UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

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BEFORE THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION

COMMISSIONERS:

Andrew N. Ferguson, Chairman

Mark R. Meador

In the Matter of

CIVIL INVESTIGATIVE DEMAND TO

NEWSGUARD TECHNOLOGIES, INC.

DATED MAY 20, 2025

)

) File No. 251-0061

) PUBLIC

)

ORDER DENYING PETITION TO QUASH

CIVIL INVESTIGATIVE DEMAND

By FERGUSON, Chairman:

NewsGuard Technologies, Inc. (NewsGuard) petitions the Commission to quash in its

entirety a Civil Investigative Demand (CID) issued on May 20, 2025, in connection with the

Commission’s investigation into whether any natural persons, partnerships, corporations,

associations, or other legal entities have engaged in unfair methods of competition, including

boycotts or other forms of collusion or coordination, with respect to withholding, degrading,

increasing the cost of, or otherwise diminishing the quantity of advertising placed on news

outlets, media platforms, or other publishers in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15

U.S.C. § 1, or Section 5 of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45.

NewsGuard requests that the Commission quash the CID because (1) the CID constitutes

retaliation against NewsGuard for its First Amendment-protected activities, and (2) the CID is

overbroad and requests sensitive information in violation of the First and Fourth Amendments.

Petition, at 6–7. For the reasons set forth below, we deny NewsGuard’s petition.

BACKGROUND

NewsGuard is a New York City-based company that “rate[s] and review[s] the reliability

of news sources across the open web, social media, and content platforms” including television

and podcasts.1 NewsGuard assigns reliability scores and ratings to over 35,000 content

publishers,2 then “makes money by selling subscriptions to its browser extension and Reality

Check newsletter, and by licensing access to its databases of ratings and false claim fingerprints

to companies.”3 According to NewsGuard, its ratings “enable brands to advertise safely on

NewsGuard, News Reliability Ratings, https://www.newsguardtech.com/solutions/news-reliability-ratings/.

Id.

NewsGuard, NewsGuard FAQ: How does NewsGuard make money?, https://www.newsguardtech.com/newsguardfaq/.

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reliable news sources while avoiding brand-safety risk.”4 In addition to providing ratings,

NewsGuard produces reports and research related to online misinformation and disinformation,

and engages in outreach to industry participants and policymakers. 5 NewsGuard asserts that it

has become “a leading source of journalism about information reliability.” Petition, at 2. Its work

addresses a range of topics, including what it views as foreign and domestic disinformation

campaigns and online propaganda. See id.

On May 20, 2025, under the authority of a Commission resolution authorizing the use of

compulsory process, the Commission issued a CID to NewsGuard pursuant to Section 20 of the

FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 57b-1. The NewsGuard CID was one of seventeen still-outstanding CIDs

issued as part of the Commission’s investigation into whether entities have conspired to

withhold, degrade, increase the cost of, or otherwise diminish the quantity of advertising placed

on news outlets, media platforms, or other publishers in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman

Act and Section 5 of the FTC Act, under the guise of promoting “brand suitability” and “brand

safety” against “misinformation.” Specifically, the Commission is investigating whether online

advertisers and/or advertising agencies have unlawfully agreed to use certain lists promulgated

by other industry participants that categorize or rate content publishers as not “brand suitable” or

not “brand safe,” to coordinate the placement of ads. As such, CID recipients to date include

multiple advertising agencies as well as entities that the Commission has reason to believe

possess information relating to the use of such lists to coordinate ad placement. These entities

include several advertising trade associations, several brand safety/suitability rating

organizations such as NewsGuard, and several policy/advocacy groups.

The CID to NewsGuard seeks information pertaining to NewsGuard’s organizational

structure; documents and data relating to NewsGuard’s ratings of content publisher entities;

communications with other entities related to the subject of the investigation; the methodology

by which NewsGuard determines the ratings, labels, or categorizations that it applies to news or

information sites; lists that NewsGuard has provided to third parties that evaluate or categorize

content publisher entities; identification of NewsGuard’s customers and its communications with

those customers; and NewsGuard’s financial information, among other subjects. See generally

Petition Ex. 1, at 1–6. The CID contains 31 specifications. Id. The relevant time period for

NewsGuard’s responses is from January 1, 2018 to the present. Id. at 8.

NewsGuard appears to have had at least ten substantive meet-and-confer sessions with

Commission staff. See Petition Ex. 2, at 1–6 (Statement of Counsel Pursuant to 16 C.F.R.

§ 2.10(a)(2)). During those sessions, NewsGuard raised concerns about the CID based on the

First Amendment and unreasonable burden. See, e.g., id. ¶ 3. Despite its concerns, NewsGuard

has responded to a substantial portion of the CID: it has produced 41,183 pages of documents

and provided other information sought by the CID through letters, emails, and phone calls. See

id. ¶ 26.

On January 15, 2026, staff sent NewsGuard a letter that substantially modified the scope

of the original CID. Petition Ex. 3. The letter modified Specifications 8, 11, 15, and 26 to

address NewsGuard’s burden concerns by limiting the scope of the information requested in each

NewsGuard, NewsGuard: Global Leader in Information Reliability, https://www.newsguardtech.com/aboutnewsguard/.

NewsGuard, NewsGuard: The leading datasets for studying misinformation, disinformation, and online

information reliability, https://www.newsguardtech.com/industries/researchers/.

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Specification. For example, the letter narrowed Specification 26 to cover only customers that use

NewsGuard’s news reliability ratings and to exclude all customers who are natural persons. Id. at

3. The letter also provided that, except for those four Specifications (as modified) and

Specification 12, staff deemed NewsGuard to have satisfied its CID obligations through its prior

productions. Id.

CID.6

II.

The following day, January 16, 2026, NewsGuard timely filed its petition to quash the

ANALYSIS

The CID Does Not Constitute Retaliation in Violation of the First

Amendment.

NewsGuard first argues that the CID should be quashed because it is part of an

unconstitutional retaliation campaign targeting NewsGuard’s protected First Amendment

activities. Petition, at 7. To prevail on this claim, NewsGuard must show that (1) it “engaged in

conduct protected under the First Amendment,” (2) the FTC “took some retaliatory action

sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness in [NewsGuard’s] position from speaking

again,” and (3) there is “a causal link between the exercise of a constitutional right and the

adverse action.” Aref v. Lynch, 833 F.3d 242, 258 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (cleaned up). For purposes of

this Order, the Commission assumes without deciding that NewsGuard engages in some

protected First Amendment activities. But its claim fails at each of the other two prongs: it has

not shown that the CID has caused a sufficient chilling effect, and it has not shown a causal link

between the CID and its First Amendment-protected activities.

Chilling Effect

NewsGuard argues that the “draconian” CID, which it claims the Commission issued “‘to

punish or suppress [its] disfavored expression,’” is “plainly sufficient to chill” its First

Amendment-protected speech. Petition, at 8 (quoting NRA v. Vullo, 602 U.S. 175, 188 (2024)).

NewsGuard identifies four “adverse consequences” resulting from the Commission’s

investigation that allegedly chill its expression: (1) the fact that it incurs costs to review its

internal documents to identify responsive materials; (2) the fact that its internal resources are

diverted to respond to the CID; (3) the possibility that the CID will result in the disclosure of

NewsGuard’s customer lists; and (4) the fact that the CID is enforceable in federal court.

Petition, at 8–9.

To the extent that NewsGuard is alleging that the Commission initiated a retaliatory

investigation it appears unlikely that such a claim is even cognizable. The Supreme Court and the

U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit have declined to resolve the question.

See Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 262 n.9 (2006); Media Matters for Am. v. Paxton, 138

F.4th 563, 584–85 (D.C. Cir. 2025). Several courts of appeals have suggested that such claims

Commission staff granted several extensions to the deadline for NewsGuard to file a petition to limit or quash the

CID. Under the latest extension, NewsGuard’s deadline was January 16, 2026. Under Commission Rule 2.10(c), 16

C.F.R. § 2.10(c), the Commission had 40 days, or until March 2, 2026, to issue an order ruling on NewsGuard’s

petition. Due to the lapse in federal government appropriations from January 31 through February 3, 2026, this date

has been extended until March 6, 2026.

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should not be recognized. See Archer v. Chisholm, 870 F.3d 603, 620 (7th Cir. 2017); Breaux v.

City of Garland, 205 F.3d 150, 157–61 (5th Cir. 2000); see also J.T.H. v. Mo. Dep’t of Soc.

Servs. Child.’s Div., 39 F.4th 489, 493 (8th Cir. 2022) (“[W]e have never recognized a

retaliatory-investigation claim of this kind. Nor have other courts around the country. . . .”);

Sivella v. Twp. of Lyndhurst, No. 20-2342, 2021 WL 3356934, at *3 (3d Cir. Aug. 3, 2011)

(“Since Hartman, no Supreme Court case has addressed the issue of whether the initiation of a

retaliatory investigation can constitute a First Amendment violation … an absence of relevant

Supreme Court precedent strongly supports a finding that a particular right is not clearly

established.”). And the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has squarely held that “a

retaliatory investigation” “does not implicate a federal constitutional right.” Rehberg v. Paulk,

611 F.3d 828, 850 & n.24 (11th Cir. 2010), aff’d, 566 U.S. 356 (2012); Thompson v. Hall, 426 F.

App’x 855, 858 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (same).

Even if a retaliatory investigation claim were theoretically cognizable—which only one

federal court of appeals appears to have assumed—it could arise only in extraordinary

circumstances. See Moore v. Garnand, 83 F.4th 743, 752 (9th Cir. 2023) (recognizing that while

no case had “held that a retaliatory investigation by itself was unconstitutional,” it was possible

that the entire “scope and manner” of a given investigation could violate the First Amendment).

Such extraordinary circumstances might include “campaigns of harassment and humiliation,”

Coszalter v. City of Salem, 320 F.3d 968, 975 (9th Cir. 2003), threats of arrest, Lacey v.

Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 909–10, 917 (9th Cir. 2012), or “other means of coercion,

persuasion, and intimidation” such as a substantial fine, White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1228 & n.8

(9th Cir. 2000) (citing Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 67 (1963)).

None of these is true of the Commission’s investigation. NewsGuard is one of numerous

CID recipients in a matter indisputably of public concern and high priority for the Commission.

The scope of the CID is standard for FTC investigations. See infra Part II.A.2.c. NewsGuard

faces no threat of fines or arrest. CIDs are not self-executing, and NewsGuard will incur no

penalty or other legal detriment for failing to comply unless the Commission first files a petition

for enforcement in a federal court and the court, after considering NewsGuard’s arguments, rules

for the Commission and orders NewsGuard to respond. See, e.g., Gen. Fin. Corp. v. FTC, 700

F.2d 366, 368 (7th Cir. 1983); 15 U.S.C. § 57b-1(e) (CID enforcement provision). And

NewsGuard’s statement of counsel acknowledges that, far from harassing or coercing

NewsGuard, Commission staff has met-and-conferred numerous times to address NewsGuard’s

concerns and substantially modified the CID to reduce its scope. See Petition Ex. 2, at 1–6; see

also id. Ex. 3. Indeed, NewsGuard does not allege any change in its speech resulting from the

CID. While subjective responses are not “dispositive” and a plaintiff need not show that it

“altogether” ceased speaking, see Constantine v. Rectors & Visitors of George Mason Univ., 411

F.3d 474, 500 (4th Cir. 2005), it is telling that the CID has apparently had no impact on

NewsGuard’s speech over the nine months it has been pending. Overall, the record demonstrates

that the Commission’s approach to its investigation of NewsGuard is miles away from the

circumstances that could give rise to a retaliatory investigation claim, assuming one is even

cognizable. Cf. Moore, 83 F.4th at 752–53 (even “unjustifiably pursuing a criminal

investigation” and “attempting to induce the IRS to open an investigation” were insufficient for a

retaliatory investigation claim). For the same reasons, these circumstances also do not give rise

to a sufficient chilling effect.

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Moreover, the four generalized harms that NewsGuard points to as evidence of a chilling

effect prove both too much and too little. They prove too much because all CIDs require their

recipients to incur costs and divert internal resources to respond, and all CIDs are enforceable in

federal court. See FTC v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 449 U.S. 232, 244 (1980) (“[T]he expense

and annoyance of litigation is part of the social burden of living under government.”) (cleaned

up); FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 555 F.2d 862, 882 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (“Some burden on subpoenaed

parties is to be expected and is necessary in furtherance of the agency’s legitimate inquiry and

the public interest.”); 15 U.S.C. § 57b-1(e). And the Commission frequently requests the

identification of customers as part of its compulsory process, particularly in antitrust

investigations where the Commission must understand market dynamics to make an informed

enforcement decision. See, e.g., Attach. to Global Disinformation Index’s Pet. to Quash CID,

FTC File No. 251-0061, at 4 (Sept. 17, 2025), https://tinyurl.com/v9mhhm8c/; FTC, Model

Request for Additional Information and Documentary Material, at 5 (Jan. 2024); FTC v. TakeTwo Interactive Software, Inc., No. 1:08-mc-00360-HHK, Dkt. 1-3, at 2 (D.D.C. June 5, 2008).

If these consequences amount to a chilling effect, then virtually every CID the Commission

issues would impermissibly chill speech.

At the same time, these generic harms prove too little because, as explained above,

NewsGuard would have to demonstrate extraordinary circumstances to make out a claim that the

Commission’s investigation is retaliatory (assuming such a claim is cognizable). NewsGuard has

not even alleged, much less documented, that it has suffered any unusual or specific injuries

because of the CID. At most, NewsGuard has alleged that the legal expense it has incurred to

comply with the CID “has exceeded 28% of the revenue NewsGuard has derived from the

advertising brand-safety services” that are the subject of the CID. Petition, at 9. But, as stated

above, legal expenses incurred in responding to a CID are part and parcel of all Commission

investigations; this claimed injury is plainly insufficient. Nor does NewsGuard claim to have

changed its behavior in response to the CID. The absence of any allegations of actual injury

renders NewsGuard’s claim that the CID chilled its speech untenable.

Causal Link

NewsGuard also fails to demonstrate a causal link between its speech and the CID. Aref,

833 F.3d at 258. To show causation, NewsGuard must demonstrate at a minimum that the CID

“would not have been [issued] absent the retaliatory motive.” Nieves v. Bartlett, 587 U.S. 391,

399 (2019).7 In making that but-for showing, NewsGuard must overcome the “longstanding

presumption of regularity” that attaches to government action. Hartman, 547 U.S. at 263. That

presumption is at its apex in the context of law-enforcement investigations, an area of “executive

discretion of such high order.” Id. As such, to meet this prong, NewsGuard must put forward

sufficient evidence to displace the presumption of regularity and demonstrate that the but-for

cause of the CID was NewsGuard’s protected activity—specifically, its “reports regarding the

reliability of news and information websites” and its “journalism about foreign governments’

In fact, the requisite showing is more robust: NewsGuard must demonstrate that there was no reasonable basis for

the CID. For example, in the similar context of retaliatory arrests, the Supreme Court has held that plaintiffs must

show that the government lacked probable cause. Nieves, 587 U.S. at 399–400. The same logic applies here too. See

Gonzalez v. Trevino, 602 U.S. 653, 663 (2024) (Alito, J., concurring); cf. Media Matters for Am. v. Bailey, No. 24cv-147, 2024 WL 3924573, at *12–13 (D.D.C. Aug. 23, 2024) (considering the issue and ultimately declining to

impose an objective basis standard, at least in part for case-specific reasons). However, as discussed in the

accompanying text, NewsGuard has not satisfied even the basic but-for standard.

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disinformation campaigns and other issues of information reliability.” See Petition, at 7–8. For

two reasons, NewsGuard has not met this burden.

First, there are ample nonretaliatory explanations for the Commission’s investigation.

The CID is part of a broad investigation into a high-priority issue—advertising boycotts that may

violate the antitrust laws. In particular, the Commission is investigating whether various entities

unlawfully agreed to withhold the placement of ads using lists that categorize content publishers

as not “brand suitable” or “brand safe.” NewsGuard has hardly been singled out, as numerous

other entities have also received CIDs. 8 The investigation’s breadth refutes NewsGuard’s theory

that the CID was issued in retaliation for NewsGuard’s speech. In addition, the other entities that

received a CID did not engage in the same speech as NewsGuard. The fact that they received

CIDs anyway demonstrates that the NewsGuard CID would have been issued regardless of any

purported retaliatory motive against NewsGuard’s news-rating activities. These reasons alone

vitiate any conclusion that retaliation was the but-for cause of the CID to NewsGuard.

Second, NewsGuard’s circumstantial evidence of retaliation fails to establish a causal

relationship between its speech and the CID. In attempting to show such a connection,

NewsGuard points to four categories of evidence: (1) certain statements by Chairman Ferguson, 9

(2) the timing of the CID, (3) the scope of the CID, and (4) the Decision and Order in In re

Omnicom Group Inc., No. C-4823 ¶¶ I.D, II.A (Sept. 26, 2025) (Omnicom Consent Order). 10

Petition, at 10–14.

Statements by Chairman Ferguson

NewsGuard points to three statements by Chairman Ferguson that identified NewsGuard

by name:



A November 2024 post on X in which then-Commissioner Ferguson commented on the

impending closure of the Department of State’s Global Engagement Center (GEC),

observing that “Congressional investigations revealed the GEC funded the Global

Disinformation Index and NewsGuard, which led collusive ad-boycotts—possibly in

See CID to The Global Disinformation Index, Attach. to Pet. to Quash, FTC File No. 251-0061 (Sept. 17, 2025)

https://tinyurl.com/v9mhhm8c/; CID to Media Matters for Am., Ex. 1 to Pet. to Quash, FTC File No. 251-0061

(June 18, 2025), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/ftc gov/pdf/2510064mediamattersptqredactedpublic.pdf.

NewsGuard also identifies statements by the Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC),

Petition, at 4, 11–12, but these are a red herring. Remarks from “non-decisionmakers are not generally direct

evidence of retaliation,” e.g., Waggel v. George Wash. Univ., 957 F.3d 1364, 1374 (D.C. Cir. 2020), and could only

conceivably be relevant if the non-decisionmaker was involved in the decisionmaking process, see, e.g., Harris v.

Wackenhut Servs., Inc., 648 F. Supp. 2d 53, 62 (D.D.C. 2009). The FCC Chairman was not involved in any

decisionmaking regarding the FTC’s advertising boycott investigation or the CID issued to NewsGuard, and

NewsGuard does not even allege as much. See, e.g., In re Architect of Capitol Emp. Disp., No. 24-mc-32 (TNM),

2024 WL 3359515, at *3 (D.D.C. July 10, 2024) (disregarding comments by “non-decisionmakers” who “did not

work for the [relevant entity]” and whom plaintiffs “never link[ed]” to their termination); United States v. Biden,

729 F. Supp. 3d 410, 422 (D. Del. 2024) (any “pressure campaign from Congressional Republicans” to charge

defendant was irrelevant without “credible [allegations] to suggest that the conduct of those lawmakers (or anyone

else) had any impact whatsoever on the Special Counsel”).

https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/ftc gov/pdf/OmnicomOrder.pdf.

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violation of our antitrust laws—to censor the speech of conservative and independent

media in the United States.”11 Petition, at 3.



A December 2024 statement in then-Commissioner Ferguson’s concurrence in FTC v.

1661, Inc. d/b/a GOAT that identified NewsGuard as one example of a news-rating and

brand-safety organization whose activities may contribute to a “risk of advertiser

boycotts that raise Sherman Act problems.” The statement observed that “the antitrust

laws do not permit third parties to facilitate group boycotts among competitors” and

called on the Commission to “use the full extent of its authority to protect the free speech

of all Americans,” including by “investigat[ing] collusion that may suppress competition

and, in doing so, suppress free speech online.” 12 Petition, at 3.



A June 2025 statement by Chairman Ferguson in connection with the administrative

complaint and other filings in In re Omnicom Group / The Interpublic Group of Cos.,

FTC File No. 251-0049. NewsGuard excerpts part of the following sentence in the

statement: “Numerous other industry groups and private organizations have publicly

sought to use the chokepoint of the advertising industry to effect political or ideological

goals.” In a parenthetical to a footnote accompanying this sentence, the statement

summarized a U.S. House of Representatives committee staff report as “describing

NewsGuard and other organizations’ steering of advertising revenue with ‘an

unavoidable partisan lens.’”13 Petition, at 11.

Rather than suggesting retaliation, these statements reflect the Chairman’s views and

understanding of entities in the advertising industry that may have engaged in censorship and

highlight that investigating possible antitrust violations in that industry was a priority for the

incoming Chairman. The Chairman simply observed, consistent with the findings of

congressional investigations, that antitrust violations may have occurred and deserved the

Commission’s attention. Such statements about enforcement priorities are commonplace for

enforcement officials; indeed, it “is what we expect of public servants tasked with enforcing the

law.” Media Matters for Am. v. FTC, No. 25-5302, 2025 WL 2988966, at *14 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 23,

2025) (Walker, J., dissenting). If anything, the statements underscore First Amendment values by

reflecting the Chairman’s belief that censorship is pernicious and may violate the antitrust laws if

done pursuant to an agreement. See id. at *18 (explaining that Chairman “Ferguson’s (far-fromincriminating) comments” reveal a “campaign against censorship”); see also United States v.

Rundo, 108 F.4th 792, 807 (9th Cir. 2024) (statement that prosecution “was initiated to address

violent attempts to ‘squelch free speech’” was “not suspect” and instead “put[] the nondiscriminatory motive of the prosecutors’ office on display”); United States v. Wilson, 123 F.4th

1021, 1032 (9th Cir. 2024) (Bumatay, J., concurring) (the “mere fact that government officials”

used labels such as “‘radical left’ . . . to identify violent wrongdoers” “doesn’t suggest that they

targeted the violent rioters because of their political beliefs” instead of “based on their violence

alone”); United States v. Penagaricano-Soler, 911 F.2d 833, 838 (1st Cir. 1990) (rejecting

selective prosecution claim based on public statements by high-ranking officials where “the

government presented sufficient countervailing reasons of a non-discriminatory nature”).

https://x.com/AFergusonFTC/status/1856152760850243905.

https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/ftc gov/pdf/ferguson-goat-concurrence.pdf.

https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/ftc gov/pdf/omnicom-ipg-ferguson-statement 0.pdf.

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NewsGuard also points to two other statements by Chairman Ferguson: a written

statement that he had a “track record of standing up to . . . the radical left” and would

“[i]nvestigate . . . advertiser boycotts,” and a statement on a podcast that “‘progressives’ who are

‘fighting disinformation’ were ‘not going to give up just because of the election,’ so ‘it’s really

important that the FTC take investigative steps in the new administration under President

Trump.’” Petition, at 10–11 (quoting Media Matters for Am. v. FTC, 805 F. Supp. 3d 105, 134

(D.D.C. 2025)). NewsGuard contends that these statements “characterize similar investigations

‘in ideological terms’” and “‘indicate at a minimum that Chairman Ferguson saw the FTC’s

investigation as having a partisan bent.’” Id. at 10 (quoting Media Matters, 805 F. Supp. 3d at

134). Neither statement mentions NewsGuard, and far from suggesting retaliation, they reflect a

legitimate concern about potential antitrust violations. Nor do these general statements connect

the CID to NewsGuard’s First Amendment-protected activities; they do not reflect any matterspecific direction toward NewsGuard or suggest that the CID was prompted by commentary

rather than by the Commission’s independent investigative interests. And framing these

statements as partisan or ideological is irrelevant to NewsGuard’s retaliation claim because they

do nothing to connect the CID to a particular protected activity by NewsGuard.

Timing of the CID

NewsGuard next argues that the timeline of this “fast-moving investigation” into

advertising boycotts supports an inference of retaliation. Specifically, NewsGuard points to the

following sequence of events: then-Commissioner Ferguson was chosen by President-elect

Donald Trump to be Chairman in December 2024; he became Chairman in January 2025; he

announced an investigation into “‘tech platform censorship’” in February 2025; and the

Commission issued a CID to NewsGuard (and other entities) in May 2025. Petition, at 12–13

(quoting Media Matters, 805 F. Supp. 3d at 136; other alterations omitted). NewsGuard argues

this sequence of events “further demonstrat[es] the ‘but-for’ causation between the FTC’s

retaliatory motive and the NewsGuard CID.” Id. at 12.

NewsGuard misconstrues the timing inquiry. The relevant question is not the interval

between the CID’s issuance and the FTC’s “retaliatory motive” as exemplified by Chairman

Ferguson becoming Chairman—though even if it were, that four-month gap would be beyond the

typical “outer limit” for establishing causation. See Gustave-Schmidt v. Chao, 360 F. Supp. 2d

105, 118–19 (D.D.C. 2004); see also Hamilton v. Geithner, 666 F.3d 1344, 1357 (D.C. Cir.

2012) (temporal proximity can support causation “only where the two events are very close in

time” and even “a three-month period” may “be too lengthy”) (cleaned up). Nor is it the interval

between the CID’s issuance and then-Commissioner Ferguson’s November–December 2024

comments mentioning NewsGuard (an even longer temporal gap). Instead, the causal link that

NewsGuard must demonstrate is between (1) an adverse action (here, the issuance of the CID),

and (2) its own exercise of a constitutional right. See Aref, 833 F.3d at 258. But NewsGuard does

not identify any specific speech, on a single date, for which the CID was purportedly issued in

retaliation.14 In other words, to draw an inference of retaliation from timing, an adverse Event B

must closely follow a protected Event A. Here, NewsGuard does not allege an identifiable Event

NewsGuard argues that the Commission’s investigation “has followed the exact same timeline that the district

court found troubling in Media Matters.” Petition, at 12 (citing Media Matters, 805 F. Supp. 3d at 136). While the

Commission respectfully disagrees with the district court’s decision in that case and is currently appealing it, the

plaintiff there at least identified a specific article that it claimed led to the issuance of a retaliatory CID (albeit 18

months later). Media Matters, 805 F. Supp. 3d at 113, 116.

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A at all, much less one that was closely followed by adverse Event B. It is impossible to find a

temporal connection to an unknown event. See Lakkis v. Lahovski, 994 F. Supp. 2d 624, 634

(M.D. Pa. 2014) (suggesting that allegations that are “not anchored in time” are insufficient to

support a First Amendment retaliation claim because they do not imply “temporal proximity to

enable a fact-finder to infer a causal link”). 15

At any rate, the assertion that the investigation was launched promptly does not support

NewsGuard’s version of events because it is equally consistent with what actually occurred:

namely, a robust effort by the Commission to pursue a high-priority investigation into

advertising boycotts. A fact that is equally consistent with both sides’ positions does not

constitute evidence in favor of either. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Walgreen Co., 140 F.4th 663, 674

(5th Cir. 2025). And timing alone does not suggest “improper motive” because it “can merely be

the sign of the government’s change in enforcement priorities.” Rundo, 108 F.4th at 805. Here, if

the Commission acted promptly to issue a CID to NewsGuard, that action only establishes (if

anything) a causal connection between the CID and the Commission’s substantive enforcement

priorities. It is not evidence of retaliation.

Scope of the CID

Next, NewsGuard argues that the “‘scope of the CID suggests pretext on the part of the

FTC,’” which bolsters its contention that the CID is retaliatory. Petition, at 13 (quoting Media

Matters, 805 F. Supp. 3d at 137). NewsGuard asserts that the CID’s “‘demands . . . go well

beyond the investigation’s purported scope’” and, as an example, points to two CID

specifications that request NewsGuard’s financial information. Id. (quoting Media Matters, 805

F. Supp. 3d at 137).

The CID’s scope, consisting of 31 specifications, is far from unusual. For example,

another CID from the same investigation, which became public after the recipient filed a petition

to quash, contains 29 specifications (only two fewer than the CID to NewsGuard) and covers the

same relevant time period.16 The scope of the NewsGuard CID is also in line with the typical

CID issued in Commission investigations. See Texaco, 555 F.2d at 882 (“There is no doubt that

these subpoenas are broad in scope, but the FTC’s inquiry is a comprehensive one and must be

so to serve its purposes.”).17 And all of the CID’s specifications follow naturally from the

Commission’s objective of investigating potential advertising boycotts. As to NewsGuard’s

financial information specifically, it could shed light on whether NewsGuard expended funds on

(or received funds for) coordinating activities. See FTC v. Invention Submission Corp., 965 F.2d

1086, 1089–90 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (recognizing that “financial information can be relevant to a precomplaint investigation”). More fundamentally, it is the Commission’s prerogative to define the

scope of the investigation, subject to the requirement that “the inquiry is within the authority of

the agency, the demand is not too indefinite and the information sought is reasonably relevant.”

United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950). As explained further below, the

To the extent NewsGuard may argue that it regularly issues ratings and is therefore continually speaking, that

argument proves too much: any adverse regulatory action taken during NewsGuard’s existence would be

transformed into something temporally proximate and indicative of retaliation.

See CID to The Global Disinformation Index, Attach. to Pet. to Quash, FTC File No. 251-0061 (Sept. 17, 2025),

https://tinyurl.com/v9mhhm8c/.

E.g., FTC v. Cigna Grp., No. 1:25-mc-00004, Dkt. 1-2 (D.D.C. Jan. 15, 2025) (43 specifications); FTC v. IT

Media, Inc., No. 2:15-cv-09483, Dkt. 1-2 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 12, 2016) (30 specifications).

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NewsGuard CID easily satisfies this requirement, and NewsGuard does not argue that the CID

fails to provide adequate notice of the scope of the Commission’s investigation.

NewsGuard’s argument regarding the CID’s scope is further undercut by the January 15

letter from staff, which granted “substantial” “modifications” to the CID. Petition Ex. 3, at 3. As

NewsGuard acknowledges, the letter deemed NewsGuard to have “‘satisfied its CID obligations,

except for’ Specifications 8, 11, 12, 15, and 26.” Petition Ex. 2 ¶ 26; see Petition, at 13 n.14

(recognizing that the modified CID no longer seeks NewsGuard’s financial information). And as

to the five outstanding Specifications, the letter modified all but one “to limit” their scope.

Petition Ex. 3, at 2–3. These modifications to the CID’s scope demonstrate the Commission’s

“good-faith effort to reduce NewsGuard’s burden” to the extent “consistent with the

Commission’s need for information” to further the investigation. Id.; see Texaco, 555 F.2d at

882–83 (recognizing that concerns over burdensomeness of an FTC subpoena were

“‘substantially mitigated’ during the course of extensive negotiations with Commission

attorneys”).

Omnicom Consent Order

Finally, NewsGuard argues that the Omnicom Consent Order provides further evidence

of a “retaliatory nexus” between the CID and NewsGuard’s First Amendment-protected activity

because it prohibits the merged entity in that case from using services, “such as NewsGuard’s,”

that “evaluate ‘viewpoints as to the veracity of news reporting’ and ‘adherence to journalistic

standards or ethics.’” Petition, at 13–14 (quoting Omnicom Consent Order).

On June 23, 2025, the Commission approved the acquisition of one large advertising

agency (IPG) by another (Omnicom), subject to a consent order. Together with the consent

order, the Commission issued an administrative complaint that alleged, in part: “Major

advertisers have discussed and ultimately declined to advertise on certain websites and

applications. These decisions appear to have been coordinated through one or more associations

of advertising industry players, including ad agencies.”18 To address this allegation, the June

2025 consent order contained a provision prohibiting the merged entity from entering into

agreements with any third party that affect advertising spend based on the political or ideological

viewpoints of sellers of advertising inventory. See Decision & Order, In re Omnicom Grp. Inc.,

No. 251-0049 ¶ II.A (June 23, 2025), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/ftc gov/pdf/OmnicomDandO.pdf.

In September 2025, in response to public comments, the Commission modified the

consent order to more specifically define “political or ideological viewpoints” to include

“viewpoints as to the veracity of news reporting or other politically or ideologically contested

facts, such as their characterization as ‘misinformation,’ ‘disinformation,’ ‘bias,’ or similar

terms” and “adherence to journalistic standards or ethics.” See Omnicom Consent Order ¶ I.D.

NewsGuard now complains that these prohibitions “‘coerce a private party to punish or suppress

disfavored speech on [the government’s] behalf,’” including speech by NewsGuard. Petition, at

13–14 (quoting Vullo, 602 U.S. at 190).

Complaint, In re Omnicom Grp. Inc., No. 251-0049 ¶ 17, https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/ftc gov/pdf/OmnicomComplaint.pdf.

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The Commission disagrees that the Omnicom Consent Order shows retaliation against

NewsGuard. Instead, the evidence reflects the Commission’s nonretaliatory reasons for adopting

the Omnicom Consent Order. As the administrative complaint alluded to, and the Commission’s

analysis of the proposed order explained, Omnicom’s acquisition of IPG would increase market

concentration in the advertising industry, making it far easier for market participants to engage in

anticompetitive, collusive boycotts of disfavored media publishers, just as the Commission found

they had done in the recent past. See 90 Fed. Reg. 27304, 27305–06 (June 26, 2025). The

proposed order sought to remedy this problem by “eliminating Omnicom’s ability to participate

in [such] ongoing or future coordination.” Id. at 27304. During the public comment period,

however, several commenters expressed concern that the initial order as written might not

achieve that goal. See Regulations.gov, Comment from CPAC & Independent Media Council

(July 29, 2025), https://tinyurl.com/yf5nw8p2; Comment from GB News Limited (July 29, 2025),

https://tinyurl.com/4jcumwyp; Comment from Newsmax Media Inc. (July 28, 2025),

https://tinyurl.com/3ruxx5vp. After considering the submitted comments, the Commission

entered a final consent order with revised language designed to more effectively preclude

Omnicom from engaging in the collusive conduct that the Commission had identified previously.

NewsGuard is not named in the Omnicom Consent Order, and the challenged condition in the

Order applies to Omnicom’s agreements with any brand safety organization—i.e., organizations

that offer services “such as NewsGuard’s,” not just NewsGuard itself. 19 This is evidence of the

Commission acting to address antitrust concerns about concentration in the advertising industry

that were raised by public commenters, not retaliating against NewsGuard. 20

The CID Does Not Otherwise Violate the First or Fourth Amendments.

NewsGuard’s second argument is that the CID is overly broad and unnecessarily

intrusive in violation of the First and Fourth Amendments. Petition, at 14. While NewsGuard’s

theories somewhat overlap, it essentially makes three points in support of this argument: (1) the

CID improperly seeks information protected by a First Amendment journalist’s privilege; (2) the

CID violates NewsGuard’s associational rights under the First Amendment; and (3) the CID is an

unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment. None of these arguments is persuasive.

First Amendment Journalist’s Privilege

NewsGuard argues that it is an organization that engages in “journalistic activities,” and

therefore, information regarding its “deliberative process and procedures for formulating ratings”

Indeed, it appears that there are several other entities in this space. See U.S. House Judiciary Comm., Interim Staff

Report at 3 (July 10, 2024), https://tinyurl.com/2v7ej2wj (describing “the Global Disinformation Index (GDI)” as a

“news ranking organization[]” like NewsGuard); id. at 26 (“Documents show that [an advertising entity]

recommend[ed] that its members work with organizations such as GDI and NewsGuard” and “promote[ed] GDI and

NewsGuard ... over other ‘independent fact checkers’” (emphasis added)); id. (quoting evidence indicating that

“GDI is one of many” “independent fact checkers to weed out mis-and-disinfo from supply chain and ad buys,”

including “NewsGuard, IFCN, etc.” (emphasis added)); see also id. at 33 (listing eleven “ad-tech service providers”

that are engaged in “content detection and classification for the purposes of content moderation and/or

monetization”).

In addition, the Omnicom Consent Order was issued over one month after the NewsGuard CID, and was modified

in the manner NewsGuard complains of over three months after that. Obviously, events that postdate an adverse

action cannot have caused that action. See, e.g., Hankins v. Wheeler, 760 F. Supp. 3d 467, 482 (E.D. La. 2024)

(holding “[t]here is simply no correlation, much less causation, between” alleged constitutional violations and

deficiencies in an investigation “that occurred afterward,” since “[t]o find otherwise defies logic”).

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is immune from production in response to the CID. Petition, at 16; see also id. at 15 (“[T]he First

Amendment affords NewsGuard a privilege that protects it from having to disclose

information.”). Here, NewsGuard appears to be invoking a journalist’s privilege under the First

Amendment. We are unpersuaded that such a privilege shields NewsGuard from responding for

two reasons: the public interest in effective law enforcement outweighs any qualified First

Amendment privilege in withholding information that NewsGuard may hold (assuming such a

privilege exists), and NewsGuard has not met its burden of showing that the information sought

by the CID falls within that privilege.

Some courts have held that the First Amendment “provides journalists with a qualified

privilege against compelled disclosure of information obtained through their news gathering

activities.” Hutira v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 211 F. Supp. 2d 115, 118 (D.D.C. 2002); see also

Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705, 712–14 (D.C. Cir. 1981). In those courts that have recognized the

privilege, the reporter invoking the privilege bears the burden of demonstrating its applicability.

See Hutira, 211 F. Supp. 2d at 119 nn.4–5. “[T]he critical question for deciding whether a person

may invoke the journalist’s privilege is whether she is gathering news for dissemination to the

public.” Shoen v. Shoen, 5 F.3d 1289, 1293 (9th Cir. 1993). In other words, assuming the

existence of the privilege,21 the person seeking to invoke the privilege “must demonstrate,

through competent evidence, the intent to use material—sought, gathered or received—to

disseminate information to the public and that such intent existed at the inception of the

newsgathering process.” von Bulow v. von Bulow, 811 F.2d 136, 144 (2d Cir. 1987).

The Public Interest

The Supreme Court has held that only in limited circumstances will the First Amendment

bar the government from gathering information during a law enforcement investigation. In

Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972), the Court considered whether the First Amendment

protected journalists from revealing confidential information and sources in response to a grand

jury subpoena. The Court ruled in favor of the government, noting that it could “perceive no

basis for holding that the public interest in law enforcement and in ensuring effective grand jury

proceedings is insufficient to override the consequential, but uncertain, burden on news gathering

that is said to result from insisting that reporters, like other citizens, respond to relevant questions

put to them in the course of a valid grand jury investigation or criminal trial.” Id. at 690–91; see

also Zerilli, 656 F.2d at 711 (“The Court justified this decision by pointing to the traditional

importance of grand juries and the strong public interest in effective criminal investigation.”).

The Commission exercises investigative law enforcement powers akin to those of a

criminal grand jury. Indeed, the Supreme Court has noted that the Commission “has a power of

inquisition . . . . [that] is more analogous to the Grand Jury, which does not depend on a case or

controversy for power to get evidence but can investigate merely on suspicion that the law is

being violated.” Morton Salt, 338 U.S. at 642–43; see also In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 486

F.2d 85, 90 (3d Cir. 1973) (“Grand jury subpoenas then, when they are brought before the

See In re Request from U.K. Pursuant to Treaty Between Gov’t of U.S. and Gov’t of U.K. on Mutual Assistance in

Criminal Matters in the Matter of Dolours Price, 685 F.3d 1, 17 n.23 (1st Cir. 2012) (“[T]here is a circuit split on

whether under Branzburg [v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972)] there can ever be a reporter’s privilege of constitutional

or common law dimensions.”); In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 438 F.3d 1141, 1145–49 (D.C. Cir. 2006)

(rejecting existence of constitutional reporter’s privilege in grand jury proceedings); cf. Chen v. FBI, 153 F.4th 1289,

1295 (D.C. Cir. 2025) (declining to recognize a federal common law newsgathering privilege).

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federal courts for enforcement, for all practical purposes are exactly analogous to subpoenas

issued by a federal administrative agency on the authority of a statute, without any prior judicial

control.”). As such, when the Commission acts in its law enforcement capacity, as it does here,

the public interest in the ability to thoroughly gather evidence outweighs any qualified First

Amendment privilege.

NewsGuard’s Burden

NewsGuard also fails to meet its burden to show that the material sought by the CID

qualifies for the journalist’s privilege as recognized by some courts. First, NewsGuard broadly

claims that the CID’s “requests regarding NewsGuard’s deliberative process and procedures for

formulating ratings” are “intrusive” and reflect a “‘fishing expedition.’” Petition, at 16–17

(quoting Media Matters, 805 F. Supp. 3d at 130). But these general, unsupported statements do

not provide “competent evidence” demonstrating where NewsGuard obtained the information in

question and whether the organization intended to disseminate the information to the public at

the time it received it. von Bulow, 811 F.2d at 144. Such “blanket assertions” of privilege, id. at

147, are insufficient under both von Bulow and the Commission’s Rules of Practice. To properly

assert a “claim of protected status” in response to the CID, NewsGuard needed to “include a

detailed log of the items withheld . . . of sufficient detail to enable the Commission staff to assess

the validity of the claim for each document . . . . The failure to provide information sufficient to

support a claim of protected status may result in a denial of the claim.” 16 C.F.R. § 2.11(a)(1).

NewsGuard submitted no such privilege log here, nor did it otherwise identify any purportedly

privileged documents. Its privilege claim can be denied on that basis alone.

Second, NewsGuard’s argument conflates its commercial and journalistic activities. To

the extent a First Amendment newsgathering privilege exists, it applies only where there is an

intent to disseminate information to the public, which is at the heart of the “paramount public

interest in . . . an[] independent press capable of participating in robust, unfettered debate.” von

Bulow, 811 F.2d at 144 (cleaned up). By contrast, NewsGuard appears to have licensed its

ratings products only to “advertisers” and “individual NewsGuard subscribers” (not the public),

for a fee, via terms spelled out in private licensing agreements. See supra Part I; Petition, at 2.

Those clients and subscribers were under no obligation to disseminate the materials they

received from NewsGuard to the general public or otherwise put them to public use. These

circumstances describe garden-variety commercial-intelligence or consulting arrangements, not

journalism. Licensing a commercial product for a fee to select commercial purchasers via private

contract is not “disseminat[ing] information to the public,” von Bulow, 811 F.2d at 147, which is

required for First Amendment protection. See also Am. Sav. Bank, FSB v. USB PaineWebber,

Inc., No. M8-85, 2002 WL 31833223, at *2–3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 2002) (denying motion to

quash subpoena to credit rating agency that performed fee-based ratings subject to private

contractual agreements, since circulating information only to private counterparties was not

newsgathering and did not qualify for First Amendment privilege). If it were, business

consultants who gather information about a market or firm and give that information to a client

in exchange for a fee could claim the putative journalist’s privilege to avoid investigation into

their business practices. No matter the status of the claims journalist’s privilege, it would never

extend to such ordinary business activities.

Accordingly, assuming the First Amendment journalist’s privilege exists, we reject its

application to this CID.

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First Amendment Associational Rights

NewsGuard next argues that the CID violates its First Amendment associational rights by

demanding that it identify its customers and produce communications with those customers.

Petition, at 17.

NewsGuard cites Americans for Prosperity Foundation v. Bonta, 594 U.S. 595, 609

(2021), for the proposition that “before requiring that organizations reveal sensitive information

about their members and supporters,” the government must satisfy “exacting scrutiny.” Petition,

at 17. But that case is inapposite. There is a difference between a non-profit group’s members or

the donors at issue in Bonta—who take part in, or donate to, a group without expecting a

commercial return—and the customers of a for-profit commercial enterprise with whom the

enterprise has a commercial, transactional relationship. This distinction is crucial for purposes of

the First Amendment, under which commercial speech generally receives less protection than

political or expressive speech. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n of N.Y.,

447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980). In accordance with this principle, courts hold that “[p]roducing a

customer list does not offend the First Amendment because commercial transactions do not

entail the same rights of association as political meetings.” United States v. Bell, 414 F.3d 474,

485 (3d Cir. 2005); see also United States v. Benson, 561 F.3d 718, 727 (7th Cir. 2009) (holding

compelled disclosure of customer list did not violate the First Amendment because defendant

operated a commercial enterprise, “not a membership organization”); Edmondson v. RCI Hosp.

Holdings, Inc., No. 16-CV-2242 (VEC), 2018 WL 2768643, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 8, 2018)

(holding disclosure of customer identities unprotected by First Amendment associational

privilege). Here, NewsGuard makes money by selling subscriptions and licensing access to its

ratings databases to customers—a classic commercial exchange that places its customer lists

outside of First Amendment protection.

NewsGuard further asserts that it is “a journalistic organization with a First Amendment

right to associate with its customers to engage in the free exchange of ideas protected by the

Constitution.” Petition, at 18 (citing NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460

(1958)). Yet courts reject the existence of any such right between an organization and its

customers. A First Amendment right of association “generally will not apply, for example, to

business relationships.” Sanitation & Recycling Indus., Inc. v. City of N.Y., 107 F.3d 985, 996

(2d Cir. 1997) (citing Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 620 (1984)); see also Calm

Ventures LLC v. Newsom, 548 F. Supp. 3d 966, 975 (C.D. Cal. 2021) (“Plaintiff and its

customers do not associate for the purpose of engaging in those activities protected by the First

Amendment.”) (quotation omitted); Amato v. Elicker, 534 F. Supp. 3d 196, 209 (D. Conn. 2021)

(claim of infringement on right to associate with customers “falls outside First Amendment

associational protection”). Here, again, NewsGuard has a commercial relationship with the

subscribers who pay for access to its products. Thus, the associational interests at issue in

NAACP—which reversed the compelled disclosure of a political advocacy group’s membership

lists, 357 U.S. at 460, 462—do not apply.

Fourth Amendment Search

Lastly, NewsGuard argues that the CID violates the Fourth Amendment because it is

impermissibly “expansive” and an unreasonable intrusion into NewsGuard’s business affairs,

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especially given the alleged First Amendment issues discussed above. Petition, at 14. This

argument also lacks merit.

We begin with NewsGuard’s assertion that “[t]he Fourth Amendment imposes substantial

restrictions on the reach of administrative subpoenas,” which it attributes to the Supreme Court’s

decision in Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946). Petition, at 14.

NewsGuard misinterprets the Supreme Court’s holding. The Court concluded that the Fourth

Amendment permits administrative agencies to make broad demands for information so long as

(1) the agency is authorized by law to conduct the investigation, and (2) the materials sought are

relevant to the investigation. Okla. Press, 327 U.S. at 208–09 (holding that agency process does

not violate the Fourth Amendment where “the investigation is authorized by Congress, is for a

purpose Congress can order, and the documents sought are relevant to the inquiry”). The Court

noted that any information request should not be “unreasonable,” by which it meant “too much

indefiniteness or breadth.” Id. at 208; see also In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 829 F.2d 1291, 1298

(4th Cir. 1987) (“The critical inquiry, assuming that the hurdle of relevancy has been cleared, is

whether there is too much indefiniteness or breadth in the things required to be produced by the

subpoena.”). The Court reiterated this conclusion in Morton Salt as to the Commission

specifically, noting that Commission process is appropriate so long as “the inquiry is within the

authority of the agency, the demand is not too indefinite and the information sought is reasonably

relevant.” 338 U.S. at 652.22

Lower courts have applied these principles to evaluate the burden posed by Commissionissued process. In Texaco, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

considered a challenge to the scope of a Commission subpoena. The court found that a

Commission information request is too “indefinite” only where it is “unduly burdensome or

unreasonably broad,” as “[s]ome burden on subpoenaed parties is to be expected and is

necessary in furtherance of the agency’s legitimate inquiry and the public interest.” 555 F.2d at

882 (emphasis added); see also Genuine Parts Co. v. FTC, 445 F.2d 1382, 1391 (5th Cir. 1971)

(“extreme breadth . . . must be accorded the Commission in conducting such an investigation”);

Adams v. FTC, 296 F.2d 861, 867 (8th Cir. 1961) (“[B]roadness alone is not sufficient

justification to refuse enforcement of a subpoena so long as the material sought is relevant.”).

Thus, courts will only modify CIDs if the recipient has demonstrated that compliance “threatens

to unduly disrupt or seriously hinder normal operations of a business.” Texaco, 555 F.2d at 882.

A Commission CID therefore does not violate the Fourth Amendment where (1) the

Commission’s inquiry is in furtherance of its statutorily authorized function, (2) the materials

sought are relevant to that inquiry, and (3) the request is not unduly burdensome or unreasonably

broad. NewsGuard has not demonstrated that the CID here fails in any of these respects. First,

the Commission issued the CID pursuant to its statutory authority to obtain information relating

to an antitrust investigation. See 15 U.S.C. § 57b-1(c)(1). NewsGuard’s petition does not argue

(nor could it) that the Commission lacks antitrust investigative authority or the ability to issue

CIDs as part of an antitrust investigation. Second, the information sought by the CID is relevant

The Court further noted that Fourth Amendment considerations weigh less heavily for businesses than for

individuals, as “[t]he Federal Government allows [businesses] the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce” and

“[f]avors from [the] government often carry with them an enhanced measure of regulation.” 338 U.S. at 652. “Even

if one were to regard the request for information in this case as caused by nothing more than official curiosity,

nevertheless law-enforcing agencies have a legitimate right to satisfy themselves that corporate behavior is

consistent with the law and the public interest.” Id.

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to the Commission’s antitrust investigation. Indeed, NewsGuard’s petition identifies only two

specifications (relating to NewsGuard’s financial information) that it claims are beyond the

scope of the investigation. Petition, at 13. Yet even these specifications are clearly relevant, as

they would show any payments that NewsGuard received as part of an agreement that may have

violated the antitrust laws. In any event, as NewsGuard’s petition admits, staff has already

confirmed that NewsGuard has satisfied its obligations as to these specifications. See id. at 13

n.14. Third, the request is not unduly burdensome or unreasonably broad, as NewsGuard has not

provided any evidence that complying with the CID would “unduly disrupt or seriously hinder

normal [business] operations.” NewsGuard’s argument that the CID is broad or that the

information sought is “sensitive” does not establish a basis to quash the CID, let alone

demonstrate a Fourth Amendment violation, especially given staff’s extensive, good faith efforts

to narrow the CID.23

III.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, NewsGuard’s petition to quash is denied.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT NewsGuard’s Petition to Quash the May 20, 2025,

Civil Investigative Demand be, and hereby is, DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT NewsGuard shall comply in full with the

Commission’s Civil Investigative Demand no later than April 9, 2026, or at such other date,

time, and location as the Commission staff may determine.

By the Commission, Commissioner Meador recused.

April J. Tabor

Secretary

SEAL:

ISSUED: March 6, 2026

This analysis remains unchanged even assuming that NewsGuard has First Amendment interests implicated by the

CID. While NewsGuard is correct that the Supreme Court has noted that Fourth Amendment requirements should be

applied with “exactitude” when First Amendment interests are involved, Petition, at 15, the Court clarified that this

does not require “special showings” by the government so long as the information request is reasonable and issued

pursuant to appropriate process and authority. See Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 565 (1978). Thus,

contrary to NewsGuard’s implication, any First Amendment considerations here do not create a heightened standard

under the Fourth Amendment.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.