Of The Government B.io6190

Agency decision

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

I

ON APPROPRIATIONS

HOUSE OF REPR

Significant Audit

Findings In T

Departments

ties

Of The Government B.io6190

BY THE COMPTR,

OF THE UNITED’S

COMPTROLLER

GENERAL

OF THE

WASHINGTON.

D.C.

UNITED

STATES

20848

B-106190

The Honorable George H. Mahon

Chairman, Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives

G”

Dear Mr.

Chairman:

This report

contains

significant

audit findings

developed

during our audits and other examinations

in the civil

departThese findings

pertain

ments and agencies of the Government.

for the most part to matters

on which we believe

administrative

action,

and in some cases legislative

action,

is required

to

achieve greater

economy or efficiency

in Government operations,

Some findings

and recommendations

on which the departments

and agencies have reported

that corrective

action was being

t.aken also have been included because we have not yet observed

the effectiveness

of the reported

action.

This compilation

is made in response to the request that

information

of this type be made available

to your Committee

before the commencement of appropriation

hearings at each

session of the Congress.

Concurrently

with the release of this

we are sending to the departments

and agencies copies

report,

of the sections

specifically

applicable

to them so that they

may be in a position

to answer any inquiries

which may be made

on these matters

during the appropriation

hearings.

A report

on significant

audit findings

partment of Defense and the three military

being submitted

separately.

Sincerely

involving

departments

yours,

Comptroller

General

of the United States

the Deis

Contents

Page

.

DEPARTMENTOF AGRICULTURE

Agricultural

Stabilization

and Conservation

Commodity Credit Corporation

Export Marketing Service

Farmers Home Administration

Food and Nutrition

Service

Soil Conservation Service

1

Service

and

.

DEPARTMENTOF COMMERCE

National Oceanic and Atmospheric

Administration

13

15

DEPARTMENTOF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE

Health Services and Mental Health Administration

National Institutes

of Health

Office of Education

Social and Rehabilitation

Service

Social Security Administration

17

19

20

22

24

31

DEPARTMENTOF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT

Community Development

General Insurance

Housing Production and Mortgage Credit

Interstate

Land Sales

33

35

38

39

46

DEPARTMENTOF THE INTERIOR

Bureau of Reclamation

Geological Survey

Southwestern Power Administration

47

49

50

52

DEPARTMENTOF JUSTICE

Law Enforcement Assistance

53

55

57

Administration

DEPARTMENTOF LABOR

Manpower Administration

Occupational

Safety and Health

n

4

3

6

9

10

11

Administration

59

65

DEPARTMENTOF STATE, AGENCYFOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

67

DEPARTMENTOF TRANSPORTATION

Department-wide

Federal Aviation

Rdminis':ration

National Highway Traffi c Safety Administration

National Railroad Passenger Corporation

(AMTRAK)

77

79

80

82

83

DEPARTMENTOF THE TREASURY

Internal

Revenue Service

International

Financial

Affairs

U.S. Customs Service

87

89

90

92

ATOMIC ENERGYCOMMISSION

Director

of Regulation

95

97

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT

courts

Department of Corrections

Department of Environmental

Services

Department of Highways and Traffic

Department of Human Resources

Executive Office of the Commissioner

Page

99

101

102

103

104

105

106

ENVIRONMENTALPROTECTIONAGENCY

107

EXPORT-IMPORTBANK OF THE UNITED STATES

113

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONSCOMMISSION

119

GENERALSERVICES ADMINISTRATION

Automated Data and Telecommunications

Federal Supply Service

National Archives and Records Service

Public Buildings

Service

123

125

126

128

130

Service

INTER-AMERICAN FOUNDATION

133

NATIONAL AERONAUTICSAND SPACE ADMINISTRATION

137

0 FFICE OF ECONOMICOPPORTUNITY

Economic Development Division

Experimental Research Division

External Audit Division

Office of Legal Services

State and Local Government Division

141

143

145

147

149

151

OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT

AND BUDGET

153

RENEGOTIATION BOARD

157

TENNESSEEVALLEY AUTHORITY

161

UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

165

UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE

171

VETERANS ADMINISTRATION

175

VARIOUS DEPARTMENTSAND AGENCIES

Civil Service Commission, Off'ice of Management and Budget,

and Department of Labor

Department of Agriculture

and Department of Health, Education,

and Welfare

Department of Agriculture;

Department of Health, Education,

and Welfare; Department of Justice;

Department of the

Treasury; and Office of Management and Budget

Department of Agriculture;

Department of Health, Education,

and Welfare; Department of Labor; Office of Economic

Opportunity;

and Office of p4anagement and Budget

181

l

-

1

182

183

185

187

1

Page

VARIOUS DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES (continued)

Department

of Agriculture

and Department

of the Interior

Department

of Agriculture,

Department

of State,

and

Agency for International

Development

Department

of Commerce;

Department

of Defense;

General

Services

Administration;

Department

of Health,

Education,

and Welfare;

Department

of Labor;

and Veterans

Administration

Department

of Commerce,

Department

of the Interior,

and

Office

of Management

and Budget

Department

of Defense,

General

Services

Administration,

and Tennessee

Valley

Authority

Department

of Defense

and Department

of State

Department

of the Interior,

Department

of Agriculture,

Department

of Defense,

and the General

Services

Administration

Department

of Justice

and Department

of State

Department

of Justice

and Department

of the Treasury

Department

of Labor and Department

of Health,

Education,

and Welfare

Office

of Management

and Budget,

Corps of Engineers,

Department

of Housing

and Urban Development,

and Department

of

Transportation

Office

of Management

and Budget

and General

Services

Administration

189

191

193

197

199

201

205

207

209

211

213

215

DEPARTMENTOF AGRICULTURE

Contents

Page

AGRICULTURALSTABILIZATION AND CONSERVATIONSERVICE AND COMMODITY

CREDIT CORPORATION

Need intensifies

to amend legislation

to reduce Government losses

on the peanut price-support

program

Fees for processing price-support

loans and storage facility

and

equipment loans not related to actual costs

EXPORT MARKETING SERVICE

Russian wheat sales and weaknesses in Agriculture's

wheat export subsidy program

FARMERSHOMEADMINISTRATION

Ways to improve effectiveness

of rural

business

3

3

4

6

management of

6

loan programs

9

9

FOOD AND NUTRITION SERVICE

Need for more accurate information

on schools not participating

in

the school lunch program and on the cost of lunches served under

the program

10

SOIL CONSERVATIONSERVICE

Progress in meeting important objectives

of the Great Plains

Conservation Program could be improved

11

1

10

11

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

AGRICULTURAL STABILIZATION

AND CONSERVATION SERVICE AND

COMMODITY CREDIT CORPORATION

.

Need intensifies

reduce

Government

peanut

price-supnort

to amend legislation

losses

on the

program

to

In May 1968 GAO reported

to the Congress

that

the Commodity

Credit

Corporation

(CCC) had lost

about

$270 million

on the peanut

price-support

program

between

1955 and 1966 and would lose at least

$248 million

over the

next 5 years 9 1967 through

1971.

At that

time GAO recommended

that

the

Department

develop

for the Congress’

consideration

a program

to more effectively

control

peanut

production.

Because the program

was not changed

and CCC incurred

greater

losses,

GAO reassessed

the program

to determine

what should

be done to effectively

control

production

and reduce

losses.

In an April

1973 report

to the Congress,

GAO stated

that

the Agricultural

Adjustment

Act of 1938, as amended,

requires

the Secretary

of

Agriculture

to control

peanut

production

on the basis

of demand but

specifies

also that he authorize

annually

not less than 1,610,OOO

acres

for growing

peanuts.

The sponsors

of the act had expressed

hope that

this

acreage

would be sufficient

on all occasions

to supply

the edible

trade

without

any substantial

surplus.

Since 1955, however,

fewer than 1,610,OOO

acres have been needed annually

to satisfy

commercial

demand because

advances

in farm technology

have increased

yields

per acre by an average

of

70 pounds a year.

An average

of 1,015,OOO

acres annually

would have produced the necessary

supply

during

1967 through

1971.

Under the program,

CCC has to buy the surplus

peanuts

and store

them

until

they are sold.

CCC sells

them for significantly

lower prices

than it

From 1967 through

1971 CCC recovered

through

sales

53 perpays for them.

cent of its cost of buying

surplus

peanuts

and lost

$279 million

on the

program,

a 66-percent

increase

over the loss of $168 million

from 1962

through

19 66.

In March 1972 the Department’s

Agricultural

Stabilization

and Conservation

Service

(ASCS), which

administers

the program

for CCC,

if the present

program

were continued,

losses

from 1973

projected

that,

through

1977 would total

$537 million,

a 92-percent

increase

over the

losses

incurred

between

1967 and 1971.

.

Although

GAO made no recommendations

to the Department,

it recommended

to the Congress

that

the Agricultural

Adjustment

Act of 1938 be amended to

rescind

the minimum acreage

provision

to give the Secretary

more flexibility

to adjust

production

so that

it will

be consistent

with commercial

demand.

Although

the Department

agreed

that

such a change could help bring

peanut

production

more in line

with

demand,

it said that

it was not completely

satisfied

that

the change was the most desirable

solution

in the

long run.

It said further

that

it was studying

GAO’s recommendation

and

possible

alternatives.

3

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

AAGRICULTURAL STABILIZATION

.\ND CONSERVATION SERVICE AND

CObiblODITY CREDIT CORPORATION (continued)

GAO recognized

demand more in line

would not preclude

of the Department’s

that

alternatives

existed

for bringing

production

and

but noted

that

removal

of the minimum acreage

provision

any actions

the Secretary

may wish to take as a result

study of alternatives.

(B-163484,

Apr.

13, 1973.)

Fees for processing

price-support

and storage

facility

and equipment

not related

to actual

costs

loans

loans

GAO examined

into

the fee assessment

policies

concerning

its processing

of price-support

loans

equipment

loans

authorized

under CCC programs,

and practices

of

and storage

facility

ASCS

and

Title

V of the Independent

Offices

Appropriation

Act of 1952 and

Circular

No. A-25 of the Office

of Management

and Budget

state

that

Government activities

which

provide

identifiable

recipients

with

special

benefits

or privileges

should

be financially

self-sustaining

to the maximum extent

possible.

The act states

that

fair

and equitable

fees should

be prescribed

which

consider

direct

and indirect

costs

to the Government,

value

to the

recipients,

public

policy

or interest

served,

and other

pertinent

facts.

Circular

No. A-25 states

that,

in addition

to those

costs

directly

related

to the activity,

the cost to the Government

should

include

a proportionate

share of an agency) s management

and supervisory

costs

and that

the cost of

providing

the service

should

be reviewed

every year and fees should

be

adjusted

as necessary.

GAO’s review

showed that ASCS charged

fees for processing

loans--established

in 1969 and based on 1967 information--that

directly.related

to the costs

which should

have been recovered

charge

for processing

storage

facility

and equipment

loans.

antiually.review

its costs

to process

these

loans.

..

that

In a’ July

ASCS:

1972

report

--Systematically

storage

facility

for recovering

fullest

extent

public

policy,

--Review

the costs

as necessary.

to

the

Secretary

of

Agriculture,

price-support

were not

and did not

ASCS did not

GAO recommended

establish

fees for processing

price-support

loans and

and equipment

loans

on a basis

that

would provide

the related

costs,

including

overhead

costs,

to the

possible

and would consider

value

to the recipient,

interest

served,

and other

pertinent

facts.

of

these

activities

every

year

and adjust

the

fees

ASCS replied

that,

although

it did not totally

agree with GAO’s recommendat ions,

it would review

its loan-fee

arrangements.

On May 31, 1973,

ASCS issued

a directive

to its State

and county

offices

ordering

an increase

in price-support

loan service

fees,

beginning

with loans made in the 1973

4

l

DEPARTMENTOF AGRICULTURE

AGRICULTURALSTABILIZATION

AND CONSERVATIONSERVICE AND

COMMODITYCREDIT CORPORATION(continued)

crop year.

However, ASCS rescinded these increases on June 22, 1973, in

response to Executive Order 11723, dated June 13, 1973, which froze certain

prices for a maximum of 60 days. ASCS officials

advised GAO in September

and August 1973, respectively,

that:

--The price-support

loan service fees were no longer frozen under

Phase IV guidelines

and it was considering

increasing such fees

for the 1974 crop year.

--The matter of establishing

a fee for processing storage facility

and equipment loans was still

under consideration.

(B-163484,

July 13, 1972.)

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

EXPORT MARKETING

SERVICE

Russian

wheat sales

and weaknesses

in Agriculture

Is management

of

wheat export

subsidy

program

The President

announced

the sign ing of an agreement

with Russia

on

July 8, 1972, making

$750 million

in credit

available

for 3 years

for purchasing

various

U.S. grains.

By then Russia

was already

purchasing

U.S.

wheat.

Within

a few weeks,

cash and credit

wheat sales

to Russia,

heavily

subsidized

by the U.S. Government,

approximated

$700 million,

the largest

private

grain

sales

in U.S. history.

I

1

The wheat export

subsidy

program

began in 1949 to help the United

States

meet its obligation

to export

wheat at prices

agreed

to under

the

International

Wheat Agreement.

The program’s

major

objectives

are to

generally

insure

that

U.S. wheat

is competitive

in world

markets

and to

reduce

Government

wheat

inventories.

The Export

Marketing

Service

establishes

daily

subsidy

rates

for

wheat.

The Service

has maintained

a zero subsidy

rate

for all

types

of

wheat since

September

22, 1972,

allowing

wheat prices

to seek their

own

levels,

but,

during

the preceding

4 months,

rates

ranged

from a few cents

to as high as 51 cents

a bushel,

Before

its suspension,

the program

incurred

about

$4.3 billion

in subsidy

costs

for exporting

about

10.5 billion

bushels

of U.S. wheat.

There is little

doubt

that

the program

has been

instrumental

in competitively

pricing

U.S. wheat moving

into

export

markets.

GAO reported

to the Congress

that

the large

sales

of U.S. wheat

to

Russia

and other

exports

in the summer of 1972 caused a dramatic

rise

in the

price

of U.S. wheat.

Hard Winter

wheat

sold at gulf

ports

for $1.68

a

bushel

in July brought

$2.49

a bushel

in September

and even more later.

An

export

goal of 650 million

bushels

and a fiscal

year 1973 budget

estimate

of $67 million

in subsidy

mushroomed

to 1.1 billion

bushels

in exports

and

over $300 million

in subsidy.

tbtaling

addition

Agriculture

claims

that

about

$457 million

to other

benefits.

the U.S. Treasury

as a result

of the

will

accrue

wheat sales

net benefits

to Russia

in

Agriculture

is committed

to pay over $300 million

in subsidies

on the

Russian

and other

export

sales.

GAO expressed

the belief

that many of these

sales would have been made even with

reduced

subsidies

and that Agriculture

should

have responded

more rapidly

to the available

information

and reduced

or eliminated

the subsidies

sooner.

Wheat

export

subsidy

6

program

After

October

1971 the key determinant

in establishing

daily

wheat subsidy rates

was the export

target

price.

The difference

between

the target

price

and the domestic

price

was the daily

export

subsidy

rate.

Maintenance

of a low target

price

throughout

the period

of the Russian

sales

and for

6

1

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

m

*

EXPORT MARKETING

SERVICE

(continued)

several

subsequent

Government

to pay

weeks was a crucial

excessive

subsidies.

factor

in

obligating

the

U.S.

GAO questioned

the maintenance

of a low target

price

in view of available intelligence

reports

and analyses

indicating

adverse

Russian

crop conditions.

Agriculture

also knew that

the United

States

was the dominant

wheat

supplier

and that

purchasers

of large

supplies

had to come to the

United

States.

Agriculture

officials

recognized

early

in 1972 that

the world

wheat

situation

was changing

but decided

against

increasing

the export

target

price

for several

reasons.

GAO expected

to find

a detailed

analysis

to

support

such a major policy

decision,

but it seems to have been based

largerly

on intuitive

judgments

made by Agriculture

officials.

Speculating

in

subsidy

registrations

Changes made in 1967 to the basic

wheat export

subsidy

program,

ting

subsidy

registrations

at exporters’

options,

and other

program

in effect

at the time of the Russian

wheat

sales

tended

to minimize

and created

an environment

whereby

exporters

could make substantial

Although

Agriculture

sought

to increase

the flexibility

for exporters

price

U.S. wheat competitively

in international

markets,

the program

appropriate

administrative

controls.

permitfeatures

risks

profits.

to

lacked

Some exporters

making

sales

in August

1972 registered

weeks later

at higher

subsidy

rates.

In five

examples,

of about

$604,493

was paid.

Had exporters

been required

the subsidy

would have been $286,188,

the dates

of sales,

sales

several

a total

subsidy

to register

on

or $318,305

less.

Export

the program

exporters.

no evidence

competition

Marketing

Service

had allowed

excess

Carrying-charge

officials

profit

contend

there

is

because

of intense

that

among

payments

In addition

to the basic

export

subsidy,

Agriculture

provided

a

carrying-charge

subsidy

to cover

the estimated

costs

of owning wheat

for

future

delivery,

The subsidy

registration

date,

instead

of the sale date,

is used to calculate

subsidy

entitlement.

In 28 instances

totaling

about

$360,000,

had the sale contract

dates

rather

than the registration

dates

determined

the carrying-charge

subsidies,

the payments

would have been

about

$350,000

less.

Program

h

evaluation

needs

Despite

annual

subsidy

outlays

of millions

not comprehensively

evaluated

the wheat export

evaluations

indicating

that

the subsidy

program

dismissed

by operating

officials.

7

of dollars,

Agriculture

subsidy

program.

Limited

was not fully

effective

has

were

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

EXPORT MARKETING

SERVICE

(continued)

GAO examined

several

pertinent

statistical

relationships

indicative

of

program

effectiveness.

It concluded,

on the basis

of making U.S. wheat

competitive

in international

markets,

that Agriculture

seemed to have paid

greater

subsidies

than the marketplace

required.

Other agricultural

economists

questioned

the need for subsidy

payments

and suggested

that

the

program

needed

to be completely

reevaluated,

The major GAO recommendation

to the Secretary

of Agriculture

was that

the wheat,export

subsidy

program

be reviewed

in its entirety

and that

its

reinstatement

be predicated

on a meaningful

justification

for its existence.

ment

tion

The Secretary

of Agriculture

said GAO’s study would help the Departimprove

the program.

The Secretary

agreed

with GAO’s major

recommendabut took issue with

GAO on some other

observations

and conclusions.

GAO suggested

that

the Congress

should

consider

requiring

that

agencies

develop

definitive

ground

rules

so that

expected

benefits

from exports

can

be appropriately

weighed

against

their

impact

on various

segments

of the

domestic

economy,

(B-176943,

July 9, 1973.)

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

FARMERS HOME ADMINISTRATION

Ways to improve

.rural

business

c

It

/’’

I

*/:

effectiveness

loan programs

of

The Economic

Opportunity

Act of 1964, as amended,

authorized

several

One of these programs-special

programs

to combat poverty

in rural

areas.

the Economic

Opportunity

Cooperative

Loan Program--administered

by the

Farmers

Home Administration

(FHA) provided

loans

to cooperative

associations

in rural

areas.

Although

the program

was terminated

could be helpful

to FHA in administering

dustrial

loan programs

authorized

by the

on June 30, 1971,

GAO’s findings

the new rural

business

and inRural

Development

Act of 1972.

GAO found that

many economic

opportunity

cooperatives

encountered

problems,

such as weak management

and adverse

market

conditions,

and

therefore

failed

to stay in business

or became delinquent

in their

loan

repayments.

Not all problems

encountered

by the cooperatives

could

have

been foreseen.

Many problems,

however,

could have been identified

and

corrected

had FHA required

adequate

determinations

of the economic

soundness

and feasibility

of cooperative

projects

and had FHA improved

its policies

and procedures

for supervising

and evaluating

cooperatives’

activities.

In accordance

with

GAO’s recommendations

for implementing

the business

and industrial

loan programs

authorized

by the Rural

Development

Act of

1972,

FHA stated

that

it (1) was preparing

regulations

that

would require

applications

for loan assistance

to include

feasibility

studies,

marketing

agreements,

management

evaluations,

and an analysis

of the adequacy

of working capital,

(2) had taken

steps

to provide

employee

training,

(3) had considered

additional

staffing

of new types

of professional

and technical

skills,

and (4) would,

when practical,

express

program

objectives

in specific

goals

and use such goals

to periodically

measure

program

effectiveness.

fiscal

FHA plans

to

year 1974.

implement

(B-114873,

the new business

May 2, 1973.)

9

and industrial

loan

programs

in

DEPARTMENTOF AGRICULTURE

FOODAND NUTRITION SERVICE

Need for more accurate information

on schools not participating

in the

school lunch program and on the cost

of lunches served under the program

Food and Nutrition

Service (FNS) statistics

showed that, in fiscal

year’

q

1972, 82,900 schools, with about 45 million

students enrolled,

were partici-‘,

However, FNS data also showed that,

/

pating in the school lunch program.

schools, with about

‘I*

early in the 1971-72 school year, about 24,900 eligible

8.7 million

students enrolled,

were not participating

in the program.

About

18,100 of these schools did not have any type of food service;

and FNS identified

at least 4,400, with 1.4 million

students enrolled,

as needy schools.

An FNS survey in March 1972 showed that about 1.5 million

needy students

attending participating

schools were not eating free or reduced-price

lunches,

GAO found that some schools did not participate

because they lacked the

equipment and facilities

to prepare and serve the food and others did not

participate

for reasons based on local preference or on special local conditions not susceptible

to Federal persuasion.

FNS did not have reliable

data concerning which schools needed assistance and the extent of their

needs. Such data would help FNS resolve these problems and determine the

assistance or changes in administrative

policies

or legislation

needed to

enable such schools to participate.

GAO also found that FNS had not sufficiently

guided the schools on how

to compute accurate per-lunch costs which FNS needs to insure that Federal

reimbursements do not exceed the actual cost of lunches, as required by

existing

legislation.

GAO recommended that actions be taken to obtain better information

on

schools needing assistance and the extent of their needs, promote the school

lunch program, and define reimbursable

costs,

The Department generally

agreed with GAO’s conclusions

and described actions that were being taken to

implement the recommendations,

(B-178564, June 29, 1973.)

10

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

SOIL

CONSERVATION

SERVICE

Progress

in meeting

of the Great Plains

could

be improved

II

*

important

Conservation

objectives

Program

The Soil

Conservation

Service

(SCS),

Department

of Agriculture,

combats

climatic

hazards

in the Great Plains

by helping

farmers,

ranchers,

and other

landowners

and operators

voluntarily

carry

out planned

soil

and water

conservation

practices

through

technical

assistance

and direct

cost sharing

under

contracts

of from 3 to 10 years.

In June 1973 GAO reported

to the Congress

that

progress

in converting

unsuitable

cropland

to permanent

vegetative

cover

and reseeding

badly

depleted

rangeland

had been less than expected

in view of the program’s

legislative

history,

which

stressed

the importance

of meeting

these needs.

To provide

for greater

progress

before

the program’s

scheduled

expiration

in 1981,

GAO recommended

that

SCS (1) revise

its fund allocation

system

to insure

that

program

funds

are used,

to the extent

practical,

for highest

priority

work first

and (2) increase

a $25,000

administrative

limitation

on

any one contract

to recognize

cost

increases

since

the limitation

was established

and to increase

the rate

of achieving

important

program

objectives.

GAO also noted

a conflict

between

the program

and certain

features

of

the commodity

price-support

programs

and suggested

that

the Congress

explore

with

the Department

the feasibility

and desirability

of enacting

legislation

to provide

additional

incentives

for farmers

to convert

unsuitable

cropland

to permanent

vegetative

cover,

giving

consideration

to disincentives

resulting from commodity

price-support

programs.

In

response

--Had

the

to

GAO’s

studied

and will

fund allocation

continue

system,

Department

to study

the feasibility

giving

due consideration

--Had recognized

the inadequacy

of

and was reevaluating

the limitation

of conservation

practices.

t

the

recommendations,

the

$25,000

in view

The Department

did not comment on the conflict

commodity

price-support

programs.

SCS headquarters

agreed

that

the conflict

was one of the significant

progress

of achieving

program

objectives.

(B-114833,

11

stated

that

SCS:

of revising

to priorities.

limitation

per

of the increasing

contract

costs

between

the program

officials,

however,

constraints

on the

June 28, 1973.)

and

DEPARTMENTOF COMMERCE

Contents

Page

NATIONAL OCEANIC AND AT!IOSPHERIC ADIIINISTRATION

Continuation

of the Fish Protein Concentrate

yield only limited

benefits

13

15

Program would

15

DEP.I\RT!IENT OF CO?QIERCE

I;.\TIONXL

OCE-\YIC

Continuation

Fish Protein

r;ould

)-ield

.YiD .JIT\IOSPHERIC XDI\IIYISTR.4TI@N

of the

Concentrate

only limited

Program

benefits

.\t the request

of the Chairman,

Subcommittee

on Fisheries

and Wildlife

Conserration,

House Committee

on !Ierchant

!larine

and Fisheries,

GAO reviewed

the Fish Protein

Concentrate

(FPC) Program

administered

by the Administration’s

Sational

Yarine

Fisheries

Service,

Under this

program

a Governmentoiined experimental

plant

\<as established

at Aberdeen,

Washington,

to

demonstrate

the economic

feasibility

of commercial

production

of FPC.

G.1\0 concluded

that,

although

the plant

was useful

in developing

a

process

for producing

FPC, it did not demonstrate

the economic

feasibility

of commercial

production

of FPC.

The domestic

market

potential

for the

tyPe of FPC produced

by the Service

was limited

at that

time and the U.S.

fishing

industry

Icould not be enhanced

by a commercial

FPC industry.

GXO expressed

the belief

that

the Government

could

realize

only limited

benefits

if it Tiere to continue

operating

an experimental

plant.

It appeared

that

if a strong

domestic

and foreign

need for FPC becomes

evident,

industry

ma)- become interested

and begin

to produce

it.

GAO also expressed

the belief

that,

if an estension

of the program

is authorized,

it would be more beneficial

to move the experimental

plant

to a Gulf

location

in order

to be closer

to the source

of fish

supply.

G.10 suggested

that,

if the Subcommittee

favors

extending

the program,

the Subcommittee

should

include

in a report

on the subject

language

instructing the Service

to (1) continually

develop

information

on the present

and

potential

FPC markets,

both domestic

and foreign,

(2) determine

the present

and future

available

fish

resources

for producing

FPC commercially,

(3) evaluate

sites

on the Atlantic

and Gulf Coasts,

including

a determination

of the detailed

costs

for each site

and industry’s

v;illingness

to participate,

and (4) complete

the research

into

storage

methods

to develop

and demonstrate

alternatives

to using

frozen

fish.

The National

Oceanic

and Atmospheric

Administration

stated

that

GAO’s

report

presented

a fair

evaluation

of the FPC program

and situation

and

that

the information

in the report

was generally

consistent

with

its

records.

(B-157927,

Yay 25, 1973.)

15

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,

EDUCATION,

L

AND WELFARE

Contents

Page

HEALTH SERVICES AND MENTAL HEALTH ADMINISTRATION

Need for Neighborhood

Health

Centers

to seek

reimbursements

and to improve

administrative

practices

NATIONAL INSTITUTES

OF HEALTH

Better

management

needed

of

health

research

19

increased

third-party

and operating

19

equipment

by grantees

OFFICE OF EDUCATION

Need for improved

coordination

of federally

assisted

student

programs

in institutions

of higher

education

Additional

efforts

needed

to fully

achieve

the objectives

of

Vocational

Education

Act

20

20

22

aid

22

the

23

SOCIAL AND REHABILITATION

SERVICE

Need to improve

effectiveness

of vocational

rehabilitation

in helping the handicapped

Social

services

have only a minor

impact

on directly

helping

welfare recipients

achieve

self-support

or reduced

dependency

Need to improve

administration

of certain

eligibility

aspects

in

the aid to families

with

dependent

children

program

in Pennsylvania

Some problems

in contracting

for federally

assisted

child-care

services

Improvement

needed

in the administration

of the program

to provide

Medicare

benefits

for welfare

recipients

Problems

in functioning

of State

systems

for reviewing

use of

medical

services

financed

under Medicaid

24

SOCIAL SECURITY

Opportunities

processing

31

ADMINISTRATION

to increase

services

competition

among

suppliers

of

24

25

26

27

28

29

data

31

17

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,

HEALTH

D.

AND WELFARE

SERVICES AND MENTAL HEALTH ADMINISTRATION

Need for Neighborhood

increased

third-party

improve

administrative

M

EDUCATION,

Health

Centers

reimbursements

and operating

to seek

and

practices

At the request

of the Chairman,

Subcommittee

on Health,

Senate

Committee

on Labor and Public

Welfare,

GAO reviewed

certain

actions

taken

by the Health

Services

and Mental

Health

Administration

to implement

its announced

policy

of eventually

replacing

direct

Federal

support

in all

of its health

service

delivery

projects

with

increased

third-party

and other

reimbursements.

The Subcommittee

was particularly

interested

in the potential

impact

of

this

policy

on the Neighborhood

Health

Center

(NHC) program

funded

under

Section

314(e)

of the Public

Health

Service

Act (42 U.S.C.

246(e)).

NHCs

provide,

directly

or indirectly,

a range of services

designed

to meet the

majority

of health

needs of a defined

target

population.

These services

include,

as a minimum,

preventive,

diagnostic,

therapeutic,

and general

health

maintenance

elements.

In May 1973 GAO reported

to the Subcommittee

that

NHCs’ administrative

and operating

practices

and the nature

of available

third-party

reimbursement

programs

severely

limited

NHCs’ prospects

to improve

their

level

of selfsupport.

In its

selective

review

of five

NHCs, GAO noted

evidence

of (1)

lack of control

over accounts

receivable,

(2) ineffective

use of available

health

services,

and (3) inadequate

efforts

to qualify

for and use thirdparty

reimbursements.

GAO noted

also that

the NHCs offered

a variety

of

services,

such as nutrition,

optometry,

and speech therapy,

for which

thirdparty

reimbursement

was not available

and that

these

services

would have to

be reduced

or eliminated

if greater

reliance

were placed

on third-party

reimbursement

programs.

GAO expressed

its belief

that

the NHCs could

substantially

increase

their

level

of self-support

by eliminating

inefficient

administrative

and operating practices

and by obtaining

recognition

as providers

of services

eligible

under

Federal

and federally

assisted

programs.

(B-164031(2),

May 2, 1973.)

19

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,

NATIONAL

Better

health

INSTITUTES

EDUCATION,

AND WELFARE

OF HEALTH

management

needed

research

equipment

of

by grantees

Research

grants

to such institutions

as universities,

colleges,

and

medical

schools

constitute

the largest

part

of the research

program

of the

These grants

provide

funds

for such

National

Institutes

of Health

(NIH).

expenses

as salaries,

supplies,

travel,

and equipment.

About 13 percent

of

the direct

costs

incurred

under NIH research

grants

was for equipment

during

1965--the

latest

year for which

data was compiled

on funds

spent

in this

category.

GAO reviewed

the management

of major

research

equipment

costing

or more per unit

and reported

to the Secretary

of Health,

Education,

fare

(HEW) on July 17, 1973, that:

-

-4

$1,000

and Wel-

1. Although

HEW instructions

specify

that

a grantee

carefully

screen

existing

equipment

before

purchasing

more and require

that

a grantee

certify

that

equipment

is not already

on hand and available,

institutions

lacked

records

adequate

to enable

them to comply with

these

instructions.

Moreover,

NIH had not issued

guidelines

suitable

for grantees

to carry

out HEW’s instructions.

Adequate

records

would have enabled

researchers

to locate

and

use available

equipment

and would have prevented

unnecessary

expenditure

of

research

money for equipment.

2. At the grantee

institutions

visited,

the most effective

ment was not being

made because

NIH has not taken

appropriate

out HEW instructions

urging

researchers

to share equipment.

use

steps

of

to

equipcarry

3. In 1970 NIH established

an equipment

pool in Bethesda,

Maryland,

for

researchers’

use.

However,

NIH does not require

researchers

to use available

pool equipment

or have any procedures

for determining

whether

researchers’

equipment

needs can be met with

available

equipment.

As a result,

the amount

of equipment

used averaged

only 13 percent

from July

1971 through

February

1972.

Another

factor

contributing

to the low use rate

is that

less than

1 percent

of NIH’s

equipment,

worth

$64 million,

is in the pool.

GAO recommended

--Instruct

screen

all

that

grantees

major

the

Secretary

of

to improve

their

items of equipment

--Issue

guidelines

or instructions

and procedures

for establishing

sharing

equipment.

--Establish

NIH pool

screening

is available

HEW direct

records

before

NIH to:

so that

their

officials

purchasing

new equipment.

to its grantees

equipment

pools

to develop

policies

and other

means for

procedures

to determine

whether

equipment

for use before

purchasing

new research

20

can

from the

equipment.

I

,

DEPARTMENTOF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE

NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH (continued)

--Consider expanding the NIH equipment pool by including

more of NIH's

scientific

equipment and requiring

participation

in the pool, unless

special research situations

or the need for extended continual

usage

of certain equipment requires individual

purchases of equipment.

NIH officials

recommendations.

generally agreed with GAO's findings,

(B-164031(2), July 17, 1973.)

21

conclusions,

and

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,

OFFICE

EDUCATION,

AND WELFARE

OF EDUCATION

Need for improved

coordination

of

federally

assisted

student

aid programs

in institutions

of higher

education

The Office

of Education

administers

four major programs

providing

financial

aid to students

attending

colleges,

universities,

and vocational.

schools.

These include

the Guaranteed

Student

Loan program,

the National

Dethe

College

Work-Study

program,

and

the

Educafense

Student

Loan program,

The 4 programs

provided

assistance

of

tional

Opportunity

Grant program.

about

$1.7 billion

to approximately

2.3 million

students

in fiscal

year 1971.

GAO examined

the coordination

of these programs

because

student

enrollment

and tuition

costs

have increased

significantly

in recent

year-s and have

added to the demand for financial

assistance

and to the Government’s

potential

liability

in the case of defaulted

loans.

-

-

GAO pointed

out that

seven of

In an August

1972 report

to the Congress,

eight

institutions

visited

generally

awarded

aid to students

under Office

of

Education

programs

that

require

a showing

of need without

considering

whether

the students

also had obtained

or requested

loans

from lending

institutions

As a result,

some students

were

under

the Guaranteed

Student

Loan program.

provided

with

aid in excess

of their

indicated

financial

needs and some students borrowed

under both loan programs

and incurred

large

debts

that

could be difficult

to repay.

GAO reviewed

400 student

aid cases selected

at random from a list

of

approximately

6,500

students

who had obtained

loans under the Guaranteed

Student

Loan program.

Of the 400 students,,

57 (14 percent)

were awarded

aid,

totaling

about

$51,800,

in excess

of their

indicated

financial

needs.

On the

basis

of the sample,

GAO estimated

that

900, or 14 percent

of the 6,500

students,

had been awarded

aid,

totaling

at least

$761,000,

in excess

of their

indicated

needs.

GAO also noted

that

some institutions

have not had

aid funds

to meet the financial

needs of their

students

received

excess

aid made such aid unavailable

to others

tion

one

GAO suggested

that

on the amount that

loan program.

the Congress

consider

a student

may borrow

sufficient

Federal

and that

sutdents

who qualified.

establishing

an overall

limitawhen participating

,in more than

Also,

GAO recommended

that

HEW take certain

actions

to improve

the

coordination

of federally

assisted

student

aid programs.

HEW concurred

in

the intent

of GAO’s recommendations;

however,

prior

to implementing

the

recommendations,

HEW planned

to study

the matter.

(B-164031(1),

Aug. 2,

1972.)

22

who

I

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,

OFFICE

OF EDUCATION

Additional

efforts

the objectives

of

EDUCATION,

AND WELFARE

(continued)

needed

to fully

achieve

the Vocational

Education

Act

The objective

of the Vocational

Education

Act of 1963, as amended in

1968,

is to provide

all persons

who need vocational

education

with

access

to

vocational

training

which

is realistic

and suited

to their

needs,

interests,

and abilities.

Particular

emphasis

is placed

on meeting

the needs of the

disadvantaged.

GAO reviewed

Federal

vocational

programs

in California,

Michigan,

Ohio,

and Pennsylvania

to find

out if legislative

objectives

were being

achieved

and to identify

major problems.

These States

received

$104 million,

or

22 percent

of the total

Federal

assistance

for vocational

education,

in fiscal year 1972.

GAO’s review

concentrated

on high school

vocational

education,

because

the States’

programs

emphasized

this

level

of education.

achieve

GAO reported

the objectives

to

the Congress

of the act.

that

additional

GAO noted

that:

efforts

are

needed

to

fully

--The

objective

of the legislation

had not been achieved

nationwide

or

in any of the four States

reviewed.

Thirty-seven

percent

of the

Nation’s

high school

students

presumed

to need vocational

education

were not receiving

it according

to HEW data,

and in the 4 States

even

greater

proportions--44

to 75 percent

--were

not receiving

it.

Vocational

educators

say that

causes

of this

situation

are insufficient

funds

and an unfavorable

image of vocational

education,

However,

no

specific

studies

on the image problem

had been made.

--In

the four

States,

funds

intended

by the act to support

special

programs or services

for disadvantaged

persons

unable

to succeed

in the

regular

vocational

education

program

were often

not used for this

purpose.

This happened

because

some State

and local

education

officials

did not fully

understand

the intended

use of funds

for disadvantaged

persons

and therefore

used these

funds

for regular

vocational

programs.

and independent

evaluators

GAO also reported

that

HEW, the four

States,

believe

that

the current

management

information

system

of HEW and the States

did not provide

sufficient

data to adequately

evaluate

the results

of programs,

Data furnished

to HEW by the States

was often

as required

by the act.

inaccurate

or incomplete.

.

A

HEW concurred

with

all

of GAO’s recommendations

and has taken or promised

to take action

to research

vocational

education’s

financial

and image problems , to properly

control

the use of disadvantaged

funds,

and to improve

the

State

officials

also generally

concurred

with

management

informat

ion sys terns.

GAO’s recommendations,

but they and HEW said that

GAO should

have included

more information

on the accomplishments

and potential

of vocational

education.

Although

GAO found

that

some programs

appeared

to be operating

effectively,

incomplete

and inaccurate

management

information

prevented

unquali(B-164031(1),

Oct. 18,

fied

conclusions

on overall

program

effectiveness.

1972 .)

23

DEP.I\RTbIEST OF HEXLTH,

SOCIA4L .1\ND REH-\BILITXTION

SERVICE

Need to improve

effectiveness

vocational

rehabilitation

the handicapped

in

EDUC.\T ION,

AND WELFARE

of

helping

In April

1973 GAO reported

to the Congress

on its review

of the

effectiveness

of programs

under the Vocational

Rehabilitation

Act.

The

act authorized

Federal

grants

to assist

States

to rehabilitate

handicapped

persons

so they might

prepare

for and engage

in gainful

employment.

The

Rehabilitation

Services

Administration

(RS.4) is responsible

for providing

leadership

to the States

in planning,

developing,

and coordinating

State

programs.

State

vocational

rehabilitation

agencies

carry

out programs

authorized

State

and Federal

costs

for basic

support

services--services

under

the act.

generally

rendered

directly

to handicapped

persons--were

$697 million

(the

Federal

share was $548 million)

for fiscal

year 1972.

Helping

all

handicapped

persons

The vocational

rehabilitation

program

has not been able to help all

handicapped

persons --possibly

7 million-who need and would benefit

from

the program.

The number of persons

rehabilitated

annually,

although

increasis

still

not

as

great

as

RSA’s

estimates

of

the

number

becoming

eligible

ing,

each year (increment).

RSA projects

that

rehabilitations

may exceed its estimates

of the annual

increment

in 5 to 10 years.

Then the universe

of persons

in need would begin

to decrease.

Whether

rehabilitations

will

exceed the increment

within

this

time could be affected

by many factors,

such as new legislation

making more

groups

eligible

for services.

Better

estimates

of the size of the universe

and annual

increment

are needed to properly

plan for the size and direction

of the program

and the resources

needed.

Further,

some of the services

provided

under

this

program

are available

under

other

Federal

programs.

it is probably

not necessary

to

Therefore,

meet the needs of the total

universe

through

resources

available

only to RSA.

Helping

each

handicapped

GAO randomly

selected

reported

closed

in 1970 to

clients,

person

served

and reviewed

820 of the 31,650

determine

how well

the program

3 States

individual

,

although

In many instances

benefits

were limited,

improved

or progressed

to the extent

of their

individual

needed additional

services

even though

they might

have

considerable

extent,

.llthough

large

numbers

of

fully

rehabilitated,

GAO found

competitive

with nonhandicapped

cases

served

some clients

capability.

been assisted

persons

were reported

as having

been

that

many had not become self-sufficient

persons.

24

may have

Others

to a

successor

DEPARTJIENT OF HEALTH,

SOCIAL

AND REH.\BILITATION

SERVICE

EDUCATION,

AND WELFARE

(continued)

GAO made several

recommendations

to HEW which

it believed

would

HEW and State

management

and increase

effectiveness

of the program.

HEW said that

most had

generally

agreed

with

these recommendations.

adopted

or were being worked

out.

(B-164031(3),

Apr.

3, 1973.)

r

Social

services

have only a minor

directly

helping

welfare

recipients

self-support

or reduced

dependency

improve

agencies

been

impact

on

achieve

Social

services

provided

to recipients

of aid to families

with

dependent

children

(AFDC) under provisions

of title

IV, parts

A and C, of the Social

Security

Act are supposed

to help recipients

get off welfare

and to prevent

or reduce

illegitimate

births,

strengthen

family

life,

attain

or retain

personal

independence,

and protect

children.

GAO wanted

to know if the goal of

getting

people

off welfare

is being

achieved

as intended

by the Congress.

although

it has begun developing

HEW has been unable

to answer this

question,

data so that

it can.

GAO reported

to the Congress

in June 1973 that

social

services

had only

a minor

impact

on directly

helping

recipients

to develop

and use the skills

Therefore,

one of

necessary

to achieve

reduced

dependency

or self-support.

It is

the basic

congressional

goals

for the services

has not been achieved.

unrealistic

to expect

that

social

services

can play a major

role

in helping

recipients

achieve

reduced

dependency

or self-support,

considering

the nature

of services

provided,

the method

for determining

who should

receive

certain

and present

economic

constraints.

services,

GAO also

reported

that:

--Because

local

welfare

departments

did not have adequate

systems

to

they could not insure

that

their

service

assess

recipients’

potential,

resources

would be allocated

for the maximum benefit

of recipients.

An inventory

approach

developed

by the Denver Welfare

Department

could

systematically

measure

the employment

potential

of recipients

and lead

to better

resource

allocation.

tration

--Federal

leadership

in services

programs

had

gram accountability

had not been emphasized,

all

levels

of government

needed

strengthening.

not been aggressive,

and administration

--Certain

barriers

which cannot

be influenced

as high unemployment

rates,

greatly

affected

achieved

self-support

or reduced

dependency

limit

the effectiveness

of services.

by social

services,

such

whether

welfare

recipients

and therefore

could

greatly

GAO’s recommendations

and accountability

to the Secretary

of HE.W to

for services

included:

improve

program

using

the inventory

--Start

a number of demonstration

projects,

to assess

the potential

of all welfare

or similar

approaches,

and to allocate

service

resources

accordingly.

25

proat

adminis-

approach

recipients

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,

SOCIAL

AND REHABILITATION

SERVICE

EDUCATION,

AND WELFARE

(continued)

--Report

to the Congress

at the

taken

to improve

the allocation

the study.

end of the test

period

of service

resources

on actions

as a result

to be

of

--Develop

by July

1974 in conjunction

with

the Secretary

of Labor

a

system

so certain

characteristics

of recipients--shown

in this

report

to indicate

high potential

for achieving

self-support

or reduced

dependency--serve

as the basis

for determining

which

recipients

registered

under the 1971 amendments

will

be afforded

priority

in receiving

work incentive

program

services,

said

1973.)

HEW, by letter

dated May 22, 1973, agreed

with

that

action

would be taken to implement

them.

Need to improve

certain

eligibility

aid to families

in Pennsylvania

administration

aspects

in

with

dependent

of

the

children

GAO’s recommendations

(B-164031(3),

June

_

and

27,

program

In response

to his request,

GAO reported

to the Chairman,

House Committee

on Ways and Means,

that

administration

of the incapacity

and unemployed

father

eligibility

aspects

of the AFDC program

had not been effective

in Pennsylvania.

GAO reported

also that

this

had been caused by inadequate

guidance

on the part

of HEW, fiscal

problems

in the State,

and increasing

AFDC caseloads.

GAO

noted

that:

--Recipients

with minor

impairments,

such as needs for eyeglasses

or

became eligible

for AFDC when Pennsylvania

broadened

its

dentures,

definition

of incapacity

in 1970.

The State

could

do this

because

Federal

regulations

did not describe

an applicant’s

eligibility

in

terms of the extent

to which

the incapacity

must affect

his ability

to support

or care for the child.

--Nonvisible

cent of

all

--Initial

cent

eligibility

information

the unemployed-father

of

--In

74 percent

father

cases,

or overdue.

--Caseworkers

or evaluated

impairments

incapacity

were inadequately

cases included

of the incapacity

redeterminations

in

verified

for about

a GAO sampling.

was not adequately

cases sampled.

cases and

of eligibility

81 percent

of

were late,

did not receive

adequate

training

the adequacy

of State

inservice

To improve

administration

a number of recommendations,

of these

aspects

of

including

the following,

26

verified

35 per-

in

71 per-

the unemployedinadequate,

and HEW had not

training.

monitored

the

GAO made

of HEW.

AFDC program,

to the Secretary

II

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,

SOCIAL

AND REHABILITATION

SERVICE

EDUCATION,

AND WELFARE

(continued)

--Revise

the applicable

section

of the Code of Federal

Regulations

in

such a manner that,

for an applicant

to be eligible

for AFDC because

of an incapacity,

the incapacity

must have a direct

or immediately

apparent

bearing

on diminishing

parental

support

or care to the child.

--Determine

similar

whether

to those

initial

eligibility

in Pennsylvania

exist

and redetermination

nationwide.

problems

--Take

the necessary

action,

including

implementation

of HEW’s policy

of reducing

the Federal

share of welfare

payments

to recipients

whose

ineligibility

is detected

after

redeterminations

are due, to insure

that

States

improve

their

eligibility

and redetermination

processes.

HEW generally

to take action

to

sequently

revised

1973.)

agreed

with

GAO’s recommendations

and has taken

implement

them.

The Code of Federal

Regulations

in line

with

GAO’s recommendation.

(B-164031(3),

Some problems

in

federally

assisted

contracting

child-care

or agreed

was subJune 27,

for

services

The Federal

Government

shares

with

the States

the expense

of child-care

services

under

the AFDC program,

the largest

of several

federally

funded

child-care

programs.

In recent

years,

the program

has been expanding

and

concern

about

rapidly

rising

costs

has been expressed.

GAO reported

to the Congress

in June 1973 that

contracted

child-care

services

were provided

in fiscal

year 1971 to about

39,000

children

in

California

and Pennsylvania

at a total

Federal

and State

cost of about

The children

obtained

educational,

social,

nutritional,

and

$60 million.

health

benefits.

In some instances,

the program

enabled

parents

to obtain

or continue

employment

or training.

A significant

number of available

spaces

provided

by contracted

childcare services

were used for children

of nonworking,

nontraining

parents

because

many of those who were working

or training

elected

to make their

own

child-care

arrangements

or applied

for services

after

the nonworking,

nontraining

parents

had already

enrolled

their

children.

Some welfare

recipients

could not get child-care

services

primarily

because

their

communities

could

not provide

the local

share of the cost.

GAO also reported

that

HEW had not (1) provided

adequate

guidance

to

States

to assist

them in contracting

for child-care

services,

(2) implemented

a system

to provide

data for assessing

program

effectiveness,

or (3) adeAs a result

administration

of the program.

quately

monitored

the States’

contract

requirements

and procedures

had weaknesses,

free

child-care

services

were provided

to some financially

ineligible

families,

financially

able

families

were not required

to pay service

fees,

facilities

were underused,

the cost of contracted

childcare

for similar

services

varied

significantly,

State

claims

for reimbursement

were inaccurate

because

of fiscal

weaknesses,

and private

contributions

were inappropriate.

27

DEF.V?TYENT OF HEXLTH.

SQiI.AL

.i.UD REH-\BILIT.1TION

G.-\O recommended

SERVICE

that

EDUC.\TION.

(continued)

HEW:

--.Assist

States

in developing

plans

for

(1) assess

the seriousness

of program

a systematic

method of meeting

priority

--Establish

program

States.

ways

aspects

--Establish

of the

criteria

which

overall

costs

for

--Clarify

ineligible

eligibility

families.

--Help

for

the States

some portion

--Follow

correct

XND CCELF,\RE

to insure

of State

effective

contracts,

gathering

shortcomings

needs.

and timely

including

can be used

the services

requirements

to

help

monitoring

more audits

avoid

up on California

and Pennsylvania

claims

for Federal

funds discussed

the

_

families

the

/

reasonableness

services

to

able

to pay

the

in-

actions

to adjust

in the report,

controlling

of child-care

to

of fiscal

and

by HEW and

providing

for

needed

establish

i

in evaluating

procured.

establish

sliding

fee scales

of child-care

services.

I

--Provide

guidelines

to the Staies’for

contributions

toward

the local

shire

information

and (2)

use

costs,

of

1/

private

.

HEW concurred

with

CAO’s findings

and recommendations,

stating

that

corrective

actions

had been taken or were being

developed.

HEW also advised

GAO that

$622,000

in overclaims

had been recovered

from the State

of

Pennsylvania.

Recent

changes

to Federal

regulations

on social

services

and

revised

Federal

day-care

requirements

will

also affect

some of the problems

discussed

in GAO’s report.

(B-164031(3),

June 13, 1973.)

Improvement

needed

in

the program

to provide

w-elfare

recipients

the administration

Medicare

benefits

of

for

Section

1843 of the Social

Security

Act provides

that

States

may enroll

eligible

welfare

recipients

in Medicare’s

supplementary

benefits

program.

This is referred

to as the buy-in

program

and is managed through

the coordinated

efforts

of the Social

Security

Administration,

Social

and Rehabilitation

Service,

and State

and local

health

and welfare

agencies.

/

As of December

1971 about

2 million

persons

were enrolled

in the buy-in

program.

In 1971 the States

paid about

$134 million

in premiums

on behalf

of

these persons,

The Federal

Government

pays its share of premiums

through

Lledicaid,

but these payments

are limited

to premiums

paid

for persons

receiving cash assistance,

In August

has experienced

eligible

welfare

1973 GAO reported

major

administrative

recipients

were

to

the Congress

that

since

1966 the program

problems.

As a result

(1) not all

enrolled,

because

local

welfare

offices

had

28

.

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH.

SOCIAL

-

AND REHABILITATION

SERVICE

EDJJCATION.

AND WELFARE

(continued)

not obtained

necessary

information

to enroll

them or because

identification

data was not current

or complete,

and (2) two States

received

about

$2.9 million

in overpayments

for premiums

that

should

have been paid entirely

by the

procedures

did not adequately

identify

premiums

States,

because

the States’

paid for persons

not receiving

cash assistance.

the

GAO made several

recommendations

program.

In response

to these

--It

designed

to

recommendations,

improve

administration

HEW stated

that:

will

reemphasize

to the States

the importance

of periodic

ciliation

of their

lists

of eligible

persons

with

their

lists

enrollees

as a means of identifying

eligible

persons

and the

of timely

enrolling

all

eligible

persons.

of

reconof

urgency

--As a part

of the Medicaid

Management

Information

will

be developed

to assist

States

in identifying

funds paid only on behalf

of persons

receiving

System,

procedures

and claiming

Federal

cash assistance.

--Reviews

have been or will

be made to determine

which have included

persons

not receiving

cash

buy-in

programs

are improperly

claiming

Federal

(B-164031(3),

Aug. 14, 1973.)

whether

any of 29 States

assistance

in their

participation.

Problems

in functioning

reviewing

use of medical

under Medicaid

of State

services

systems

financed

for

At the request

of the Chairman,

House Committee

on Ways and Means,

GAO

reviewed

the functioning

of the utilization

review

systems

under

the Medicaid

program

in Massachusetts

and Maryland.

The purpose

of the review

systems

is

to safeguard

against

unnecessary

medical

care and services

and to insure

that

Medicaid

payments

are reasonable

and consistent

with

efficiency,

economy,

and

quality

care.

GAO concluded

that

neither

State

had developed

an effective

review

Massachusetts’

system,

system

to be applied

uniformly

throughout

the State.

however , produced

some positive

benefits.

The use of regional

dental

consultants

to approve

or disapprove

dental

services

before

the services

were

provided

resulted

in savings

of about

$1.7 million

in calendar

year 1970.

Maryland

established

procedures

to determine

that

claims

paid were for services authorized

and rendered

and did not exceed amounts

established

by the

The Maryland

claims

processing

system,

however,

did not include

proState.

cedures

for identifying

or preventing

duplicate

payments.

GAO reported

that,

because

of the manner

in which

the review

function

is

organized

and operated

in Massachusetts,

it is difficult

to judge

the adequacy of the aggregate

resources

applied

to this

function.

The State

has

recognized

the need for more effective

controls

over all public

assistance

including

those

for Medicaid,

and has developed

a plan for an

expenditures,

State

officials

informed

GAO that

automated

payment

and control

system.

varyland

had the necessary

computer

capability

and funds

for developing

a

29

DEPARTMENTOF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE

SOCIAL AND REHABILITATION SERVICE (continued)

review

making

system,

reviews.

but

the

GAO recommended

biggest

that

--study

the HEWmodel

offering

opportunity

--provide

officials

for

to

GAO recommended

develop

an effective

by Massachusetts

to

problem

HEW assist

was a lack

of

sufficient

both

States

and monitor

their

system

for the

for improvement

purpose

and

of

design

the systematic

efficiently

accumulation

of

administer

review

adopting

data required

systems.

that HEW assist

Maryland

and monitor

utilization

review

system

and assist

--apply

ties,

its

utilization

--provide

review

for central

system,

and

--assist

participating

adequate

utilization

personnel

review

State

actions

by management

to

intermediate

care

administration

of

the

utilization

skilled

nursing

homes

to

facili-

develop

In commenting

on GAO’s reports,

,HEW outlined

steps

it was taking

to improve utilization

reviews.

In August

1973 HEW told

GAO that

it had undertaken a pilot

project

in Ohio and that,

during

fiscal

year 1974, the Model

System is expected

to be installed

in about

10 States

with planning

and

negotiations

proceeding

on implementing

the system

in additional

States

during

fiscal

year 1975.

HEW also informed

GAO that

an additional

incentive

to meaningful

State

utilization

review

was provided

by a provision

in the

1972 Social

Security

Amendments

which

requires

reduced

Federal

matching

where

the Secretary

had not made a positive

finding

of adequate

utilization

review

HEW informed

GAO that

it is preparing

for the imfor institutional

care.

plementation

of this

provision

by promulgating

additional

regulations

regarding

minimal

utilization

review

activities

and by preparing

for the

(B-164031(3),

Nov. 24, 1972,

and

enforcement

of the provision.

Dec. 21, 1972.)

30

.

to

actions

regulations

hospitals

and

review

plans.

to

features

its

actions

and monitor

Medicaid

for

1

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,

SOCIAL

SECURITY

Opportunities

suppliers

*

of

EDUCATION,

AND WELFARE

ADMINISTRATION

to increase

competition

data processing

services

among

At the request

of the Chairman

of the Subcommittee

on Intergovernmental

Relations,

House Committee

on Government

Operations,

GAO examined

procurement policies

and practices

followed

by Nationwide

Mutual

Insurance

Company

under

its contract

with

the Social

Security

Administration

(SSA) in subcontracting

in September

1972 for electronic

data processing

services.

Nationwide serves

as the carrier,

or organization

making Medicare

payments

for

physicians

’ services

and other

medical

services,

in Ohio and West Virginia.

GAO reported

to the Subcommittee

that

in this

procurement

action

(1)

Nationwide

did not follow

sound,

competitive

procurement

practices

in

developing

specifications

or in soliciting

and evaluating

proposals,

(2)

SSA allowed

Nationwide

considerable

discretion

in determining

how to evaluate

proposals

and what factors

to consider

in selecting

a particular

subcontractor,

and (3) SSA’s stated

policy

of fostering

competition

among the various suppliers

of data processing

services

was not fostered

by this

procuremerit.

Nationwide’s

evaluations

were based on the offerors’

estimates

of the

total

cost of processing

claims

under

each system

rather

than on the offerors’

proposed

prices

for processing

a Medicare

claim.

Because

of the

emphasis

on evaluation

factors

other

than costs,

Nationwide

selected

the

offeror

with

the highest

cost proposal.

SSA made two evaluations

and concluded

that

approval

of

mended award was not warranted

because

of the cost difference

proposal

selected

by Nationwide

and the lowest

cost proposal.

proach

to evaluating

the cost of proposals

and its assumptions

workload,

salary

increases,

and manpower

requirements

differed

wide’s

approach

and assumptions.

the recombetween

the

SSA’s apon future

from Nation-

Nationwide

and the selected

offeror

agreed

to modify

the proposed

subcontract

substantially.

The modifications

involved

guarantees

of the

total

claims

processing

costs;

but,

despite

SSA’s suggestion

that

other

offerors

be given

the opportunity

to compete

on this

basis,

Nationwide

did

not give the other

offers

such an opportunity.

*

GAO expressed

the belief

that

this

procurement

action

was not consistent

with

SSA’s stated

policy

of fostering

competition

among the various

suppliers

of data processing

services

because

(1) SSA’s intervention

to

permit

other

offerors

to respond

to the modified

terms and conditions

was

ineffective

and (2) only

one of the offerors

could meet Nationwide’s

preference

for a proven

online

system.

GAO recommended

SSA should:

that,

in

line

with

its

31

policy

of

fostering

competition,

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,

SOCIAL

SECURITY

ADMINISTRATION

EDUCATION,

AND WELFARE

(continued)

--Consider

requiring

that

potential

offerors

be advised,

in writing,

of the evaluation

criteria

which will

be used to evaluate

their

proposals

and that

they be advised

of the relative

importance

that

will

be given

to all

evaluation

factors.

--Give

careful

attention

assumptions

to be used

should

advise

carriers-tractors--just

how the

to be computed.

HEW concurred

structions

to the

in GAO’s

carriers.

to the validity

of the basic

approaches

and

in computing

the total

cost of a proposal

and

as well

as potential

data processing

subconover and above the quoted

prices,

are

factors,

suggestions

(B-164031(4),

and

32

said it would

Aug. 2, 1973.)

revise

its

in-

DEPARTMENTOF HOUSINGAND URBAN DEVELOPMENT

Contents

Page

COMMUNITYDEVELOPMENT

Improvement needed in the San Antonio

Improving the Model Cities Program

GENERALINSURANCE

Actions needed to provide

greater

flood

Model Cities

Program

35

35

36

insurance

protection

38

38

HOUSINGPRODUCTIONAND MORTGAGECREDIT

Benefits could be realized by revising

policies

and practices

for

acquiring

existing

structures

for low-rent public housing

Reducing costs in acquiring

properties

resulting

from defaults on

home loans

Opportunity

for reducing interest

costs

Opportunities

to improve effectiveness

and reduce costs of homeownership assistance programs

Opportunities

to improve effectiveness

and reduce costs of rental

assistance housing ..program

.i

39

INTERSTATE LAND SALES

Improved consumer protection

46

46

needed in interstate

33

land sales

39

41

42

43

44

DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT

COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT

Improvement

San Antonio

I

needed

in the

Model Cities

Program

The Model Cities

Program was established

to demonstrate

that

the

environment

and general

welfare

of people

living

in slum and blighted

neighborhoods

could be improved

substantially

through

concentration

of

Federal,

State,

and local

efforts.

A city

demonstration

agency

is responsible

for developing

and executing

the Model Cities

Program

at the

local

level,

and the Department

of Housing

and Urban Development

(HUD) has

overall

administrative

responsibility

at the Federal

level.

Because

of

the importance

of the Model Cities

Program

as a means of demonstrating

new

approaches

to solving

the social,

economic,

and physical

problems

of the

cities,

GAO examined

into major

areas of the planning,

development,

and

implementation

of the program

in San Antonio

from its

inception

in May

1968 to June 1971.

The two functional

areas of the Model Cities

Program

designated

by

the city

demonstration

agency

as having

the highest

priority

were education

and physical

environment.

GAO found

that

the agency had not met its objectives

in implementing

the program

in these

two areas during

the first

2 action

years

of the program.

Although

it is difficult

to identify

major

factors

which

affected

the city

demonstration

agency’s

rate

of progress

in implementing

the Model Cities

Program,

GAO identified

certain

factors

which may have influenced

the results

and/or

impact

of the program.

GAO noted:

--A

minimum

--A

low

--Little

and

of

level

State

of

support

citizen

in

first

year

technical

assistance

between

the

provided

to

agency

Federal

and State

of some projects.

--Difficulty

the

in

and

untimely

GAO recommended

that

program.

demonstration

conflicting

the initiation

--Limited

the

city

--Problems

with

which

delayed

for

of

participation.

coordination

of effort

Federal

and local

agencies.

--Inadequate

agencies.

the

agency

program

the

Secretary

the

regulations

obtaining

financial

support.

evaluations

by

agency.

the

agency

by Federal

and policies

of HUD:

--In

line

with HUD’s program

guidelines,

require

agency to solicit

the views of model-neighborhood

uating

Model Cities

Programs

and projects.

35

the

city

demonstration

residents

in eval-

DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT

COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT (continued)

--In

cooperation

with

the city

demonstration

agency,

review

the agency’s

day-to-day

practices

in coordinating

its efforts

with

those

of established

agencies

and after

such a review,

assist

the agency

in

establishing

procedures

necessary

for interagency

cooperation

and

participation.

--Examine

into

the practices

of the city

demonstration

agency in

soliciting

and using

technical

assistance

from Federal

agencies

as appropriate,

assist

the agency

in obtaining

such assistance.

--Require

HUD’s regional

and area offices

to review

the

city

demonstration

agency evaluation

efforts

to insure

agency makes project

evaluations

which

are timely

and

scope to measure

project

impact

and performance.

.

and,

results

of

that

the

of sufficient

HUD generally

agreed

with

GAO’s findings

and recommendations,

HUD

said that,

although

it was certain

that

some difficulty

would continue

in

the management

of the San Antonio

Model Cities

Program,

it was encouraged

by the results

and increasing

responsiveness

at all

government

levels.

HUD also anticipated

that

its decentralization

of the Model Cities

Program

to its area offices

should

further

strengthen

the program

and help alleviate

many of the problems

noted

in the San Antonio

program.

(B-171500,

Jan. 9,

1973.)

Improving

the

Model

Cities

Program

GAO examined

the planning,

implementation,

administration,

and evaluation

of four functional

areas--manpower,

economic

development,

education

and health--of

the Model Cities

Programs

in Kansas City and St. Louis,

Missouri,

and New Orleans,

Louisiana.

These functional

areas were selected

because

(1) they had been designated

by the cities

as high priority

areas,

(2) they required

a high degree

of Federal

agency assistance

and coordination,

and (3) Federal

agencies

allocated

and the cities

spent

significant

amounts

of funds

in these areas.

,

GAO reported

to the Congress

that

the three

cities

had had varying

degrees

of success

in attaining

the annual

goals of their

Model Cities

projects

in the manpower,

economic

development,

and health

areas;

in the

educational

area,

all

three

cities

accomplished

their

annual

project

goals.

The following

weaknesses

in HUD’s and city

demonstration

agencies’

administration

of the program

may have affected

the attainment

of project

goals.

--Development

that was,

of plans

on the basis

in many cases,

neither

--Use of HUD supplemental

of to develop

new and

funds

innovative

to

of data on neighborhood

current

nor sufficiently

conditions

complete.

expand

projects.

instead

36

existing

programs

.

DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT

COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT (continued)

c

--Lack

local

of success

funds

to

in obtaining

support

the

--Insufficient

progress.

efforts

to

GAO recommended

that

HUD:

Federal

programs.

timely

grant-in-aid

develop

evaluation

funds

or

States

plans

to

measure

and

--Require

city

demonstration

agencies

to periodically

obtain

and

analyze

information

on the extent

and causes

of problems

in the

model neighborhoods

and to use the results

of such analyses

to (1)

plan the types of projects

that

will

help alleviate

the neighborhood

problems

and (2) ascertain

whether

existing

projects

represent

the

most suitable

approaches

to accomplishing

their

program

goals.

--Ascertain,

in its reviews

of cities’

plans,

whether

the cities

are

developing

new and innovative

approaches

to solve

their

social,

and physical

problems

and, when it appears

that

the

economic,

cities

are using

HUD supplemental

funds primarily

to expand

existing

programs,

assist

city

demonstration

agencies,

through

its regional

and area offices,

to develop

new and innovative

projects.

--Examine

city

demonstration

agency efforts

to establish

organizational

structures

(including

staffing)

for conducting

required

evaluations

of projects;

define

program

goals

and objectives

for measuring

progress

and for identifying

problems

of projects;

and use evaluation

and revising

their

comprehensive

plans

results

in planning,

refining,

and in designing

and initiating

new programs

and activities.

--Periodically

agencies

T

-,

to

review

insure

the

that

evaluation

efforts

HUD’s requirements

of city

demonstration

are being

met.

HUD generally

agreed

with

GAO’s findings

and recommendations.

It

said,

however,

that

city

demonstration

agencies’

administrative

capabilities

and economic

conditions,

rather

than insufficient

data,

were the more

salient

causes

of difficulties

in the manpower

and economic

development

areas.

It said also that

neither

the statute

nor HUD’s guidelines

required

innovation

within

each project

or as an essential

approach

to the cities’

longstanding

problems.

GAO believes

that

the legislative

history

of the

Model Cities

Act clearly

shows that

the Congress

anticipated

that

emphasis

would be placed

on new and innovative

projects

and that

supplemental

funds

would be used for such projects.

HUD also stated

deficient.

(B-171500,

that

it was aware

Jan. 16, 1973.)

that

37

local

evaluation

efforts

were

DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT

GENERAL INSURANCE

Actions

needed

flood

insurance

to provide

protection

greater

To compensate

people

suffering

loss of property

because

of floods,

the

Congress

established

the National

Flood

Insurance

Program

administered

by

GAO reviewed

the program

to dethe Federal

Insurance

Administration

(FIA).

termine

whether

it was meeting

its objectives

to provide

property

owners

with flood

insurance

and to encourage

flood-prone

communities

to adopt

land

use and control

measures

designed

to reduce

flood

damage.

GAO reported

that much more needs to be done if the program

is to

fully

meet its objectives.

Responses

to questionnaires

sent to a sampling

of nonparticipating

communities

indicated

that many communities

were not

Maximum benefits

were not available

to many particiaware of the program.

pating

communities

because

FIA had not made the required

flood

plain

studies.

FIA review

and approval

of communities

’ land use and control

measures

was

not timely,

and FIA had not established

a program

to monitor

community

implementation

of the measures.

GAO recommended

that

FIA send literature

describing

program

benefits

and eligibility

requirements

to officials

of nonparticipating

communities

to help them decide

whether

they should

apply

to participate

in the program.

GAO recommended

also that

FIA use private

engineering

firms

to make flood

plain

studies

to the extent

that

funds

are available

and that

Federal

agencies

cannot

make them on a timely

basis,

GAO further

recommended

that

FIA

review

communities’

land use and control

measures,

notify

communities

having

deficient

measures

of needed

corrective

action,

and establish

a

monitoring

program

of communities’

compliance

with

FIA land use and control

measures.

The Administrator,

FIA, agreed with

GAO’s recommendations

but

that

lack of staff

had prevented

FIA from making

such improvements.

(B-178737,

July

19, 1973.)

38

stated

,

DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT

HOUSING PRODUCTION AND MORTGAGE CREDIT

Benefits

could be realized

and practices

for acquiring

for low-rent

public

housing

.h

by revising

existing

policies

structures

The low-rent

housing

program

is designed

to make decent,

safe,

and

sanitary

dwellings

available

to low-income

families

at rents

within

their

HUD

provides

financial

and

technical

assistance

to

LHAs,

nancial

means.

low-rent

public

housing

projects

develop

and/or

acquire,

own, and operate

accomplish

this

aim.

To provide

low-rent

public

housing,

LHAs use several

methods--conventional

construction,

turnkey,

direct

acquisition

of existing

privately

dwellings,

and leasing

.

Use of direct

acquisition

does not increase

housing

fiwhich

to

owned

method

supply

GAO reviewed

HUD’s and LHAs’ practices

and procedures

relating

direct

acquisition

method

of obtaining

existing,

occupied

standard

and found

that,

although

the method was expendient,

it had certain

tages which

tended

to make it less desirable

than other

methods.

By using

the direct

acquisition

method,

the LHAs increased

of low-rent

public

housing

but did not directly

help to achieve

housing

goal

f increasing

the housing

supply.

to the

structures

disadvan-

the

the

supply

national

GAO’s review

of 15 projects

in 8 selected

cities

or metropolitan

areas

showed that

LHAs had expended

about

$80 million

to acquire

the projects

HUD ’ s

without

increasing

the supply

of standard

housing

by a single

unit.

analyses

of housing-market

conditions

showed that,

in seven of the eight

cities,

a need for both subsidized

and nonsubsidized

standard

housing

existed

when these projects

were acquired,

The LHAs’ action,

therefore,

did not improve

the overall

condition

of the housing

market.

It appears

that,

in such

cases,

the construction

of new housing

and the rehabilitation

of substandard

housing

would be the preferred

method

and would use Federal

funds more effectively

by adding

to the supply

of standard

housing.

.

GAO proposed

that

HUD limit

its

financial

assistance

to LHAs to the

acquisition

of privately

owned standard

housing

where the supply

of such

housing

exceeds

the demand and terminate

the acquisition

of existing,

occupied,

privately

owned standard

housing

which

is in the planning

or early

development

stages

and use the funds

instead

to finance

the construction

of

new low-rent

public

housing

projects

or to purchase

and rehabilitate

existing

substandard

housing .

HUD did not agree because

it felt

that

such a practice

would be too

restrictive.

despite

an overall

demand for unsubsidized

HUD commented

that,

some structures

would not meet the demand for various

housing

in a community,

reasons.

39

CEF.AXT!fEST3F HOUSISG Q-D URB.V,'DE1-ELOF!~lENT

Hc7USISG FR3DLICTIJS

ASD !IJRTG.AGE CREDIT

(continued)

G-40 agreed

that,

if certain

standard

housing

had a high vacancy

rate

and could be purchased

at an acceptable

price,

acquisition

of such housing

by an LX.4 Icould be beneficial.

Of the 15 projects

reviewed

by GXO, however,

all had 10~ vacancy

rates.

-Acquired

units

used to house

are not being

those most in need

G-A0’ s review

shoried that

the acquisition

of privately

orined standard

housing

generally

had not substantially

reduced

the number of families

or

persons

li\-ing

in substandard

housing,

because

many of the occupants

of the

acquired

housing

units

had previously

lived

in standard

housing.

Some of

the families

occupying

the acquired

units

had incomes

exceeding

the established

limits

entitling

them to public

housing.

Also,

some persons

were

occupying

units

larger

than those suggested

in HUD’s guidelines.

Because only a relatively

small

number of the occupants

of the acquired

housing

projects

included

in G-40’s review

had previously

occupied

substandard

housing,

there

appeared

to be a need for specific

standard

admission policies

to insure

that

those families

or persons

most in need are

given preference.

G-40 suggested

that

the Congress

might wish to require

that

LHXs give

preference

for admission

to public

housing

to occupants

of private

substandard

housing

ox-er those riho are occupying

private

standard

housing.

Hardships

to former

of acquired

properties

occupants

The acquisition

of privately

olined standard

housing

has provided

standard

housing

to certain

low-income

families

sooner

than it could

have

been provided

under the other

methods,

but it has resulted

in (1) hardships

to form.er occupants

of acquired

projects

\<ho were forced

to move and (2)

the people

forced

loss

of tax revenues

to local

governments.

In some cases,

although

HUD regulations

provided

to ‘move were not assisted

in relocating,

for it.

Other

displaced

occupants

were subjected

to physical

and financial

hardships.

G-40 recommended

that HUD, prior

to approving

LHAs’ acquisition

of

require

LHAs to adequately

occupied,

privately

owned standard

housing,

deconstrate

that

housing

of comparable

quality

and rent

existed

in the

and that

adequate

relocation

assistance

would be available

for tenants

be displaced.

action

Because

it

on GAO’s

!;eel to

acquired

;ro.b-ide

is aliaiting

the

recommendation.

insure

that

properties

r;.A<Q’s review

adeq,Jate

indicated

assurance

results

of

its

housing

studies,

area

to

HUD took

prices

of

are reasonable

that

that

HUD needed

to improve

the prices

of acquired

40

its procedures

properties

are

to

no

DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT

HOUSING PRODUCTION AND MORTGAGE CREDIT

-3

(continued)

GAO recommended

that

HUD establish

appraisal

requirements

for

reasonable.

the direct

acquisition

method

similar

to those established

for the turnkey

method which

requires

that

two independent

cost estimates

be obtained

and

provide

that

the total

price

be no greater

than the average

of the cost

estimates

. Although

HUD agreed with

this

recommendation,

it took no action

pending

the results

of the housing

studies.

(B-114863,

Sept.

7, 1972.)

Reducing

resulting

costs

from

in acquiring

properties

defaults

on home loans

Privately

financed

home loans

are insured

by HUD or are guaranteed

by

the Veterans

Administration

(VA).

VA also makes loans

to veterans

unable

to obtain

private

financing

and to purchasers

of properties

which

VA acWhen a borrower

defaults

on a HUDquired

as a result

of loan defaults.

the lender

terminates

the loan,

acquires

the

insured

or VA-guaranteed

loan,

and

generally

conveys

the

property

to

HUD

or

VA

in

exchange

for

property,

When a borrower

defaults

on a VA-financed

insurance

or guaranty

payments.

loan,

VA terminates

the loan and acquires

the property.

GAO stated

that

the Government

In a report

to the Congress,

foreclosure

costs

on HUD-insured,

VA-guaranteed,

and VA-financed

wider

use of the “power

of sale”

method

of foreclosure.

Defaulted

generally

are terminated

by foreclosures

conducted

in accordance

statutes.

In the District

of Columbia

and in the 26 States

which

the use of the power-of-sale

method

of. foreclosure,

foreclosures

erally

less costly

and less time consuming

than the judicial

and

methods

of foreclosure

authorized

by the other

24 States

because

of-sale

foreclosures

can be completed

without

court

action.

could

reduce

loans

by

loans

with

State

authorize

are genother

the power-

GAO reported

that

costs

could

further

be reduced

by HUD’s and VA’s

greater

emphasis

on the “voluntary

deed” method

of terminating

such loans;

by VA paying

mortgage

claims

on defaulted

loans as HUD does;

and by I-IUD’s

reliance

on mortgagees’

title

evidence

for foreclosed

properties.

GAO recommended

.

that

HUD and VA:

--Provide

mortgagees

to determine

when

properties

securing

with

data

they should

defaulted

on loan

attempt

loans,

--Require

instead

to

justifications

deeds.

mortgagees

of accepting

In addition,

HUD should

title

evidence

for properties

VA should

adopt HUD’s policy

terminating

defaulted

loans

furnish

voluntary

termination

to obtain

costs

to

voluntary

for

enable

deeds

foreclosing

them

to

mortgages

stop requiring

mortgagees

to purchase

additional

acquired

by foreclosure

and conveyed

to HUD.

for paying

mortgagees

for costs

involved

in

and in conveying

the mortgaged

properties

to VA.

GAO also recommended

that

the Congress

establish

a Federal

power-of-sale

foreclosure

insured,

or guaranteed

home mortgages.

41

enact

law

legislation

for all

which

federally

would

financed,

DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT

HOUSING PRODUCTION AND MORTGAGE CREDIT

(continued]

HUD expressed

support

for new initiatives

to encourage

mortgagees

to

accept

voluntary

deeds but stated

that

mortgagees

are well

aware of the

costs

involved

in either

the voluntary

deed or the foreclosure

method.

HUD

also stated

that

it planned

to amend its mortgage

instructions

to require

justifications

from mortgagees

for foreclosing

in lieu

of accepting

voluntary

deeds,

but has not yet done so.

VA stated

that

its existing

policy

was

GAO believes

HUD and VA need to encourage

mortgagees

to seek a

adequate.

greater

number of voluntary

deeds,

especially

in those

States

where it would

result

in reducing

property

acquisition

costs.

HUD objected

to discontinuing

the purchase

of title

evidence

for foreGAO believes

the

closed

properties

because

many foreclosures

are faulty.

risk

to HUD of title

defects

is minimal

and that

the costs

incurred

by HUD

for additional

title

evidence

are unnecessary.

VA objected

to adopting

HUD’s policy

of paying

mortgagees

for loan

termination

and property

conveyance

costs

on the basis

that

its existing

policies

make VA loans an attractive

investment

and encourage

mortgagees

to

be lenient

with

defaulting

mortgagors.

GAO noted,

however,

that HUD’s policy

also encourages

leniency.

HUD and VA generally

agreed

with

GAO’s recommendation

that

the

establish

a Federal

power-of-sale

foreclosure

law for all federally

insured,

or guaranteed

home mortgages.

(B-114860,

Oct.

20, 1972.)

Opportunity

for

reducing

interest

Congress

financed,

costs

As authorized

by sections

235 and 236 of the National

Housing

Act,

HUD

makes monthly

assistance

payments

to mortgagees

so that

low-income

families

may purchase

or rent housing.

HUD insures

that

the mortgage

loans will

be

paid and charges

the mortgagees

for the insurance

premiums.

HUD’s monthly

assistance

payments

include

the monthly

amounts

of the mortgage

insurance

on the anniversary

month of each mortgage,

the mortgapremiums.

Annually,

gees pay the accumulated

premium

to HUD.

GAO reported

to the Congress

that,

because

HUD’s monthly

assistance

payments

include

the mortgage

insurance

premiums,

HUD is paying

out funds

which

it must collect

from the mortgagees

and that

the Government

loses

the

use of such funds for an average

of 6 months

each year.

GAO estimated

that

the interest

costs

applicable

to the insurance

premiums

for the sections

235

and 236 mortgage

balances

of about

$11 billion

would be at least

$1.6 million

during

fiscal

year 1973.

GAO proposed

that

HUD save such interest

costs

by deducting

the premiums

from the monthly

assistance

payments.

HUD did not agree with

the proposal

and stated

procedures

under the

HUD stated

that

section

236 program

already

met the proposal

objective.

implementing

the proposal

for the section

235 program

would offset

any

savings

that would result

because

of the cost of the additional

work necesGAO disagreed

and therefore

recommended

sary to implement

the proposal.

that

the Congress

authorize

HUD to waive

the mortgage

insurance

premiums

for

the section

235 and 236 housing

programs

similar

to the waiver

of premiums

rcntnl

provided

for mortgages

insured

under

the low- and moderate-income

42

.

.

DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT

HOUSING PRODUCTION AND MORTGAGE CREDIT

(continued]

housing

program

(B-171630,

Nov.

ZZlCd].

Opportunities

and reduce

assistance

authorized

22, 1972.)

by

section

(3)

of

the

National

Housing

Act.

to improve

effectiveness

costs

of homeownership

programs

Low- and moderate-income

families

are assisted

in becoming

homeowners

through

mortgage

insurance,

loans,

and interest

subsidies

administered

by HUD

and the Department

of Agriculture

(USDA].

Because of the magnitude

of Federal

funds

involved

in these programs

and indications

of problems

encountered

in administering

the programs,

GAO reviewed

the programs

to determine

whether

HUD and USDA could

improve

program

effectiveness

and reduce

costs.

In a report

to the Congress,

GAO reported

that

HUD and USDA, in allocatdid not insure

that

all

eligible

families

had the same

ing program

resources,

opportunities

to participate

in the programs

regardless

of where they lived.

The need for subsidized

housing

had not been identified

adequately

and was

not used as the primary

basis

for allocating

limited

resources.

An area’s

capacity

to produce

housing

was a major

factor

in distributing

HUD program

resources

at both national

and local

levels.

Allocations

of USDA program

resources

at the national

level

were based primarily

on prior

years’

housing

production

and allocations

at the local

level

were based primarily

on a firstcome, first-served

basis.

GAO also reported

that

HUD and USDA (1) had approved

for mortgage

insurance or loans housing

with significant

defects

which

concerned

the health

and safety

of the occupants

and (2) had not determined

the causes

of mortgage

defaults

and ways of reducing

the default

rate.

GAO informed

the Congress

that

HUD could

save about

$1 billion

homeownership

assistance

program

were financed

through

Government

rather

than through

private

lenders

because

of the lower

interest

which

the Government

could borrow.

GAO recommended

that

--Insure

that

to identified

program

needs.

--Reinspect

to insure

rected,

sidized

should

HUD and USDA:

resources

are

allocated

primarily

all

houses within

the l-year

warranty

that

housing

defects

have been properly

--Require

in-depth

such studies

to

gram applicants.

if its

borrowings

rate

at

studies

develop

in

proportion

period

after

identified

purchases

and cor-

to determine

reasons

for defaults

and use

guidelines

for screening

and counseling

pro-

USDA should

make separate

allocations

of program

resources

and unsubsidized

housing

loans

according

to need.

In

establish

procedures

or seek legislation,

if necessary,

43

for subaddition,

it

to provide

DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT

HOUSING PRODUCTION AND MORTGAGE CREDIT

the purchasers

of existing

sellers

for defects

existing

rural

at

(continued)

housing

the time

with a right

of purchase,

of

recourse

to

the

GAO also recommended

that

the Congress

consider

legislation

which would

permit

HUD’s homeownership

assistance

program

to be financed

by the Government rather

than by private

lenders

because

of the possible

savings

in interest costs.

A similar

recommendation

by GAO had previously

been made to the

Congress

on legislation

for financing

rural

housing

programs.

.

HUD said it has increasingly

considered

needs in its allocations

of

program

resources,

and USDA directed

that

at least

50 percent

of its program

resources

be allocated

to subsidized

rural

housing.

GAO believes

that

both

agencies

should

identify

true needs and allocate

resources

accordingly.

within

the constraints

of available

funding,

to make reinHUD agreed,

spections;

USDA notified

its field

staff

to make inspections

prior

to expiration

of the warranty

period.

Both HUD and USDA mentioned

procedures

for

determining

causes

of defaults.

GAO believes,

however,

that

they should

give

attention

to analyzing

causes

of defaults

and minimizing

future

defaults.

it,

USDA said it was considering

as a last

resort,

to advance

a legislative

proposal

which

funds

to correct

any defects.

would

authorize

HUD, the Treasury

Department,

and the Office

of Management

and Budget

agreed

that

the cost of Government

financing

would

be lower

than financing

through

private

lenders

but said

that

factors

other

than cost must be considered.

(B-171630,

Dec. 29, 1972.)

Opportunities

reduce

costs

to improve

effectiveness

and

of rental

assistance

housing

program

GAO reviewed

HUD’s program

to increase

rental

housing

units

for low- and

moderate-income

families

to determine

whether

HUD could

improve

its

effectiveness

and reduce

costs.

The review

showed that

HUD, in allocating

program

resources,

had not insured

that

all

eligible

families

had the same opportunity

to participate

in the rental

assistance

program

regardless

of where they lived.

The need for subsidized

housing

had not been identified

adequately

and had not

been used as the primary

basis

for allocating

the limited

program

resources.

A major factor

in allocating

resources

was an area’s

capability

to produce

housing .

price

vised

GAO also

data in

guidelines

found

that HUD did not adequately

consider

purchase

or option

its land appraisals.

However,

in April

1972, HUD issued

rewhich,

if properly

followed,

should

improve

the appraisals.

In its report

to the Congress,

GAO stated

that HUD could

save about

$1.2 billion

in rental

assistance

program

costs

if mortgage

loans

for fiscal

years

1973 through

1978 could be financed

through

direct

Government

borrowings,

rather

than through

private

lenders,

because

of the lower

interest

rate at which

the Government

could borrow.

44

.

DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT

.

.

HOUSING PRODUCTION AND MORTGAGE CREDIT

(continued)

GAO questioned

whether

existing

incentives

to private

investors,

such

as low capital

investment

and income tax shelters,

would insure

high-quality

management

services

over the lives

of the projects,

Tax shelters,

in

particular,

generally

expire

within

the first

10 years

of project

ownership

and are available

to project

owners regardless

of how well

or how poorly

they manage projects.

GAO recommended

that HUD (1) insure

that

rental

assistance

program

resources

be allocated

primarily

in proportion

to needs and (2) monitor

field

offices’

land valuation

practices

to insure

compliance

with

HUD’s revised

guidelines.

GAO also recommended

that

HUD and the Treasury

Department

should

jointly

study

the adequacy

of project

ownership

incentives

in promoting good project

management

and, if necessary,

take appropriate

action

to

restructure

the incentives.

GAO recommended

that

the Congress

consider

legislation

which would

permit

the rental

assistance

housing

program

to be financed

by the Governmerit,

rather

than by private

lenders,

because

of the possible

savings

in

interest

costs , GAO previously

made similar

recommendations

to the Congress

on the financing

of HUD’s homeownership

assistance

program

and the Department of Agriculture’s

rural

housing

program.

HUD stated

that

it had been considering

a more intensive

effort

to

stimulate

housing

production

where it was most needed

and agreed

that

field

compliance

with

appraisal

,guidelines

needed

to be monitored.

If subsidized

housing

is to be fairly

distributed

throughout

the Nation,

GAO believes

HUD

must identify

true needs and allocate

resources

accordingly.

Treasury

questioned

whether

the existing

tax shelters

encourage

investors

to sell

or neglect

properties

after

the shelters

expire.

HUD believed

that

new incentives,

rather

than a change of existing

incentives,

were

needed

and said that

it planned

to explore

the matter

in depth.

HUD, the Treasury

Department,

and the Office

of

agreed

that

direct

Government

financing

would

result

they favored

the present

method

of private

financing

tars.

(B-171630,

Jan, 10, 1973.)

45

Management

and Budget

in cost savings,

but

because

of other

fac-

DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT

INTERSTATE

LAND SALES

Imuroved

consumer

nrotection

in interstate

land sales

needed

I

To help protect

the public

in interstate

land transactions,

Congress,

in August

1968,

enacted

the Interstate

Land Sales Full

Act, to be administered

by HUD.

Because HUD received

complaints

in such transactions,

GAO reviewed

how HUD’s Office

of Interstate

Registration

was carrying

out its

regulatory

responsibilities.

the

Disclosure

of abuses

Land

.

GAO’s review

showed that,

because

HUD’s Office

of Interstate

Land

Sales Registration

had only

55 full-time

staff

members and no field

support,

it could not identify

all unregistered

land developers,

effectively

coordinate consumer

protection

activities

with

the States,

and adequately

verify

land developers’

registration

information.

The Office

could not investigate

all significant

violations

of the law or take prompt

enforcement

action

against

developers.

GAO recommended

that

HUD, to the extent

practicable,

decentralize

the Office’s

regulatory

activities-assigning

responsibility

to HUD field

HUD commented

that

it was evaluating

GAO’s recommendation

office

personnel,

and had budgeted

to increase

its permanent

staff

to 74 employees

in fiscal

year 1974.

GAO also

recommended

--Selectively

inspect

verify

the accuracy

and to help determine

that

HUD:

subdivisions

before

and after

registration

to

and reliability

of land developers’

disclosures

the adequacy

of State

regulatory

programs.

--Establish

agreements

with

the States

land subdivisions

and developers.

for

exchanging

information

--Improve

promptly

followup

procedures

to

to consumer

complaints

insure

that

land

referred

by the

--Investigate

consumer

alleged

complaints.

violations

of

who,

to law, fail

to amend

and who may be offering

significant

--Promptly

act against

developers

statements

of record

and property

unregistered

land for sale.

contrary

reports

developers

Office.

on

the

act

respond

indicated

by

HUD disagreed

that

subdivisions

should

be inspected

before

registration

because

it believed

the States

could better

perform

this

function.

GAO believes

that,

until

HUD is reasonably

satisfied

that

the States’

inspection

programs

are adequate,

the Federal

Government

should

take the initiative

in

making such inspections.

more

HUD also

effective

stated

action

it

plans

against

to eliminate

violators.

its complaint

backlog

and

(B-118754,

June 13, 1973.1

46

to

take

’

_

DEPARTMENTOF THE INTERIOR

Contents

Page

BUREAUOF RECLAMATION

Need for reevaluat ion of acreage limitat

benefits

1

ion on irrigation

49

49

GEOLOGICALSURVEY

Improved inspection

and regulation

could reduce the possibility

of oil spills

on the Outer Continental

Shelf

50

SOUTHWESTERN

POWERADMINISTRATION

Financial

progress and problems in

the Southwestern Federal power system

52

47

50

52

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR

BUREAU OF RECLAMATION

Need for

limitation

reevaluation

on irrigation

of

acreage

benefits

The Reclamation

Act of 1902 limits

to 160 acres

the land on which

any

one owner is entitled

to receive

irrigation

benefits

from a federally

subObjectives

of the limitation

are to break

sidized

water

resources

project.

spread

the- benefits

of the irrigation

proup large,

private

landholdings,

and promote

the family-sized

farm as a

gram to the maximum number of people,

desirable

form of rural

life.

GAO’s review

of the Central

Valley

project,

the largest

project

administered

by the Bureau of Reclamation,

Department

of the Interior,

showed

that

the 160-acre

limitation

had not resulted

in preventing

(1) large

landowners

and farm operators

from benefiting

under

the program

and (2) landowners

and farm operators

from retaining

or acquiring

large

landholdings.

These beneficiaries

were receiving

project

water

on large

landholdings

by

leasing

eligible

land from the individual

owners and retaining

or controlling eligible

land by establishing

corporations,

partnerships,

and trusts.

The impact

question

as to

water

resources

of modern technology

and techniques

on farming

the practicability

of limiting

the use of water

projects

to a landowner’s

160 acres

of irrigable

raises

a

from Bureau

land.

GAO recommended

that

the Congress

reevaluate

the appropriateness

of

If the Congress

determines

that

establishment

of

the 160-acre

limitation.

family-sized

farms should

still

be encouraged

by retaining

the limitation,

it should

enact

clarifying

legislation

to preclude

large

landowners

and

farm operators

from circumventing

the limitation

through

controlling

numerous 160-acre

tracts

by organizing

corporations,

partnerships,

and trusts,

and/or

by leasing

additional

tracts.

Should

the Congress

consider

the 160acre limitation

no longer

desirable,

however,

it should

enact

legislation

which would

(1) establish

a new maximum acreage

limit

for family-sized

farms

that

would be eligible

to receive

Federal

project

water

at subsidized

rates,

(2) preclude

large

landowners

and farm operators

from circumventing

the

limitation,

and (3) require

the payment

of the full

cost of irrigation

water

furnished

to larger

areas.

The Department

generally

agreed

with

GAO’s findings

and stated

that

there

was good reason

to undertake

the difficult

task of restating,

consolidating,

and modernizing

the acreage

limitation

provisions

of reclamation

law and that

it was earnestly

endeavoring

to develop

a proposal

for that

purpose.

(B-125045,

Nov. 30, 1972.)

.

49

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR

GEOLOGICAL

SURVEY

Improved

inspection

and regulation

could reduce

the possibility

of

on the Outer Continental

Shelf

At

committee,

quacy of

tions

on

oil

spills.

that

the

operations

oil

spills

Conservation

and Natural

Resources

Subthe request

of the Chairman,

House Committee

on Government

Operations,

GAO reviewed

the adethe Department’s

inspection

and regulation

of oil

and gas operaFederal

leaseholds

on the Outer Continental

Shelf

(OCS) to prevent

In its June 1973 report

to the Subcommittee,

GAO pointed

out

Department’s

Geological

Survey

could

improve

supervision

of these

in several

respects.

Strengthening

enforcement

proceedings

The law authorizes

the Department

to fine

lessees

for knowingly

and

willfully

violating

OCS regulations

and to cancel

leases

for not complying

These sanctions

generally

with

the law, regulations,

or lease provisions.

GAO found that,

to enforce

require

proceedings

in a U.S. district

court.

the Survey usually

issued

written

warnings

to lessees.

The

its regulations,

Gulf Coast Region

also ordered

stoppages

of equipment

operations

until

deficiencies

were corrected.

GAO further

observed

that

Survey

inspectors

in the Gulf Coast Region

did not always

follow

prescribed

regional

enforcement

actions.

For example,

in a case involving

a violation

of required

safety

procedures,

the inspector orally

warned

the operator

instead

of suspending

operations

until

the

deficiency

was corrected.

The Gulf Coast Region had not specified

circumstances

under which

inspectors

would be authorized

to alter

or waive

prescribed

enforcement

actions.

The Survey’s

Pacific

Region

used only written

warnings

which were not

always

effective

in obtaining

prompt

remedial

action

by the operators.

Survey officials

told

GAO that

the policy

in the Santa Barbara

Channel

was not

to require

shutting

down wells

where natural

oil seepage

was a special

probl6.m.

. .

However,

the failure

of a safety

device,

unless

promptly

corrected,

could

result

in a blowout

causing

greater

pollution

than the seepage.

Therefore,

GAO recommended

that

the Survey

consider

the advisability

of

halting

operations,

if necessary,

on individual

wells

as is required

in

Gulf Coast Region.

Improving

inspection

The Survey has

for only the operation

wells,

remedial

work

wells.

where

Making

sufficient

relatively

few

the

activities

issued

written

of producing

on producing

policies

on the frequency

of inspections

wells,

but not the drilling

of new

wells,

or abandonment

of nonproductive

inspections

was not a problem

offshore

structures

are operating.

50

in

the Pacific

However,

in

Region

the

1I

a

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR

GEOLOGICAL

SURVEY (continued)

where many structures

are spread

over 108,000

square

Gulf Coast Region,

miles,

the district

offices

did not inspect

structures

as frequently

as reFor example,

quired

by regional

standards

or by official

Survey policy.

only half

of 50 wells

started

in fiscal

year 1972 were inspected

during

the

drilling

operations

although

the region’s

unwritten

policy

called

for inspecting

each well.

Although

the Gulf Coast Region’s

inspection

staff

had been increased

from 10 engineers

and technicians

in 1969 to 39 in 1972, regional

officials

explained

that

additional

personnel

would be needed,

along with

additional

transportation

means, before

frequency

of inspections

could be increased.

GAO recommended

that

the Survey

establish

a realistic

policy

on how

frequently

each type of OCS operation

must be inspected,

considering

the

GAO also recomresource

available

and the risks

of oil spills

involved.

mended that

the Survey

consider

establishing

a formal

training

program

for

its inspectors,

because

of their

increasing

inspection

responsibilities

and

changing

technologies

in offshore

oil

and gas operations,

Regulation

of

offshore

GAO noted

a need

by Survey

regulations.

--A

program

to

causes safety

--Regulations

workover

for

operations

regulating

control

devices

governing

and wireline

--Regulations

governing

operations

on a single

are dangerous

because

erosion

to fail

remedial

operations.

certain

offshore

operations

of pipes

and other

equipment

and contributes

to spills.

work

on producing

wells,

not

covered

which

often

known

as

concurrent

drilling,

production,

and remedial

structure

which,

according

to Survey

officials,

of the confusion

caused in a confined

area.

Department

officials

informed

GAO that

actions

were underway

to implement most of GAO’s recommendations.

Also,

the Department

had sponsored

three

studies

, completed

between

November

1971 and December

1972, to recommend improved

Federal

safety

and pollution

control

regulations

and procedures

for OCS oil and gas operations.

The Survey

assigned

a special

work group

to evaluate

these

studies,

and in May 1973 the group presented

15 recommendations

to implement

its

findings.

(B-146333,

June 29, 1973.)

51

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR

SOUTHWESTERN POWER ADMINISTRATION

Financial

progress

and problems

in

Southwestern

Federal

power system

the

The Department

of the Interior’s

Southwestern

Power Administration

(SPA) is the marketing

agency for power generated

at Federal

water

resources

SPA is required

to recover,

projects

in the Southwestern

United

States.

the Federal

investment

in the power

through

revenues

from sales

of power,

features

of these projects

within

50 years

from the date each project

is

placed

in service.

1

.

At

the end of fiscal

year 1970,

after

25 years

into

the repayment

period,

SPA had not repaid

any portion

of the Federal

investment

in the

system and was about

$29.7 million

in arrears

in recovering

other

costs .

It had, however,

prepared

rate and repayment

studies

showing

that

the repayment requirements

would be met.

because

reliability

GAO questioned

the validity

of the most current

long range

cost and revenue

projections

were

or currentness

of which was doubtful.

study

(February

1971)

based on data,

the

The Department

of the Interior

concurred

in two principal

recommendations

that

(1) a revised

rate and repayment

study

be made and (2) action

be taken

to firm

up tentative

cost allocations.

The Department

did not

with

GAO’s

recommendation

that

SPA

supplement

future

rate

agree,

however,

and repayment

studies

for the system with

comparisons

of actual

repayments

of the Federal

investment

with

annually

scheduled

repayments

established

on

either

a compound

interest

amortization

method

or on any other

orderly

method.

GAO believes

that

such information

would be useful

to the Congress

and SPA management,

as a basis

for inquiring

into

the adequacy

of power

rates.

(B-125031,

Nov. 22, 1972.)

52

DEPARTMENTOF JUSTICE

Contents

Page

LAW ENFORCEMENTASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION

Need to determine cost and improve reporting

criminal

data exchange system

.

53

55

of the nationwide

55

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE

Need to determine

of the nationwide

+

ADMINISTRATION

cost and improve

reporting

criminal

data exchange

system

In January

1973 GAO reported

to the Congress

that

the Department

of

Justice

needed

to determine

the cost of developing

and operating

a nationwide criminal

data exchange

system

and to improve

the reporting

of data contained

in the system.

The Law Enforcement

Assistance

Administration

(LEAA)

awarded

grants,

totaling

about

$4 million,

to develop

a prototype

of such a

system and to enable

20 States

to participate

when it became operational.

GAO reported

that,

because

the cost to develop

a fully

operational

system

had not been determined,

State

and local

governments

could not determine whether

they would be able,

or willing,

to meet the financial

.

requirements

of developing

and operating

the system.

It also reported

that

system users

had no assurance

that

the data they received

was complete

or

accurate

because

arrest

information

was maintained

and disseminated

without

the related

disposition

information

to show whether

an individual

was innocent or guilty.

GAO recommended

that,

before

authorizing

ditures,

the Attorney

General

should

require

of Investigation

(FBI) or LEAA determine

the

operating

the criminal

data exchange

system.

FBI and LEAA implement

a program

for improving

dispositions

by criminal

justice

agencies

to

data into

the national

system.

substantial

additional

expenthat

either

the Federal

Bureau

total

cost of developing

and

It also recommended

that

the

the reporting

of arrests

and

the State

agencies

which

enter

The Department

agreed

with

GAO’s recommendations

and in July

1973 said

that

it was developing

a method

to estimate

system

costs.

However,

the

Department

stated

that

to improve

reporting

Federal

legislation

was needed

to insure

that

States

provide

timely

disposition

data on reported

arrests.

(B-171019,

Jan. 16, 1973.)

55

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

Contents

Page

MANPOWER ADMINISTRATION

Concentrated

Employment

Program

in New York

employment

objectives

Need to improve

effectiveness

and management

Corps in-school

program

Selection

and enrollment

of participants

in

Emergency

Employment

Act of 1971

Types of jobs offered

to unemployed

persons

Employment

Act of 1971

Impact

of grants

to Indian

tribes

under the

Act of 1971

Public

service

benefits

from jobs under the

Act of 1971

59

City

has not

of

Neighborhood

met

its

59

Youth

60

programs

under

the

61

under

the

Emergency

Emergency

Employment

Emergency

Employment

62

63

OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION

More concerted

effort

needed by the Federal

Government

on occupational

safety

and health

programs

for Federal

employees

V

57

63

65

65

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

MANPOWER ADMINISTRATION

Concentrated

Employment

Program

in New York City has not met its

employment

objectives

The Concentrated

Employment

Program

(CEP)

manpower

services

necessary

to help unemployed

and hold

regular

jobs.

GAO wanted

to determine

in New York City.

is designed

to

and low-income

how well

this

combine

all

persons

obtain

was being

done

About

$675 million

was allocated

for CEP in the 4-year

period

ended June

At that

time,

CEP was operating

in 69 urban

and 13 rural

locations

and

1971.

CEP had reached

384,000

persons.

CEP was established

in New York City

in

three

areas,

South Bronx,

East Harlem,

and Central

Harlem.

GAO’s evaluation

mainly

covered

South Bronx because

CEP was just

getting

underway

in East and

Central

Harlem when GAO’s field

work began.

GAO reported

that

CEP, after

a reasonable

start

in South Bronx,

fell

considerably

short

of its goals pertaining

to the number of persons

enrolled

in

CEP and the number of persons

placed

in jobs in all

three

areas.

For exin the South Bronx during

the second contract

period,

October

1968 to

ample,

about

2,160 persons

were enrolled

in CEP and 831 were reSeptember

1971,

ported

to have been placed

in jobs.

The goals

for that

period

were to enrol

3,670 persons

and to subsequently

place

3,200

in jobs.

GAO also reported

several

shortcomings

been responsible

for the South Bronx CEP’s

goals.

These shortcomings

included:

--CEP did not have an active

outreach

street

and door-to-door

activity--to

persons.

c

in CEP administration

failure

to reach

its

which

program

function--an

identify

on-theeligible

and

intensive

recruit

had

--Procedures

followed.

gibility

for screening

enrollees

for eligibility

were not adequately

As a result,

many enrollees

were ineligible

or their

elicould not be determined

on the basis

of recorded

information.

--Although

repeatedly,

program.

the

agency

responsible

the agencies

were

--CEP staff

members had high

tions

and were inadequately

proaches.

for

unable

training

enrollees

was changed

to establish

a suitable

training

turnover

rates

indoctrinated

in

in

both key and

CEP objectives

lower posiand ap-

Subsequent

to GAO’s review,

corrective

actions

were taken

or planned

by

Labor

and New York City

to strengthen

CEP in the South Bronx and Central

The East Harlem

CEP was substantially

revised

in June 1971 and

Harlem

areas.

was administered

under more flexible

guidelines,

which Labor considered

more

responsive

to the need of the community.

59

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

MANPOWER ADMINISTRATION

(continued)

GAO recommended

that

the Department

of Labor monitor

the planned

improvements in CEP in the South Bronx and the two Harlem

areas to make sure that

(1) the contractual

responsibilities

of the prime

sponsor

and participating

agencies

are clearly

understood

and carried

out,

(2) an active

outreach

activity

that will

bring

into

CEP those

area residents

most in need of manpower

assistance

is performed,

and (3) all possible

assistance

is extended

to CEP

enrollees

who experience

problems

in attending

training

courses

and in finding or retaining

suitable

employment,

The Department

of Labor agreed

that

the recommendations

must be implemented

if CEP is to attain

satisfactory

performance.

The Department

also

recognized

that

CEPs should

not continue

to be funded

unless

a specific

plan

is developed

to implement

the recommendations

and to establish

necessary

(B-130515,

Sept.

7, 1972.)

performance

standards.

Need to improve

of Neighborhood

effectiveness

Youth Corps

and management

in-school

program

The in-school

component

of the Neighborhood

Youth Corps (NYC) program

provides

paid work experience

and supportive

services

to youths

from lowincome families

to encourage

their

continued

enrollment

in school.

GAO reviewed

the 1970-71

NYC in-school

program

in three

locations

to determine

whether

the program’s

effectiveness

had been improved

since

GAO’s prior

reviews of the NYC program

in 1968 and to evaluate

certain

aspects

of program

administration.

GAO reported

to the Congress

that

the effect

of the in-school

program

on

school

drop-out

tendencies

had not changed.

Enrollees

in the projects

GAO

reviewed

dropped

out at about

the same rate as those who were eligible

but

GAO’s

latest

review,

as

had

its

earlier

reviews,

showed

the

not enrolled.

sponsors

did not consider

an applicant’s

drop-out

potential

in determining

his eligibility,

The Department

told

GAO that

it would reassess

the dropoutpotential

aspects

of the eligibility

criteria

to improve

selection

of eligible

youths

and emphasized

to its

regional

offices

that,

in the meantime,

all projects

should

be reminded

to fully

use current

drop-out

characteristics

data along with

other

enrollment

requirements.

GAO also reported

on weaknesses

in the work experience

and training,

counseling,

and remedial

education

provided

to enrollees.

The Department

needed

to monitor

sponsor

operations

more effectively

to better

insure

compliance

with NYC contracts

and departmental

guidelines

and controls

over enrollee

payrolls

needed

to be improved

to insure

that

accurate

and complete

records

are maintained

and unauthorized

expenditures

are avoided.

GAO made several

recommendations

to the Department

ing program

operations

and management.

The Department

action

was needed

in all areas discussed

in the report

new guidelines

were sent to the field

to eliminate

or

cited.

(B-130515,

Feb. 20, 1973.)

60

of Labor for improvagreed

that

corrective

and advised

GAO that

diminish

the problems

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

I

MANPOWER ADMINISTRATION

(continued)

Selection

participants

Emergency

of

under the

of 1971

and

enrollment

in programs

Employment

Act

Pursuant

to his request,

GAO reported

to the Chairman,

Subcommittee

Senate

Committee

on Labor and Public

Employment,

Manpower,

and Poverty,

fare,

on the selection

and enrollment

of participants

in programs

under

Emergency

Employment

Act of 1971 (EEA).

Procedures

and hiring

for reaching,

participants

on

Welthe

screening,

As of June 1972 EEA had obtained

public

service

jobs

in State

and local

About 17,000

of these persons

had been pregovernments

for 168,700

persons.

viously

employed

in State

or local

governments

but had been laid

off,

generally

because

of budgetary

problems.

The special

publicity

and outreach

efforts

of the program

agents

(States,

counties,

and cities),

as well

as the rate of unemployment

and the

number

of unemployed

persons

in the areas served

by the agents,

undoubtedly

had some effect

on the number of persons

applying

for EEA jobs.

Although

GAO’s analysis

did not establish

any direct

correlation

between

the outreach

efforts

or the number of unemployed

persons

and the number of job applicants,

it did show that

generally

the higher

the rate of unemployment,

the higher

the ratio

of applicants

to jobs.

Matching

applicants

to the available

jobs has largely

been achieved

through

existing

administrative

units

of government,

without

creating

new

bureaucracies

and apparently

without

changing

much in the existing

institutions,

Efforts

to get unemployed

persons

into

jobs as soon as possible

met a

number of obstacles

, some of which

could not have been anticipated

and others

which

could have been eliminated

by better

planning

and program

information.

Reaching

target

groups

Program

agents

established

various

priorities

for hiring

persons

to fill

jobs under EEA.

The majority

of program

agents

had hiring

procedures

which

gave preference

to veterans.

Almost

all the program

agents

stated

that

they

also gave preference

to other

significant

segments

of the unemployed,

such as

disadvantaged

persons

and members of minority

groups.

ri

-3

Data on the extent

of unemployment

among the significant

segments

of the

population

was generally

not available

on a localized

basis.

GAO therefore

was unable

to determine

whether

the various

groups

of unemployed

persons,

such as young or disadvantaged

persons,

were being

properly

represented

among

those being

hired.

(B-163922,

Oct. 12, 1972.)

61

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

MANPOWER ADMINISTRATION

(continued)

Types of jobs offered

to

unemployed

persons

under

Emergency

Employment

Act

the

of 1971

Pursuant

to his request,

GAO reported

to the Chairman,

Subcommittee

on

Employment,

Manpower,

and Poverty,

Senate

Committee

on Labor and Public

Welfare,

on the types

of jobs offered

to unemployed

and underemployed

persons

under the EEA, GAO reported

that:

--Program

agents

selected

wide variety

of public

to provide

educational,

tion

services.

and established

service

needs.

law enforcement,

.

job opportunities

to meet a

The largest

number of jobs were

public

works,

and transporta-

--Factors

most often

cited

as affecting

the types

of jobs selected

were

(1) unmet public

service

needs of the area and (2) needs and skills

of

unemployed

persons.

Lack of funds

for job-related

training,

lack of

time to adequately

assess public

service

needs,

and potential

for permanent employment

also affected

job selection.

--Controversies

arose over the types

of jobs selected

by

program

agents

in the GAO review.

Except

in one case,

versies

did not seriously

delay program

implementation.

the controversies

were resolved

by modifying

the cases,

or the employment

practices

which

affected

job selection.

11 of the 23

these

controIn about

half

the job types

--Most

jobs provided

program

participants

with

the same wages and benefits

as comparable

employees

of the program

agents

and subagents

included

in the GAO review.

A number

of agents

and subagents,

however,

established

special

job classifications

for EEA participants

and, for

this

reason,

the participants

did not qualify

for retirement

benefits

or promotional

opportunities

available

to regular

permanent

employees.

Other

rights

or benefits

for which

some participants

did not qualify

included

severance

pay, maternity

leave,

tenure,

regular

merit

and

special

in-grade

salary

adjustment,

night

or overtime

pay differential,

and appeal

rights

for grievances.

--Overall,

program

agents

were able to use EEA funds to establish

public

service

jobs which would result

in employment

for a substantial

number

of persons.

Some program

agents,

however,

were not always

able to establish

jobs

to meet their

highest

public

service

needs,

due to a lack

of funds

for equipment

and supplies

or for training

potential

employees.

Also,

certain

local

conditions,

such as established

civil

service

rules

and limited

opportunities

for advancement

within

existing

job

structures

, differed

among the program

agents

reviewed.

As a result,

program

implementation

was less than uniform

and, in some cases,

agents

were precluded

from complying

with

all of the act’s

requirements.

Nevertheless,

agents

generally

made genuine

efforts

to meet the act’s

requirements

and to provide

advantageous

job opportunities

to EEA

participants.

(B-163922,

Nov. 27, 1972.)

62

,

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

MANPOWER ADMINISTRATION

Impact

of grants

to

under

the Emergency

Act of 1971

(continued)

Indian

tribes

Employment

Subcommittee

In a report

to the Chairman,

Poverty,’

Senate

Committee

on Labor and Public

quest,

GAO reported

that:

on Employment,

Manpower,

Welfare,

pursuant

to his

and

re-

--The EEA program

has created

additional

jobs

for unemployed

Indians

and

alleviated

some of the public

service

needs of the tribes

reviewed.

The EEA program,

however,

as presently

funded,

cannot

be expected

to

have a major

impact

on the chronic

shortage

of jobs on or near most

reservations.

--Overall,

program

agents

serving

Indian

tribes

were more effective

than

other

program

agents

in placing

EEA participants

in permanent

nonsubsiAfter

about

10 months

of program

dized

jobs on or near reservations.

about

200

participants

of

the

tribes

reviewed

had

been peroperation,

manently

placed.

There were some prospects

for additional

permanent

placements.

However,

in some cases,

the prospects

for permanent

placement were somewhat

limited.

--Because

of limitations

on the use of EEA funds

and the

tribes

have had problems

financing

costs

tribal

funds,

ministration

and supportive

services

and some enrollees

for work related

costs.

general

lack of

of program

adhave had to pay

--A departmental

decision

that

other

program

agents

could

not allocate

EEA funds

to tribes

would have significantly

decreased

funding

for

tribes

in the State

of Washington.

According

to Department

officials,

‘:he Secretary

of Labor plans

to allocate

discretionary

EEA funds

to

co?-er any amounts

which

tribes

may lose.

GAO also reported

that

jobs established

by the tribes

reviewed

were

chosen

to meet tribal

needs and to fit

the skills

of the unemployed.

The

establishi.ng

of types

of jobs was limited

by the lack of funds

to purchase

certain

needed

equipment

and the lack of persons

with

appropriate

skills

for

Most

jobs

provided

the

tribes

with

needed

public

services.

the jobs.

Bene improved

management

of tribal

affits

included

improved

housing

and roads,

fairs,

and assistance

to tribal

enterprises

., (B-163922,

Mar. 14, 1973.)

Public

service

benefits

from jobs

under

the Emergency

Employment

Act of 1971

In a report

to the Chairman,

Subcommittee

on Employment,

Manpower,

and

Poverty,

Senate

Committee

on Labor and Public

Welfare,

pursuant

to his request,

GAO reported

that

nationwide

about

200,000

public

service

jobs were

established

by State

and local

governments

under EEA during

fiscal

year 1972,

the first

year of the program.

Although

GAO found

it somewhat

difficult

to

determine

the extent

of changes

in public

services

resulting

from the

63

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

XANPOWER ADMINISTRATION

program,

that

the

(continued)

according

to statements

public

service

benefits

made to

objective

GAO by program

agents,

of the act was being

it appears

met,

A related

review

by GAO of other

program

agents

in rural

and urban areas

showed that,

in the urban areas,

the program

generally

served

to prevent

a

decrease

in city

services

rather

than to provide

additional

services

and

that,

in the rural

areas,

the program

generally

provided

additional

needed

public

services.

(B-163922,

.June 8, 1973.)

64

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

OCCUPATIONAL

SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION

More concerted

effort

needed

bv the

Federal

Government

on occupational

safety

and health

programs

for Federal

employees

a

Section

19 of the Occupational

Safety

and Health

Act of 1970 requires

each Federal

agency

to establish

and maintain

an effective

and comprehensive

consistent

with

standards

promulgated

occupational

safety

and health

program-by the Secretary

of Labor--and

to provide

safe and healthful

work conditions

for Federal

employees.

The Occupational

Safety

and Health

Administration

(OSHA) by executive

order

is required

to issue

regulations

to provide

guidance to Federal

agencies

in fulfilling

their

responsibilities

under

the act.

In a report

to the Chairman,

Senate

Committee

on Labor and Public

Welfare,

GAO stated

that much more needed

to be done if the Federal

Government

were to insure

that

its own agencies

were complying

with

the standards

which

it was enforcing

in the private

sector

and if Federal

employees

were to be

GAO noted

that:

assured

of safe and healthful

conditions

in workplaces.

--OSHA’s

enforcement

and inspection

practices

differed

significantly

between

private

businesses

and Federal

agencies.

For private

businesses

OSHA enforces

compliance

with

safety

and health

standards

through

inspections

and penalties

authorized

by the act.

Al though

required

to evaluate

each Federal

agency’s

program

annually,

OSHA

had not evaluated

many Federal

programs.

--GAO inquiries

at 49 Federal

agencies

indicated

that

workplace

inspections

often

varied

from a walk-through

official

to an inspection

which was part of a review

matters

unrelated

to safety.

Most Federal

agencies

time inspectors.

,

Federal

agency

by a safety

involving

used only part-

--GAO inspected

workplaces

of four

Federal

agencies

in the Washington,

area and found about

200 instances

of noncompliance

with

OSHA’s

D.C.,

safety

and health

standards.

About

50 of the instances

were sufficiently

severe

that,

had they been found

in private

businesses,

the

businesses

would have been subject

to monetary

penalties

assessed

by

OSHA.

These inspections

are covered

in the following

GAO reports

to

the cited

agencies:

(1) General

Services

Administration,

B-163375,

January

30, 1973,

(2) Department

of Commerce,

B-163375,

January

31,

1973,

(3) Department

of the Interior,

B-163375,

January

31, 1973,

and (4) Government

Printing

Office,

B-163375,

February

28, 1973.

--Although

safety

sistency

most Federal

program

before

and overall

agencies

the act

direction.

surveyed

had established

was passed,

the programs

some sort

of

lacked

con-

--OSHA has imposed

a uniform

recording

and reporting

system

on Federal

agencies,

which

is a potential

improvement

over past systems,

but a

number of problems

remain

to be overcome.

Definitions

of job-related

incidents

and incompatibilities

in existing

agency

reporting

systems

must be remedied,

65

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

OCCUPATIONAL

SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION

(continued)

--OSHA has not provided

the centralized

leadership

needed

to effect

a

uniform

Federal

policy.

OSHA has also neither

produced

guidelines

for Federal

agency programs

nor adequately

evaluated

those

in existence,GAO made several

recommendations

to strengthen

OSHA’s leadership

The Department

advised

GAO that

it concurred

the areas cited

above.

ally

with all

the recommendations

and that

OSHA had taken or planned

various

actions

along

the lines

GAO suggested.

role

in

generto take

GAO recommended

also

that

the Committee

consider

amending

the act to

bring

Federal

workplaces

under

the inspection

responsibility

of OSHA.

These

inspections

should

supplement,

and not replace,

inspections

by the agencies’

own personnel

.

(B-163375,

Mar. 15, 1973.)

66

*

DEPARTMENTOF STATE

AGENCYFOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Contents

Page

c

Need for U.S. concessional

assistance to Brazil

Limiting

U.S. development assistance to Ecuador

Need to consider terminating

development loan program in Korea

Providing for a coordinated program of family planning,

health,

and nutrition

Questionable effectiveness

of grant supporting

India’s family

planning program

Problems of the land reform program in Vietnam

Developing countries’

external debt and U.S. foreign assistance

End of rupee financing

of U.S. programs in Nepal

67

69

69

70

72

73

74

75

75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL

Need for

to Brazil

U.S.

concessional

assistance

The United

States

provided

about

Brazil

in fiscal

year 1973 and planned

year 1974.

GAO reported

that

Brazil’s

was questionable.

--Its

gross

about

9.9

national

percent

DEVELOPMENT

$50 million

in concessional

aid to

to provide

about

$17 million

in fiscal

need for such assistance,

however,

product

has grown at

since

1968 and totaled

$3 billion

in foreign

at the start

of 1973

an average

annual

about

$50 billion

exchange

in 1971 and

were about

$4.2 billion.

rate

of

in 1972.

--It

accumulated

Total

reserves

1972.

--It

is able to obtain

substantial

economic

assistance

from other

the

International

Bank

for

Reconstruction

sources.

For example,

Development,

the Inter-American

Development

Bank,

and the ExportImport

Bank of the United

States

authorized

over $900 million

in

ternal

assistance

in fiscal

year 1972 alone.

and

ex-

some of its

resources

in 1972 to the Special

--Brazil,

in turn,

p ledged

Fund of the African

Development

Bank.

The resources

of this

fund,

like

the more concessional

loan funds

of the Inter-American

Development Bank and the Asian

Development

Bank, will

be used to finance

high-priority

development

projects.

--Authorized

amounted

to

but undisbursed

over a quarter

Agency

for

of a billion

International

dollars

Development

loans

as of May 1, 1973.

The Department

of State

and the Agency for International

Development

levels

were consistent

with

U.S.

(AID) said that

current

U.S. assistance

foreign

policy

objectives.

GAO noted

that program

managers

have not addressed

the question

of when a foreign

aid recipient

like

Brazil

reaches

the point

in its development

when it no longer

needs further

U.S. concessional

assistance.

GAO believes

AID to identify

longer

requires

c

.

Limiting

U.S.

to Ecuador

the Congress

should

require

precisely

and objectively

that

U.S. concessional

assistance.

development

the Department

of State

and

point

at which

a country

no

(B-133283,

July

30, 1973.)

assistance

The United

States

contributed

modest

assistance

to Ecuador,

one of the

lesser

developed

countries

in Latin

America,

in the 1940s and 1950s and introduced

relatively

significant

amounts

of capital

and technology

in the

and indirect

ass is tance

1960s and 1970s.

From 1962 through

1972 U.S. direct

This assistance

accounted

for

commitments

amounted

to about

$360 million.

about

78 percent

of the outside

assistance

to Ecuador

and amounted

to about

13 percent

of Ecuador’s

Central

Government

revenues.

69

DEPARTMENTOF STATE

AGENCYFOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

GAO concluded

that:

--Short-term

U.S. program objectives , goals, and priorities

in Ecuador

have shifted frequently;

the long-term U.S. objective

is uncertain.

--U.S. assistance has helped to construct

or modernize transportation

and power production

facilities,

health accommodations, and schools;

feed people; transfer skills;

change attitudes;

cement United StatesEcuadorean relations;

and protect certain U.S. economic interests,

Some accomplishments were small, measured against the aggregate need.

--U.S. assistance has not served as a catalyst

causing or permitting

Ecuador to achieve increased political

stability

or to achieve accelerated progress in economic and social development.

GAO also concluded that U.S. assistance has served to a large degree

as a substitute

for Ecuador’s own self-help,

due principally

to a lack of

real commitment to basic reform and development on the part of the Ecuadorean Government,

GAO recommended that the Secretary of State and the Administrator

of

AID reassess the purpose and value of U.S. assistance to Ecuador.

The

agencies took the position

that weakness in the Ecuadorean ‘commitment to

its own development during the past decade was not a sufficient

reason for

the United States to abandon its assistance unless by so doing it would

cause the Ecuadoreans to respond more effectively

in the future.

GAO suggested that

the Congress consider:

--Whether it may be in the U.S. interest

to limit U.S. development

resources which can be made available

to Ecuador until the country

can demonstrate a reasonable commitment to its own development.

--The appropriateness

of creating statutory

standards limiting

the

aggregate amount of U.S. public resources that can be provided to

recipients

who have not demonstrated a reasonable commitment to their

own development . (B-146998, Feb. 27, 1973.)

Need to consider terminating

development loan program in Korea

During fiscal years 1968 through 1972, Korea received $3,829 million

in U.S. direct bilateral

economic and military

assistance.

Korea has also

benefited substantially

from U.S. expenditures

supporting U.S. military

forces stationed in Korea and additional

sums provided for sending its

troops to Vietnam,

Korea’s economic growth indicators

have been most impressive since

1965, but this has been achieved at the expense of a steadily

mounting external debt and an increasing

trade deficit.

Expansion of industry has been

emphasi zed, with much less attention

being given to social and welfare

70

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL

needs.

The rural

and urban

income

consumption

gap also widened.

.

gap

and

DEVELOPMENT

the

food

grain

production

and

U.S. assistance

undoubtedly

stimulated

Korea’s

economic

expansion,

but

it also may have contributed,

inadvertently,

to its economic

problems.

For

aid has helped

to make it possible

for Korea to

example,

U.S. concessional

get large

amounts

of nonconcessional

credit,

but this

has caused Korea’s

In addition,

external

debt situation

to worsen.

subsidization

of food and

fiber

programs

has built

up Korean

demand for imported

products,

thus adding to its

trade

gap.

the United

States

has reduced

its AID program

Over the past 10 years,

However,

other

U.S. inputs --such

as Public

Law 480, Exportconsiderably.

assistance,

and U.S. expenditures

in Korea--have

reImport

Bank, military

mained high or have increased.

This fact

and the increased

inputs

from

multilateral

organizations

mean that

external

assistance

to Korea actually

has increased.

For

many years AID focused

on developing

Korea’s

industries

and subsidizing

its commercial

import

requirements.

In recent

years,

however,

AID

has restructured

its program

to emphasize

development

of the lagging

The Korean

Government

has not given

qdeagricultural

and social

sectors.

quate

attention

toward

correcting

this

imbalance

of its economy.

Korean

emphasis

on capital

development,

rather

than on such sectors

as agriculture,

has aggravated

the situation.

During

1971 and 1972 most of the AID development

loan funds were used

to import

rice.

The AID development

loan program

has been,

in essence,

an

extension

of the Public

Law 480 program.

Together

these

two programs

seem

to serve

as a disincentive

for the Korean

Government

to seek an early

solution

to problems

in its agricultural

sector.

l

M

With the United

Nations

and the international

creasing

their

assistance

to Korea,

the Public

Law

increased

amounts

which

can be used in the lagging

Government’s

continuing

emphasis

on other

sectors,

for continuing

the AID development

loan program.

lending

institutions

in480 program

generating

sectors,

and the Korean

GAO questions

the need

The State

Department

and AID believe

that

the

of U.S. economic

aid should

remain

flexible

because

performance

of the Korean

economy and events

which

outlook.

timing

for a phasedown

of the recent

irregular

have clouded

its

economic

GAO suggested

that

the

State

and AID the feasibility

for Korea.

(B-164264,

July

Congress

should

of terminating

12, 1973.)

71

review

with

the

the development

Department

of

loan program

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL

Providing

for a coordinated

health,

family

planning,

program

and nutrition

DEVELOPMENT

of

In

1967 the Congress

enacted

an amendment

to foreign

aid legislation

Thereafter,

entitled

“Title

X--Programs

Relating

to Population

Growth.”

amounts

earmarked

for population

and family

planning

programs

increased

sharply- to $35 million

in fiscal

year 1968 (from $5 million

the previous

year),

$45 million

in 1969,

$75 million

in 1970,

$100 million

in 1971, and

$125 million

in both 1972 and 1973.

AID provided

$35 million

directly

to family

planning

programs

in

Indonesia,

Laos, Thailand,

and the Philippines

between

1968 and 1972.

GAO reviewed

AID’s problems

in implementing

programs

in these

countries,

particularly

in view of the relatively

short

period

AID had to develop

implement

programs

to use the large

amounts

of money provided.

,

a

and

For each of the four

countries,

title

X funds were used to a greater

or

lesser

degree

for purposes

related

indirectly

to controlling

population

Various

maternal

and child

health

and nutrition

programs

in

growth

rates.

the Philippines,

Thailand,

and Laos previously

funded

by regular

AID appropriations

were considered

family

planning

projects

when title

X funds became available.

AID obligated

large

amounts

during

the last

month of the fiscal

years

for undefined

program

requirements

so that

funds would not be lost

to the

Inadequate

administrative

and logis tics

sys terns contributed

to the

program.

problem

of defining

program

requirements,

making proper

distribution,

and

maintaining

accountability

for the commodities.

In all

four

countries,

services

were made available

in excess

of demand so that

clinics

were unproductive,

commodities

were overstocked,

and equipment

either

was not used

or was underused.

AID used title

X funds

for health

and nutrition

programs

not related

dire,ctly

to reducing

population

growth

rates,

because

it believed

that

such

use in some cases was the best means to promote

family

planning.

Through

this

means a very humanitarian

service

has been provided.

GAO therefore

suggested

that

the Congress

consider

whether

title

X may need to be revised

to provide

for a coordinated

program

of family

planning,

health,

and nutrition.

AID said it would concur

in this

recommendation,

provided

that

additional

funds for health

and nutrition

are included

in the title

X appropriation.

In implementing

a coordinated

family

planning,

health,

and nutrition

program,

AID would be glad to give increased

emphasis

to health

and

nutrition

but would in no way wish to reduce

the emphasis

given

to family

planning.

(B-173240,

May 23, 1973.)

72

’

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL

Questionable

supporting

c

L

effectiveness

India’s

family

of grant

planning

DEVELOPMENT

program

In mid-1970,

AID announced

that

it was providing

a grant

of $20 million

to India

to help expand its population

control

program.

AID stated

that

the

grant

was made in accordance

with

title

X of the Foreign

Assistance

Act and

that

the funds would be spent

in the United

States

for goods and services

normally

imported

by India

and financed

by development

loans.

In

its

report

to

the

Administrator

of AID,

GAO concluded

that:

--The

effectiveness

of the $20 million

grant

was questionable.

Effective

expansion

of the Government

of India’s

family

planning

program

and use of the funds was contingent

upon administrative

reforms.

India

failed

to expend

its own funds,

and administrative

reforms

continued

to be the major

constraint

on India’s

program.

--The

grant

will

probably

have little

if any effect

on the size of

India’s

family

planning

program.

The program

has not suffered

from

a lack of funding

and, in fact,

has recently

failed

to use its

budgeted

funds.

There is little

indication

that

this

situation

will

change in the near future.

--The

$20 million

grant

in dollars

was given

to India

without

any substantive

performance

prerequisites

which would reasonably

insure

that

the funds would be used effectively

to achieve

the objectives

of the family

planning

progam.

If additional

funding

was in fact

needed,

rupees

could have been made available

from the huge excess

of U.S. -owned rupees

on hand.

It would appear

that

the inherent

pressures

of obligating

funds

in conformance

with

the expressed

wishes

of the Congress

to assist

programs

concerned

with

population

control

and family

planning

were factors

in obligating

the funds

without

an adequately

developed

program.

--GAO questioned

neither

India’s

need to control

the growth

of its

population

nor the legality

of this

transaction.

However,

it did

question

whether

AID beneficially

influenced

or assisted

the objectives

of India’s

family

planning

program

by providing

resources

under

the circumstances

described.

In GAO’s opinion,

the $20 million

grant

resulted

in additional

general

development

assistance.

*

m

GAO recommended

that

the Administrator

of AID (1) reconsider

the use

of dollars,

earmarked

for population

control,

for purposes

unrelated

to

foreign

exchange

costs

of the population

program

for those

countries

where

currencies

are available,

and (2) obample amounts

of U.S. -owned foreign

tain

from the Auditor

General

periodic

evaluations

of the extent

to which

the purposes

of the grant

are being

achieved.

AID said that

expansion

of the Indian

program

simply

could not be

achieved

by allocating

additional

U.S.-owned,

excess

local

currencies.

Moreover,

AID might

provide

dollars

to support

expanded

local

currency

exif such aid would help to significantly

improve

penditures

in the future,

family

planning

programs.

73

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL

GAO expressed

the belief

that

To further

should

be used first.

are not adequate

in excess-currency

relationship

has been established,

meet foreign

exchange

costs.

DEVELOPMENT

U.S. -owned excess

foreign

currencies

the objectives

of a program

when resources

countries

and when a direct

and positive

dollar

support

could

then be provided

to

J

in the bill

(H.R. 16705)

making

appropriaGAO noted

that

the Senate,

tions

for foreign

assistance

and related

programs

for fiscal

year 1973,

provided

guidance

on the use of dollars

for programs

in excess-currency

countries.

However,

the Congress

adjourned

before

enactment.

(B-161854,

Jan, 12, 1973.)

Problems

of

in Vietnam

the

land

reform

program

As of March 31, 1973, the United

States

had contributed

The primary

aim

lion

to the land reform

program

in Vietnam.

is to broaden

the political

base of the Government

of Vietnam

breaking

up large

landholdings

and giving

rural

families

title

they farm.

about

$38 milof the program

(GVN) by

to the land

The GVN land reform

program

was relatively

strong

from

but little

real progress

took place

between

1962 and 1969.

March 1970 marked the beginning

of considerable

land reform

again.

1954 to 1961,

A law passed

in

activity

once

The present

program

consists

of two subprograms:

the Land-to-the-Tiller

(LTTT) program

and the Montagnard

program.

Under the LTTT program

1,007,217

hectares

had been distributed

to about

650,000

tenant

farmers

of March 1973.

This exceeded

the initial

goal of 1 million

hectares.

as

The Montagnard

land reform

program,

however,

has made slow progress.

It has been carried

out poorly,

has not received

adequate

GVN support,

and

has received

a disproportionately

low share of U.S. support.

In many cases

where land has been transferred,

problems

exist

which prevent

the Montagnards

from receiving

full

program

benefits.

These problems

include

allocations

for less than the amount of land area indicated

in program

guidelines

and

land encroachments.

If the United

States

continues

its past

level

of support

to the GVN

budget,

the cost of the program

to the United

States

might

reach over $300

million.

Compensation

payments

to former

landlords

under

the LTTT program

alone

are expected

to cost about

$537 million.

This will

place

a serious

additional

burden

on the GVN budget.

Agency officials

agreed

problems

but contend

that

since

November

1972

some problems

hindering

the attainment

(B-159451,

June 22, 1973.)

still

exist

in the land reform

program

progress

has been made in overcoming

of the program’s

initial

objectives.

74

.

ti

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL

Develoninn

and U.S.

L

L

countries’

external

foreign

assistance

DEVELOPMENT

debt

In a growing

number of developing

countries,

external

public

debt has

become a heavy burden

on further

economic

growth.

By December

1970,

80

developing

countries

had accumulated

over $66 billion

of external

debt.

Debt

service

(interest

and amortization)

payments

on this

debt increased

by about

nearly

$6 billion.

18 percent

in 1970, reaching

Such payments,

which

are

represent

an almost

critical

drain

on resources

expected

to continue

rising,

and underscore

the developing

countries’

debt burden.

Although

the United

States

is the largest

single

creditor

to the deall

creditor

nations

are under increasing

pressure

to

veloping

countries,

reschedule,

refinance,

or cancel

outstanding

debts.

Any form of debt relief

provided

is comparable

to new aid.

And as the need for relief

becomes more

frequent,

debt relief

is increasingly

an important

form of economic

assistante.

The assistance

which

the United

States

provided

developing

countries

through

debt relief

is not now included

in the President’s

proposals

to the

Congress

for new economic

assistance.

Nor is it shown in a meaningful

manner

in subsequent

reports

summarizing

the actual

assistance

provided.

GAO recommended

that

this

assistance

should

be systematically

and comprehensively

reported

to the Congress

by the Secretary

of State.

The Department

of State

and AID commented

that AID has in the past,

for those

countries

in

which

net aid flows

were of major importance,

presented

the Congress

information

on net aid,

debt,

and related

balance

of payments

problems.

GAO expressed

the belief

that

the Congress

may wish to consider

legislation

to require

comprehensive

annual

reporting

by the Secretary

of State,

to be submitted

in January

of each year and thus be available

to the committees

of the Congress

in their

considerations

of authorization

and appropriation

proposals.

Such reporting

might

make available

for the Congress

current

summary perspectives

of the worldwide

dimensions

of the debt burden

problem,

as well

as the specifics

of debt relief

granted

or proposed.

In July 1973 the House passed

an amendment

to the

Act which would accomplish

these reporting

objectives.

1973.)

.

*

End of rupee

U.S. programs

financing

in Nepal

Foreign

Assistance

(B-177988,

May 11,

of

The basic

U.S. Foreign

policy

objective

in Nepal reflects

the broader

Asian

context

wherein

the United

States

seeks to assist

in development

and

to contribute

to peace and stability.

The United

States

has no vested

interests

in Nepal.

The AID program

is consistent

phasis

on manpower

and institutional

technical

skills

and the economic

with

U.S. interests

in Nepal.

Its emdevelopment

also helps

develop

the

and administrative

infrastructure

necessary

75

DEPARTMENTOF STATE

AGENCYFOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

for Nepal to absorb capital

assistance from other donors.

A unique feature

has been the use of U.S. -owned excess Indian and, to a small extent,

In fiscal

year 1971, over 80 perPakistani

rupees from program financing.

cent of AID’s $15.4 million

program in Nepal was financed by these rupees.

U.S. program strategy in the 1970s calls for an end to the present

U.S. technical

assistance

Indian and Pakistani

rupee-financed

AID program.

is to continue and AID planned to begin a development lending program in

late fiscal year 1973.

with foreign aid financing most of its development effort,

Nepal has

though

limited

in

relation

to

the

needs

of

its

people--from

the

progressed-At

that

time,

Nepal

had

no

civil

service

low base starting

point in 1951.

and virtually

no schools, hospitals,

roads, electric

power, or industry.

The United States has contributed

about $166.5 million--including

about

$81 million

in Indian and Pakistani

rupees-- of the $405.5 million

total

economic grants, loans, and credits extended by external donors to Nepal

from fiscal

years 1952 through 1971.

GAO suggested in its report that the Congress may wish to consider the

future funding of the Nepal assistance program, of which almost half has

India had been unwilling

to

been financed with U.S.-owned Indian rupees.

extend its longstanding

agreement for such use of rupees beyond fiscal

year

1973. Unless rupee support is continued, dollar financing would need to be

increased if the assistance program is to continue at its present level.

In May 1973 AID said that it had taken steps to substitute

dollar funding for rupee use, commencing in fiscal

year 1973. AID also said that its

fiscal

year 1974 appropriation

request included both grant and loan funds

for kinds of activities

which in the past would have been financed by

Indian rupees.

(B-177681, Mar. 16, 1973.)

76

DEPARTMENTOF TRANSPORTATION

Contents

Page

DEPARTMENT-WIDE

Regulating the transportation

FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION

Identifying

and correcting

safety

c

79

79

of hazardous materials

defects

on light

aircraft

80

80

NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION

Enforcement of Federal motor vehicle safety standards

82

82

NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGERCORPORATION(AMTRAK)

Need to improve train conditions

through better maintenance

Analysis of railroad

passenger service train scheduling and

operations

Railroad reservation,

information,

and ticketing

services being

improved

83

83

77

84

85

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

DEPARTMENT-WIDE

Regulating

the transportation

of hazardous

materials

,

Hazardous

materials

shipments

represent

an increasing

danger

to public

Each year hundreds

of new materials

are developed;

thousands

of

safety.

and the annual

volume

is estimated

to reach

such shipments

are made daily;

1.5 billion

tons by 1980.

Four units

of the Department

of Transportation-the Federal

Railroad

Administration,

the Federal

Highway

Administration,

the

Federal

Aviation

Administration,

and Coast Guard--are

responsible

for regulating

the safe transportation

of hazardous

materials

for railroads,

motor

civil

air carriers,

and vessels.

carriers,

GAO reported

to the Congress

that

the Department

needed

to work toward

a more effective

inspection

and enforcement

program

to insure

compliance

with regulations

for safely

transporting

hazardous

materials.

The Department’s

program

was handicapped

by (1) lack of basic

data on hazardous

materials

movements,

(2) insufficient

and unsystematic

inspection

efforts,

and (3) inadequate

enforcement

actions.

Because a Federal

agency

can

directly

assess

civil

penalties

without

the delays

of processing

criminal

cases,

effective

enforcement

would be promoted

if authority

to impose civil

fines

were extended

to the Federal

Railroad

Administration

and the Federal

Highway

Administration.

such

The Coast

authority.

Guard

GAO recommended

and the

Federal

that

Secretary

the

Aviation

of

Administration

already

Transportation:

1.

Establish

a management

information

system

data on hazardous

materials

movements.

to

2.

Reassess

the adequacy

the volume

and danger

effort

3.

Develop

program,

a plan

4.

Present

needed

the plan

resources.

for

of

of

the

the

a more

to

the

DepartmentIs

materials.

effective

Congress

The Department

said it found

much of

improving

the program

and that

it planned

similar

to those

GAO suggested.

(B-164497,

79

had

inspection

for

it

value

in

to initiate

May 1,

to

develop

and maintain

compared

with

and enforcement

evaluate

and

consider

GAO’s recommendations

several

actions

1973.)

for

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

FEDERAL AVIATION

ADMINISTRATION

Identifying

and

defects

on light

correcting

aircraft

safety

Government

Activities

Subcommittee,

At the request

of the Chairman,

GAO reviewed

the Federal

Aviation

House Committee

on Government

Operations,

Administration’s

(FAA) aircraft

safety

regulatory

activities

involving

selected

manufacturers

of light

aircraft

to whom FAA had delegated

certain

authority

for determining

that

their

aircraft

met Government

regulations,

_

l

flight

GAO reported

that

testing

leading

FAA should

more actively

to type certification

of

FAA had not implemented

inservice

light

aircraft

for

in the Government’s

1967 and

studies.

participate

in

new and modified

the

a program

to independently

flight

the adverse

flight

characteristics

1969 aircraft

design-induced

pilot

design

aircraft.

and

test major

identified

error

aircraft

certified

by the Government

as airworthy

In a number of cases,

Although

some

aircraft

with

dewere later

found

to have design

weaknesses.

sign weaknesses

were certified

after

the Government

participated

directly

in

design

development

and testing

of the aircraft,

most of them were certified

under delegation

procedures

whereby

manufacturers

determined

whether

the

aircraft

complied

with

applicable

Government

regulations.

After

it became known that

weaknesses,

FAA and manufacturers

correct

the weaknesses.

GAO recommended

that

the

aircraft

usually

Secretary

had been

delayed

of

Transportation

1.

Participate

fully

in

designed

or modified

for mass production.

flight

light

2.

Establish

problems

for

3.

Establish

criteria

for guiding

regional

design

weaknesses

promptly,

assessing

in relation

to safety,

and undertaking

corrective

action.

procedures

in interpreting

manufactured

modifying

the

with

design

designs

to

require

FAA to:

and other

critical

testing

of newly

aircraft

before

they are type certified

systematically

monitoring

FAA light

aircraft

safety

offices

seriousness

effective

manufacturers’

regulations.

in

identifying

of weaknesses

and prompt

Since FAA had not implemented

a program

to independently

light

aircraft

for the adverse

flight

characteristics

identified

and 1969 studies,

GAO suggested

that

the Government

Activities

may wish to discuss

with

FAA the need for such a program.

FAA stated

tion

certification

capabilities

in

that

flight

test

in the 1967

Subcommittee

it had recently

become further

involved

in the delegaprocess

because

of rapidly

changing

state-of-the-art

aircraft

and changes

in airworthiness

rules

and policy.

As

80

*

4

DEPARTMENTOF TRANSPORTATION

FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION (continued)

instructed

by the Subcommittee, GAO did not obtain written

Department of Transportation

on the report contents.

s

comments from the

Manufacturers generally

favored use of delegation procedures for type

certification

as the most economical and practical

method of producing light

(B-164497(1),

June 8, 1973.)

aircraft

in the United States.

81

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

NATIONAL

Enforcement

HIGHWAY TRAFFIC

of

Federal

SAFETY ADMINISTRATION

motor

vehicle

safety

standards

The National

Traffic

and Motor Vehicle

Safety

Act of 1966 was enacted

to protect

the American

public

from unreasonable

risk

of motor

vehicle

and deaths

by means of a coordinated

national

safety

accidents,

injuries,

program

and the establishment

of safety

standards

for motor vehicles.

Responsibility

for enforcing

this

law rests

with the National

Highway

Traffic

Safety

Administration

(NHTSA) .

_

l

In

a report

to the Congress,

GAO expressed

the opinion

that

the NHTSA’s

testing

program-its major

activity

for determining

manufacturers’

compliance with

Federal

motor

vehicle

safety

standards--provided

little

assurance

that

motor vehicles

would comply with

the standards

and thereby

provide

the

safety

benefits

intended--protection

against

unreasonable

risk

of accidents,

injuries,

or death.

Testing

had not been systematically

focused

on problems

identified

through

analysis

of available

accident

data as having

a high potential

for

reducing

highway

accidents,

deaths,

and injuries.

NHTSA did not use manufacturers

1 certification

data to supplement

and refine

its limited

testing

program

and did not take timely

action

to resolve

test

failure

cases.

GAO recommended

that

the

1.

Systematic

selecting

testing.

use of

vehicles,

2.

Evaluation

dent data

of

and

Secretary

Transportation

accident

data and studies

equipment,

and standards

compliance

testing

priorities

studies

and the results

of

require:

as a key factor

in

areas for compliance

prior

on the basis

compliance

of accitests.

use of manufacturers’

the NHTSA’s standards

certification

enforcement

data

particularly

corrected.

in

3.

Expanded

and

to supplement

coverage.

systematic

and refine

4.

Timely

having

in resolving

vehicles

and

action

unsafe

of

test

failure

cases,

equipment

conditions

The Department

stated

it was doing

as much and as well

as could be expected

with

available

resources.

The Department

and automobile

industry

representatives

cautioned

that

use of accident

data should

involve

meaningful evaluation

of its relationship

to specific

vehicle

safety

standards.

The representatives

agreed,

however,

that

results

of accident

investigations

could be helpful

in determining

priorities

for compliance

checking

and

enforcement.

(B-164497(3),

Apr.

24, 1973.)

82

*

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

NATIONAL

s

c

RAILROAD

PASSENGER CORPORATION

(AMTRAK)

AMTRAK--a private,

for profit

corporation

created

by the Congress

to

operate

and revitalize

intercity

rail

passenger

service--uses

the facilities

The railroads

are reimbursed

by AMTRAK

of 13 railroads

to provide

service.

for operating

costs

exceeding

revenues.

AMTRAK receives

Federal

financial

assistance

through

grants

from the Department.

The Chairman,

Subcommittee

on Transportation

and Aeronautics,

House

Committee

on Interstate

and Foreign

Commerce,

asked GAO for a report

and

evaluation

of railroad

passenger

service

provided

by AMTRAK.

Need to

through

improve

better

train

conditions

maintenance

GAO inspected

AMTRAK’s trains

and reviewed

the maintenance,

repair,

and

refurbishment

of its locomotives

and passenger

cars in 1972.

GAO reported

to the Subcommittee

Chairman

that

the general

cleanliness

of passenger

cars

and the condition

of on-board

equipment,

such as air-conditioning,

was unsatisfactory

on many of the trains

it inspected.

AMTRAK did not carry

out

the congressional

directive

to take direct

control

over maintenance

and repair,

and it was not able to keep its

trains

in good operating

condition

because

its contractual

arrangements

with

the railroads

did not provide

for

an effective

maintenance

program

and because

it did not adequately

monitor

the railroads’

activities.

AMTRAK lost

revenue

and incurred

additional

costs

by renting

cars because

one third

of its fleet

was out of service

during much of 1972 for maintenance,

repair,

or refurbishment.

GAO recommended

that

AMTRAK:

--Take

direct

responsibility

for

passenger

cars and locomotives.

maintaining

and

repairing

--Establish

procedures

increase

the number

locomotives.

for inspecting

of employees

car maintenance

and

assigned

to inspection

--Enforce

use

condition

train

crews’

of

car

--Establish

a maintenance

record

--Expedite

passenger

establishment

cars.

of

--Award

refurbishment

--Schedule

passenger

--Prepare

detailed

--Hold

contractors

contracts

cars

in

system

a parts

specifications

responsible

for

cars.

inventory

control

system

of

competition,

basis

open

refurbishment.

refurbishment.

defective

83

reports.

passenger

for

for

repairs

of cars

for

on the

advance

trip

its

refurbishment.

for

and

and

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

NATIONAL

RAILROAD

PASSENGER CORPORATION

(AMTRAK)

(continued)

AMTRAK, the Department

of Transportation,

and the Interstate

Commerce

Commission

generally

agreed with

GAO’s conclusions

and recommendations.

AMTRAK said that

it was taking

actions

similar

to those recommended

by GAO

(B-175155,

June 21,

to improve

the condition

and operation

of its

trains.

1973.)

Analysis

of railroad

passenger

train

scheduling

and operations

service

GAO engaged

a firm

of transportation

consultants

to study

intercity

passenger

train

scheduling

and operations

to determine

how well

passenger

The consultant

firm’s

report

rail

service

matched

user demands and desires.

was furnished

to the Subcommittee

Chairman.

On the

basis

--AMTRAK

obtain

of

should

better

its

study,

the

consultant

better

match train

use of equipment.

make-ups

--Because

many passengers

ride

coaches

only,

maximized

and use of parlor

cars,

sleeper

cars,

which

are costly

to operate,

should

profitable.

firm

said

that:

to

traffic

requirements

use of coaches

should

be

cars,

and separate

dining

be minimized

except

where

--Given

the low loadings

on many AMTRAK routes,

particularly

shorter

haul routes,

alternate

equipment,

especially

the

car,

should

be considered,

--To reduce

variations

in traffic,

charging

ferential

fares,

i.e.,

light

and premium

fares

in peak

to

AMTRAK should

experiment

lower fares

on days when

periods.

the

rail

diesel

with

traffic

difis

--Because

terminal

costs

are substantial

and AMTRAK makes many train

stops

at low-revenue-producing

cities,

AMTRAK should

study

the location

and frequency

of its stops

and the costs

associated

with

them.

--Because

passenger

rail

service

is

transportation

mode, AMTRAK should

market

of recreational

travel.

generally

a leisure-time

study how it could

tap

--AMTRAK should

establish

and analyze

market

data

an adequate

for operational

and finance

as a basis

program

to

planning.

the

growing

collect

AMTRAK said that

it recognized

the validity

of the consultant’s

observations

but that

it had found

many institutional

railroad

practices

which

inhibited

instant

and dramatic

change.

AMTRAK said

that

it was striving

to

overcome

these practices

and expected

continued

improvement.

(B-175155,

Feb. 22, 1973.)

84

.

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

NATIONAL

RAILROAD

PASSENGER CORPORATION

Railroad

reservation,

and ticketing

services

*

r

(AMTRAK)

(continued)

information,

being

improved

GAO interviewed

1,900 passengers

concerning

reservations

on 340 train

trips

in June and July 1972.

GAO reported

to the Subcommittee

Chairman

that

about

60 percent

of these passengers

commented

on their

difficulties

in getting

train

information,

making

reservations,

and obtaining

tickets.

They

mentioned

long delays

in making

telephone

inquiries;

long lines

and slow

service

at ticket

offices;

incorrect

information

on fares,

schedules,

and

errors

in seat and compartment

assignments;

and AMTRAK’s

accommodations;

inability

to confirm

reservations

for the return

portion

of round trips.

At two of AMTRAK’s major

reservation

offices

(Chicago

and New York),

about

30 percent

of customers

’ telephone

calls

during

an 8-week period

in

the summer of 1972 were not completed

because

of insufficient

telephone

equipment

and personnel.

GAO found

that

obtaining

reservations,

information,

or tickets,

whether

by telephone

or in person,

was slow.

Reservation

and ticket

agents

frequently

gave out incorrect

information

regarding

fares,

sleeping

accommodations,

dining

facilities,

and departure

times;

and many

agents

did not know of AMTRAK’s policy

to accept

major

cred

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