
that Sunshower paid to Mr. Valdez.
-39Dr. LaRue reviewed the franc to U.S. do lar exchange rates
from January 1, 1990, to December 30, 2006.
During that time,
the relationship between the franc and the U.S. dollar was
relatively stable, and the buy-side market for francs was highly
liquid with minimal transaction costs.
Dr. LaRue concluded that
the franc to U.S. dollar exchange rates were not sufficient to
yield a positive pretax return and that the v lue of the U.S.
dollar against a franc would have had to increase by more than
157 percent before Mr. Hovnanian realized his first nominal
dollar of pretax profit."
Dr. LaRue concluded that even if the
franc became worthless, Mr. Hovnanian would have experienced a
positive aftertax return in excess of 9,380 percent,
notwithstanding the corresponding loss of his initial investment
in francs.
When Credicom Asia redeemed its class A stock, the
claimed tax basis in the francs ultimately transferred to ICP was
over 200 times greater than their fair market value.
If the
value of the francs doubled during Mr. Hovnani n' s holding
period, the potential Federal income tax savings, assuming a tax
rate of 39.1 percent, would exceed the pretax economic gain by
approximately 80 times .
We credit Dr. LaRue's testimony and conclude that a rational
investor would have recognized the nonexistencè of a realistic
A nominal dollar is the value of a dolla in the future
that is not discounted to take into account the time-value-ofmoney, risk, or other similar costs of capital.
-40-
probability that the francs which Rovakat held would have
sufficiently appreciated to produce a pretax profit.
This lack
of pretax profit potential weighs heavily against a finding that
the francs transaction was economically significant."
Gilman v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1989-684
Accord
(sale-leaseback
transaction lacked economic substance where, when the transaction
.
was - ente.red into, a .prudent _investor would have concluded that
there was no chance to earn a nontax profit in excess of
transaction costs),
c.
affd.
933 F.2d 143
(2d Cir.
1991).
Actual Economic Effect
Tax losses which fail to "correspond to any actual economic
losses, do not constitute the type of bona fide losses that are
deductible" for Federal tax purposes.
Commissioner, 157 F.3d at 252
ACM Pship. v.
(internal citations omitted).
The
economics of the francs transaction do not support Rovakat's
claim to the losses reported on its 2002 through 2004 returns.
Upon the sale of the francs, Rovakat did not realize a $5,769,532
"Mr. Hovnanian presented no expert testimony on the pretax
profit potential associated with Rovakat's investment in the
francs transaction.
Rather, he contends that the fees which
Rovakat paid to Mr. Valdez were "collection fees" unrelated to
the structuring of the francs transaction.
We find to the
contrary. Even if they were collection fees, however, Rovakat
still could not have reasonably expected a pretax profit on the
francs transaction.
The $13,000 fee paid to De Castro for the
Rovakat opinion alone consumed any profit to be realized on the
francs transaction.
-41economic loss; it realized a $1,283 economic gain."
While
realization of an economic gain may suggest that a transaction
has economic substance, the prospect of a nominal, incidental
pretax profit does not necessarily establish that a transaction
was designed to serve a nontax profit motive.
Sheldon v. Commissioner,
94 T..C.
738,
768
Id. at 258;
(1990).
to the francs transaction, any profitability
Moreover,
as
n the transaction
was negated by the costs of entering into the transaction."
d.
Francs Paid in Redemption
We are similarly not.persuaded that Credicom Asia's partial
redemption of its class A stock with francs had practical
economic effect apart from tax savings.
The f nctional currency
of Credicom Asia was the U.S. dollar, and the
of CNV was the Belgian franc.
unctional currency
·One might·reasonably expect that
the redemption would have been effect-ed with the functional
currency of one of the parties to the redemption and not the
nonfunctional franc.
While the form of consideration might, at
first blush, appear to be insignificant, the tax benefit to
Rovakat's $1,283 economic gain equals $3 ,468 (amount
Rovakat realized when it sold the francs) minus $34,185 (fair
market value of francs when Rovakat received t em).
"Equally compelling is our finding that the event giving
rise to Rovakat's claimed high basis in the francs was CNV's
failed investment in Credicom Asia, as oppose.d to an economic
outlay made by Rovakat.
Dr. Friedman opined that the class A
stock was worthless at and before the time of its redemption.
consider that opinion to be reasonable and reliable, and we
accept it.
We
-42-
Rovakat's members by structuring the transaction with francs was
potentially tremendous.
Gains or losses attributable to a section 988 transaction
are generally treated as ordinary income or ordinary losses.
Sec. 988(a) (1).
A disposition of property is usually considered
to be a section 988 transaction where the property is a
nonfunctional currency; i.e., a currency other than (1) the U.S.
dollar or (2) in certain cases, the currency of the economic
environment in which a significant part of an activity is
conducted and which is used in the books and records of that
activity.
See sec. 1.988-1, Income Tax Regs.; see also secs.
985(b) (1),
989(a).
If, as Mr. Hovnanian asserts, Rovakat acquired the francs as
part of an investment activity entered into for the production of
income, the francs would be a nonfunctional currency to Rovakat,
and Rovakat's disposition of the francs would result in ordinary
income or ordinary loss.
See sec. 988(a) (1),
(c) (1).
If,
however, Credicom Asia had redeemed its class A stock in U.S. dollars and the contributions from CNV to ICP to Rovakat were
denominated in U.S. dollars, any gain or loss on Rovakat's
disposition of the U.S. dollars would be taxed as a capital gain
or a capital loss.
212, 213
See Ark. Best Corp. v. Commissioner, 485 U.S.
(1988); see also sec. 1221(a).
Thus, by using francs in
partial satisfaction of the redemption, Mr. Valdez aimed to
-43-
convert capital losses into ordinary losses that could offset
ordinary income such as salaries and wages .
For a high-income
taxpayer such as Mr. Hovnanian expecting to receive a significant
amount of ordinary income for his role in the WIC lawsuit, these
tax savings were substantial.
Mr. Hovnanian has offered no valid
business reason why Credicom Asia would partially redeem its
class A stock with francs but for the prospect of converting the
character of the purported resulting loss from capital to
ordinary.
e.
Rovakat's Sale of the Francs
Nor do we find that there was a valid business reason for
Rovakat's sale of the francs just 1 day after Mr. Hovnanian
purchased 90 percent of ICP's interest in Rovakat.
Mr. Hovnanian
asserts that the sale of the francs was necessary for Rovakat to
generate working capital.
We are not persuad d.
27, 2002, Rovakat had $100, 000 in its checkinc
As of December
account and had
invoiced Limited for $593,125 from "consultin " services.
Mr.
Hovnanian fails to adequately explain why its proffered need for
Rovakat to have working capital was not met by these funds.
Rovakat' s decision to exit the francs transaction literally
overnight is especially telling because Rovakat' s sale of the
francs served as the triggering mechanism by which Mr. Hovnanian
would purportedly be able to personally claim
is portion of that
-44-
loss for Federal income tax purposes.
See Santa Monica Pictures,
LLC v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2005-104.
f.
Fees Paid to the Immobiliere Group
Mr. Valdez's payment of over $4 million in fees to the
Immobiliere group in exchange for CNV's participation in the
francs transaction also suggests that the francs transaction
lacked economic substance.
These fees were not standard
financing fees but were based upon the amount of tax basis which
ICP expected to receive.
Mr. Hovnanian has not explained why a
fee due to a foreign company would depend upon the basis of
property for Federal tax purposes.
The payment of fees
contingent upon the tax basis which could be realized for Federal
tax purposes suggests that tax-motivated considerations were the
principal reason for the francs transaction.
See Kerman v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2011-54.
g.
Summary of Objective Economic Effect
We conclude that the first factor of the economic substance
inquiry weighs heavily against a finding that the francs
transaction was "compelled or encouraged by business or
regulatory realities,
* * * imbued with tax-independent
considerations, and * * * not shaped solely by tax-avoidance
features".
Frank Lyon Co. v. United States,
435 U.S. 561,
583-
584 (1978).
Rovakat effectively spent over $382,000 to produce
an economic gain of less than $1,300 and a reportable tax loss in
-45-
excess of $5 million.
Rovakat's reporting of the losses reflects
neither the economic realities of the gain which Rovakat
realized, nor that the actual economic loss was borne by CNV.
The use of francs to partially redeem Credicom Asia's shares
served the seemingly limited purpose of converting the character
of the loss from capital to ordinary.
Rovakat joined ICP so as
to effect a disposition of the francs and have those losses
allocated to Mr. Hovnanian.
3.
Subjective Business Purpose
a.
Overview
The second factor of the economic substance inquiry requires
that we examine the taxpayer's subjective nontax reasons for
entering into a transaction and whether the taxpayer held a
legitimate profit motive for doing so.
v.
Commissioner,
752 F.2d 89,
and revg. in part 81 T.C..184
92
Rice's Toyota World, Inc.
(4th Cir.
(1983).
1985)), affg.
in part
Whether a transaction is
conducted with a subjective business purpose depends on a number
of subfactors, including whether:
(1) The ta payer had a valid
nontax business purpose for entering into the transaction, see
Casebeer v. Commissioner,
909 F.2d at 1363-1364;
(2)
the
transaction was negotiated and entered into an arm's length,
Helba v.
Commissioner,
87 T.C.
983,
1004-1007
without published opinion 860 F.2d 1075
(1986),
see
affd.
(3d Cir. 1988);
(3)
taxpayer performed due diligence regarding the commercial
the
-46viability and market risks of the transaction,
Commissioner,
386 (1987);
868 F.2d 851,
(4)
854
(6th Cir.
see Rose v.
1989), affg.
88 T.C.
in the case of a partnership, the partners
intended to join together for the present conduct of an
undertaking or enterprise, see Culbertson v. Commissioner, 337.
U.S. at 742; and (5) the transaction was marketed as a tax
shelter in which the purported tax benefit significantly exceeded
the taxpayer's actual investment,
T.C. Memo. 1996-261.
see Booker v. Commissioner,
These subfactors are not·exclusive, and no
one subfactor is dispositive.
We analyze the subfactors
seriatim.
b.
Rovakat's Business Purpose
Mr. Hovnanian has failed to establish that the francs
transaction served any legitimate business purpose, and we
conclude that none existed.
He asserts that the contribution of
francs to Rovakat and Rovakat's subsequent sale of the francs
were intended to serve as seed money to fund Rovakat's
development of a competitor to the Nielsen television rating
service (Nielsen).
We are unpersuaded.
Early in 2001, Mr. Hovnanian introduced Dish and EchoStar
(collectively, EchoStar) to the concept of establishing EchoStar
as a competitor to Nielsen.
EchoStar committed support of up to
$15 million to a project to carry out this concept, though the
record is not clear whether Mr. Hovnanian or Rovakat actually
-47received these funds.
Mr. Hovnanian testified that he engaged
Mr. Valdez to form Rovakat as part of the project because, among
other things, Mr. Valdez had access to investors with the capital
to fund such a venture.
The Nielsen-competi or project
ultimately failed.
Mr. Hovnanian's testimony misses the point.
We focus on the
business purpose of the francs transaction and not any business
venture which Mr. Hovnanian may have pursued before Rovakat's
formation.
The record does not establish'that Rovakat had an
ongoing business after the Nielsen-competitor project failed, nor
when that project failed..
Mr. Hovnanian could have called
witnesses from EchoStar to testify on this point, but he declined
to do so."
Mr. Hovnanian also asserts that the francs transaction
enabled him to establish and cultivate ties with Mr. Valdez and
with the.Belgian entities, apart from any possible tax
considerations.
We are not persuaded.
The C edicom Asia
redemption, CNV's contribution of the francs to ICP, and the
payment of fees from ICP to Immobiliere occurred between Mr.
At trial, Mr. Hovnanian attempted to in roduce, and the
Court declined to admit, an affidavit from an EchoStar executive
in lieu of that executive's direct testimony. We found the
affidavit to be inadmissible hearsay not excepted by Fed. R.
Evid. 807. See Saavedra v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1988-587
(declining to admit an affidavit where the ta payer did not
demonstrate "reasonable efforts to obtain the witness' personal
testimony"); see also Rule 143(b).
-48Valdez and members of the Immobiliere group.
Any goodwill which
may have been gained from these transactions was to the benefit
of Mr. Valdez and not Mr. Hovnanian,
c.
Lack of Arm's-Length Dealing
In determining whether a transaction possesses objective
indicia of economic substance, we examine whether the transaction
was conducted at arm's length.
1005.
Helba v. Commissioner, supra at
Where a transaction occurs between related parties, the
transaction is carefully scrutinized "'because the control
element suggests the opportunity to contrive a fictional * * *
[transaction].'"
Geftman v. Commissioner, 154 F.3d 61, 68
(quoting United States v. Uneco,
Inc.,
(3d
Cir.
1998)
532 F.2d 1204,
1207
(8th Cir. 1976)), revg. in part and vacating in part T.C.
Memo. 1996-447; see also Schering-Plough Corp. v. United States,
651 F. Supp. 2d 219,
Co. v. United States,
244
(D.N.J.
2009),
affd.
F.3d
(3d Cir.,
sub nom. Merck &
June 20,
2011).
We find a lack of arm's-length dealing with respect to the
francs transaction.
Mr. Valdez controlled each aspect of that
transaction up until the sale of ICP's interest in Rovakat to Mr.
Hovnanian.
By June 7, 2001, Mr. Valdez was Credicom Asia's
president, and he caused the redemption of the class A shares
with francs and with U.S. dollars.
He controlled the bank
accounts of Credicom Asia and of ICP.
He effected the transfer
of funds between Credicom Asia, CNV, and ICP
He controlled ICP,
and he managed LVCM.
In addition, Mr. Valdez continued to influence the outcome
of the francs transaction even after ICP sold 90 percent of its
interest in Rovakat to Mr. Hovnanian.
Mr. Våldez suggested that
Mr. Hovnanian engage Mr. Weinreb to prepare Rovakat's 2002
through 2004 returns.
Mr. Valdez recommended that Mr. Hovnanian
engage De Castro to provide tax advice regarding the francs
transaction.
Rovakat's procurement of tax advice was more
reflective of a symbiotic relationship between De Castro and Mr.
Valdez rather than of independent counseling on the merits of the
francs transaction.
d.
Lack of Due Diligence
Mr. Hovnanian presented no documentary evidence to suggest
that he undertook a critical nontax economic analysis of the
risks associated with investing in francs."
The De Castro
opinion focuses only on the tax effect of the francs transaction
without regard to the commercial viability or market risk
associated with that transaction.
Such a lacx of due diligence
on the part of Mr. Hovnanian suggests that he was not concerned
with the economic realities of the francs transaction or with
"The absence of such evidence creates a presumption that no
such documents existed or that they were not favorable to Mr.
Hovnanian's position.
See Wichita Terminal Elevator Co. v.
Commissioner,
Cir. 1947).
6 T.C.
1158, 1165
(1946), affd. 162 F.2d 513
(10th
-50-
elements of risk.
Cf. Salina Pship. L.P. v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 2000-352 (finding indicia of economic substance where a
partnership held two meetings with the investment banker who
structured a transaction in which the partnership invested and
was presented with several analyses of the financial risks and
rewards associated with such an investment).
Mr. Hovnanian's
lack of concern for the underlying economics of the francs
transaction is not consistent with a genuine nontax profit
motive.
e.
Lack of Mutuality of Profit Objective
We also examine the surrounding facts and circumstances to
determine whether any of the relevant persons,
in good faith,
intended to join together for the present conduct of an
undertaking or enterprise.
459 F.3d 220,
231-232
TFID III-E, Inc. v. United States,
(2d Cir. 2006); see also Commissioner v.
Culbertson, 337 U.S. at 742.
We find that the francs transaction
lacks mutuality of profit objective.
CNV was motivated to enter into the francs transaction to
realize whatever fees it could from its failed investment fua
Credicom Asia.
The payment of these fees allowed CNV to pay its
arrears and to continue its operations long enough to allow for
the sale of CNV's remaining asset, an interest in Golf de
Ramatuelle.
While these goals might be valid business reasons
for CNV's redemption of its class A stock, they bear no apparent
-51relation to CNV's, ICP's, or Rovakat's business purpose for
entering into the francs transaction.
The fees due to CNV were
contingent on the tax basis in the francs for Federal tax
purposes.
Such a framework suggests that IC
was motivated by
CNV's tax attributes and not by an independent economic
significance of the francs.
Mutuality of profit objective also is lacking between ICP
and Rovakat.
ICP's transfer of 50,000 francs añd ISP's transfer
of $100,000 served the seemingly limited purpose of enabling ICP
to become a temporary partner of Rovakat and to transfer the
purportedly high-basis francs to Rovakat to trigger the intended
tax loss.
Mr. Hovnanian did not desire to in est in francs, and
those francs were sold just 1 day after Mr. Hovnanian acquired
ICP's 90-percent interest in Rovakat.
The oc urrence of these
steps within such a short time suggests that the disposition of
the francs was predetermined.
f.
Other Distressed Asset Transactions
Mr. Hovnanian, acting in a capacity as other than Rovakat's
tax matters partner, invested in at least two.other transactions
similar to the francs transaction.
The resulting claimed losses
from those transactions were used to offset unrelated income of
Mr. Hovnanian and an entity that he and his family owned.
Mr.
Hovnanian's investment in those similar transactions supports a
finding that the francs transaction lacked economic substance.
-52-
g.
Other Considerations
Mr. Hovnanian asserts that because Rovakat was not sure it
would earn income, any loss from the francs transaction was not
certain to be used.
We disagree.
Mr. Hovnanian purchased ICP's
interest in Rovakat during the last week of 2002, by which time
he most likely knew whether some or all of the loss could be used
for that year.
In addition, we doubt that Mr. Hovnanian would
have paid $13,000 to De Castro for its tax opinion if he did not
expect that the loss could be used.
Further, notwithstanding
whether Rovakat realized any income, the loss passed through to
Mr. Hovnanian who in turn was entitled to carry forward and to
apply any unapplied portion of the loss against his future income
(e.g., his salary and any bonus he received as to the WIC
lawsuit)."
h.
Summary of Subjective Business Purpose
We conclude that Rovakat's reasons for entering into the
francs transaction do not demonstrate a legitimate profit motive.
The lack of arm's-length dealing at almost every stage of the
francs transaction, coupled with the lack of mutuality of profit
"Mr. Hovnanian fails to explain why Rovakat did not pass
through the entire loss in 2002, the year in which it was
reportedly incurred.
Instead, Rovakat suspended some of the loss
at the partnership level and in later years recognized at the
partnership level portions of the suspended loss as needed to
offset its partners' income.
Respondent asserts, and we agree,
that such a suspension of the loss was improper.
We consider
Rovakat's improper reporting of its claimed loss as another
attempt to hide the illegitimacy of the francs transaction.
-53-
objective by all parties, suggests that a nontax profit was a
primary driver for entering into the francs transaction.
Mr.
Hovnanian's investment in two similar transac ions also suggests
that Rovakat was motivated mostly by tax considerations when
entering into the francs transaction.
On balance, we conclude
that the economic reality of the francs trans ction is not
consistent with a bona fide profit objective.
4.
Summary of Economic Substance
We conclude that the francs transaction lacked economic
substance.
Because a transaction that lacks economic substance
is not recognized for Federal tax purposes, and "'cannot be the
basis for a deductible loss'",
157 F.3d at 247
(3d Cir.
see ACM Pship. v. Commissioner,
(quoting Lerman v. Commissioner,
1991), affg.
Fox v.
939 F.2d 44,
Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
45
1988-570),
we hold that Rovakat is not entitled to the losses claimed on its
2002 through 2004 returns.
"We are not unmindful that Rovakat realized an economic
gain of $1,283 from the francs transaction.
Because respondent
does not contend that this gain is taxable to Rovakat or to Mr.
Hovnanian, we hold it is not.
Cf. Lerman v. Õommissioner, 939
F.2d 44, 45 (3d Cir. 1991) ("If a transaction is devoid of
economic substance * * * it simply is not recágnized for federal
taxation purposes, for better or for worse"), affg. Fox v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1988-570.
-54-
III.
Omitted Income
A.
Overview
Respondent determined that Rovakat's 2003 gross income
includes $90,443 which was paid to Limited through WASI on March
24, 2003.
In addition, respondent amended his answer to assert.
that Rovakat omitted $650,000 in income from its 2002 gross
income.
As to the latter, respondent asserts that Rovakat failed
to recognize the (1) $593,125 received from Limited on December
31, 2002, and (2)
$56,875 paid to Limited, through WASI, on or
about November 22, 2002.
We agree with respondent that Rovakat
omitted income for 2002 but only to the extent of the $593,125.
Gross income includes "all income from whatever source
derived,
including (but not limited to)
derived from business".
Sec. 61(a) (2).
* * * gross income
Under section 451(a),
items of gross income generally must be included in the gross
income of a cash method taxpayer in the taxable year in which the
taxpayer actually or constructively received that income.
sec. 1.451-1(a), Income Tax Regs.
See
Income not actually reduced to
a taxpayer's possession is constructively received by a taxpayer
in the year during which the income is credited to an account,
set apart, or otherwise made available so that the taxpayer may
draw upon it at any time.
See sec. 1.451-2(a),
Income Tax Regs.
Income is not constructively received if the taxpayer's control
-55-
of its receipt is subject to substantial limitations or to
restrictions.
B.
See id.
Payments From Limited
Limited deposited $593,125 in Rovakat's bank account on
December 31, 2002.
Mr. Hovnanian concedes that Rovakat was
required to recognize the $593,125 as income but maintains. that
the amount was a "refundable prepaid deposit" includable in
Rovakat's 2003 gross income.
·The $593,125 is not includable in
Rovakat's 2002 income if it is a deposit.
Indianapolis Power & Light Co.,
493 U.S.
S e Commissioner v.
203
213
(1990).
The
$593,125 is includable in Rovakat's 2002 income if it is an
advance.
See Schlude v. Commissioner, 372 U.S. 128, 134
(1963).
Respondent seeks to prevail on this issue by relying on the
record as a whole, the 2002 return, and the invoices between
Rovakat, Limited, and WASI.
On the basis of these documents, we
are satisfied that respondent has met his burden of proof.
Limited deposited the $593,125 payment into Rovakat's bank
account during 2002.
Neither of the two invoices submitted by
Rovakat to Limited in connection with the $593,125 payment states
that the payment was subject to a contingencý.
Nor does the
record contain any document that establishes the existence of a
contingency that would negate inclusion of the payment in 2002
under sections 61 and 451.
See Commissioner v. Indianapolis
Power & Light Co., supra at 211 ("Whether these payments
-56-
constitute income when received * * * depends upon the parties'
rights and obligations at the time the payments are made.").
Moreover, Rovakat reported as income on its 2003 return a
$943,192 payment received from Limited for "consulting" services
on March 25, 2003.
Rovakat did not report any portion of the
$593,125 payment as income on its 2003 return even though Mr.
Hovnanian asserts that the income was taxable to Rovakat in that
year.
Nor did Rovakat file an amended 2003 return to include
that payment in its gross income for that year.
1(a), Income Tax Regs.
See sec. 1.451-
("If a taxpayer ascertains that an item
should have been included in gross income in a prior taxable
year, he should, if within the period of limitation, file an
amended return and pay any additional tax due.").
We hold that
Rovakat was required to report the $593,125 payment received from
Limited in 2002.
C.
Payments to WASI
Respondent also determined that Rovakat was required to
report as income (1) $56,875 aof the $650,000 which Limited
received from WASI on November 22, 2002, and (2) $90,443 of the
$1,033,635 which Limited received from WASI on March 24, 2003.
According to respondent, these amounts represent "implicit
deductions" claimed by Rovakat.
We disagree.
The definition of gross lncome encompasses all undeniable
accessions to wealth, clearly realized, and over which a taxpayer
-57has complete dominion and control.
Glass Co.,
348 U.S. 426,
431
Commissicner v. Glenshaw
(1955).
While broad,
the definition
of gross income does not contemplate income that does not result
in a realizable economic benefit to the taxp yer.
v. Goldberg,
U.S.
670
330 F.2d 30,
(1933),
39
United States
(1964)· (citing Burnet v. Wells,
and Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U.S.
376
289
(1930)).
Rovakat realized no apparent economic benefit from the fees of
$56,875 and $90,443.
Respondent's contentiod that Mr. Hovnanian
seeks an implicit deduction from these fees is without merit
because Rovakat did not report these fees as deductions on its
2002, 2003, or 2004 returns.
We hold that Ro,vakat need not
recognize as income the fees of $56,875 and $90,443.
IV.
Effect of Omitted Income on 2002 Period of Limitations
Mr. Hovnanian asserts that the period of limitations as to
Rovakat's 2002 taxable year is closed.
Respondent counters that
the period remains open because Rovakat omitted from its 2002
return an amount in excess of 25 percent of the amount of gross
income required to be stated on that return.
We agree with
respondent.
The Commissioner generally must assess tax within 3 years
after a return is filed.
See sec. 6501(a).
Section 6501(e) (1)
provides an exception, however, where the taxpayer fails to
report gross income in excess of 25 percent of the amount of
gross income stated on its return.
Section 6229 sets forth
-58-
special rules to extend the period of limitations described by
section 6501 with respect to partnership items or affected items.
Section 6229(a) generally provides that the period for assessing
against a person any income tax attributable to a partnership
item or to an affected item shall not expire before the date that
is 3 years after the later of the date that the partnership
return is filed or the last day for filing the return.
Section
6229(c) (2) provides that if any partnership omits from gross
income an amount properly includable therein that is in excess of
25 percent of the amount of.gross income stated on its return,
the 3-year period described in section 6229(a)
years.
is extended to 6
Highwood Partners v. Commissioner, 133 T.C. 1, 10 (2009).
Mr. Hovnanian filed Rovakat's 2002 return on October 23,
2003, and the return reported no gross income.
The $593,125
omitted from Rovakat's 2002 return was in excess of 25 percent of
the amount of gross income stated on the return.
Respondent
issued Mr. Hovnanian the FPAA for 2002 on November 13, 2008,
within the 6-year period for assessment provided by sections
6229(c) (2) and 6501(e) (1) (A).
Accordingly, respondent timely
issued the FPAA for 2002, and the adjustments set forth in that
FPAA are not barred by any limitations period.
V.
Liability for Self-Employment Tax
Respondent determined that the $593,125 and $943,192 paid to
Rovakat in 2002 and 2003, respectively, were self-employment
-59-
income."
Section 1401 imposes a tax on self employment income.
Sec.
1401(a)
and (b);
1391
(10th Cir.
Schelble v. Commissioner,
1997),
affg. T.C. Memo.
130 F.3d 1388,
1996 269.
Self-
employment income includes an individual's distributive share of
income from a partnership.
Sec. 1402(a); sec. 1.1402(a)-2(d),
(f), Income Tax Regs.
Rovakat received $593,125 and $943,192 in 2002 and 2003,
respectively.
Limited paid these amounts through WASI as fees.
Neither the 2002 nor the 2003 return reported these amounts as
self-employment income.
as such.
They were and should have been reported
See sec. 1402(a).
"The FPAA for 2003 determined that Rovakat's selfemployment income was $1,536,317, which appa ently is the sum of
the $593,125 and $943,192 Rovakat received in 2002 and 2003,
respectively.
On brief, respondent,asserts that Rovakat's self-
employment income was $650,000 and $1,033,635 for 2002 and 2003,
respectively. We attribute the increased amounts to respondent's
determination that Rovakat's gross income includes the $56,875
and the $90,443. We have held supra that those amounts are not
includable in Rovakat's income.
-60-
VI.
Entitlement to Deductions
Respondent determined that Rovakat was not entitled to
deduct "other expenses" of $63,964 and $352,663 for 2003 and
2004, respectively."
We agree.
Deductions are strictly a matter of legislative grace, and a
taxpayer bears the burden of producing sufficient evidence to
substantiate any deduction that would otherwise be allowed by the
Code.
Sec.
U.S. 79,
84
6001; Rule 142(a); INDOPCO,
(1992).
Inc. v.
Commissioner,
503
Rovakat did not present any evidence to
substantiate the actual payment of the "other expenses" claimed
on its 2003 and 2004 returns or that these payments were ordinary
and necessary to Rovakat's activity.
See secs. 162(a), 212.
We
conclude that Rovakat may not deduct any portion of those claimed
expenses.
VII.
Accuracy-Related Penalties
A.
Overview
Section 6662(a)
and (b) (1),
(2), and (3) provides that a
taxpayer may be liable for a 20-percent accuracy-related penalty
on the portion of an underpayment of income tax attributable to,
among other things, negligence or disregard of rules or
"We conclude that respondent has conceded his determination
that Rovakat may not deduct charitable contributions of $6,224
for 2003 and $60,350 for 2004, by virtue of the fact that
respondent did not address that issue at trial or in his
posttrial brief.
Cf. Harbor Cove Marina Partners Pship. v.
Commissioner,
123 T.C.
64,
66
(2004).
-61-
regulations, a substantial understatement of income tax, or a
substantial valuation misstatement.
Section 6662(h) (1) increases
the 20-percent rate to a 40-percent rate to the extent that the
underpayment is attributable to a gross valuation misstatement.
Sec. 6662(h) (1).
An accuracy-related penalty under section 6662
does not apply to any portion of an underpaynent of tax for which
a taxpayer had reasonable cause and acted in good faith.
Sec.
6664 (c) (1).
Respondent determined that one or more cf the referenced
accuracy-related penalties apply with respect to the partnership
adjustments for Rovakat's 2002 through 2004 taxable years.
Respondent determined that the 40-percent accuracy-related
penalty applies to the portion of any underpayment of tax
attributable to the ordinary losses reported for 2002, 2003, and
2004.
Respondent determined that a 20-percent accuracy-related
penalty applies to any underpayment of tax attributable to the
omitted income and to the disallowed deductions.
Mr. Hovnanian
does not deny that the accuracy-related penalties apply in
accordance with their terms.
His sole defense against the
imposition of the accuracy-related penalties is that Rovakat
meets the reasonable cause exception of section 6664."
The Commissioner bears the burden of production on whether
an accuracy-related penalty·applies "with respect to the
liability of any individual".
See sec. 7491; Higbee v.
Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 446-447 (2001). !We have previously
(continued...)
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B.
Gross Valuation Misstatement
Respondent determined that it was appropriate to impose an
accuracy-related penalty of 40 percent under section 6662(h) for
a gross valuation misstatement with respect to the basis reported
on the francs transaction.
Section 6662 (h) provides that a
taxpayer may be liable for a 40-percent penalty on that portion
of an underpayment of tax that is attributable to one or more
gross valuation misstatements.
A gross valuation misstatement
exists if the value or adjusted basis of any property claimed on
a tax return is 400 percent or more of the amount determined to
be the correct amount of such value or adjusted basis.
6662(h) (2) (A).
Sec.
The value or adjusted basis of any property
claimed on a tax return that is determined to have a correct
value or adjusted basis of zero is considered to be 400 percent
or more of the correct amount.
Regs.
Sec. 1.6662-5(g), Income Tax
Whether there 1s a gross valuation misstatement in the
partnership context is determined at the partnership level.
1.6662-5(h) (1),
Sec.
Income Tax Regs.
"(...continued)
questioned whether sec. 7491 applies in the partnership context,
given that the section applies only to the liability of "any
individual". See, e.g., Palm Canyon X Inys., LLC v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-288; Santa Monica Pictures, LLC v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2005-104. We need not decide that
question here because we find that the record establishes that
the criteria for the imposition of the sec. 6662(a) accuracyrelated penalties is met without regard to the burden of
production.
-63-
In Merino v. Commissioner,
1999),
196 F.3d 147,
affg. T.C. Memo. 1997-385,
158-159
(3d Cir.
the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit held that imposition of a valuation misstatement
penalty is generally appropriate where a claimed tax benefit is
disallowed because it is an integral part of a transaction
determined to lack economic substance.
We found that the francs
transaction was a sale.or, alternatively, that it lacked economic
substance.. Rovakat's basis in the francs as reported on its
returns exceeds 400 percent of the basis that Rovakat actually
had."
Consequently, an accuracy-related penalty under section
6662(a) on account of a gross valuation misstatement under
section 6662 (h) applies through its terms to that portion of any
underpayment of tax attributable to the repor ed loss."
C.
Other Accuracy-Related Penalties Determined
Respondent determined that Rovakat is li ble for the 20-
percent accuracy-related penalty under section 6662(a) as to the
portion of any underpayment of tax attributable to the remaining
adjustments on account of negligence or disregard of rules or
regulations, substantial understatement of income tax, and/or
"We conclude from the record that Rovakat's basis in the
francs was $34,185 because the francs transaction was a sale, see
sec. 1012, or, alternatively, that the basis was zero because the
francs transaction lacked economic substance..
Given that holding, we do not consider the applicability
of a 20-percent accuracy-related penalty on that portion of the
underpayment of tax attributable to the reported losses.
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substantial valuation misstatement under section 6662(b) (1),
and (3).
(2),
Only one accuracy-related penalty may be applied with
respect to any portion of an underpayment, even if that portion
resulted from more than one of the types of misconduct described
in section 6662.
Sec. 1.6662-2,
Income Tax Regs.
The record
establishes (and Mr. Hovnanian does not contest) that the
determined accuracy-related penalties apply absent a mitigating
reason.
D.
Reasonable Cause
Mr. Hovnanian argues that the accuracy-related penalties may
not be imposed because Rovakat meets the reasonable cause defense
of section 6664 (c) (1).
Pursuant to that section, an accuracy-
related penalty under section 6662(a) may not be imposed with
respect to any portion of an underpayment of tax for which Mr.
Hovnanian establishes that Rovakat, through his actions, had
reasonable cause and acted in good faith."
Whether a taxpayer
acted with reasonable cause and in good faith is a factual
determination,
in which the taxpayer's effort to assess the
proper level of tax is of utmost importance.
See sec. 1.6664-
4 (b) (1), Income Tax Regs.
"We determine the application of the reasonable cause
defense in this partnership-level proceeding because Mr.
Hovnanian claims that the defense applies on account of his
actions as Rovakat's managing member and tax matters partner.
See Am. Boat Co., LLC v. United States, 583 F.3d 471, 480 (7th
Cir. 2009); 106 Ltd. v. Commissioner, 136 T.C. 67, 75-77 (2011);
Fears v. Commissioner, 129 T.C. 8, 10 (2007).
-65-
Mr. Hovnanian argues that Rovakat reaso ably relied on the
Rovakat opinion and on the Sidley Austin opinion when filing
Rovakat's 2002 through 2004 returns.
A taxpayer's reliance on
the advice of a professional, such as an attorney, may constitute
reasonable cause and good faith where the taxpayer proves by a
preponderance of the evidence that:
(1) The
axpayer reasonably
believed that the professional upon whom the reliance is placed
is a competent tax adviser with sufficient exþertise to justify
reliance;
(2) the taxpayer provided necessary and accurate
information to the adviser; and (3) the taxpayer actually relied
in good faith on the adviser's judgment.
Neonatology Associates,
P.A. v.. Commissioner,
(200Ö),
221
(3d Cir. 2002);
Regs.
115 T.C. 43,
see also sec.
98-99
1.6664-4 (c) (1),
affd.
299 F.3d
Income Tax
On the basis of the record as a whole, we conclude that
Mr. Hovnanian has not satisfied all of these requirements.
As to the Rovakat opinion, Mr. Hovnanian had no personal
contact with the attorneys who rendered that opinion.
Instead,
he relied solely on the recommendation of Mr. Valdez, the person
who promoted the transaction to be opined upo .
See Tigers Eye
Trading, LLC v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009 121 (defining a
promoter as "an adviser who participated in structuring the
transaction or is otherwise related to, has an interest in, or
profits from the transaction").
Mr. Hovnanian knew that Mr.
Valdez structured and promoted the francs transaction, and we
-66-
find in the record that the Rovakat opinion was simply a product
that Mr. Valdez essentially included as part of his "investments"
to attempt to insulate his clients from the imposition of an
accuracy-related penalty as to his transactions.
Nor did Mr. Hovnanian reasonably rely on the Rovakat opinion
in that the opinion contained material misstatements of fact or
otherwise did not properly explain the facts.
Cf. Long Term
Capital Holdings v. United States, 330 F. Supp. 2d 122,
Conn. 2004), affd.
150 Fed. Appx. 40
(2d Cir.
2005).
209
(D.
First,
the
Rovakat opinion stated that Mr. Hovnanian was not affiliated with
any member of Rovakat or of ICP; Mr. Hovnanian owned an interest
in Rovakat, and he managed ICP.
Second, the Rovakat opinion
stated that Rovakat's principal.business activity was "trading
personal property for the account of owners of interest in the
activity"; Mr. Hovnanian admitted during his testimony that
Rovakat never intended to invest in francs.
Third, the Rovakat
opinion stated that the parties to the "transaction" entered into
the francs transaction for "business reasons independent of the
tax consequences for tax purposes, with a view toward making a
profit on the activities contemplated in the Transaction"; the
opinion never elaborates on this purported "business purpose".
Fourth, the Rovakat opinion stated that the parties to the
"transaction" dealt with each other at arm's length; the francs
-67transaction was not conducted at arm's length but orchestrated
exclusively by Mr. Valdez."
Nor do we find that Mr. Hovnanian relied in good faith on
the Rovakat opinion's conclusion that Rovakat realized a
$5,769,532 loss as to a transaction that resulted in a $1,283
economic gain.
In determining whether a taxpayer relied in good
faith on the advice of a professional, we consider (1) the
taxpayer's business sophistication and experience,
(2) the
reasonableness of the advice solicited, and (3) whether the
advice was obtained as part of a tax shelter.
See 106, Ltd. v.
Commissioner,
lso sec.
136 T.C.
67,
77-78
1.6664-4 (b) (1), Income Tax Regs.
(2011); see
Each factor weighs against a
finding that Mr. Hovnanian relied in good faith on the Rovakat
opinion.
As a business executive with more than 20 years of
experience and an economics degree from the University of
Pennsylvania, Mr. Hovnanian obviously recognized the incongruity
of reporting a loss in excess of $5 million oh a transaction that
"In addition, the Rovakat opinion contained numerous
disclaimers that served as notice to Mr. Hovnanian that the legal
opinion was tenuous. The opinion states, for example, that
Congress has actively pursued legislation to curb abusive tax
shelters and the media has publicized many of the tax
transactions of now large bankrupt entities and high profile
individuals.
* * * The legislative and poli ical climate and
publicity may influence a court to accept the IRS arguments
notwithstanding the merits of our analysis." The opinion states
likewise that "We have * * * considered certain judicial
doctrines which, if applicable, could affect our view of the
facts described and our analysis".
-68-
yielded an economic gain.
We have stated that where an
investment has such obviously suspect tax claims as to put a
reasonable taxpayer under a duty of inquiry, a good faith
investigation of the underlying viability, financial structure,
and economics of the investment is required.
Roberson v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1996-335 (citing LaVerne v.
Commissioner,
94 T.C.
637,
652-653
published opinion 956 F.2d 274
(1990), affd. without
(9th Cir. 1992), affd. without
published opinion sub nom. Cowles v. Commissioner, 949 F.2d 401
(10th Cir.
1991),
and Horn v.
Commissioner,
90 T.C.
908,
(1988)), affd. without published opinion 142 F.3d 435
1998).
942
(6th Cir.
If Mr. Hovnanian's business prowess did not allow him to
make such a determination, then certainly the fact that the
Rovakat and ISP opinions were virtually identical in all material
respects should have prompted inquiry from an independent
adviser.
We conclude that any reliance which Mr. Hovnanian
placed on the Rovakat opinion was not reasonable.
We similarly reject Mr. Hovnanian's claimed reliance on the
Sidley Austin opinion.
Mr. Valdez procured the Sidley Austin
opinion for the benefit of ICP and of himself.
That opinion
makes no specific mention of Rovakat or of Mr. Hovnanian, and it
was not given to Mr. Hovnanian until 2008.
The Sidley Austin
opinion also turned the seemingly simple prospect of purchasing
francs and contributing them to a partnership into a 74-page
-69guide on shifting losses from foreign entities to U.S. taxpayers.
Any reliance that Mr. Hovnanian claims to have placed on the
Sidley Austin opinion is not reasonable or is otherwise not
supported by the record.
The Supreme Court observed long ago that an expert opinion
may be had as to any amount.
U.S.
88,
101 (1958).
Winans.v. N.Y. & Erie R.R. Co., 62
Legal and tax opinions are no different.
The mere fact that a taxpayer purchases an "opinion" from a
self-professed expert does not necessarily mean that the taxpayer
relied on the "expert" in good faith.
An individual who blindly
relies on a professional opinion to support a facially too good
to be true transaction such as we have here does so at his or her
own peril.
Cf. Neonatology Associates, P.A. v. Commissioner, 115
I
T.C. at 99.
Never has this been more true than in today's
environment where taxpayers seek to reduce their tax liabilities
by engineering artificial tax losses in complex and/or foreign
transactions which leave little to no paperwork that the
Commissioner may access to examine the transac ion.
We conclude
that Rovakat, through Mr. Hovnanian, does not peet the reasonable
cause defense of section 6664 (c) (1).
It follows that the
accuracy-related penalties determined by respondent are
applicable to the extent stated herein.
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VIII.
Epiloque
We have considered and rejected as without merit all
arguments that Mr. Hovnanian made which are not addressed herein.
To reflect the foregoing,
Decision will be entered
under Rule 155.
I
I
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