United States Tax Court

Agency decision

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

United States Tax Court

T.C. Memo. 2023-47

EDWIN L. GAGE AND ELAINE R. GAGE,

Petitioners

v.

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,

Respondent

—————

Docket No. 23874-17.

Filed April 12, 2023.

—————

Pamela K. Wheeler and Jeffery D. Trevillion, Jr., for petitioners.

G. Chad Barton, William F. Castor, and Vassiliki Economides Farrior,

for respondent.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

HOLMES, Judge: The United States, on behalf of the Department

of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), filed a complaint against

Edwin and Elaine Gage. The Gages tentatively settled in December

2012 and gave their lawyer a cashier’s check for the agreed amount

before the end of the year. The government sometimes works slowly, and

the tentative settlement didn’t become final until March 2013. Shortly

after, the Gages’ lawyer delivered the check.

When the Gages filed their return for 2012, they claimed a

business-loss deduction for the amount of the settlement.

The questions in this case are:

Served 04/12/23

2

[*2]

•

•

Is the $875,000 the Gages paid to settle with HUD deductible as

an ordinary and necessary business expense under section 162 1

for the tax year 2012?

If it isn’t, do the Gages owe a penalty for claiming the deduction?

Background

I.

Formation of RMG and the Regulatory Agreement with HUD

In February 1995 Edwin Gage incorporated RM&G, Inc. as an

Oklahoma corporation. In June 1995, he incorporated Heartland Care

Group, Inc., and it became RMG’s parent company. By the time of the

events that led to this case, the Gages jointly owned 30% of both RMG

and Heartland Care.

RMG paid $7.25 million for Heartland Health Care Center of

Bethany (Center), a nursing home in Bethany, Oklahoma, and for the

leases to nine other Oklahoma nursing homes. In July 1996, a wholly

owned subsidiary of RMG named Heartland of Bethany was itself

incorporated to help win a HUD-insured refinancing of the Center. After

RMG incorporated Heartland of Bethany, RMG transferred the Center

to it though RMG continued to manage the home itself.

In February 1997 Heartland of Bethany borrowed nearly

$5 million from Harry Mortgage Co. Harry Mortgage secured the loan

with a nonrecourse mortgage. HUD insured the mortgage, but wanted

to protect itself and so required RMG to operate as an identity-ofinterest management agent 2 for the management of the Center. HUD

also got both RMG and Heartland of Bethany to sign regulatory

1 We are compelled to cite some nontax law in this opinion. When we do so, we

will give full citations. Our “section” references without full citations are to the Internal

Revenue Code in effect for the year in issue, all regulation references are to the Code

of Federal Regulations, Title 26 (Treas. Reg.), in effect for the year in issue, and all

Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.

2 An identity-of-interest “is any relationship based on family ties or financial

interests between or among two or more entities involved in a project-related

transaction which reasonably gives rise to a presumption that the entities may not

operate at arms-length.” HUD, Healthcare Mortgage Insurance Program Section 232

of the National Housing Act: A HUD Handbook § I, Ch. 1.6, at 4 (2017),

https://www.hud.gov/sites/documents/42321HSGH.PDF.

3

[*3] agreements with HUD. The Gages themselves did not sign, but the

regulatory agreements designated them as owners.

These regulatory agreements are central to this case. HUD was

potentially on the hook for the mortgage—a mortgage that the Gages

and the other individual owners of the corporations involved definitely

were not. HUD wants to ensure that the people responsible for the

management of a nursing home don’t take so much money out of the

operation as to send the mortgage into foreclosure. The parties drafted

the regulatory agreement between HUD and Heartland of Bethany to

provide that Heartland of Bethany would not, without HUD’s prior

written approval, transfer or encumber the mortgaged property or

transfer any of the Center’s personal property. It could pay out any

funds only if there was a cash surplus or if the cash went to pay for

reasonable operating expenses and necessary repairs. The Agreement

prohibited Heartland of Bethany from receiving or keeping any assets

or income (except surplus cash) from the Center without HUD’s prior

written approval. The Agreement also made Heartland of Bethany’s

owners 3 personally responsible for retaining funds or otherwise

violating the regulatory agreement.

The regulatory agreement between HUD and RMG is similar to

the one that HUD had with Heartland of Bethany. It too provided that

HUD had to consent to any sublease or change or transfer in the

management, operation, or control of the Center. RMG also promised to

keep its own books in reasonable condition for proper audit with the

expectation that they would be “subject to examination and inspection

at any reasonable time” by HUD. RMG also promised to keep “copies of

all written contracts or other instruments which affected the mortgaged

property, all or any of which may be subject to inspection and

examination” by HUD.

II.

District Court Litigation

The deal worked as intended for a few years, but in 2003

Heartland of Bethany defaulted on the mortgage. That same year, Harry

Mortgage assigned the mortgage on the Center to HUD. HUD foreclosed

in 2004 and then sold the Center for just over $600,000. HUD’s loss on

the deal ended up being about $4 million.

3 The Agreement defined “Owners” to include Heartland of Bethany and its

successors, heirs and assigns.

4

[*4] Years passed. 4 The government wasn’t going to let the loss go,

and in 2010 it sued RMG’s owners in federal district court. See United

States v. Rich, No. 5:10-cv-990 (W.D. Okla. filed Sept. 13, 2010). It

sought double damages, costs, and fees under the National Housing Act,

12 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1750, and the Housing and Community Development

Act of 1987, § 421, Pub. L. No. 100-242, 101 Stat. 1815, 1913 (codified as

amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-4a), for the recovery of Center assets and

income. The government’s complaint alleged that the owners used the

Center’s assets and income in breach of the regulatory agreement terms.

The complaint also included a claim under federal common law for

unjust enrichment.

Negotiations ensued, and by August 2012 it looked like the case

would settle. The Gages, RMG’s other owners, and counsel for the

United States tentatively agreed to settle for $1.75 million, of which the

Gages would pay $875,000. The deal was expressly conditioned on final

approval by the Department of Justice, but it must have looked pretty

likely that the deal would work out—the magistrate judge who

supervised the settlement talks entered an order in which he noted that

a settlement conference was held and that the settlement was

contingent upon acceptance and approval by the DOJ. The district court

then entered an administrative closing order, which terminated the suit

without prejudice.

On December 27, 2012, the Gages purchased a cashier’s check in

the amount of $875,000 and delivered it to their lawyer. Their lawyer

emailed the Assistant U.S. Attorney who represented the government to

inform him that the check would soon be delivered. The Assistant U.S.

Attorney, however, explained that the United States did not have

authority to receive the cashier’s check before the settlement was finally

approved. The Gages’ lawyer held onto the check.

The DOJ reviewed the settlement agreement and finally signed it

in March 2013. The settlement agreement recited that the United States

alleged that the owners had used the Center’s assets and income in

violation of the regulatory agreements. It also recited that the owners

4 HUD held off on starting litigation because it first wanted to run an audit.

RMG’s owners did not at first provide subpoenaed records. But when the owners

received a draft audit report it prompted more back and forth on what documents

might still exist. After HUD issued its final audit report, RMG’s owners contended that

they had more records, albeit in a storage unit. The HUD auditor then met with a

representative from RMG in the storage locker to sift through disorganized boxes of

documents. This all took a while.

5

[*5] denied any wrongdoing. The settlement agreement expressly stated

that the United States was not agreeing to or in any way representing

how the settlement amount would affect the owners’ tax bill. It instead

stated that “[t]he Parties agree and acknowledge that the United States

has not made a representation, and nothing in this Agreement

constitutes a representation or agreement by the United States,

concerning the characterization of the Settlement Amount or this

Agreement for purposes of the Internal Revenue laws, Title 26 of the

United States Code.”

The Gages’ attorney then finally delivered the cashier’s check,

dated December 27, 2012, to the United States on March 18, 2013.

III.

Return and Audit

On their 2012 income tax return the Gages claimed a business

loss of more than $900,000 on Form 4797, Sales of Business Property,

the sum of the $875,000 payment and their legal fees. The Gages

included the payment as a 2012 loss because they delivered the check to

their attorney before the end of that year. The Commissioner disagreed,

and added a substantial-understatement penalty under section 6662.

The IRS sent the Gages a notice of deficiency. The Commissioner

has, however, conceded that the Gages’ legal fees are deductible. The

Gages have also conceded a minor issue, and the case was distilled into

a single question: Are the Gages entitled to deduct the $875,000 as a

business loss for 2012?

The Gages lived in Oklahoma when they filed their petition. 5

Discussion

The parties agreed to submit the case for decision under Rule 122.

The Gages argue that they are entitled to deduct the $875,000

settlement payment under section 162, which allows the deduction of

ordinary and necessary business expenses.

I.

Deductibility of the Settlement

The Commissioner has two arguments for why the settlement

amount is not deductible for 2012. The first is one of timing—he says

5 Appellate venue is therefore presumptively in the Tenth Circuit. See

§ 7482(b)(1)(A).

6

[*6] that the Gages’ check was not actually received by the government

until 2013. His second is that, even if the Gages are right about the

timing, they still can’t win because the settlement was one for punitive

damages. Punitive damages are nondeductible under section 162(f). The

Commissioner argues that the case against the Gages featured a plea

for double damages, and that this transforms the government’s recovery

into an award of punitive damages.

We’ll start with the timing issue. The Gages are cash-method

taxpayers. What this means is that they can take deductions only for

expenses that they actually paid, not that they merely incurred, during

a particular tax year. See Saviano v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. 955, 964

(1983) (“It is clear that a cash basis taxpayer cannot deduct an expense

incurred unless it has been paid during the taxable year”) (citing Treas.

Reg. § 1.461-1(a)(1)), aff’d, 765 F.2d 643 (7th Cir. 1985); see also § 446(a);

Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(c)(1)(i) (“Expenditures [by cash-method taxpayers]

are to be deducted for the taxable year in which actually made.”) There’s

a rule for payments by check as well—tax law treats a payment by check

as made when the check is delivered. See Guy v. Commissioner, 105

T.C.M. (CCH) 1626, 1628 (2013). If a check is dated in one year but

cashed in the next year, the deduction will not be allowed absent proof

of delivery in the year of the deduction. See Reynolds v. Commissioner,

79 T.C.M. (CCH) 1376, 1383 (2000), aff’d, 296 F.3d 607 (7th Cir. 2002). 6

The Gages did not themselves deliver the check to the

government at the end of 2012. They instead gave it to their lawyer to

deliver to the government when the settlement was finally approved.

(And one might, though the parties don’t, question whether the Gages

owed anything under the settlement at all before it was finally

approved.) Their lawyer delivered the check to the United States only

on March 18, 2013. A copy of the United States’s payment record

confirms that this is the date that the check was received. That check

was not cashed by the United States (i.e., actually paid) until March 22,

2013—after the DOJ reviewed and approved the agreement. The record

includes a copy of the check, dated December 27, 2012, and a copy of the

United States’s payment record, showing that the United States

received the Gages’ cashier’s check on March 18, 2013, and cashed it on

6 There is an important exception for people who wait till the end of the year

to make their charitable contributions. Those count in the year that the mailbox slot

slams shut. See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-1(b).

7

[*7] March 22, 2013. The payment record proves that the delivery was

made in 2013, not in 2012.

That would seem to end the matter. But the Gages argue that

under Oklahoma law a payment is made when there is a tender of

payment. They purchased a cashier’s check and delivered it to their

attorney in the case who then offered to give it to the Assistant U.S.

Attorney who worked the case. He said that he could not hold the check

since the settlement agreement had not been approved. The Gages argue

that under Oklahoma law, this uncontested sequence of events is a

tender of payment.

We don’t need to review Oklahoma law because what constitutes

delivery of a check made in settlement of a federal lawsuit brought by

the federal government is, we hold, a matter of federal, not state, law.

There are a few reasons. The first is that the litigation here was between

an agency of the federal government and a taxpayer. See Trout v.

Commissioner, 131 T.C. 239, 251 (2008) (citing Boyle v. United Techs.

Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 504 (1988)) (finding that litigation between the

federal government agency and a taxpayer is a factor that weighs in

favor of using federal common law). This may not be decisive, but it

weighs in favor of using federal law. Id.

The second reason is that settlements are contracts, and this

contract was entered into under federal law. It was between a federal

government agency and the Gages, and it was brought under a federal

statute to protect a federal financial interest by the DOJ under its own

procedures for approval of settlements. The federal government settles

cases all over this broad land, and caselaw tells us that this means there

is a strong interest in nationwide uniformity and therefore a need to use

federal common law to develop and maintain a uniform law of

settlements. See id. at 251 (first citing Boyle, 487 U.S. at 504; and then

citing United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 726, 728

(1979)) (“[A] federal government agency as litigant, contracts entered

into under federal law, and the need for nationwide uniformity in

administration, all point us to the federal common law of contracts as

our source of rules.”). All of these factors point toward using federal law

to decide when the Gages paid the settlement. 7

7 We do note some lack of clarity in Tenth Circuit caselaw about whether

federal common law or state law generally governs the interpretation of a settlement

agreement where the United States is a party. In United States v. McCall, 235 F.3d

8

[*8] Because we disallowed the deduction on timing alone, we do not

need to decide whether the settlement was for punitive or compensatory

damages.

II.

Penalty

All that remains is the question of whether the Gages owe an

accuracy-related penalty under section 6662(a).

Section 6662(a) imposes a 20% penalty for underpayments due to

“any substantial understatement of income tax.” See § 6662(b)(2).

Whether the Commissioner met his burden of production in this case is

a simple math problem. An understatement of tax is “substantial” if it

exceeds the greater of $5,000 or “10 percent of the tax required to be

shown on the return.” § 6662(d)(1)(A). The tax required to be shown on

the return is about $180,000, and 10% of that is about $18,000. This

means that the understatement is way more than 10%, and we find that

the Gages did substantially understate their income tax liability for

2012. 8

The Gages argue, however, that they claimed the deduction

reasonably and in good faith, which is a defense to a section 6662(a)

penalty. See § 6664(c)(1). The regulation tells us to look at all the

relevant facts and circumstances. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(b)(1). One

circumstance that indicates reasonable cause and good faith is an honest

misunderstanding of fact or law that is reasonable in light of all of the

facts and circumstances, including the experience, knowledge, and

education of the taxpayer. Id. An important factor for us to look for is

1211, 1215 (10th Cir. 2000), that court held that state law governed the interpretation

of an agreement that settled a federal claim. In an earlier case, however, the same

court held that “[f]ederal common law governs the enforcement and interpretation of

[Title VII claims] because the ‘rights of the litigants and the operative legal policies

derive from a federal source.’” Snider v. Circle K Corp., 923 F.2d 1404, 1407 (10th Cir.

1991) (quoting Fulgence v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 662 F.2d 1207, 1209 (5th Cir.

1981)), superseded by statute on other grounds, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No.

102-166, 105 Stat. 1071. This possible lack of clarity doesn’t bother us too much here,

because not only did the Gages’ settlement settle a federal claim; it settled a federal

claim of the federal government. This means that all the factors that courts have

identified as directing the use of federal common law point in one direction.

8 The Commissioner also bears the burden of proving that he complied with

section 6751. See Chai v. Commissioner, 851 F.3d 190, 221 (2d Cir. 2017), aff’g in part,

rev’g in part T.C. Memo 2015-42; see also Graev v. Commissioner, 149 T.C. 485, 493

(2017), supplementing and overruling in part 147 T.C. 460 (2016). The parties

stipulated that he did so.

9

[*9] the extent of the taxpayer’s efforts to figure out his proper tax

liability. Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 448–49 (2001).

We therefore must look at whether the Gages had reasonable

cause and good faith on two distinct issues:

•

claiming the deduction for 2012 instead of for 2013; and

•

taking the position that the settlement payment was an ordinary

and necessary business expense.

A.

Timing

The Gages paid for the cashier’s check on December 27, 2012.

They argue that the funds effectively left their control as soon as they

bought it.

The record we have shows the Gages are competent, skilled

business people able to organize and operate two different corporations,

but that they are not learned in tax law. We do find it more likely than

not that they delivered the check to their attorney with the intent of

fulfilling the terms of the settlement agreement. From their perspective

they were out the $875,000 when they bought the check and gave it to

their lawyer. We think their reporting position on the timing issue was

reasonable under the circumstances, and that they acted in good faith

in thinking they’d made the payment in 2012. 9

B.

Ordinary and Necessary Business Expense

That’s not the end of the penalty analysis, because the

Commissioner says they were wrong not only about the year they

claimed the deduction but in thinking they had a right to claim it at all.

To figure this out, we have to give a bit of background on the legal issue

involved. Section 162(a) allows taxpayers to deduct all ordinary and

necessary business expenses. There is an exception, however, in section

162(f) which states that “[n]o deduction shall be allowed under

subsection (a) for any fine or similar penalty paid to a government for

the violation of any law.” (Emphasis added.) Treasury Regulation

§ 1.162-21(b)(1)(ii) and (iii) defines the phrase “fine or similar penalty”

for the purposes of section 162(f) as including an amount paid as a civil

9 In their briefs they also mentioned, albeit in passing, that their CPA saw that

a check had been issued and reasonably assumed it had been delivered. Since this fact

was not stipulated, we cannot consider it in our analysis.

10

[*10] penalty imposed by federal, state, or local law and an amount paid

in settlement of the taxpayer’s actual or potential liability for a fine or

penalty (civil or criminal). Treasury Regulation § 1.162-21(b)(2), on the

other hand, provides that “[c]ompensatory damages . . . paid to a

government do not constitute a fine or penalty.” The Commissioner

argues that the settlement payment is a “fine or similar penalty” while

the Gages argue it was “compensatory.”

We have held that civil penalties “imposed for purposes of

enforcing the law and as punishment for the violation thereof” are

“similar” to penalties under section 162(f). Huff v. Commissioner, 80 T.C.

804, 824 (1983) (quoting S. Pac. Trans. Co. v. Commissioner, 75 T.C. 497,

652 (1980), supplemented by 82 T.C. 122 (1984)). On the other hand, we

have held that some civil payments, although labeled “penalties”,

remain deductible if “imposed to encourage prompt compliance with a

requirement of the law, or as a remedial measure to compensate another

party.” Id.; see also Middle Atl. Distribs., Inc. v. Commissioner, 72 T.C.

1136, 1143 (1979) (finding the purpose of a fine or similar penalty under

section 162(f) to “punish and/or deter”).

Our characterization of a payment under section 162(f) depends

on the origin of the liability giving rise to it. Waldman v. Commissioner,

88 T.C. 1384, 1389 (1987) (first citing Bailey v. Commissioner, 756 F.2d

44, 47 (6th Cir. 1985); and then citing Middle Atl. Distribs., 72 T.C. at

1144–45), aff’d per order, 850 F.2d 611 (9th Cir. 1988). If the origin of

the liability is a law designed to compensate an injured party for its

damages, then section 162(f) is likely inapplicable. See, e.g., Mason &

Dixon Lines, Inc. v. United States, 708 F.2d 1043, 1047–48 (6th Cir.

1983) (liquidated damages for violating state truck-weight limits

compensatory). If the origin of the liability is a law designed to punish

or deter conduct committed by the taxpayer, then the payment is likely

nondeductible under section 162(f). See, e.g., True v. United States, 894

F.2d 1197, 1205 (10th Cir. 1990) (“on balance” Federal Water Pollution

Control Act damages are a penalty because they serve “a deterrent and

retributive function similar to a criminal fine”); Huff, 80 T.C. at 824

(civil penalty punitive because statute designed to penalize).

The relevant law here is the National Housing Act, 12

U.S.C. §§ 1701–1750, and section 421 of the Housing and Community

Development Act of 1987, 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-4a. It allows the United

States to recover double damages, costs, and fees for breach of a

regulatory agreement with HUD. The United States also sought in its

11

[*11] complaint recovery under federal common-law theories of unjust

enrichment, fraud, disgorgement of profits, recoupment, and restitution.

The caselaw is unclear about what purpose the recovery of double

damages might serve. The Second Circuit has held that that “[t]he

purpose underlying the equity[-]skimming statue[10]was to provide the

government with a greater deterrent by affording it an additional

remedy beyond the traditional remedies of foreclosure and suit for

breach of contract.” Livecchi, 771 F.3d at 352 (emphasis added) (quoting

United States v. Livecchi, No. 03-CV-6451P, 2005 WL 2420350, at *7

(W.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2005)). The First Circuit, however, limits recovery

of double damages to only a subset of cases brought under the statute.

In United States v. Cofield, 215 F.3d 164, 171 (1st Cir. 2000), it explained

that “[d]ouble damages for the government on a deterrence rational

make sense primarily where the defendant is guilty of substantial or

repeated fault.” A district court in that circuit acknowledged that the

attorney general may, not must, recover double the value of the assets

and income of the property, and whether to award double damages in

any potential case is ultimately left to the discretion of the trial court.

See United States v. Giordano, 898 F. Supp. 2d 440, 468 (D.R.I. 2012).

We conclude from this that the double-damages provision under

which the government sued the Gages may serve both to compensate the

government and to punish. We also conclude that is not clear from the

text of the statute or the caselaw construing it which purpose was

present in the Gage’s settlement.

And the terms of the settlement itself don’t help us much either.

The agreement specified that the Gages in conjunction with other

owners were responsible for paying the United States $1.75 million by

certified check on the effective date of the agreement. 11 It promised to

release the Gages from any civil or administrative monetary claim once

they fully paid. But there ends any help it might give us in

characterizing the settlement.

We have one last place to look. When a settlement agreement is

silent on the character of the payment, we have looked for other evidence

10 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-4a has been described as an equity-skimming statute. See

United States v. Livecchi, 711 F.3d 345, 352 (2d Cir. 2013).

11 The settlement agreement was entered into between the United States and

the owners of the Center. The agreement required the Gages and one other couple to

collectively satisfy the $1.75 million settlement amount.

12

[*12] of the parties’ intent. See Ziroli v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.

2022-75, at *10. We have looked in other cases at documents sent

between the parties that describe settlement negotiations, or relied on

parties’ testimony about their negotiations. But we have none of that

here: This case was submitted under Rule 122. There is no

documentation of the parties’ negotiations included in the exhibits, and

we don’t even know if any exists.

We do have one bit of proof about that intent. As the Gages

emphasize, the amount they paid in settlement of the claim was far less

than the actual damages claimed, and much less than double those

damages.

In Hawronsky v. Commissioner, 105 T.C. 94, 96 (1995), aff’d

without published opinion, 98 F.3d 1338 (5th Cir. 1996), a taxpayer paid

over $275,000 to the Department of Health and Human Services for an

alleged violation of 42 U.S.C. § 254l(f)(1)(B)(iv). Of that amount, around

$126,000 was trebled principal and around $145,000 was trebled

interest. Hawronsky, 105 T.C. at 96. We held in Hawronsky that “the

treble damages penalty . . . serves a deterrent and a retributive function

similar to a criminal fine” because the damages “amount has no

demonstrated relationship to the cost imposed on the Government of

replacing petitioner’s services.” Id.

Here we think, in contrast, that there was such a “demonstrated

relationship.” Since HUD’s loss was more than $4 million while the

Gages with the other owners settled for only $1.75 million, we think it

was reasonable for the Gages to have thought their payment more

compensatory than punitive. This might not be enough if we had to

figure out whether the Gages were entitled to deduct the settlement. But

that’s not the question we’re asking here. We are asking only whether

the Gages’ claiming the deduction was reasonable. And here the proof—

at least proof of the ambiguity of the situation—weighs strongly in their

favor. When the text of the statute creating a cause of action is

ambiguous, when the specific text of the parties’ settlement specifically

avoids giving us an answer, and when even the amount of the settlement

could be read both ways, we can find it more likely than not that the

Gages’ return position was at least reasonable and taken in good faith.

We are not drawing a bright line that holds treble damages are

always punitive and double damages never are. We couldn’t. The

Supreme Court explained in United States v. Bornstein, 423 U.S. 303,

316 (1976), a case under the False Claims Act, that “the Government’s

13

[*13] actual damages are to be doubled before any subtractions are

made for compensatory payments previously received by the

Government from any source. “This method of computation, which

maximizes the deterrent impact of the double-damages provision and

fixes the relative rights and liabilities of the respective parties with

maximum precision, best comports in our view with the language and

purpose of the Act.” Id. at 316–17.

That kind of statutory precision isn’t present here. The settlement

amount here was only $1.75 million while HUD’s loss was about

$4 million. And here there was no mention in the settlement that actual

damages were being “doubled before any subtractions [were] made.” Id.

at 316. That means that the facts here show that it is a close legal

question, and we therefore find that the Gages were reasonable to report

the settlement as they did, and that they also acted in good faith in doing

so.

They win on the penalty.

Decision will be entered under Rule 155.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.