UNITED STATES TAX COURT
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T.C. Memo. 2005-212
UNITED STATES TAX COURT
CHAY R. STEWART, Petitioner v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Docket No. 10829-04.
Filed September 12, 2005.
Chay R. Stewart, pro se.
Lorraine D. Masano and Francis C. Mucciolo, for respondent.
MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION
COLVIN, Judge:
Respondent determined deficiencies in
petitioner’s income tax of $53,524 for 2000 and $81,458 for 2001
and that petitioner is liable for additions to tax for failure to
file under section 6651(a)(1) of $13,381 for 2000 and $20,364.50
for 2001 and for failure to pay estimated tax under section 6654
of $2,858.96 for 2000 and $3,255.36 for 2001.
The issues for decision are:
- 2 1.
Whether respondent’s determination of petitioner’s
income tax deficiencies for 2000 and 2001 is valid.
We hold that
it is.
2.
Whether petitioner was denied equal protection and due
process of law because respondent failed to allow business
expense deductions based on statistical information.
We hold
that he was not.
3.
Whether petitioner is liable for additions to tax for
failure to file under section 6651(a) and for failure to pay
estimated tax under section 6654(a).
4.
We hold that he is.
Whether petitioner is liable for a penalty under
section 6673 for instituting proceedings primarily for delay and
for maintaining frivolous or groundless positions.
We hold that
he is not.
Section references are to the Internal Revenue Code.
FINDINGS OF FACT
The parties submitted this case fully stipulated under Rule
122.
A.
Petitioner
Petitioner lived in Ormond Beach, Florida, when he filed his
petition.
In 2000 and 2001, petitioner sold insurance and
financial products for which he received commissions.
received the following payments:
He
- 3 Payor
Midland Natl. Life
Ins. Co.
2000
$129,829
Lifeusa Ins. Co.
17,812
Financial Brokerage,
Inc.
8,646
2001
$221,795
Type of
payment
commissions
commissions
3,008
commissions
Fidelity & Guaranty
Life Ins.
1,050
commissions
American Equity Inv.
Life Ins
6,017
commissions
Charles Schwab & Co.
Commercial Bank of
Volusia County
541
96
interest
682
$157,510
481
$232,447
interest
Petitioner filed no Federal income tax returns and made no
estimated tax payments for 2000 and 2001.
No Federal income tax
was withheld from his income for 2000 and 2001.
B.
Respondent’s Determination
In the notice of deficiency, respondent determined that
petitioner had received but failed to report self-employment
income from commissions in the amounts of $156,287 in 2000 and
$231,870 in 2001 and interest income in the amounts of $1,223 in
2000 and $577 in 2001.
Respondent determined that petitioner’s
filing status was single and that he was entitled to claim the
standard deduction and one exemption.
Respondent determined that
petitioner was liable for additions to tax for failure to file
- 4 under section 6651(a)(1) and failure to pay estimated tax under
section 6654.
OPINION
A.
Whether Respondent’s Determination of Petitioner’s
Deficiencies in Income Tax for 2000 and 2001 Is Valid
Petitioner contends that respondent prepared only “dummy
returns”1 for 2000 and 2001, and that respondent’s determination
of his deficiencies in income tax for 2000 and 2001 is invalid
because respondent did not prepare for each year a substitute
return that qualified under section 6020(b).2
We disagree.
Petitioner’s contention that the Commissioner must file a
substitute for return under section 6020(b) before determining a
1
A “dummy return” is generated to open an account for the
taxpayer on the master file and normally consists of a first page
of a Form 1040, U.S. Individual Income Tax Return, which contains
a taxpayer's name, address, and Social Security number. Internal
Revenue Manual, Chief Counsel Directives Manual-Tax Litigation,
sec. 35.4.27.2 (Nov. 16, 1999); see Spurlock v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 2003-124 n.18.
2
Sec. 6020(b) provides:
SEC. 6020(b). Execution of Return by Secretary.-(1) Authority of Secretary to execute return.--If
any person fails to make any return required by any
internal revenue law or regulation made thereunder at
the time prescribed therefor, or makes, willfully or
otherwise, a false or fraudulent return, the Secretary
shall make such return from his own knowledge and from
such information as he can obtain through testimony or
otherwise.
(2) Status of returns.--Any return so made and
subscribed by the Secretary shall be prima facie good
and sufficient for all legal purposes.
- 5 deficiency is frivolous.
Schiff v. United States, 919 F.2d 830,
832-833 (2d Cir. 1990).
The Commissioner need not prepare a substitute for return
under section 6020(b) in order to determine a deficiency for a
taxpayer who has not filed a return for that year.
Roat v.
Commissioner, 847 F.2d 1379, 1381 (9th Cir. 1988); Hartman v.
Commissioner, 65 T.C. 542, 545 (1975); Burnett v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 2002-181, affd. without published opinion 67 Fed.
Appx. 248 (5th Cir. 2003).
Where a taxpayer files no return,
respondent may determine the deficiency as if a return had been
filed on which the taxpayer reported the amount of tax due was
zero; the deficiency is the amount of tax due.
Laing v. United
States, 423 U.S. 161, 174 (1976); Schiff v. United States, supra;
Roat v. Commissioner, supra.
B.
Whether Petitioner Was Denied Equal Protection and Due
Process of Law Because Respondent Failed To Allow Business
Expense Deductions Based on Statistical Information for His
Industry
Petitioner contends that he was denied equal protection and
due process of law because respondent failed to allow business
expense deductions based on statistical information for his
insurance and financial products industry.
We disagree.
A taxpayer may deduct all ordinary and necessary expenses
paid or incurred in carrying on a trade or business.
162(a).
Sec.
Taxpayers are required to maintain records that
sufficiently establish the amount of claimed deductions.
Sec.
- 6 6001; sec. 1.6001-1(a), Income Tax Regs.
burden of proof.
Petitioner bears the
Rule 142(a).3
If a taxpayer establishes that he or she paid a deductible
expense but cannot substantiate the precise amount, we may
estimate the amount of the deductible expense.
Cohan v.
Commissioner, 39 F.2d 540, 544 (2d Cir. 1930); Vanicek v.
Commissioner, 85 T.C. 731, 742-743 (1985).
The taxpayer must
present credible evidence that provides a rational basis for our
estimate.
Vanicek v. Commissioner, supra.
We may estimate the
taxpayer’s expenses bearing heavily against the taxpayer whose
“inexactitude is of his own making.”
Cohan v. Commissioner,
supra; Maciel v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004-28.
Petitioner asks us to estimate the amount of his business
expense deductions under Cohan and contends that he is entitled
to deductions based on statistical information for the insurance
and financial products industries.
We disagree.
Cohan does not
apply because petitioner did not present evidence (statisticial
or otherwise) that he incurred deductible expenses greater than
the amount of the standard deduction allowed by respondent.
Thus, we have no basis to estimate the amount of his deductible
expenses.
3
Petitioner does not contend that the burden of proof
shifts to respondent under sec. 7491(a).
- 7 Citing Brenner v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004-202,
petitioner contends that respondent routinely allows more than 50
percent of a taxpayer’s gross compensation for business expenses
for a taxpayer in petitioner’s business and location.
disagree.
We
Like petitioner, the taxpayer in Brenner v.
Commissioner, supra, was in the insurance business and lived in
Ormond Beach, Florida, when he filed his petition.
The
Commissioner used the bank deposits method to reconstruct his
income.
The Commissioner allowed the taxpayer to deduct
estimated insurance business expenses equal to 54.77 percent of
his commissions based on the Statistics of Labor Bulletin, Sole
Proprietorship Returns, 1994, Table 2.--Nonfarm Sole
Proprietorships: Income Statements, by Selected Groups: Insurance
agents and brokers (statistics for insurance agents).
The Commissioner’s allowance of business expenses based on
Bureau of Labor Statistics figures in Brenner does not establish
that respondent routinely allows a business deduction based on
statistics or industry averages or that respondent is required to
use them.
Our responsibility as a Court is to apply the law to
the facts of the case before us; how the Commissioner treated
other taxpayers is generally irrelevant in making that
determination, Davis v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 1014, 1022 (1976);
Teichgraeber v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 453, 456 (1975), absent
proof that a taxpayer has been singled out for adverse treatment
- 8 based on impermissible considerations such as race, religion, or
other arbitrary classification, and absent contractual agreements
to the contrary, Estate of Campion v. Commissioner, 110 T.C. 165,
170 (1998), affd. without published opinion sub nom. Drake Oil
Tech. Partners v. Commissioner, 211 F.3d 1277 (10th Cir. 2000),
and Tucek v. Commissioner, 198 F.3d 259 (10th Cir. 1999); Norfolk
S. Corp. v. Commissioner, 104 T.C. 13, 58-59, supplemented by 104
T.C. 417 (1995), affd. 140 F.3d 240 (4th Cir. 1998); Davis v.
Commissioner, supra.
We conclude that petitioner is not entitled to business
deductions based on statistical information and that he was not
denied equal protection or due process of law because respondent
did not allow such deductions.
C.
Additions to Tax
Section 7491(c) places on the Commissioner the burden of
producing evidence that it is appropriate to impose additions to
tax.
To meet that burden, the Commissioner must produce evidence
showing that it is appropriate to impose the particular addition
to tax, but the Commissioner need not produce evidence relating
to defenses such as reasonable cause or substantial authority.
Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 446 (2001); H. Conf. Rept.
105-599, at 241 (1998), 1998-3 C.B. at 995.
Respondent has met
the burden of production under section 7491(c) with respect to
the addition to tax for failure (1) to file under section
- 9 6651(a)(1) because the record shows that petitioner was required
to file but has not filed a return for 2000 and 2001; and (2) to
make estimated tax payments under section 6654(a) because the
record shows that he did not make estimated tax payments with
respect to his tax liability for 2000 or 2001.
Petitioner offers no defense to the additions to tax
determined by respondent.
We conclude that he is liable for the
additions to tax for failure to file under section 6651(a)(1) of
$13,381 for 2000 and $20,364.50 for 2001 and for failure to pay
estimated tax under section 6654(a) of $2,858.96 for 2000 and
$3,255.36 for 2001.
D.
Whether Petitioner Is Liable for a Penalty Under Section
6673
Respondent alleges for the first time on brief that
petitioner is liable for a penalty under section 6673 because he
made only frivolous arguments.
Petitioner contends that he is
not liable for a penalty under section 6673 because (1) his
arguments are supported by a reasoned argument for a change in
case authority, and (2) the majority of cases hold that the
Commissioner cannot determine a deficiency for a year for which
the taxpayer did not file a return.
The Court may impose a penalty of up to $25,000 if the
position or positions asserted by the taxpayer in the case are
frivolous or groundless or the proceedings were instituted
primarily for delay.
Sec. 6673(a)(1)(B).
A position maintained
- 10 by the taxpayer is frivolous if it is contrary to established law
and is not supported by a reasoned, colorable argument for change
in the law.
Coleman v. Commissioner, 791 F.2d 68, 71 (7th Cir.
1986); Gilligan v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004-194.
Petitioner’s contention that the Commissioner cannot
determine a deficiency for a year for which a taxpayer did not
file a return is frivolous.
Scruggs v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
1995-355, affd. without published opinion 117 F.3d 1433 (11th
Cir. 1997); Zyglis v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1993-341, affd.
without published opinion 29 F.3d 620 (2d Cir. 1994).
However, not all of petitioner’s arguments are frivolous.
For example, petitioner contended in his pretrial memorandum that
respondent is required to reduce petitioner’s gross receipts by
the average business expense for the insurance industry.
Petitioner pointed out that in Brenner v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 2004-202, the Commissioner allowed as a business expense
deduction 54.77 percent of the gross receipts of a nonfiling
taxpayer from Ormond Beach, Florida, who sold insurance and
financial products.
We do not impose a penalty under section 6673 because not
all of petitioner’s arguments are frivolous.
However, we warn
petitioner that the Court may impose this penalty in the future
if he makes frivolous arguments or institutes proceedings
primarily for delay.
To reflect the foregoing,
- 11 Decision will be
entered for respondent.
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