United States Tax Court

United States Tax Court

T.C. Memo. 2025-19

ALAN HAMEL AND ESTATE OF SUZANNE HAMEL, DECEASED,

ALAN HAMEL, SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR,

Petitioners

v.

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,

Respondent 1

__________

Docket No. 20882-21.

Filed February 25, 2025.

__________

Kenneth M. Barish and Steven Ray Mather, for petitioners.

Matthew R. Delgado and Heather L. Lampert, for respondent.

SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM OPINION

WEILER, Judge: On August 8, 2023, respondent filed a Motion to

Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction as to Penalties, and on September 22,

2023, he filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. 2 On September 22,

2023, Alan Hamel in his personal capacity, and as special administrator

for the Estate of Suzanne Hamel (collectively, petitioners), filed a Motion

for Summary Judgment, a Declaration by Clifton Lamb in Support of

Motion for Summary Judgment, and a Memorandum in Support of

Motion for Summary Judgment. On July 24, 2023, the parties also filed

a First Stipulation of Facts.

1 This Opinion supplements our previously filed opinion Hamel v.

Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2024-62.

2 Respondent also filed a Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary

Judgment on September 22, 2023.

Served 02/25/25

2

[*2] On June 3, 2024, we issued our opinion in this case, Hamel, T.C.

Memo. 2024-62, granting respondent’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of

Jurisdiction as to Penalties, granting respondent’s Motion for Summary

Judgment, and denying petitioners’ Motion for Summary Judgment.

On July 3, 2024, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of

Findings or Opinion Pursuant to Rule 161 3 (Motion for

Reconsideration). Petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration seeks

reconsideration of Hamel principally on the basis of the effect of the U.S.

Supreme Court decision in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 144

S. Ct. 2244 (2024) (overruling Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources

Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)). For the reasons below, we

will grant petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration, in part. However,

after reconsidering the matter, we reaffirm our decision in Hamel to

grant respondent’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction as to

Penalties, to grant respondent’s Motion for Summary Judgment, and to

deny petitioners’ Motion for Summary Judgment.

Background

We adopt the findings of fact set forth in Hamel, repeating such

facts only as necessary for clarity and convenience.

Discussion

In Hamel we rejected petitioners’ reading of section 6230(a)(2)

and found Temporary Treasury Regulation § 301.6231(a)(6)-1T(a)(2) to

be controlling, citing our decisions on the matter. Manroe v.

Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2020-16, at *9; Gunther v. Commissioner,

T.C. Memo. 2019-6, at *8–15, aff’d, 789 F. App’x 836 (11th Cir. 2020);

see Highpoint Tower Tech. Inc. v. Commissioner, 931 F.3d 1050, 1057–58

(11th Cir. 2019); see also I.R.C. § 6230(a)(1). Consistent with these

decisions, we found we did not hold jurisdiction to consider section 6662

penalties in this proceeding, thereby granting respondent’s Motion to

Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction as to Penalties.

We also considered the parties’ Cross-Motions for Summary

Judgment and held that the periods of limitation for assessments of tax

3 Unless otherwise indicated, statutory references are to the Internal Revenue

Code, Title 26 U.S.C. (I.R.C. or Code), in effect at all relevant times, regulation

references are to the Code of Federal Regulations, Title 26 (Treas. Reg.), in effect at all

relevant times, and Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and

Procedure.

3

[*3] attributable to any partnership item (or affected item) under

section 6229(d) against petitioners as to Palm Canyon remain open. We

further held that the Notices of Deficiency, which were issued to the

Hamels on March 12, 2021, were valid. Hamel, T.C. Memo. 2024-62,

at *13.

On the basis of our precedent requiring strict compliance, we

concluded that petitioners remained unidentified partners for purposes

of section 6229(e) on or after March 12, 2020, since they have failed to

comply with the foregoing specified regulatory requirements. Hamel,

T.C. Memo. 2024-62, at *12. Accordingly, we denied petitioners’ Motion

for Summary Judgment and granted respondent’s Motion for Summary

Judgment.

I.

Rule 161 Motions Generally

As we explained in Estate of Quick v. Commissioner, 110 T.C. 440,

441 (1998), supplementing 110 T.C. 172 (1998), “[t]he granting of a

motion for reconsideration rests with the discretion of the Court, and we

usually do not exercise our discretion absent a showing of unusual

circumstances or substantial error.” Reconsideration is generally

inappropriate to allow for the “tendering [of] new legal theories,” at least

when the new theory could have been raised in prior proceedings. Id.

at 441–42. But “an intervening change in the law can warrant the

granting of . . . a motion to reconsider.” Intermountain Ins. Serv. of Vail,

LLC v. Commissioner, 134 T.C. 211, 216 (2010), supplementing T.C.

Memo. 2009-195. Therefore, granting a motion for reconsideration may

be appropriate to allow the Court to consider a new legal theory made

viable only because of an intervening change in the law or precedent.

On the basis of the intervening change in precedent by the

Supreme Court found in Loper Bright as raised by petitioners, we are

inclined to reconsider and supplement some of our reasoning in Hamel.

Thus, we will grant petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration, in part.

II.

Petitioners’ Arguments

Petitioners first contend that the Supreme Court’s Loper Bright

decision undermines both our decision in Gaughf Properties, L.P. v.

Commissioner, 139 T.C. 219 (2012), aff’d, 738 F.3d 415 (D.C. Cir. 2013),

and the effect of it as precedent in this case. Petitioners argue that the

information required by section 6229(e) was in the hands of (and

actually used by) the IRS as early as July 22, 2004, and that Temporary

Treasury Regulation § 301.6223(c)-1T goes beyond and is contrary to the

4

[*4] requirements of section 6229(e) and is therefore invalid. Petitioners

also contend that we incorrectly determined Temporary Treasury

Regulation § 301.6231(a)(6)-1T “filled the gap” with a statement of IRS

position regardless of whether that statement has legislative or rational

support. We disagree with each of petitioners’ arguments and will

explain below.

III.

Analysis

Temporary Treasury Regulation § 301.6229(e)-1T indicates that

a partner remains unidentified for purposes of section 6229(e) until

identifying information is furnished as provided in Temporary Treasury

Regulation § 301.6223(c)-1T. Petitioners challenge the requirements

found in Temporary Treasury Regulation § 301.6223(c)-1T as going

beyond the statutory requirements of section 6229(e); accordingly, our

analysis on reconsideration focuses on this regulation.

In Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43, the Supreme Court adopted a

two-part test to interpret statutes administered by federal agencies:

When a court reviews an agency’s construction of the

statute which it administers, it is confronted with two

questions. First, always, is the question whether Congress

has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the

intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for

the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the

unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however,

the court determines Congress has not directly addressed

the precise question at issue, the court does not simply

impose its own construction on the statute, as would be

necessary in the absence of an administrative

interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous

with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court

is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible

construction of the statute.

(Footnotes omitted.)

The foregoing so-called Chevron test was applied and relied upon

by this Court, and other courts, for years. The Supreme Court in Loper

Bright, 114 S. Ct. at 2273, however, overruled Chevron.

Going forward, the Supreme Court has directed lower courts

reviewing agency action to “exercise their independent judgment in

5

[*5] deciding whether [the] agency has acted within its statutory

authority.” Id. Importantly, however, Loper Bright “d[id] not call into

question prior cases that relied on the Chevron framework.” Id. The

Supreme Court explained:

Mere reliance on Chevron cannot constitute a “‘special

justification’” for overruling such a holding, because to say

a precedent relied on Chevron is, at best, “just an argument

that the precedent was wrongly decided.” Halliburton Co.

v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 573 U.S. 258, 266 (2014)

(quoting Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443

(2000)).

Id.

Accordingly, we reject petitioners’ first contention, that the

Supreme Court’s decision in Loper Bright undermines our decision in

Gaughf Properties and its effect as precedent in this case.

With respect to petitioners’ second argument, we do acknowledge

that we relied, in part, on Chevron when we previously held that

Temporary Treasury Regulation § 301.6229(e)-1T was valid. 4 See

Gaughf Props., 139 T.C. at 240–49 (addressing the requirements of

providing information to satisfy section 6229(e) and concluding that

Temp. Treas. Reg. § 301.6223(c)-1T(b) applied, all information listed in

paragraph (b)(3) was required, and Temp. Treas. Reg. § 301.6229(e)-1T

is valid). In Gaughf Properties, 139 T.C. at 247–48, however, we found

ambiguity with respect to section 6229(e) on the basis of Congress’s use

of the word “furnish.”

Under today’s precedent, a deferential and permissible

interpretation of the statute no longer prevails simply because the

Department of the Treasury (Treasury) offers it to resolve a perceived

ambiguity. See Varian Med. Sys. v. Commissioner, No. 8435-23, 163

T.C., slip op. at 29 (Aug. 26, 2024) (citing Loper Bright, 144 S. Ct.

at 2266, 2273). Therefore, in cases involving statutory ambiguity such

as this one, “instead of declaring a particular party’s reading

4 While in Gaughf Properties the taxpayer challenge was to Temporary

Treasury Regulation § 301.6229(e)-1T, and here the challenge is directed to Temporary

Treasury Regulation § 301.6223(c)-1T(b), the two regulatory challenges are essentially

the same since Temporary Treasury Regulation § 301.6229(e)-1T incorporates by

reference the requirements found in Temporary Treasury Regulation § 301.6223(c)1T(b). See Gaughf Props., 129 T.C. at 246.

6

[*6] ‘permissible,’” we are to now “use every tool at [our] disposal to

determine the best reading of the statute and resolve the ambiguity.”

Loper Bright, 144 S. Ct. at 2266. Our further analysis in Gaughf

Properties, 139 T.C. at 247–48, confirms that section 6229(e) “does not

clearly prohibit an agency from promulgating regulations which require

information to be filed where the relevant statute provides that the

information must be ‘furnished.’”

Congress “often enact[s] . . . statutes” that authorize an agency

“to exercise a degree of discretion.” Loper Bright, 144 S. Ct. at 2263.

Other statutes empower an agency to prescribe rules to “fill up the

details” of a statutory scheme or leave that agency with appropriate

flexibility. Id. (quoting Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 43

(1825)). 5 The Supreme Court states in Loper Bright:

When the best reading of a statute is that it

delegates discretionary authority to an agency, the role of

the reviewing court under the APA is, as always, to

independently interpret the statute and effectuate the will

of Congress subject to constitutional limits. The court

fulfills that role by recognizing constitutional delegations,

“fix[ing] the boundaries of [the] delegated authority,”

H. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83

Colum. L. Rev. 1, 27 (1983), and ensuring the agency has

engaged in “‘reasoned decisionmaking’” within those

boundaries, Michigan, 576 U.S. at 750 (quoting Allentown

Mack Sales & Service, Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359, 374

(1998)); see also Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. of United States,

Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29

5 The Supreme Court in Loper Bright, 144 S. Ct. at 2263, continued:

For example, some statutes “expressly delegate[]” to an agency the

authority to give meaning to a particular statutory term. Batterton v.

Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 425 (1977) (emphasis deleted). Others empower

an agency to prescribe rules to “fill up the details” of a statutory

scheme, Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. 1, 43 (1825), or to regulate

subject to the limits imposed by a term or phrase that “leaves agencies

with flexibility,” Michigan v. EPA, 576 U.S. 743, 752 (2015), such as

“appropriate” or “reasonable.”

(Footnote omitted.)

7

[*7]

(1983). By doing so, a court upholds the traditional

conception of the judicial function that the APA adopts.

Id.

In reaching a conclusion on the validity of a regulation we may

give “[c]areful attention to the judgment of the Executive Branch.” Id.

at 2273. The views of Treasury in this context “constitute a body of

experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may

properly resort for guidance.” Id. at 2262 (quoting Skidmore v. Swift &

Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)). “The weight of such a judgment in a

particular case,” of course, “depend[s] upon the thoroughness evident in

its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with

earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it

power to persuade, if lacking power to control.” Id. at 2259 (quoting

Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140); see also Varian Med. Sys., 163 T.C., slip op.

at 29–30. In Gaughf Properties, 139 T.C. at 246, we wrote:

Section 301.6229(e)-1T, Temporary Proced. & Admin.

Regs., supra, was issued pursuant to the authority section

7805 provides to the Commissioner. 52 Fed. Reg. 6779,

6780 (Mar. 5, 1987). Secondary authority for issuance of

the regulation is found in section 6230(k), which provides:

“The Secretary shall prescribe such regulations as may be

necessary to carry out the purposes of this subchapter”; i.e.,

subchapter C of chapter 63, which contains sections 6221

through 6234.

(Footnote omitted).

Relying on the primary and secondary authorities granted by

Congress in sections 7805(a) and 6230(k) for issuance of the regulation

at issue, we found that the taxpayer’s argument in Gaughf Properties,

139 T.C. at 246, challenging the regulation lacked merit. 6 After

considering Loper Bright, we find no reason to alter our conclusion here

in this case. For the Supreme Court has noted that courts should

generally defer to and uphold Treasury regulations which implement a

congressional mandate in some reasonable manner. Nat’l Muffler

6 There is additional statutory support for the Commissioner’s regulatory

requirements in Temporary Treasury Regulation § 301.6223(c)-1T, found in section

6230(i), which provides: “Except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, each . . .

furnishing of information, shall be filed or made at such time, in such manner, and at

such place as may be prescribed in regulations.”

8

[*8] Dealers Ass’n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 476–77 (1979). We are

to “look to see whether the regulation harmonizes with the plain

language of the statute, its origin, and its purpose.” Id. at 477.

As referenced above, the Supreme Court has said federal agencies

are required to engage in reasoned decisionmaking. Michigan v. EPA,

576 U.S. at 750 (citing Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., 522 U.S. at 374). 7

“Not only must an agency’s decreed result be within the scope of its

lawful authority, but the process by which it reaches that result must be

logical and rational.” Id. (quoting Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., 522

U.S. at 374). It follows that agency action is lawful only if it rests “on a

consideration of the relevant factors.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n, 463

U.S. at 43 (quoting Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Ark.-Best Freight Sys., Inc.,

419 U.S. 281, 285 (1975)).

In this case it is not difficult to conclude that Treasury engaged

in some level of “reasoned decisionmaking” when deciding to promulgate

Temporary Treasury Regulation § 301.6223(c)-1T. It was first published

in a notice of proposed rulemaking (Notice) on April 18, 1986, 51 Fed.

Reg. 13,231 (Apr. 18, 1986), along with several other temporary

regulations, with the purpose to “clarify miscellaneous provisions

related to the tax treatment of partnership items and [to] provide

guidance to partners and partnerships affected” by the Tax Equity and

Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324.

51 Fed. Reg. at 13,231. The Notice stated that Temporary Treasury

Regulation § 301.6223(c)-1T was issued under sections 6223(c) and

6230(i) and (k). 51 Fed. Reg. at 13,235. The Notice called for written

comments and stated that Treasury would entertain any requests for

public hearing by June 17, 1986. 8 Id. at 13,231.

Although the Notice does not contain express reasoning for

Temporary Treasury Regulation § 301.6223(c)-1T, the preamble to the

Notice discusses the various temporary regulations contained therein.

The preamble further states how Congress added sections 6221 through

6231 to the Code and called for consolidated proceedings to determine

the tax treatment of “partnership items” at the partnership level.

51 Fed. Reg. at 13,321. The Notice also emphasizes the importance of

the date on which a Notice of Deficiency, or other notice relating to a

7 Petitioners do not specifically raise a “reasoned decisionmaking” challenge to

Temporary Treasury Regulation § 301.6223(c)-1T; nevertheless, we will address the

issue.

8 Treasury received several comments on the proposed regulations; however,

there were no requests for any public hearing. 52 Fed. Reg. 6779 (Mar. 5, 1987).

9

[*9] partnership proceeding, is mailed to the tax matters partner.

Lastly, the Notice goes on to state that “a partner is not entitled to notice

unless the partner is adequately identified at least 30 days before” the

NOD, or similar notice, is mailed. Id. at 13,321–22.

Although we find section 6229(e) unclear, Congress has expressly

delegated rulemaking authority to Treasury to promulgate by

regulation the partnership information required under the Code. With

respect to this rulemaking authority from Congress, we conclude

Treasury has properly done so within its delegation of authority. 9

Accordingly, and after reconsideration, we remain unconvinced by

petitioners’ second argument and now expressly conclude that the best

reading of section 6229(e) is consistent with the regulatory requirements

of Temporary Treasury Regulation § 301.6223(c)-1T. We therefore reject

petitioners’ contention that Temporary Treasury Regulation

§ 301.6223(c)-1T goes beyond (or is contrary to) section 6229(e).

Lastly petitioners contend that we incorrectly upheld Temporary

Treasury Regulation § 301.6231(a)(6)-1T when we declined their

argument that this regulation is unlawful and contrary to a plain

reading of sections 6221 and 6230. Petitioners contend we erroneously

adopted Chevron deference when we concluded section 6230 directs the

Secretary to “fill in the gap” and that the regulation is neither contrary

to the statute nor otherwise unlawful. Hamel, T.C. Memo. 2024-62,

at *7. We disagree.

Petitioners’ challenge to this regulation is of no consequence,

since our conclusion in Hamel—holding we lacked jurisdiction as to the

penalties being challenged—rejected petitioners’ reading of section

6230(a)(2) and the amendments to section 6221 under the Taxpayer

Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 1238(a), 111 Stat. 788, 1026.

Hamel, T.C. Memo. 2024-62, at *7–8. In Hamel, T.C. Memo. 2024-62,

at *7, we said:

Under a plain reading of the newly enacted wording,

the effect of the amendment was to remove partnership9 As the Supreme Court has said, in the cases that come before us “the question

that matters [is]: Does the statute authorize the challenged agency action?” Loper

Bright, 144 S. Ct. at 2269. In answering this question, we may not follow Treasury’s

guidance if it contradicts the statutory text. See, e.g., Niz-Chavez v. Garland, 141 S. Ct.

1474, 1485 (2021). Here, however, we conclude Temporary Treasury Regulation

§ 301.6223(c)-1T is consistent with our reading of section 6229(e). See Gaughf Props.,

139 T.C. at 248.

10

[*10] item penalties from deficiency procedures effective for

partnership tax years ending after August 5, 1997. See

Domulewicz v. Commissioner, 129 T.C. 11, 21–22 (2007),

aff’d in part, remanded in part sub nom. Desmet v.

Commissioner, 581 F.3d 297 (6th Cir. 2009); see also H.R.

Rep. No 105-220 (1997) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1997-4

C.B. (Vol. 2) 1457. We find the foregoing text and change to

undermine petitioners’ argument and confirm our prior

holdings. See Domulewicz, 129 T.C. at 22.

Our foregoing statutory analysis holds true, notwithstanding the

decision in Loper Bright. Accordingly, we see no benefit in reconsidering

a challenge of Temporary Treasury Regulation § 301.6231(a)(6)1T(a)(2), and we will deny petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration, in

part, as to their last argument.

IV.

Conclusion

Considering the foregoing, we reaffirm Hamel, and the granting

of respondent’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction as to

Penalties, the granting of respondent’s Motion for Summary Judgment,

and the denying of petitioners’ Motion for Summary Judgment. We have

considered all the arguments that the parties have made, and to the

extent they are not addressed herein, we find the arguments to be moot,

irrelevant, or without merit.

To reflect the foregoing,

An appropriate order will be issued.