G. CONTROL AND POWER :

2001 EO CPE Text

G. CONTROL AND POWER :

ISSUES INVOLVING SUPPORTING ORGANIZATIONS, DONOR ADVISED FUNDS,

AND DISQUALIFIED PERSON FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS

by

Ron Shoemaker and Bill Brockner

“It is not what you own;

It’s what you control”

Attributed to John D. Rockefeller

“The desire of power in excess caused the angels to fall”

Francis Bacon from “Of Goodmen”

1.

Introduction

The 1997 CPE Text, Topic I, and the 2000 CPE Text, Topic P, addressed some of

the more common issues and problems of organizations asserting supporting organization

status under IRC 509(a)(3). The 1997 CPE Text concentrated primarily on the “operated

in connection with” relationship test under Regs. 1.509(a)-4(i), although other important

issues were discussed. The 2000 CPE Text focused on the IRC 509(a)(3) control test.

This topic will elaborate on the control test; discuss the IRC 501(c)(3) “threshold”

requirements; and comment on other IRC 509(a)(3) issues under Regs. 1.509(a)-4(b), (c),

(d), and (e) relating to the organizational and operational tests. Part 7 includes a

supporting organization check sheet, “SOCHECK”, to guide EO specialists through a

IRC 509(a)(3) determination.

In addition, this article will provide an update of control and power issues, discussed

in prior CPE Texts, relating to donor advised funds (“DAFs”) under IRC 501(c)(3) and

IRC 4941 self-dealing with respect to disqualified person financial institutions and their

financial products and services. The topic will also update the 2000 CPE Text, Topic P,

p. 225, discussion on the treatment of IRC 4947(a)(2) distributions to private foundations

under IRC 4940. Finally, the topic will touch on the Charitable Family Limited

Partnership, another recent tax plan with EO connections and tax abuse potential.

2.

IRC 509(a)(3) Supporting Organizations

Note: Hereafter we will identify the terms “supporting organization” and

“supporting organizations” as “SO” and “SOs” respectively; an “operated, supervised or

controlled by” SO as a “SO1”, a “supervised, or controlled in connection with” SO as a

“SO2”, and an “operated in connection with“ SO as a SO3”; IRC 509(a)(1) and 509(a)(2)

supported organization(s) will be identified as “SD” and “SDs”; and disqualified persons

will be referred to as DPs.

Control and Power: Issues Involving Supporting Organizations,

Donor Advised Funds, and Disqualified Person Financial Institutions

A.

Threshold Requirement- IRC 501(c)(3) status

Before considering IRC 509(a)(3) classification, it is necessary to determine if the

organization is exempt under IRC 501(c)(3), or, in the case of a non exempt trust under

IRC 4947(a)(1), whether all unexpired interests are devoted to solely charitable purposes.

In explaining IRC 509(a)(3) in conjunction with certain grandfather exceptions for

existing organizations, the General Explanation of the Tax Reform Act of 1969, H.R.

13270, 91st Congress, Public Law 91-171, p. 59, footnote 29, (Blue Book) states:

However, this does not change the basic requirement for exemption in

section 501(c)(3) that the organizations have been organized and operated

exclusively for tax exempt purposes listed in that provision.

EO Determination Specialists, Examination Agents, and Tax Law Specialists should

initially review the IRC 501(c)(3) charitable credentials of a IRC 509(a)(3) applicant as

vigorously as they would initially review the IRC 501(c)(3) charitable credentials of an

applicant claming public charity status under IRC 509(a)(1) or 509(a)(2).

One recent concern is the appearance of a line of cases wherein the 1023 applicant is

performing services for unrelated specified charities as a primary activity. Organizations

that provide noncharitable services to such a class of organizations do not qualify for

exemption themselves unless they are covered by statute, i.e., IRC 501(e) or IRC 501(f),

or they provide services at substantially below cost. See Rev. Rul. 71-529, 1971-2 C.B.

234, and Rev. Rul. 72-369, 1972-2 C.B. 245, and the 1986 CPE Text, Topic H.

Recent T:EO examples of unrelated services proposed to be performed by 1023

applicants for unrelated IRC 501(c)(3) organizations include facilitating bond issuances

for community trusts or environmental charities, prepaid tuition programs for a number

of private colleges, and job placement services for a group of colleges and their alumni.

See also Topic E of this Text on College Housing.

B.

Organizational and Operational Requirements

(1) Overview

Applicants must be organized and operated exclusively for the benefit of, to perform

the functions of, or to carry out the purposes of one or more SDs.

Pursuant to Reg. 509(a) – 4 (c) and (d), an SO’s articles must:

(a) Limit purposes to IRC 509(a)(3)(A) purposes;

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(b) Not expressly empower SO to engage in activities not in furtherance of

purposes in (a);

(c) State the specified SDs on whose behalf such SO is to be operated; and

(d) Not expressly empower the SO to operate to support or benefit any SD other

than those referred to in (c).

Further, Reg. 1.509(a)-4(e) provides that an SO will be regarded as “operated

exclusively” to support one or more specified SDs only if it engages soley in activities

which support or benefit the specified SDs.

In Trust under will of Bella Mabury v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. 733 (1983), the terms

of a decedent’s trust described in IRC 4947(a)(1) provided that the trust would terminate

upon the earlier of (1) the publication of a book by a specified IRC 509(a)(1) church or

(2) the expiration of 21 years from the date of the survivor of the persons named in the

decedent’s will. If (1) occurred, the trust estate would be distributed to the church. If (2)

occurred, the trust estate would be distributed to two other organizations designated in

decedent’s will not stipulated in the facts as IRC 509(a)(1) or 509(a)(2) entities.

The Tax Court held that the trust failed the organization test within the meaning of

IRC 509(a)(3) and Regs. 1.509(a)-4(c) because the Trust's articles “expressly empower”

the trust to benefit organizations other than specified organizations described in IRC

509(a)(1) or (2).

(2) Specificity In General and SO1 and SO2 Requirements

Reg. 1.509(a)-4(d) provides that the articles of the SOs must specify the IRC

509(a)(1) and 509(a)(2) SDs by name. However, more latitude is granted to SO1s (Reg.

1.509(a)-4(g)) and SO2s (see Reg. 1.509(a)-4(h)). In such cases, the articles of

organization need not specify the SDs by name but may, instead benefit one or more

beneficiary organizations designated by class or purpose. Example (1) of Reg. 1.509(a)4(d)(2)(iii) describes organization, X, which operates for the benefit of institutions of

higher learning in State Y. X is controlled by these institutions. If X’s articles require it

to operate for the benefit of such institutions, X will meet the organizational test. In

Example (2), M is an organization described in IRC 501(c)(3), which was organized and

operated by representatives of N church to run a home for the aged. M is controlled by

N. The care of the sick and the aged are long standing temporal functions and purposes

of organized religion such as N. By operating a home for the aged, M is operating to

support or benefit N church in carrying out its temporal functions. Thus M operates to

support one of N’s purposes without designating N by name.

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Donor Advised Funds, and Disqualified Person Financial Institutions

Under the regulations and the examples cited, articles that merely provide the SO

would benefit all IRC 501(c)(3) public charities in a particular geographical area do not

meet the specificity requirements.

Reg. 1.509(a)-4(d)(2)(iv) provides another special rule for SO1s and SO2s. A SO

will meet the organizational test even though its articles do not designate each “specified”

organization if there has been an “historic and continuing” relationship between the SO1

or SO2 and the SDs, and, by reason of the relationship, there has developed a “substantial

identity” of interests between the organizations. In Windsor Foundation v. U.S., 1977-2

USTC 9709, the Tax Court held that the SO failed the organization test because of the

failure to establish a “substantial identity” of interests between the SO and the SD.

Finally, Reg. 1.509(a)-4(d)(3) provides more special rules for SO1s and SO2s. A

SO will not fail the test of being organized for the benefit of “specified” organizations

solely because its articles:

(i)

Permit the substitution of one SD within a designated class for

another SD, either in the same or a different class designated in the

articles;

(ii) Permit the SO to operate for the benefit of new or additional SDs

of the same or a different class designated in the articles; or

(iii) Permit the SO to vary the amount of its support among different

SDs within the class or classes of organizations designated by the

articles.

The key to achieving the latitude granted in the regulations is to provide for it in the

organizing document. Thus, a change of SDs in the organizing instrument of the SO1 or

SO2 that was not covered by articles permitted under Reg. 1.509(a) – 4(d)(3), may cause

the SO to fail the organization test, the operational test (when distributions are made by

the SO to substituted SDs), and the SO1 or SO2 relationship test. See, for example, PLR

9052055, October 4, 1990. See also PLR 97309040, October 6, 1997, involving

substitutions made pursuant to a governing instrument reformation approved by a court.

(3) Requirements for SO3s

SO3s, the “razor edge” organizations described in Reg. 1.509(a)-4(i), must have

governing instruments that designate a specified SD. However, there is some flexibility

permitted by the Regulations. Reg. 1.509(a)-4(d)(i)(a) provides that an SO will not be

disqualified merely because its articles permit an SD designated by class or purpose,

rather than by name, to be substituted for the SDs designated by name in the articles, but

only if the substitution is conditioned on an event “beyond the control” of the SO, such as

loss of exemption. Also, Reg. 1.509(a)-4(d)(4)(i)(a) provides that the articles may permit

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the SO3 to vary the amounts of its support between different SDs, so long as the amounts

meet the requirements of the integral part test of Reg. 1.509(a)-4(i)(3) with respect to at

least one beneficiary. A third exception in Reg. 1.509(a)-4(d)(4)(i)(b) is likely to be of

limited application. It permits the SO3 to have governing instrument language allowing

it to operate for the benefit of a beneficiary organization that is not publicly supported,

but only if the SO3 currently operates for the benefit of an IRC 509(a)(1) or (a)(2) SD

and the possibility of operating for the benefit of the other SD is a remote contingency.

Reg. 1.509(a)-4(d)(4)(c)(ii) and (iii) make clear, however, that once the SO3 is no longer

supporting the SD and the SO3 is supporting the non IRC 509(a)(1) or (2) organization,

because the remote contingency has occurred, the SO3 would then fail to continue to

qualify as SO. As with SO1s and SO2s, the flexibility permitted in the Regulations for

SO3s is conditioned on appropriate language in the governing instrument.

(4) Specificity Examples

A number of authorities illustrate the rules. In Rev. Rul. 79-197, 1979-1 C.B. 204, a

SO1’s articles of organization required it to pay its future income to specific SDs named

in the articles, until a specific sum was paid. After that, it would pay all its assets to

public charities selected by the substantial contributor to the SO1. Rev. Rul. 79-197

explains that the organization failed as a SO under IRC 509(a)(3) because, in the end, it

was not supporting a SO designated by name, class, or purpose. Although the

organization was described as a SO1 and thus was entitled to the more liberal designation

requirements of Reg. 1.509(a)-4(d)(2), it failed to qualify as an IRC 509(a)(3) SO

because its articles did not specifically designate the SD by class or purpose.

In Quarrie Charitable Fund v United States, 603 F.2d 1274 (7th Cir.,1979), the trust

document allowed the trustee to transfer the income to a SD other than the designated

charity when, in the trustee’s discretion, the charitable uses would become unnecessary,

undesirable, impractical, or no longer adapted to the needs of the public. The court found

that the language failed the organizational requirement of Reg. 1.509(a)-4(d)(4)(i)(a).

The court explained that the problem was not that the charitable use may become

impractical or undesirable, but that in the trustee’s discretion, such use may become

impractical or undesirable etc. In contrast, the Regulations establish objective standards

of when the charitable recipient may be changed.

Other cases on the organizational and designation requirements of the regulations

were discussed in the 1997 CPE Text, Topic I, page 123-125. In the Goodspeed,

Callahan, and Cockerline scholarship cases, the respective courts found that the SOs, by

virtue of the language in the trust documents, were supporting specific organizations, i.e.,

specific high schools or colleges, even though they may not have been directly named in

the trust documents.

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Control and Power: Issues Involving Supporting Organizations,

Donor Advised Funds, and Disqualified Person Financial Institutions

The organization and operation test discussion herein fits within the major theme of

this Topic regarding control and power of DPs or others. As evident in Rev. Rul. 79-179

and the Quarrie case, if discretion (i.e., control or power) is given or retained to select the

SD outside the parameters is permitted in the regulations, the SO will fail to qualify under

IRC 509(a)(3). For example, retained power in SO3 X’s trust instrument to allow

descendent DPs to substitute Community Trust A with Community Trust B when such

DPs move to the B geographic area would cause X to fail the organization test. It is

again important to note that the regulations do allow some flexibility in terms of

substituting or adding SDs, provided appropriate language is included in the articles of

organization.

C.

IRC 509(a)(3)(C) – Prohibition of DP Control of SOs

(1) Overview

IRC 509(a)(3) is an area of aggressive tax planning by some taxpayers and their

advisors, particularly entities claiming status as SO3s. Applicant SO3s often, and

inappropriately, attempt to avoid private foundation status and IRC Chapter 42 regulation

while their DPs retain control of assets. This was discussed in Inappropriate Use of a

Supporting Organization at page 222 of the 2000 CPE Text, Topic P.

This year’s topic leads off with a quote attributed to oil industry titan, John D.

Rockefeller, the essence of which is that control may be a more important factor than

ownership itself. Control may be the most critical or meaningful factor in the plethora of

requirements that must be met for an organization to be classified as an IRC 509(a)(3)

SO. SO1 and SO2 applicants generally display facts and circumstances tending to

indicate that SDs are in control. On the other hand, SO3 applicants have a greater

proclivity to display facts and circumstances tending to show that DPs directly or

indirectly control the SOs.

Excess benefits transactions under IRC 4958 may also occur in SOs with Boards

consisting of DPs without adequate conflict of interest procedures. The “rebuttable

presumption” rules under proposed Regs. 53.4958-6 provides a standard.

(2) Control – Regulatory Authority

IRC 509(a)(3)(C) provides that an organization will fail to qualify as a SO if it is

directly or indirectly controlled by one or more DPs as defined under IRC 4946, other

than foundation managers.

Reg. 1.509(a)-4(j)(1) provides that if a person who is otherwise a DP with respect to

a SO, for example, a substantial contributor, is appointed or designated as a foundation

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Donor Advised Funds, and Disqualified Person Financial Institutions

manager of the SO by a SD to serve as the representative of the SD, such person will still

be regarded as a DP, rather than as a representative of the SD.

Reg. 1.509(a)-4(j)(1) also provides:

Under the provisions of IRC 509(a)(3) a SO may not be controlled directly

or indirectly by one or more DPs. An organization will be considered

“controlled” for purposes of IRC 509(a)(3), if the DPs, by aggregating their

votes or positions of authority, may require such organizations to perform

any act which significantly affects it operations or may prevent such

organization from performing such act. . . . a SO will be considered to be

controlled directly or indirectly by one or more disqualified persons if the

voting power of such persons is 50 percent or more of the total voting

power of the organization’s governing body or if one or more of such

persons have the right to exercise veto power over the actions of the

organization. However, all pertinent facts and circumstances including the

nature, diversity, and income yield of an organization’s holdings, the length

of time particular stocks, securities, or other assets are retained, and its

manner of exercising its voting right with respect to stocks in which

members of the governing body also have some interest, will be taken into

consideration in determining whether a disqualified person does in fact

indirectly control an organization.”

(3) The Essence of Control – Four Examples

(a) Example 1 - Rev. Rul. 80-207

Rev. Rul. 80-207, 1980-2 C.B. 113, provides an example of indirect control. In

Rev. Rul. 80-207, two of the four SO directors were also employees of a corporation in

which the substantial contributor to the organization owned more than 35 percent of the

voting power of the corporation. This individual was also a director of the SO. Because

of the employment relationship of the two employee board members, Rev. Rul. 80-207

concluded that the SO was controlled indirectly by the DP.

Rev. Rul. 80-207 provides the following analysis:

Because only one of the organization’s directors is a disqualified person

and neither the disqualified person nor any other director has a veto power

over the organization’s actions, the organization is not directly controlled

by a disqualified person under section 1.509(a)-4(j) of the regulations.

However, in determining whether an organization is indirectly controlled

by one or more disqualified persons, one circumstance to be considered is

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whether a disqualified person is in a position to influence the decisions of

members of the organization’s governing body who are not themselves

disqualified persons. Thus, employees of a disqualified person will be

considered in determining whether one or more disqualified persons

controls 50 percent or more of the voting power of an organization’s

governing body.

Rev. Rul 80-207 clarifies that all pertinent facts and circumstances will be

considered in determining whether a DP does in fact indirectly control an SO such as

through a position of influence.

(b) Example 2 – Control of Board of Directors

Consider the following example: “T” seeks status as a SO1. T has a five member

board of directors. Two directors, substantial contributors, “M” and his wife, are DPs

under IRC 4946. The other three directors are officers or directors of the SD. One of the

three SD directors, “O”, is a partner in a law firm that represents the substantial

contributors, T, and the SD. O and his firm represent M and his wife on their personal

tax affairs. Further, the SO’s directors elect M as the initial operating CEO of the SO.

Two of T’s three remaining officers are also DPs. Reg. 1.509(a)-4(j)(i) provides that if a

SD designates a person who is otherwise a DP, aside from being a foundation manager to

the SO, that person is still regarded as a DP. Under the circumstances, T appears

indirectly controlled by DPs as in Rev. Rul 80-207. It would be difficult to see how O

could remain independent or be objective in his T board of director dealings with M and

his wife. Other cumulative evidence of DP control of T is the fact that three of the four

officers are DPs.

(c) Example 3 – Complex Trustee Structure

The control issue should be thoroughly analyzed if organizational documents or

other facts indicate that: 1) DPs select the “non DPs” or “independents” or “community

members” on the Board; or 2) committees controlled by DPs nominate Board members.

Other control indicia might include bylaws that provide that DP members of the Board of

Directors cannot be removed, even for cause. This is strong evidence of prohibited

control. See, for example, D below.

Consider this hypothetical: X is a charitable trust that claims IRC 509(a)(3) status

as an SO3 following Rev. Proc. 72-50, 1972-2 C.B. 830. X will provide support to

specified SDs as provided in the trust document.

X will receive contributions, make investments, and make grants to SDs in the

board’s discretion, except that grants totaling over $100,000 to single recipients within a

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12-month period must be approved either by (1) the vote of at least 2/3rds of the X Board

of Trustees, or (2) two majority votes of the Board, one preceding and one following the

annual reconstitution of the Board.

X’s Board consists of two “Class A” trustees and three “Class B” trustees. The

Class A trustees will be A, the grantor/creator, and a family member of A, or an

employee of an entity that A owns. Class B trustees cannot include any DPs.

X’s Board will be reconstituted every year. The Class A trustees select the

successor Class A trustees. Class B trustees are selected by majority action of the Trustee

Electors from among nominations approved by the Class B Nominating Committee. The

Trustee Electors, who elect their successors, will be officers or directors of an SD, but

cannot include DPs. X’s Nominating Committee consists of two individuals selected by

the Class A trustees and one selected by the Trustee Electors, and may include trustees.

A majority of the Nominating Committee approves the slate of candidates, which

includes at least two candidates for each position to be filled. The Trustee Electors then

vote on the slate. If the Trustee Electors do not elect a Class B trustee position, then the

Nominating Committee proposes a different slate of candidates for each unfilled position.

If the Trustee Electors do not fill the Class B trustee position after two slates, then the

Class A trustees shall elect the Class B trustee to fill the unfilled position. Trustees of

either class may be removed, but only for cause and only by the affirmative vote of

2/3rds of the Trustee Electors. A trustee may delegate in writing his or her rights to any

other trustee.

A’s approval is expressly required to amend X’s trust instrument. Given A’s power

over the trustee selection process discussed above, A can effectively prohibit grants

exceeding $100,000 to a single recipient within a 12-month period. Moreover, a trustee

may delegate his or her voting rights on substantive matters to A in making distributions

upon dissolution.

If individual A is legally competent, X trust instrument may be amended only with

his written approval. If he is dead or incompetent, X’s board may amend with an 80%

vote. The trust instrument provides that A’s charitable preferences will be used as a

guide.

In this hypothetical, X fails to meet the control test as a SO because X is indirectly

controlled by a DP. A directly controls his own position on the board and indirectly

controls the other Class A trustee positions through family or employment relationships.

Further, the facts and circumstances show that A exercises indirect control over the three

Class B trustee positions through his control over the slate of nominees for those

positions. Although A cannot ensure that a particular individual will be on X’s Board

(because two candidates must be offered for each open position), A can ensure that

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particular individuals will not be on the X Board. A has in effect veto power over the

return of any or all of the incumbent Class B trustees to the board, such as trustees who

may not agree with his ideas on the direction of X. As the Board is reelected every year,

A can depend on an X Board that will endorse A’s views and proposals. By controlling

the nomination process, A also maintains the ability to steer grants to the charities of A’s

choice. A’s control is also manifested by the trust instrument’s expressed intent that X

not survive A’s death or incompetence for very long, and that the Board use A’s

charitable preferences as a guide in making distributions upon dissolution.

(d) Example 4 – SO Assets Controlled by DPs

Consider this hypothetical:

Business owner G loans cash to his wholly-owned corporation, H, in an exchange

for a promissory note (NOTE) issued by H. NOTE is secured by real estate owned by H

and used in its business. Further, H has purchased key man insurance to pay off the debt

in the case of G’s death. G transfers NOTE to newly organized SO3, “J”. G and his

wife serve as two of the five directors of J and one director is appointed by SD, “Q”. G

is DP by virtue of being a substantial contributor in addition to being a foundation

manager.

J’s asset is H’s NOTE. Because G controls H, G controls NOTE transferred to J. If

he wished, G could consume all of H’s income and liquid assets through salary and

dividends leaving nothing to be paid on NOTE. G could also operate H in an imprudent

manner, such as an untimely expansion of H’s product or service without adequate

capital support, which could work to the detriment of J.

J asserts that J holds NOTE secured by H real estate and by the corporate life

insurance policy on G. The life insurance can be cancelled or cashed in by H. G’s

control of H allows him control over the real estate. Any number of actions taken by G

could impair the security. For example, G, in operating H, could incur debt (or have

incurred debt) secured by the real estate with a priority equal to or greater than the

priority of the security held by J. Further, G could impair the going concern value of the

H business in a manner that impairs the market value of H’s underlying real estate asset.

Whether a DP indirectly controls the supporting organization is based on “all

pertinent facts and circumstances.” Regs. 1.509(a)-4(j)(I), extracted in (2) above, mention

that the time length of the retention of SO assets, as well as the manner of exercising

voting rights in stock in which members of the SO’s governing body also have interests,

are factors to suggest that a DP’s continuing relationship with certain SO assets have a

bearing on the control issue. In this hypothetical, NOTE held by J and G’s connection to

NOTE are relevant facts.

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Since G exercises, in large part, control over J’s asset, it would be difficult not to

conclude that G is exercising indirect control over J. Inurement issues may also arise

where DPs, such as G, may use assets of IRC 501(c)(3)s for their use. See, for example,

Rev. Rul. 67-5, 1967-1 C.B. 123.

Other SO control examples are discussed in the 1997 CPE Text, page 116, et. seq.

D.

SOs and Donor Advised Funds (“DAFs”)

T:EO is considering situations in which a DAF associated with an IRC 501(c)(3) SD

is claiming SO status. As we will discuss through the example below, a DAF may not be

compatible with an SD in terms of being classified as an IRC 509(a)(3). In Part 3 of this

Topic, we will update past CPE topics on DAFs with a claimed public charity status other

than IRC 509(a)(3).

Consider the following example of proposed DAF SO3 X associated with an SD:

X is a charitable trust described in IRC 4947(a)(1). Pursuant to Rev. Proc. 72-50,

1972-2 C.B. 830, X applies for status as a SO3 under IRC 509(a)(3). X’s trust instrument

provides that the assets are devoted to benefit Christian activities, and that X’s primary

mission is to support Christian educational activities, such as Christian youth

organizations worldwide, with an emphasis on education and scholarship grants. X will

receive gifts from its donor founders, invest them, and use the principal and income to

support various programs of Christian organizations worldwide.

X’s substantial contributor founders are A and B. They are also X’s trustees, along

with a third trustee. A and B cannot be removed as trustees except upon resignation,

death, or incapacitation. Future trustees shall be selected from the direct descendants of

A and B. If there are insufficient descendants to constitute a majority, X will be

dissolved. X will also be dissolved after the death or permanent incapacitation of the last

grandchild of the donors.

The SD named in the trust instrument is Z. Z claims IRC 501(c)(3) and

170(b)(1)(A)(vi) status. Z has the power to enforce the trust agreement and compel an

accounting. X may make its grants either through Z or directly, with Z's prior approval,

in amounts a majority of X’s Trustees determine. Most Board decisions, including

trustee selections and grant approvals, must be reviewed by Z. Z cannot unilaterally

withhold approval but must provide a valid reason to X for any disapproval. Z has no

review approval over X’s investment policies.

Z is a relatively large organization with prior year total revenues and expenses in the

millions of dollars. Z provides the following public information about its operations:

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Here’s how we operate: You approach us with a particular project, either

educational, scientific, religious, or charitable. Our board reviews it, and if

we believe it falls within our purposes, we accept it as a ‘foundation

account’ or a Z foundation.

The control of a “foundation at Z” is in the hands of the Donor/Applicant,

or his designee, under the final authority of the Z. For there to be a

“completed gift”, the final authority has to be given to the charity – just like

it would be if you set up your own “three person Board” in a private

foundation. But we make our living by helping you accomplish your bona

fide charitable purposes, and we would be swiftly out of business if we

crossed up any bona fide charitable suggestions you or your designee might

make . . . your foundation can support any qualified charity, except those

where your gift will encourage (1) violence (2) promote atheism, or (3)

compromise the freedoms guaranteed in our Constitution. We also permit

your foundation within this framework to also conduct independent

charitable activities.

The facts here make it difficult for X to establish its SO3 status under IRC

509(a)(3). A majority of X’s board consists of DPs, who cannot be removed except upon

resignation, death, or incapacitation, and, in the future, descendants of DPs. X’s board

approval is required for X to take most actions. Although Z maintains an approval power

over certain decisions, this power does not extend to investment decisions and cannot in

any case be exercised unilaterally. Moreover, Z has publicly acknowledged that it will

not disapprove any proposal that is charitable in nature and fits within its extremely broad

guidelines. In form and in substance, X is controlled by DPs.

Further, X has failed to establish that it meets the operational test of IRC

509(a)(3)(A) and Reg. 1.509(a)-4(e)(1), because in addition to making payments to Z and

making grants and providing services to the individual members of the charitable class

benefited by Z, X will also make grants to other organizations besides Z. Although Z

may approve these grants to other organizations, its authority to disapprove them is

significantly restricted, as discussed above. Moreover, Z can make no grants of X’s

assets without the approval of a majority of X’s board. Thus, the grants to other

organizations are made by X rather than by Z.

X can carry on independent activities that may not promote Z’s purposes and

activities. This may conflict with the Reg. 1.509(a)-4(i)(3)(ii) SO3 integral part test (See

FY 1997 EO CPE Text, page 108) and/or the organizational and operational tests that are

discussed earlier in 2.B of this topic. Also, the power of X to make grants to other

organizations without Z’s authority and Z’s lack of a voice in investment policies make it

difficult to meet the Reg. 1.509(a)-4(i)(2)(ii) responsiveness test.

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As a collateral matter, Z’s status under IRC 509(a)(1) and IRC 170(b)(1)(A)(vi)

appears questionable if Z’s activities are primarily to service entities such as X.

E.

IRC 6104(d) Disclosure Requirements and IRC 509(a)(3) Organizations

Final Regulations under IRC 6104(d), effective March 13, 2000, and published as

T.D. 8861 in 2000-5 I.R.B. 441, January 31, 2000, make it clear that IRC 509(a)(3)

organizations are subject to the disclosure requirements in the same manner as all other

tax-exempt organizations. They include IRC 4947(a)(1) charitable trusts classified as

IRC 509(a)(3) organizations through application of the procedures under Rev. Proc. 7250, 1972-2 C.B. 830. See Reg. 301.6104(d)-1(b)(2); 2000-5 I.R.B. 445.

F.

SOCHECK On IRC 509(a)(3) – A Checksheet Guide To Status Determinations

The SOCHECK checksheet may be found in Part 7.

3.

Donor Advised Funds – Power and Control Issues

A.

General Update

Donor advised funds (hereafter “DAFs”) are a thriving industry. According to the

Chronicle on Philanthropy, November 4, 1999, the donor advised Fidelity Charitable Gift

Fund was number 3 on the Philanthropy 400 for 1998. Only the Salvation Army and the

YMCA garnered more receipts.

DAFs have been discussed in a number of recent CPE texts, most recently in Topic

C, page 222 of the 2000 CPE Text. Over the last year, T:EO has seen an increasing

number of exemption applications or ruling requests involving DAFs. The Service

continues to closely scrutinize these cases, especially their public charity status under

IRC 509(a)(1) and 170(b)(1)(A)(vi).

T:EO continues to review exemption applications or ruling requests with a DAF

feature using the principles similar to the material restriction or condition requirements of

Reg. 1.507-2(a)(8). Based on this approach, the Service will look closely at applications

that include contractual or promotional material that indicates the DAF would follow

donor advice as to charitable distributions all the time, provided that the distribution was

made to a public charity. Authority for treating this as a negative factor is found in Reg.

1.507-2(a)(8)(iv)(A)(1) and Example (4) of Reg. 1.507-2(a)(8)(v). The facts of Example

(4) involve a transfer of funds to a community trust, which is a public charity described in

IRC 170(b)(1)(A)(vi). Under the terms of the transfer, a creator of the transferor

foundation retains the right to determine what charities are to receive distributions from

the funds and the community trust has no right during the lifetime of the creator to vary

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Donor Advised Funds, and Disqualified Person Financial Institutions

his direction as to distribution of funds to the ultimate charity. Example (4) concludes,

that, under such facts, there is a restriction on the transferred funds. In the example, the

community trust/transferee is precluded from determining the charitable distributee

different than that designated by the creator of the transferor and, thus, precludes the

transfer as being treated as part or a component fund of the community trust. The

Example treats the funds as a separate trust. Compare this with PLR 200028038, April

14, 2000, which describes a donor advised component in a community trust that follows

the requirements of Reg. 1.507-2(a)(8) and represents that it will adopt an annual 5

percent distribution.

Many, if not most, DAFs have implicit or explicit contractual relationships with

their donor advisors that require that distributions from the DAFs may only be made with

the recommendation of the donors. Put another way, distributions from donors may only

be triggered by donor recommendations.

T:EO presently is considering whether this triggering mechanism should be a

negative factor. The regulations provide that a retained power to direct the timing of

distributions may constitute an adverse factor. Specifically, Reg. 1.507-2(a)(8)(iv)(A)(1)

provides that an adverse factor includes, with respect to distributions, the reservation of a

right by a disqualified person to direct the timing of distributions to public charities

described in IRC 509(a)(1) or (2). The purpose of this material restriction or condition

requirement of the Regulation is to ensure that the transfer has relinquished dominion and

control (“ownership”) of the transferred property. It would be logical to assert that if a

DAF is unable to initiate a charitable distribution to a public charity, it lacks dominion

and control or “ownership” over the property.

Some DAFs promote, with respect to their donor advisors, specific programs of

giving. Depending on the vigor with which such programs are carried out, and the nature

of the timing of the promotional communications, such promotions may be viewed as

tantamount to requests or demands for distribution.

Further, some DAFs may place more stringent requirements on donor advisors than

others. Some DAFs impose an annual 5 percent distribution of net fair market value of

assets on each separate donor advised account comparable to the IRC 4942 distribution

requirement for private foundations. A failure to recommend such distribution by a

donor advisor would result in transfer of funds from the non-compliant donor advisor’s

account to the DAF’s unrestricted account. Such a default provision may be viewed as a

method by which the DAF initiates a distribution.

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B.

Legislative Proposal

In February, 2000, the Department of the Treasury issued the General Explanation

of the Administration’s Fiscal Year 2001 Revenue Proposals. The Revenue Proposals

included tax provisions addressing DAFs. At page 106, this document states, in part, as

follows:

In recent years, the use of so-called “donor advised funds” maintained by

charitable organizations has grown dramatically. These funds generally

permit a donor to claim a current charitable contribution deduction for

amounts contributed to the charity and to provide ongoing advice regarding

the investment or distribution of such amounts, which are maintained by the

charity in a separate fund or account. Several financial institutions have

formed charitable corporations for the purpose of offering such donor

advised funds, and other existing charities have begun operating donor

advised funds. Although these donor advised funds resemble the separate

funds maintained by community trusts, the rules governing their operation

are unclear.

Some, but not all, charities that maintain donor advised funds have

voluntarily adopted minimum annual payout requirements. As a result,

there is concern that amounts maintained in donor advised funds are not

being distributed currently for charitable purposes. The lack of uniform

guidelines governing the operation of donor advised funds also raises

concerns that such funds may be used to provide donors with the benefits

normally associated with private foundations (such as control over

grantmaking), without the regulatory safeguards that apply to private

foundations. Accordingly, legislation is needed to encourage the continued

growth of donor advised funds by providing clear rules that are easy to

administer, while minimizing the potential for misuse of donor advised

funds to benefit donors and advisors.

The proposal would provide that a charitable organization which has, as its

primary activity14, the operation of one or more donor advised funds may

qualify as a public charity only if: (1) there is no material restriction or

condition that prevents the organization from freely and effectively

employing the assets in such donor advised funds, or the income therefrom,

in furtherance of its exempt purpose; (2) distributions are made from such

donor advised funds only as contributions to public charities (or private

operating foundations) or governmental entities: and (3) annual

14

Any charity that maintains more than 50% of its assets in donor advised funds would be deemed to meet

this primary activity test.

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Donor Advised Funds, and Disqualified Person Financial Institutions

distributions from donor advised funds equal at least five percent of the net

fair market value of the organization’s aggregate assets held in donor

advised funds (with a carry forward of excess distributions for up to five

years). It is intended that the definition of “material restriction” generally

will be based on current-law regulations under section 507, but the

existence of a material restriction will not be presumed from fact that a

charity regularly follows donor advice. Failure to comply with any of these

requirements with respect to any donor advised fund would result in the

organization’s being classified as a private foundation, and, therefore, being

subject to the current-law private foundation rules and excise taxes. In

addition, the proposal would require any other charitable organization that

operates one or more donor advised funds, but not as its primary activity, to

comply with the above three requirements. If such an organization (e.g., a

school that operates donor advised funds) fails to satisfy these requirements

with respect to its donor advised funds, the organization’s public charity

status would not be affected, but all assets maintained by the organization

in donor advised funds would be subject to the current-law private

foundation rules and excise taxes.

Various groups have submitted comments on the administration’s proposal to

Congress and to the Treasury Department. See, proposed legislative recommendations

from some of the most important DAFs and the Council of Foundations in the Exempt

Organization Tax Review, July 2000, vol. 29 No. 1. Page 208 et. seq. As of August 1,

2000, no DAF bill has been introduced in Congress.

4.

Update On IRC 4941 – Foundation Manager Bank’s Use Of Private Foundation

Funds To Further Bank’s Commercial Endeavors

A.

Overview

T:EO has been considering the IRC 4941 implications of foundation manager banks

that invest the funds of their private foundation customers. This investment activity may

serve the needs of the private foundation for investment income and simultaneously

benefit the bank (or other financial institution) by furthering a specific business

opportunity. As in the quote from Francis Bacon, extracted on the title page of this topic,

power in excess caused the angels to fall. Non-bank trust function activity can be a selfdealing act. This issue was discussed at some length in the 1999 EO CPE Text, Topic P,

pages 324-326, and the 2000 EO CPE Text, Topic P, pages 234 to 237. In the 2000 EO

CPE Text, we discussed two examples. The respective offices of T:EO and

CC:TEGE:EOEG have reached a tentative consensus on these two examples which we

will identify as A and B.

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B.

Example A

(1) Facts (Extracted from the 2000 EO CPE Text, page 234)

The foundation manager, X, is a national banking institution, which

serves as trustee of a number of private foundations. Corporate entities

related to the parent corporation of X have created two business trusts

(BTs) under state law to invest in large commercial investments not

otherwise available to the public at large. Under the placement agreement

between the parties, X is obligated to use its reasonable efforts to procure

subscriptions for the purchase of beneficial interests in the (BTs) by

eligible investors in accordance with the provisions of the agreement. For

such services, X is contractually entitled to receive a percentage fee of the

amounts procured for subscriptions to the BTs. Thus, the ability of the X to

procure subscriptions not only will entitle it to a fee for its efforts, but also

establishes its business credibility with the customer and enable it to live up

to its contract terms with the BTs.

X has invested a significant portion of the assets of one private

foundation for which it is a foundation manager in one of the BTs.

X-Sub, as a wholly-owned subsidiary of X, is a disqualified person

under IRC 4946(a)(1)(E), since X is conceded to be a foundation manager

within the meaning of IRC 4946(a)(1)(B). X-Sub also has a business

relationship with the BTs and also provides sub-advisory services to the

BTs for a fee. Pursuant to the agreement with the parties, X-Sub, the subadviser, has full authority to manage the assets of the BTs, allocate and

reallocate the BTs' assets among the Investment Funds and monitor the

performance in each Investment Fund. It also provides administrative and

accounting services to the BTs, including bookkeeping and distribution of

quarterly reports, and the preparation of financial statements and tax

information reports for investors. In return for these services, the BTs pay

X-Sub a fee equal to a percentage of the BTs net assets per annum.

It may be argued that the benefit to X of providing subscriptions to the

BTs is magnified. Not only does X receive a fee directly for the

subscriptions secured and not only do such subscriptions build its business

credibility and goodwill with the customers (the trusts), but subscriptions

also further the business interests of its subsidiary X-Sub, a disqualified

person, by providing it fees for its services.

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The BTs are not an investment vehicle merely to serve X's charitable

or trust department fiduciary clients with a needed investment opportunity.

Rather, it is a complete investment business endeavor serving existing

general bank customers and non-bank customers alike. Admission as an

investor to the BTs is open to all individual and institutional investors that

meet the qualifications for investment under the terms of the private

placement agreement. Thus, the BTs are conducting an investment

business endeavor in which X and its subsidiary have a substantial

economic interest by virtue of the contractual relationships with the BTs.

Procuring subscriptions to these BTs furthers the establishment of these

endeavors, lends credibility to them, and generates fees for the disqualified

persons.

(2) Analysis and Conclusion

X's actions in Example A constitute acts of self-dealing within the meaning of IRC

4941(d)(1)(E) as use by a disqualified person of the income or assets of X’s private

foundation customers for X’s own financial and/or business benefit. In both GCM 39107

and 39632, self dealing was held to exist merely on the basis that the use of the private

foundation assets by the foundation manager to make a loan to a business customer (at

the going interest rate) was self-dealing simply because the use of the assets enhanced the

goodwill of the foundation manager with his customer.

X, as trustee of the Foundation, has authority and a duty to invest the assets of the

Foundation in income producing assets. By directing a substantial sum of money

belonging to the Foundation for investment in the BTs, X is benefiting a significant

business partner, one that is a source of revenue for X. Thus, the subscription not only

fulfills its contractual obligation to the BTs and develops goodwill with this business

partner, X directly profits by generating a fee for its subscription services to the BTs.

The use of the Foundation’s assets in this regard constitutes the use of trust assets for X's

business gain within the meaning of IRC 4941(d)(1)(E). X is also indirectly benefited in

that X-Sub’s business interests are also furthered by such action.

Is benefit to X by virtue of the subscription transaction merely an incidental or

tenuous benefit within the meaning of Reg. 53.4941(d)-2(f)(2)? Even assuming that X's

only benefit is the goodwill generated with the BTs, we have concluded that such benefit

may not be viewed as incidental or tenuous. The promotion of financial products is at the

very core of the business by which X generates a profit. Further, by virtue of the various

relationships with the BTs, X is generating fees for services both directly and indirectly.

Does the IRC 4941(d)(2)(E) personal service exception delineated under Reg.

53.4941(d)-2(c)(4) and Reg. 53.4941(d)-3(c)(2) [see e.g. examples 2 and 3] excuse X

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Donor Advised Funds, and Disqualified Person Financial Institutions

from self-dealing? In example A, we do not have a bank arranging a common trust fund

to provide a better investment opportunity for all or many of its trust accounts. This is an

individual and selective investment transaction for this one private foundation, which is

also open to all non-fiduciary customers and non-customers of bank X who meet certain

investment qualifications. What separates this from being within the normal investment

trust functions of bank X is that the transaction in question is not just serving the

investment needs of the foundation, but it is also serving the financial needs of X’s

business partner, and, thus, furthers X’s own core business activity beyond that as merely

serving as a fiduciary in providing a trust function. Compare with Example B involving a

bank that meets the trust personal service exception.

C.

Example B – A Trust Function Personal Service Scenario

Example (B) was first described in the 2000 EO CPE Text, page 236. It is also the

subject of PLR 200023051, dated March 10, 2000.

Facts

M and N are national banking associations. Each is a direct, wholly-owned

subsidiary of O. M is a national bank offering a full range of banking, trust, and

investment services. M maintains certain funds exclusively for the collective investment

of monies contributed thereto by M in its capacity as a trustee, executor, administrator,

guardian, or custodian. Some of these common trust funds have been established

primarily for the investment of assets of private foundations (PFs) to carry out investment

responsibilities of M. It has been represented that these funds are common trust funds

described in IRC 584(a). M wants to convert the two common trust funds maintained

primarily for the investment of PF assets into P’s mutual funds (P’s Funds) described in

IRC 851 and terminate the common trust funds.

M is the investment advisor to P, a family of open-end management investment

companies. P’s Funds are a series of bank advised funds legally separate in corporate

form. Each corporate entity consists of a series of distinct portfolios of assets having

different investment policies and objectives.

Subject to the approval of the members of the Boards of Directors of P, M will be

substituted for N as custodian of P’s Funds.

It has been represented that none of the Funds own any stock of O. M does not own

any shares of any of the P’s Funds, except on behalf of other parties.

M has determined, in its capacity as fiduciary of the PFs participating in the

common trust funds, that investments be made directly to P for investment in P’s Funds.

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Donor Advised Funds, and Disqualified Person Financial Institutions

To effect this conversion, substantially all of the assets of each common trust fund will be

transferred to a P Fund in exchange for shares equal in value to the transferred assets.

Each common trust fund will then terminate. A Diagram follows:

Present

Investment

O

PFs

Common

Trust

Funds

Future

Investment

M/N

Custodian Fees

P

(MUTUAL

FUNDS)

Administrative Fees

Investment-Advisor Fees

O & P are unrelated entities

M is fiduciary, agent, custodian of PFs & Trusts

M/N is investment advisor to P

It is represented that:

(a) All of the fees charged by M to the PFs for its services as trustee are

reasonable and necessary for the services rendered, in accordance with industry practice,

and consistent with local laws governing fiduciaries.

(b) All of the fees charged P’s Funds by M or N for representative services as

investment advisor, sub-administrator and custodian of P’s Funds, are reasonable and in

accordance with industry practice.

Law and Analysis

To fall within the exception provided by IRC 4941(d)(2)(E), three requirements

must be met:

(a) The services must consist of trust functions and/or general banking services.

The latter term includes only checking accounts, saving accounts, and

safekeeping activities;

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(b) The services must be reasonable and necessary to carrying out the exempt

purposes of the PFs; and

(c) The compensation paid by the PFs to DP banks must not be excessive.

M and N will be compensated for their services in managing the assets of the PFs.

P’s Funds are not controlled by M or N or any of their affiliates and none of M or N’s

assets or any assets of their affiliates will be invested in P’s Funds. The services

provided by M and N fall within “trust functions” under Reg. 53.4941(d)-2(c)(4) and in

Example 2 of Reg. 53.4941(d)-3(c) which describes investment management. It is

represented that the services provided are reasonable and necessary to obtain funds to

carry out the exempt purposes of the PFs. It has been represented that the amount of

compensation to be paid M and N will be reasonable.

D.

Comparison of Example A and Example B

In example A, in contrast to example B, there was more than a fiduciary relationship

involving the payment of fees for trust functions such as investment advisory services. In

B, the investment vehicle (mutual funds) was not controlled by DP bank. In A, the DP

bank was inextricably intertwined with a commercial business activity that does not fall

within the self-dealing personal service banking exceptions for trust functions.

T:EO continues to review the IRC 4941 financial products and personal service

issue areas including variations of the scenarios described in A and B.

5.

Update on IRC 4940 Treatment of Distributions from Charitable Lead Trusts

Topic P of the 2000 CPE Text, page 225, discussed the definition of net investment

income under IRC 4940(c)(1) in the context of income distributions from a charitable

lead trust to a private foundation (PF). The specific concern is whether the ordinary

income component of distributions received by a PF from a IRC 4947(a)(2) trust should

be included in the calculation of net investment income for purposes of IRC 4940. Reg.

53.4940-1(d)(2) requires that the PF include the ordinary income component of a

distribution from section 4947(a)(2) trusts in the calculation of its net investment income

as if the income were its own.

We believe that courts would likely hold that the Reg. 53.4840-1(d)(2) goes beyond

the statutory authority. Accordingly, distinctions should not be made for purposes of IRC

4940 between distributions from taxable entities and private foundations, including trusts

described in IRC 4947(a)(1) or 4947(a)(2). Similar treatment should be afforded IRC

4942 minimum investment return treatment of IRC 4947(a)(2) trust distributions

following Ann Jackson Family Foundation v. Commissioner, 97 T.C. 534 (1991), aff’d

15 F.3d 917 (9th Cir. 1999).

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Donor Advised Funds, and Disqualified Person Financial Institutions

Exempt Organizations personnel should contact the appropriate EO Area Managers

regarding development of cases involving private foundations that receive distributions

from IRC 4947(a)(2) Trusts.

6.

Charitable Family Limited Partnerships

This planned giving scheme known in the trade as the “CHAR-FLIP” displays the

control and power elements that have been discussed in this article. As noted in the Wall

Street Journal on July 13, 1999, the CHAR-FLIP is “a complicated tax avoidance method

that uses charities as partners in business ventures.” It may be this years favorite charity

scam superseding the charitable split-dollar transaction discussed in the 2000 EO CPE

Text, Topic R, and presumably put to rest in recent legislation noted in the Current

Developments section of this EO CPE Text.

The charitable family limited partnership technique is touted as avoiding the capital

gain tax on the sale of the donor's appreciated assets, allowing the donor to continue to

control the assets until some subsequent sale date, often many years in the future, and still

provide the donor with a current charitable deduction on his or her income tax return.

Another "benefit" is reducing estate taxes. The technique is promoted by one or more

commercial firms.

A typical charitable family limited partnership works as follows: Donor “D”, having

substantially appreciated assets, which are often not readily marketable, such as real estate

or proprietary interest in a closely held business, sets up a donor family limited partnership

(“DFLP”). D transfers highly appreciated assets to DFLP in exchange for both a general

and limited partnership interest with the general partnership interest comprising a very

modest 1 or 2 percent of the total partnership interests. The DFLP agreement usually

provides for a term of 40 to 50 years.

D contributes a large percentage of the DFLP interest to charity “Z”, usually as much

as 95 to 98 percent, in the form of a limited partnership interest. D will usually retain the

general partnership interest. D may also retain a modest limited partnership interest or

transfer such an interest to D’s children. D obtains an independent appraisal of the value of

the partnership interests in order to establish the fair market value of the IRC 170(c)

charitable contribution deduction. Z receives whatever assets are held by DFLP at the end

of the partnership term, assuming the partnership interest was not sold prior to the expiration

of the partnership term.

D claims an IRC 170(c) tax deduction based on the value of the gift of the partnership

interest to Z. The value likely has been discounted to take into account the lack of Z control

and management of partnership operations as well as the lack of marketability of the limited

partnership interest in the context of a closely held business.

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Donor Advised Funds, and Disqualified Person Financial Institutions

The key point is control. Control remains with D as the general partner. Z holds a

limited partnership interest with no voice in the day to day management or operations of the

partnership.

If appreciated property held by DFLP is sold by DFLP, most of the gain escapes

taxation by virtue of the IRC 501(c)(3) exempt status of Z. Only the modest limited or

general partnership interests held by D and his family are subject to capital gain taxation.

D generally receives a management fee as compensation for operating and managing

the partnership.

Z holds a DFLP interest that may produce current income (although many charitable

family limited partnerships produce little or no income) as well as an interest in a

(hopefully) appreciating asset which will be sold or exchanged no later that the expiration of

the partnership term, usually 40 years or even 50 years.

One of the aspects of the “CHAR-FLIP” is a feature which gives a DFLP the right to

sell the property to D or his family at a price specified in the partnership agreement. This

right is essentially a put option. While such option may serve to benefit Z, the option is

often viewed by critics of this technique as working more for the benefit of D or his family

than for Z.

The CHAR-FLIP technique raises a number of potential tax issues. Depending on the

facts of each particular partnership agreement, the operation of the partnership may cross

over into the area of clear tax abuse. An examination of an organization holding an interest

in a CHAR-FLIP should include close scrutiny of the partnership agreement as well as the

manner of operation, valuation, management compensation and other matters relating to the

legal relationships.

In a nutshell, EO examination may uncover IRC 170, IRC 501(c)(3) inurement and

private benefit, IRC 511, and IRC 4958 issues. If the charity is a private foundation,

there may be issues under IRC 4941 and 4943.

The FY 2000 EP and EO/GE Work plans, dated August 18, 1999, provide the

following EO Examinations instruction on page 6:

Referrals should be made to the Examinations Division if an EO agent

identifies an entity holding an interest in a charitable family limited

partnership.

7.

SOCheck On IRC 509(a)(3) – A Checksheet Guide To Status Determinations

129

SOCHECK

(Checksheet Questionnaire for IRC 509(a)(3) Supporting

Organizations Determinations)

Selected Regs.;

Readings; and Notes

Legend

SO = Supporting Organization

SO1 = “operated, supervised or controlled by” SO

SO2 = “supervised or controlled in connection with“ SO

SO3 = “operated in connection with” SO

SD = Supported Organization described in IRC 509(a)(1) or (2)

DP = Disqualified Person

(“s” for plural form; e.g., “SOs, “SDs”)

[Caveat; SOCHECK may not include and/or sketch all possible

facts and circumstances tests. Please refer to the Regulations.]

Note: SOCHECK contains 5

parts. All SO applicants must

satisfy all parts.

2001 CPE Topic G. Note: No

exemption for organizations

primarily operated to carry on

UTB for unrelated SDs.

1. THRESHOLD REQUIREMENT

A. Is the SO claiming IRC 501(c)(3) status organized and

operated exclusively for charitable purposes?

(1) [ ] Yes – go to Part 2

(2) [ ] No – Organization is not eligible for SO status.

B. Is trust entity SO, not claiming IRC 501(c)(3) status,

described in IRC 4947(a)(1)?

Rev. Proc. 72-50

(1) [ ] Yes – go to Part 2

(2) [ ] No – Organization is not eligible for SO status.

2. RELATIONSHIP TESTS – [Including relationships with IRC

501(c)(4), (c)(5), or (c)(6) entities treated like IRC 509(a)(2)s]

A. Is the SO a SO1?

(1) Do the SD(s) officials select a majority of Directors or

Trustees of SO?

Reg. 1.509(a)-4(g)

a. [ ] Yes – go to Part 3

b. [ ] No – go to B.

B. Is the SO a SO2?

Reg. 1.509(a)-4(h)

130

(1) Is control of management of the SO vested in the same

persons who control or manage the SD(s)?

a. [ ] Yes – go directly to Part 3

b. [ ] No – go to C.

Reg. 1.509(a)-4(i)

C. Is the SO a SO3 because it meets both the

Responsiveness test (in either (1) or (2) below) and the

Integral Part test (in (3) below)?

Reg. 1.509(a)-4(i)(2)(ii)

(1) Responsiveness test – The SO must meet a, b, or c

and also must meet item d OR meet Alternative

Responsiveness test at (2) below.

a. Do the officers, directors, trustees, or membership of

the SDs elect or appoint one or more of the officers,

directors or trustees of the SO? Or

b. Are one or more members of the governing bodies of

the SDs also officers, directors or trustees or hold

other important offices of the SO? Or

c. Do officers, directors or trustees of the SO maintain a

close and continuous working relationship with the

officers, directors, or trustees of the SDs?

AND

In Windsor Foundation, 77-2

USTC 9709, Tax Court held that

SO failed Responsiveness Test

for failure to meet (d). 1982

CPE, p. 28.

d. By reason of the relationship described above, does

the SD have a significant voice in the SO’s

investment policies, timing of grants, manner of

making grants, and selection of recipients of grants,

etc.?

i. [ ] Yes – go to (3)

ii. [ ] No – go to (2)

(2) Alternative Responsiveness test – If Responsiveness

test (1) above is not met, the organization must meet

a, b, and c below.

Reg. 1.509(a)-4(I)(2)(iii)

Note: More common for SO to

meet (2) than (1).

1982 CPE, p. 29.

a. Is the SO a charitable trust under State law (or an

entity treated as a trust)? and

b. Is each specified SD(s) a named beneficiary under

the SO’s governing instrument? and

c. Do the specified SD(s) have the power to enforce the

trust and compel an accounting under State law?

i. [ ] Yes – go to (3).

ii. [ ] No – organization fails to meet SO3 relationship

test

(3) Integral Part test – The SO must meet requirement a

or b below.

1997 EO CPE, Topic I; IRM 7.8.3

(5.2)

131

Reg. 1.509(a)-4(i)(3)(ii).

Note: “FS Test” rarely

satisfied. Grantmaking not

considered supportive

enough. TAM 9730002.

Grant making to other

public charities may be

supportive if SD is a

community trust. G.C.M.

38417. 1997 CPE, p. 108.

a. The “Functional Support” test. Does the SO

engage in activities, not including grant making,

for or on behalf of SD(s) which perform the

functions of or carry out purposes of the SD(s)

and which the SD(s) would otherwise normally

undertake, but for the involvement of the SO?

i. [ ] Yes – go to Part 3.

ii. [ ] No – go to b.

OR

b. The “Attentiveness” test: Requires satisfaction of

tests i; ii(a), (b), or (c); and iii, below.

Reg. 1.509(a)-4(i)(3)(iii).

Note: Most SO3s meet this

test because they distribute

to SDs.

(i). Does the SO make payments of substantially all

(85%) of its income (including short term capital gain)

to or for the use of the designated SD(s)? and

IRM 7.8.3 (5.2.4.2)

(ii). (a). Does the SO’s support of the SD (within the

meaning of IRC 509(d)) constitute at least 10% of the

SD’s total support? (Or, if SO supports multiple SDs,

10% of the total support of one of the SDs?) or

G.C.M. 36379

Note: See Reg. 1.509(a)4(i)(3)(iii) examples; G.C.M.

36326 looks favorably on

significant program with

50% SO support.

Reg. 1.509(a)-4(i)(3)(iii)(d);

G.C.M. 36379

Note: New organizations do

not have a history.

Special 5 year rule with H &

C at Reg. 1.509(a)-4(i)(1)(iii);

1982 CPE, p. 32.

G.C.M. 36326

(b). Does the SO earmark its support for a significant

particular program or activity of the SD and, if so, can

the SO demonstrate that if its funding of such

program or activity is discontinued, the SDs operation

of such program or activity will be interrupted?

(c). Is the SD attentive based on all pertinent facts

and circumstances often involving a historic and

continuing relationship?

and

(iii) Does the SO’s support which meets (ii) above,

consistently constitute 33 1/3% of the SO’s total

support?

(a) [ ] Yes – go to Part 3.

(b) [ ] No – organization fails SO3 test.

3. ORGANIZATIONAL TEST

Reg. 1.509(a)-4(c)(1). IRM

7.8.3 (5.3)

132

A. Does the SO’s organization instrument limit its purposes

to those for the benefit of, to perform the

functions of, or to carry out the purposes of one or more

specified SDs, and does not expressly empower the SO

to engage in activities which are not in furtherance of

such purposes?

(1) Are purposes limited appropriately?

a.

b.

[ ] Yes – go to (2).

[ ] No – organization fails Organizational Test

(2) Do SO1s, SO2s, and SO3s meet specificity

requirements?

a.

Reg. 1.509(a)4(d)(2)(iii); Special

community trust rule Rev. Rul. 81-43

Reg. 1.509(a)4(d)(2)(iv); IRM 7.8.3

(5.4.3)

SO1s and SO2s – Are beneficiary SDs specified

or designated by class or purpose in governing

instrument?

(i) [ ] Yes – go to c.

(ii) [ ] No – Is there an historic and continuing

relationship with the SD? If yes, go to c.

Otherwise, SO fails the organization test.

b.

Specificity requirements for SO3s – Are SDs

specified by name?

(i) [ ] Yes – go to c.

(ii) [ ] No – SO fails organization test.

c.

SO1s & SO2s – Reg.

1.509(a)-4(d)(3); SO3s –

Reg. 1.509(a)-4(d)(4).

IRM. 7.8.3 (5.3); 2001

CPE, Topic G.

Governing Instrument Provisions – Are there

governing instrument provisions involving

substitutions, etc.? If so, are there conflicts with

the specificity requirements?

(i) If there are no conflicts, SO meets

Organization Test. Go to 4. If there are

conflicts, SO does not meet Organization

Test.

4. OPERATIONAL TEST

A. Is the SO operated exclusively for the benefit of, to

perform the functions of, or carry out the purposes of

one or more specified SDs?

Reg. 1.509(a)-4(e)(I);

IRM 7.8.3 (5.5); 2001

CPE, Topic G.

(1) Does the SO support or benefit only the specified

SDs meeting the Organization Test in 3 above?

a. [ ] Yes – go on to (2)

b. [ ] No – organization fails Operational Test.

133

Special permissible activities

include fundraising, alumni

activity, etc. Reg. 1.509(a)4(e)(2); 1982 CPE, p. 36.

(2) Does SO support or benefit SD through

disbursements to SD or other permissible

activities?

a. [ ] Yes – go on to 5.

b. [ ] No – SO fails Operational Test

5. CONTROL TEST – Often the Most Critical Factor

Reg. 1.509(a)-4(j); 2000 CPE, p.

222; 2001 CPE, Topic G; IRM

7.8.3 (5.6)

A. Is the SO controlled directly or indirectly by DPs other

than foundation managers and other than one or

more SDs?

(1) SO1s and SO2s

By nature of meeting these relationship tests, SOs

are generally controlled by the SDs. There should be

an analysis to discover whether SDs select or

designate SO board members that may be DPs, for a

reason in addition to being foundation managers, or

are connected to DPs through family or economic

associations. Otherwise go to (3).

(2) SO3s

DP power to annually designate

charitable recipients is control.

Rev. Rul. 80-305.

Rev. Rul. 80-207

a. Do DPs control SO?

(i) Directly through majority presence on the

Board, or positions of authority, veto power,

etc.?

(ii) Indirectly, through board nomination process,

or manipulation of board structure, or through

presence of board members or persons of

authority that have family or economic

association with DPs?

(iii) Indirectly, through control of SO assets or

other facts and circumstances?

[ ] If Yes, SO fails Control Test.

[ ] If No, go to (3).

(3) If SO1 or SO2 or SO3 is not controlled by DPs,

Control Test is met and if all SOCHECK parts have

been met, SO qualifies as a IRC 509(a)(3).

SOs may not support IRC

509(a)(3) but see G.C.M. 39508.

2% rule – Reg. 1.170A-9(e)(6)(i).

Domestic Government entity is

a good SD- IRC 170(b)(1)(A)(v);

G.C.M. 36523; foreign

nongovernment SD is o.k. Rev.

Rul. 74-229; Rev. Proc. 92-94.

Lobby election restriction – IRC

501(h)(4)(F); 1997 CPE, p. 126.

134

COLLATERAL NOTES:

1. There should be a representation that SD organization is a valid IRC

501(c)(3) and IRC 509(a)(1) (including a government entity) or 509(a)(2)

organization. Note that an IRC 509(a)(3) is not excepted from the 2

percent source limit for IRC 170(b)(1)(A)(vi), thus, SO support may affect

the public charity status of its SD.

2. SOs that support an IRC 501(c)(4), (c)(5), or (c)(6) can not make the

lobbying election under IRC 501(h).

3. ALL 509(a)(3)s are subject to IRC 6104(d) disclosure rules.