UNITED STATES TAX COURT

T.C. Memo. 2003-60

UNITED STATES TAX COURT

CHERYL D. FLATHERS, Petitioner v.

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent

Docket No. 13037-02L.

Filed March 4, 2003.

Cheryl D. Flathers, pro se.

Rollin G. Thorley, for respondent.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

CHIECHI, Judge:

This case is before the Court on respon-

dent’s motion for summary judgment and to impose a penalty under

section 6673 (respondent’s motion).1

1

We shall grant respondent’s

All section references are to the Internal Revenue Code in

effect at all relevant times. All Rule references are to the Tax

Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.

- 2 motion.

Background

The record establishes and/or the parties do not dispute the

following.

Petitioner resided in Las Vegas, Nevada, at the time she

filed the petition in this case.

On or about March 17, 1999, petitioner filed a Federal

income tax (tax) return for her taxable year 1998 (1998 return).

In her 1998 return, petitioner reported total income of $0, total

tax of $0, and claimed a refund of $4,704.60 of tax withheld.

Petitioner attached to her 1998 return Form W-2, Wage and Tax

Statement, reporting wages, tips, and other compensation of

$47,554.71.

Petitioner also attached a two-page document to that

return (petitioner’s attachment to her 1998 return).

That

document stated in pertinent part:

I, Cheryl Dawn Flathers, am submitting this as part of

my 1998 Income Tax Return, even though I know that no

section of the Internal Revenue Code:

1)

Establishes an income tax "liability [sic]: as,

for example, Code Sections 4401, 5005, and 5703 do

with respect to wagering, alcohol, and tobacco

taxes;

2)

Provides that income taxes "have to be paid on the

basis of a return"-as, for example, Code Sections

4374, 4401(c), 5061(a) and 5703(b) do with respect

to other taxes; I am filing anyway because I know

the government has prosecuted others for failing

to file income tax forms by (erroneously) invoking

Code Sections 7201 and 7203. Therefore, this

return is not being filed voluntarily but is being

filed out of fear that if I did not file this

- 3 return I could also be (illegally) prosecuted for

failing to file an income tax return for the year

1998.

3)

In addition to the above, I am filing even though

the "Privacy Act Notice" as contained in a 1040

booklet clearly informs me that I am not required

to file. It does so in at least two places.

a) In one place, it states that I need only

file a return for "any tax" I may be "liable"

for. Since no Code Section makes me "liable"

for income taxes, this provision notifies me

that I do not have to file an income tax return.

b) In another place, it directs me to Code

Section 6001. This section provides, in

relevant part that "Whenever in the judgment

of the Secretary it is necessary, he may

require any person by notice served on such

person; or by regulations, to make such returns, render such statements, or keep such

records, as the Secretary deems sufficient to

show whether or not such person is liable far

[sic] the tax under this title." Since the

Secretary of the Treasury did not "serve" me

with any such "notice" and since no legislative regulation exists requiring anyone to

file an income tax return, I am again informed by the "Privacy Act Notice" that I am

not required to file an income tax return.

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It should also be noted that I had "zero" income

according to the Supreme Court's definition of

income * * * since in Merchant’s Loan & Trust C.V.

Smlietanka [sic], 255 U.S. 509, (at pages 518 &

519) that court held that "The word (income) must

be given the same meaning in all of the Income Tax

Acts of Congress that was given to it in the Corporation Excise Tax Act of 1909." Therefore,

since I had no earnings in 1998, that would have

been taxable as "income" under the Corporation

Excise Tax Act of 1909, I can only swear to having

"zero" income in 1998. Obviously, since I know

the legal definition of "income"; if I were to

swear to having received any other amount of "income" I would be committing perjury * * *. Therefore, not wishing to commit perjury * * *, I can

- 4 only swear to having "zero" income for 1998.

On June 14, 1999, respondent paid petitioner the $4,704.60

refund that she claimed in her 1998 return plus interest thereon.

On February 4, 2000, respondent issued to petitioner a

notice of deficiency (notice) with respect to her taxable year

1998, which she received.

In that notice, respondent determined

a deficiency in, and an accuracy-related penalty under section

6662(a) on, petitioner’s tax for her taxable year 1998 in the

respective amounts of $5,969 and $1,177.

Petitioner did not file a petition in the Court with respect

to the notice relating to her taxable year 1998.

Instead, on

April 15, 2000, in response to the notice, petitioner sent a

letter (petitioner’s April 15, 2000 letter) to the Internal

Revenue Service.

That letter stated in pertinent part:

Your Deficiency Notice dated February 4, 2000.

First and foremost, be advised that this alleged

deficiency has been created out of thin air by the IRS

from a return which I submitted in a timely manner, a

return which was reviewed by the IRS and a refund

issued, including interest paid for the delay in refunding the amount to me. The IRS now attempts to

extort penalties and interest on top of the amount duly

refunded to me.

According to your “Deficiency Notice” of the above

date (cover sheet [page 1 of notice with respect to

petitioner’s taxable year 1998] attached), there is an

alleged deficiency with respect to my 1998 income tax

return of $7546.09, and if I wanted to “contest this

deficiency before making payment,” I must “file a

petition with the United States Tax Court.” Before I

file, pay, or do anything with respect to your “Notice”

I must first establish whether or not it was sent

- 5 pursuant to law, whether or not it has the “force and

effect of law,” and whether you had any authority to

send me the Notice in the first place.

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Let me further point out that IRS Code Sections 6001

and 6011 (as identified in the 1040 Privacy Act)

notifies me that I need only “comply with regulations.”

Nothing in the Privacy Act Notice or in the above

statutes informs me that I have to “comply” with, or

pay attention to, letters and/or alleged “determinations” sent to me by various and sundry employees of

the IRS.

Please note that Section 6212 states that “If the

Secretary determines that there is a deficiency in

respect of any tax ... he is authorized to send notice

of such deficiency etc., etc., etc.” However, the

“Notice” I received was not sent by the Secretary but

by Deborah S. Decker who is identified as being the

Director of the IRS Service Center in Ogden, Utah, and

I have no way of knowing whether he/she has been delegated by the Secretary to send out such notices on the

Secretary’s behalf. So before I do anything at all

with respect to your “Notice”, I would have to see a

Delegation Order from the Secretary of the Treasury

delegating Deborah S. Decker the authority to send out

Deficiency Notices.

In addition, I would also like you to send me (or

identify for me) the legislative regulations that you

claim implement Code Sections 6212 and 6213. I have

also attached an excerpt from the IRS Procedures Manual

(MT 1218-196, at page P-6-40) which points out that the

IRS is required to “make available to all taxpayers

comprehensive, accurate, and timely information on the

requirements of tax law and regulations.” So, pursuant

to this provision from your Procedures Manual, I am

asking that you identify (“make available”) for me the

legislative regulations that you claim implement both

Code Section 6212 and 6213 - since I haven’t been able

to locate them.

On July 17, 2000, respondent assessed a frivolous return

penalty under section 6702 regarding petitioner’s 1998 return.

- 6 On July 24, 2000, respondent assessed petitioner’s tax, as

well as a penalty under section 6662(a) and interest as provided

by law, for her taxable year 1998.

(We shall refer to those

assessed amounts, as well as interest as provided by law accrued

after July 24, 2000, as petitioner’s unpaid liability for 1998.)

On July 24, 2000, respondent issued to petitioner a notice

of balance due with respect to petitioner’s unpaid liability for

1998.

On October 12, 2000, respondent issued to petitioner a final

notice of intent to levy and notice of your right to a hearing

(notice of intent to levy) with respect to the frivolous return

penalty under section 6702 regarding her 1998 return.

On May 30, 2001, respondent issued to petitioner a notice of

Federal tax lien and your right to a hearing (notice of tax lien)

with respect to both petitioner’s unpaid liability for 1998 and

the frivolous return penalty under section 6702 regarding her

1998 return.

On or about June 25, 2001, in response to the notice of

intent to levy and the notice of tax lien, petitioner filed Form

12153, Request for a Collection Due Process Hearing (Form 12153),

and requested a hearing with respondent’s Appeals Office (Appeals

Office).

Petitioner attached, inter alia, a seven-page document

to her Form 12153 (petitioner’s attachment to her Form 12153).

That document stated in pertinent part:

- 7 1.

VERIFICATION FROM THE SECRETARY.

First of all, I expect you to have at the CDP hearing

“verification from the Secretary that the requirements

of any applicable law or administrative procedure have

been met”. That is the specific statement from the

Secretary (or his delegate) that THE LAW requires you

to have. Don’t tell me at the CDP hearing that in lieu

of your having that specific statement from the Secretary, you have some IRS transcript or printout that “I

may not understand”. * * *

2.

PROOF OF ASSESSMENT AND COPY OF RETURN SHOWING OWED TAXES

Pursuant to Code Section 6201(1), before I can owe any

income taxes there has to be an assessment based on a

“return or list”. I filed a return showing no taxes

due, in fact a return that showed a refund for which a

refund check was issued by the Internal Revenue Service, PLUS INTEREST! Therefore, I do not see how the

IRS could have made a lawful assessment from a return

showing no income taxes due and owing unless the IRS

prepared another 1040 showing a different amount due.

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3.

A COPY OF FORM 17, STATUTORY NOTICE OF DEFICIENCY

I have never received a Statutory Notice of Deficiency, Form 17, for payment of any 1998 income

taxes.

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4.

I CLAIM THERE IS NO UNDERLYING, STATUTORY

LIABILITY IN CONNECTION WITH THE INCOME TAXES

AT ISSUE.

I am challenging the “existence” of the underlying

tax liability as the law (Sec. 6330(c)(2)(B)) and

regulation (301.6330-1T-(3)) specifically permit

me to do. * * *

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I CLAIM THERE IS NO STATUTE REQUIRING ME “TO PAY”

THE INCOME TAXES AT ISSUE.

* * * it is my belief that there is no law requir-

- 8 ing me “to pay” income taxes * * *

6.

NO LAW AUTHORIZES THE IRS TO CLAIM THAT I OWE MORE

IN INCOME TAXES THAN THE “ZERO” I REPORTED ON MY

1998 INCOME TAX RETURN.

* * * it is my contention that no law authorizes the

Secretary (let alone any IRS agent) to determine that I

owe more in income taxes that the “zero” I reported on

my 1998 income tax return. * * * [Reproduced literally.]

On April 12, 2002, a settlement officer with respondent’s

Appeals Office (settlement officer) sent petitioner a letter.

That letter stated in pertinent part:

I have scheduled the Collection Due Process hearing you

requested on this case for the time and date shown

above [May 16, 2002]. * * *

Your request for a due process hearing was timely for

the Letter 3172, Notice of Federal Tax Lien Filing,

issue for the Form 1040 taxes for 1998 and for the

civil penalty assessment for 1998. Your request for a

due process hearing for the Letter 1058, Notice of

Intent to Levy, on the civil penalty assessment for

1998 was not timely and therefore, you are entitled to

an equivalency hearing on this matter.

Appeals’ jurisdiction to hear your case is specified in

the Internal Revenue code, Sections 6320 and 6330, and

the related federal regulations. Appeals will consider

the appropriateness of the proposed collection action,

spousal defenses, and collection alternatives. If you

received a statutory notice of deficiency * * * you may

not raise as an issue the amount or existence of the

underlying assessment. * * *

I am also enclosing Forms 2866, Certificate of Official

Record, and Forms 4340, Certificate of Assessment for

the Form 1040 taxes for 1998 and for the civil penalty

assessment under IRC §6702 for 1998. These documents

meet the verification requirements under IRC

§6330(c)(1). Your request for additional information

should be made under the Freedom of Information Act

through the Disclosure Officer located at the Internal

Revenue Service, 210 E. Earll, Phoenix, Arizona 85012.

- 9 I have reviewed the correspondence you attached to your

request for the collection due process hearing and

would like to point out that the courts have previously

ruled against your arguments, and in some instances,

have imposed sanctions. I have verified the validity

of the assessments through the review of the complete

computer transcripts, the tax return file and related

workpapers. I have no further legal obligation to

consider any challenge to the validity of the assessment in the absence of independent proof that the

assessment was defective in some manner. I am hopeful

that you wish to discuss legitimate issues and alternatives for resolving your case at the upcoming hearing.

I will have the original tax return for 1998 available

for your review at the hearing, as well as the civil

penalty documentation.

On May 3, 2002, respondent’s settlement officer sent petitioner another letter (settlement officer’s May 3, 2002 letter).

That letter stated in pertinent part:

I am writing to you regarding the upcoming collection

due process hearing set for May 16, 2002 at 3:00 p.m.

at the Las Vegas Appeals Office.

You previously indicated in your correspondence that

you intended to audio record the hearing and have a

court reporter present. There has been a recent change

in this practice for hearings before Appeals. Effective immediately audio and stenographic recordings will

no longer be allowed on Appeals cases.

The recording of hearings has always been discretionary

for Appeals under IRC §7521. Pursuant to a recent

decision all audio and stenographic recordings will be

eliminated. You may still have a witness present at

the hearing; however, this witness may not represent

you or negotiate for you.

On May 7, 2002, in response to the settlement officer’s May

3, 2002 letter, petitioner sent the settlement officer a letter

(petitioner’s May 7, 2002 letter).

nent part:

That letter stated in perti-

- 10 I am in receipt of your letter of May 3, 2002, in which

you attempt to deny me the right to record my hearing

under IRC section 7521.

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Who made this “recent decision”, where is the documentation? Where is the proof of legislative mandate

providing authority to make this change? Furthermore,

under whose authority is my Constitutional right to

preserve testimony for myself being truncated? After

all, I require an accurate record of who said what and

when.

The code quoted [section 7521] deals with “Procedures

involving taxpayer interviews”. Are you then stating,

by quoting this code section, that you are only conducting an “interview” and not a “hearing” as is my

right under the law? You are labeled as a “settlement

officer”, not an “appeals officer”. If you are unable

to show authority as an appeals officer, then I require

that you provide an appeals officer at the hearing who

has the authority to impartially decide the issues at

hand. If this is an “interview” which is conducted by

exam and audit and for which the code you quote would

be correct, then I am not receiving a hearing. If you

claim this is a hearing, then an appeals officer, with

appropriate identification will need to be present to

conduct a true hearing, and the code you quote does not

apply.

On May 13, 2002, in response to petitioner’s May 7, 2002

letter, respondent’s settlement officer sent petitioner a letter

(settlement officer’s May 13, 2002 letter).

That letter stated

in pertinent part:

I am in receipt of your letter dated May 7, 2002 regarding the change in procedures for the audio recording or stenographic recording of Appeals hearings. I

am enclosing a copy of the memorandum dated May 2, 2002

per your request for documentation of this change.

This will be a “hearing” and as a settlement officer I

have the same authority as an appeals officer to impartially decide the issues at hand, as you stated in your

- 11 letter.

The copy of the memorandum referred to in the settlement officer’s May 13, 2002 letter, which the settlement officer enclosed

with that letter, stated in pertinent part:

Effective immediately, audio and stenographic recordings will no longer be allowed on Appeals cases.

Taxpayers and/or representatives who have already

requested such recordings will be informed of the

change in practice immediately, and advised that their

request cannot be allowed.

BACKGROUND

Prior to enactment of IRC 7521, Service Compliance

functions voluntarily allowed audio recordings. Appeals decided to follow this practice at that time.

IRC 7521, enacted in 1988, provided for the allowance

of audio recordings of conferences relative to the

determination or collection of a tax, between the

taxpayer and the Internal Revenue Service, provided

that the Service was given at least ten (10) days

advance notice of the taxpayer’s intent to record the

conference.

Although Appeals makes liability and collectibility

determinations, Appeals’ procedures differ from Examination and Collection function contacts that are not

discretionary for the taxpayer. Contact with Appeals

is discretionary for the taxpayer, and as such, recording has always been discretionary for Appeals. * * *

On May 16, 2002, respondent’s settlement officer held an

Appeals Office hearing with petitioner with respect to the notice

of tax lien.2

Although petitioner knew that the Appeals Office

no longer allowed audio recordings of Appeals Office hearings,

2

On May 16, 2002, respondent’s settlement officer also held

an equivalent hearing with petitioner with respect to the notice

of intent to levy.

- 12 petitioner secretly made an audio recording of her Appeals Office

hearing.

At the Appeals Office hearing, the settlement officer

gave petitioner Form 4340, Certificate of Assessments, Payments,

and Other Specified Matters (Form 4340), with respect to her

taxable year 1998.

On July 11, 2002, the Appeals Office issued to petitioner a

notice of determination concerning collection action(s) under

section 6320 and/or 6330 (notice of determination) with respect

to petitioner’s unpaid liability for 1998 (notice of determination with respect to petitioner’s unpaid liability for 1998).3

An attachment to that notice stated in pertinent part:

Verification of Legal and Procedural Requirements

The Secretary has provided sufficient verification that

the requirements of any applicable law or administrative procedure have been met.

Certified account transcripts, Forms 4340, were requested and reviewed along with the administrative

return file for 1998, which included the civil penalty

work papers. * * *

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The collection due process and equivalency hearings

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On July 11, 2002, the Appeals Office also issued to petitioner (1) a notice of determination with respect to the frivolous return penalty regarding petitioner’s 1998 return and (2) a

decision letter concerning equivalent hearing under sec. 6320

and/or 6330 (decision letter) with respect to the notice of

intent to levy issued to petitioner with respect to the frivolous

return penalty regarding petitioner’s 1998 return (decision

letter with respect to the frivolous return penalty regarding

petitioner’s 1998 return).

- 13 were held on May 16, 2002 * * *. The taxpayer was

advised prior to the hearing by letter that no audio

recording or stenographic recording of the hearing

would be permitted per a directive issued by the Acting

Chief of Appeals dated May 2, 2002.

Settlement Officer Rene Swall has had no prior involvement with respect to these liabilities.

Issues Raised by the Taxpayer

The taxpayer checked both blocks on the Form 12153 and

states, “see attached letter”. Attached is a copy of

the Notice of Federal Tax Lien (NFTL), the Letter 3172,

and several pages of non-filer arguments. As part of

the taxpayer’s argument, she asks for verification from

the secretary, proof of the assessments, [and] a copy

of the statutory notice of deficiency. The taxpayer

further claims that there is no underlying statutory

liability in connection with the income taxes at issue,

that there is no statute requiring her to pay the taxes

at issue, and that no law authorizes the Service to

claim that she owes more income tax than the “zero”

reported on her return. In addition the taxpayer

states that she did not receive a notice and demand for

payment per IRC §6331.

Certified transcripts, Forms 4340, for both periods

were provided to the taxpayer prior to the hearing.

The taxpayer was advised by letter that these transcripts meet the verification requirements under IRC

§6330(c)(1). * * *

At the hearing the taxpayer raised the issue of audio

recording and was advised again that the audio recording would not be allowed. * * *

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I attempted to review the Form 4340 transcripts and the

administrative file with the taxpayer, which included

the tax return filed and the statutory notice of deficiency that was sent and received. The taxpayer stated

that what I provided her as evidence of the statutory

notice of deficiency was only a “letter”. The taxpayer

was advised that she could not raise the issue of the

underlying liability as she had received the statutory

notice of deficiency, and had in fact responded to it

- 14 with additional frivolous arguments. The taxpayer is

now precluded from raising this issue at the collection

due process hearing. Collection alternatives could not

be discussed with the taxpayer, as the taxpayer is not

in filing compliance, nor did the taxpayer attempt to

complete the financial statement that was mailed to her

prior to the hearing. The taxpayer asked for the cite

that makes her liable to pay the taxes and continued to

raise only frivolous arguments. The hearing was concluded.

The taxpayer does not believe that wages are income or

that the tax laws apply to her. I advised the taxpayer

of recent court case decisions where sanctions were

imposed for bringing the same type of arguments and

attempted to provide the taxpayer with copies of recent

cases on T. Pierson and R. Davis as well as Publication

2105, Why Do I Have to Pay Taxes, and a handout, The

Truth About Frivolous Tax Arguments. The taxpayer

refused to accept these from me.

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The taxpayer raised no other non-frivolous issues.

Balancing the Need for Efficient Collection with Taxpayer Concerns

The requirements of all applicable laws and administrative procedures have been met. The courts have previously addressed the taxpayers’ arguments, and Appeals

does not have the authority for reconsideration of the

matters.

The assessments are valid and the Service followed

proper procedures in making these assessments. For the

civil penalty to apply the individual’s conduct must be

due in part to a position, which is frivolous, or a

desire (which appears on the return) to delay or impede

the administration of Federal income tax laws. Income

reported to the Service verifies that the taxpayer had

sufficient income that would require her to file a

return. The taxpayer was provided an opportunity to

file a correct return, but instead responded with

frivolous arguments. The taxpayer received her required notices. The filing of the NFTL was appropriate

to protect the Government’s interest. In addition, the

issuance of the notice of intent to levy was appropri-

- 15 ate on the civil penalty assessment. No collection

alternatives could be discussed as the taxpayer is not

in filing compliance and the taxpayer only continued to

raise frivolous arguments.

Given the taxpayer’s history of non-compliance, I

believe that collection action in the form of levy

should be allowed to proceed. Lacking the taxpayer’s

cooperation, the proposed collection action balances

the need for efficient collection of taxes with the

taxpayer’s legitimate concern that any collection

action be no more intrusive than necessary.

Discussion

The Court may grant summary judgment where there is no

genuine issue of material fact and a decision may be rendered as

a matter of law.4

Rule 121(b); Sundstrand Corp. v. Commissioner,

98 T.C. 518, 520 (1992), affd. 17 F.3d 965 (7th Cir. 1994).

We

conclude that there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding the questions raised in respondent’s motion.

With respect to petitioner’s taxable year 1998, petitioner

received a notice of deficiency, but she did not file a petition

with respect to that notice.

On the instant record, we find that

petitioner may not challenge the existence or the amount of

4

The only questions raised in respondent’s motion relate to

petitioner’s unpaid liability for 1998 over which we have jurisdiction and do not relate to the frivolous return penalty regarding her 1998 return over which we do not have jurisdiction. In

this connection, on Feb. 6, 2003, the Court issued an Order

granting respondent’s motion to dismiss this case for lack of

jurisdiction insofar as petitioner sought review of either the

notice of determination with respect to the frivolous return

penalty regarding petitioner’s 1998 return or the decision letter

with respect to the frivolous return penalty regarding petitioner’s 1998 return.

- 16 petitioner’s unpaid liability for 1998.

See sec. 6330(c)(2)(B);

Sego v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 604, 610-611 (2000); Goza v.

Commissioner, 114 T.C. 176, 182-183 (2000).

Where, as is the case here, the validity of the underlying

tax liability is not properly placed at issue, the Court will

review the determination of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue

for abuse of discretion.

Sego v. Commissioner, supra at 610;

Goza v. Commissioner, supra at 181-182.

As was true of petitioner’s attachment to her 1998 return,

petitioner’s April 15, 2000 letter, petitioner’s attachment to

her Form 12153, and petitioner’s May 7, 2002 letter, petitioner’s

response contains contentions, arguments, statements, and requests that the Court finds to be frivolous and/or groundless.

To illustrate, petitioner appears to argue that she did not

receive proper notice and demand under section 6303(a) because,

according to petitioner, respondent must use Form 17 in issuing

such notice and demand.

We reject petitioner’s argument that respondent did not

issue the notice and demand required by section 6303(a).

Form

4340 with respect to petitioner’s taxable year 1998 shows that

respondent sent petitioner a notice of balance due on July 24,

2000, the same day on which respondent assessed petitioner’s tax,

as well as any penalties and interest as provided by law, for her

taxable year 1998.

A notice of balance due constitutes the

- 17 notice and demand for payment under section 6303(a).

Commissioner, 119 T.C. 252, 262-263 (2002).

Craig v.

Respondent is not

required to use Form 17 as the notice and demand for payment.

E.g., Keene v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-277; Tapio v.

Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-141.

As a further illustration of the frivolous and/or groundless

nature of petitioner’s position in this case, petitioner contends

in petitioner’s response that the settlement officer failed to

obtain verification that the requirements of any applicable law

or administrative procedure have been met, as required by section

6330(c)(1).

In this regard, petitioner contends that the settle-

ment officer improperly relied on Form 4340 to meet the verification requirement of section 6330(c)(1).

The record establishes that the settlement officer obtained

verification from the Secretary that the requirements of any

applicable law or administrative procedure were met, and we

reject petitioner’s contention to the contrary.

As for the

settlement officer’s reliance on Form 4340, at the Appeals Office

hearing, the settlement officer relied on, and gave petitioner,

Form 4340 with respect to petitioner’s taxable year 1998.

Section 6330(c)(1) does not require the settlement officer to

rely on a particular document to satisfy the verification requirement imposed by that section.

at 261-262.

Craig v. Commissioner, supra

Nor does section 6330(c)(1) require the settlement

- 18 officer to provide petitioner with a copy of the verification

upon which the settlement officer relied.

Id. at 262.

Form 4340

is a valid verification that the requirements of any applicable

law or administrative procedure have been met.

Id.

Petitioner

has not shown any irregularity in respondent’s assessment procedure that would raise a question about the validity of the

assessment or the information contained in Form 4340 with respect

to petitioner’s taxable year 1998.

We hold that the assessment

with respect to petitioner’s taxable year 1998 was valid and that

the settlement officer satisfied the verification requirement of

section 6330(c)(1).

See id.5

Based upon our examination of the entire record before us,

we find that respondent did not abuse respondent’s discretion in

determining to proceed with the collection action as determined

in the notice of determination with respect to petitioner’s

unpaid liability for 1998.

In respondent’s motion, respondent requests that the Court

require petitioner to pay a penalty to the United States pursuant

5

In petitioner’s response, petitioner also argues that

“Appeals personnel denied Petitioner the right to protect her

rights in total disregard for the Taxpayer Bill of Rights,

Publication 1 and Petitioner’s constitutional right to protect

oneself.” That is because, according to petitioner, the Appeals

Office denied her request to record her Appeals Office hearing.

However, petitioner admits that she “did in fact tape the CDP

hearing”, and we shall not address petitioner’s argument about

the Appeals Office’s refusal to permit her to record her Appeals

Office hearing.

- 19 to section 6673(a)(1).

Section 6673(a)(1) authorizes the Court

to require a taxpayer to pay to the United States a penalty in an

amount not to exceed $25,000 whenever it appears to the Court,

inter alia, that a proceeding before it was instituted or maintained primarily for delay, sec. 6673(a)(1)(A), or that the

taxpayer’s position in such a proceeding is frivolous or groundless, sec. 6673(a)(1)(B).

In Pierson v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 576, 581 (2000), we

issued an unequivocal warning to taxpayers concerning the imposition of a penalty under section 6673(a) on those taxpayers who

abuse the protections afforded by sections 6320 and 6330 by

instituting or maintaining actions under those sections primarily

for delay or by taking frivolous or groundless positions in such

actions.6

In the instant case, petitioner advances, we believe primarily for delay, frivolous and/or groundless contentions, arguments, statements, and requests, thereby causing the Court to

waste its limited resources.

We shall impose a penalty on

petitioner pursuant to section 6673(a)(1) in the amount of

$1,500.

We have considered all of petitioner’s contentions, argu-

6

The record in this case reflects that the settlement officer attempted to give petitioner, inter alia, a copy of the

Court’s opinion in Pierson v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 576 (2000),

which she refused to accept.

- 20 ments, statements, and requests that are not discussed herein,

and we find them to be without merit and/or irrelevant.

To reflect the foregoing,

An appropriate order granting

respondent’s motion and decision

will be entered for respondent.