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I
ON APPROPRIATIONS
HOUSE OF REPR
Significant Audit
Findings In T
Departments
ties
Of The Government B.io6190
BY THE COMPTR,
OF THE UNITED’S
COMPTROLLER
GENERAL
OF THE
WASHINGTON.
D.C.
UNITED
STATES
20848
B-106190
The Honorable George H. Mahon
Chairman, Committee on Appropriations
House of Representatives
G”
Dear Mr.
Chairman:
This report
contains
significant
audit findings
developed
during our audits and other examinations
in the civil
departThese findings
pertain
ments and agencies of the Government.
for the most part to matters
on which we believe
administrative
action,
and in some cases legislative
action,
is required
to
achieve greater
economy or efficiency
in Government operations,
Some findings
and recommendations
on which the departments
and agencies have reported
that corrective
action was being
t.aken also have been included because we have not yet observed
the effectiveness
of the reported
action.
This compilation
is made in response to the request that
information
of this type be made available
to your Committee
before the commencement of appropriation
hearings at each
session of the Congress.
Concurrently
with the release of this
we are sending to the departments
and agencies copies
report,
of the sections
specifically
applicable
to them so that they
may be in a position
to answer any inquiries
which may be made
on these matters
during the appropriation
hearings.
A report
on significant
audit findings
partment of Defense and the three military
being submitted
separately.
Sincerely
involving
departments
yours,
Comptroller
General
of the United States
the Deis
Contents
Page
.
DEPARTMENTOF AGRICULTURE
Agricultural
Stabilization
and Conservation
Commodity Credit Corporation
Export Marketing Service
Farmers Home Administration
Food and Nutrition
Service
Soil Conservation Service
1
Service
and
.
DEPARTMENTOF COMMERCE
National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration
13
15
DEPARTMENTOF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE
Health Services and Mental Health Administration
National Institutes
of Health
Office of Education
Social and Rehabilitation
Service
Social Security Administration
17
19
20
22
24
31
DEPARTMENTOF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT
Community Development
General Insurance
Housing Production and Mortgage Credit
Interstate
Land Sales
33
35
38
39
46
DEPARTMENTOF THE INTERIOR
Bureau of Reclamation
Geological Survey
Southwestern Power Administration
47
49
50
52
DEPARTMENTOF JUSTICE
Law Enforcement Assistance
53
55
57
Administration
DEPARTMENTOF LABOR
Manpower Administration
Occupational
Safety and Health
n
4
3
6
9
10
11
Administration
59
65
DEPARTMENTOF STATE, AGENCYFOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
67
DEPARTMENTOF TRANSPORTATION
Department-wide
Federal Aviation
Rdminis':ration
National Highway Traffi c Safety Administration
National Railroad Passenger Corporation
(AMTRAK)
77
79
80
82
83
DEPARTMENTOF THE TREASURY
Internal
Revenue Service
International
Financial
Affairs
U.S. Customs Service
87
89
90
92
ATOMIC ENERGYCOMMISSION
Director
of Regulation
95
97
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT
courts
Department of Corrections
Department of Environmental
Services
Department of Highways and Traffic
Department of Human Resources
Executive Office of the Commissioner
Page
99
101
102
103
104
105
106
ENVIRONMENTALPROTECTIONAGENCY
107
EXPORT-IMPORTBANK OF THE UNITED STATES
113
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONSCOMMISSION
119
GENERALSERVICES ADMINISTRATION
Automated Data and Telecommunications
Federal Supply Service
National Archives and Records Service
Public Buildings
Service
123
125
126
128
130
Service
INTER-AMERICAN FOUNDATION
133
NATIONAL AERONAUTICSAND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
137
0 FFICE OF ECONOMICOPPORTUNITY
Economic Development Division
Experimental Research Division
External Audit Division
Office of Legal Services
State and Local Government Division
141
143
145
147
149
151
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT
AND BUDGET
153
RENEGOTIATION BOARD
157
TENNESSEEVALLEY AUTHORITY
161
UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
165
UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE
171
VETERANS ADMINISTRATION
175
VARIOUS DEPARTMENTSAND AGENCIES
Civil Service Commission, Off'ice of Management and Budget,
and Department of Labor
Department of Agriculture
and Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare
Department of Agriculture;
Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare; Department of Justice;
Department of the
Treasury; and Office of Management and Budget
Department of Agriculture;
Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare; Department of Labor; Office of Economic
Opportunity;
and Office of p4anagement and Budget
181
l
-
1
182
183
185
187
1
Page
VARIOUS DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES (continued)
Department
of Agriculture
and Department
of the Interior
Department
of Agriculture,
Department
of State,
and
Agency for International
Development
Department
of Commerce;
Department
of Defense;
General
Services
Administration;
Department
of Health,
Education,
and Welfare;
Department
of Labor;
and Veterans
Administration
Department
of Commerce,
Department
of the Interior,
and
Office
of Management
and Budget
Department
of Defense,
General
Services
Administration,
and Tennessee
Valley
Authority
Department
of Defense
and Department
of State
Department
of the Interior,
Department
of Agriculture,
Department
of Defense,
and the General
Services
Administration
Department
of Justice
and Department
of State
Department
of Justice
and Department
of the Treasury
Department
of Labor and Department
of Health,
Education,
and Welfare
Office
of Management
and Budget,
Corps of Engineers,
Department
of Housing
and Urban Development,
and Department
of
Transportation
Office
of Management
and Budget
and General
Services
Administration
189
191
193
197
199
201
205
207
209
211
213
215
DEPARTMENTOF AGRICULTURE
Contents
Page
AGRICULTURALSTABILIZATION AND CONSERVATIONSERVICE AND COMMODITY
CREDIT CORPORATION
Need intensifies
to amend legislation
to reduce Government losses
on the peanut price-support
program
Fees for processing price-support
loans and storage facility
and
equipment loans not related to actual costs
EXPORT MARKETING SERVICE
Russian wheat sales and weaknesses in Agriculture's
wheat export subsidy program
FARMERSHOMEADMINISTRATION
Ways to improve effectiveness
of rural
business
3
3
4
6
management of
6
loan programs
9
9
FOOD AND NUTRITION SERVICE
Need for more accurate information
on schools not participating
in
the school lunch program and on the cost of lunches served under
the program
10
SOIL CONSERVATIONSERVICE
Progress in meeting important objectives
of the Great Plains
Conservation Program could be improved
11
1
10
11
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
AGRICULTURAL STABILIZATION
AND CONSERVATION SERVICE AND
COMMODITY CREDIT CORPORATION
.
Need intensifies
reduce
Government
peanut
price-supnort
to amend legislation
losses
on the
program
to
In May 1968 GAO reported
to the Congress
that
the Commodity
Credit
Corporation
(CCC) had lost
about
$270 million
on the peanut
price-support
program
between
1955 and 1966 and would lose at least
$248 million
over the
next 5 years 9 1967 through
1971.
At that
time GAO recommended
that
the
Department
develop
for the Congress’
consideration
a program
to more effectively
control
peanut
production.
Because the program
was not changed
and CCC incurred
greater
losses,
GAO reassessed
the program
to determine
what should
be done to effectively
control
production
and reduce
losses.
In an April
1973 report
to the Congress,
GAO stated
that
the Agricultural
Adjustment
Act of 1938, as amended,
requires
the Secretary
of
Agriculture
to control
peanut
production
on the basis
of demand but
specifies
also that he authorize
annually
not less than 1,610,OOO
acres
for growing
peanuts.
The sponsors
of the act had expressed
hope that
this
acreage
would be sufficient
on all occasions
to supply
the edible
trade
without
any substantial
surplus.
Since 1955, however,
fewer than 1,610,OOO
acres have been needed annually
to satisfy
commercial
demand because
advances
in farm technology
have increased
yields
per acre by an average
of
70 pounds a year.
An average
of 1,015,OOO
acres annually
would have produced the necessary
supply
during
1967 through
1971.
Under the program,
CCC has to buy the surplus
peanuts
and store
them
until
they are sold.
CCC sells
them for significantly
lower prices
than it
From 1967 through
1971 CCC recovered
through
sales
53 perpays for them.
cent of its cost of buying
surplus
peanuts
and lost
$279 million
on the
program,
a 66-percent
increase
over the loss of $168 million
from 1962
through
19 66.
In March 1972 the Department’s
Agricultural
Stabilization
and Conservation
Service
(ASCS), which
administers
the program
for CCC,
if the present
program
were continued,
losses
from 1973
projected
that,
through
1977 would total
$537 million,
a 92-percent
increase
over the
losses
incurred
between
1967 and 1971.
.
Although
GAO made no recommendations
to the Department,
it recommended
to the Congress
that
the Agricultural
Adjustment
Act of 1938 be amended to
rescind
the minimum acreage
provision
to give the Secretary
more flexibility
to adjust
production
so that
it will
be consistent
with commercial
demand.
Although
the Department
agreed
that
such a change could help bring
peanut
production
more in line
with
demand,
it said that
it was not completely
satisfied
that
the change was the most desirable
solution
in the
long run.
It said further
that
it was studying
GAO’s recommendation
and
possible
alternatives.
3
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
AAGRICULTURAL STABILIZATION
.\ND CONSERVATION SERVICE AND
CObiblODITY CREDIT CORPORATION (continued)
GAO recognized
demand more in line
would not preclude
of the Department’s
that
alternatives
existed
for bringing
production
and
but noted
that
removal
of the minimum acreage
provision
any actions
the Secretary
may wish to take as a result
study of alternatives.
(B-163484,
Apr.
13, 1973.)
Fees for processing
price-support
and storage
facility
and equipment
not related
to actual
costs
loans
loans
GAO examined
into
the fee assessment
policies
concerning
its processing
of price-support
loans
equipment
loans
authorized
under CCC programs,
and practices
of
and storage
facility
ASCS
and
Title
V of the Independent
Offices
Appropriation
Act of 1952 and
Circular
No. A-25 of the Office
of Management
and Budget
state
that
Government activities
which
provide
identifiable
recipients
with
special
benefits
or privileges
should
be financially
self-sustaining
to the maximum extent
possible.
The act states
that
fair
and equitable
fees should
be prescribed
which
consider
direct
and indirect
costs
to the Government,
value
to the
recipients,
public
policy
or interest
served,
and other
pertinent
facts.
Circular
No. A-25 states
that,
in addition
to those
costs
directly
related
to the activity,
the cost to the Government
should
include
a proportionate
share of an agency) s management
and supervisory
costs
and that
the cost of
providing
the service
should
be reviewed
every year and fees should
be
adjusted
as necessary.
GAO’s review
showed that ASCS charged
fees for processing
loans--established
in 1969 and based on 1967 information--that
directly.related
to the costs
which should
have been recovered
charge
for processing
storage
facility
and equipment
loans.
antiually.review
its costs
to process
these
loans.
..
that
In a’ July
ASCS:
1972
report
--Systematically
storage
facility
for recovering
fullest
extent
public
policy,
--Review
the costs
as necessary.
to
the
Secretary
of
Agriculture,
price-support
were not
and did not
ASCS did not
GAO recommended
establish
fees for processing
price-support
loans and
and equipment
loans
on a basis
that
would provide
the related
costs,
including
overhead
costs,
to the
possible
and would consider
value
to the recipient,
interest
served,
and other
pertinent
facts.
of
these
activities
every
year
and adjust
the
fees
ASCS replied
that,
although
it did not totally
agree with GAO’s recommendat ions,
it would review
its loan-fee
arrangements.
On May 31, 1973,
ASCS issued
a directive
to its State
and county
offices
ordering
an increase
in price-support
loan service
fees,
beginning
with loans made in the 1973
4
l
DEPARTMENTOF AGRICULTURE
AGRICULTURALSTABILIZATION
AND CONSERVATIONSERVICE AND
COMMODITYCREDIT CORPORATION(continued)
crop year.
However, ASCS rescinded these increases on June 22, 1973, in
response to Executive Order 11723, dated June 13, 1973, which froze certain
prices for a maximum of 60 days. ASCS officials
advised GAO in September
and August 1973, respectively,
that:
--The price-support
loan service fees were no longer frozen under
Phase IV guidelines
and it was considering
increasing such fees
for the 1974 crop year.
--The matter of establishing
a fee for processing storage facility
and equipment loans was still
under consideration.
(B-163484,
July 13, 1972.)
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
EXPORT MARKETING
SERVICE
Russian
wheat sales
and weaknesses
in Agriculture
Is management
of
wheat export
subsidy
program
The President
announced
the sign ing of an agreement
with Russia
on
July 8, 1972, making
$750 million
in credit
available
for 3 years
for purchasing
various
U.S. grains.
By then Russia
was already
purchasing
U.S.
wheat.
Within
a few weeks,
cash and credit
wheat sales
to Russia,
heavily
subsidized
by the U.S. Government,
approximated
$700 million,
the largest
private
grain
sales
in U.S. history.
I
1
The wheat export
subsidy
program
began in 1949 to help the United
States
meet its obligation
to export
wheat at prices
agreed
to under
the
International
Wheat Agreement.
The program’s
major
objectives
are to
generally
insure
that
U.S. wheat
is competitive
in world
markets
and to
reduce
Government
wheat
inventories.
The Export
Marketing
Service
establishes
daily
subsidy
rates
for
wheat.
The Service
has maintained
a zero subsidy
rate
for all
types
of
wheat since
September
22, 1972,
allowing
wheat prices
to seek their
own
levels,
but,
during
the preceding
4 months,
rates
ranged
from a few cents
to as high as 51 cents
a bushel,
Before
its suspension,
the program
incurred
about
$4.3 billion
in subsidy
costs
for exporting
about
10.5 billion
bushels
of U.S. wheat.
There is little
doubt
that
the program
has been
instrumental
in competitively
pricing
U.S. wheat moving
into
export
markets.
GAO reported
to the Congress
that
the large
sales
of U.S. wheat
to
Russia
and other
exports
in the summer of 1972 caused a dramatic
rise
in the
price
of U.S. wheat.
Hard Winter
wheat
sold at gulf
ports
for $1.68
a
bushel
in July brought
$2.49
a bushel
in September
and even more later.
An
export
goal of 650 million
bushels
and a fiscal
year 1973 budget
estimate
of $67 million
in subsidy
mushroomed
to 1.1 billion
bushels
in exports
and
over $300 million
in subsidy.
tbtaling
addition
Agriculture
claims
that
about
$457 million
to other
benefits.
the U.S. Treasury
as a result
of the
will
accrue
wheat sales
net benefits
to Russia
in
Agriculture
is committed
to pay over $300 million
in subsidies
on the
Russian
and other
export
sales.
GAO expressed
the belief
that many of these
sales would have been made even with
reduced
subsidies
and that Agriculture
should
have responded
more rapidly
to the available
information
and reduced
or eliminated
the subsidies
sooner.
Wheat
export
subsidy
6
program
After
October
1971 the key determinant
in establishing
daily
wheat subsidy rates
was the export
target
price.
The difference
between
the target
price
and the domestic
price
was the daily
export
subsidy
rate.
Maintenance
of a low target
price
throughout
the period
of the Russian
sales
and for
6
1
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
m
*
EXPORT MARKETING
SERVICE
(continued)
several
subsequent
Government
to pay
weeks was a crucial
excessive
subsidies.
factor
in
obligating
the
U.S.
GAO questioned
the maintenance
of a low target
price
in view of available intelligence
reports
and analyses
indicating
adverse
Russian
crop conditions.
Agriculture
also knew that
the United
States
was the dominant
wheat
supplier
and that
purchasers
of large
supplies
had to come to the
United
States.
Agriculture
officials
recognized
early
in 1972 that
the world
wheat
situation
was changing
but decided
against
increasing
the export
target
price
for several
reasons.
GAO expected
to find
a detailed
analysis
to
support
such a major policy
decision,
but it seems to have been based
largerly
on intuitive
judgments
made by Agriculture
officials.
Speculating
in
subsidy
registrations
Changes made in 1967 to the basic
wheat export
subsidy
program,
ting
subsidy
registrations
at exporters’
options,
and other
program
in effect
at the time of the Russian
wheat
sales
tended
to minimize
and created
an environment
whereby
exporters
could make substantial
Although
Agriculture
sought
to increase
the flexibility
for exporters
price
U.S. wheat competitively
in international
markets,
the program
appropriate
administrative
controls.
permitfeatures
risks
profits.
to
lacked
Some exporters
making
sales
in August
1972 registered
weeks later
at higher
subsidy
rates.
In five
examples,
of about
$604,493
was paid.
Had exporters
been required
the subsidy
would have been $286,188,
the dates
of sales,
sales
several
a total
subsidy
to register
on
or $318,305
less.
Export
the program
exporters.
no evidence
competition
Marketing
Service
had allowed
excess
Carrying-charge
officials
profit
contend
there
is
because
of intense
that
among
payments
In addition
to the basic
export
subsidy,
Agriculture
provided
a
carrying-charge
subsidy
to cover
the estimated
costs
of owning wheat
for
future
delivery,
The subsidy
registration
date,
instead
of the sale date,
is used to calculate
subsidy
entitlement.
In 28 instances
totaling
about
$360,000,
had the sale contract
dates
rather
than the registration
dates
determined
the carrying-charge
subsidies,
the payments
would have been
about
$350,000
less.
Program
h
evaluation
needs
Despite
annual
subsidy
outlays
of millions
not comprehensively
evaluated
the wheat export
evaluations
indicating
that
the subsidy
program
dismissed
by operating
officials.
7
of dollars,
Agriculture
subsidy
program.
Limited
was not fully
effective
has
were
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
EXPORT MARKETING
SERVICE
(continued)
GAO examined
several
pertinent
statistical
relationships
indicative
of
program
effectiveness.
It concluded,
on the basis
of making U.S. wheat
competitive
in international
markets,
that Agriculture
seemed to have paid
greater
subsidies
than the marketplace
required.
Other agricultural
economists
questioned
the need for subsidy
payments
and suggested
that
the
program
needed
to be completely
reevaluated,
The major GAO recommendation
to the Secretary
of Agriculture
was that
the wheat,export
subsidy
program
be reviewed
in its entirety
and that
its
reinstatement
be predicated
on a meaningful
justification
for its existence.
ment
tion
The Secretary
of Agriculture
said GAO’s study would help the Departimprove
the program.
The Secretary
agreed
with GAO’s major
recommendabut took issue with
GAO on some other
observations
and conclusions.
GAO suggested
that
the Congress
should
consider
requiring
that
agencies
develop
definitive
ground
rules
so that
expected
benefits
from exports
can
be appropriately
weighed
against
their
impact
on various
segments
of the
domestic
economy,
(B-176943,
July 9, 1973.)
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
FARMERS HOME ADMINISTRATION
Ways to improve
.rural
business
c
It
/’’
I
*/:
effectiveness
loan programs
of
The Economic
Opportunity
Act of 1964, as amended,
authorized
several
One of these programs-special
programs
to combat poverty
in rural
areas.
the Economic
Opportunity
Cooperative
Loan Program--administered
by the
Farmers
Home Administration
(FHA) provided
loans
to cooperative
associations
in rural
areas.
Although
the program
was terminated
could be helpful
to FHA in administering
dustrial
loan programs
authorized
by the
on June 30, 1971,
GAO’s findings
the new rural
business
and inRural
Development
Act of 1972.
GAO found that
many economic
opportunity
cooperatives
encountered
problems,
such as weak management
and adverse
market
conditions,
and
therefore
failed
to stay in business
or became delinquent
in their
loan
repayments.
Not all problems
encountered
by the cooperatives
could
have
been foreseen.
Many problems,
however,
could have been identified
and
corrected
had FHA required
adequate
determinations
of the economic
soundness
and feasibility
of cooperative
projects
and had FHA improved
its policies
and procedures
for supervising
and evaluating
cooperatives’
activities.
In accordance
with
GAO’s recommendations
for implementing
the business
and industrial
loan programs
authorized
by the Rural
Development
Act of
1972,
FHA stated
that
it (1) was preparing
regulations
that
would require
applications
for loan assistance
to include
feasibility
studies,
marketing
agreements,
management
evaluations,
and an analysis
of the adequacy
of working capital,
(2) had taken
steps
to provide
employee
training,
(3) had considered
additional
staffing
of new types
of professional
and technical
skills,
and (4) would,
when practical,
express
program
objectives
in specific
goals
and use such goals
to periodically
measure
program
effectiveness.
fiscal
FHA plans
to
year 1974.
implement
(B-114873,
the new business
May 2, 1973.)
9
and industrial
loan
programs
in
DEPARTMENTOF AGRICULTURE
FOODAND NUTRITION SERVICE
Need for more accurate information
on schools not participating
in the
school lunch program and on the cost
of lunches served under the program
Food and Nutrition
Service (FNS) statistics
showed that, in fiscal
year’
q
1972, 82,900 schools, with about 45 million
students enrolled,
were partici-‘,
However, FNS data also showed that,
/
pating in the school lunch program.
schools, with about
‘I*
early in the 1971-72 school year, about 24,900 eligible
8.7 million
students enrolled,
were not participating
in the program.
About
18,100 of these schools did not have any type of food service;
and FNS identified
at least 4,400, with 1.4 million
students enrolled,
as needy schools.
An FNS survey in March 1972 showed that about 1.5 million
needy students
attending participating
schools were not eating free or reduced-price
lunches,
GAO found that some schools did not participate
because they lacked the
equipment and facilities
to prepare and serve the food and others did not
participate
for reasons based on local preference or on special local conditions not susceptible
to Federal persuasion.
FNS did not have reliable
data concerning which schools needed assistance and the extent of their
needs. Such data would help FNS resolve these problems and determine the
assistance or changes in administrative
policies
or legislation
needed to
enable such schools to participate.
GAO also found that FNS had not sufficiently
guided the schools on how
to compute accurate per-lunch costs which FNS needs to insure that Federal
reimbursements do not exceed the actual cost of lunches, as required by
existing
legislation.
GAO recommended that actions be taken to obtain better information
on
schools needing assistance and the extent of their needs, promote the school
lunch program, and define reimbursable
costs,
The Department generally
agreed with GAO’s conclusions
and described actions that were being taken to
implement the recommendations,
(B-178564, June 29, 1973.)
10
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
SOIL
CONSERVATION
SERVICE
Progress
in meeting
of the Great Plains
could
be improved
II
*
important
Conservation
objectives
Program
The Soil
Conservation
Service
(SCS),
Department
of Agriculture,
combats
climatic
hazards
in the Great Plains
by helping
farmers,
ranchers,
and other
landowners
and operators
voluntarily
carry
out planned
soil
and water
conservation
practices
through
technical
assistance
and direct
cost sharing
under
contracts
of from 3 to 10 years.
In June 1973 GAO reported
to the Congress
that
progress
in converting
unsuitable
cropland
to permanent
vegetative
cover
and reseeding
badly
depleted
rangeland
had been less than expected
in view of the program’s
legislative
history,
which
stressed
the importance
of meeting
these needs.
To provide
for greater
progress
before
the program’s
scheduled
expiration
in 1981,
GAO recommended
that
SCS (1) revise
its fund allocation
system
to insure
that
program
funds
are used,
to the extent
practical,
for highest
priority
work first
and (2) increase
a $25,000
administrative
limitation
on
any one contract
to recognize
cost
increases
since
the limitation
was established
and to increase
the rate
of achieving
important
program
objectives.
GAO also noted
a conflict
between
the program
and certain
features
of
the commodity
price-support
programs
and suggested
that
the Congress
explore
with
the Department
the feasibility
and desirability
of enacting
legislation
to provide
additional
incentives
for farmers
to convert
unsuitable
cropland
to permanent
vegetative
cover,
giving
consideration
to disincentives
resulting from commodity
price-support
programs.
In
response
--Had
the
to
GAO’s
studied
and will
fund allocation
continue
system,
Department
to study
the feasibility
giving
due consideration
--Had recognized
the inadequacy
of
and was reevaluating
the limitation
of conservation
practices.
t
the
recommendations,
the
$25,000
in view
The Department
did not comment on the conflict
commodity
price-support
programs.
SCS headquarters
agreed
that
the conflict
was one of the significant
progress
of achieving
program
objectives.
(B-114833,
11
stated
that
SCS:
of revising
to priorities.
limitation
per
of the increasing
contract
costs
between
the program
officials,
however,
constraints
on the
June 28, 1973.)
and
DEPARTMENTOF COMMERCE
Contents
Page
NATIONAL OCEANIC AND AT!IOSPHERIC ADIIINISTRATION
Continuation
of the Fish Protein Concentrate
yield only limited
benefits
13
15
Program would
15
DEP.I\RT!IENT OF CO?QIERCE
I;.\TIONXL
OCE-\YIC
Continuation
Fish Protein
r;ould
)-ield
.YiD .JIT\IOSPHERIC XDI\IIYISTR.4TI@N
of the
Concentrate
only limited
Program
benefits
.\t the request
of the Chairman,
Subcommittee
on Fisheries
and Wildlife
Conserration,
House Committee
on !Ierchant
!larine
and Fisheries,
GAO reviewed
the Fish Protein
Concentrate
(FPC) Program
administered
by the Administration’s
Sational
Yarine
Fisheries
Service,
Under this
program
a Governmentoiined experimental
plant
\<as established
at Aberdeen,
Washington,
to
demonstrate
the economic
feasibility
of commercial
production
of FPC.
G.1\0 concluded
that,
although
the plant
was useful
in developing
a
process
for producing
FPC, it did not demonstrate
the economic
feasibility
of commercial
production
of FPC.
The domestic
market
potential
for the
tyPe of FPC produced
by the Service
was limited
at that
time and the U.S.
fishing
industry
Icould not be enhanced
by a commercial
FPC industry.
GXO expressed
the belief
that
the Government
could
realize
only limited
benefits
if it Tiere to continue
operating
an experimental
plant.
It appeared
that
if a strong
domestic
and foreign
need for FPC becomes
evident,
industry
ma)- become interested
and begin
to produce
it.
GAO also expressed
the belief
that,
if an estension
of the program
is authorized,
it would be more beneficial
to move the experimental
plant
to a Gulf
location
in order
to be closer
to the source
of fish
supply.
G.10 suggested
that,
if the Subcommittee
favors
extending
the program,
the Subcommittee
should
include
in a report
on the subject
language
instructing the Service
to (1) continually
develop
information
on the present
and
potential
FPC markets,
both domestic
and foreign,
(2) determine
the present
and future
available
fish
resources
for producing
FPC commercially,
(3) evaluate
sites
on the Atlantic
and Gulf Coasts,
including
a determination
of the detailed
costs
for each site
and industry’s
v;illingness
to participate,
and (4) complete
the research
into
storage
methods
to develop
and demonstrate
alternatives
to using
frozen
fish.
The National
Oceanic
and Atmospheric
Administration
stated
that
GAO’s
report
presented
a fair
evaluation
of the FPC program
and situation
and
that
the information
in the report
was generally
consistent
with
its
records.
(B-157927,
Yay 25, 1973.)
15
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,
EDUCATION,
L
AND WELFARE
Contents
Page
HEALTH SERVICES AND MENTAL HEALTH ADMINISTRATION
Need for Neighborhood
Health
Centers
to seek
reimbursements
and to improve
administrative
practices
NATIONAL INSTITUTES
OF HEALTH
Better
management
needed
of
health
research
19
increased
third-party
and operating
19
equipment
by grantees
OFFICE OF EDUCATION
Need for improved
coordination
of federally
assisted
student
programs
in institutions
of higher
education
Additional
efforts
needed
to fully
achieve
the objectives
of
Vocational
Education
Act
20
20
22
aid
22
the
23
SOCIAL AND REHABILITATION
SERVICE
Need to improve
effectiveness
of vocational
rehabilitation
in helping the handicapped
Social
services
have only a minor
impact
on directly
helping
welfare recipients
achieve
self-support
or reduced
dependency
Need to improve
administration
of certain
eligibility
aspects
in
the aid to families
with
dependent
children
program
in Pennsylvania
Some problems
in contracting
for federally
assisted
child-care
services
Improvement
needed
in the administration
of the program
to provide
Medicare
benefits
for welfare
recipients
Problems
in functioning
of State
systems
for reviewing
use of
medical
services
financed
under Medicaid
24
SOCIAL SECURITY
Opportunities
processing
31
ADMINISTRATION
to increase
services
competition
among
suppliers
of
24
25
26
27
28
29
data
31
17
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,
HEALTH
D.
AND WELFARE
SERVICES AND MENTAL HEALTH ADMINISTRATION
Need for Neighborhood
increased
third-party
improve
administrative
M
EDUCATION,
Health
Centers
reimbursements
and operating
to seek
and
practices
At the request
of the Chairman,
Subcommittee
on Health,
Senate
Committee
on Labor and Public
Welfare,
GAO reviewed
certain
actions
taken
by the Health
Services
and Mental
Health
Administration
to implement
its announced
policy
of eventually
replacing
direct
Federal
support
in all
of its health
service
delivery
projects
with
increased
third-party
and other
reimbursements.
The Subcommittee
was particularly
interested
in the potential
impact
of
this
policy
on the Neighborhood
Health
Center
(NHC) program
funded
under
Section
314(e)
of the Public
Health
Service
Act (42 U.S.C.
246(e)).
NHCs
provide,
directly
or indirectly,
a range of services
designed
to meet the
majority
of health
needs of a defined
target
population.
These services
include,
as a minimum,
preventive,
diagnostic,
therapeutic,
and general
health
maintenance
elements.
In May 1973 GAO reported
to the Subcommittee
that
NHCs’ administrative
and operating
practices
and the nature
of available
third-party
reimbursement
programs
severely
limited
NHCs’ prospects
to improve
their
level
of selfsupport.
In its
selective
review
of five
NHCs, GAO noted
evidence
of (1)
lack of control
over accounts
receivable,
(2) ineffective
use of available
health
services,
and (3) inadequate
efforts
to qualify
for and use thirdparty
reimbursements.
GAO noted
also that
the NHCs offered
a variety
of
services,
such as nutrition,
optometry,
and speech therapy,
for which
thirdparty
reimbursement
was not available
and that
these
services
would have to
be reduced
or eliminated
if greater
reliance
were placed
on third-party
reimbursement
programs.
GAO expressed
its belief
that
the NHCs could
substantially
increase
their
level
of self-support
by eliminating
inefficient
administrative
and operating practices
and by obtaining
recognition
as providers
of services
eligible
under
Federal
and federally
assisted
programs.
(B-164031(2),
May 2, 1973.)
19
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,
NATIONAL
Better
health
INSTITUTES
EDUCATION,
AND WELFARE
OF HEALTH
management
needed
research
equipment
of
by grantees
Research
grants
to such institutions
as universities,
colleges,
and
medical
schools
constitute
the largest
part
of the research
program
of the
These grants
provide
funds
for such
National
Institutes
of Health
(NIH).
expenses
as salaries,
supplies,
travel,
and equipment.
About 13 percent
of
the direct
costs
incurred
under NIH research
grants
was for equipment
during
1965--the
latest
year for which
data was compiled
on funds
spent
in this
category.
GAO reviewed
the management
of major
research
equipment
costing
or more per unit
and reported
to the Secretary
of Health,
Education,
fare
(HEW) on July 17, 1973, that:
-
-4
$1,000
and Wel-
1. Although
HEW instructions
specify
that
a grantee
carefully
screen
existing
equipment
before
purchasing
more and require
that
a grantee
certify
that
equipment
is not already
on hand and available,
institutions
lacked
records
adequate
to enable
them to comply with
these
instructions.
Moreover,
NIH had not issued
guidelines
suitable
for grantees
to carry
out HEW’s instructions.
Adequate
records
would have enabled
researchers
to locate
and
use available
equipment
and would have prevented
unnecessary
expenditure
of
research
money for equipment.
2. At the grantee
institutions
visited,
the most effective
ment was not being
made because
NIH has not taken
appropriate
out HEW instructions
urging
researchers
to share equipment.
use
steps
of
to
equipcarry
3. In 1970 NIH established
an equipment
pool in Bethesda,
Maryland,
for
researchers’
use.
However,
NIH does not require
researchers
to use available
pool equipment
or have any procedures
for determining
whether
researchers’
equipment
needs can be met with
available
equipment.
As a result,
the amount
of equipment
used averaged
only 13 percent
from July
1971 through
February
1972.
Another
factor
contributing
to the low use rate
is that
less than
1 percent
of NIH’s
equipment,
worth
$64 million,
is in the pool.
GAO recommended
--Instruct
screen
all
that
grantees
major
the
Secretary
of
to improve
their
items of equipment
--Issue
guidelines
or instructions
and procedures
for establishing
sharing
equipment.
--Establish
NIH pool
screening
is available
HEW direct
records
before
NIH to:
so that
their
officials
purchasing
new equipment.
to its grantees
equipment
pools
to develop
policies
and other
means for
procedures
to determine
whether
equipment
for use before
purchasing
new research
20
can
from the
equipment.
I
,
DEPARTMENTOF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE
NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH (continued)
--Consider expanding the NIH equipment pool by including
more of NIH's
scientific
equipment and requiring
participation
in the pool, unless
special research situations
or the need for extended continual
usage
of certain equipment requires individual
purchases of equipment.
NIH officials
recommendations.
generally agreed with GAO's findings,
(B-164031(2), July 17, 1973.)
21
conclusions,
and
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,
OFFICE
EDUCATION,
AND WELFARE
OF EDUCATION
Need for improved
coordination
of
federally
assisted
student
aid programs
in institutions
of higher
education
The Office
of Education
administers
four major programs
providing
financial
aid to students
attending
colleges,
universities,
and vocational.
schools.
These include
the Guaranteed
Student
Loan program,
the National
Dethe
College
Work-Study
program,
and
the
Educafense
Student
Loan program,
The 4 programs
provided
assistance
of
tional
Opportunity
Grant program.
about
$1.7 billion
to approximately
2.3 million
students
in fiscal
year 1971.
GAO examined
the coordination
of these programs
because
student
enrollment
and tuition
costs
have increased
significantly
in recent
year-s and have
added to the demand for financial
assistance
and to the Government’s
potential
liability
in the case of defaulted
loans.
-
-
GAO pointed
out that
seven of
In an August
1972 report
to the Congress,
eight
institutions
visited
generally
awarded
aid to students
under Office
of
Education
programs
that
require
a showing
of need without
considering
whether
the students
also had obtained
or requested
loans
from lending
institutions
As a result,
some students
were
under
the Guaranteed
Student
Loan program.
provided
with
aid in excess
of their
indicated
financial
needs and some students borrowed
under both loan programs
and incurred
large
debts
that
could be difficult
to repay.
GAO reviewed
400 student
aid cases selected
at random from a list
of
approximately
6,500
students
who had obtained
loans under the Guaranteed
Student
Loan program.
Of the 400 students,,
57 (14 percent)
were awarded
aid,
totaling
about
$51,800,
in excess
of their
indicated
financial
needs.
On the
basis
of the sample,
GAO estimated
that
900, or 14 percent
of the 6,500
students,
had been awarded
aid,
totaling
at least
$761,000,
in excess
of their
indicated
needs.
GAO also noted
that
some institutions
have not had
aid funds
to meet the financial
needs of their
students
received
excess
aid made such aid unavailable
to others
tion
one
GAO suggested
that
on the amount that
loan program.
the Congress
consider
a student
may borrow
sufficient
Federal
and that
sutdents
who qualified.
establishing
an overall
limitawhen participating
,in more than
Also,
GAO recommended
that
HEW take certain
actions
to improve
the
coordination
of federally
assisted
student
aid programs.
HEW concurred
in
the intent
of GAO’s recommendations;
however,
prior
to implementing
the
recommendations,
HEW planned
to study
the matter.
(B-164031(1),
Aug. 2,
1972.)
22
who
I
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,
OFFICE
OF EDUCATION
Additional
efforts
the objectives
of
EDUCATION,
AND WELFARE
(continued)
needed
to fully
achieve
the Vocational
Education
Act
The objective
of the Vocational
Education
Act of 1963, as amended in
1968,
is to provide
all persons
who need vocational
education
with
access
to
vocational
training
which
is realistic
and suited
to their
needs,
interests,
and abilities.
Particular
emphasis
is placed
on meeting
the needs of the
disadvantaged.
GAO reviewed
Federal
vocational
programs
in California,
Michigan,
Ohio,
and Pennsylvania
to find
out if legislative
objectives
were being
achieved
and to identify
major problems.
These States
received
$104 million,
or
22 percent
of the total
Federal
assistance
for vocational
education,
in fiscal year 1972.
GAO’s review
concentrated
on high school
vocational
education,
because
the States’
programs
emphasized
this
level
of education.
achieve
GAO reported
the objectives
to
the Congress
of the act.
that
additional
GAO noted
that:
efforts
are
needed
to
fully
--The
objective
of the legislation
had not been achieved
nationwide
or
in any of the four States
reviewed.
Thirty-seven
percent
of the
Nation’s
high school
students
presumed
to need vocational
education
were not receiving
it according
to HEW data,
and in the 4 States
even
greater
proportions--44
to 75 percent
--were
not receiving
it.
Vocational
educators
say that
causes
of this
situation
are insufficient
funds
and an unfavorable
image of vocational
education,
However,
no
specific
studies
on the image problem
had been made.
--In
the four
States,
funds
intended
by the act to support
special
programs or services
for disadvantaged
persons
unable
to succeed
in the
regular
vocational
education
program
were often
not used for this
purpose.
This happened
because
some State
and local
education
officials
did not fully
understand
the intended
use of funds
for disadvantaged
persons
and therefore
used these
funds
for regular
vocational
programs.
and independent
evaluators
GAO also reported
that
HEW, the four
States,
believe
that
the current
management
information
system
of HEW and the States
did not provide
sufficient
data to adequately
evaluate
the results
of programs,
Data furnished
to HEW by the States
was often
as required
by the act.
inaccurate
or incomplete.
.
A
HEW concurred
with
all
of GAO’s recommendations
and has taken or promised
to take action
to research
vocational
education’s
financial
and image problems , to properly
control
the use of disadvantaged
funds,
and to improve
the
State
officials
also generally
concurred
with
management
informat
ion sys terns.
GAO’s recommendations,
but they and HEW said that
GAO should
have included
more information
on the accomplishments
and potential
of vocational
education.
Although
GAO found
that
some programs
appeared
to be operating
effectively,
incomplete
and inaccurate
management
information
prevented
unquali(B-164031(1),
Oct. 18,
fied
conclusions
on overall
program
effectiveness.
1972 .)
23
DEP.I\RTbIEST OF HEXLTH,
SOCIA4L .1\ND REH-\BILITXTION
SERVICE
Need to improve
effectiveness
vocational
rehabilitation
the handicapped
in
EDUC.\T ION,
AND WELFARE
of
helping
In April
1973 GAO reported
to the Congress
on its review
of the
effectiveness
of programs
under the Vocational
Rehabilitation
Act.
The
act authorized
Federal
grants
to assist
States
to rehabilitate
handicapped
persons
so they might
prepare
for and engage
in gainful
employment.
The
Rehabilitation
Services
Administration
(RS.4) is responsible
for providing
leadership
to the States
in planning,
developing,
and coordinating
State
programs.
State
vocational
rehabilitation
agencies
carry
out programs
authorized
State
and Federal
costs
for basic
support
services--services
under
the act.
generally
rendered
directly
to handicapped
persons--were
$697 million
(the
Federal
share was $548 million)
for fiscal
year 1972.
Helping
all
handicapped
persons
The vocational
rehabilitation
program
has not been able to help all
handicapped
persons --possibly
7 million-who need and would benefit
from
the program.
The number of persons
rehabilitated
annually,
although
increasis
still
not
as
great
as
RSA’s
estimates
of
the
number
becoming
eligible
ing,
each year (increment).
RSA projects
that
rehabilitations
may exceed its estimates
of the annual
increment
in 5 to 10 years.
Then the universe
of persons
in need would begin
to decrease.
Whether
rehabilitations
will
exceed the increment
within
this
time could be affected
by many factors,
such as new legislation
making more
groups
eligible
for services.
Better
estimates
of the size of the universe
and annual
increment
are needed to properly
plan for the size and direction
of the program
and the resources
needed.
Further,
some of the services
provided
under
this
program
are available
under
other
Federal
programs.
it is probably
not necessary
to
Therefore,
meet the needs of the total
universe
through
resources
available
only to RSA.
Helping
each
handicapped
GAO randomly
selected
reported
closed
in 1970 to
clients,
person
served
and reviewed
820 of the 31,650
determine
how well
the program
3 States
individual
,
although
In many instances
benefits
were limited,
improved
or progressed
to the extent
of their
individual
needed additional
services
even though
they might
have
considerable
extent,
.llthough
large
numbers
of
fully
rehabilitated,
GAO found
competitive
with nonhandicapped
cases
served
some clients
capability.
been assisted
persons
were reported
as having
been
that
many had not become self-sufficient
persons.
24
may have
Others
to a
successor
DEPARTJIENT OF HEALTH,
SOCIAL
AND REH.\BILITATION
SERVICE
EDUCATION,
AND WELFARE
(continued)
GAO made several
recommendations
to HEW which
it believed
would
HEW and State
management
and increase
effectiveness
of the program.
HEW said that
most had
generally
agreed
with
these recommendations.
adopted
or were being worked
out.
(B-164031(3),
Apr.
3, 1973.)
r
Social
services
have only a minor
directly
helping
welfare
recipients
self-support
or reduced
dependency
improve
agencies
been
impact
on
achieve
Social
services
provided
to recipients
of aid to families
with
dependent
children
(AFDC) under provisions
of title
IV, parts
A and C, of the Social
Security
Act are supposed
to help recipients
get off welfare
and to prevent
or reduce
illegitimate
births,
strengthen
family
life,
attain
or retain
personal
independence,
and protect
children.
GAO wanted
to know if the goal of
getting
people
off welfare
is being
achieved
as intended
by the Congress.
although
it has begun developing
HEW has been unable
to answer this
question,
data so that
it can.
GAO reported
to the Congress
in June 1973 that
social
services
had only
a minor
impact
on directly
helping
recipients
to develop
and use the skills
Therefore,
one of
necessary
to achieve
reduced
dependency
or self-support.
It is
the basic
congressional
goals
for the services
has not been achieved.
unrealistic
to expect
that
social
services
can play a major
role
in helping
recipients
achieve
reduced
dependency
or self-support,
considering
the nature
of services
provided,
the method
for determining
who should
receive
certain
and present
economic
constraints.
services,
GAO also
reported
that:
--Because
local
welfare
departments
did not have adequate
systems
to
they could not insure
that
their
service
assess
recipients’
potential,
resources
would be allocated
for the maximum benefit
of recipients.
An inventory
approach
developed
by the Denver Welfare
Department
could
systematically
measure
the employment
potential
of recipients
and lead
to better
resource
allocation.
tration
--Federal
leadership
in services
programs
had
gram accountability
had not been emphasized,
all
levels
of government
needed
strengthening.
not been aggressive,
and administration
--Certain
barriers
which cannot
be influenced
as high unemployment
rates,
greatly
affected
achieved
self-support
or reduced
dependency
limit
the effectiveness
of services.
by social
services,
such
whether
welfare
recipients
and therefore
could
greatly
GAO’s recommendations
and accountability
to the Secretary
of HE.W to
for services
included:
improve
program
using
the inventory
--Start
a number of demonstration
projects,
to assess
the potential
of all welfare
or similar
approaches,
and to allocate
service
resources
accordingly.
25
proat
adminis-
approach
recipients
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,
SOCIAL
AND REHABILITATION
SERVICE
EDUCATION,
AND WELFARE
(continued)
--Report
to the Congress
at the
taken
to improve
the allocation
the study.
end of the test
period
of service
resources
on actions
as a result
to be
of
--Develop
by July
1974 in conjunction
with
the Secretary
of Labor
a
system
so certain
characteristics
of recipients--shown
in this
report
to indicate
high potential
for achieving
self-support
or reduced
dependency--serve
as the basis
for determining
which
recipients
registered
under the 1971 amendments
will
be afforded
priority
in receiving
work incentive
program
services,
said
1973.)
HEW, by letter
dated May 22, 1973, agreed
with
that
action
would be taken to implement
them.
Need to improve
certain
eligibility
aid to families
in Pennsylvania
administration
aspects
in
with
dependent
of
the
children
GAO’s recommendations
(B-164031(3),
June
_
and
27,
program
In response
to his request,
GAO reported
to the Chairman,
House Committee
on Ways and Means,
that
administration
of the incapacity
and unemployed
father
eligibility
aspects
of the AFDC program
had not been effective
in Pennsylvania.
GAO reported
also that
this
had been caused by inadequate
guidance
on the part
of HEW, fiscal
problems
in the State,
and increasing
AFDC caseloads.
GAO
noted
that:
--Recipients
with minor
impairments,
such as needs for eyeglasses
or
became eligible
for AFDC when Pennsylvania
broadened
its
dentures,
definition
of incapacity
in 1970.
The State
could
do this
because
Federal
regulations
did not describe
an applicant’s
eligibility
in
terms of the extent
to which
the incapacity
must affect
his ability
to support
or care for the child.
--Nonvisible
cent of
all
--Initial
cent
eligibility
information
the unemployed-father
of
--In
74 percent
father
cases,
or overdue.
--Caseworkers
or evaluated
impairments
incapacity
were inadequately
cases included
of the incapacity
redeterminations
in
verified
for about
a GAO sampling.
was not adequately
cases sampled.
cases and
of eligibility
81 percent
of
were late,
did not receive
adequate
training
the adequacy
of State
inservice
To improve
administration
a number of recommendations,
of these
aspects
of
including
the following,
26
verified
35 per-
in
71 per-
the unemployedinadequate,
and HEW had not
training.
monitored
the
GAO made
of HEW.
AFDC program,
to the Secretary
II
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,
SOCIAL
AND REHABILITATION
SERVICE
EDUCATION,
AND WELFARE
(continued)
--Revise
the applicable
section
of the Code of Federal
Regulations
in
such a manner that,
for an applicant
to be eligible
for AFDC because
of an incapacity,
the incapacity
must have a direct
or immediately
apparent
bearing
on diminishing
parental
support
or care to the child.
--Determine
similar
whether
to those
initial
eligibility
in Pennsylvania
exist
and redetermination
nationwide.
problems
--Take
the necessary
action,
including
implementation
of HEW’s policy
of reducing
the Federal
share of welfare
payments
to recipients
whose
ineligibility
is detected
after
redeterminations
are due, to insure
that
States
improve
their
eligibility
and redetermination
processes.
HEW generally
to take action
to
sequently
revised
1973.)
agreed
with
GAO’s recommendations
and has taken
implement
them.
The Code of Federal
Regulations
in line
with
GAO’s recommendation.
(B-164031(3),
Some problems
in
federally
assisted
contracting
child-care
or agreed
was subJune 27,
for
services
The Federal
Government
shares
with
the States
the expense
of child-care
services
under
the AFDC program,
the largest
of several
federally
funded
child-care
programs.
In recent
years,
the program
has been expanding
and
concern
about
rapidly
rising
costs
has been expressed.
GAO reported
to the Congress
in June 1973 that
contracted
child-care
services
were provided
in fiscal
year 1971 to about
39,000
children
in
California
and Pennsylvania
at a total
Federal
and State
cost of about
The children
obtained
educational,
social,
nutritional,
and
$60 million.
health
benefits.
In some instances,
the program
enabled
parents
to obtain
or continue
employment
or training.
A significant
number of available
spaces
provided
by contracted
childcare services
were used for children
of nonworking,
nontraining
parents
because
many of those who were working
or training
elected
to make their
own
child-care
arrangements
or applied
for services
after
the nonworking,
nontraining
parents
had already
enrolled
their
children.
Some welfare
recipients
could not get child-care
services
primarily
because
their
communities
could
not provide
the local
share of the cost.
GAO also reported
that
HEW had not (1) provided
adequate
guidance
to
States
to assist
them in contracting
for child-care
services,
(2) implemented
a system
to provide
data for assessing
program
effectiveness,
or (3) adeAs a result
administration
of the program.
quately
monitored
the States’
contract
requirements
and procedures
had weaknesses,
free
child-care
services
were provided
to some financially
ineligible
families,
financially
able
families
were not required
to pay service
fees,
facilities
were underused,
the cost of contracted
childcare
for similar
services
varied
significantly,
State
claims
for reimbursement
were inaccurate
because
of fiscal
weaknesses,
and private
contributions
were inappropriate.
27
DEF.V?TYENT OF HEXLTH.
SQiI.AL
.i.UD REH-\BILIT.1TION
G.-\O recommended
SERVICE
that
EDUC.\TION.
(continued)
HEW:
--.Assist
States
in developing
plans
for
(1) assess
the seriousness
of program
a systematic
method of meeting
priority
--Establish
program
States.
ways
aspects
--Establish
of the
criteria
which
overall
costs
for
--Clarify
ineligible
eligibility
families.
--Help
for
the States
some portion
--Follow
correct
XND CCELF,\RE
to insure
of State
effective
contracts,
gathering
shortcomings
needs.
and timely
including
can be used
the services
requirements
to
help
monitoring
more audits
avoid
up on California
and Pennsylvania
claims
for Federal
funds discussed
the
_
families
the
/
reasonableness
services
to
able
to pay
the
in-
actions
to adjust
in the report,
controlling
of child-care
to
of fiscal
and
by HEW and
providing
for
needed
establish
i
in evaluating
procured.
establish
sliding
fee scales
of child-care
services.
I
--Provide
guidelines
to the Staies’for
contributions
toward
the local
shire
information
and (2)
use
costs,
of
1/
private
.
HEW concurred
with
CAO’s findings
and recommendations,
stating
that
corrective
actions
had been taken or were being
developed.
HEW also advised
GAO that
$622,000
in overclaims
had been recovered
from the State
of
Pennsylvania.
Recent
changes
to Federal
regulations
on social
services
and
revised
Federal
day-care
requirements
will
also affect
some of the problems
discussed
in GAO’s report.
(B-164031(3),
June 13, 1973.)
Improvement
needed
in
the program
to provide
w-elfare
recipients
the administration
Medicare
benefits
of
for
Section
1843 of the Social
Security
Act provides
that
States
may enroll
eligible
welfare
recipients
in Medicare’s
supplementary
benefits
program.
This is referred
to as the buy-in
program
and is managed through
the coordinated
efforts
of the Social
Security
Administration,
Social
and Rehabilitation
Service,
and State
and local
health
and welfare
agencies.
/
As of December
1971 about
2 million
persons
were enrolled
in the buy-in
program.
In 1971 the States
paid about
$134 million
in premiums
on behalf
of
these persons,
The Federal
Government
pays its share of premiums
through
Lledicaid,
but these payments
are limited
to premiums
paid
for persons
receiving cash assistance,
In August
has experienced
eligible
welfare
1973 GAO reported
major
administrative
recipients
were
to
the Congress
that
since
1966 the program
problems.
As a result
(1) not all
enrolled,
because
local
welfare
offices
had
28
.
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH.
SOCIAL
-
AND REHABILITATION
SERVICE
EDJJCATION.
AND WELFARE
(continued)
not obtained
necessary
information
to enroll
them or because
identification
data was not current
or complete,
and (2) two States
received
about
$2.9 million
in overpayments
for premiums
that
should
have been paid entirely
by the
procedures
did not adequately
identify
premiums
States,
because
the States’
paid for persons
not receiving
cash assistance.
the
GAO made several
recommendations
program.
In response
to these
--It
designed
to
recommendations,
improve
administration
HEW stated
that:
will
reemphasize
to the States
the importance
of periodic
ciliation
of their
lists
of eligible
persons
with
their
lists
enrollees
as a means of identifying
eligible
persons
and the
of timely
enrolling
all
eligible
persons.
of
reconof
urgency
--As a part
of the Medicaid
Management
Information
will
be developed
to assist
States
in identifying
funds paid only on behalf
of persons
receiving
System,
procedures
and claiming
Federal
cash assistance.
--Reviews
have been or will
be made to determine
which have included
persons
not receiving
cash
buy-in
programs
are improperly
claiming
Federal
(B-164031(3),
Aug. 14, 1973.)
whether
any of 29 States
assistance
in their
participation.
Problems
in functioning
reviewing
use of medical
under Medicaid
of State
services
systems
financed
for
At the request
of the Chairman,
House Committee
on Ways and Means,
GAO
reviewed
the functioning
of the utilization
review
systems
under
the Medicaid
program
in Massachusetts
and Maryland.
The purpose
of the review
systems
is
to safeguard
against
unnecessary
medical
care and services
and to insure
that
Medicaid
payments
are reasonable
and consistent
with
efficiency,
economy,
and
quality
care.
GAO concluded
that
neither
State
had developed
an effective
review
Massachusetts’
system,
system
to be applied
uniformly
throughout
the State.
however , produced
some positive
benefits.
The use of regional
dental
consultants
to approve
or disapprove
dental
services
before
the services
were
provided
resulted
in savings
of about
$1.7 million
in calendar
year 1970.
Maryland
established
procedures
to determine
that
claims
paid were for services authorized
and rendered
and did not exceed amounts
established
by the
The Maryland
claims
processing
system,
however,
did not include
proState.
cedures
for identifying
or preventing
duplicate
payments.
GAO reported
that,
because
of the manner
in which
the review
function
is
organized
and operated
in Massachusetts,
it is difficult
to judge
the adequacy of the aggregate
resources
applied
to this
function.
The State
has
recognized
the need for more effective
controls
over all public
assistance
including
those
for Medicaid,
and has developed
a plan for an
expenditures,
State
officials
informed
GAO that
automated
payment
and control
system.
varyland
had the necessary
computer
capability
and funds
for developing
a
29
DEPARTMENTOF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE
SOCIAL AND REHABILITATION SERVICE (continued)
review
making
system,
reviews.
but
the
GAO recommended
biggest
that
--study
the HEWmodel
offering
opportunity
--provide
officials
for
to
GAO recommended
develop
an effective
by Massachusetts
to
problem
HEW assist
was a lack
of
sufficient
both
States
and monitor
their
system
for the
for improvement
purpose
and
of
design
the systematic
efficiently
accumulation
of
administer
review
adopting
data required
systems.
that HEW assist
Maryland
and monitor
utilization
review
system
and assist
--apply
ties,
its
utilization
--provide
review
for central
system,
and
--assist
participating
adequate
utilization
personnel
review
State
actions
by management
to
intermediate
care
administration
of
the
utilization
skilled
nursing
homes
to
facili-
develop
In commenting
on GAO’s reports,
,HEW outlined
steps
it was taking
to improve utilization
reviews.
In August
1973 HEW told
GAO that
it had undertaken a pilot
project
in Ohio and that,
during
fiscal
year 1974, the Model
System is expected
to be installed
in about
10 States
with planning
and
negotiations
proceeding
on implementing
the system
in additional
States
during
fiscal
year 1975.
HEW also informed
GAO that
an additional
incentive
to meaningful
State
utilization
review
was provided
by a provision
in the
1972 Social
Security
Amendments
which
requires
reduced
Federal
matching
where
the Secretary
had not made a positive
finding
of adequate
utilization
review
HEW informed
GAO that
it is preparing
for the imfor institutional
care.
plementation
of this
provision
by promulgating
additional
regulations
regarding
minimal
utilization
review
activities
and by preparing
for the
(B-164031(3),
Nov. 24, 1972,
and
enforcement
of the provision.
Dec. 21, 1972.)
30
.
to
actions
regulations
hospitals
and
review
plans.
to
features
its
actions
and monitor
Medicaid
for
1
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,
SOCIAL
SECURITY
Opportunities
suppliers
*
of
EDUCATION,
AND WELFARE
ADMINISTRATION
to increase
competition
data processing
services
among
At the request
of the Chairman
of the Subcommittee
on Intergovernmental
Relations,
House Committee
on Government
Operations,
GAO examined
procurement policies
and practices
followed
by Nationwide
Mutual
Insurance
Company
under
its contract
with
the Social
Security
Administration
(SSA) in subcontracting
in September
1972 for electronic
data processing
services.
Nationwide serves
as the carrier,
or organization
making Medicare
payments
for
physicians
’ services
and other
medical
services,
in Ohio and West Virginia.
GAO reported
to the Subcommittee
that
in this
procurement
action
(1)
Nationwide
did not follow
sound,
competitive
procurement
practices
in
developing
specifications
or in soliciting
and evaluating
proposals,
(2)
SSA allowed
Nationwide
considerable
discretion
in determining
how to evaluate
proposals
and what factors
to consider
in selecting
a particular
subcontractor,
and (3) SSA’s stated
policy
of fostering
competition
among the various suppliers
of data processing
services
was not fostered
by this
procuremerit.
Nationwide’s
evaluations
were based on the offerors’
estimates
of the
total
cost of processing
claims
under
each system
rather
than on the offerors’
proposed
prices
for processing
a Medicare
claim.
Because
of the
emphasis
on evaluation
factors
other
than costs,
Nationwide
selected
the
offeror
with
the highest
cost proposal.
SSA made two evaluations
and concluded
that
approval
of
mended award was not warranted
because
of the cost difference
proposal
selected
by Nationwide
and the lowest
cost proposal.
proach
to evaluating
the cost of proposals
and its assumptions
workload,
salary
increases,
and manpower
requirements
differed
wide’s
approach
and assumptions.
the recombetween
the
SSA’s apon future
from Nation-
Nationwide
and the selected
offeror
agreed
to modify
the proposed
subcontract
substantially.
The modifications
involved
guarantees
of the
total
claims
processing
costs;
but,
despite
SSA’s suggestion
that
other
offerors
be given
the opportunity
to compete
on this
basis,
Nationwide
did
not give the other
offers
such an opportunity.
*
GAO expressed
the belief
that
this
procurement
action
was not consistent
with
SSA’s stated
policy
of fostering
competition
among the various
suppliers
of data processing
services
because
(1) SSA’s intervention
to
permit
other
offerors
to respond
to the modified
terms and conditions
was
ineffective
and (2) only
one of the offerors
could meet Nationwide’s
preference
for a proven
online
system.
GAO recommended
SSA should:
that,
in
line
with
its
31
policy
of
fostering
competition,
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,
SOCIAL
SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION
EDUCATION,
AND WELFARE
(continued)
--Consider
requiring
that
potential
offerors
be advised,
in writing,
of the evaluation
criteria
which will
be used to evaluate
their
proposals
and that
they be advised
of the relative
importance
that
will
be given
to all
evaluation
factors.
--Give
careful
attention
assumptions
to be used
should
advise
carriers-tractors--just
how the
to be computed.
HEW concurred
structions
to the
in GAO’s
carriers.
to the validity
of the basic
approaches
and
in computing
the total
cost of a proposal
and
as well
as potential
data processing
subconover and above the quoted
prices,
are
factors,
suggestions
(B-164031(4),
and
32
said it would
Aug. 2, 1973.)
revise
its
in-
DEPARTMENTOF HOUSINGAND URBAN DEVELOPMENT
Contents
Page
COMMUNITYDEVELOPMENT
Improvement needed in the San Antonio
Improving the Model Cities Program
GENERALINSURANCE
Actions needed to provide
greater
flood
Model Cities
Program
35
35
36
insurance
protection
38
38
HOUSINGPRODUCTIONAND MORTGAGECREDIT
Benefits could be realized by revising
policies
and practices
for
acquiring
existing
structures
for low-rent public housing
Reducing costs in acquiring
properties
resulting
from defaults on
home loans
Opportunity
for reducing interest
costs
Opportunities
to improve effectiveness
and reduce costs of homeownership assistance programs
Opportunities
to improve effectiveness
and reduce costs of rental
assistance housing ..program
.i
39
INTERSTATE LAND SALES
Improved consumer protection
46
46
needed in interstate
33
land sales
39
41
42
43
44
DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT
Improvement
San Antonio
I
needed
in the
Model Cities
Program
The Model Cities
Program was established
to demonstrate
that
the
environment
and general
welfare
of people
living
in slum and blighted
neighborhoods
could be improved
substantially
through
concentration
of
Federal,
State,
and local
efforts.
A city
demonstration
agency
is responsible
for developing
and executing
the Model Cities
Program
at the
local
level,
and the Department
of Housing
and Urban Development
(HUD) has
overall
administrative
responsibility
at the Federal
level.
Because
of
the importance
of the Model Cities
Program
as a means of demonstrating
new
approaches
to solving
the social,
economic,
and physical
problems
of the
cities,
GAO examined
into major
areas of the planning,
development,
and
implementation
of the program
in San Antonio
from its
inception
in May
1968 to June 1971.
The two functional
areas of the Model Cities
Program
designated
by
the city
demonstration
agency
as having
the highest
priority
were education
and physical
environment.
GAO found
that
the agency had not met its objectives
in implementing
the program
in these
two areas during
the first
2 action
years
of the program.
Although
it is difficult
to identify
major
factors
which
affected
the city
demonstration
agency’s
rate
of progress
in implementing
the Model Cities
Program,
GAO identified
certain
factors
which may have influenced
the results
and/or
impact
of the program.
GAO noted:
--A
minimum
--A
low
--Little
and
of
level
State
of
support
citizen
in
first
year
technical
assistance
between
the
provided
to
agency
Federal
and State
of some projects.
--Difficulty
the
in
and
untimely
GAO recommended
that
program.
demonstration
conflicting
the initiation
--Limited
the
city
--Problems
with
which
delayed
for
of
participation.
coordination
of effort
Federal
and local
agencies.
--Inadequate
agencies.
the
agency
program
the
Secretary
the
regulations
obtaining
financial
support.
evaluations
by
agency.
the
agency
by Federal
and policies
of HUD:
--In
line
with HUD’s program
guidelines,
require
agency to solicit
the views of model-neighborhood
uating
Model Cities
Programs
and projects.
35
the
city
demonstration
residents
in eval-
DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT (continued)
--In
cooperation
with
the city
demonstration
agency,
review
the agency’s
day-to-day
practices
in coordinating
its efforts
with
those
of established
agencies
and after
such a review,
assist
the agency
in
establishing
procedures
necessary
for interagency
cooperation
and
participation.
--Examine
into
the practices
of the city
demonstration
agency in
soliciting
and using
technical
assistance
from Federal
agencies
as appropriate,
assist
the agency
in obtaining
such assistance.
--Require
HUD’s regional
and area offices
to review
the
city
demonstration
agency evaluation
efforts
to insure
agency makes project
evaluations
which
are timely
and
scope to measure
project
impact
and performance.
.
and,
results
of
that
the
of sufficient
HUD generally
agreed
with
GAO’s findings
and recommendations,
HUD
said that,
although
it was certain
that
some difficulty
would continue
in
the management
of the San Antonio
Model Cities
Program,
it was encouraged
by the results
and increasing
responsiveness
at all
government
levels.
HUD also anticipated
that
its decentralization
of the Model Cities
Program
to its area offices
should
further
strengthen
the program
and help alleviate
many of the problems
noted
in the San Antonio
program.
(B-171500,
Jan. 9,
1973.)
Improving
the
Model
Cities
Program
GAO examined
the planning,
implementation,
administration,
and evaluation
of four functional
areas--manpower,
economic
development,
education
and health--of
the Model Cities
Programs
in Kansas City and St. Louis,
Missouri,
and New Orleans,
Louisiana.
These functional
areas were selected
because
(1) they had been designated
by the cities
as high priority
areas,
(2) they required
a high degree
of Federal
agency assistance
and coordination,
and (3) Federal
agencies
allocated
and the cities
spent
significant
amounts
of funds
in these areas.
,
GAO reported
to the Congress
that
the three
cities
had had varying
degrees
of success
in attaining
the annual
goals of their
Model Cities
projects
in the manpower,
economic
development,
and health
areas;
in the
educational
area,
all
three
cities
accomplished
their
annual
project
goals.
The following
weaknesses
in HUD’s and city
demonstration
agencies’
administration
of the program
may have affected
the attainment
of project
goals.
--Development
that was,
of plans
on the basis
in many cases,
neither
--Use of HUD supplemental
of to develop
new and
funds
innovative
to
of data on neighborhood
current
nor sufficiently
conditions
complete.
expand
projects.
instead
36
existing
programs
.
DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT (continued)
c
--Lack
local
of success
funds
to
in obtaining
support
the
--Insufficient
progress.
efforts
to
GAO recommended
that
HUD:
Federal
programs.
timely
grant-in-aid
develop
evaluation
funds
or
States
plans
to
measure
and
--Require
city
demonstration
agencies
to periodically
obtain
and
analyze
information
on the extent
and causes
of problems
in the
model neighborhoods
and to use the results
of such analyses
to (1)
plan the types of projects
that
will
help alleviate
the neighborhood
problems
and (2) ascertain
whether
existing
projects
represent
the
most suitable
approaches
to accomplishing
their
program
goals.
--Ascertain,
in its reviews
of cities’
plans,
whether
the cities
are
developing
new and innovative
approaches
to solve
their
social,
and physical
problems
and, when it appears
that
the
economic,
cities
are using
HUD supplemental
funds primarily
to expand
existing
programs,
assist
city
demonstration
agencies,
through
its regional
and area offices,
to develop
new and innovative
projects.
--Examine
city
demonstration
agency efforts
to establish
organizational
structures
(including
staffing)
for conducting
required
evaluations
of projects;
define
program
goals
and objectives
for measuring
progress
and for identifying
problems
of projects;
and use evaluation
and revising
their
comprehensive
plans
results
in planning,
refining,
and in designing
and initiating
new programs
and activities.
--Periodically
agencies
T
-,
to
review
insure
the
that
evaluation
efforts
HUD’s requirements
of city
demonstration
are being
met.
HUD generally
agreed
with
GAO’s findings
and recommendations.
It
said,
however,
that
city
demonstration
agencies’
administrative
capabilities
and economic
conditions,
rather
than insufficient
data,
were the more
salient
causes
of difficulties
in the manpower
and economic
development
areas.
It said also that
neither
the statute
nor HUD’s guidelines
required
innovation
within
each project
or as an essential
approach
to the cities’
longstanding
problems.
GAO believes
that
the legislative
history
of the
Model Cities
Act clearly
shows that
the Congress
anticipated
that
emphasis
would be placed
on new and innovative
projects
and that
supplemental
funds
would be used for such projects.
HUD also stated
deficient.
(B-171500,
that
it was aware
Jan. 16, 1973.)
that
37
local
evaluation
efforts
were
DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT
GENERAL INSURANCE
Actions
needed
flood
insurance
to provide
protection
greater
To compensate
people
suffering
loss of property
because
of floods,
the
Congress
established
the National
Flood
Insurance
Program
administered
by
GAO reviewed
the program
to dethe Federal
Insurance
Administration
(FIA).
termine
whether
it was meeting
its objectives
to provide
property
owners
with flood
insurance
and to encourage
flood-prone
communities
to adopt
land
use and control
measures
designed
to reduce
flood
damage.
GAO reported
that much more needs to be done if the program
is to
fully
meet its objectives.
Responses
to questionnaires
sent to a sampling
of nonparticipating
communities
indicated
that many communities
were not
Maximum benefits
were not available
to many particiaware of the program.
pating
communities
because
FIA had not made the required
flood
plain
studies.
FIA review
and approval
of communities
’ land use and control
measures
was
not timely,
and FIA had not established
a program
to monitor
community
implementation
of the measures.
GAO recommended
that
FIA send literature
describing
program
benefits
and eligibility
requirements
to officials
of nonparticipating
communities
to help them decide
whether
they should
apply
to participate
in the program.
GAO recommended
also that
FIA use private
engineering
firms
to make flood
plain
studies
to the extent
that
funds
are available
and that
Federal
agencies
cannot
make them on a timely
basis,
GAO further
recommended
that
FIA
review
communities’
land use and control
measures,
notify
communities
having
deficient
measures
of needed
corrective
action,
and establish
a
monitoring
program
of communities’
compliance
with
FIA land use and control
measures.
The Administrator,
FIA, agreed with
GAO’s recommendations
but
that
lack of staff
had prevented
FIA from making
such improvements.
(B-178737,
July
19, 1973.)
38
stated
,
DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT
HOUSING PRODUCTION AND MORTGAGE CREDIT
Benefits
could be realized
and practices
for acquiring
for low-rent
public
housing
.h
by revising
existing
policies
structures
The low-rent
housing
program
is designed
to make decent,
safe,
and
sanitary
dwellings
available
to low-income
families
at rents
within
their
HUD
provides
financial
and
technical
assistance
to
LHAs,
nancial
means.
low-rent
public
housing
projects
develop
and/or
acquire,
own, and operate
accomplish
this
aim.
To provide
low-rent
public
housing,
LHAs use several
methods--conventional
construction,
turnkey,
direct
acquisition
of existing
privately
dwellings,
and leasing
.
Use of direct
acquisition
does not increase
housing
fiwhich
to
owned
method
supply
GAO reviewed
HUD’s and LHAs’ practices
and procedures
relating
direct
acquisition
method
of obtaining
existing,
occupied
standard
and found
that,
although
the method was expendient,
it had certain
tages which
tended
to make it less desirable
than other
methods.
By using
the direct
acquisition
method,
the LHAs increased
of low-rent
public
housing
but did not directly
help to achieve
housing
goal
f increasing
the housing
supply.
to the
structures
disadvan-
the
the
supply
national
GAO’s review
of 15 projects
in 8 selected
cities
or metropolitan
areas
showed that
LHAs had expended
about
$80 million
to acquire
the projects
HUD ’ s
without
increasing
the supply
of standard
housing
by a single
unit.
analyses
of housing-market
conditions
showed that,
in seven of the eight
cities,
a need for both subsidized
and nonsubsidized
standard
housing
existed
when these projects
were acquired,
The LHAs’ action,
therefore,
did not improve
the overall
condition
of the housing
market.
It appears
that,
in such
cases,
the construction
of new housing
and the rehabilitation
of substandard
housing
would be the preferred
method
and would use Federal
funds more effectively
by adding
to the supply
of standard
housing.
.
GAO proposed
that
HUD limit
its
financial
assistance
to LHAs to the
acquisition
of privately
owned standard
housing
where the supply
of such
housing
exceeds
the demand and terminate
the acquisition
of existing,
occupied,
privately
owned standard
housing
which
is in the planning
or early
development
stages
and use the funds
instead
to finance
the construction
of
new low-rent
public
housing
projects
or to purchase
and rehabilitate
existing
substandard
housing .
HUD did not agree because
it felt
that
such a practice
would be too
restrictive.
despite
an overall
demand for unsubsidized
HUD commented
that,
some structures
would not meet the demand for various
housing
in a community,
reasons.
39
CEF.AXT!fEST3F HOUSISG Q-D URB.V,'DE1-ELOF!~lENT
Hc7USISG FR3DLICTIJS
ASD !IJRTG.AGE CREDIT
(continued)
G-40 agreed
that,
if certain
standard
housing
had a high vacancy
rate
and could be purchased
at an acceptable
price,
acquisition
of such housing
by an LX.4 Icould be beneficial.
Of the 15 projects
reviewed
by GXO, however,
all had 10~ vacancy
rates.
-Acquired
units
used to house
are not being
those most in need
G-A0’ s review
shoried that
the acquisition
of privately
orined standard
housing
generally
had not substantially
reduced
the number of families
or
persons
li\-ing
in substandard
housing,
because
many of the occupants
of the
acquired
housing
units
had previously
lived
in standard
housing.
Some of
the families
occupying
the acquired
units
had incomes
exceeding
the established
limits
entitling
them to public
housing.
Also,
some persons
were
occupying
units
larger
than those suggested
in HUD’s guidelines.
Because only a relatively
small
number of the occupants
of the acquired
housing
projects
included
in G-40’s review
had previously
occupied
substandard
housing,
there
appeared
to be a need for specific
standard
admission policies
to insure
that
those families
or persons
most in need are
given preference.
G-40 suggested
that
the Congress
might wish to require
that
LHXs give
preference
for admission
to public
housing
to occupants
of private
substandard
housing
ox-er those riho are occupying
private
standard
housing.
Hardships
to former
of acquired
properties
occupants
The acquisition
of privately
olined standard
housing
has provided
standard
housing
to certain
low-income
families
sooner
than it could
have
been provided
under the other
methods,
but it has resulted
in (1) hardships
to form.er occupants
of acquired
projects
\<ho were forced
to move and (2)
the people
forced
loss
of tax revenues
to local
governments.
In some cases,
although
HUD regulations
provided
to ‘move were not assisted
in relocating,
for it.
Other
displaced
occupants
were subjected
to physical
and financial
hardships.
G-40 recommended
that HUD, prior
to approving
LHAs’ acquisition
of
require
LHAs to adequately
occupied,
privately
owned standard
housing,
deconstrate
that
housing
of comparable
quality
and rent
existed
in the
and that
adequate
relocation
assistance
would be available
for tenants
be displaced.
action
Because
it
on GAO’s
!;eel to
acquired
;ro.b-ide
is aliaiting
the
recommendation.
insure
that
properties
r;.A<Q’s review
adeq,Jate
indicated
assurance
results
of
its
housing
studies,
area
to
HUD took
prices
of
are reasonable
that
that
HUD needed
to improve
the prices
of acquired
40
its procedures
properties
are
to
no
DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT
HOUSING PRODUCTION AND MORTGAGE CREDIT
-3
(continued)
GAO recommended
that
HUD establish
appraisal
requirements
for
reasonable.
the direct
acquisition
method
similar
to those established
for the turnkey
method which
requires
that
two independent
cost estimates
be obtained
and
provide
that
the total
price
be no greater
than the average
of the cost
estimates
. Although
HUD agreed with
this
recommendation,
it took no action
pending
the results
of the housing
studies.
(B-114863,
Sept.
7, 1972.)
Reducing
resulting
costs
from
in acquiring
properties
defaults
on home loans
Privately
financed
home loans
are insured
by HUD or are guaranteed
by
the Veterans
Administration
(VA).
VA also makes loans
to veterans
unable
to obtain
private
financing
and to purchasers
of properties
which
VA acWhen a borrower
defaults
on a HUDquired
as a result
of loan defaults.
the lender
terminates
the loan,
acquires
the
insured
or VA-guaranteed
loan,
and
generally
conveys
the
property
to
HUD
or
VA
in
exchange
for
property,
When a borrower
defaults
on a VA-financed
insurance
or guaranty
payments.
loan,
VA terminates
the loan and acquires
the property.
GAO stated
that
the Government
In a report
to the Congress,
foreclosure
costs
on HUD-insured,
VA-guaranteed,
and VA-financed
wider
use of the “power
of sale”
method
of foreclosure.
Defaulted
generally
are terminated
by foreclosures
conducted
in accordance
statutes.
In the District
of Columbia
and in the 26 States
which
the use of the power-of-sale
method
of. foreclosure,
foreclosures
erally
less costly
and less time consuming
than the judicial
and
methods
of foreclosure
authorized
by the other
24 States
because
of-sale
foreclosures
can be completed
without
court
action.
could
reduce
loans
by
loans
with
State
authorize
are genother
the power-
GAO reported
that
costs
could
further
be reduced
by HUD’s and VA’s
greater
emphasis
on the “voluntary
deed” method
of terminating
such loans;
by VA paying
mortgage
claims
on defaulted
loans as HUD does;
and by I-IUD’s
reliance
on mortgagees’
title
evidence
for foreclosed
properties.
GAO recommended
.
that
HUD and VA:
--Provide
mortgagees
to determine
when
properties
securing
with
data
they should
defaulted
on loan
attempt
loans,
--Require
instead
to
justifications
deeds.
mortgagees
of accepting
In addition,
HUD should
title
evidence
for properties
VA should
adopt HUD’s policy
terminating
defaulted
loans
furnish
voluntary
termination
to obtain
costs
to
voluntary
for
enable
deeds
foreclosing
them
to
mortgages
stop requiring
mortgagees
to purchase
additional
acquired
by foreclosure
and conveyed
to HUD.
for paying
mortgagees
for costs
involved
in
and in conveying
the mortgaged
properties
to VA.
GAO also recommended
that
the Congress
establish
a Federal
power-of-sale
foreclosure
insured,
or guaranteed
home mortgages.
41
enact
law
legislation
for all
which
federally
would
financed,
DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT
HOUSING PRODUCTION AND MORTGAGE CREDIT
(continued]
HUD expressed
support
for new initiatives
to encourage
mortgagees
to
accept
voluntary
deeds but stated
that
mortgagees
are well
aware of the
costs
involved
in either
the voluntary
deed or the foreclosure
method.
HUD
also stated
that
it planned
to amend its mortgage
instructions
to require
justifications
from mortgagees
for foreclosing
in lieu
of accepting
voluntary
deeds,
but has not yet done so.
VA stated
that
its existing
policy
was
GAO believes
HUD and VA need to encourage
mortgagees
to seek a
adequate.
greater
number of voluntary
deeds,
especially
in those
States
where it would
result
in reducing
property
acquisition
costs.
HUD objected
to discontinuing
the purchase
of title
evidence
for foreGAO believes
the
closed
properties
because
many foreclosures
are faulty.
risk
to HUD of title
defects
is minimal
and that
the costs
incurred
by HUD
for additional
title
evidence
are unnecessary.
VA objected
to adopting
HUD’s policy
of paying
mortgagees
for loan
termination
and property
conveyance
costs
on the basis
that
its existing
policies
make VA loans an attractive
investment
and encourage
mortgagees
to
be lenient
with
defaulting
mortgagors.
GAO noted,
however,
that HUD’s policy
also encourages
leniency.
HUD and VA generally
agreed
with
GAO’s recommendation
that
the
establish
a Federal
power-of-sale
foreclosure
law for all federally
insured,
or guaranteed
home mortgages.
(B-114860,
Oct.
20, 1972.)
Opportunity
for
reducing
interest
Congress
financed,
costs
As authorized
by sections
235 and 236 of the National
Housing
Act,
HUD
makes monthly
assistance
payments
to mortgagees
so that
low-income
families
may purchase
or rent housing.
HUD insures
that
the mortgage
loans will
be
paid and charges
the mortgagees
for the insurance
premiums.
HUD’s monthly
assistance
payments
include
the monthly
amounts
of the mortgage
insurance
on the anniversary
month of each mortgage,
the mortgapremiums.
Annually,
gees pay the accumulated
premium
to HUD.
GAO reported
to the Congress
that,
because
HUD’s monthly
assistance
payments
include
the mortgage
insurance
premiums,
HUD is paying
out funds
which
it must collect
from the mortgagees
and that
the Government
loses
the
use of such funds for an average
of 6 months
each year.
GAO estimated
that
the interest
costs
applicable
to the insurance
premiums
for the sections
235
and 236 mortgage
balances
of about
$11 billion
would be at least
$1.6 million
during
fiscal
year 1973.
GAO proposed
that
HUD save such interest
costs
by deducting
the premiums
from the monthly
assistance
payments.
HUD did not agree with
the proposal
and stated
procedures
under the
HUD stated
that
section
236 program
already
met the proposal
objective.
implementing
the proposal
for the section
235 program
would offset
any
savings
that would result
because
of the cost of the additional
work necesGAO disagreed
and therefore
recommended
sary to implement
the proposal.
that
the Congress
authorize
HUD to waive
the mortgage
insurance
premiums
for
the section
235 and 236 housing
programs
similar
to the waiver
of premiums
rcntnl
provided
for mortgages
insured
under
the low- and moderate-income
42
.
.
DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT
HOUSING PRODUCTION AND MORTGAGE CREDIT
(continued]
housing
program
(B-171630,
Nov.
ZZlCd].
Opportunities
and reduce
assistance
authorized
22, 1972.)
by
section
(3)
of
the
National
Housing
Act.
to improve
effectiveness
costs
of homeownership
programs
Low- and moderate-income
families
are assisted
in becoming
homeowners
through
mortgage
insurance,
loans,
and interest
subsidies
administered
by HUD
and the Department
of Agriculture
(USDA].
Because of the magnitude
of Federal
funds
involved
in these programs
and indications
of problems
encountered
in administering
the programs,
GAO reviewed
the programs
to determine
whether
HUD and USDA could
improve
program
effectiveness
and reduce
costs.
In a report
to the Congress,
GAO reported
that
HUD and USDA, in allocatdid not insure
that
all
eligible
families
had the same
ing program
resources,
opportunities
to participate
in the programs
regardless
of where they lived.
The need for subsidized
housing
had not been identified
adequately
and was
not used as the primary
basis
for allocating
limited
resources.
An area’s
capacity
to produce
housing
was a major
factor
in distributing
HUD program
resources
at both national
and local
levels.
Allocations
of USDA program
resources
at the national
level
were based primarily
on prior
years’
housing
production
and allocations
at the local
level
were based primarily
on a firstcome, first-served
basis.
GAO also reported
that
HUD and USDA (1) had approved
for mortgage
insurance or loans housing
with significant
defects
which
concerned
the health
and safety
of the occupants
and (2) had not determined
the causes
of mortgage
defaults
and ways of reducing
the default
rate.
GAO informed
the Congress
that
HUD could
save about
$1 billion
homeownership
assistance
program
were financed
through
Government
rather
than through
private
lenders
because
of the lower
interest
which
the Government
could borrow.
GAO recommended
that
--Insure
that
to identified
program
needs.
--Reinspect
to insure
rected,
sidized
should
HUD and USDA:
resources
are
allocated
primarily
all
houses within
the l-year
warranty
that
housing
defects
have been properly
--Require
in-depth
such studies
to
gram applicants.
if its
borrowings
rate
at
studies
develop
in
proportion
period
after
identified
purchases
and cor-
to determine
reasons
for defaults
and use
guidelines
for screening
and counseling
pro-
USDA should
make separate
allocations
of program
resources
and unsubsidized
housing
loans
according
to need.
In
establish
procedures
or seek legislation,
if necessary,
43
for subaddition,
it
to provide
DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT
HOUSING PRODUCTION AND MORTGAGE CREDIT
the purchasers
of existing
sellers
for defects
existing
rural
at
(continued)
housing
the time
with a right
of purchase,
of
recourse
to
the
GAO also recommended
that
the Congress
consider
legislation
which would
permit
HUD’s homeownership
assistance
program
to be financed
by the Government rather
than by private
lenders
because
of the possible
savings
in interest costs.
A similar
recommendation
by GAO had previously
been made to the
Congress
on legislation
for financing
rural
housing
programs.
.
HUD said it has increasingly
considered
needs in its allocations
of
program
resources,
and USDA directed
that
at least
50 percent
of its program
resources
be allocated
to subsidized
rural
housing.
GAO believes
that
both
agencies
should
identify
true needs and allocate
resources
accordingly.
within
the constraints
of available
funding,
to make reinHUD agreed,
spections;
USDA notified
its field
staff
to make inspections
prior
to expiration
of the warranty
period.
Both HUD and USDA mentioned
procedures
for
determining
causes
of defaults.
GAO believes,
however,
that
they should
give
attention
to analyzing
causes
of defaults
and minimizing
future
defaults.
it,
USDA said it was considering
as a last
resort,
to advance
a legislative
proposal
which
funds
to correct
any defects.
would
authorize
HUD, the Treasury
Department,
and the Office
of Management
and Budget
agreed
that
the cost of Government
financing
would
be lower
than financing
through
private
lenders
but said
that
factors
other
than cost must be considered.
(B-171630,
Dec. 29, 1972.)
Opportunities
reduce
costs
to improve
effectiveness
and
of rental
assistance
housing
program
GAO reviewed
HUD’s program
to increase
rental
housing
units
for low- and
moderate-income
families
to determine
whether
HUD could
improve
its
effectiveness
and reduce
costs.
The review
showed that
HUD, in allocating
program
resources,
had not insured
that
all
eligible
families
had the same opportunity
to participate
in the rental
assistance
program
regardless
of where they lived.
The need for subsidized
housing
had not been identified
adequately
and had not
been used as the primary
basis
for allocating
the limited
program
resources.
A major factor
in allocating
resources
was an area’s
capability
to produce
housing .
price
vised
GAO also
data in
guidelines
found
that HUD did not adequately
consider
purchase
or option
its land appraisals.
However,
in April
1972, HUD issued
rewhich,
if properly
followed,
should
improve
the appraisals.
In its report
to the Congress,
GAO stated
that HUD could
save about
$1.2 billion
in rental
assistance
program
costs
if mortgage
loans
for fiscal
years
1973 through
1978 could be financed
through
direct
Government
borrowings,
rather
than through
private
lenders,
because
of the lower
interest
rate at which
the Government
could borrow.
44
.
DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT
.
.
HOUSING PRODUCTION AND MORTGAGE CREDIT
(continued)
GAO questioned
whether
existing
incentives
to private
investors,
such
as low capital
investment
and income tax shelters,
would insure
high-quality
management
services
over the lives
of the projects,
Tax shelters,
in
particular,
generally
expire
within
the first
10 years
of project
ownership
and are available
to project
owners regardless
of how well
or how poorly
they manage projects.
GAO recommended
that HUD (1) insure
that
rental
assistance
program
resources
be allocated
primarily
in proportion
to needs and (2) monitor
field
offices’
land valuation
practices
to insure
compliance
with
HUD’s revised
guidelines.
GAO also recommended
that
HUD and the Treasury
Department
should
jointly
study
the adequacy
of project
ownership
incentives
in promoting good project
management
and, if necessary,
take appropriate
action
to
restructure
the incentives.
GAO recommended
that
the Congress
consider
legislation
which would
permit
the rental
assistance
housing
program
to be financed
by the Governmerit,
rather
than by private
lenders,
because
of the possible
savings
in
interest
costs , GAO previously
made similar
recommendations
to the Congress
on the financing
of HUD’s homeownership
assistance
program
and the Department of Agriculture’s
rural
housing
program.
HUD stated
that
it had been considering
a more intensive
effort
to
stimulate
housing
production
where it was most needed
and agreed
that
field
compliance
with
appraisal
,guidelines
needed
to be monitored.
If subsidized
housing
is to be fairly
distributed
throughout
the Nation,
GAO believes
HUD
must identify
true needs and allocate
resources
accordingly.
Treasury
questioned
whether
the existing
tax shelters
encourage
investors
to sell
or neglect
properties
after
the shelters
expire.
HUD believed
that
new incentives,
rather
than a change of existing
incentives,
were
needed
and said that
it planned
to explore
the matter
in depth.
HUD, the Treasury
Department,
and the Office
of
agreed
that
direct
Government
financing
would
result
they favored
the present
method
of private
financing
tars.
(B-171630,
Jan, 10, 1973.)
45
Management
and Budget
in cost savings,
but
because
of other
fac-
DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT
INTERSTATE
LAND SALES
Imuroved
consumer
nrotection
in interstate
land sales
needed
I
To help protect
the public
in interstate
land transactions,
Congress,
in August
1968,
enacted
the Interstate
Land Sales Full
Act, to be administered
by HUD.
Because HUD received
complaints
in such transactions,
GAO reviewed
how HUD’s Office
of Interstate
Registration
was carrying
out its
regulatory
responsibilities.
the
Disclosure
of abuses
Land
.
GAO’s review
showed that,
because
HUD’s Office
of Interstate
Land
Sales Registration
had only
55 full-time
staff
members and no field
support,
it could not identify
all unregistered
land developers,
effectively
coordinate consumer
protection
activities
with
the States,
and adequately
verify
land developers’
registration
information.
The Office
could not investigate
all significant
violations
of the law or take prompt
enforcement
action
against
developers.
GAO recommended
that
HUD, to the extent
practicable,
decentralize
the Office’s
regulatory
activities-assigning
responsibility
to HUD field
HUD commented
that
it was evaluating
GAO’s recommendation
office
personnel,
and had budgeted
to increase
its permanent
staff
to 74 employees
in fiscal
year 1974.
GAO also
recommended
--Selectively
inspect
verify
the accuracy
and to help determine
that
HUD:
subdivisions
before
and after
registration
to
and reliability
of land developers’
disclosures
the adequacy
of State
regulatory
programs.
--Establish
agreements
with
the States
land subdivisions
and developers.
for
exchanging
information
--Improve
promptly
followup
procedures
to
to consumer
complaints
insure
that
land
referred
by the
--Investigate
consumer
alleged
complaints.
violations
of
who,
to law, fail
to amend
and who may be offering
significant
--Promptly
act against
developers
statements
of record
and property
unregistered
land for sale.
contrary
reports
developers
Office.
on
the
act
respond
indicated
by
HUD disagreed
that
subdivisions
should
be inspected
before
registration
because
it believed
the States
could better
perform
this
function.
GAO believes
that,
until
HUD is reasonably
satisfied
that
the States’
inspection
programs
are adequate,
the Federal
Government
should
take the initiative
in
making such inspections.
more
HUD also
effective
stated
action
it
plans
against
to eliminate
violators.
its complaint
backlog
and
(B-118754,
June 13, 1973.1
46
to
take
’
_
DEPARTMENTOF THE INTERIOR
Contents
Page
BUREAUOF RECLAMATION
Need for reevaluat ion of acreage limitat
benefits
1
ion on irrigation
49
49
GEOLOGICALSURVEY
Improved inspection
and regulation
could reduce the possibility
of oil spills
on the Outer Continental
Shelf
50
SOUTHWESTERN
POWERADMINISTRATION
Financial
progress and problems in
the Southwestern Federal power system
52
47
50
52
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
BUREAU OF RECLAMATION
Need for
limitation
reevaluation
on irrigation
of
acreage
benefits
The Reclamation
Act of 1902 limits
to 160 acres
the land on which
any
one owner is entitled
to receive
irrigation
benefits
from a federally
subObjectives
of the limitation
are to break
sidized
water
resources
project.
spread
the- benefits
of the irrigation
proup large,
private
landholdings,
and promote
the family-sized
farm as a
gram to the maximum number of people,
desirable
form of rural
life.
GAO’s review
of the Central
Valley
project,
the largest
project
administered
by the Bureau of Reclamation,
Department
of the Interior,
showed
that
the 160-acre
limitation
had not resulted
in preventing
(1) large
landowners
and farm operators
from benefiting
under
the program
and (2) landowners
and farm operators
from retaining
or acquiring
large
landholdings.
These beneficiaries
were receiving
project
water
on large
landholdings
by
leasing
eligible
land from the individual
owners and retaining
or controlling eligible
land by establishing
corporations,
partnerships,
and trusts.
The impact
question
as to
water
resources
of modern technology
and techniques
on farming
the practicability
of limiting
the use of water
projects
to a landowner’s
160 acres
of irrigable
raises
a
from Bureau
land.
GAO recommended
that
the Congress
reevaluate
the appropriateness
of
If the Congress
determines
that
establishment
of
the 160-acre
limitation.
family-sized
farms should
still
be encouraged
by retaining
the limitation,
it should
enact
clarifying
legislation
to preclude
large
landowners
and
farm operators
from circumventing
the limitation
through
controlling
numerous 160-acre
tracts
by organizing
corporations,
partnerships,
and trusts,
and/or
by leasing
additional
tracts.
Should
the Congress
consider
the 160acre limitation
no longer
desirable,
however,
it should
enact
legislation
which would
(1) establish
a new maximum acreage
limit
for family-sized
farms
that
would be eligible
to receive
Federal
project
water
at subsidized
rates,
(2) preclude
large
landowners
and farm operators
from circumventing
the
limitation,
and (3) require
the payment
of the full
cost of irrigation
water
furnished
to larger
areas.
The Department
generally
agreed
with
GAO’s findings
and stated
that
there
was good reason
to undertake
the difficult
task of restating,
consolidating,
and modernizing
the acreage
limitation
provisions
of reclamation
law and that
it was earnestly
endeavoring
to develop
a proposal
for that
purpose.
(B-125045,
Nov. 30, 1972.)
.
49
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
GEOLOGICAL
SURVEY
Improved
inspection
and regulation
could reduce
the possibility
of
on the Outer Continental
Shelf
At
committee,
quacy of
tions
on
oil
spills.
that
the
operations
oil
spills
Conservation
and Natural
Resources
Subthe request
of the Chairman,
House Committee
on Government
Operations,
GAO reviewed
the adethe Department’s
inspection
and regulation
of oil
and gas operaFederal
leaseholds
on the Outer Continental
Shelf
(OCS) to prevent
In its June 1973 report
to the Subcommittee,
GAO pointed
out
Department’s
Geological
Survey
could
improve
supervision
of these
in several
respects.
Strengthening
enforcement
proceedings
The law authorizes
the Department
to fine
lessees
for knowingly
and
willfully
violating
OCS regulations
and to cancel
leases
for not complying
These sanctions
generally
with
the law, regulations,
or lease provisions.
GAO found that,
to enforce
require
proceedings
in a U.S. district
court.
the Survey usually
issued
written
warnings
to lessees.
The
its regulations,
Gulf Coast Region
also ordered
stoppages
of equipment
operations
until
deficiencies
were corrected.
GAO further
observed
that
Survey
inspectors
in the Gulf Coast Region
did not always
follow
prescribed
regional
enforcement
actions.
For example,
in a case involving
a violation
of required
safety
procedures,
the inspector orally
warned
the operator
instead
of suspending
operations
until
the
deficiency
was corrected.
The Gulf Coast Region had not specified
circumstances
under which
inspectors
would be authorized
to alter
or waive
prescribed
enforcement
actions.
The Survey’s
Pacific
Region
used only written
warnings
which were not
always
effective
in obtaining
prompt
remedial
action
by the operators.
Survey officials
told
GAO that
the policy
in the Santa Barbara
Channel
was not
to require
shutting
down wells
where natural
oil seepage
was a special
probl6.m.
. .
However,
the failure
of a safety
device,
unless
promptly
corrected,
could
result
in a blowout
causing
greater
pollution
than the seepage.
Therefore,
GAO recommended
that
the Survey
consider
the advisability
of
halting
operations,
if necessary,
on individual
wells
as is required
in
Gulf Coast Region.
Improving
inspection
The Survey has
for only the operation
wells,
remedial
work
wells.
where
Making
sufficient
relatively
few
the
activities
issued
written
of producing
on producing
policies
on the frequency
of inspections
wells,
but not the drilling
of new
wells,
or abandonment
of nonproductive
inspections
was not a problem
offshore
structures
are operating.
50
in
the Pacific
However,
in
Region
the
1I
a
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
GEOLOGICAL
SURVEY (continued)
where many structures
are spread
over 108,000
square
Gulf Coast Region,
miles,
the district
offices
did not inspect
structures
as frequently
as reFor example,
quired
by regional
standards
or by official
Survey policy.
only half
of 50 wells
started
in fiscal
year 1972 were inspected
during
the
drilling
operations
although
the region’s
unwritten
policy
called
for inspecting
each well.
Although
the Gulf Coast Region’s
inspection
staff
had been increased
from 10 engineers
and technicians
in 1969 to 39 in 1972, regional
officials
explained
that
additional
personnel
would be needed,
along with
additional
transportation
means, before
frequency
of inspections
could be increased.
GAO recommended
that
the Survey
establish
a realistic
policy
on how
frequently
each type of OCS operation
must be inspected,
considering
the
GAO also recomresource
available
and the risks
of oil spills
involved.
mended that
the Survey
consider
establishing
a formal
training
program
for
its inspectors,
because
of their
increasing
inspection
responsibilities
and
changing
technologies
in offshore
oil
and gas operations,
Regulation
of
offshore
GAO noted
a need
by Survey
regulations.
--A
program
to
causes safety
--Regulations
workover
for
operations
regulating
control
devices
governing
and wireline
--Regulations
governing
operations
on a single
are dangerous
because
erosion
to fail
remedial
operations.
certain
offshore
operations
of pipes
and other
equipment
and contributes
to spills.
work
on producing
wells,
not
covered
which
often
known
as
concurrent
drilling,
production,
and remedial
structure
which,
according
to Survey
officials,
of the confusion
caused in a confined
area.
Department
officials
informed
GAO that
actions
were underway
to implement most of GAO’s recommendations.
Also,
the Department
had sponsored
three
studies
, completed
between
November
1971 and December
1972, to recommend improved
Federal
safety
and pollution
control
regulations
and procedures
for OCS oil and gas operations.
The Survey
assigned
a special
work group
to evaluate
these
studies,
and in May 1973 the group presented
15 recommendations
to implement
its
findings.
(B-146333,
June 29, 1973.)
51
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
SOUTHWESTERN POWER ADMINISTRATION
Financial
progress
and problems
in
Southwestern
Federal
power system
the
The Department
of the Interior’s
Southwestern
Power Administration
(SPA) is the marketing
agency for power generated
at Federal
water
resources
SPA is required
to recover,
projects
in the Southwestern
United
States.
the Federal
investment
in the power
through
revenues
from sales
of power,
features
of these projects
within
50 years
from the date each project
is
placed
in service.
1
.
At
the end of fiscal
year 1970,
after
25 years
into
the repayment
period,
SPA had not repaid
any portion
of the Federal
investment
in the
system and was about
$29.7 million
in arrears
in recovering
other
costs .
It had, however,
prepared
rate and repayment
studies
showing
that
the repayment requirements
would be met.
because
reliability
GAO questioned
the validity
of the most current
long range
cost and revenue
projections
were
or currentness
of which was doubtful.
study
(February
1971)
based on data,
the
The Department
of the Interior
concurred
in two principal
recommendations
that
(1) a revised
rate and repayment
study
be made and (2) action
be taken
to firm
up tentative
cost allocations.
The Department
did not
with
GAO’s
recommendation
that
SPA
supplement
future
rate
agree,
however,
and repayment
studies
for the system with
comparisons
of actual
repayments
of the Federal
investment
with
annually
scheduled
repayments
established
on
either
a compound
interest
amortization
method
or on any other
orderly
method.
GAO believes
that
such information
would be useful
to the Congress
and SPA management,
as a basis
for inquiring
into
the adequacy
of power
rates.
(B-125031,
Nov. 22, 1972.)
52
DEPARTMENTOF JUSTICE
Contents
Page
LAW ENFORCEMENTASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION
Need to determine cost and improve reporting
criminal
data exchange system
.
53
55
of the nationwide
55
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE
Need to determine
of the nationwide
+
ADMINISTRATION
cost and improve
reporting
criminal
data exchange
system
In January
1973 GAO reported
to the Congress
that
the Department
of
Justice
needed
to determine
the cost of developing
and operating
a nationwide criminal
data exchange
system
and to improve
the reporting
of data contained
in the system.
The Law Enforcement
Assistance
Administration
(LEAA)
awarded
grants,
totaling
about
$4 million,
to develop
a prototype
of such a
system and to enable
20 States
to participate
when it became operational.
GAO reported
that,
because
the cost to develop
a fully
operational
system
had not been determined,
State
and local
governments
could not determine whether
they would be able,
or willing,
to meet the financial
.
requirements
of developing
and operating
the system.
It also reported
that
system users
had no assurance
that
the data they received
was complete
or
accurate
because
arrest
information
was maintained
and disseminated
without
the related
disposition
information
to show whether
an individual
was innocent or guilty.
GAO recommended
that,
before
authorizing
ditures,
the Attorney
General
should
require
of Investigation
(FBI) or LEAA determine
the
operating
the criminal
data exchange
system.
FBI and LEAA implement
a program
for improving
dispositions
by criminal
justice
agencies
to
data into
the national
system.
substantial
additional
expenthat
either
the Federal
Bureau
total
cost of developing
and
It also recommended
that
the
the reporting
of arrests
and
the State
agencies
which
enter
The Department
agreed
with
GAO’s recommendations
and in July
1973 said
that
it was developing
a method
to estimate
system
costs.
However,
the
Department
stated
that
to improve
reporting
Federal
legislation
was needed
to insure
that
States
provide
timely
disposition
data on reported
arrests.
(B-171019,
Jan. 16, 1973.)
55
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
Contents
Page
MANPOWER ADMINISTRATION
Concentrated
Employment
Program
in New York
employment
objectives
Need to improve
effectiveness
and management
Corps in-school
program
Selection
and enrollment
of participants
in
Emergency
Employment
Act of 1971
Types of jobs offered
to unemployed
persons
Employment
Act of 1971
Impact
of grants
to Indian
tribes
under the
Act of 1971
Public
service
benefits
from jobs under the
Act of 1971
59
City
has not
of
Neighborhood
met
its
59
Youth
60
programs
under
the
61
under
the
Emergency
Emergency
Employment
Emergency
Employment
62
63
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION
More concerted
effort
needed by the Federal
Government
on occupational
safety
and health
programs
for Federal
employees
V
57
63
65
65
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
MANPOWER ADMINISTRATION
Concentrated
Employment
Program
in New York City has not met its
employment
objectives
The Concentrated
Employment
Program
(CEP)
manpower
services
necessary
to help unemployed
and hold
regular
jobs.
GAO wanted
to determine
in New York City.
is designed
to
and low-income
how well
this
combine
all
persons
obtain
was being
done
About
$675 million
was allocated
for CEP in the 4-year
period
ended June
At that
time,
CEP was operating
in 69 urban
and 13 rural
locations
and
1971.
CEP had reached
384,000
persons.
CEP was established
in New York City
in
three
areas,
South Bronx,
East Harlem,
and Central
Harlem.
GAO’s evaluation
mainly
covered
South Bronx because
CEP was just
getting
underway
in East and
Central
Harlem when GAO’s field
work began.
GAO reported
that
CEP, after
a reasonable
start
in South Bronx,
fell
considerably
short
of its goals pertaining
to the number of persons
enrolled
in
CEP and the number of persons
placed
in jobs in all
three
areas.
For exin the South Bronx during
the second contract
period,
October
1968 to
ample,
about
2,160 persons
were enrolled
in CEP and 831 were reSeptember
1971,
ported
to have been placed
in jobs.
The goals
for that
period
were to enrol
3,670 persons
and to subsequently
place
3,200
in jobs.
GAO also reported
several
shortcomings
been responsible
for the South Bronx CEP’s
goals.
These shortcomings
included:
--CEP did not have an active
outreach
street
and door-to-door
activity--to
persons.
c
in CEP administration
failure
to reach
its
which
program
function--an
identify
on-theeligible
and
intensive
recruit
had
--Procedures
followed.
gibility
for screening
enrollees
for eligibility
were not adequately
As a result,
many enrollees
were ineligible
or their
elicould not be determined
on the basis
of recorded
information.
--Although
repeatedly,
program.
the
agency
responsible
the agencies
were
--CEP staff
members had high
tions
and were inadequately
proaches.
for
unable
training
enrollees
was changed
to establish
a suitable
training
turnover
rates
indoctrinated
in
in
both key and
CEP objectives
lower posiand ap-
Subsequent
to GAO’s review,
corrective
actions
were taken
or planned
by
Labor
and New York City
to strengthen
CEP in the South Bronx and Central
The East Harlem
CEP was substantially
revised
in June 1971 and
Harlem
areas.
was administered
under more flexible
guidelines,
which Labor considered
more
responsive
to the need of the community.
59
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
MANPOWER ADMINISTRATION
(continued)
GAO recommended
that
the Department
of Labor monitor
the planned
improvements in CEP in the South Bronx and the two Harlem
areas to make sure that
(1) the contractual
responsibilities
of the prime
sponsor
and participating
agencies
are clearly
understood
and carried
out,
(2) an active
outreach
activity
that will
bring
into
CEP those
area residents
most in need of manpower
assistance
is performed,
and (3) all possible
assistance
is extended
to CEP
enrollees
who experience
problems
in attending
training
courses
and in finding or retaining
suitable
employment,
The Department
of Labor agreed
that
the recommendations
must be implemented
if CEP is to attain
satisfactory
performance.
The Department
also
recognized
that
CEPs should
not continue
to be funded
unless
a specific
plan
is developed
to implement
the recommendations
and to establish
necessary
(B-130515,
Sept.
7, 1972.)
performance
standards.
Need to improve
of Neighborhood
effectiveness
Youth Corps
and management
in-school
program
The in-school
component
of the Neighborhood
Youth Corps (NYC) program
provides
paid work experience
and supportive
services
to youths
from lowincome families
to encourage
their
continued
enrollment
in school.
GAO reviewed
the 1970-71
NYC in-school
program
in three
locations
to determine
whether
the program’s
effectiveness
had been improved
since
GAO’s prior
reviews of the NYC program
in 1968 and to evaluate
certain
aspects
of program
administration.
GAO reported
to the Congress
that
the effect
of the in-school
program
on
school
drop-out
tendencies
had not changed.
Enrollees
in the projects
GAO
reviewed
dropped
out at about
the same rate as those who were eligible
but
GAO’s
latest
review,
as
had
its
earlier
reviews,
showed
the
not enrolled.
sponsors
did not consider
an applicant’s
drop-out
potential
in determining
his eligibility,
The Department
told
GAO that
it would reassess
the dropoutpotential
aspects
of the eligibility
criteria
to improve
selection
of eligible
youths
and emphasized
to its
regional
offices
that,
in the meantime,
all projects
should
be reminded
to fully
use current
drop-out
characteristics
data along with
other
enrollment
requirements.
GAO also reported
on weaknesses
in the work experience
and training,
counseling,
and remedial
education
provided
to enrollees.
The Department
needed
to monitor
sponsor
operations
more effectively
to better
insure
compliance
with NYC contracts
and departmental
guidelines
and controls
over enrollee
payrolls
needed
to be improved
to insure
that
accurate
and complete
records
are maintained
and unauthorized
expenditures
are avoided.
GAO made several
recommendations
to the Department
ing program
operations
and management.
The Department
action
was needed
in all areas discussed
in the report
new guidelines
were sent to the field
to eliminate
or
cited.
(B-130515,
Feb. 20, 1973.)
60
of Labor for improvagreed
that
corrective
and advised
GAO that
diminish
the problems
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
I
MANPOWER ADMINISTRATION
(continued)
Selection
participants
Emergency
of
under the
of 1971
and
enrollment
in programs
Employment
Act
Pursuant
to his request,
GAO reported
to the Chairman,
Subcommittee
Senate
Committee
on Labor and Public
Employment,
Manpower,
and Poverty,
fare,
on the selection
and enrollment
of participants
in programs
under
Emergency
Employment
Act of 1971 (EEA).
Procedures
and hiring
for reaching,
participants
on
Welthe
screening,
As of June 1972 EEA had obtained
public
service
jobs
in State
and local
About 17,000
of these persons
had been pregovernments
for 168,700
persons.
viously
employed
in State
or local
governments
but had been laid
off,
generally
because
of budgetary
problems.
The special
publicity
and outreach
efforts
of the program
agents
(States,
counties,
and cities),
as well
as the rate of unemployment
and the
number
of unemployed
persons
in the areas served
by the agents,
undoubtedly
had some effect
on the number of persons
applying
for EEA jobs.
Although
GAO’s analysis
did not establish
any direct
correlation
between
the outreach
efforts
or the number of unemployed
persons
and the number of job applicants,
it did show that
generally
the higher
the rate of unemployment,
the higher
the ratio
of applicants
to jobs.
Matching
applicants
to the available
jobs has largely
been achieved
through
existing
administrative
units
of government,
without
creating
new
bureaucracies
and apparently
without
changing
much in the existing
institutions,
Efforts
to get unemployed
persons
into
jobs as soon as possible
met a
number of obstacles
, some of which
could not have been anticipated
and others
which
could have been eliminated
by better
planning
and program
information.
Reaching
target
groups
Program
agents
established
various
priorities
for hiring
persons
to fill
jobs under EEA.
The majority
of program
agents
had hiring
procedures
which
gave preference
to veterans.
Almost
all the program
agents
stated
that
they
also gave preference
to other
significant
segments
of the unemployed,
such as
disadvantaged
persons
and members of minority
groups.
ri
-3
Data on the extent
of unemployment
among the significant
segments
of the
population
was generally
not available
on a localized
basis.
GAO therefore
was unable
to determine
whether
the various
groups
of unemployed
persons,
such as young or disadvantaged
persons,
were being
properly
represented
among
those being
hired.
(B-163922,
Oct. 12, 1972.)
61
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
MANPOWER ADMINISTRATION
(continued)
Types of jobs offered
to
unemployed
persons
under
Emergency
Employment
Act
the
of 1971
Pursuant
to his request,
GAO reported
to the Chairman,
Subcommittee
on
Employment,
Manpower,
and Poverty,
Senate
Committee
on Labor and Public
Welfare,
on the types
of jobs offered
to unemployed
and underemployed
persons
under the EEA, GAO reported
that:
--Program
agents
selected
wide variety
of public
to provide
educational,
tion
services.
and established
service
needs.
law enforcement,
.
job opportunities
to meet a
The largest
number of jobs were
public
works,
and transporta-
--Factors
most often
cited
as affecting
the types
of jobs selected
were
(1) unmet public
service
needs of the area and (2) needs and skills
of
unemployed
persons.
Lack of funds
for job-related
training,
lack of
time to adequately
assess public
service
needs,
and potential
for permanent employment
also affected
job selection.
--Controversies
arose over the types
of jobs selected
by
program
agents
in the GAO review.
Except
in one case,
versies
did not seriously
delay program
implementation.
the controversies
were resolved
by modifying
the cases,
or the employment
practices
which
affected
job selection.
11 of the 23
these
controIn about
half
the job types
--Most
jobs provided
program
participants
with
the same wages and benefits
as comparable
employees
of the program
agents
and subagents
included
in the GAO review.
A number
of agents
and subagents,
however,
established
special
job classifications
for EEA participants
and, for
this
reason,
the participants
did not qualify
for retirement
benefits
or promotional
opportunities
available
to regular
permanent
employees.
Other
rights
or benefits
for which
some participants
did not qualify
included
severance
pay, maternity
leave,
tenure,
regular
merit
and
special
in-grade
salary
adjustment,
night
or overtime
pay differential,
and appeal
rights
for grievances.
--Overall,
program
agents
were able to use EEA funds to establish
public
service
jobs which would result
in employment
for a substantial
number
of persons.
Some program
agents,
however,
were not always
able to establish
jobs
to meet their
highest
public
service
needs,
due to a lack
of funds
for equipment
and supplies
or for training
potential
employees.
Also,
certain
local
conditions,
such as established
civil
service
rules
and limited
opportunities
for advancement
within
existing
job
structures
, differed
among the program
agents
reviewed.
As a result,
program
implementation
was less than uniform
and, in some cases,
agents
were precluded
from complying
with
all of the act’s
requirements.
Nevertheless,
agents
generally
made genuine
efforts
to meet the act’s
requirements
and to provide
advantageous
job opportunities
to EEA
participants.
(B-163922,
Nov. 27, 1972.)
62
,
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
MANPOWER ADMINISTRATION
Impact
of grants
to
under
the Emergency
Act of 1971
(continued)
Indian
tribes
Employment
Subcommittee
In a report
to the Chairman,
Poverty,’
Senate
Committee
on Labor and Public
quest,
GAO reported
that:
on Employment,
Manpower,
Welfare,
pursuant
to his
and
re-
--The EEA program
has created
additional
jobs
for unemployed
Indians
and
alleviated
some of the public
service
needs of the tribes
reviewed.
The EEA program,
however,
as presently
funded,
cannot
be expected
to
have a major
impact
on the chronic
shortage
of jobs on or near most
reservations.
--Overall,
program
agents
serving
Indian
tribes
were more effective
than
other
program
agents
in placing
EEA participants
in permanent
nonsubsiAfter
about
10 months
of program
dized
jobs on or near reservations.
about
200
participants
of
the
tribes
reviewed
had
been peroperation,
manently
placed.
There were some prospects
for additional
permanent
placements.
However,
in some cases,
the prospects
for permanent
placement were somewhat
limited.
--Because
of limitations
on the use of EEA funds
and the
tribes
have had problems
financing
costs
tribal
funds,
ministration
and supportive
services
and some enrollees
for work related
costs.
general
lack of
of program
adhave had to pay
--A departmental
decision
that
other
program
agents
could
not allocate
EEA funds
to tribes
would have significantly
decreased
funding
for
tribes
in the State
of Washington.
According
to Department
officials,
‘:he Secretary
of Labor plans
to allocate
discretionary
EEA funds
to
co?-er any amounts
which
tribes
may lose.
GAO also reported
that
jobs established
by the tribes
reviewed
were
chosen
to meet tribal
needs and to fit
the skills
of the unemployed.
The
establishi.ng
of types
of jobs was limited
by the lack of funds
to purchase
certain
needed
equipment
and the lack of persons
with
appropriate
skills
for
Most
jobs
provided
the
tribes
with
needed
public
services.
the jobs.
Bene improved
management
of tribal
affits
included
improved
housing
and roads,
fairs,
and assistance
to tribal
enterprises
., (B-163922,
Mar. 14, 1973.)
Public
service
benefits
from jobs
under
the Emergency
Employment
Act of 1971
In a report
to the Chairman,
Subcommittee
on Employment,
Manpower,
and
Poverty,
Senate
Committee
on Labor and Public
Welfare,
pursuant
to his request,
GAO reported
that
nationwide
about
200,000
public
service
jobs were
established
by State
and local
governments
under EEA during
fiscal
year 1972,
the first
year of the program.
Although
GAO found
it somewhat
difficult
to
determine
the extent
of changes
in public
services
resulting
from the
63
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
XANPOWER ADMINISTRATION
program,
that
the
(continued)
according
to statements
public
service
benefits
made to
objective
GAO by program
agents,
of the act was being
it appears
met,
A related
review
by GAO of other
program
agents
in rural
and urban areas
showed that,
in the urban areas,
the program
generally
served
to prevent
a
decrease
in city
services
rather
than to provide
additional
services
and
that,
in the rural
areas,
the program
generally
provided
additional
needed
public
services.
(B-163922,
.June 8, 1973.)
64
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
OCCUPATIONAL
SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION
More concerted
effort
needed
bv the
Federal
Government
on occupational
safety
and health
programs
for Federal
employees
a
Section
19 of the Occupational
Safety
and Health
Act of 1970 requires
each Federal
agency
to establish
and maintain
an effective
and comprehensive
consistent
with
standards
promulgated
occupational
safety
and health
program-by the Secretary
of Labor--and
to provide
safe and healthful
work conditions
for Federal
employees.
The Occupational
Safety
and Health
Administration
(OSHA) by executive
order
is required
to issue
regulations
to provide
guidance to Federal
agencies
in fulfilling
their
responsibilities
under
the act.
In a report
to the Chairman,
Senate
Committee
on Labor and Public
Welfare,
GAO stated
that much more needed
to be done if the Federal
Government
were to insure
that
its own agencies
were complying
with
the standards
which
it was enforcing
in the private
sector
and if Federal
employees
were to be
GAO noted
that:
assured
of safe and healthful
conditions
in workplaces.
--OSHA’s
enforcement
and inspection
practices
differed
significantly
between
private
businesses
and Federal
agencies.
For private
businesses
OSHA enforces
compliance
with
safety
and health
standards
through
inspections
and penalties
authorized
by the act.
Al though
required
to evaluate
each Federal
agency’s
program
annually,
OSHA
had not evaluated
many Federal
programs.
--GAO inquiries
at 49 Federal
agencies
indicated
that
workplace
inspections
often
varied
from a walk-through
official
to an inspection
which was part of a review
matters
unrelated
to safety.
Most Federal
agencies
time inspectors.
,
Federal
agency
by a safety
involving
used only part-
--GAO inspected
workplaces
of four
Federal
agencies
in the Washington,
area and found about
200 instances
of noncompliance
with
OSHA’s
D.C.,
safety
and health
standards.
About
50 of the instances
were sufficiently
severe
that,
had they been found
in private
businesses,
the
businesses
would have been subject
to monetary
penalties
assessed
by
OSHA.
These inspections
are covered
in the following
GAO reports
to
the cited
agencies:
(1) General
Services
Administration,
B-163375,
January
30, 1973,
(2) Department
of Commerce,
B-163375,
January
31,
1973,
(3) Department
of the Interior,
B-163375,
January
31, 1973,
and (4) Government
Printing
Office,
B-163375,
February
28, 1973.
--Although
safety
sistency
most Federal
program
before
and overall
agencies
the act
direction.
surveyed
had established
was passed,
the programs
some sort
of
lacked
con-
--OSHA has imposed
a uniform
recording
and reporting
system
on Federal
agencies,
which
is a potential
improvement
over past systems,
but a
number of problems
remain
to be overcome.
Definitions
of job-related
incidents
and incompatibilities
in existing
agency
reporting
systems
must be remedied,
65
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
OCCUPATIONAL
SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION
(continued)
--OSHA has not provided
the centralized
leadership
needed
to effect
a
uniform
Federal
policy.
OSHA has also neither
produced
guidelines
for Federal
agency programs
nor adequately
evaluated
those
in existence,GAO made several
recommendations
to strengthen
OSHA’s leadership
The Department
advised
GAO that
it concurred
the areas cited
above.
ally
with all
the recommendations
and that
OSHA had taken or planned
various
actions
along
the lines
GAO suggested.
role
in
generto take
GAO recommended
also
that
the Committee
consider
amending
the act to
bring
Federal
workplaces
under
the inspection
responsibility
of OSHA.
These
inspections
should
supplement,
and not replace,
inspections
by the agencies’
own personnel
.
(B-163375,
Mar. 15, 1973.)
66
*
DEPARTMENTOF STATE
AGENCYFOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
Contents
Page
c
Need for U.S. concessional
assistance to Brazil
Limiting
U.S. development assistance to Ecuador
Need to consider terminating
development loan program in Korea
Providing for a coordinated program of family planning,
health,
and nutrition
Questionable effectiveness
of grant supporting
India’s family
planning program
Problems of the land reform program in Vietnam
Developing countries’
external debt and U.S. foreign assistance
End of rupee financing
of U.S. programs in Nepal
67
69
69
70
72
73
74
75
75
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL
Need for
to Brazil
U.S.
concessional
assistance
The United
States
provided
about
Brazil
in fiscal
year 1973 and planned
year 1974.
GAO reported
that
Brazil’s
was questionable.
--Its
gross
about
9.9
national
percent
DEVELOPMENT
$50 million
in concessional
aid to
to provide
about
$17 million
in fiscal
need for such assistance,
however,
product
has grown at
since
1968 and totaled
$3 billion
in foreign
at the start
of 1973
an average
annual
about
$50 billion
exchange
in 1971 and
were about
$4.2 billion.
rate
of
in 1972.
--It
accumulated
Total
reserves
1972.
--It
is able to obtain
substantial
economic
assistance
from other
the
International
Bank
for
Reconstruction
sources.
For example,
Development,
the Inter-American
Development
Bank,
and the ExportImport
Bank of the United
States
authorized
over $900 million
in
ternal
assistance
in fiscal
year 1972 alone.
and
ex-
some of its
resources
in 1972 to the Special
--Brazil,
in turn,
p ledged
Fund of the African
Development
Bank.
The resources
of this
fund,
like
the more concessional
loan funds
of the Inter-American
Development Bank and the Asian
Development
Bank, will
be used to finance
high-priority
development
projects.
--Authorized
amounted
to
but undisbursed
over a quarter
Agency
for
of a billion
International
dollars
Development
loans
as of May 1, 1973.
The Department
of State
and the Agency for International
Development
levels
were consistent
with
U.S.
(AID) said that
current
U.S. assistance
foreign
policy
objectives.
GAO noted
that program
managers
have not addressed
the question
of when a foreign
aid recipient
like
Brazil
reaches
the point
in its development
when it no longer
needs further
U.S. concessional
assistance.
GAO believes
AID to identify
longer
requires
c
.
Limiting
U.S.
to Ecuador
the Congress
should
require
precisely
and objectively
that
U.S. concessional
assistance.
development
the Department
of State
and
point
at which
a country
no
(B-133283,
July
30, 1973.)
assistance
The United
States
contributed
modest
assistance
to Ecuador,
one of the
lesser
developed
countries
in Latin
America,
in the 1940s and 1950s and introduced
relatively
significant
amounts
of capital
and technology
in the
and indirect
ass is tance
1960s and 1970s.
From 1962 through
1972 U.S. direct
This assistance
accounted
for
commitments
amounted
to about
$360 million.
about
78 percent
of the outside
assistance
to Ecuador
and amounted
to about
13 percent
of Ecuador’s
Central
Government
revenues.
69
DEPARTMENTOF STATE
AGENCYFOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
GAO concluded
that:
--Short-term
U.S. program objectives , goals, and priorities
in Ecuador
have shifted frequently;
the long-term U.S. objective
is uncertain.
--U.S. assistance has helped to construct
or modernize transportation
and power production
facilities,
health accommodations, and schools;
feed people; transfer skills;
change attitudes;
cement United StatesEcuadorean relations;
and protect certain U.S. economic interests,
Some accomplishments were small, measured against the aggregate need.
--U.S. assistance has not served as a catalyst
causing or permitting
Ecuador to achieve increased political
stability
or to achieve accelerated progress in economic and social development.
GAO also concluded that U.S. assistance has served to a large degree
as a substitute
for Ecuador’s own self-help,
due principally
to a lack of
real commitment to basic reform and development on the part of the Ecuadorean Government,
GAO recommended that the Secretary of State and the Administrator
of
AID reassess the purpose and value of U.S. assistance to Ecuador.
The
agencies took the position
that weakness in the Ecuadorean ‘commitment to
its own development during the past decade was not a sufficient
reason for
the United States to abandon its assistance unless by so doing it would
cause the Ecuadoreans to respond more effectively
in the future.
GAO suggested that
the Congress consider:
--Whether it may be in the U.S. interest
to limit U.S. development
resources which can be made available
to Ecuador until the country
can demonstrate a reasonable commitment to its own development.
--The appropriateness
of creating statutory
standards limiting
the
aggregate amount of U.S. public resources that can be provided to
recipients
who have not demonstrated a reasonable commitment to their
own development . (B-146998, Feb. 27, 1973.)
Need to consider terminating
development loan program in Korea
During fiscal years 1968 through 1972, Korea received $3,829 million
in U.S. direct bilateral
economic and military
assistance.
Korea has also
benefited substantially
from U.S. expenditures
supporting U.S. military
forces stationed in Korea and additional
sums provided for sending its
troops to Vietnam,
Korea’s economic growth indicators
have been most impressive since
1965, but this has been achieved at the expense of a steadily
mounting external debt and an increasing
trade deficit.
Expansion of industry has been
emphasi zed, with much less attention
being given to social and welfare
70
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL
needs.
The rural
and urban
income
consumption
gap also widened.
.
gap
and
DEVELOPMENT
the
food
grain
production
and
U.S. assistance
undoubtedly
stimulated
Korea’s
economic
expansion,
but
it also may have contributed,
inadvertently,
to its economic
problems.
For
aid has helped
to make it possible
for Korea to
example,
U.S. concessional
get large
amounts
of nonconcessional
credit,
but this
has caused Korea’s
In addition,
external
debt situation
to worsen.
subsidization
of food and
fiber
programs
has built
up Korean
demand for imported
products,
thus adding to its
trade
gap.
the United
States
has reduced
its AID program
Over the past 10 years,
However,
other
U.S. inputs --such
as Public
Law 480, Exportconsiderably.
assistance,
and U.S. expenditures
in Korea--have
reImport
Bank, military
mained high or have increased.
This fact
and the increased
inputs
from
multilateral
organizations
mean that
external
assistance
to Korea actually
has increased.
For
many years AID focused
on developing
Korea’s
industries
and subsidizing
its commercial
import
requirements.
In recent
years,
however,
AID
has restructured
its program
to emphasize
development
of the lagging
The Korean
Government
has not given
qdeagricultural
and social
sectors.
quate
attention
toward
correcting
this
imbalance
of its economy.
Korean
emphasis
on capital
development,
rather
than on such sectors
as agriculture,
has aggravated
the situation.
During
1971 and 1972 most of the AID development
loan funds were used
to import
rice.
The AID development
loan program
has been,
in essence,
an
extension
of the Public
Law 480 program.
Together
these
two programs
seem
to serve
as a disincentive
for the Korean
Government
to seek an early
solution
to problems
in its agricultural
sector.
l
M
With the United
Nations
and the international
creasing
their
assistance
to Korea,
the Public
Law
increased
amounts
which
can be used in the lagging
Government’s
continuing
emphasis
on other
sectors,
for continuing
the AID development
loan program.
lending
institutions
in480 program
generating
sectors,
and the Korean
GAO questions
the need
The State
Department
and AID believe
that
the
of U.S. economic
aid should
remain
flexible
because
performance
of the Korean
economy and events
which
outlook.
timing
for a phasedown
of the recent
irregular
have clouded
its
economic
GAO suggested
that
the
State
and AID the feasibility
for Korea.
(B-164264,
July
Congress
should
of terminating
12, 1973.)
71
review
with
the
the development
Department
of
loan program
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL
Providing
for a coordinated
health,
family
planning,
program
and nutrition
DEVELOPMENT
of
In
1967 the Congress
enacted
an amendment
to foreign
aid legislation
Thereafter,
entitled
“Title
X--Programs
Relating
to Population
Growth.”
amounts
earmarked
for population
and family
planning
programs
increased
sharply- to $35 million
in fiscal
year 1968 (from $5 million
the previous
year),
$45 million
in 1969,
$75 million
in 1970,
$100 million
in 1971, and
$125 million
in both 1972 and 1973.
AID provided
$35 million
directly
to family
planning
programs
in
Indonesia,
Laos, Thailand,
and the Philippines
between
1968 and 1972.
GAO reviewed
AID’s problems
in implementing
programs
in these
countries,
particularly
in view of the relatively
short
period
AID had to develop
implement
programs
to use the large
amounts
of money provided.
,
a
and
For each of the four
countries,
title
X funds were used to a greater
or
lesser
degree
for purposes
related
indirectly
to controlling
population
Various
maternal
and child
health
and nutrition
programs
in
growth
rates.
the Philippines,
Thailand,
and Laos previously
funded
by regular
AID appropriations
were considered
family
planning
projects
when title
X funds became available.
AID obligated
large
amounts
during
the last
month of the fiscal
years
for undefined
program
requirements
so that
funds would not be lost
to the
Inadequate
administrative
and logis tics
sys terns contributed
to the
program.
problem
of defining
program
requirements,
making proper
distribution,
and
maintaining
accountability
for the commodities.
In all
four
countries,
services
were made available
in excess
of demand so that
clinics
were unproductive,
commodities
were overstocked,
and equipment
either
was not used
or was underused.
AID used title
X funds
for health
and nutrition
programs
not related
dire,ctly
to reducing
population
growth
rates,
because
it believed
that
such
use in some cases was the best means to promote
family
planning.
Through
this
means a very humanitarian
service
has been provided.
GAO therefore
suggested
that
the Congress
consider
whether
title
X may need to be revised
to provide
for a coordinated
program
of family
planning,
health,
and nutrition.
AID said it would concur
in this
recommendation,
provided
that
additional
funds for health
and nutrition
are included
in the title
X appropriation.
In implementing
a coordinated
family
planning,
health,
and nutrition
program,
AID would be glad to give increased
emphasis
to health
and
nutrition
but would in no way wish to reduce
the emphasis
given
to family
planning.
(B-173240,
May 23, 1973.)
72
’
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL
Questionable
supporting
c
L
effectiveness
India’s
family
of grant
planning
DEVELOPMENT
program
In mid-1970,
AID announced
that
it was providing
a grant
of $20 million
to India
to help expand its population
control
program.
AID stated
that
the
grant
was made in accordance
with
title
X of the Foreign
Assistance
Act and
that
the funds would be spent
in the United
States
for goods and services
normally
imported
by India
and financed
by development
loans.
In
its
report
to
the
Administrator
of AID,
GAO concluded
that:
--The
effectiveness
of the $20 million
grant
was questionable.
Effective
expansion
of the Government
of India’s
family
planning
program
and use of the funds was contingent
upon administrative
reforms.
India
failed
to expend
its own funds,
and administrative
reforms
continued
to be the major
constraint
on India’s
program.
--The
grant
will
probably
have little
if any effect
on the size of
India’s
family
planning
program.
The program
has not suffered
from
a lack of funding
and, in fact,
has recently
failed
to use its
budgeted
funds.
There is little
indication
that
this
situation
will
change in the near future.
--The
$20 million
grant
in dollars
was given
to India
without
any substantive
performance
prerequisites
which would reasonably
insure
that
the funds would be used effectively
to achieve
the objectives
of the family
planning
progam.
If additional
funding
was in fact
needed,
rupees
could have been made available
from the huge excess
of U.S. -owned rupees
on hand.
It would appear
that
the inherent
pressures
of obligating
funds
in conformance
with
the expressed
wishes
of the Congress
to assist
programs
concerned
with
population
control
and family
planning
were factors
in obligating
the funds
without
an adequately
developed
program.
--GAO questioned
neither
India’s
need to control
the growth
of its
population
nor the legality
of this
transaction.
However,
it did
question
whether
AID beneficially
influenced
or assisted
the objectives
of India’s
family
planning
program
by providing
resources
under
the circumstances
described.
In GAO’s opinion,
the $20 million
grant
resulted
in additional
general
development
assistance.
*
m
GAO recommended
that
the Administrator
of AID (1) reconsider
the use
of dollars,
earmarked
for population
control,
for purposes
unrelated
to
foreign
exchange
costs
of the population
program
for those
countries
where
currencies
are available,
and (2) obample amounts
of U.S. -owned foreign
tain
from the Auditor
General
periodic
evaluations
of the extent
to which
the purposes
of the grant
are being
achieved.
AID said that
expansion
of the Indian
program
simply
could not be
achieved
by allocating
additional
U.S.-owned,
excess
local
currencies.
Moreover,
AID might
provide
dollars
to support
expanded
local
currency
exif such aid would help to significantly
improve
penditures
in the future,
family
planning
programs.
73
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL
GAO expressed
the belief
that
To further
should
be used first.
are not adequate
in excess-currency
relationship
has been established,
meet foreign
exchange
costs.
DEVELOPMENT
U.S. -owned excess
foreign
currencies
the objectives
of a program
when resources
countries
and when a direct
and positive
dollar
support
could
then be provided
to
J
in the bill
(H.R. 16705)
making
appropriaGAO noted
that
the Senate,
tions
for foreign
assistance
and related
programs
for fiscal
year 1973,
provided
guidance
on the use of dollars
for programs
in excess-currency
countries.
However,
the Congress
adjourned
before
enactment.
(B-161854,
Jan, 12, 1973.)
Problems
of
in Vietnam
the
land
reform
program
As of March 31, 1973, the United
States
had contributed
The primary
aim
lion
to the land reform
program
in Vietnam.
is to broaden
the political
base of the Government
of Vietnam
breaking
up large
landholdings
and giving
rural
families
title
they farm.
about
$38 milof the program
(GVN) by
to the land
The GVN land reform
program
was relatively
strong
from
but little
real progress
took place
between
1962 and 1969.
March 1970 marked the beginning
of considerable
land reform
again.
1954 to 1961,
A law passed
in
activity
once
The present
program
consists
of two subprograms:
the Land-to-the-Tiller
(LTTT) program
and the Montagnard
program.
Under the LTTT program
1,007,217
hectares
had been distributed
to about
650,000
tenant
farmers
of March 1973.
This exceeded
the initial
goal of 1 million
hectares.
as
The Montagnard
land reform
program,
however,
has made slow progress.
It has been carried
out poorly,
has not received
adequate
GVN support,
and
has received
a disproportionately
low share of U.S. support.
In many cases
where land has been transferred,
problems
exist
which prevent
the Montagnards
from receiving
full
program
benefits.
These problems
include
allocations
for less than the amount of land area indicated
in program
guidelines
and
land encroachments.
If the United
States
continues
its past
level
of support
to the GVN
budget,
the cost of the program
to the United
States
might
reach over $300
million.
Compensation
payments
to former
landlords
under
the LTTT program
alone
are expected
to cost about
$537 million.
This will
place
a serious
additional
burden
on the GVN budget.
Agency officials
agreed
problems
but contend
that
since
November
1972
some problems
hindering
the attainment
(B-159451,
June 22, 1973.)
still
exist
in the land reform
program
progress
has been made in overcoming
of the program’s
initial
objectives.
74
.
ti
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL
Develoninn
and U.S.
L
L
countries’
external
foreign
assistance
DEVELOPMENT
debt
In a growing
number of developing
countries,
external
public
debt has
become a heavy burden
on further
economic
growth.
By December
1970,
80
developing
countries
had accumulated
over $66 billion
of external
debt.
Debt
service
(interest
and amortization)
payments
on this
debt increased
by about
nearly
$6 billion.
18 percent
in 1970, reaching
Such payments,
which
are
represent
an almost
critical
drain
on resources
expected
to continue
rising,
and underscore
the developing
countries’
debt burden.
Although
the United
States
is the largest
single
creditor
to the deall
creditor
nations
are under increasing
pressure
to
veloping
countries,
reschedule,
refinance,
or cancel
outstanding
debts.
Any form of debt relief
provided
is comparable
to new aid.
And as the need for relief
becomes more
frequent,
debt relief
is increasingly
an important
form of economic
assistante.
The assistance
which
the United
States
provided
developing
countries
through
debt relief
is not now included
in the President’s
proposals
to the
Congress
for new economic
assistance.
Nor is it shown in a meaningful
manner
in subsequent
reports
summarizing
the actual
assistance
provided.
GAO recommended
that
this
assistance
should
be systematically
and comprehensively
reported
to the Congress
by the Secretary
of State.
The Department
of State
and AID commented
that AID has in the past,
for those
countries
in
which
net aid flows
were of major importance,
presented
the Congress
information
on net aid,
debt,
and related
balance
of payments
problems.
GAO expressed
the belief
that
the Congress
may wish to consider
legislation
to require
comprehensive
annual
reporting
by the Secretary
of State,
to be submitted
in January
of each year and thus be available
to the committees
of the Congress
in their
considerations
of authorization
and appropriation
proposals.
Such reporting
might
make available
for the Congress
current
summary perspectives
of the worldwide
dimensions
of the debt burden
problem,
as well
as the specifics
of debt relief
granted
or proposed.
In July 1973 the House passed
an amendment
to the
Act which would accomplish
these reporting
objectives.
1973.)
.
*
End of rupee
U.S. programs
financing
in Nepal
Foreign
Assistance
(B-177988,
May 11,
of
The basic
U.S. Foreign
policy
objective
in Nepal reflects
the broader
Asian
context
wherein
the United
States
seeks to assist
in development
and
to contribute
to peace and stability.
The United
States
has no vested
interests
in Nepal.
The AID program
is consistent
phasis
on manpower
and institutional
technical
skills
and the economic
with
U.S. interests
in Nepal.
Its emdevelopment
also helps
develop
the
and administrative
infrastructure
necessary
75
DEPARTMENTOF STATE
AGENCYFOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
for Nepal to absorb capital
assistance from other donors.
A unique feature
has been the use of U.S. -owned excess Indian and, to a small extent,
In fiscal
year 1971, over 80 perPakistani
rupees from program financing.
cent of AID’s $15.4 million
program in Nepal was financed by these rupees.
U.S. program strategy in the 1970s calls for an end to the present
U.S. technical
assistance
Indian and Pakistani
rupee-financed
AID program.
is to continue and AID planned to begin a development lending program in
late fiscal year 1973.
with foreign aid financing most of its development effort,
Nepal has
though
limited
in
relation
to
the
needs
of
its
people--from
the
progressed-At
that
time,
Nepal
had
no
civil
service
low base starting
point in 1951.
and virtually
no schools, hospitals,
roads, electric
power, or industry.
The United States has contributed
about $166.5 million--including
about
$81 million
in Indian and Pakistani
rupees-- of the $405.5 million
total
economic grants, loans, and credits extended by external donors to Nepal
from fiscal
years 1952 through 1971.
GAO suggested in its report that the Congress may wish to consider the
future funding of the Nepal assistance program, of which almost half has
India had been unwilling
to
been financed with U.S.-owned Indian rupees.
extend its longstanding
agreement for such use of rupees beyond fiscal
year
1973. Unless rupee support is continued, dollar financing would need to be
increased if the assistance program is to continue at its present level.
In May 1973 AID said that it had taken steps to substitute
dollar funding for rupee use, commencing in fiscal
year 1973. AID also said that its
fiscal
year 1974 appropriation
request included both grant and loan funds
for kinds of activities
which in the past would have been financed by
Indian rupees.
(B-177681, Mar. 16, 1973.)
76
DEPARTMENTOF TRANSPORTATION
Contents
Page
DEPARTMENT-WIDE
Regulating the transportation
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION
Identifying
and correcting
safety
c
79
79
of hazardous materials
defects
on light
aircraft
80
80
NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION
Enforcement of Federal motor vehicle safety standards
82
82
NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGERCORPORATION(AMTRAK)
Need to improve train conditions
through better maintenance
Analysis of railroad
passenger service train scheduling and
operations
Railroad reservation,
information,
and ticketing
services being
improved
83
83
77
84
85
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
DEPARTMENT-WIDE
Regulating
the transportation
of hazardous
materials
,
Hazardous
materials
shipments
represent
an increasing
danger
to public
Each year hundreds
of new materials
are developed;
thousands
of
safety.
and the annual
volume
is estimated
to reach
such shipments
are made daily;
1.5 billion
tons by 1980.
Four units
of the Department
of Transportation-the Federal
Railroad
Administration,
the Federal
Highway
Administration,
the
Federal
Aviation
Administration,
and Coast Guard--are
responsible
for regulating
the safe transportation
of hazardous
materials
for railroads,
motor
civil
air carriers,
and vessels.
carriers,
GAO reported
to the Congress
that
the Department
needed
to work toward
a more effective
inspection
and enforcement
program
to insure
compliance
with regulations
for safely
transporting
hazardous
materials.
The Department’s
program
was handicapped
by (1) lack of basic
data on hazardous
materials
movements,
(2) insufficient
and unsystematic
inspection
efforts,
and (3) inadequate
enforcement
actions.
Because a Federal
agency
can
directly
assess
civil
penalties
without
the delays
of processing
criminal
cases,
effective
enforcement
would be promoted
if authority
to impose civil
fines
were extended
to the Federal
Railroad
Administration
and the Federal
Highway
Administration.
such
The Coast
authority.
Guard
GAO recommended
and the
Federal
that
Secretary
the
Aviation
of
Administration
already
Transportation:
1.
Establish
a management
information
system
data on hazardous
materials
movements.
to
2.
Reassess
the adequacy
the volume
and danger
effort
3.
Develop
program,
a plan
4.
Present
needed
the plan
resources.
for
of
of
the
the
a more
to
the
DepartmentIs
materials.
effective
Congress
The Department
said it found
much of
improving
the program
and that
it planned
similar
to those
GAO suggested.
(B-164497,
79
had
inspection
for
it
value
in
to initiate
May 1,
to
develop
and maintain
compared
with
and enforcement
evaluate
and
consider
GAO’s recommendations
several
actions
1973.)
for
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
FEDERAL AVIATION
ADMINISTRATION
Identifying
and
defects
on light
correcting
aircraft
safety
Government
Activities
Subcommittee,
At the request
of the Chairman,
GAO reviewed
the Federal
Aviation
House Committee
on Government
Operations,
Administration’s
(FAA) aircraft
safety
regulatory
activities
involving
selected
manufacturers
of light
aircraft
to whom FAA had delegated
certain
authority
for determining
that
their
aircraft
met Government
regulations,
_
l
flight
GAO reported
that
testing
leading
FAA should
more actively
to type certification
of
FAA had not implemented
inservice
light
aircraft
for
in the Government’s
1967 and
studies.
participate
in
new and modified
the
a program
to independently
flight
the adverse
flight
characteristics
1969 aircraft
design-induced
pilot
design
aircraft.
and
test major
identified
error
aircraft
certified
by the Government
as airworthy
In a number of cases,
Although
some
aircraft
with
dewere later
found
to have design
weaknesses.
sign weaknesses
were certified
after
the Government
participated
directly
in
design
development
and testing
of the aircraft,
most of them were certified
under delegation
procedures
whereby
manufacturers
determined
whether
the
aircraft
complied
with
applicable
Government
regulations.
After
it became known that
weaknesses,
FAA and manufacturers
correct
the weaknesses.
GAO recommended
that
the
aircraft
usually
Secretary
had been
delayed
of
Transportation
1.
Participate
fully
in
designed
or modified
for mass production.
flight
light
2.
Establish
problems
for
3.
Establish
criteria
for guiding
regional
design
weaknesses
promptly,
assessing
in relation
to safety,
and undertaking
corrective
action.
procedures
in interpreting
manufactured
modifying
the
with
design
designs
to
require
FAA to:
and other
critical
testing
of newly
aircraft
before
they are type certified
systematically
monitoring
FAA light
aircraft
safety
offices
seriousness
effective
manufacturers’
regulations.
in
identifying
of weaknesses
and prompt
Since FAA had not implemented
a program
to independently
light
aircraft
for the adverse
flight
characteristics
identified
and 1969 studies,
GAO suggested
that
the Government
Activities
may wish to discuss
with
FAA the need for such a program.
FAA stated
tion
certification
capabilities
in
that
flight
test
in the 1967
Subcommittee
it had recently
become further
involved
in the delegaprocess
because
of rapidly
changing
state-of-the-art
aircraft
and changes
in airworthiness
rules
and policy.
As
80
*
4
DEPARTMENTOF TRANSPORTATION
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION (continued)
instructed
by the Subcommittee, GAO did not obtain written
Department of Transportation
on the report contents.
s
comments from the
Manufacturers generally
favored use of delegation procedures for type
certification
as the most economical and practical
method of producing light
(B-164497(1),
June 8, 1973.)
aircraft
in the United States.
81
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
NATIONAL
Enforcement
HIGHWAY TRAFFIC
of
Federal
SAFETY ADMINISTRATION
motor
vehicle
safety
standards
The National
Traffic
and Motor Vehicle
Safety
Act of 1966 was enacted
to protect
the American
public
from unreasonable
risk
of motor
vehicle
and deaths
by means of a coordinated
national
safety
accidents,
injuries,
program
and the establishment
of safety
standards
for motor vehicles.
Responsibility
for enforcing
this
law rests
with the National
Highway
Traffic
Safety
Administration
(NHTSA) .
_
l
In
a report
to the Congress,
GAO expressed
the opinion
that
the NHTSA’s
testing
program-its major
activity
for determining
manufacturers’
compliance with
Federal
motor
vehicle
safety
standards--provided
little
assurance
that
motor vehicles
would comply with
the standards
and thereby
provide
the
safety
benefits
intended--protection
against
unreasonable
risk
of accidents,
injuries,
or death.
Testing
had not been systematically
focused
on problems
identified
through
analysis
of available
accident
data as having
a high potential
for
reducing
highway
accidents,
deaths,
and injuries.
NHTSA did not use manufacturers
1 certification
data to supplement
and refine
its limited
testing
program
and did not take timely
action
to resolve
test
failure
cases.
GAO recommended
that
the
1.
Systematic
selecting
testing.
use of
vehicles,
2.
Evaluation
dent data
of
and
Secretary
Transportation
accident
data and studies
equipment,
and standards
compliance
testing
priorities
studies
and the results
of
require:
as a key factor
in
areas for compliance
prior
on the basis
compliance
of accitests.
use of manufacturers’
the NHTSA’s standards
certification
enforcement
data
particularly
corrected.
in
3.
Expanded
and
to supplement
coverage.
systematic
and refine
4.
Timely
having
in resolving
vehicles
and
action
unsafe
of
test
failure
cases,
equipment
conditions
The Department
stated
it was doing
as much and as well
as could be expected
with
available
resources.
The Department
and automobile
industry
representatives
cautioned
that
use of accident
data should
involve
meaningful evaluation
of its relationship
to specific
vehicle
safety
standards.
The representatives
agreed,
however,
that
results
of accident
investigations
could be helpful
in determining
priorities
for compliance
checking
and
enforcement.
(B-164497(3),
Apr.
24, 1973.)
82
*
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
NATIONAL
s
c
RAILROAD
PASSENGER CORPORATION
(AMTRAK)
AMTRAK--a private,
for profit
corporation
created
by the Congress
to
operate
and revitalize
intercity
rail
passenger
service--uses
the facilities
The railroads
are reimbursed
by AMTRAK
of 13 railroads
to provide
service.
for operating
costs
exceeding
revenues.
AMTRAK receives
Federal
financial
assistance
through
grants
from the Department.
The Chairman,
Subcommittee
on Transportation
and Aeronautics,
House
Committee
on Interstate
and Foreign
Commerce,
asked GAO for a report
and
evaluation
of railroad
passenger
service
provided
by AMTRAK.
Need to
through
improve
better
train
conditions
maintenance
GAO inspected
AMTRAK’s trains
and reviewed
the maintenance,
repair,
and
refurbishment
of its locomotives
and passenger
cars in 1972.
GAO reported
to the Subcommittee
Chairman
that
the general
cleanliness
of passenger
cars
and the condition
of on-board
equipment,
such as air-conditioning,
was unsatisfactory
on many of the trains
it inspected.
AMTRAK did not carry
out
the congressional
directive
to take direct
control
over maintenance
and repair,
and it was not able to keep its
trains
in good operating
condition
because
its contractual
arrangements
with
the railroads
did not provide
for
an effective
maintenance
program
and because
it did not adequately
monitor
the railroads’
activities.
AMTRAK lost
revenue
and incurred
additional
costs
by renting
cars because
one third
of its fleet
was out of service
during much of 1972 for maintenance,
repair,
or refurbishment.
GAO recommended
that
AMTRAK:
--Take
direct
responsibility
for
passenger
cars and locomotives.
maintaining
and
repairing
--Establish
procedures
increase
the number
locomotives.
for inspecting
of employees
car maintenance
and
assigned
to inspection
--Enforce
use
condition
train
crews’
of
car
--Establish
a maintenance
record
--Expedite
passenger
establishment
cars.
of
--Award
refurbishment
--Schedule
passenger
--Prepare
detailed
--Hold
contractors
contracts
cars
in
system
a parts
specifications
responsible
for
cars.
inventory
control
system
of
competition,
basis
open
refurbishment.
refurbishment.
defective
83
reports.
passenger
for
for
repairs
of cars
for
on the
advance
trip
its
refurbishment.
for
and
and
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
NATIONAL
RAILROAD
PASSENGER CORPORATION
(AMTRAK)
(continued)
AMTRAK, the Department
of Transportation,
and the Interstate
Commerce
Commission
generally
agreed with
GAO’s conclusions
and recommendations.
AMTRAK said that
it was taking
actions
similar
to those recommended
by GAO
(B-175155,
June 21,
to improve
the condition
and operation
of its
trains.
1973.)
Analysis
of railroad
passenger
train
scheduling
and operations
service
GAO engaged
a firm
of transportation
consultants
to study
intercity
passenger
train
scheduling
and operations
to determine
how well
passenger
The consultant
firm’s
report
rail
service
matched
user demands and desires.
was furnished
to the Subcommittee
Chairman.
On the
basis
--AMTRAK
obtain
of
should
better
its
study,
the
consultant
better
match train
use of equipment.
make-ups
--Because
many passengers
ride
coaches
only,
maximized
and use of parlor
cars,
sleeper
cars,
which
are costly
to operate,
should
profitable.
firm
said
that:
to
traffic
requirements
use of coaches
should
be
cars,
and separate
dining
be minimized
except
where
--Given
the low loadings
on many AMTRAK routes,
particularly
shorter
haul routes,
alternate
equipment,
especially
the
car,
should
be considered,
--To reduce
variations
in traffic,
charging
ferential
fares,
i.e.,
light
and premium
fares
in peak
to
AMTRAK should
experiment
lower fares
on days when
periods.
the
rail
diesel
with
traffic
difis
--Because
terminal
costs
are substantial
and AMTRAK makes many train
stops
at low-revenue-producing
cities,
AMTRAK should
study
the location
and frequency
of its stops
and the costs
associated
with
them.
--Because
passenger
rail
service
is
transportation
mode, AMTRAK should
market
of recreational
travel.
generally
a leisure-time
study how it could
tap
--AMTRAK should
establish
and analyze
market
data
an adequate
for operational
and finance
as a basis
program
to
planning.
the
growing
collect
AMTRAK said that
it recognized
the validity
of the consultant’s
observations
but that
it had found
many institutional
railroad
practices
which
inhibited
instant
and dramatic
change.
AMTRAK said
that
it was striving
to
overcome
these practices
and expected
continued
improvement.
(B-175155,
Feb. 22, 1973.)
84
.
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
NATIONAL
RAILROAD
PASSENGER CORPORATION
Railroad
reservation,
and ticketing
services
*
r
(AMTRAK)
(continued)
information,
being
improved
GAO interviewed
1,900 passengers
concerning
reservations
on 340 train
trips
in June and July 1972.
GAO reported
to the Subcommittee
Chairman
that
about
60 percent
of these passengers
commented
on their
difficulties
in getting
train
information,
making
reservations,
and obtaining
tickets.
They
mentioned
long delays
in making
telephone
inquiries;
long lines
and slow
service
at ticket
offices;
incorrect
information
on fares,
schedules,
and
errors
in seat and compartment
assignments;
and AMTRAK’s
accommodations;
inability
to confirm
reservations
for the return
portion
of round trips.
At two of AMTRAK’s major
reservation
offices
(Chicago
and New York),
about
30 percent
of customers
’ telephone
calls
during
an 8-week period
in
the summer of 1972 were not completed
because
of insufficient
telephone
equipment
and personnel.
GAO found
that
obtaining
reservations,
information,
or tickets,
whether
by telephone
or in person,
was slow.
Reservation
and ticket
agents
frequently
gave out incorrect
information
regarding
fares,
sleeping
accommodations,
dining
facilities,
and departure
times;
and many
agents
did not know of AMTRAK’s policy
to accept
major
cred
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