United States Tax Court

United States Tax Court

T.C. Memo. 2025-91

LISA MARIE WALSH,

Petitioner

v.

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,

Respondent

__________

Docket No. 4460-22.

Filed August 26, 2025.

__________

Lisa Marie Walsh, pro se.

Brian P. Beddingfield, Nathan C. Johnston, and James J. Yeh, for

respondent.

MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION

LANDY, Judge: Petitioner, Lisa Marie Walsh, seeks relief from

joint and several liability under section 6015 1 with respect to 2011

through 2016 (years in issue). The issues for decision are whether

Ms. Walsh is entitled to relief (1) under either section 6015(b) or (c)

relating to understatements of income tax for 2012 and 2013 or (2) under

section 6015(f) relating to underpayments of income tax for the years in

issue. We hold that Ms. Walsh is not entitled to relief under section

6015(b), (c), or (f) for the years in issue.

1 Unless otherwise indicated, statutory references are to the Internal Revenue

Code, Title 26 U.S.C., in effect at all relevant times, regulation references are to the

Code of Federal Regulations, Title 26 (Treas. Reg.), in effect at all relevant times, and

Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure. All dollar

amounts are rounded to the nearest dollar.

Served 08/26/25

2

[*2]

FINDINGS OF FACT

The following facts are derived from the Stipulation as to the

Administrative Record, the First Stipulation of Facts, the Exhibits

attached to both stipulations, the three Exhibits admitted at trial, and

the testimony of Ms. Walsh and Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Revenue

Agent C. Kim (RA Kim).

I.

Marriage and the Control of Household Finances

Ms. Walsh married Brendan Walsh on April 24, 1999. The couple

share two children. Ms. Walsh graduated from high school and had no

formal education beyond that. Notwithstanding, Ms. Walsh obtained a

real estate agent’s license, and in November 2011, started a parasol

business called Persolé, LLC (Persolé). During the couple’s marriage,

Mr. Walsh was the higher income earner, making approximately

$30,000 a month from his insurance business. Meanwhile, Ms. Walsh

was primarily a stay-at-home parent, but she earned income from

Persolé, as an interior designer, and as a real estate agent. Ms. Walsh

was responsible for paying household utility bills and children-related

expenses.

In 2006 the Walshes purchased a newly constructed, fivebedroom, five-bath, 4,500-square-foot single family home in Novato,

California (Novato Property), for approximately $1.4 million. The

Walshes lived at the Novato Property and used it as their family home

until they separated in 2016. The Walshes were members at the Marin

County Country Club, held season tickets to San Francisco Giants

baseball games, and owned and drove a Maserati and a BMW. During

the years in issue both children attended private school.

After discovering Mr. Walsh’s alleged infidelity, Ms. Walsh, in

January 2016, signed a lease for an apartment in Newport Beach,

California, and moved out of the Novato Property. At the time of trial

Ms. Walsh resided at the Newport Beach apartment where she lived

with her son, and she periodically earned income from short-term rental

of the apartment.

II.

Preparation and Filing of Tax Returns

During their marriage and throughout the years in issue the

Walshes filed joint Forms 1040, U.S. Individual Income Tax Return. The

couple’s joint Forms 1040 for the years in issue were prepared by Patrick

J. Carlin, a certified public accountant. During the pendency of

3

[*3] Ms. Walsh’s request for relief Mr. Carlin provided a written

statement to the IRS stating that Ms. Walsh granted him permission to

electronically file (e-file) the joint Form 1040 for each of the years in

issue. Ms. Walsh helped Mr. Carlin prepare the joint Forms 1040 by

gathering and submitting to him information regarding items of income

and expenses related to her businesses, home mortgage interest

statements, and property tax documents.

The Walshes have a history of noncompliance with the federal

income tax laws. They failed to timely file their income tax returns, pay

the liabilities shown on the tax returns, and appropriately report their

income tax liabilities for tax years 2012 and 2013, leading to both

understatements and underpayments of income tax for those two years.

While they timely filed returns and did not have any understatements

for 2011 or 2014 through 2016, there were underpayments of tax which

have not been paid. The underpayments on their joint Forms 1040 for

the years in issue were $42,644, $41,552, $10,932, $22,239, $36,939, and

$19,012, respectively. At the time of trial the following income tax

liabilities were due:

Year

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

Total Amount Due

$67,186

74,049

20,170

38,474

63,050

26,054

During the IRS’s review of Ms. Walsh’s request for innocent

spouse relief, it determined that the amounts due for 2012, 2014, 2015,

and 2016 were fully attributable to Mr. Walsh. The IRS further

determined that $37,387 of the underpayment for 2011 and $4,504 of

the deficiency for 2013 were attributable to Ms. Walsh.

III.

Income Tax Examination and Tax Court Proceedings

On June 20, 2014, the IRS selected the Walshes’ 2011 joint Form

1040 for examination. Thereafter, on February 27, 2015, the IRS

selected the Walshes’ returns for 2012 and 2013 for examination. Ms.

Walsh testified that she was not involved with the examination.

Conversely, RA Kim, who conducted the examination, testified that she

spoke with Ms. Walsh on multiple occasions during the examination.

4

[*4] On June 9, 2016, the IRS issued the Walshes a Notice of

Deficiency (Notice) determining deficiencies in income tax, section

6651(a)(1) additions to tax, and section 6662(a) accuracy-related

penalties for 2011 through 2013. The Walshes hired Edward I. Kaplan

to represent them, and on September 6, 2016, Mr. Kaplan timely filed a

petition to this Court seeking redetermination of the deficiencies,

additions to tax, and penalties. Walsh v. Commissioner, No. 19641-16

(T.C. filed Sept. 6, 2016).

On September 10, 2018, the IRS and Mr. Kaplan, on the Walshes’

behalf, executed a Stipulation of Settled Issues resolving all issues

raised in the Notice. This Court entered a decision related to 2011

through 2013 on February 14, 2019. The resulting deficiencies and

section 6651(a)(1) additions to tax were as follows:

Year

Deficiency

2011

2012

2013

—

$2,536

748

Addition to Tax/Penalty

Section 6651(a)(1)

Section 6662(a)

—

—

—

—

$634

187

Neither Mr. Kaplan nor Ms. Walsh raised the issue of innocent

spouse relief in the prior deficiency case. While Ms. Walsh acknowledged

that she was a copetitioner in the prior proceedings, she maintained that

she did not receive any information related to the IRS examination or

the prior Court case.

IV.

Separation and Divorce

On January 1, 2017, Ms. Walsh separated from Mr. Walsh, and

on December 12, 2017, Ms. Walsh filed a petition for dissolution of

marriage in the Superior Court of California, County of Orange

(Superior Court). Mr. Walsh was served the summons and petition for

dissolution of marriage on January 6, 2018. On September 28, 2018, the

Superior Court entered a Stipulation and Order that ordered Mr. Walsh

to pay Ms. Walsh $156 per month in child support and $8,660 per month

in spousal support, payable in semi-monthly installments beginning

October 15, 2018.

On June 17, 2021, the Superior Court entered a judgment of

dissolution that dissolved the Walshes’ marriage, awarded Ms. Walsh

spousal support of $6,400 per month and arrearages of $38,970, and

determined that the Walshes’ Form 1040 liabilities were joint and

5

[*5] several liabilities to be divided equally between the parties. 2 The

Superior Court specifically stated that “[t]o the extent that either

[Ms. Walsh or Mr. Walsh] pays more than half on this [federal tax] debt

from this portion forward, the other party shall indemnify and pay the

other party their one half thereof, subject to proof and subject to any

claims and defenses that either may have with the taxing authorities.”

The Superior Court further stated that “[i]f either party seeks to

compromise the amounts with the [IRS], they shall first notify the other,

invite them to join in the discussions remembering that until fully paid

or otherwise ordered, the fiduciary duties they have to the other under

the [California] Family Code remain.”

During the divorce proceedings, Ms. Walsh accepted

responsibility for the Form 1040 liabilities for the years in issue. She

testified that she and Mr. Walsh would have been able to maintain their

affluent lifestyle even if they paid their tax debt. The Superior Court

found that the Walshes’ failure to pay their federal tax liabilities allowed

them to maintain their lavish lifestyle.

V.

Petitioner’s Tax Compliance After Legal Separation

Ms. Walsh filed Forms 1040 for 2017 through 2019 with the filing

status of married filing separate and for taxable year 2020 with the

filing status of single. 3 At the time of trial Ms. Walsh owed the following

tax liabilities for 2017 through 2020:

Year

2017

2018

2019

2020

Tax Liability at the Time of Trial

$809

3,004

22,064

8,931

Ms. Walsh has no outstanding tax liability for taxable year 2021.

As of the date of trial Ms. Walsh had not filed her 2022 Form 1040.

2 The Superior Court also awarded Ms. Walsh one-half of Mr. Walsh’s section

401(k) retirement account, valued at $103,024, and one-half of Mr. Walsh’s pension

account, valued at $98,256. In the property division Ms. Walsh was awarded an early

trust distribution of $20,000, $16,155 from the joint trust account, and an equalization

payment of $122,751.

3 The Forms 1040 for 2017 through 2020 were filed late, on March 3 and 4 and

October 19, 2020, and March 14, 2022, respectively.

6

[*6] VI. Ms. Walsh’s Request for Relief from Joint and Several Liability

On or around May 13, 2020, Ms. Walsh filed a request for innocent

spouse relief. No copy of Form 8857, Request for Innocent Spouse Relief,

is in the record. The Commissioner’s workpaper, which the parties

stipulated, states that Ms. Walsh indicated on Form 8857 that she did

not know whether the joint Forms 1040 showed balances due to the IRS,

and that “[she doesn’t] know how to read a tax return.” Ms. Walsh

maintained that she did not become aware of the “extraordinary tax bill”

until January 2020. Ms. Walsh also claimed that Mr. Walsh changed the

couple’s mailing address with the IRS from the Novato Property to his

office address in San Francisco (Office Address) without her knowledge

in or around 2012.

When Ms. Walsh requested innocent spouse relief, she reported

receiving monthly income of $11,851, consisting of $8,660 in spousal

support, $504 in self-employment income, and $2,687 in unemployment

benefits. Moreover, she reported monthly expenses of $10,639,

consisting, inter alia, of rent for a 3-bedroom, 2.5-bath apartment of

$4,700, utility expenses of $610, and credit card payments of $1,059, all

of which the IRS determined to be significantly above the allowable

expense amount. In calendar year 2022, excluding any self-employment

income and the income from short-term apartment rentals, Ms. Walsh

received $133,400 in income, consisting of $85,200 in spousal support

and arrearages and $48,200 of retirement distributions.

On Form 8857 Ms. Walsh did not indicate that either she or any

members of her family were victims of domestic violence or physical

abuse; however, she did indicate that Mr. Walsh made her afraid to

disagree, criticize, or insult him because he made the financial decisions

for the family. At trial Ms. Walsh stated that Mr. Walsh was emotionally

and financially abusive. Ms. Walsh did not contend that she was

suffering from a mental or physical health problem when the Forms

1040 were filed or when she filed Form 8857 for the years in issue.

In response to Ms. Walsh’s request for innocent spouse relief,

Mr. Walsh filed Form 12508, Questionnaire for Non-Requesting Spouse.

He stated that Ms. Walsh (1) provided her wage information to Mr.

Carlin for inclusion on the couple’s joint Forms 1040; (2) gave tax

documents to Mr. Carlin, who prepared the joint Forms 1040; (3) had

full knowledge of and access to the couple’s assets, including their joint

account; and (4) paid bills out of the joint account and made monetary

transfers from the joint account to her separate bank accounts.

7

[*7] Mr. Walsh also asserted that Ms. Walsh “always signed the

‘permission to e-file’” permitting Mr. Carlin to file the couple’s joint

Forms 1040 for the tax years in issue.

On November 15, 2021, the IRS issued Ms. Walsh a final

determination denying her request for relief for the years in issue. On

February 11, 2022, Ms. Walsh, while residing in California, timely filed

her Petition with this Court disputing the final determination.

OPINION

I.

Jurisdiction

Our Court is a court of limited jurisdiction, and we can exercise

our jurisdiction only to the extent provided by Congress. § 7442; Judge

v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 1175, 1180–81 (1987); Naftel v. Commissioner,

85 T.C. 527, 529 (1985); see also Rules 13(b), 320(b). Pursuant to section

6015(e), we have jurisdiction to review a stand-alone petition for

innocent spouse relief when the taxpayer files a petition no later than

the close of the 90th day after the Commissioner mails a final

determination denying the requesting spouse’s claim for relief. See

§ 6015(e)(1)(A)(ii), (e)(1)(A)(i)(I). Ms. Walsh timely filed a stand-alone

Petition with this Court, and thus we have jurisdiction to review the

IRS’s determination against relief. The Court provided Mr. Walsh with

a notice of his right to intervene as a party to this case under section

6015(e)(4) and Rule 325, but he did not intervene.

II.

Relief from Joint and Several Liability

Married taxpayers may elect to file a joint federal income tax

return. § 6013(a). The tax on a joint return is computed on the spouses’

aggregate income. Each spouse is fully responsible for the accuracy of

the return and jointly and severally liable for the entire amount of tax

shown on the return or found to be owed. § 6013(d)(3); Pullins v.

Commissioner, 136 T.C. 432, 437 (2011). Pursuant to section 6015, a

spouse may be relieved from joint and several liability if certain

conditions are met. See, e.g., § 6015(b), (c), (f); see also Pullins, 136 T.C.

at 437. We apply a de novo standard of review to any determination the

Commissioner makes under section 6015. See § 6015(e)(7); see also

Porter v. Commissioner, 132 T.C. 203, 210 (2009), superseded in part by

statute, Taxpayer First Act, Pub. L. No. 116-25, § 1203(a)(1), 133 Stat.

981, 988 (2019). For section 6015 petitions filed on or after July 1, 2019,

however, our scope of review is limited. See § 6015(e)(7); see also

8

[*8] Taxpayer First Act § 1203(a)(1), (b), 133 Stat. at 988; Sutherland v.

Commissioner, 155 T.C. 95, 96–97, 105 (2020).

Because Ms. Walsh petitioned this Court on February 11, 2022,

section 6015(e)(7) applies as amended, and we must decide this case on

(1) the administrative record, which has been stipulated into evidence

(and consists of Exhibits 1-J through 18-J); (2) any additional newly

discovered or previously unavailable evidence, which also has been

stipulated into evidence (and consists of Exhibits 19-J to 33-J and the

three trial Exhibits admitted into evidence); and (3) the testimony taken

at trial, which was not part of the administrative record. See, e.g.,

Freman v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2023-10, at *10; Sleeth v.

Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2019-138, at *3, aff’d, 991 F.3d 1201 (11th

Cir. 2021). Ms. Walsh, as the requesting spouse, bears the burden of

proving that she is entitled to relief. See Rule 142(a); Porter, 132 T.C.

at 210.

III.

Relief Under Section 6015 for 2011 Through 2013

Under section 6015(a), a spouse may seek relief from joint and

several liability under section 6015(b) or, if eligible, may allocate

liability according to provisions set forth in section 6015(c). A taxpayer

who does not qualify for relief under section 6015(b) or (c) may seek

equitable relief under section 6015(f). § 6015(f)(1)(B); Porter, 132 T.C.

at 206.

The Walshes underpaid the income tax liabilities reported on

their joint Forms 1040 for 2011 through 2013 and understated the

liabilities for 2012 and 2013. The Walshes’ returns were selected for

examination resulting in the issuance of the Notice determining

deficiencies, additions to tax, and section 6662(a) accuracy-related

penalties for 2011 through 2013. The Walshes timely petitioned this

Court for review, and the Court entered a decision related to the

deficiencies for 2011 through 2013 on February 14, 2019. Consequently,

Ms. Walsh may be eligible for relief under section 6015(f) for 2011 and

section 6015(b), (c), or (f) for 2012 and 2013, unless she is barred by the

doctrine of res judicata. 4 For the reasons below, we find that Ms. Walsh

4 In Thurner v. Commissioner, 121 T.C. 43, 52 (2003), we held that “a claim for

equitable relief under section 6015(f) is subject to the same standards for the

application of the doctrine of res judicata that Congress imposed under section

6015(g)(2) with respect to claims for relief under section 6015(b) and (c).”

9

[*9] is ineligible for relief from joint and several liability for 2011

through 2013.

A.

The Applicability of the Doctrine of Res Judicata

Section 6015(g)(2) provides:

In the case of any election under subsection (b) or (c) or of

any request for equitable relief under subsection (f), if a

decision of a court in any prior proceeding for the same

taxable year has become final, such decision shall be

conclusive except with respect to the qualification of the

individual for relief which was not an issue in such

proceeding. The exception contained in the preceding

sentence shall not apply if the court determines that the

individual participated meaningfully in such prior

proceeding.

Res judicata is an affirmative defense developed by courts to bar

relitigation of the same cause of action. Kechijian v. Commissioner, T.C.

Memo. 2022-127, at *8. “Under the judicial doctrine of res judicata, when

a court of competent jurisdiction enters a final judgment on the merits

of a cause of action, the parties to the action are bound by every matter

that was or could have been offered and received to sustain or defeat the

claim.” Deihl v. Commissioner, 134 T.C. 156, 160 (2010) (citing

Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 597 (1948)). This doctrine is

applicable to Tax Court proceedings. Kechijian, T.C. Memo. 2022-127,

at *8. Because federal income tax is determined annually and each year

is a separate cause of action, applying res judicata bars subsequent

proceedings involving the same tax year. Deihl, 134 T.C. at 160 (citing

Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. at 597–98); see also Kechijian, T.C.

Memo. 2022-127, at *8.

For res judicata purposes, an agreed or stipulated judgment is a

judgment on the merits. Deihl, 134 T.C. at 160 (citing Baker v. IRS (In

re Baker), 74 F.3d 906, 910 (9th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (and cases cited

thereat)). Under the Supreme Court’s analysis in Sunnen, four

conditions must be met to preclude the relitigation of a claim:

(1) the parties in each action must be identical (or at least

be in privity); (2) a court of competent jurisdiction must

have rendered the first judgment; (3) the prior action must

have resulted in a final judgment on the merits; and (4) the

10

[*10] same cause of action or claim must be involved in both

suits.

Koprowski v. Commissioner, 138 T.C. 54, 62 (2012) (citing Commissioner

v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. at 597–98); see also Breland v. Commissioner, 152

T.C. 156, 160–61 (2019), aff’d, No. 23-12345, 2024 WL 2796450 (11th

Cir. May 31, 2024). “Once these conditions are met, each party is

prohibited from raising any claim or defense that was or could have been

raised as part of the litigation over the cause of action in the prior case.”

Koprowski, 138 T.C. at 62.

In this case the four conditions are satisfied: (1) Ms. Walsh was a

petitioner in the prior deficiency case before this Court, see Walsh v.

Commissioner, No. 19641-16; (2) this Court had jurisdiction over 2011

through 2013 in the prior case and rendered judgment for those years;

(3) this Court entered a decision that was a final judgment on the merits;

and (4) Ms. Walsh’s request for innocent spouse relief relates to the same

liabilities for the same taxable years that were at issue in the prior

proceeding. Accordingly, the doctrine of res judicata bars relitigation of

the 2011 through 2013 tax liabilities unless the section 6015(g)(2)

exception applies.

B.

Whether Section 6015(g)(2) Exception Applies

Under section 6015(g)(2) Ms. Walsh may avoid the preclusive

effect of res judicata if in the prior deficiency case (1) her claim for

innocent spouse relief was not an issue and (2) she did not participate

meaningfully. See Koprowski, 138 T.C. at 65; Deihl, 134 T.C. at 161;

Kechijian, T.C. Memo. 2022-127, at *10; see also Treas. Reg. § 1.60151(e) (providing that res judicata applies “if relief under section 6015 was

at issue in the prior proceeding, or if the requesting spouse meaningfully

participated in that proceeding and could have raised relief under

section 6015”). “[A] taxpayer that participated meaningfully in a prior

proceeding is barred from requesting relief under section 6015 for the

same taxable year after the decision of the Court has become final.”

Harbin v. Commissioner, 137 T.C. 93, 98 (2011). Ms. Walsh bears the

burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that she did not

participate meaningfully in the prior proceeding. See Deihl, 134 T.C.

at 162 (citing Monsour v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004-190). Ms.

Walsh did not raise the issue of innocent spouse relief in the previous

deficiency case. Accordingly, we must determine whether she

“participated meaningfully” in the prior Tax Court proceeding within

the meaning of section 6015(g)(2).

11

[*11] Meaningful participation is not defined in section 6015(g)(2) or in

the relevant Treasury regulations. Deihl, 134 T.C. at 162. Instead, we

“look[] to the totality of the facts and circumstances to determine

whether a taxpayer has participated meaningfully in a prior

proceeding.” Harbin, 137 T.C. at 98. The following factors are

particularly probative of meaningful participation:

(1) exercising exclusive control over the handling of the

prior proceeding; (2) having a high level of participation in

the prior proceeding (e.g., signing court documents and

participating in settlement negotiations); and (3) having

the opportunity to raise a claim for relief from joint and

several liability in the prior proceeding.

Kechijian, T.C. Memo. 2022-127, at *11 (first citing Harbin, 137 T.C.

at 98; and then citing Rogers v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2018-53,

at *97–98, aff’d, 9 F.4th 576 (7th Cir. 2021)); see also Deihl, 134 T.C.

at 164–65; Thurner, 121 T.C. at 53; Huynh v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.

2006-180, aff’d, 276 F. App’x 634 (9th Cir. 2008). We look to the

“taxpayer’s level of education and sophistication[,] . . . her knowledge or

understanding of the activities giving rise to the deficiency,” and

whether the “taxpayer was represented by counsel and communicated

with counsel at the prior proceeding.” Rogers, T.C. Memo. 2018-53,

at *98–99 (first citing Harbin, 137 T.C. at 98; then citing Deihl, 134 T.C.

at 163; then citing Monsour, T.C. Memo. 2004-190; and then citing

Deihl, 134 T.C. at 164).

Ms. Walsh participated meaningfully through her counsel in the

prior Tax Court proceeding. In Kechijian, T.C. Memo. 2022-127, at *12,

this Court found that a requesting spouse represented by counsel in a

prior Tax Court case had meaningfully participated because competent

legal counsel acted on her behalf. The requesting spouse’s lack of direct

participation in the prior proceeding did not affect whether she

meaningfully participated. Compare Rogers, T.C. Memo. 2018-53, at *99

(finding that the requesting spouse meaningfully participated through

counsel because her J.D. and M.B.A. degrees, tax and accounting

background, and knowledge of her husband’s business activities that

gave rise to the underpayment all demonstrated she understood the

proceedings), with Deihl, 134 T.C. at 158, 164 (finding that the

requesting spouse did not meaningfully participate despite being

represented by counsel because she did not review any filings,

participate in settlement negotiations, or sit in on meetings between her

attorneys and the IRS, and her lawyers did not explain the meaning of

12

[*12] the documents filed), and Harbin, 137 T.C. at 99 (finding that the

requesting spouse did not meaningfully participate through counsel

because there was a conflict of interest in representing the parties that

were in a contentious divorce and had adverse interests).

The Walshes were represented by Mr. Kaplan in the prior

proceeding, and Ms. Walsh benefited from his representation.

Mr. Kaplan filed the petition, executed joint stipulations, and negotiated

a settlement with the IRS on the Walshes’ behalf. The IRS allowed

deductions for $36,921 of additional business expenses specifically

related to Ms. Walsh’s interior design business for 2011 because of Mr.

Kaplan’s representation. Consequently, the parties’ settled with no

deficiency in income tax, section 6651(a)(1) addition to tax, or section

6662(a) accuracy-related penalty due from petitioners for 2011. For 2012

and 2013 the parties settled with the Walshes liable for reduced tax

deficiencies and section 6651(a) additions to tax but no section 6662(a)

accuracy-related penalties. The parties also agreed that the deficiency

for 2013 was attributable to unreported income from Ms. Walsh’s

business, Persolé.

Ms. Walsh’s testimony that she did not participate in the prior

proceedings is unconvincing and conflicts with the evidence in the

record. Ms. Walsh testified that she had no knowledge of the prior Tax

Court proceeding and that she was not involved with the examination

that led to the issuance of the Notice underlying those proceedings. To

the contrary, Ms. Walsh had personal knowledge of the items giving rise

to the deficiencies in the prior case that was critical to Mr. Kaplan’s

representation. The deficiency for 2013 was entirely attributable to Ms.

Walsh, and Mr. Kaplan was able to reduce the deficiency for 2011 to zero

by securing a deduction for Ms. Walsh’s business expenses, directly

contradicting her statement that Mr. Kaplan represented only

Mr. Walsh’s interests during the prior case. No evidence established a

conflict of interest in Mr. Kaplan’s representation of the Walshes before

this Court in the prior proceeding.

Ms. Walsh maintained that she had never met or communicated

with Mr. Kaplan but then later testified that she had corresponded with

him via email about the outstanding bill for his representation. She

argued that the judge in the divorce proceedings found that she did not

owe Mr. Kaplan for this bill because he did not represent her before the

Tax Court, but that contention is specious. The Superior Court judge

merely refused to make a finding of collectability of Mr. Kaplan’s bill for

legal services against either Ms. Walsh or Mr. Walsh because there was

13

[*13] insufficient evidence in the record. The Superior Court opined that

“it would have been quite simple to call [Mr. Kaplan] as a witness” to

substantiate the nature of his representation; however, neither

Mr. Walsh nor Ms. Walsh did so. Notably, Ms. Walsh also chose not to

call Mr. Kaplan as a witness in this case, leaving nothing to corroborate

her claims other than her own self-serving testimony and the evidence

in the record.

In addition Ms. Walsh was an active participant during the

examination that resulted in the issuance of the Notice in the prior

deficiency case. RA Kim conducted the examination of the Walshes’

2011, 2012, and 2013 Forms 1040. RA Kim testified that Ms. Walsh

called and requested examination documents in October 2015. RA Kim

further testified that she held a conference call in March 2016 with

Ms. Walsh to discuss the results of the examination report only three

months before the issuance of the Notice.

Ms. Walsh did not provide credible evidence or testimony to

corroborate her statements, and on the basis of the evidence in the

record, we find that she meaningfully participated in the prior

proceeding through legal counsel. Consequently, the section 6015(g)(2)

exception does not apply, and the doctrine of res judicata bars her claim

for relief from joint and several liability under section 6015. Accordingly,

Ms. Walsh is not eligible for relief under section 6015(b), (c), or (f) for

2011 through 2013.

IV.

Relief Under Section 6015(f) for 2014 Through 2016

Because Ms. Walsh is not entitled to relief under section 6015 for

2011 through 2013, we now turn to whether she is entitled to relief for

2014 through 2016. As stated above, section 6015(f) provides an

alternative means for innocent spouse relief for a requesting spouse who

does not otherwise qualify for relief under section 6015(b) or (c).

§ 6015(f)(1)(B). Section 6015(f) permits relief from joint and several

liability if it would be inequitable to hold the requesting spouse liable

for any unpaid tax or deficiency (or any portion thereof) after considering

all the facts and circumstances. § 6015(f)(1)(A); Porter, 132 T.C. at 206;

Treas. Reg. § 1.6015-4(a). Because the liabilities for 2014 through 2016

are based solely on underpayments of income tax, Ms. Walsh is eligible

for relief under section 6015(f) for only these three taxable years.

Treasury Regulation § 1.6015-4(c) directs us to Rev. Proc. 201334, 2013-43 I.R.B. 397, modifying and superseding Rev. Proc. 2003-61,

14

[*14] 2003-2 C.B. 296, modifying and superseding Rev. Proc. 2000-15,

2000-1 C.B. 447, for guidance on the section 6015(f) analysis. Although

we are not bound by the eligibility guidelines set forth in Rev. Proc.

2013-34, we will analyze Ms. Walsh’s request under these guidelines to

ascertain whether she satisfies the requirements for relief under section

6015(f). See Pullins, 136 T.C. at 439; see also Jones v. Commissioner,

T.C. Memo. 2019-139, at *13–14, aff’d, No. 20-70013, 2022 WL 327473

(9th Cir. Feb. 3, 2022).

Rev. Proc. 2013-34 sets forth a three-step analysis for evaluating

section 6015(f) claims for relief. See Freman, T.C. Memo. 2023-10, at *21.

The requesting spouse must first satisfy the seven threshold

requirements under Rev. Proc. 2013-34, § 4.01, 2013-43 I.R.B. at 399.

The requesting spouse must then satisfy either the three-part test for

streamlined relief under Rev. Proc. 2013-34, § 4.02, 2013-43 I.R.B.

at 400, or, if the requesting spouse does not satisfy the test for

streamlined relief, the requesting spouse may still qualify for relief from

joint and several liability if it would be inequitable to hold him or her

liable in the light of all of the facts and circumstances under Rev. Proc.

2013-34, § 4.03, 2013-43 I.R.B. at 400. See Freman, T.C. Memo. 2023-10,

at *21.

Ms. Walsh bears the burden of proof with respect to her request

for relief under section 6015(f). See Rule 142(a); Porter, 132 T.C. at 210.

For the reasons stated below, we find it would not be inequitable to hold

Ms. Walsh liable for 2014 through 2016.

A.

Threshold Requirements

To be eligible for section 6015(f) relief, the requesting spouse must

satisfy the following threshold conditions: (1) the requesting spouse

must have filed a joint return for the years for which she is requesting

relief; (2) relief is not available under section 6015(b) or (c); (3) the

deadline for filing a claim for relief has been met; (4) the spouses made

no fraudulent asset transfers; (5) the nonrequesting spouse did not

transfer disqualified assets to the requesting spouse; (6) the requesting

spouse did not knowingly participate in filing a fraudulent joint return;

and (7) the tax liability is partially or fully attributable to the

nonrequesting spouse. See Rev. Proc. 2013-34, § 4.01. “If the liability is

partially attributable to the requesting spouse, then relief can only be

considered for the portion of the liability attributable to the

nonrequesting spouse.” Id. § 4.01(7), 2013-43 I.R.B. at 399.

15

[*15] For 2014 through 2016, the Walshes elected to file joint returns.

Because the liabilities for 2014 through 2016 are based on

underpayments of income tax, Ms. Walsh is not eligible for relief under

section 6015(b) or (c). Further, Ms. Walsh filed a timely claim for relief

for 2014 through 2016, and there is no evidence that the Walshes

transferred assets as part of a fraudulent scheme, that Mr. Walsh

transferred disqualified assets to Ms. Walsh, or that they knowingly

filed a fraudulent return. See Rev. Proc. 2013-34, § 4.01(1)–(6), 2013-43

I.R.B. at 399. Finally, the parties stipulated that the income tax

liabilities for 2014 through 2016 are attributable to underpayments

resulting from Mr. Walsh’s income. See id. § 4.01(7).

B.

Streamlined Determination

Where, as here, the threshold conditions are satisfied, Rev. Proc.

2013-34, § 4.02, sets forth circumstances under which the IRS will make

a streamlined determination granting equitable relief to the requesting

spouse under section 6015(f) if the requesting spouse can establish that

she (1) is no longer married to the nonrequesting spouse; (2) would suffer

economic hardship if relief were not granted; and (3) did not know or

have reason to know that the nonrequesting spouse would not or could

not pay the underpayment of tax reported on the joint income tax return.

The requesting spouse must establish that she satisfies each of the three

conditions to receive a streamlined determination granting relief. Rev.

Proc. 2013-34, § 4.02.

1.

Marital Status Requirement

The first requirement is met if the requesting spouse is no longer

married to the nonrequesting spouse. Id. § 4.02(1). Because Ms. Walsh

received a judgment of dissolution in 2021 and is divorced, this factor

favors relief.

2.

Economic Hardship Requirement

For the reasons stated below, we find that Ms. Walsh would not

suffer economic hardship if relief were not granted; therefore, not all the

streamlined determination conditions are satisfied. Economic hardship

exists if satisfaction of the tax liability, in whole or in part, would result

in the requesting spouse’s being unable to meet her reasonable basic

living expenses. Id. § 4.02(2), 4.03(2)(b), 2013-43 I.R.B at 400, 401. If

denying relief would not cause the requesting spouse economic hardship,

this condition for streamlined relief is not satisfied. Id. § 4.02(2). Where

the requesting spouse’s income is below 250% of the federal poverty

16

[*16] guidelines, this factor will weigh in favor of relief, unless the

requesting spouse has assets to make payments towards the tax liability

and still adequately meet any reasonable basic living expenses. Id.

§ 4.02(2), 4.03(2)(b); see also Contreras v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.

2019-12, at *16–17.

Additionally, if neither of the foregoing conditions is met, then the

Court will also consider additional factors such as (1) the taxpayer’s age

and earning potential; (2) an amount reasonably necessary for food,

clothing, housing, medical expenses, and transportation; (3) the assets

available to pay the taxpayer’s expenses; (4) the cost of living in the

taxpayer’s geographical area; and (5) any other factors bearing on

economic hardship. Rev. Proc. 2013-34, § 4.02(2) (citing id. § 4.03(2)(b)

(“Whether the requesting spouse will suffer economic hardship is

determined based on rules similar to those provided in Treas. Reg.

§ 301.6343-1(b)(4) . . . .”)).

At the time of trial Ms. Walsh testified that she received $7,100

per month in spousal support, consisting of $6,400 in alimony and $700

in arrearages. Ms. Walsh also received distributions from her retirement

account totaling $48,200 and earned income from renting out her

apartment in 2022. Under the 2023 federal poverty guidelines, a

household with two persons in the contiguous 48 states has a poverty

threshold of $19,720, and 250% of that threshold is $49,300. See 42

U.S.C. § 9902(2); see also Annual Update of the HHS Poverty Guidelines,

88 Fed. Reg. 3424 (Jan. 19, 2023). Ms. Walsh’s monthly income of $7,100

per month—$85,200 per year—significantly exceeds the 250%

threshold. Ms. Walsh claims that her current monthly expenses total

$10,639, including rent for her Newport Beach apartment, but she

provided only vague assertions to corroborate that expense amount. We

find that Ms. Walsh has not established that she would suffer actual

economic hardship if she was required to pay any part of the tax liability

for the years in issue.

Moreover, Ms. Walsh has not established that she would face

present hardship if she were not granted relief. We determine that

Ms. Walsh has not established that any additional factors regarding her

financial position warrant a finding that it would be inequitable to

maintain joint and several liability. Therefore, this condition for

streamlined relief is not satisfied. Since the requirements under Rev.

Proc. 2013-34, § 4.02, are conjunctive and Ms. Walsh fails to meet the

economic hardship requirement of the streamlined determination, we

determine that she is not entitled to a streamlined determination.

17

[*17] C.

Full Equitable Relief Analysis

For cases in which the threshold conditions are met but the

requesting spouse is not eligible for a streamlined determination, Rev.

Proc. 2013-34, § 4.03(2), 2013-43 I.R.B at 400, sets forth seven

nonexclusive factors to be considered in determining whether the

requesting spouse is entitled to equitable relief under section 6015(f).

Those factors are (1) the taxpayer’s marital status, (2) whether the

requesting spouse will suffer economic hardship absent relief,

(3) whether the requesting spouse had knowledge or reason to know that

the nonrequesting spouse would not or could not pay the income tax

liabilities, (4) whether either spouse had a legal obligation to pay the

liabilities, (5) whether the requesting spouse significantly benefited

from the underpayments, (6) whether the requesting spouse has

complied with income tax laws in the years following those to which the

request for relief relates, and (7) the mental or physical health of the

requesting spouse. Rev. Proc. 2013-34, § 4.03(2). These factors are to be

weighted appropriately, and no one factor is determinative. Id.; see also

Thomas v. Commissioner, 162 T.C. 9, 29 (2024) (citing Yancey v.

Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2017-59, at *19 (collecting cases)).

The Commissioner contends that three factors—economic

hardship, legal obligation, and mental or physical health—are neutral

factors. The Commissioner concedes that the marital factor weighs in

favor of relief. The Commissioner does maintain that the factors for

knowledge or reason to know that the nonrequesting spouse would not

or could not pay the income tax liabilities, significant benefit, and

compliance with tax laws weigh against relief. We agree with the

Commissioner.

1.

Neutral Factors

a.

Economic Hardship

This factor weighs in favor of relief when a failure to grant relief

from joint and several liability would cause the requesting spouse to be

unable to pay reasonable basic living expenses. Rev. Proc. 2013-34,

§ 4.03(2)(b). If denying relief would not cause the requesting spouse

economic hardship, this factor is neutral. Id. As discussed supra

Part IV.B.2, Ms. Walsh has not presented sufficient evidence to prove

her claim of economic hardship. Therefore, this factor is neutral.

18

b.

[*18]

Legal Obligation

This factor favors relief where the nonrequesting spouse has the

sole obligation to pay an outstanding federal tax liability pursuant to a

divorce decree or other legally binding agreement. Rev. Proc. 2013-34,

§ 4.03(2)(d), 2013-43 I.R.B. at 402. This factor is neutral where both

spouses have such an obligation, or the divorce decree or agreement is

silent as to any such obligation. Id. Under the terms of the divorce

decree, both spouses have a legal obligation to pay one-half of the tax

liability. Thus, this factor is neutral.

c.

Mental or Physical Health

This factor weighs in favor of relief if the requesting spouse was

in poor physical or mental health when the returns from which she seeks

relief were filed, or at the time she requested relief. Id. § 4.03(2)(g), 201343 I.R.B. at 403. If the requesting spouse was in neither poor mental nor

physical health, this factor is neutral. Id. The Court also considers a

taxpayer’s mental and physical health at the time of trial. See Pullins,

136 T.C. at 454; Bell v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2011-152, 2011 WL

2600899, at *18. The record before us establishes that Ms. Walsh was

not suffering from any mental or physical health problems when the

returns were filed, when she requested relief, or at the time of trial.

Accordingly, this factor is neutral.

2.

Factor in Favor of Relief: Marital Status

As discussed supra Part IV.B.1 and as conceded by the

Commissioner, Ms. Walsh is divorced from Mr. Walsh. Thus, this factor

weighs in favor of relief. See Rev. Proc. 2013-34, § 4.03(2)(a), 2013-43

I.R.B. at 400.

3.

Factors Weighing Against Relief

a.

Knowledge or Reason to Know

For underpayment cases, we determine whether the requesting

spouse knew or had reason to know that the nonrequesting spouse would

not or could not pay the tax liability within a reasonable time after the

return was filed. Id. § 4.03(2)(c)(ii), 2013-43 I.R.B. at 401. This factor

weighs in favor of relief if the requesting spouse reasonably expected the

nonrequesting spouse to pay the tax liability reported on the return. Id.

A reasonable expectation of payment will be presumed if the spouses

submitted a request for an installment agreement to pay the tax

19

[*19] reported as due on the return by the later of 90 days after the due

date for payment of the tax, or 90 days after the return was filed. Id. The

installment plan request must “detail the plan for paying the tax,

interest, and penalties, satisfy the liability within a reasonable time,

and it must not be unreasonable for the requesting spouse to believe that

the nonrequesting spouse will be able to make the payments

contemplated in the requested installment agreement.” Id.

This factor, however, weighs against relief if, on the basis of the

facts and circumstances, it was not reasonable for the requesting spouse

to believe that the nonrequesting spouse would or could pay the tax

liability reported on the return. Id. Relevant factors include the

requesting spouse’s knowledge of “the nonrequesting spouse’s prior

bankruptcies, financial difficulties, or other issues with the Service or

other creditors,” as well as knowledge of the nonrequesting spouse’s

inability to timely pay bills. Id.

The facts and circumstances analysis also includes but is not

limited to

the requesting spouse’s level of education, any deceit or

evasiveness of the nonrequesting spouse, the requesting

spouse’s degree of involvement in the activity generating

the income tax liability, the requesting spouse’s

involvement in business or household financial matters,

the requesting spouse’s business or financial expertise, and

any lavish or unusual expenditures compared with past

spending levels.

Id. § 4.03(2)(c)(iii), 2013-43 I.R.B. at 402; see Thomas, 162 T.C. at 30;

see also Severance v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2023-101, at *16

(finding that the requesting spouse’s involvement in providing tax

documents to the tax preparer, military experience, and management of

the family’s finances weighed against relief); Minton v. Commissioner,

T.C. Memo. 2018-15, at *13–15.

Taxpayers have a duty of inquiry into the amounts of their tax

liabilities. Price v. Commissioner, 887 F.2d 959, 965 (9th Cir. 1989);

Butler v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 276, 284 (2000); Wiener v.

Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2008-230. This Court has consistently held

that a requesting spouse cannot “play the ‘ostrich, hiding her head in

the proverbial sand.’” Wang v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2014-206,

at *24 (quoting Doyle v. Commissioner, 94 F. App’x 949, 952 (3d Cir.

20

[*20] 2004), aff’g T.C. Memo. 2003-96); see also Jones, T.C. Memo. 2019139, at *19. In other words, innocent spouse relief is not available to

those who choose to ignore information in their possession. Pocock v.

Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2022-55, at *24 (first citing Charlton v.

Commissioner, 114 T.C. 333, 340 (2000); and then citing Sleeth, T.C.

Memo. 2019-138, at *12). Indeed, “[a] taxpayer may not obtain the

benefits of joint filing status but then obtain relief from joint and several

liability by ignoring or avoiding facts fully disclosed on a return she

signed.” Pullins, 136 T.C. at 444 (citing Hayman v. Commissioner, 992

F.2d 1256, 1262 (2d Cir. 1993), aff’g T.C. Memo. 1992-228).

“In determining whether a taxpayer knew or should have known

that a tax liability would not be paid, we impute to a taxpayer knowledge

of what she could have gleaned from tax returns she signed, had she

taken the time to review them.” Hudgins v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.

2012-260, at *18–19 (citing Porter v. Commissioner, 132 T.C. at 211–12).

In Hudgins, T.C. Memo. 2012-260, at *19–20, the Court held that the

requesting spouse, who conceded that she was unaware that there was

tax due at the time the return was signed, did not have a reasonable

belief that the tax liability would be paid when she signed the return

because she did not examine the return before signing it.

Ms. Walsh knew that the couple owed liabilities to the IRS.

Although she testified that Mr. Walsh was paying $400 a month on an

installment plan, she did not provide any evidence of when that

installment agreement began, how long it was expected to continue,

whether they were current on payments, or whether the plan was still

in existence. Thus, Ms. Walsh has failed to provide the requisite

information for the reasonable expectation presumption to apply.

Ms. Walsh must demonstrate that she reasonably expected that the

liability would be paid. She has failed to carry that burden; and to the

contrary, in analyzing all the facts and circumstances, we find this factor

weighs against relief.

Much like the requesting spouse in Hudgins, Ms. Walsh contends

that she had no knowledge that the returns for the years in issue showed

tax due and that she never examined the returns. Ms. Walsh not only

signed the returns but was actively involved in the family finances and

tax preparation. She knew that Mr. Carlin prepared their Forms 1040

because she sent him the permission to e-file the returns for 2014

through 2016. Ms. Walsh helped prepare the Forms 1040 by gathering

and providing to Mr. Carlin her business income and expense

information, home mortgage interest statements, and property tax

21

[*21] documents. She had the financial and business sophistication to

establish Persolé and an interior design business. She also was a

licensed real estate agent and had sold at least one home at the time of

trial. She had a duty to inspect the returns for the years in issue, and

she failed to do so.

In addition, Ms. Walsh knew that Mr. Walsh had a history of

deceiving and hiding money from the IRS. She was also aware that he

had a history of not paying his debts, such as the money owed to the

California Franchise Tax Board for state tax liabilities and outstanding

attorney’s fees due to Mr. Kaplan. Ms. Walsh was further aware that

Mr. Walsh was using his business account to pay for her Maserati and

other personal expenses. Given the foregoing, it was not reasonable for

Ms. Walsh to believe that Mr. Walsh would or could pay the tax

liabilities reported on the returns. On the basis of the foregoing, this

factor weighs against relief.

Notwithstanding Ms. Walsh’s knowledge of her and Mr. Walsh’s

underpayments for the years in issue, her knowledge may be negated,

and this factor will weigh in Ms. Walsh’s favor, if she proves that

Mr. Walsh abused her or maintained control of the household finances.

See Rev. Proc. 2013-34, § 4.03(2)(c)(ii). Control would be exhibited if

Mr. Walsh restricted Ms. Walsh’s access to financial information and

prevented her from questioning or challenging payment of the liabilities.

See Thomas, 162 T.C. at 30 (citing Rev. Proc. 2013-34, § 4.03(2)(c)(ii));

see also Pocock, T.C. Memo. 2022-55, at *25. The Court considers all

facts and circumstances in determining the presence of abuse, see Rev.

Proc. 2013-34, § 4.03(2)(c)(iv), 2013-43 I.R.B. at 402, and requires

substantiation, or at a minimum, specificity, regarding allegations of

abuse, Thomas, 162 T.C. at 30-31 (citing Nihiser v. Commissioner, T.C.

Memo. 2008-135, 2008 WL 2120983, at *9). “A generalized claim of

abuse is insufficient.” Pocock, T.C. Memo. 2022-55, at *26 (first citing

Thomassen v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2011-88, aff’d, 564 F. App’x

885 (9th Cir. 2014); and then citing Knorr v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.

2004-212)).

Ms. Walsh made only general statements about Mr. Walsh’s

control of the tax issues by changing their IRS mailing address to the

Office Address. As stated above, we find these contentions unconvincing

and contrary to the evidence in the record. Ms. Walsh testified that

Mr. Walsh was financially and emotionally abusive and would withhold

her alimony payments, but on the basis of the evidence in the record, we

find this occurred after the marriage was dissolved. Ms. Walsh did not

22

[*22] allege or demonstrate that Mr. Walsh was abusive during their

marriage. Accordingly, Ms. Walsh’s reason to know is not outweighed by

the presence of abuse or financial control, and the knowledge factor

weighs against relief.

b.

No Significant Benefit Factor

This factor considers whether the requesting spouse benefited

significantly from the unpaid federal income tax liability and weighs

against relief if the requesting spouse enjoyed the benefit of a lavish

lifestyle because of the tax underpayment. Rev. Proc. 2013-34,

§ 4.03(2)(e), 2013-43 I.R.B. at 402. This factor is neutral if the tax

underpayment was small. Id. “A significant benefit is any benefit in

excess of normal support.” Treas. Reg. § 1.6015-2(d). Living a lavish

lifestyle is living a lifestyle in excess of normal support. See Rev. Proc.

2013-34, § 4.03(2)(e). Owning “luxury assets and taking expensive

vacations” are examples of a lavish lifestyle that would weigh against

relief. Id.

In Thomas this Court found that the requesting spouse lived a

lavish lifestyle because she drove a 2013 Land Rover, owned two

properties in desirable areas, and took European vacations. The Court

held that this factor weighed against relief because the taxpayers’

underpayments allowed them to afford an affluent lifestyle and the

requesting spouse significantly benefited as a result. Thomas, 162 T.C.

at 31–33.

Ms. Walsh and Mr. Walsh lived a lavish lifestyle between 2011

and 2016. They purchased and lived in their $1.4 million newly

constructed family home from 2006 until their separation in 2017. In

2011 they purchased a Marin County Country Club membership for

$25,000 and paid yearly dues for the membership thereafter. They also

held season tickets to San Francisco Giants baseball games. At the time

of their separation, Ms. Walsh owned a Maserati and Mr. Walsh owned

a BMW. Between 2011 and 2016, Ms. Walsh’s children attended private

school.

The Walshes afforded their lavish lifestyle in part by not paying

their income tax for 2014 through 2016. The superior court judge found

that the Walshes’ annual underpayments of income tax permitted them

to maintain their lavish lifestyle. We similarly determine that because

the Walshes did not pay their tax liabilities, they were able to maintain

their lavish lifestyle for the years in issue. Accordingly, Ms. Walsh

23

[*23] received a significant benefit because of their underpayments of

income tax for the years in issue. This factor weighs against relief.

c.

Compliance with Income Tax Laws

This factor weighs in favor of relief if the requesting spouse

complied with the income tax laws for taxable years after divorcing the

nonrequesting spouse. Rev. Proc. 2013-34, § 4.03(2)(f)(i), 2013-43 I.R.B.

at 402. If the requesting spouse is not in compliance, this factor will

weigh against relief, unless she made a good faith effort to comply with

the tax laws but was unable to fully comply. Id. Ms. Walsh was not in

compliance and did not make a good faith effort to comply with tax laws

in the years following her divorce.

The Walshes separated in January 2017, and on December 12,

2017, Ms. Walsh filed her petition for dissolution of marriage. She did

not timely file her 2017 through 2020 Forms 1040 and has outstanding

account balances for those years. As of the time of trial she had

accumulated account balances plus accruals of $809 for 2017, $3,004 for

2018, $22,064 for 2019, and $8,931 for 2020. Further, Ms. Walsh omitted

income from her 2021 Form 1040. She reported only $910 in total

income, but she confirmed receiving $67,332 in alimony payments,

$27,450 in unemployment compensation, a divorce equalization

payment of $122,751, and a $16,155 distribution from her trust account

in 2021. As of the time of trial Ms. Walsh had not filed her 2022 Form

1040.

Ms. Walsh did not provide a reason for being unable to timely file

her returns for 2017 through 2020. As for her underreporting on her

2021 return, Ms. Walsh testified that she did not know that her alimony

was taxable income despite her divorce decree’s indicating the contrary

and her reporting it as income on her returns for 2018 through 2020.

Finally, Ms. Walsh has unpaid tax liabilities for the years following her

divorce. Therefore, this factor weighs against relief.

V.

Conclusion

In summary, the only factor weighing in favor of relief for

Ms. Walsh is that she is divorced. Ms. Walsh’s knowledge, the fact that

she benefited from her and Mr. Walsh’s nonpayment of the tax

liabilities, and her noncompliance with the federal income tax laws for

the years following 2016 all weigh against relief. The remaining factors

all are neutral. After weighing the above factors and examining the

entire record before us, we conclude that Ms. Walsh failed to carry her

24

[*24] burden and is not entitled to relief under section 6015(f) for 2014

through 2016.

All other contentions raised by the parties—to the extent not

discussed—are found to be irrelevant, moot, or without merit.

To reflect the foregoing,

An appropriate decision will be entered.