Bulletin No. 1997–31

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August 4, 1997

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HIGHLIGHTS

OF THIS ISSUE

These synopses are intended only as aids to the reader in

identifying the subject matter covered. They may not be

relied upon as authoritative interpretations.

INCOME TAX

EMPLOYEE PLANS

Rev. Rul. 97–30, page 12.

Notice 97–44, page 15.

Federal rates; adjusted federal rates; adjusted federal long-term rate, and the long-term exempt rate. For

purposes of sections 1274, 1288, 382, and other sections

of the Code, tables set forth the rates for August 1997.

Weighted average interest rate update. Guidelines are

set forth for determining for July 1997, the weighted average interest rate and the resulting permissible range of interest rates used to calculate current liability for purposes of

the full funding limitation of section 412(c)(7) of the Code as

amended by the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987

and by the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (GATT).

Ct.D. 2061, page 5.

Punitive damages for personal injuries. Petitioners’ punitive damages were not received “on account of” personal

injuries; therefore, the gross-income-exclusion provision

does not apply and the damages are taxable. O’Gilvie et

al., Minors v. United States.

EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS

Announcement 97–74, page 16.

A list is given of organizations now classified as private foundations.

Finding Lists begin on page 18.

Announcement Relating to Decisions of the Tax Court begins on page 4.

Index for July begins on page 20.

Department of the Treasury

Internal Revenue Service

Mission of the Service

ucts and services; and perform in a manner warranting

the highest degree of public confidence in our integrity, efficiency, and fairness.

The purpose of the Internal Revenue Service is to collect

the proper amount of tax revenue at the least cost; serve

the public by continually improving the quality of our prod-

Statement of Principles

of Internal Revenue

Tax Administration

The Service also has the responsibility of applying and

administering the law in a reasonable, practical manner.

Issues should only be raised by examining officers when

they have merit, never arbitrarily or for trading purposes.

At the same time, the examining officer should never hesitate to raise a meritorious issue. It is also important that

care be exercised not to raise an issue or to ask a court to

adopt a position inconsistent with an established Service

position.

The function of the Internal Revenue Service is to administer the Internal Revenue Code. Tax policy for raising revenue

is determined by Congress.

With this in mind, it is the duty of the Service to carry out that

policy by correctly applying the laws enacted by Congress;

to determine the reasonable meaning of various Code provisions in light of the Congressional purpose in enacting them;

and to perform this work in a fair and impartial manner, with

neither a government nor a taxpayer point of view.

Administration should be both reasonable and vigorous. It

should be conducted with as little delay as possible and

with great courtesy and considerateness. It should never

try to overreach, and should be reasonable within the

bounds of law and sound administration. It should, however, be vigorous in requiring compliance with law and it

should be relentless in its attack on unreal tax devices and

fraud.

At the heart of administration is interpretation of the Code. It

is the responsibility of each person in the Service, charged

with the duty of interpreting the law, to try to find the true

meaning of the statutory provision and not to adopt a

strained construction in the belief that he or she is “protecting the revenue.” The revenue is properly protected only

when we ascertain and apply the true meaning of the statute.

Introduction

The Internal Revenue Bulletin is the authoritative instrument

of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue for announcing official rulings and procedures of the Internal Revenue Service

and for publishing Treasury Decisions, Executive Orders, Tax

Conventions, legislation, court decisions, and other items of

general interest. It is published weekly and may be obtained

from the Superintendent of Documents on a subscription

basis. Bulletin contents of a permanent nature are consolidated semiannually into Cumulative Bulletins, which are sold

on a single-copy basis.

dures must be considered, and Service personnel and others concerned are cautioned against reaching the same conclusions in other cases unless the facts and circumstances

are substantially the same.

The Bulletin is divided into four parts as follows:

Part I.—1986 Code.

This part includes rulings and decisions based on provisions

of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986.

It is the policy of the Service to publish in the Bulletin all substantive rulings necessary to promote a uniform application

of the tax laws, including all rulings that supersede, revoke,

modify, or amend any of those previously published in the

Bulletin. All published rulings apply retroactively unless otherwise indicated. Procedures relating solely to matters of internal management are not published; however, statements

of internal practices and procedures that affect the rights

and duties of taxpayers are published.

Part II.—Treaties and Tax Legislation.

This part is divided into two subparts as follows: Subpart A,

Tax Conventions, and Subpart B, Legislation and Related

Committee Reports.

Part III.—Administrative, Procedural, and Miscellaneous.

To the extent practicable, pertinent cross references to

these subjects are contained in the other Parts and Subparts. Also included in this part are Bank Secrecy Act Administrative Rulings. Bank Secrecy Act Administrative Rulings

are issued by the Department of the Treasury’s Office of the

Assistant Secretary (Enforcement).

Revenue rulings represent the conclusions of the Service on

the application of the law to the pivotal facts stated in the

revenue ruling. In those based on positions taken in rulings

to taxpayers or technical advice to Service field offices,

identifying details and information of a confidential nature

are deleted to prevent unwarranted invasions of privacy and

to comply with statutory requirements.

Part IV.—Items of General Interest.

With the exception of the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking

and the disbarment and suspension list included in this part,

none of these announcements are consolidated in the Cumulative Bulletins.

Rulings and procedures reported in the Bulletin do not have

the force and effect of Treasury Department Regulations,

but they may be used as precedents. Unpublished rulings

will not be relied on, used, or cited as precedents by Service

personnel in the disposition of other cases. In applying published rulings and procedures, the effect of subsequent legislation, regulations, court decisions, rulings, and proce-

The first Bulletin for each month includes a cumulative index

for the matters published during the preceding months.

These monthly indexes are cumulated on a quarterly and

semiannual basis, and are published in the first Bulletin of the

succeeding quarterly and semiannual period, respectively.

The contents of this publication are not copyrighted and may be reprinted freely. A citation of the Internal Revenue Bulletin as the source would be appropriate.

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402.

Announcement Relating to Court Decisions

It is the policy of the Internal Revenue

Service to announce at an early date

whether it will follow the holdings in certain cases. An Action on Decision is the

document making such an announcement.

An Action on Decision will be issued at

the discretion of the Service only on unappealed issues decided adverse to the

government. Generally, an Action on Decision is issued where its guidance would

be helpful to Service personnel working

with the same or similar issues. Unlike a

Treasury Regulation or a Revenue Ruling,

an Action on Decision is not an affirmative statement of Service position. It is not

intended to serve as public guidance and

may not be cited as precedent.

Actions on Decisions shall be relied

upon within the Service only as conclusions applying the law to the facts in the

particular case at the time the Action on

Decision was issued. Caution should be

exercised in extending the recommendation of the Action on Decision to similar

cases where the facts are different. Moreover, the recommendation in the Action

on Decision may be superseded by new

legislation, regulations, rulings, cases, or

Actions on Decisions.

Prior to 1991, the Service published acquiescence or nonacquiescence only in

certain regular Tax Court opinions. The

Service has expanded its acquiescence

program to include other civil tax cases

where guidance is determined to be helpful. Accordingly, the Service now may acquiesce or nonacquiesce in the holdings

of memorandum Tax Court opinions, as

well as those of the United States District

Courts, Claims Court, and Circuit Courts

of Appeal. Regardless of the court deciding the case, the recommendation of any

Action on Decision will be published in

the Internal Revenue Bulletin.

The recommendation in every Action

on Decision will be summarized as acquiescence, acquiescence in result only,

or nonacquiescence. Both “acquiescence” and “acquiescence in result only”

mean that the Service accepts the holding

of the court in a case and that the Service

will follow it in disposing of cases with

the same controlling facts. However, “acquiescence” indicates neither approval

nor disapproval of the reasons assigned

by the court for its conclusions; whereas,

“acquiescence in result only” indicates

disagreement or concern with some or all

of those reasons. Nonacquiescence signifies that, although no further review was

sought, the Service does not agree with

the holding of the court and, generally,

will not follow the decision in disposing

of cases involving other taxpayers. In reference to an opinion of a circuit court of

appeals, a nonacquiescence indicates that

the Service will not follow the holding on

a nationwide basis. However, the Service

will recognize the precedential impact of

the opinion on cases arising within the

venue of the deciding circuit.

The announcements published in the

weekly Internal Revenue Bulletins are

consolidated semiannually and annually.

The semiannual consolidation appears in

the first Bulletin for July and in the Cumulative Bulletin for the first half of the

year, and the annual consolidation appears in the first Bulletin for the following January and in the Cumulative Bulletin for the last half of the year.

The Commissioner ACQUIESCES in

the following decision:

The May Department Stores Co. v.

United States,1

36 Fed. Cl. 680 (1996).

Acquiescence relating to whether interest accrued on the taxpayers’ underpayments of tax for 1983 and 1984 from the due date of the first or third estimated tax

payment for the next succeeding years.

August 4, 1997

1997–31 I.R.B.

Part I. Rulings and Decisions Under the Internal Revenue Code of 1986

Section 42. — Low-Income

Housing Credit

The adjusted applicable federal short-term, midterm, and long-term rates are set forth for the month

of August 1997. See Rev. Rul. 97–30, page 12.

Section 104. — Compensation

for Injuries or Sickness

Ct.D. 2061

SUPREME COURT

OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 95–966*

O’GILVIE ET AL., MINORS V. UNITED

STATES

519 U.S.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT

OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

December 10, 1996*

Syllabus

Petitioners, the husband and two children of a woman who died of toxic shock

syndrome, received a jury award of

$1,525,000 actual damages and $10 million punitive damages in a tort suit based

on Kansas law against the maker of the

product that caused decedent’s death.

They paid federal income tax insofar as

the award’s proceeds represented punitive

damages, but immediately sought a refund. Procedurally speaking, this litigation represents the consolidation of two

cases brought in the same Federal District

Court: the husband’s suit against the Government for a refund, and the Government’s suit against the children to recover

the refund that the Government had made

to the children earlier. The District Court

found for petitioners under 26 U.S.C.

§104(a)(2), which, as it read in 1988, excluded from “gross income,” the “amount

of any damages received . . . on account

of personal injuries or sickness.” (Emphasis added.) The court held on the merits that the italicized language includes

punitive damages, thereby excluding such

damages from gross income. The Tenth

Circuit reversed, holding that the exclusionary provision does not cover punitive

damages.

* Together with No. 95–977, O’Gilvie v. United

States, also on certiorari to the same court.

1997–31 I.R.B.

Held:

1. Petitioners’ punitive damages were

not received “on account of” personal injuries; hence the gross-income-exclusion

provision does not apply and the damages

are taxable. Pp. 2–11.

(a) Although the phrase “on account of”

does not unambiguously define itself, several factors prompt this Court to agree with

the Government when it interprets the exclusionary provision to apply to those personal injury lawsuit damages that were

awarded by reason of, or because of, the

personal injuries, and not to punitive damages that do not compensate injury, but are

private fines levied by civil juries to punish

reprehensible conduct and to deter its future occurrence. For one thing, the Government’s interpretation gives the phrase “on

account of” a meaning consistent with the

dictionary definition. More important, in

Commissioner v. Schleier, 515 U.S.

this Court came close to resolving the

statute’s ambiguity in the Government’s

favor when it said that the statute covers

pain and suffering damages, medical expenses, and lost wages in an ordinary tort

case because they are “designed to com, n. 5, but

pensate . . . victims” id., at

does not apply to elements of damages that

are “punitive in nature,” id., at

. The

Government’s reading also is more faithful

to the statutory provision’s history and

basic tax-related purpose of excluding

compensatory damages that restore a victim’s lost, nontaxable “capital.” Petitioners

suggest no very good reason why Congress

might have wanted the exclusion to have

covered these punitive damages, which are

not a substitute for any normally untaxed

personal (or financial) quality, good, or

“asset” and do not compensate for any kind

of loss. Pp. 2–8.

(b) Petitioners’ three arguments to the

contrary—that certain words or phrases in

the original, or current, version of the

statute work in their favor; that the exclusion of punitive damages from gross income may be justified by Congress’ desire

to be generous to tort victims and to avoid

such administrative problems as separating punitive from compensatory portions

of a global settlement or determining the

extent to which a punitive damages award

is itself intended to compensate; and that

their position is supported by a 1989

statutory amendment that specifically

says that the gross income exclusion does

not apply to any punitive damages in connection with a case not involving physical

injury or sickness—are not sufficiently

persuasive to overcome the Government’s interpretation. Pp. 8–11.

2. Petitioners’ two case-specific procedural arguments—that the Government’s

lawsuit was untimely and that its original

notice of appeal was filed a few days

late—are rejected. Pp. 12–14.

66 F. 3d 1550, affirmed.

BREYER, J., delivered the opinion of the

Court, in which REHNQUIST, C. J., and

STEVENS, KENNEDY, SOUTER, and GINSBURG, JJ., joined. SCALIA, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which O’CONNOR and

THOMAS, JJ., joined.

SUPREME COURT

OF THE UNITED STATES

Nos. 95–966 AND 95–977

KEVIN M. O’GILVIE AND

STEPHANIE L. O’GILVIE,

MINORS, PETITIONERS

95-966

UNITED STATES

KELLY M. O’GILVIE, PETITIONER

95-977

UNITED STATES

ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED

STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH

CIRCUIT

[December 10, 1996]

JUSTICE BRYER delivered the opinion of

the Court.

Internal Revenue Code §104(a)(2), as

it read in 1988, excluded from “gross income,” the

“amount of any damages received

(whether by suit or agreement and

whether as lump sums or as periodic

payments) on account of personal injuries or sickness.” 26 U.S.C. §104

(a)(2) (1988 ed.) (emphasis added).

The issue before us is whether this provision applies to (and thereby makes nontaxable) punitive damages received by a

August 4, 1997

plaintiff in a tort suit for personal injuries.

We conclude that the punitive damages

received here were not received “on account of” personal injuries; hence the provision does not apply and the damages are

taxable.

Petitioners in this litigation are the husband and two children of Betty O’Gilvie,

who died in 1983 of toxic shock syndrome. Her husband, Kelly, brought a tort

suit (on his own behalf and that of her estate) based on Kansas law against the

maker of the product that caused Betty

O’Gilvie’s death. Eventually, he and the

two children received the net proceeds of

a jury award of $1,525,000 actual damages and $10 million punitive damages.

Insofar as the proceeds represented punitive damages, petitioners paid income tax

on the proceeds but immediately sought a

refund.

The litigation before us concerns petitioners’ legal entitlement to that refund.

Procedurally speaking, the litigation represents the consolidation of two cases

brought in the same Federal District

Court: Kelly’s suit against the Government for a refund, and the Government’s

suit against the children to recover the refund that the Government had made to the

children earlier. 26 U.S.C. §7405(b) (authorizing suits by the United States to recover refunds erroneously made). The

Federal District Court held on the merits

that the statutory phrase “damages . . . on

account of personal injury or sickness,”

includes punitive damages, thereby excluding punitive damages from gross income and entitling Kelly to obtain, and

the children to keep, their refund. The

Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit,

however, reversed the District Court.

Along with the Fourth, Ninth and Federal

Circuits, it held that the exclusionary provision does not cover punitive damages.

Because the Sixth Circuit has held the

contrary, the Circuits are divided about

the proper interpretation of the provision.

We granted certiorari to resolve this conflict.

Petitioners received the punitive damages at issue here “by suit,”—indeed “by”

an ordinary “suit” for “personal injuries.”

Contrast United States v. Burke, 504 U.S.

229 (1992) (§104(a)(2) exclusion not applicable to backpay awarded under Title

August 4, 1997

VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 because the claim was not based upon “‘tort

or tort type rights,’” id., at 233); Commis(1995)

sioner v. Schleier, 515 U.S.

(alternative holding) (Age Discrimination

in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA)

claim is similar to Title VII claim in

Burke in this respect). These legal circumstances bring those damages within the

gross-income-exclusion provision, however, only if the petitioners also “received” those damages “on account of”

the “personal injuries.” And the phrase

“on account of” does not unambiguously

define itself.

On one linguistic interpretation of

those words, that of petitioners, they require no more than a “but-for” connection

between “any” damages and a lawsuit for

personal injuries. They would thereby

bring virtually all personal injury lawsuit

damages within the scope of the provision, since: “but for the personal injury,

there would be no lawsuit, and but for the

lawsuit, there would be no damages.”

On the Government’s alternative interpretation, however, those words impose a

stronger causal connection, making the

provision applicable only to those personal injury lawsuit damages that were

awarded by reason of, or because of, the

personal injuries. To put the matter more

specifically, they would make the section

inapplicable to punitive damages, where

those damages

“‘are not compensation for injury [but]

[i]nstead . . . are private fines levied by

civil juries to punish reprehensible

conduct and to deter its future occurrence.’” Electrical Workers v. Foust,

442 U.S. 42, 48 (1979), quoting Gertz

v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323,

350 (1974) (footnote omitted).

The Government says that such damages

were not “received . . . on account of” the

personal injuries, but rather were awarded

“on account of” a defendant’s reprehensible conduct and the jury’s need to punish

and to deter it. Hence, despite some historical uncertainty about the matter, see

Rev. Rul. 75–45, 1975–1 Cum. Bull. 47,

revoked by Rev. Rul. 84–108, 1984–2

Cum. Bull. 32, the Government now concludes that these punitive damages fall

outside the statute’s coverage.

We agree with the Government’s interpretation of the statute. For one thing, its

interpretation gives the phrase “on ac-

count of” a meaning consistent with the

dictionary definition. See, e.g., Webster’s

Third New International Dictionary 13

(1981) (“for the sake of: by reason of: because of”).

More important, in Schleier, supra, we

came close to resolving the statute’s ambiguity in the Government’s favor. That

case did not involve damages received in

an ordinary tort suit; it involved liquidated damages and backpay received in a

settlement of a lawsuit charging a violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. Nonetheless, in deciding

one of the issues there presented (whether

the provision now before us covered

ADEA liquidated damages), we contrasted the elements of an ordinary tort recovery with ADEA liquidated damages.

We said that pain and suffering damages,

medical expenses, and lost wages in an

ordinary tort case are covered by the

statute and hence excluded from income

“not simply because the taxpayer received a tort settlement, but rather because each element . . . satisfies the requirement . . . that the damages were

received ‘on account of personal injuries or sickness.’” Id., at

(slip

op., at 6–7).

In holding that ADEA liquidated damages

are not covered, we said that they are not

“designed to compensate ADEA victims,”

id., at

, n. 5 (slip op., at 9, n. 5); instead, they are “‘punitive in nature,’” id.,

(slip op., at 8) (quoting Trans

World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S.

111, 125 (1985)).

Applying the same reasoning here

would lead to the conclusion that the

punitive damages are not covered because

they are an element of damages not “designed to compensate . . . victims,”

Schleier, 515 U.S., at

(slip op., at 9,

n. 5); rather they are “‘punitive in nature.’” Ibid. Although we gave other reasons for our holding in Schleier as well,

we explicitly labeled this reason an “independent” ground in support of our decision, id., at

(slip op., at 11). We cannot accept petitioners’ claim that it was

simply a dictum.

We also find the Government’s reading

more faithful to the history of the statutory provision as well as the basic tax-related purpose that the history reveals.

That history begins in approximately

1918. At that time, this Court had recently

1997–31 I.R.B.

decided several cases based on the principle that a restoration of capital was not income; hence it fell outside the definition

of “income” upon which the law imposed

a tax. E.g., Doyle v. Mitchell Brothers

Co., 247 U.S. 179, 187 (1918); Southern

Pacific Co. v. Lowe, 247 U.S. 330, 335

(1918). The Attorney General then advised the Secretary of the Treasury that

proceeds of an accident insurance policy

should be treated as nontaxable because

they primarily

“substitute . . . capital which is the

source of future periodical income . . .

merely tak[ing] the place of capital in

human ability which was destroyed by

the accident. They are therefore [nontaxable] ‘capital’ as distinguished from

‘income’ receipts.” 31 Op. Atty. Gen.

304, 308 (1918).

The Treasury Department added that

“upon similar principles . . . an amount

received by an individual as the result

of a suit or compromise for personal

injuries sustained by him through accident is not income [that is] taxable

. . . .” T. D. 2747, 20 Treas. Dec. Int.

Rev. 457 (1918).

Soon thereafter, Congress enacted the

first predecessor of the provision before

us. That provision excluded from income

“[a]mounts received, through accident

or health insurance or under workmen’s compensation acts, as compensation for personal injuries or sickness,

plus the amount of any damages received whether by suit or agreement

on account of such injuries or sickness.” Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18,

§213(b)(6), 40 Stat. 1066.

The provision is similar to the cited

materials from the Attorney General and

the Secretary of the Treasury in language

and structure, all of which suggests that

Congress sought, in enacting the statute,

to codify the Treasury’s basic approach. A

contemporaneous House Report, insofar

as relevant, confirms this similarity of approach, for it says:

“Under the present law it is doubtful

whether amounts received through accident or health insurance, or under

workmen’s compensation acts, as compensation for personal injury or sickness, and damages received on account

of such injuries or sickness, are re-

1997–31 I.R.B.

quired to be included in gross income.

The proposed bill provides that such

amounts shall not be included in gross

income.” H. R. Rep. No. 767, pp. 9–10

(1918).

This history and the approach it reflects

suggest there is no strong reason for trying to interpret the statute’s language to

reach beyond those damages that, making

up for a loss, seek to make a victim

whole, or, speaking very loosely, “return

the victim’s personal or financial capital.”

We concede that the original provision’s language does go beyond what one

might expect a purely tax-policy-related

“human capital” rationale to justify. That

is because the language excludes from

taxation not only those damages that aim

to substitute for a victim’s physical or personal well-being—personal assets that the

Government does not tax and would not

have taxed had the victim not lost them. It

also excludes from taxation those damages that substitute, say, for lost wages,

which would have been taxed had the victim earned them. To that extent, the provision can make the compensated taxpayer

better off from a tax perspective than had

the personal injury not taken place.

But to say this is not to support cutting

the statute totally free from its original

moorings in victim loss. The statute’s failure to separate those compensatory elements of damages (or accident insurance

proceeds) one from the other does not

change its original focus upon damages

that restore a loss, that seek to make a victim whole, with a tax-equality objective

providing an important part of, even if not

the entirety of, the statute’s rationale. All

this is to say that the Government’s interpretation of the current provision (the

wording of which has not changed significantly from the original) is more consistent than is petitioners’ with the statute’s

original focus.

Finally, we have asked why Congress

might have wanted the exclusion to have

covered these punitive damages, and we

have found no very good answer. Those

damages are not a substitute for any normally untaxed personal (or financial)

quality, good, or “asset.” They do not

compensate for any kind of loss. The statute’s language does not require, or

strongly suggest, their exclusion from income. And we can find no evidence that

congressional generosity or concern for

administrative convenience stretched beyond the bounds of an interpretation that

would distinguish compensatory from

noncompensatory damages.

Of course, as we have just said, from

the perspective of tax policy one might

argue that noncompensatory punitive

damages and, for example, compensatory

lost wages are much the same thing. That

is, in both instances, exclusion from gross

income provides the taxpayer with a

windfall. This circumstance alone, however, does not argue strongly for an interpretation that covers punitive damages,

for coverage of compensatory damages

has both language and history in its favor

to a degree that coverage of noncompensatory punitive damages does not. Moreover, this policy argument assumes that

coverage of lost wages is something of an

anomaly; if so, that circumstance would

not justify the extension of the anomaly or

the creation of another. See Wolfman,

Current Issues of Federal Tax Policy, 16

U. Ark. Little Rock L. J. 543, 549–550

(1994) (“[T]o build upon” what is, from a

tax policy perspective, the less easily explained portion “of the otherwise rational

exemption for personal injury,” simply

“does not make sense”).

Petitioners make three sorts of arguments to the contrary. First, they emphasize certain words or phrases in the original, or current, provision that work in

their favor. For example, they stress the

word “any” in the phrase “any damages.”

And they note that in both original and

current versions Congress referred to certain amounts of money received (from

workmen’s compensation, for example)

as “amounts received . . . as compensation,” while here they refer only to

“damages received” without adding the

limiting phrase “as compensation.” 26

U.S.C. §104(a); Revenue Act of 1918,

§213(b)(6), 40 Stat. 1066. They add that

in the original version, the words “on account of personal injuries” might have referred to, and modified, the kind of lawsuit, not the kind of damages. And they

find support for this view in the second

sentence of the Treasury Regulation first

adopted in 1958 which says:

“The term ‘damages received (whether

by suit or agreement’ means an amount

received (other than workmen’s compensation) through prosecution of a

legal suit or action based upon tort or

August 4, 1997

tort type rights, or through a settlement

agreement entered into in lieu of such

prosecution.” 26 CFR §1.104–1(c)

(1996).

These arguments, however, show only

that one can reasonably read the statute’s

language in different ways—the very assumption upon which our analysis rests.

They do not overcome our interpretation

of the provision in Schleier, nor do they

change the provision’s history. The help

that the Treasury Regulation’s second

sentence gives the petitioners is offset by

its first sentence, which says that the exclusion applies to damages received “on

account of personal injuries or sickness,”

and which we have held sets forth an independent requirement. Schleier, 515

(slip op., at 14). See AppenU.S., at

dix, infra, at 16.

Second, petitioners argue that to some

extent the purposes that might have led

Congress to exclude, say, lost wages from

income would also have led Congress to

exclude punitive damages, for doing so is

both generous to victims and avoids such

administrative problems as separating

punitive from compensatory portions of a

global settlement or determining the extent to which a punitive damages award is

itself intended to compensate.

Our problem with these arguments is

one of degree. Tax generosity presumably

has its limits. The administrative problem

of distinguishing punitive from compensatory elements is likely to be less serious

than, say, distinguishing among the compensatory elements of a settlement (which

difficulty might account for the statute’s

treatment of, say, lost wages). Cf. supra p.

8. And, of course, the problem of identifying the elements of an ostensibly punitive

award does not exist where, as here, relevant state law makes clear that the damages at issue are not at all compensatory,

but entirely punitive. Brewer v.

Home-Stake Production Co., 200 Kan.

96, 100, 434 P. 2d 828, 831 (1967)

(“[E]xemplary damages are not regarded

as compensatory in any degree”); accord,

Smith v. Printup, 254 Kan. 315, 866 P. 2d

985 (1993); Folks v. Kansas Power &

Light Co., 243 Kan. 57, 755 P. 2d 1319

(1988); Nordstrom v. Miller, 227 Kan. 59,

605 P. 2d 545 (1980).

Third, petitioners rely upon a later enacted law. In 1989, Congress amended the

law so that it now specifically says the

August 4, 1997

personal injury exclusion from gross income

“shall not apply to any punitive damages in connection with a case not involving physical injury or physical

sickness.” 26 U.S.C. §104(a) (1994).

Why, petitioners ask, would Congress

have enacted this amendment removing

punitive damages (in nonphysical injury

cases) unless Congress believed that, in

the amendment’s absence, punitive damages did fall within the provision’s coverage?

The short answer to this question is that

Congress might simply have thought that

the then-current law about the provision’s

treatment of punitive damages—in cases

of physical and nonphysical injuries—

was unclear, that it wanted to clarify the

matter in respect to nonphysical injuries,

but it wanted to leave the law where it

found it in respect to physical injuries.

The fact that the law was indeed uncertain

at the time supports this view. Compare

Rev. Rul. 84–108, 1984–2 Cum. Bull. 32,

with e.g., Roemer v. Commissioner, 716 F.

2d 693 (CA9 1983); Miller v. Commissioner, 93 T. C. 330 (1989), rev’d 914 F.

2d 586 (CA4 1990).

The 1989 amendment’s legislative history, insofar as relevant, offers further

support. The amendment grew out of the

Senate’s refusal to agree to a House bill

that would have made all damages in nonphysical personal injury cases taxable.

The Senate was willing to specify only

that the Government could tax punitive

damages in such cases. Compare H. R.

Rep. No. 101–247, p. 1355 (1989), with

H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 101–386, pp.

622–623 (1989). Congress’ primary

focus, in other words, was upon what to

do about nonphysical personal injuries,

not upon the provision’s coverage of

punitive damages under pre-existing law.

We add that, in any event, the view of a

later Congress cannot control the interpretation of an earlier enacted statute. United

States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304 (1960); Higgins v. Smith, 308 U.S. 473 (1940). But

cf. Burke, 504 U.S., at 235, n. 6 (including a passing reference to the 1989

amendment, in dicta, as support for a

view somewhat like that of petitioners).

(Although neither party has argued that

it is relevant, we note in passing that

§1605 of the Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104–188, 110

Stat. 1838, explicitly excepts most punitive damages from the exclusion provided

by §104(a)(2). Because it is of prospective application, the section does not

apply here. The Conference Report on the

new law says that “[n]o inference is intended” as to the proper interpretation of

section 104(a)(2) prior to amendment. H.

R. Conf. Rep. No. 104–737, p. 301

(1996).)

The upshot is that we do not find petitioners’ arguments sufficiently persuasive. And, for the reasons set out above,

supra, at 3–8, we agree with the Government’s interpretation of the statute.

III

Petitioners have raised two further issues, specific to the procedural posture of

this litigation. First, the O’Gilvie children

point out that the Government had initially accepted their claim for a refund

and wrote those checks on July 6, 1990.

The Government later changed its mind

and, on July 9, 1992, two years plus three

days later, filed suit against them seeking

the return of a refund erroneously made.

26 U.S.C. §7405(b) (authorizing a “civil

action brought in the name of the United

States” to recover any “portion of a tax

. . . which has been erroneously refunded”). They add that the relevant

statute of limitations specifies that recovery of the refund “shall be allowed only if

such suit is begun within 2 years after the

making of such refund.” §6532(b).

The children concede that they received the refund checks on July 9, 1990,

and they agree that if the limitation period

runs from the date of receipt—if, as the

Government argues, that is the date of the

“making of” the refund—the Government’s suit was timely. But the children

say that the refund was made on, and the

limitations period runs from, the date the

Government mailed the checks (presumably July 6, 7, or 8) in which case the

Government brought this suit one or two

or three days too late.

In our view, the Government is correct

in its claim that its lawsuit was timely.

The language of the statute admits of both

interpretations. But the law ordinarily

provides that an action to recover mistaken payments of money “accrues upon

the receipt of payment,” New Bedford v.

Lloyd Investment Associates, Inc., 363

Mass. 112, 119, 292 N. E. 2d 688, 692

(1973); accord Sizemore v. E. T. Barwick

1997–31 I.R.B.

Industries, Inc., 225 Tenn. 226, 233, 465

S. W. 2d 873, 876 (1971) (“‘the time of

making the . . . payment . . . was the date

of actual receipt’”), unless, as in some

States and in some cases, it accrues upon

the still later date of the mistake’s discovery, see Allen & Lamkin, When Statute of

Limitations Begins to Run Against Action

to Recover Money Paid By Mistake, 79

A.L.R. 3d 754, 766–769 (1977). We are

not aware of any good reason why Congress would have intended a different result where the nature of the claim is so

similar to a traditional action for money

paid by mistake—an action the roots of

which can be found in the old

common-law claim of “assumpsit” or

“money had and received.” New Bedford,

supra, at 118. The lower courts and commentators have reached a similar conclusion. United States v. Carter, 906 F. 2d

1375 (CA9 1990); Akers v. United States,

541 F. Supp. 65, 67 (M. D. Tenn. 1981);

United States v. Woodmansee, 388 F.

Supp. 36, 46 (N. D. Cal. 1975), rev’d on

other grounds, 578 F. 2d 1302 (CA9

1978); 14 J. Mertens Law of Federal Income Taxation §54A.69 (1995); Kafka &

Cavanagh, Litigation of Federal Civil Tax

Controversies §20.03, p. 20–15 (2d ed.

1995). That conclusion is consistent with

dicta in an earlier case from this Court,

United States v. Wurts, 303 U.S. 414,

417–418 (1938), as well as with this

Court’s normal practice of construing ambiguous statutes of limitations in Government action in the Government’s favor.

E.g., Badaracco v. Commissioner, 464

U.S. 386, 391 (1984).

We concede the children’s argument

that a “date of mailing” interpretation produces marginally greater certainty, for

such a rule normally would refer the court

to the postmark to establish the date. But

there is no indication that a “date of receipt” rule has proved difficult to administer in ordinary state or common-law actions for money paid erroneously. The

date the check clears, after all, sets an

outer bound.

Second, Kelly O’Gilvie says that the

Court of Appeals should not have considered the Government’s original appeal

from the District Court’s judgment in his

favor because, in his view, the Government filed its notice of appeal a few days

too late. The Court of Appeals describes

the circumstances underlying this

1997–31 I.R.B.

case-specific issue in its opinion. We

agree with its determination of the matter

for the reasons it has there set forth.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals

affirmed.

APPENDIX

TO OPINION OF THE COURT

Section 104(a), in 1988, read as follows:

“Compensation for injuries or sickness

“(a) In general.—Except in the case of

amounts attributable to (and not in excess of) deductions allowed under section 213 (relating to medical, etc., expenses) for any prior taxable year,

gross income does not include—

“(1) amounts received under workmen’s compensation acts as compensation for personal injuries or sickness;

“(2) the amount of any damages received (whether by suite or agreement

and whether as lump sums or as periodic payments) on account of personal

injuries or sickness;

“(3) amounts received through accident

or health insurance for personal injuries

or sickness (other than amounts received by an employee, to the extent

such amounts (A) are attributable to

contributions by the employer which

were not includible in the gross income

of the employee, or (B) are paid by the

employer);

“(4) amounts received as a pension, annuity, or similar allowance for personal

injuries or sickness resulting from active service in the armed forces of any

country or in the Coast and Geodetic

Survey or the Public Health Service, or

as a disability annuity payable under

the provisions of section 808 of the

Foreign Service Act of 1980; and

“(5) amounts received by an individual

as disability income attributable to injuries incurred as a direct result of a violent attack which the Secretary of

State determines to be a terrorist attack

and which occurred while such individual was an employee of the United

States engaged in the performance of

hisofficial duties outside the United

States.” 26 U.S.C. §104 (1988 ed.).

In 1989, §104(a) was amended, adding,

among other things, the following lan-

guage:

“Paragraph (2) shall not apply to any

punitive damages in connection with a

case not involving physical injury or

physical sickness.” 26 U. S. C. §104(a)

(1994).

Treasury Regulation §1.104-l(c) provides:

“Section 104(a)(2) excludes from

gross income the amount of any damages received (whether by suit or

agreement) on account of personal injuries or sickness. The term ‘damages

received (whether by suit or agreement)’ means an amount received

(other than workmen’s compensation)

through prosecution of a legal suit or

action based upon tort or tort type

rights, or through a settlement agreement entered into in lieu of such prosecution.” 26 CFR §1.104-1(c) (1996).

J USTICE S CALIA , with whom J USTICE

O’CONNOR and JUSTICE THOMAS join, dissenting.

Section 104(a)(2), as it stood at the

time relevant to these cases, provided an

exclusion from income for “any damages

received . . . on account of personal injuries or sickness.” 26 U.S.C. §104(a)(2)

(1988 ed.). The Court is of the view that

this phrase, in isolation, is just as susceptible of a meaning that includes only

compensatory damages as it is of a

broader meaning that includes punitive

damages as well. Ante, at 3–4. I do not

agree. The Court greatly understates the

connection between an award of punitive

damages and the personal injury complained of, describing it as nothing more

than “but for” causality, ante, at 3. It

seems to me that the personal injury is as

proximate a cause of the punitive damages as it is of the compensatory damages; in both cases it is the reason the

damages are awarded. That is why punitive damages are called damages. To be

sure, punitive damages require intentional, blameworthy conduct, which can

be said to be a coequal reason they are

awarded. But negligent (or intentional)

conduct occupies the same role of coequal

causality with regard to compensatory

damages. Both types of damages are “received on account of” the personal injury.

The nub of the matter, it seems to me,

is this: If one were to be asked, by a

August 4, 1997

lawyer from another legal system, “What

damages can be received on account of

personal injuries in the United States?”

surely the correct answer would be “Compensatory damages and punitive damages

—the former to compensate for the inflicting of the personal injuries, and the

latter to punish for the inflicting of them.”

If, as the Court asserts, the phrase “damages received on account of personal injuries” can be used to refer only to the

former category, that is only because people sometimes can be imprecise. The notion that Congress carefully and precisely

used the phrase “damages received on account of personal injuries” to segregate

out compensatory damages seems to me

entirely fanciful. That is neither the exact

nor the ordinary meaning of the phrase,

and hence not the one that the statute

should be understood to intend.

What I think to be the fair meaning of

the phrase in isolation becomes even

clearer when the phrase is considered in

its statutory context. The Court proceeds

too quickly from its erroneous premise of

ambiguity to analysis of the history and

policy behind §104(a)(2). Ante, at 5–8.

Ambiguity in isolation, even if it existed,

would not end the textual inquiry. Statutory construction, we have said, is a

“holistic endeavor.” United Sav. Assn. of

Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates, Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988). “A

provision that may seem ambiguous in

isolation is often clarified by the remainder of the statutory scheme.” Ibid.

Section 104(a)(2) appears immediately

after another provision, §104(a)(1), which

parallels §104(a)(2) in several respects

but does not use the critical phrase “on account of”:

“(a) [G]ross income does not include—

“(1) amounts received under workmen’s compensation acts as compensation for personal injuries or sickness;

“(2) the amount of any damages received . . . on account of personal injuries or sickness.” (Emphasis added.)

Although §104(a)(1) excludes amounts

received “as compensation for” personal

injuries or sickness, while §104(a)(2) excludes amounts received “on account of”

personal injuries or sickness, the Court

reads the two phrases to mean precisely

the same thing. That is not sound textual

interpretation. “[W]hen the legislature

August 4, 1997

uses certain language in one part of the

statute and different language in another,

the court assumes different meanings

were intended.” 2A N. Singer, Sutherland

on Statutory Construction §46.07 (5th ed.

1992 and Supp. 1996). See, e.g., Russello

v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983).

This principle of construction has its limits, of course: Use of different terminology in differing contexts might have little

significance. But here the contrasting

phrases appear in adjoining provisions

that address precisely the same subject

matter and that even have identical grammatical structure.

The contrast between the two usages is

even more striking in the original statute

that enacted them. The Revenue Act of

1918 combined subsections (a)(1) and

(a)(2) of §104, together with (a)(3)

(which provides an exclusion from income for amounts received through accident or health insurance for personal injuries or sickness), into a single

subsection, which provided:

“‘Gross income’ . . . [d]oes not

include . . .:

“(6) Amounts received, through accident or health insurance or under workmen’s compensation acts, as compensation for personal injuries or sickness,

plus the amount of any damages received . . . on account of such injuries

or sickness.” §213(b)(6) of the Revenue Act of 1918, 40 Stat. 1065–66

(emphasis added).

The contrast between the first exclusion

and the second could not be more clear.

Had Congress intended the latter provision to cover only damages received “as

compensation for” personal injuries or

sickness, it could have written “amounts

received, through accident or health insurance, under workmen’s compensation

acts, or in damages, as compensation for

personal injuries or sickness.” Instead, it

tacked on an additional phrase “plus the

amount of, etc.” with no apparent purpose

except to make clear that not only compensatory damages were covered by the

exclusion.

The Court maintains, however, that the

Government’s reading of §104(a)(2) is

“more faithful to [its] history.” Ante, at 5.

The “history” to which the Court refers is

not statutory history of the sort just discussed—prior enactments approved by

earlier Congresses and revised or

amended by later ones to produce the current text. Indeed, it is not “history” from

within even a small portion of Congress,

since the House Committee Report the

Court cites, standing by itself, is uninformative, saying only that “[u]nder the present law it is doubtful whether . . . damages received on account of [personal]

injuries or sickness are required to be included in gross income.” H. R. Rep. No.

767, 65th Cong., 2d Sess., 9–10 (1918).

The Court makes this snippet of legislative history relevant by citing as pertinent

an antecedent Treasury Department decision, which concludes on the basis of recent judicial decisions that amounts received from prosecution or compromise

of a personal-injury suit are not taxable

because they are a return of capital. Ante,

at 5–6 (citing T. D. 2747, 20 Treas. Dec.

Int. Rev. 457 (1918)).

One might expect the Court to conclude from this that the Members of Congress (on the unrealistic assumption that

they knew about the Executive-Branch

opinion) meant the statutory language to

cover only return of capital, the source of

the “doubt” to which the Committee Report referred. But of course the Court cannot draw that logical conclusion, since

even if it is applied only to compensatory

damages the statute obviously and undeniably covers more than mere return of

“human capital,” namely, reimbursement

for lost income, which would be a large

proportion (indeed perhaps the majority)

of any damages award. The Court concedes this is so, but asserts that this inconsistency is not enough “to support cutting

the statute totally free from its original

moorings,” ante, at 7, by which I assume

it means the Treasury Decision, however

erroneous it might have been as to the

“capital” nature of compensatory damages. But the Treasury Decision was no

more explicitly limited to compensatory

damages than is the statute before us. It

exempted from taxation “an amount received by an individual as the result of a

suit or compromise for personal injuries.”

T. D. 2747, 20 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 457

(1918). The Court’s entire thesis of taxability rests upon the proposition that this

Treasury Decision, which overlooked the

obvious fact that “an amount received . . .

as the result of a suit or compromise for

personal injuries” almost always includes

compensation for lost future income, did

1997–31 I.R.B.

not overlook the obvious fact that such an

amount sometimes includes “smartmoney.”

So, to trace the Court’s reasoning: The

statute must exclude punitive damages because the Committee Report must have

had in mind a 1918 Treasury Decision,

whose text no more supports exclusion of

punitive damages than does the text of the

statute itself, but which must have meant

to exclude punitive damages since it was

based on the “return-of-capital” theory,

though, inconsistently with that theory, it

did not exclude the much more common

category of compensation for lost income.

Congress supposedly knew all of this, and

a reasonably diligent lawyer could figure

it out by mistrusting the inclusive language of the statute, consulting the

Committee Report, surmising that the

Treasury Decision of 1918 underlay that

Report, mistrusting the inclusive language

of the Treasury Decision, and discerning

that Treasury could have overlooked

lost-income compensatories, but could not

have overlooked punitives. I think not.

The sure and proper guide, it seems to me,

is the language of the statute, inclusive by

nature and doubly inclusive by contrast

with surrounding provisions.

The Court poses the question, ante, at

7, “why Congress might have wanted the

exclusion [in §104(a)(2)] to have covered

. . . punitive damages.” If an answer is

needed (and the text being as clear as it is,

I think it is not), surely it suffices to surmise that Congress was following the

Treasury Decision, which had inadvertently embraced punitive damages just as

it had inadvertently embraced future-income compensatory damages. Or if some

reason free of human error must be found,

I see nothing wrong with what the Court

itself suggests but rejects out of hand: Excluding punitive as well as compensatory

damages from gross income “avoids such

administrative problems as separating

punitive from compensatory portions of a

global settlement.” Ante, at 9. How substantial that particular problem is is suggested by the statistics which show that

73 percent of tort cases in state court are

disposed of by settlement, and between

92 and 99 percent of tort cases in federal

court are disposed of by either settlement

or some other means (such as summary

judgment) prior to trial. See B. Ostrom &

N. Kauder, Examining the Work of State

1997–31 I.R.B.

Courts, 1994, p. 34 (1996); Administrative Office of the United States, L.

Mecham, Judicial Business of the United

States Courts: 1995 Report of the Director

162–164. What is at issue, of course, is

not just imposing on the parties the necessity of allocating the settlement between

compensatory and punitive damages

(with the concomitant suggestion of intentional wrongdoing that any allocation

to punitive damages entails), but also imposing on the Internal Revenue Service

the necessity of reviewing that allocation,

since there would always be strong incentive to inflate the tax-free compensatory

portion. The Court’s only response to the

suggestion that this is an adequate reason

(if one is required) for including punitive

damages in the exemption is that “[t]he

administrative problem of distinguishing

punitive from compensatory elements is

likely to be less serious than, say, distinguishing among the compensatory elements of a settlement.” Ante, at 9–10. Perhaps so; and it may also be more simple

than splitting the atom; but that in no way

refutes the point that it is complicated

enough to explain the inclusion of punitive damages in an exemption that has already abandoned the purity of a

“return-of-capital” rationale.

The remaining argument offered by the

Court is that our decision in Commissioner v. Schleier, 515 U. S.

(1995),

came “close to resolving”—in the Government’s favor—the question whether

§104(a)(2) permits the exclusion of punitive damages. Ante, at 4. I disagree. In

Schleier we were faced with the question

whether backpay and liquidated damages

under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) were “damages received . . . on account of personal

injuries or sickness” for purposes of

§104(a)(2)’s exclusion. As the dissent accurately observed, 515 U. S., at

(slip

op., at 6) (opinion of O’CONNOR, J.), “the

key to the Court’s analysis” was the determination that an ADEA cause of action

did not necessarily entail “personal injury

or sickness,” so that the damages awarded

for that cause of action could hardly be

awarded “on account of personal injuries

(slip op., at

or sickness.” See id., at

7). In the case at hand, we said, “respondent’s unlawful termination may have

caused some psychological or ‘personal’

injury comparable to the intangible pain

and suffering caused by an automobile accident,” but “it is clear that no part of respondent’s recovery of back wages is attributable to that injury.” Ibid. The

respondent countered that at least “the liquidated damages portion of his settlement” could be linked to that psychological injury. Ibid. And it was in response to

that argument that we made the statement

which the Court seek. to press into service

for today’s opinion. ADEA liquidated

damages, we said, were punitive in nature, rather than compensatory. Id.,

, and n. 5 (slip op., at 8–9, and n.

5).

The Court recites this statement as

though the point of it was that punitive

damages could not be received “on account of” personal injuries, whereas in

fact the point was quite different: Since

the damages were punishment for the conduct that gave rise to the (nonpersonal-injury) cause of action, they

could not be “linked to” the incidental

psychological injury. In the present cases,

of course, there is no question that a personal injury occurred and that this personal injury is what entitled petitioners to

compensatory and punitive damages. We

neither decided nor intimated in Schleier

whether punitive damages that are indisputably “linked to” personal injuries or

sickness are received “on account of” such

injuries or sickness. Indeed, it would have

been odd for us to resolve that question (or

even come “close to resolving” it) without

any discussion of the numerous considerations of text, history and policy highlighted by today’s opinion. If one were to

search our opinions for a dictum bearing

upon the present issue, much closer is the

statement in United States v. Burke, 504

U.S. 229 (1992), that a statute confers

“tort or tort type rights” (qualifying a

plaintiff’s recovery for the §104(a)(2) exemption) if it entitles the plaintiff to “a

jury trial at which ‘both equitable and

legal relief, including compensatory and,

under certain circumstances, punitive

damages’ may be awarded.” Id., at 240

(quoting Johnson v. Railway Express

Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 460 (1975)).

But all of this is really by the way. Because the statutory text unambiguously

covers punitive damages that are awarded

on account of personal injuries, I conclude

that petitioners were entitled to deduct the

amounts at issue here. This makes it un-

August 4, 1997

necessary for me to reach the question,

discussed ante, at 12–13, whether the government’s refund action against the

O’Gilvie children was commenced within

the two-year period specified by 26 U.S.C.

§6532(b). I note, however, that the Court’s

resolution of these cases also does not demand that this issue be addressed, except

to the extent of rejecting the proposition

that the statutory period begins to run with

the mailing of a refund check. So long as

that is not the trigger, there is no need to

decide whether the proper trigger is receipt of the check or some later event,

such as the check’s clearance.

For the reasons stated, I respectfully

dissent from the judgment of the Court.

Section 280G.—Golden

Parachute Payments

of August 1997. See Rev. Rul. 97–30, this page.

Section 467.—Certain Payments

for the Use of Property or

Services

The adjusted applicable federal short-term, midterm, and long-term rates are set forth for the month

of August 1997. See Rev. Rul. 97–30, this page.

Section 468.—Special Rules for

Mining and Solid Waste

Reclamation and Closing Costs

The adjusted applicable federal short-term, midterm, and long-term rates are set forth for the month

of August 1997. See Rev. Rul. 97–30, this page.

Section 483.—Interest on

Certain Deferred Payments

Federal short-term, mid-term, and long-term rates

are set forth for the month of August 1997. See Rev.

Rul. 97–30, this page.

Section 382.—Limitation on Net

Operating Loss Carryforwards

and Certain Built-In Losses

Following Ownership Change

The adjusted applicable federal short-term, midterm, and long-term rates are set forth for the month

of August 1997. See Rev. Rul. 97–30, this page.

Section 807.—Rules for Certain

Reserves

The adjusted federal long-term rate is set forth for

the month of August 1997. See Rev. Rul. 97–30, this

page.

Section 412.—Minimum Funding

Standards

The adjusted applicable federal short-term, midterm, and long-term rates are set forth for the month

of August 1997. See Rev. Rul. 97–30, this page.

Section 846.—Discounted

Unpaid Losses Defined

The adjusted applicable federal short-term, midterm, and long-term rates are set forth for the month

of August 1997. See Rev. Rul. 97–30, this page.

Section 1274.—Determination

of Issue Price in the Case of

Certain Debt Instruments Issued

for Property

(Also Sections 42, 280G, 382, 412, 467, 468, 482,

483, 642, 807, 846, 1288, 7520, 7872.)

Federal rates; adjusted federal rates; adjusted federal long-term rate, and the

long-term exempt rate. For purposes of

sections 1274, 1288, 382, and other sections of the Code, tables set forth the rates

for August 1997.

Rev. Rul. 97–30

This revenue ruling provides various

prescribed rates for federal income tax purposes for August 1997 (the current month.)

Table 1 contains the short-term, mid-term,

and long-term applicable federal rates

(AFR) for the current month for purposes

of section 1274(d) of the Internal Revenue

Code. Table 2 contains the short-term,

mid-term, and long-term adjusted applicable federal rates (adjusted AFR) for the current month for purposes of section 1288(b).

Table 3 sets forth the adjusted federal longterm rate and the long-term tax-exempt rate

described in section 382(f). Table 4 contains the appropriate percentages for determining the low-income housing credit described in section 42(b)(2) for buildings

placed in service during the current month.

Finally, Table 5 contains the federal rate for

determining the present value of an annuity,

an interest for life or for a term of years, or

a remainder or a reversionary interest for

purposes of section 7520.

REV. RUL. 97–30 TABLE 1

Applicable Federal Rates (AFR) for August 1997

Period for Compounding

Annual

Semiannual

Quarterly

Monthly

5.87%

6.47%

7.07%

7.67%

5.79%

6.37%

6.95%

7.53%

5.75%

6.32%

6.89%

7.46%

5.72%

6.29%

6.85%

7.41%

6.39%

7.04%

7.69%

8.35%

6.29%

6.92%

7.55%

8.18%

6.24%

6.86%

7.48%

8.10%

6.21%

6.82%

7.43%

8.04%

Short-Term

AFR

110% AFR

120% AFR

130% AFR

Mid-Term

AFR

110% AFR

120% AFR

130% AFR

August 4, 1997

1997–31 I.R.B.

Period for Compounding

Annual

Semiannual

Quarterly

Monthly

9.66%

11.31%

9.44%

11.01%

9.33%

10.86%

9.26%

10.77%

6.73%

7.41%

8.10%

8.80%

6.62%

7.28%

7.94%

8.61%

6.57%

7.21%

7.86%

8.52%

6.53%

7.17%

7.81%

8.46%

Mid-Term (continued)

150% AFR

175% AFR

Long-Term

AFR

110% AFR

120% AFR

130% AFR

REV. RUL. 97–30 TABLE 2

Adjusted AFR for August 1997

Period for Compounding

Short-term

adjusted AFR

Mid-term

adjusted AFR

Long-term

adjusted AFR

Annual

Semiannual

Quarterly

Monthly

4.01%

3.97%

3.95%

3.94%

4.54%

4.49%

4.47%

4.45%

5.33%

5.26%

5.23%

5.20%

REV. RUL. 97–30 TABLE 3

Rates Under Section 382 for August 1997

Adjusted federal long-term rate for the current month

5.33%

Long-term tax-exempt rate for ownership changes

during the current month (the highest of the adjusted

federal long-term rates for the current month and the

prior two months.)

5.64%

REV. RUL. 97–30 TABLE 4

Appropriate Percentages Under Section 42(b)(2) for August 1997

Appropriate percentage for the 70% present

value low-income housing credit

8.54%

Appropriate percentage for the 30% present

value low-income housing credit

3.66%

REV. RUL. 97–30 TABLE 5

Rate Under Section 7520 for August 1997

Applicable federal rate for determining the present

value of an annuity, an interest for life or a term

of years, or a remainder or reversionary interest

1997–31 I.R.B.

7.6%

August 4, 1997

Section 1288.—Treatment of

Original Issue Discount on TaxExempt Obligations

The adjusted applicable federal short-term, midterm, and long-term rates are set forth for the month

of August 1997. See Rev. Rul. 97–30, page 12.

August 4, 1997

Section 7520.—Valuation

Tables

The adjusted applicable federal short-term,

mid-term, and long-term rates are set forth for the

month of August 1997. See Rev. Rul. 97–30, page

12.

Section 7872.—Treatment of

Loans With Below-Market

Interest Rates

The adjusted applicable federal short-term, midterm, and long-term rates are set forth for the month

of August 1997. See Rev. Rul. 97–30, page 12.

1997–31 I.R.B.

Part III. Administrative, Procedural, and Miscellaneous

Weighted Average Interest Rate

Update

Notice 97–44

Notice 88–73 provides guidelines for

determining the weighted average interest rate and the resulting permissible

range of interest rates used to calculate

current liability for the purpose of the

full funding limitation of §412(c)(7) of

the Internal Revenue Code as amended

by the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation

Act of 1987 and as further amended by

1997–31 I.R.B.

the Uruguay Round Agreements Act,

Pub. L. 103–465 (GATT).

The average yield on the 30-year Treasury Constant Maturities for June 1997 is

6.77 percent.

The following rates were determined

for the plan years beginning in the month

shown below.

Month

July

Year

1997

Weighted

Average

6.86

Drafting Information

The principal author of this notice is

Donna Prestia of the Employee Plans Division. For further information regarding this

notice, call (202) 622-6076 between 2:30

and 4:00 p.m. Eastern time (not a toll-free

number). Ms. Prestia’s number is (202)

622-7377 (also not a toll-free number).

90% to 107%

Permissible

Range

6.18 to 7.34

90% to 110%

Permissible

Range

6.18 to 7.55

August 4, 1997

Part IV. Items of General Interest

Foundations Status of Certain

Organizations

Announcement 97–74

The following organizations have

failed to establish or have been unable to

maintain their status as public charities or

as operating foundations. Accordingly,

grantors and contributors may not, after

this date, rely on previous rulings or designations in the Cumulative List of Organizations (Publication 78), or on the presumption arising from the filing of notices

under section 508(b) of the Code. This

listing does not indicate that the organizations have lost their status as organizations described in section 501(c)(3), eligible to receive deductible contributions.

Former Public Charities. The following

organizations (which have been treated as

organizations that are not private foundations described in section 509(a) of the

Code) are now classified as private foundations:

An Achievable Dream, Inc.,

Newport News, VA

AEH Community Development

Corporation, Los Angeles, CA

Affiliated Charities Ltd., Beachwood, OH

Affordable Housing Initiative, Chicago,

African Voice of Peace, Inc., New York,

All Nations Benefit Ministry, Berkeley,

Al Murf George Memorial Foundation,

Inc., New York, NY

ALS Recovery Foundation, Inc., Miami,

Argos Research Institute, Inc., Medford,

Arlington Park Civic Association,

Columbus, OH

Associated Family Care, Inc., Marquette,

Bodies of Christ Churches United

Homeless Families & Needy Children,

Chicago, IL

Building Better Communities, Inc.,

Miami, FL

Calquhoun Foundation, Inc., Massapequa,

Cascade Corporation, Erdenheim, PA

Center for Education Training and

Employment, Blue Bell, PA

August 4, 1997

The Children’s Education Foundation,

Inc., Atlanta, GA

Clarion Area Presbyterian Homes, Inc.,

Clarion, PA

Dane County Welfare Rights Alliance,

Madison, WI

Digby Group, Inc., New York, NY

Education in Living Foundation, Dallas, TX

Heros Touch, Washington, DC

International Centre for Family

Enterprises, Inc., Southborough, MA

Inter-Tribal Indians of New Jersey, Inc.,

Cliffwood Beach, NJ

Investment in Aptitude Management by

Action Building Lasting Enterprise,

Chicago, IL

Kentucky Foundation, Inc., Louisville, KY

Kids in Motion, Great Falls, MT

Lacordaire Academy Endowment Fund,

Inc., Rutherford, NJ

Ladies in Action Care, Inc., Groveton, TX

Lafarga Catalogue Raisonne, Inc.,

New Canaan, CT

Mangum House, Inc., Newark, NJ

March of Pennies, Inc., Rock Falls, IL

Mark Twain Institute, Chevy Chase, MD

Martin Luther King Jr Memorial

Foundation, San Antonio, TX

Maximum Independent Living-Lake,

Cleveland, OH

Massachusetts State Conference of Young

People in Alcoholics Anonymous,

Dedham, MA

Mesa CO Business Education Foundation,

Grand Junction, CO

Messages From Mary/Mary’s Guest

House, Inc., Gordon, WI

National Center for Chromosome

Inversions, Des Moines, IA

National Center for Patients Rights, Inc.,

Douglaston Manor, NY

National Foundation Dagas Redeemed,

New York, NY

107-109 Avenue Housing Development

Fund Corporation, New York, NY

Partners for Success, Inc., Chicago, IL

Polemical Success International, Inc.,

Boca Raton, FL

Portsmouth Museums Foundation, Inc.,

Portsmouth, VA

Shabil Associates, Capitola, CA

Shen Ten Ling Bon Teaching Association,

Brentwood, NH

Society for the Preservation of Arts

Customs & Environments, Las Vegas,

Stradivari Society, Chicago, IL

Tatra Foundation, Philadelphia, PA

Texas Association of Cajun Decendants,

Inc., Angleton, TX

Third Stream Foundation, Inc., Brookline,

Tied to the Tracks, Inc., Boston, MA

Totus Tuus, Winnetka, IL

Transit Workers for Christ, Inc.,

Staten Island, NY

Troy Local Development Corporation,

Troy, NY

Turkish American Medical Association,

New York, NY

258 East 4th Street Housing Development

Fund Corporation, New York, NY

Universal Institute Corporation,

Philadelphia, PA

Urban Human Services, San Francisco,

Visitor Industry Human Resource

Development Council, Inc., Miami, FL

Venezuelean American Endowment for

the Arts, Inc., New York, NY

Washington Square Services Corporation,

Newport, RI

Western Michigans Cherry County

Playhouse, Inc., Muskegon, MI

Western Upper Peninsula Assessment

Services, Inc., Hancock, MI

West Sacramento Christmas Basket

Project, Broderick, CA

William Blount High School Alumni

Association, Inc., Maryville, TN

Women’s Help Centers, Dallas, TX

Worthington Valley Swim Team, Owings

Mills, MD

Youth Enterprises & Associates, Inc.,

Jamaica, NY

If an organization listed above submits

information that warrants the renewal of its

classification as a public charity or as a private operating foundation, the Internal

Revenue Service will issue a ruling or determination letter with the revised classification as to foundation status. Grantors and

contributors may thereafter rely upon such

ruling or determination letter as provided

in section 1.509(a)-7 of the Income Tax

Regulations. It is not the practice of the

Service to announce such revised classification of foundation status in the Internal

Revenue Bulletin.

1997–31 I.R.B.

Definition of Terms

Revenue rulings and revenue procedures

(hereinafter referred to as “rulings”) that

have an effect on previous rulings use the

following defined terms to describe the

effect:

Amplified describes a situation where

no change is being made in a prior published position, but the prior position is

being extended to apply to a variation of

the fact situation set forth therein. Thus,

if an earlier ruling held that a principle

applied to A, and the new ruling holds

that the same principle also applies to B,

the earlier ruling is amplified. (Compare

with modified, below).

Clarified is used in those instances

where the language in a prior ruling is

being made clear because the language

has caused, or may cause, some confusion. It is not used where a position in a

prior ruling is being changed.

Distinguished describes a situation

where a ruling mentions a previously

published ruling and points out an essential difference between them.

Modified is used where the substance

of a previously published position is

being changed. Thus, if a prior ruling

held that a principle applied to A but not

to B, and the new ruling holds that it ap-

plies to both A and B, the prior ruling is

modified because it corrects a published

position. (Compare with amplified and

clarified, above).

Obsoleted describes a previously published ruling that is not considered determinative with respect to future transactions. This term is most commonly used

in a ruling that lists previously published

rulings that are obsoleted because of

changes in law or regulations. A ruling

may also be obsoleted because the substance has been included in regulations

subsequently adopted.

Revoked describes situations where the

position in the previously published ruling is not correct and the correct position

is being stated in the new ruling.

Superseded describes a situation where

the new ruling does nothing more than

restate the substance and situation of a

previously published ruling (or rulings).

Thus, the term is used to republish under

the 1986 Code and regulations the same

position published under the 1939 Code

and regulations. The term is also used

when it is desired to republish in a single

ruling a series of situations, names, etc.,

that were previously published over a period of time in separate rulings. If the

new ruling does more than restate the

substance of a prior ruling, a combination

of terms is used. For example, modified

and superseded describes a situation

where the substance of a previously published ruling is being changed in part and

is continued without change in part and it

is desired to restate the valid portion of

the previously published ruling in a new

ruling that is self contained. In this case

the previously published ruling is first

modified and then, as modified, is superseded.

Supplemented is used in situations in

which a list, such as a list of the names of

countries, is published in a ruling and

that list is expanded by adding further

names in subsequent rulings. After the

original ruling has been supplemented

several times, a new ruling may be published that includes the list in the original

ruling and the additions, and supersedes

all prior rulings in the series.

Suspended is used in rare situations to

show that the previous published rulings

will not be applied pending some future

action such as the issuance of new or

amended regulations, the outcome of

cases in litigation, or the outcome of a

Service study.

Abbreviations

E.O.—Executive Order.

ER—Employer.

ERISA—Employee Retirement Income Security Act.

EX—Executor.

F—Fiduciary.

FC—Foreign Country.

FICA—Federal Insurance Contribution Act.

FISC—Foreign International Sales Company.

FPH—Foreign Personal Holding Company.

F.R.—Federal Register.

FUTA—Federal Unemployment Tax Act.

FX—Foreign Corporation.

G.C.M.—Chief Counsel’s Memorandum.

GE—Grantee.

GP—General Partner.

GR—Grantor.

IC—Insurance Company.

I.R.B.—Internal Revenue Bulletin.

LE—Lessee.

LP—Limited Partner.

LR—Lessor.

M—Minor.

Nonacq.—Nonacquiescence.

O—Organization.

P—Parent Corporation.

PHC—Personal Holding Company.

PO—Possession of the U.S.

PR—Partner.

PRS—Partnership.

PTE—Prohibited Transaction Exemption.

Pub. L.—Public Law.

REIT—Real Estate Investment Trust.

Rev. Proc.—Revenue Procedure.

Rev. Rul.—Revenue Ruling.

S—Subsidiary.

S.P.R.—Statements of Procedral Rules.

Stat.—Statutes at Large.

T—Target Corporation.

T.C.—Tax Court.

T.D.—Treasury Decision.

TFE—Transferee.

TFR—Transferor.

T.I.R.—Technical Information Release.

TP—Taxpayer.

TR—Trust.

TT—Trustee.

U.S.C.—United States Code.

X—Corporation.

Y—Corporation.

Z—Corporation.

The following abbreviations in current use and formerly used will appear in material published in the

Bulletin.

A—Individual.

Acq.—Acquiescence.

B—Individual.

BE—Beneficiary.

BK—Bank.

B.T.A.—Board of Tax Appeals.

C.—Individual.

C.B.—Cumulative Bulletin.

CFR—Code of Federal Regulations.

CI—City.

COOP—Cooperative.

Ct.D.—Court Decision.

CY—County.

D—Decedent.

DC—Dummy Corporation.

DE—Donee.

Del. Order—Delegation Order.

DISC—Domestic International Sales Corporation.

DR—Donor.

E—Estate.

EE—Employee.

1997–31 I.R.B.

August 4, 1997

Numerical Finding List1

Bulletins 1997–27 through 1997–30

Announcements:

97–61, 1997–29 I.R.B. 13

97–67, 1997–27 I.R.B. 37

97–68, 1997–28 I.R.B. 13

97–69, 1997–28 I.R.B. 13

97–70, 1997–29 I.R.B. 14

97–71, 1997–29 I.R.B. 15

97–72, 1997–29 I.R.B. 15

97–73, 1997–30 I.R.B. 86

Delegation Orders:

172 (Rev. 5), 1997–28 I.R.B. 6

Notices:

97–37, 1997–27 I.R.B. 4

97–38, 1997–27 I.R.B. 8

97–39, 1997–27 I.R.B. 8

97–40, 1997–28 I.R.B. 6

97–41, 1997–28 I.R.B. 6

97–42, 1997–29 I.R.B. 12

97–43, 1997–30 I.R.B. 9

Railroad Retirement Quarterly Rate:

1997–28 I.R.B. 5

Proposed Regulations:

REG–104893–97, 1997–29 I.R.B. 13

Revenue Procedures:

97–32, 1997–27 I.R.B. 9

97–33, 1997–30 I.R.B. 10

97–34, 1997–30 I.R.B. 14

Revenue Rulings:

97–27, 1997–27 I.R.B. 4

97–28, 1997–28 I.R.B. 4

97–29, 1997–28 I.R.B. 4

Treasury Decisions:

8722, 1997–29 I.R.B. 4

8723, 1997–30 I.R.B. 4

A cumulative list of all revenue rulings, revenue

procedures, Treasury decisions, etc., published in

Internal Revenue Bulletins 1997–1 through 1997–26

will be found in Internal Revenue Bulletin 1997–27,

dated July 7, 1997.

August 4, 1997

1997–31 I.R.B.

Finding List of Current Action on

Previously Published Items

Bulletins 1997–27 through 1997–30

*Denotes entry since last publication

Revenue Procedures:

96–36

Superseded by

97–34, 1997–30 I.R.B. 14

96–42

Superseded by

97–27, 1997–27 I.R.B. 9

A cumulative finding list for previously published

items mentioned in Internal Revenue Bulletins

1997–1 through 1997–26 will be found in Internal

Revenue Bulletin 1997–27, dated July 7, 1997.

1997–31 I.R.B.

August 4, 1997

Index

Internal Revenue Bulletins

1997–27 Through 1997–30

For the index of items published during

the first six months of 1997, see I.R.B.

1997–27, dated July 7, 1997.

The abbreviation and number in parenthesis following the index entry refer to

the specific item; numbers in roman and

italic type following the parenthesis refer

to the Internal Revenue Bulletin in which

the item may be found and the page

number on which it appears.

Key to Abbreviations:

Revenue Ruling

Revenue Procedure

Treasury Decision

Court Decision

Public Law

Executive Order

Delegation Order

TDO

Treasury Department Order

Tax Convention

SPR

Statement of Procedural

Rules

PTE

Prohibited Transaction

Exemption

EMPLOYMENT TAX

Penalty:

Guidance regarding waiver of failure to

deposit penalty for certain taxpayers

required to begin using electronic

funds transfer on or after July 1,

1997 (Notice 43) 30, 86

August 4, 1997

Railroad retirement:

Rate determination; quarterly (July 1,

1997) 28, 5

Regulations:

26 CFR 31.0–1(a), 31.0–3(f), amended;

31.6302–1(h), added; 31.6302–1(i),

redesignated; 31.6302–1T, removed;

31.6302(c)–3, amended; 31.6302–3T,

removed; federal tax deposits by electronic funds transfer (TD 8723) 30, 4

EXCISE TAX

Group health plans; access, portability,

and renewability requirements; correction (Notice 41) 28, 6

Regulations:

26 CFR 40.6302(c)–1, amended;

40.6302(c)–1T, removed; federal tax

deposits by electronic funds transfer

(TD 8723) 30, 4

INCOME TAX

Depreciation:

Retail motor fuels outlet (RR29) 28, 4

Elections into mark-to-market accounting (Notice 37) 27, 8

Electronic or magnetic media filing:

Specifications for 1997 Forms 1098,

1099, 5498, and W–2G (RP 34) 30, 14

Employee plans:

Organizations, functions, and authority

delegations; director, Employee Plans

Division (DO 172(Rev. 5)) 28, 6

Enhanced oil recovery credit for 1997

(Notice 39) 27, 8

Extension of time to file, Form 926 (Notice 42) 29, 12

Forms 1096, 1098, 1099 series, 5498,

W–2G Requirements for reproducing

paper substitutes (RP 27) 27, 9

Interest:

Investment:

Federal short-term, mid-term, and

long-term rates for July 1997 (RR 27)

27, 4

Inventories:

LIFO:

Price indexes, department stores,

May 1997 (RR 28) 28, 4

Marginal production rates for 1997 (Notice

38) 27, 8

Proposed regulations:

26 CFR 1.894–1(d), added; guidance regarding claims for certain income tax

convention (REG–104893–97) 29, 13

Regulations:

26 CFR 1.894–1T(a) through (c), added;

guidance regarding claims for certain

income tax convention (TD 8722)

29, 4

26 CFR 1.6302–1, –2, amended;

1.6302–1T, –2T, –3T, –4T, removed;

1.6302–3(c), revised; 1.6302–4,

added; federal tax deposits by electronic funds transfer (TD 8723) 30, 4

Tax forms and instructions:

Electronic Federal Tax Payment System

(EFTPS); electronic remittance system for federal tax deposits and payments (RP 33) 30, 10

Treatment of Hong Kong and China (Notice 40) 28, 6

1997–31 I.R.B.

Notes

1997–31 I.R.B.

August 4, 1997

Notes

August 4, 1997

1997–31 I.R.B.

INTERNAL REVENUE BULLETIN

The Introduction on page 3 describes the purpose and content of this publication. The weekly Internal Revenue Bulletin is sold

on a yearly subscription basis by the Superintendent of Documents. Current subscribers are notified by the Superintendent of

Documents when their subscriptions must be renewed.

CUMULATIVE BULLETINS

The contents of this weekly Bulletin are consolidated semiannually into a permanent, indexed, Cumulative Bulletin. These are

sold on a single copy basis and are not included as part of the subscription to the Internal Revenue Bulletin. Subscribers to the weekly Bulletin are notified when copies of the Cumulative Bulletin are available. Certain issues of Cumulative Bulletins are out of print

and are not available. Persons desiring available Cumulative Bulletins, which are listed on the reverse, may purchase them from the

Superintendent of Documents.

HOW TO ORDER

Check the publications and/or subscription(s) desired on the reverse, complete the order blank, enclose the proper remittance,

detach entire page, and mail to the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402. Please

allow two to six weeks, plus mailing time, for delivery.

WE WELCOME COMMENTS ABOUT THE

INTERNAL REVENUE BULLETIN

If you have comments concerning the format or production of the Internal Revenue Bulletin or suggestions for improving it, we

would be pleased to hear from you. You can e-mail us your suggestions or comments through the IRS Internet Home Page

(www.irs.ustreas.gov) or write to the IRS Bulletin Unit, T:FP:F:CD, Room 5560, 1111 Constitution Avenue NW, Washington, DC

20224. You can also leave a recorded message 24 hours a day, 7 days a week at 1–800–829–9043.

Internal Revenue Service

Washington, DC 20224

Official Business

Penalty for Private Use, $300

First Class Mail

Postage and Fees Paid

IRS

Permit No. G–48

INTERNAL REVENUE BULLETIN

The Introduction on page 3 describes the purpose and content of this publication. The weekly Internal Revenue Bulletin is sold

on a yearly subscription basis by the Superintendent of Documents. Current subscribers are notified by the Superintendent of

Documents when their subscriptions must be renewed.

CUMULATIVE BULLETINS

The contents of this weekly Bulletin are consolidated semiannually into a permanent, indexed, Cumulative Bulletin. These are

and are not available. Persons desiring available Cumulative Bulletins, which are listed on the reverse, may purchase them from the

Superintendent of Documents.

HOW TO ORDER

Check the publications and/or subscription(s) desired on the reverse, complete the order blank, enclose the proper remittance,

detach entire page, and mail to the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402. Please

allow two to six weeks, plus mailing time, for delivery.

WE WELCOME COMMENTS ABOUT THE

INTERNAL REVENUE BULLETIN

If you have comments concerning the format or production of the Internal Revenue Bulletin or suggestions for improving it, we

would be pleased to hear from you. You can e-mail us your suggestions or comments through the IRS Internet Home Page

(www.irs.ustreas.gov) or write to the IRS Bulletin Unit, T:FP:F:CD, Room 5560, 1111 Constitution Avenue NW, Washington, DC

20224. You can also leave a recorded message 24 hours a day, 7 days a week at 1–800–829–9043.

Superintendent of Documents

U.S. Government Printing Office

Washington, DC 20402

Official Business

Penalty for Private Use, $300

First Class Mail

Postage and Fees Paid

GPO

Permit No. G–26

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