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Office of Chief Counsel
Internal Revenue Service
memorandum
CC:WR:LA:TL-N-2824-99
date:
to:
from:
subject:
February
3, 2000
Tere Itokazu
Financial
Products
IRS, Los Angeles
Marilyn
District
--------
Specialist,
FP1227
Devin, Attorney
Counsel,
Los Angeles
----------------
----- -- -------
- Debt-Eouitv
You have requested
an informal
opinion
as to a potential
debt-equity
issue arising from
Senior Debentures,
For the reasons discussed
adjustment
should be pursued.
Issue
from District
Counsel in this case
the Taxpayer’s
issuance
of certain
herein, we do not believe this
-------- --------------------- formerly
known as ---- ------ ---------- -------------was fm--- ---------------- ------- --- -- California
corporation------ ---------- -------- --- -successor
formed
in ----- under the laws of --------------- --- -- -------------international
----------------company,
with --------- -------- ----- ---------accounting
for somewhat
less than half its revenues,
------- --------------------------------activities
accounting
for an equal amount,
and -----------products
--------------the remaining
-- percent
of annual revenues.
The early
------- were a period of ------ ---------------- ---------- ----- ------ for
the Taxpayer,
which consequently
sought an infusion
of new funds. Following
the creation
of an Indenture
with
---------- ------- in ------- the Taxpayer
issued
a substantial
series of debt securities,
the proceeds
of which were to be used
The offerings
consisted
of up to ---- -- -------“for general corporate
purposes.”
dollars of “Medium-Term
Notes” in --------------- including
$ ---------------in
“Senior Debentures”
in ---- -------- Your question
deals with these Senior
.
Debentures.
According
to the “Pricing Supplement”
to the --------------- Prospectus
and Supplement,
these
---- percent debentures
were- --- ---- ---- -ear notes,
with a maturity
date of ---- ----- -------- You see these debt instruments
as the
source of a possible
tax ------- --- ------- of their unusually
long term.
In your
view, the remoteness
of the maturity
date diminishes
the investors’
right to be
10650
repaid
equity
to such an extent
than with debt.
that
the instruments
may have more
in common
with
Should these “ --------Bonds” be recharacterized
as equity, of course,
the Taxpayer
would not be entitled to deduct the amounts
it has paid (and will
pay) as interest
thereon.
Discussion
Periodic payments
made with respect to a debt obligation
are deductible
as interest
under Internal
Revenue Code Section 163, but only if the obligation
is a valid indebtedness
of the payor.
“The classic debt is an unqualified
obligation
to pay a sum certain at a reasonably
close maturity
date along with
a futed percentage
in interest
payable regardless
of the debtor’s income or the
lack thereof.
While some variation
in this formula
is not fatal to the taxpayer’s
effort to have the advance treated as a debt for tax purposes,
. . too great a
variation
will _.. preclude
such treatment.”
Gilbert v. Commissioner,
248 F.2d
399, 402-03
(2d Cir. 1957).
Whether
an instrument
represents
indebtedness
or an equity investment
for federal income tax purposes
depends on the facts and circumstances
of
each case. No particular
fact, standing
alone, is conclusive.
John Kellev Co. v.
Commissioner,
362 U.S. 521 (1946).
As outlined
in your request
to our office,
there is an array of factors to consider
in any debt vs. equity analysis.
The
ones you delineate
are:
.
.
.
g
.
.
n
.
whether
there is an unconditional
promise to pay a sum certain on demand
or at a fixed maturity
date that is in the reasonably
foreseeable
future;
whether
holders of the instrument
have the right to enforce payment
of
principal
and interest;
whether
the holder’s
rights are subordinate
to those of general creditors;
whether
holders have the right to participate
in the management
of the
issuer;
whether
the issuer is thinly capitalized;
whether
the holders of the instrument
are, in fact, the shareholders
of the
issuer;
how the instrument
is labeled by the parties; and
whether
the instrument
is consistently
treated as debt for other, non-tax
purposes
purposes.
Your
maturity
primary
concern is the first
date
---- years in the future
of the above factors.1
is hardly “foreseeable.”
You logically
note that a
But the operative
test
r Your request does also point out two other features of the bonds: (1) there are limits on
the debenture
holders’ rights to enforce payment, in that not less than -- percent of them
~-’ would have to act in concert in the event of default; and (2) the debentures,
being unsecured,
rank equally with all other senior unsecured indebtedness
of the Taxpayer; you refer to their .
subordination
to the rights of other creditors with respect to assets of the Taxpayer’s subsidi-
.
is reasonableness,
rather than foreseeability,
and reasonableness
can only be
addressed
in context. You have not given any facts about the Taxpayer’s
capital
structure
or credit rating, but it is in general known as a healthy,
stable, global
corporation,
and we are probably
safe in assuming
and ,eat there was no question
of
excessive
debt or “thin capitalization,”
or of an unsatisfactory
credit rating when
these debentures
were issued. proceeding
on these assumptions,
was there anything
unreasonable
about the debentures’
----ear term?
In Ruspvn COIV., 18 T.C. 769 (1952), an 89.year term was found to be
acceptable
where the period was substantially
coextensive
with the term of a ground
lease on the corporation’s
real property.
In Monon Railroad v. Commissioner,
55
T.C. 345 (1970), acq., 1973-2 C.B. 3, the Court found a debt with a term of 50 years
to be reasonable,
since “the substantial
nature of the [taxpayer’s]
business,
and the
fact that it had been in corporate
existence
since 1897, or 61 years prior to the
issuance
of the debentures”
were all taken into consideration
by the Court.
In Swobv Corporation,
9 T. C. 887 (1947), on the other hand, the Court found a
purported
debt obligation
of 99 years to be more akin to equity. But that was
because the context did make 99 years unreasonable:
the 99-year obligation
had
been issued by a corporation
whose principal
asset had an anticipated
life at the
time of acquisition
of less than a third of that span.
How could the “lenders”
anticipate
being repaid?
Even 15. and 20-year terms have been held excessive,
where circumstances
so dictated.
See, e.g., United States v. Snyder Bros. Co., 367
arks
in the event of the subsidiaries’
liquidation
or reorganization.
Regarding the enforcement
rights, you are correct that the “right to force payment of the
sum as a debt in the event of default’ is a very significant
factor in a debt vs. equity analysis.
United States v. South Georvia Rv., 107 F.2d 3, 5 b Cir. 1939). However, there is considerable
authority
that requiring the concurrence of a certain percentage of creditors in order to
accelerate maturity upon default is not inconsistent
with indebtedness,
since even creditors
have an interest in preventing a minority from “upsetting
the financial applecart if there should
be a default of no genuine economic consequence.”
Luden’s, Inc. v. United States, 196 F. Supp.
526, 533 (E. D. Pa. 1961); Cum, v. Commissioner,
43 T.C. 667, 686 (1965).
Regarding the subordination
question, you may be placing too much weight on the
provision you have quoted from the Prospectus.
True, “subordination
necessarily destroys one
of the essential rights of the creditor, and the willingness
to subordinate
is indicative
of equity
investment.”
Sarkes Tar&n.
Inc. v. United States, 240 F. 2d 467, 470-71 (7* Cir. 1957).
However, the Prospectus merely states that these debenture
holders’ rights to the assets of the
Taxpayer’s
subsidiaries
in the event of the subsidiaries’
liquidation
will be no greater than the
Taxpayer’s rights (except as a creditor) in that situation.
This provision does not subordinate
the rights of the debenture
holders to any of the Taxpayer’s general creditors’ rights.
Neither of these provisions is atypical ins comparable
public debt offerings, and we do
not think that in this case they can be said to militate more than a negligible amount
in favor
of a finding of equity.
3
F.2d
379,
980, 984 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 956 (1967);
397 (1965), affd. 368 F.2d 125 (5th Cir. 1966).
Reef Corp.
24 T.C.M.
Obviously,
even multi-national
companies
split up, merge, disappear,
or change
their shape and name, and it is unlikely
that any given corporation
will be around
for
---- years in its present form. But that is different
from saying that something
exists
now which wiIl prevent the Taxpayer
from fulfilling
its obligations
to these investors,
or
that something
exists now that should warn these investors
that the debt wiII not be
repaid.
In short, we would have to point to something
about the long term of these
debentures
that makes it more likely that those who purchased
them did so with the
intent of putting
their money at the risk of the Taxpayer’s
business,
rather than simply.
lending it with the expectation
of repayment.
Paradoxically,
although
this question
is the crux of the issue, it is disingenuous
to insist that purchasers
of these debentures
were thinking
about repayment.
As noted
by many of today’s financial
market
observers,
“in the case of even conventional
longterm debt with a term of 30 years, the bulk of the present value of the security
is not in
the right to receive principal
back at maturity
but in the right to receive periodic
When viewed from this perspective,
the length of the term of an
interest
payments.“z
instrument
is only a minor factor in the debt equity analysis.3
Thus, whether
we seriously
address the question
of the investors’
expectation
of
repayment,
or whether
we recognize
the reality that the debentures
probably
represented no more than a secure income stream to them, the answer to the debt-equity
query is the same: the purchasers
did notbelieve
they were putting
their funds at the
risk of the Taxpayer’s
business.
The analysis
in your inquiry
relied heavily on Notice 94-47, 1994-1 C.B. 357,
which was published
when the Service became aware of a growing number
of corporate
taxpayers’
increasingly
aggressive
financing
schemes. The Notice announced
that such
schemes would henceforth
be more carefully
scrutinized,
and laid out several factors
that would receive close attention.
One of the Service’s articulated
concerns
was the
trend toward issuing purported
debt that had a variety of equity features,
including
those issues with exceptionally
long maturity
periods.4
2 HARITON 86 GARLOCK, “Federal Income Taxation of Debt Instruments”
(3d ed.), cited in
Sheppard, ‘News Analysis: Toward Straightforward
Section 385 Guidance,” 94 TNT 218-4, Nov.
7, 1994.
3 “[Alny security is really just a stream of payments.”
Sheppard, supra. “Extending
the
maturity of a conventional
debt instrument
(even to infinity) does not give it any fundamental
attribute
of equity.”
Myers, Treasury Tax Correspondence,
97 TNT 74-27, April 2, 1997.
4 From 1995 through 1997, dollar-denominated
century bonds were issued by no fewer than
53 corporations,
for a principal amount of $12.5 billion. The Financier, Vol. 4, Issue 4,
November 1997.
4
The Notice’s discussion of long-term debt, however, contained nothing new or
different. The Service merely cautioned taxpayers that they should be wary of relying
on cases such as Monon Railroad, supra, for purposes of treating otherwise doubtful
instruments as debt, rather than equity. It never came close to saying that a long term,
even an exceptionally long term, would alone tip the balance in favor of equity treatment, nor would that factor weigh any more heavily than it had in the past. Basically,
the Notice merely reiterated that “[t]he reasonableness of an instrument’s term ._. is
determined based on all the facts and circumstances, including the issuer’s ability to
satisfy the instrument. A maturity that is reasonable in one set of circumstances may
be unreasonable in another if sufficient equity characteristics are present.”
Thus the traditional debt-equity analysis is still controlling, and in the absence
of any significant facts weighing against debt and in favor of equity, we do not see how
we could support your proposed disallowance of interest with respect to these
debentures.5
Conclusion
If counsel can be of further assistance, please feel free to call. My number is
213/894-7101.
5 (b)(2)High
b)(2)Hi gh---------- ----------- ---- ----------- ----- --- ---- ---------- --- ------------------ ---------------- -------- ------------ --------------------- ----- ---- ------------ ----------------- ----- ------------------------ ------------------- ----- ------------------------ ----------------------- ------------ ------- ------------- --------------------------- --------- -------------- ------------ --- ----------- ---- ---------- ------------- -------------------- --- ------------ -------------- ---------- ----- ----------------------- -------------- --------- -------------- ------------ --- ---------- ---- --------- -------------- ----------- --------------- --- ------------- -------------5
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