UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (2026)

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PUBLIC

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION

OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES

__________________________________________

)

Eusebio Juarez-Rufino,

)

Appellant.

)

__________________________________________)

In the Matter of

Docket No. 9444

ORDER ON REMAND FROM THE COMMISSION

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS ...................................................................................... i

TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS .......................................................................... ii

Summary of the Facts.................................................................................. 1

II. The ALJ Review Proceeding and Mr. Juarez’s Petition for

Commission Review. .................................................................................... 3

III. The Commission’s Serpe Decision and my Subsequent Order

in Scott.......................................................................................................... 5

IV. Considerations on Remand from the Commission. .................................... 8

A. Overview of the Law. ............................................................................. 8

B. Remand to the Arbitrator is Unwarranted......................................... 10

Conclusion. ................................................................................................. 17

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TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS

General

ADMC – Anti-Doping and Medication Control (Rule Series 3000)

Authority – Horseracing Integrity and Safety Authority

HISA – Horseracing Integrity and Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 3051-60

HIWU – Horseracing Integrity & Welfare Unit

Review Proceeding

AB – Appeal Book

AuOBr. – Authority’s Opening Brief

AuPCOL – Authority’s Proposed Conclusions of Law

AuPO – Authority’s Proposed Order

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Summary of the Facts.

In 2025, the Horseracing Integrity and Welfare Unit (“HIWU”) searched

the SUV owned by appellant Eusebio Juarez-Rufino, a thoroughbred racehorse

trainer, at Oaklawn Park Racetrack in Hot Springs, Arkansas. The search

disclosed two filled hypodermic syringes, which laboratory analysis later

determined contained diisopropylamine (“dipa”). Dipa is a Banned Substance

under the Anti-Doping and Medication Control (“ADMC”) Rules, issued to

implement the federal Horseracing Integrity and Safety Act. 1

HIWU charged Mr. Juarez with violating Rule 3214(a), which prohibits

“Possession of a Banned Substance . . . unless there is compelling justification

for such Possession.” The Rule imposes strict liability, regardless of knowledge

or intent, absent circumstances not present here. 2 As sanctions, HIWU sought

the 24- month default period of Ineligibility and maximum discretionary fine of

$25,000 “for a first-time Violation of ADMC Program Rule 3214(a). . . .” 3

Mr. Juarez did not assert a “compelling justification” defense, but

sought instead to excuse or mitigate the violation by asserting that the auto

1 88 Fed. Reg. 5135 (Jan. 26, 2023); 15 U.S.C. §§ 3051-60. Capitalized terms used, but not

defined in this Order, are those defined in Rule 1020. Other abbreviations are set forth in the

Table of Abbreviations.

See also, e.g., Matter of Shell, No. 9439, 2025 WL 1784696, at *11,

n.16 (FTC ALJ Mar. 6, 2025): HIWU v. Poole, JAMS Case No. 1501000576, at ¶¶ 7.7-.8 (Aug.

8, 2023), aff’d sub nom. Matter of Poole, No. 9417, 2023 WL 8435860 (FTC ALJ Nov. 13, 2023).

2 Rule 1020 (definition).

3 AB 124 (Charge letter).

See Rule 3223(b) (prescribing sanctions).

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mechanic who recently had serviced his SUV, Luis Terrazas, had put the two

syringes in the vehicle and failed to tell Mr. Juarez about them.

An arbitration was convened to resolve HIWU’s Possession charge.

Shortly before the evidentiary hearing, the Arbitrator ruled that Mr. Juarez

had failed to timely identify Mr. Terrazas as a witness. The Arbitrator

therefore declined to permit him to testify. After hearing testimony from

Mr. Juarez and other witnesses, and receiving documentary evidence, the

Arbitrator held that HIWU proved its Possession charge.

In addition, the Arbitrator ruled on Mr. Juarez’s defense that sanctions

should be reduced, but not eliminated, because there was No Significant Fault

or Negligence (“NSF”) on his part. 4 The Arbitrator determined that

Mr. Juarez’s fault was “considerable” and that he therefore “should suffer a

period of Ineligibility at the highest end of the range, 24 months,” prescribed

under Rule 3223for a first time Possession violation. 5 Accordingly, the

Arbitrator awarded the following sanctions against Mr. Juarez:

1. A two-year period of Ineligibility.

2. A fine of $10,000, reduced from the discretionary $25,000

maximum, inasmuch as, the Arbitrator found, there was no evidence

See Rule 3225.

, at ¶¶ 7.19, 7.20, 7.22 (Corrected Final Decision). See generally id. 658, at ¶¶ 7.15-.17

(discussing the NSF analysis).

5 AB 659

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Mr. Juarez intended wrongdoing or gained any benefit from Possession

of the dipa.

3. A contribution of $8,000 toward HIWU’s share of the

arbitration costs. 6

II.

The ALJ Review Proceeding and Mr. Juarez’s Petition for Commission

Review.

Mr. Juarez sought review of the Arbitrator’s decision and the sanctions

imposed, arguing that I should direct an evidentiary hearing on the review

because the Arbitrator erred by excluding Mr. Terrazas, “a necessary defense

witness.” 7 I granted that request and also stayed sanctions pending the

review. 8 Mr. Terrazas subsequently testified at an evidentiary hearing held in

February 2026. Thereafter, the parties briefed the merits of the review.

In arguing the merits, the Authority maintained that ‘[t]he Arbitrator’s

assessment of Fault was correct and the Consequences [that is, sanctions] he

imposed should be affirmed.” 9 Indeed, the Authority also asserted that there

was “reason to increase [Mr. Juarez’s] period of Ineligibility and total fine

based upon the unconvincing and fraudulent nature of the evidence introduced

by [him] before both the Arbitral Body and this tribunal.” 10 Mr. Juarez, the

Id. 659-61, at ¶¶ 7.23-.29, 8.1.

7 Amended Petition for Review at 2.

Matter of Juarez-Rufino, No. 9444, 2025 FTC Lexis 122 (ALJ Dec. 2, 2025). See FTC Rule

1.146(b)(1) & (c)(2) (authorizing receipt of additional evidence on review).

9 AuPCOL ¶ 5.

10 AuOBr. at 23 (emphasis in original).

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Authority argued, had “manufacture[d] . . . a concocted story” to defend the

Possession charge against him. 11 This conduct, the Authority maintained,

triggered the Aggravating Circumstances provisions of ADMC Rule 3227(a),

thus warranting increased Ineligibility of at least another year period and a

$5,000 fine increase above the $10,000 awarded. 12

Based on the record—which consisted of both the evidence from the

arbitration and the evidentiary hearing on review—I upheld Mr. Juarez’s

liability for Possession of dipa. Further, upon reviewing the evidence, I

concluded that Mr. Juarez’s account of the facts was “unworthy of belief.” 13

Thus, I affirmed the Arbitrator’s sanctions award, except for the fine of

$10,000, which I increased to $25,000, the maximum amount authorized by

Rule 3223(c).

However, I rejected the Authority’s request to increase the sanctions

based on Aggravating Circumstances. Despite my finding that Mr. Juarez’s

account of the facts was fabricated, and despite extensive case law recognizing

See also AuOBr. at 21 (“Mr. Terrazas was tapped by [Mr. Juarez] to prop up a

concocted Story . . . so Appellant could hide his level of Fault for the Possession ADRV.”);

Matter of Juarez-Rufino, No. 9444, 2026 WL 1456140, at *25 (Apr. 28, 2026).

11 AuPCOL ¶ 6.

See generally AuOBr. at 17-24; AuPCOL ¶ 6 & AuPO ¶ 7. Rule 1020 (definition of

Aggravating Circumstances); Lewis-Parry v. USADA at ¶ 114 (Dec. 4, 2020), https://www.

usada.org/wp-content/uploads/Chi-Lewis-Parry-Decision.pdf. Cf. United States v. Andersen, 45

F.3d 217, 220 (7th Cir. 1995) (Because “[t]he FDA represents the public,” “a deliberate attempt

to mislead the FDA” provided grounds for an upward sentencing enhancement).

Juarez-Rufino, 2026 WL 1456140, at *3. See also id. at *25 (“Mr. Juarez sought to muddy the

waters from first to last both prior to and during this Arbitration by provision of false

evidence.”) (internal quotation marks and footnote omitted).

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such conduct as constituting Aggravating Circumstances, two considerations,

in my view, warranted denying such relief. First, because HIWU had, for the

most part, not sought Aggravating Circumstances before the Arbitrator, there

was no showing that such Circumstances had been “establish[ed],” as Rule

3227(a) requires. Second, I applied FTC Rule 1.146(a)(1) to preclude the

Authority from raising on review an issue not asserted before the Arbitrator. 14

Mr. Juarez sought Federal Trade Commission review of my decision.

Among other grounds, he asserted that “the sanctions imposed are excessive in

light of the evidence actually presented,” and thus were “arbitrary and

disproportionate.” 15 In response, the Authority asserted that “[n]one of the

alleged errors raised by Appellant warrant review by the Commission.” 16 With

respect to my sanctions determination, the Authority quoted parts of my

decision and wrote: “The ALJ’s Decision properly addressed how he arrived at

his finding regarding Appellant’s Fault and the assessed Consequences. . . .” 17

III.

The Commission’s Serpe Decision and my Subsequent Order in Scott.

While Mr. Juarez’s application for Commission review was pending, the

Commission issued its decision in Matter of Serpe. 18 The Commission held

Id. at *26.

15 Respondent’s Notice of Appeal, No. 9444, 2026 WL 1633290, at *2 (May 28, 2026).

16 The Authority’s Response to Appellant’s Application for Review, No. 9444, 2026 WL

1678524, at *1 (June 5, 2026).

Id. at 3.

18 No. 9441, 2026 WL 1906387 (FTC June 30, 2026).

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that, where—as in Serpe—“the Authority decline[d] to impose a fine,” I “was

not authorized to impose a civil penalty” under the review authority conferred

in HISA cases. 19 As the Commission further emphasized, “Mr. Serpe and the

Authority were in agreement: the ALJ cannot impose a fine sua sponte.” 20 The

word “modify” in the ALJ’s review authority, the Commission found, did not

authorize “add[ing] a species of sanction that the Authority declined to impose.

. . .” 21 The underpinnings of Serpe were: (1) the party-presentation principle,

which instructs that, “when it comes to what is best for each party in

litigation, courts assume that the parties know best and decide the case

accordingly” 22; and (2) the “longstanding” cross-appeal rule, which precludes

“altering a judgment to benefit a nonappealing party.” 23

After the Commission’s Serpe decision, I issued an Order in Matter of

Scott, 24 where the charged veterinarian had raised the question whether I had

jurisdiction to consider the Authority’s position: (1) that the arbitrator’s

sanctions in that case included errors of law that rendered them too lenient;

and (2) that I should, accordingly, correct the errors by increasing the

sanctions. As I will discuss further below, I held that the facts in Scott were

Id. at *1, *8.

Id. at *8.

Id. at *10.

Id. (footnote omitted).

Id. at *11 (footnote omitted) (cleaned up).

See generally, No. 9449, 2026 WL 2111924 (FTC ALJ July 16, 2026).

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distinguishable from those in Serpe and that jurisdiction existed. I therefore

reserved, for resolution in my merits decision, the sanctions issues that the

Authority had raised and the appropriate relief that I could award. 25

Thereafter, the Commission issued its remand Order here, 26 providing,

in pertinent part as follows:

[In Serpe], we held that “the ALJ may grant only the relief requested by

the applicant for review . . . absent the extraordinary circumstances that

Article III courts have recognized necessary to justify departure from

th[e] longstanding rule” “against ‘alter[ing] a judgment to benefit a

nonappealing party.’” In re Philip Serpe, D.9441, 2026 WL 1906387, at

*11 (F.T.C. June 30, 2026).

Because that decision may bear on the issues presented in Mr. JuarezRufino’s petition, we grant his petition, vacate the ALJ’s April 28, 2026,

decision, and remand this matter to the ALJ for further consideration

consistent with our decision in Serpe.

The upward sanctions adjustment here was my increase in the fine from

$10,000 to $25,000. I made no change to the 24-month Ineligibility the

Arbitrator awarded.

I then issued an Order granting the parties leave to submit “their views

on how the Commission’s Serpe decision and my subsequent Scott Order may

affect the relief ordered on this review.” 27 The Authority has since filed its

brief, while Mr. Juarez has not availed himself of the opportunity to do so.

Id. at *2.

Matter of Juarez-Rufino, No. 9444, 2026 WL 2150295 (FTC July 22, 2026).

27 Order Granting Leave to Submit Briefs on Remand at 1 (July 24, 2026), https://www.ftc.gov/

system/files/ftc_gov/pdf/615959.2026.07.24_order_granting_leave_to_submit_briefs_on_remand

.pdf.

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The Authority recognizes that, unlike the award in Serpe, my upward

adjustment of the fine against Mr. Juarez “did not add a species of sanction not

requested by the Authority,” but “was premised on the notion of

‘commensurate’ penalties,” a default principle that the Arbitrator failed to

apply. 28 The Authority further noted my assessment that the evidence

Mr. Juarez introduced was “more likely than not false” and was “offered in an

effort to influence the fact-finding process. . . .” 29 The Authority, however,

urged a remand “so a financial penalty can be assessed consistent with the

ALJ’s determinations.” 30

IV.

Considerations on Remand from the Commission.

Overview of the Law.

My post-Serpe Order in the Scott case relied on numerous Article III

Court decisions that have construed SEC and CFTC Rules identical in all

material respects to those in HISA Section 3058(b)(3)(A) and FTC Practice

Rule 1.147(c)(5)(ii)(A) & (B). 31 Courts of Appeals have upheld upward

sanctions adjustment not only where the issues were framed by the parties in

the proceeding under review—typically before an agency ALJ—but also where

28 The Authority’s Legal Brief on Remand, No. 9444, 2026 WL 2295478 at *3-4 (Aug. 5, 2026).

Id. at 8 (quoting Juarez-Rufino, 2026 WL 1906387, at *24).

Id. at 8.

See Scott, 2026 WL 2111924, at *4-6 & 7 (comparing the provisions). See also

Administrative Law Judge Decision on Application for Review, Matter of Scott, No. 9449, at

108-13 (Aug. 31, 2026) (“Scott Decision”), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/ftc_gov/pdf/

616193.2026.08.31_administrative_law_judge_decision_on_application_for_review_0.pdf.

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the reviewing body—either the SEC or CFTC—imposed a form of sanction not

requested by enforcement counsel or not directed by the ALJ. 32 Thus, the

review posture is analogous to that here, where: (1) the ALJ is the reviewing

body and the Arbitrator is the initial decision-maker; and (2) the ALJ’s review

authority is substantively identical to that of the SEC and CFTC.

For example, the CFTC’s de novo review authority empowers it to

“affirm, reverse, modify, set aside or remand for further proceedings, in whole

or in part, the initial decision by the Administrative Law Judge and make any

findings or conclusions which in its judgment are proper based on the record in

the proceeding.” 33 As the Seventh Circuit wrote in Vercillo v. CFTC, 34 in

reviewing an ALJ decision the CFTC “exercis[es] its own independent review,”

which is “not . . . limited by the choices made by the ALJ,” but rather is

See Scott, 2026 WL 2111924, at *5 & n.45 (citing [1] Gonnella v. SEC, 954 F.3d 536, 551 (2d

Cir. 2020) (Enforcement counsel “did not specifically request” the bar order that the SEC

imposed); [2] Matter of Valicenti Advisory Servs., Inc., No. 3-8854, 1997 WL 362000, at *21

(SEC ALJ July 2, 1997) (imposing censure as the sanction, while rejecting registration

revocation, a cease and desist order, and penalties), modified, 1998 SEC Lexis 2497, at *18-19

(Nov. 18, 1998) (directing, in addition, a cease and desist order, fines, and mailing of the SEC’s

order to the Respondent’s clients), aff’d, 198 F.3d 62, 64, 66-67 (2d Cir. 1999); [3] JCC, Inc. v.

CFTC, 63 F.3d 1557, 1564 (11th Cir. 1995) (the CFTC revoked the trader’s floor registration

after the ALJ declined to do so); [4] Lawrence v. CFTC, 759 F.2d 767, 770-71 (9th Cir. 1985)

(the CFTC suspended registration although the ALJ had not done so); and [5] Silverman v.

CFTC, 562 F.2d 432, 437, 438-39 (7th Cir. 1977) (the CFTC revoked the trader’s registration

after the ALJ declined to do so)). See also Fink v. SEC, 417 F.2d 1058, 1059-60 (2d Cir. 1969)

(affirming the SEC’s increase of the hearing examiner’s two-month suspension to a lifetime

ban).

See Scott, 2026 WL 2111924, at *6-7.

34 147 F.3d 548, 553-54 (7th Cir. 1998) (characterizing the CFTC’s explanation of its authority

as “well-reasoned” and “not arbitrary”).

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“consistent with the Commission's ultimate responsibility to determine the

appropriate sanction in each case that comes before it.”

Case law also provides guidance on when the ALJ, in reviewing an

arbitrator’s decision in a HISA case, may appropriately set aside a sanction

and remand to the arbitrator for further consideration, rather than increase

(or otherwise modify) the sanction in furtherance of the ALJ’s de novo review

authority. Briefly, where the arbitration record is sufficient to enable the ALJ

to exercise its own statutorily-conferred independent judgment, a remand is

unnecessary. On the other hand, where a gap in the arbitration record renders

the ALJ incapable of exercising informed judgment, it is appropriate to set

aside the decision and remand. 35

I turn, then, to whether to remand here.

Remand to the Arbitrator is Unwarranted.

Unlike Serpe—but like Scott—the case does not involve importing into

my merits ruling a “species” of sanction that the parties did not introduce in

the arbitration. At the same time, however, Mr. Juarez’s case is not identical

on the facts to Scott.

First, in Scott, HIWU and the Authority on review consistently sought

the maximum discretionary fine of $25,000. Here, although HIWU sought a

See generally Scott Decision, n. 31 above, at 110-13 (discussing and citing case law).

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$25,000 fine in the arbitration, the Arbitrator awarded only $10,000, and on

review the Authority did not seek to increase the awarded amount. 36

Second, unlike Scott, here an evidentiary hearing was held on review,

and the record on the review was, therefore, fuller than that available to the

Arbitrator when he decided his sanctions award against Mr. Juarez.

Third, here the Authority argued that Mr. Juarez’s version of the facts

was concocted, and it thus sought increased sanctions for Aggravating

Circumstances. I denied the request even though I concurred in the

Authority’s assessment of fabrication. 37

Despite these fact wrinkles, the “species” of sanction and party

presentation considerations, central to Serpe, do not apply here. Thus, the case

law set out in my Scott Order is instructive. After determining that

Mr. Juarez’s proffered defense was a fabrication, I increased the Arbitrator’s

fine to $25,000—an increase that both Article III Court decisions and ADMC

Rule 3223(b) authorize.

The Authority suggests a remand, however, “for a determination of

financial penalties consistent with the ALJ’s evidentiary determinations. The

remand should further account for the ALJ’s explanation of ‘commensurate’

penalties, i.e., the penalties that should have been applied based upon the

See AB 98 (EAD Notice), 124 (Charge letter), 88 (HIWU Prehearing Brief); AuPCOL ¶ 5;

AuPO ¶ 5.

See pp. 4-5, above.

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Arbitrator’s determination that Appellant’s Fault was subjectively and

objectively considerable.” 38 As noted above, the Arbitrator found—on a factual

analysis that did not include Mr. Terrazas’ testimony—that he “ha[d] no choice

[under the NSF Rule] but to find that [Mr. Juarez] should suffer a period of

Ineligibility at the highest end of the range, 24 months. . . .” 39 The Arbitrator’s

NSF analysis also included a finding that Mr. Juarez’s explanation for the two

syringes found—that Mr. Terrazas “must have left [them] . . .while performing

maintenance on the vehicle”—was “both unsubstantiated and not credible.” 40

In my merits Decision, I agreed.

After Mr. Terrazas testified on this review, my “evidentiary

determination” of his testimony included the following:

Mr. Terrazas’s inability to testify credibly on matters--whether big or

small--is a telltale sign of fabrication. His lack of credibility infects

Mr. Juarez’s own defense to HIWU’s charge. As I wrote in deciding to

hear Mr. Terrazas’s testimony: “Mr. Juarez ha[s] no other explanation

for what HIWU found. . . . [T]he evidence from Mr. Terrazas [is] the

centerpiece to [his] entire case.” The evidentiary hearing showed that

the “centerpiece” is simply a mirage.

Mr. Terrazas and Mr. Juarez have been friends for at least four years.

Unlike Mr. Juarez, Mr. Terrazas has no involvement in the racing

industry. Since raising roosters is legal in Arkansas, it is unlikely that

Mr. Terrazas would get into trouble by claiming to hav[e] two syringes

38 The Authority’s Legal Brief on Remand, 2026 WL 2295478 at *3-4.

39 AB 659, at ¶ 7.22 (Corrected Final Decision).

Id., at ¶ 7.18.b.

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to be used to treat injured roosters he raised. By contrast, Mr. Juarez

faced serious consequences as a result of having syringes containing a

Banned Substance at Oaklawn Park racetrack. From all the evidence

introduced, the reasonable inference is that, once HIWU discovered

Mr. Juarez in Possession of the dipa-filled syringes, Mr. Juarez called

Mr. Terrazas so that the two could cook up a far-fetched explanation for

the presence of the two syringes with dipa in Mr. Juarez’s SUV.

Mr. Terrazas would, in effect, “take the fall.” This was one friend doing

another a favor. 41

My additional comment is particularly salient:

If, as I have concluded, Mr. Juarez's innocuous account is untrue, it may

fairly be inferred that the dipa in the seized syringes was intended for a

different—likely prohibited—use.

In Datunashvili v. UWW, the athlete introduced into evidence a video

that was proven, and then admitted, to be false. The Panel’s observation

is apropos: “Innocent athletes simply do not create video reproductions of

events and hold them out as true representations of contemporaneous

events until challenged under cross-examination.” They similarly do not

enlist a friend to fabricate a story and offer it as a defense until exposed

on cross-examination. 42

Juarez-Rufino, 2026 WL 1456140 at *20 (footnotes omitted).

Id. at *21 (footnotes omitted). See also United States v. Bieganowski, 313 F.3d 264, 278 (5th

Cir. 2002) (“[A]lthough no individual piece of evidence . . . is dispositive, taken together the

evidence as a whole suffices to establish an adequately clear picture” of what transpired);

WADA v. ICF, CAS 2021/A/7838, at ¶ 118 (June 9, 2022) (“It is in the nature of circumstantial

evidence that single items of evidence may each be capable of an innocent explanation but,

taken together, establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt.”) (internal quotation marks and

italics omitted; citing authorities); IAAF v. Qatar Athletics Federation, CAS 2018/A/5989, at

¶ 243 (Dec. 12, 2019) (“[C]omparable to a puzzle—there are abundant tiny pieces of reliable

and corroborated evidence and information that,” along with the athlete’s “contradictory,

evasive or incoherent” submissions, “add up to a clear picture” of the athlete’s possession of

Prohibited Substances.).

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My merits decision also discussed the Arbitrator’s award of a $10,000

fine instead of the discretionary maximum of $25,000, which seemed to me

commensurate with the Arbitrator’s own Ineligibility ruling that he “ha[d] no

choice” but to award the 24-month maximum. 43 The Arbitrator, however,

explained the reduced fine based on his determination that “there was no

indication of any intention or wrongdoing by [Mr. Juarez] other than the

Possession itself, and no indication of any benefit gained by [Mr. Juarez] or

any of his horses from the facts underlying the Possession violation (e.g., there

was no evidence of administration or other forms of Anti-Doping rule

violations or that any results were affected).” 44

I considered the Arbitrator’s explanation, noting that the more fulsome

record available to me was impactful:

My review here is de novo and based on the full record, including the

testimony of Mr. Terrazas, which the Arbitrator did not have. I find no

basis for reducing the fine from the $25,000 maximum. The Possession

prohibition in Rule 3214(a) is a strict liability violation. Intent and

See generally HIWU v. Duree, JAMS Case No.

1501001213, at ¶¶ 7.23 & 8.a (June 28, 2026) (“Having placed Mr. Duree’s fault at the highest

end of the [Ineligibility] range . . . the maximum fine of $25,000 is proportionate and

consistent with that assessment.”); HIWU v. Buckner, JAMS Case No. 1501000628, at ¶¶ 7.14,

7.16, 7.18 & 8.1.D & D (Mar. 5, 2024) (applying the fine should “follow the fault” convention

and awarding $25,000 where Ineligibility was 24 months); HIWU v. Wong, JAMS No.

1501000584, at ¶¶ 7.35 & 7.38 (Jan. 29, 2024) (Where the arbitrator did “not believe” at least

some of the trainer’s testimony, and where there were “no mitigating facts,” “a fine of $25,000

[was] appropriate.”), aff’d, No. 9426, 2024 WL 2045673 (FTC ALJ Apr. 22, 2024), review

denied, 2024 WL 4025986 (FTC Aug. 28, 2024); HIWU v. Saldana, JAMS Case No.

1501000587, at ¶ 7.31 (Nov. 22, 2023) (Where there was a “lack of reduction in [the trainer’s

24-month] period of Ineligibility, . . $25,000 is the appropriate fine” for a proven anti-doping

violation) (emphasis omitted).

43 AB 659, at ¶ 7.22 (Corrected Final Decision).

44 AB 660, at ¶ 7.26 (Corrected Final Decision).

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actual or potential benefit are irrelevant as a matter of law except

insofar as either may bear on the NF or NSF analysis. Lack of a bad

intent, or the absence of individual benefit, are simply part of the

“utmost caution” or “totality of the circumstances” analyses that NF [No

Fault or Negligence] or NSF take into account.

Here, the evidence—and my de novo assessment of the veracity of the

evidence Mr. Juarez introduced—weigh so heavily against him that

neither professed lack of intent to cheat or to benefit reduce the

Ineligibility period. Therefore, they do not provide any cognizable offset

against the $25,000 maximum fine. Indeed, if, as I have concluded,

Mr. Juarez has fabricated his defense, then there is indeed wrongdoing,

committed before the Arbitrator and attempted on this review.

Maximum deterrence is appropriate when, as here, evidence that is

more likely than not false is offered in an effort to influence the factfinding process. 45

If the findings in my decision on review do not justify the highest

discretionary maximum fine, what would? 46

For a remand to issue, the case law, summarized earlier, requires a

“gap” in the arbitration record, which impairs the opportunity for informed

decision-making on review. Here, while a gap did exist—the absence of

Juarez-Rufino, 2026 WL 1456140 at **24 (footnotes omitted).

Cf. Matter of Altman, No. 34-63306, 2010 WL 5092725, at *20 (SEC Nov. 10, 2010) (where

an attorney’s actions in an administrative case were “fundamentally repugnant to the

integrity of the Commission’s administrative processes,” the SEC increased the ALJ’s ninemonth suspension from appearing before the Commission to a permanent bar), aff’d, Altman v.

SEC, 666 F.3d 1322, 1329 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (declining to “disturb the Commission’s choice of

sanction unless it is either unwarranted in law or without justification in fact.”) (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted). See also Fink, 417 F.2d at 1059-60 (upholding the

SEC’s increase of the two-month suspension ordered by the hearing officer to a lifetime

industry bar); Hanly v. SEC, 415 F.2d 589, 598-99 & n.22 (2d Cir. 1969) (affirming increased

sanctions where the SEC had determined those “ordered by the hearing examiner . . . were

inadequate to protect the public interest”; citing to other cases in which the SEC had increased

sanctions).

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Mr. Terrazas’ testimony—the evidentiary hearing held as part of the review

filled it.

In Matter of Nikkhah, 47 the ALJ’s restrictive rulings unduly

disadvantaged enforcement counsel and resulted in the CFTC receiving the

ALJ’s decision on a “limited” and “truncated record.” While there was

“insufficient evidence on the record to allow [the CFTC] to make an

independent determination” of the charged party’s ability to pay the fine

imposed, instead of remanding, the CFTC exercised its own rule “to reopen the

record for receipt of further evidence directly to us, and an opportunity to be

heard thereon.” 48

The situation here is comparable. The evidentiary hearing, at which

Mr. Terrazas testified, filled the gap in the arbitration record and enabled the

parties on this review to be heard on a fuller record. I then resolved the review

based on that record, not on the more limited one before the Arbitrator.

In consequence, a remand would put the Arbitrator in an uncommonly

awkward position of: (1) re-evaluating the appropriate fine based on a record

that augments the record that formed the basis for his initial determination;

(2) assessing the weight to give to my finding of Mr. Juarez’s wrongdoing on

the fine amount; and (3) applying the case law favoring a fine commensurate

47 No. 95-13, 2005 WL 723871, at *6 (CFTC Mar. 25, 2005).

Id. at *7 (footnote omitted). See also Nikkhah, 2005 WL 1307719 (CFTC May 31, 2005)

(ordering the initial schedule for the CFTC’s proceeding).

PUBLIC

with a 24-month Ineligibility period that I agreed the Arbitrator appropriately

awarded.

I appreciate the Authority’s suggestion that perhaps the Arbitrator

could be instructed, on a remand, to revisit the fine level “consistent with the

ALJ’s evidentiary determinations.” 49 However, I sense this would require “a

mental gymnastic, beyond not only [the Arbitrator’s] powers, but anyone

else’s.” 50

A remand to the Arbitrator is therefore unwarranted.

Conclusion.

My decision on review addressed the evidence, which included

Mr. Terrazas’s testimony, not before the Arbitrator. I also considered the

Arbitrator’s basis for selecting a $10,000 fine, despite his awarding a 24-month

Ineligibility period, and despite the seriousness of Mr. Juarez’s fabrication. I

held that the Arbitrator’s $10,000 fine was “not in accordance with law”—one

of the grounds recognized for rejecting a sanction under review. 51 Article III

Courts consistently uphold my authority to increase the fine, regardless of the

Juarez-Rufino, No. 9444, 2026 WL 2295487, at *2 (FTC ALJ Aug. 5, 2026).

United States v. Herrera, 51 F.4th 1226, 1268 (10th Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks to

Nash v. United States, 54 F.2d 1006, 1007 (2d Cir. 1932) omitted).

Juarez-Rufino, 2026 WL 1456140 at *25. See also 15 U.S.C. § 3058(b)(2)(A)(iii); FTC Rule

1.146(b)(3).

PUBLIC

Authority’s position on this review. 52 I adhere to my merits ruling as

appropriate on the law and the facts.

I AFFIRM: (1) the Arbitrator’s determination that Mr. Juarez violated

Rule 3214(a); (2) the two-year period of Ineligibility imposed; and (3) the award

of $8,000 in litigation costs. I SET ASIDE the fine of $10,000 and DIRECT that

a fine of $25,000 be imposed.

ORDERED:

Jay L. Himes

Administrative Law Judge

Date: September 4, 2026

See Scott Decision, n. 31 above, at 110 (discussing Reddy v. CFTC, 191 F.3d 109 (2d Cir.

1999), and the underlying CFTC decision); see pp. 8-9 & nn.32 & 46, above.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.